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Ethnic Weapons
We posted a story on the Signs page that David Kelly was involved with ultra secret work at Israel¶s
Institute for Biological Research.

A report on November 15, 1998 by the Sunday Times suggests that this Institute "is working on a
biological weapon that would harm Arabs but not Jews".
Israel planning ¶ethnic¶ bomb as Saddam caves in

The London Times
November 15 1998

ISRAEL is working on a biological weapon that would harm Arabs but not Jews, according to Israeli
military and western intelligence sources. The weapon, targeting victims by ethnic origin, is seen as
Israel¶s response to Iraq¶s threat of chemical and biological attacks.

A scientist there said the task was hugely complicated because both Arabs and Jews are of Semitic
origin. But he added: "They have, however, succeeded in pinpointing a particular characteristic in the
genetic profile of certain Arab communities, particularly the Iraqi people."
It is widely accepted that Israel has the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the region, and it is
assumed that this applies to their stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons. A quick search on the
web turned up a long list of articles on the subject, including the following:
Report: Secret Israeli chemical tests kill 4, wound 25

Arabic News.Com
August 21 1998

Tests carried out by an Israeli secret laboratory recently killed four persons and other 25 have been
reported wounded in NeisZayouna district near Tel Aviv, an Israeli daily reported.

Israel flatly denied the report. "No person has ever been killed in a work accident at the Biological
Institute since its inception 45 years ago," Prime Minister Netanyahu¶s media advisor stated today.
This just happens to be the Institute cited above. And if these deaths were due to field tests, they
wouldn¶t be "work accidents". But it is evidence that something is going on in Israel that could be related
to the development of these types of weapons. There is also this comment from Ariel Sharon, while he
was still Foreign Minister. His attitude hasn¶t changed in the intervening years as his active sabotage of
the so-called "Peace Map" shows.
Report: Israel developing biological weapons targeting Arabs

Regional-Israel, Military, 11/16/1998

Last year the Pentagon warned in a secret report against the possibility of developing biological
elements through genetic engineering to manufacture new weapons of mass destruction.

Within the same context, Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon reiterated that, "Israel reserves its right to
repel any possible Iraqi attack."

At the conclusion of his meeting on Sunday with the US secretary of commerce, Sharon added: "Israel
can defend itself and knows how to prevent being attacked."
A different type of evidence is found in the following written by the webmaster at www.konformist.com
who published a good article on ethnic weapons in 2000 that we will look at later. He is discussing the
reader response to the article:
What is interesting is that, though I received quite a few Emails from the Zionist community, none denied
the accuracy of the story. Instead, they brashly admitted it was true, then added it was necessary
because Israel needed to defend itself from its Arab neighbors. What is most telling is that many letters
included references to Arabs that were derogatory and dehumanizing. That such a destructive
philosophy is accepted by so many uncritically in Israel explains much of the vicious thuggery performed
against the Palestinians over the last four months (not to mention the last 33 years).
These comments are completely in keeping with Sharon¶s, so we can put a high probability that Israel is
developing something along these lines.

The progress on the Human Genome Project now makes it possible to target specific groups of
individuals based upon certain genetic signatures. This is the logical next step in the progression of
biological weapons. These weapons have been around for thousands of years. The Romans used to
dump dead animals into the water supply of their enemies to inflict disease. The American "settlers"
used small pox in blankets to target the Native American populations. The American Native population is
still subjected to this type of attack:
#16 Human Genome Project Opens the Door to Ethnically Specific Bioweapens

In this country, continuing a historic policy toward Native Americans, it has been revealed that the
American Indian Health Service (IHS²funded by the Federal Government, who employ the doctors and
nurses) coerced Native American men and women into forced sterilizations in the early to mid 1970s.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that 3,400 people (mostly women) underwent the
treatment, but their study only covered four of twelve IHS regions for four years.

Activists put the estimate much higher, at 60,000 to 70,000. This, coupled with the suspicion raised by
the hantavirus outbreak in the Four Corners region of Arizona/New Mexico/Colorado/Utah keeps
suspicion and fingers pointed at the federal government and at least some government policies toward
the American Indian population. (Hantavirus is one of many "new" diseases that have come under
suspicion of having their origins in genetic engineering or biowarfare labs.)

As reported in a 1994 Project Censored update, Utah¶s Dugway Proving Groundsbiowarfare research
site was also reopened despite local residents¶ protests over fears that the facility was originally closed
because of safety concerns. Fort Dietrick, the site of the most notorious CIA drug and army biowarfare
research in the United States now houses major research facilities of the National Cancer Institute,
raising issues of conflict (or collusion) or interest.
But with the development of the chemical industry, bio-warfare took a new turn. Greg Bishop, in the
article referred to above, first published at konformist.com, looks at some of the major points:
Ethnic Weapons For Ethnic Cleansing

Greg Bishop
March 2000

[T]his "theoretical possibility" was recognized over 25 years ago, if not before. It was originally brought to
the attention of potential customers with the publication of an article in the Military Review of November
1970.

This journal for command-level military personnel was published by the US Army Command and
General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The feature, entitled "Ethnic Weapons," authored by
Carl A. Larson, outlines the history, desirability, and possibilities of engineered biological pathogens
which would affect only those races which historically have no natural defense against certain "enzyme
inhibitors."

Larson is listed as head of the "Department of Human Genetics at the Institute of Genetics, Lund,
Sweden" as well as a licensed physician. The Hippocratic oath was apparently not administered in
Sweden when Larson received his accreditation.

Larson explains that many of the chemical activities and functions within the human body are caused by
the interactions of enzymes. One of the more significant activities enabled by enzyme chemical
reactions are the contraction and relaxation of muscle tissue. If the activities of these enzymes are
blocked, the victim will be paralyzed, even to the point of death by asphyxiation.

Not coincidentally, the enzyme-blocking action of compounds called organophosphates were discovered
in Germany in the 1930s when experimental insecticides killed the people unlucky enough to have used
them. This discovery led to the mass production of a substance named "Trilon," later used to impressive
effect in the extermination of groups of people the Nazis considered little more than insects. This
substance and others of similar makeup became known as "nerve gas."

A concentration of 40 milligrams per cubic meter can kill in about 10 minutes. Stronger agents were later
developed which can do the job with a single drop on the skin.

[...] Larson is even more explicit in a way that would probably never make it into the mainstream press.
In a passage that would make Doctor Strangelove proud, he muses uncontrollably on the possibilities of
genetically-sensitive chemicals to subdue enemy populations:
"Friendly forces would discriminatingly use incapacitants in entangled situations to give friend and foe a
short period of enforced rest to sort them out. By gentle persuasion, aided by psychochemicals, civilians
in enemy cities could be reeducated. The adversary would use incapacitants to spare those whom he
could use for slaves."
This was published in a serious, staid professional journal read by US military strategists. He concludes
with the statement that "the functions of life [now] lie bare to attack."

According to Charles Piller and Keith Yamamoto in their 1988 book Gene Wars, Larson¶s article was
the first time that the subject of ethnically targeted CBWs was broached publicly, and that in "the
military¶s private circles it was old news." The authors further state that in 1951 the Mechanicsburg, PA
Naval Supply Depot was the site of a classified test using a benign organism delivered to personnel to
mimic the behavior of an actual bioweapon: "

According to documents declassified in the late 1970s, the site was chosen because,
"Within this system there are employed large numbers of laborers, including many Negroes, whose
incapacitation would seriously affect the operation of the supply system."
The black workers in the Depot were supposedly more susceptible to a strain of Valley Fever than were
whites, but instead of using the actual virus, a substitute fungal organism was used. Valley Fever is
more often fatal to blacks than to whites. It was recently revealed that the truth and reconciliation
hearings in South Africa had presented witnesses who testified that scientists working for the apartheid
regime had pursued efforts along similar lines.

Another possible example of field testing of ethnic weapons (or at least an interesting case for study by
those interested in their development) may be the famed "Four Corners" virus, which seems only to
affect Native Americans living in northern New Mexico and Arizona. Most reports identified or compared
the disease to the Hantavirus, which killed victims relatively quickly following the occurrence of a
prolonged fever and fluid which rapidly filled the lungs and asphyxiated the patient. Supposedly
contracted through deer mice droppings, the mystery disease has claimed at least a dozen victims in the
last ten years.

The most recent outbreak occurred this last summer [1999], coming on the heels of El Niño, which the
major news media blamed for the renewed threat. Some area residents believe that the virus may have
been released either accidentally or intentionally from a bioweapons cache at Fort Wingate, an army
facility a few miles east of Gallup. The munitions storage at Wingate is now officially closed.
We learn that the work on such weapons was begun in Nazi Germany. The victims of these weapons
were largely Jews. When Larson published his paper in 1970, "the military¶s private circles it was old
news."Which means it had been discussed for a long time by the US military, most likely with the Nazis
brought into the US after World War II via Operation Paperclip. Tests were carried out as far back as
1951 on Blacks working at the Mechanicsburg, PA Naval Supply Depot. For more information on tests
carried out by the US government against its own citizens, refer to our timeline.

An early form of ethnic specific weapon were the malororants, developed to control crowds (of people
dissenting against the Bush Reich, perhaps?).
Pentagon Tests Ethnically-Targeted Crowd Control Weapons

Sunshine-Project
19 February 2002

Almost sixty years ago, the US developed a nauseating ¶bathroom odor¶ chemical for use as a weapon.
But according to the Army, the old malodorant will not work outside of the US and Western Europe,
because "it was found that people in many areas of the world do not find ¶fecal odor¶ to be offensive,
since they smell it on a regular basis." Therefore, according to the Army, new agents are needed for
overseas missions. These new malodorants are to be specifically adapted for their victims. According to
a 1998 document: "The objective of this work is the development of a comprehensive set of
[malodorants] that can be applied against any population set around the world to influence their
behavior."

The documents describe the Army research procedure. A group of subjects selected "based on a
diversity of geographic origins and cultural heritage" is systematically exposed to candidate malodorants
to develop "culture-response data" based on ethnic categories. That data is aggregated into "odor
response profiles" that suggest the types and quantities of malodorants necessary to "elicit a favorable
behavioral response" (i.e. incapacitation, panic, or flight) when used for crowd control on a particular
ethnic group.

[...] Whether the malodorants work or fail, research on any ethnic weapon raises serious legal questions
and could set a very dangerous precedent. If the Pentagon saw any major legal barriers to ethnic
weapons it would not have approved the malodorant research. The Pentagon¶s conclusion that ethnic
weapons are permissible must be challenged.
As horrible as these weapons are in their practice and in what they reveal about the people developing
them, it was the work on the Human Genome that really opened the door to a new generation of
bioweapons, weapons that could be fine-tuned to one¶s genetic make-up. We have been subjected to
reams of paper and hours of air-time discussing the benefits of genetic research, the ability to target
individual genes to "repair" them. Look at the flip-side:
GE Biological "Ethnic" Weapons Loom on the Horizon

Date: Thu, Jan 21, 1999
By Patricia Reaney
Reuters

The designer weapon works on a similar principle to gene therapy but instead of replacing faulty genes
that don¶t work it exploits genetic variations to target its victims.

For example, micro-organisms could be genetically engineered to attack known receptor sites on the cell
membrane or viruses could be targeted at specific DNA sequences inside cells.
This is the technology that Israel is using. But it did not originate in Israel:
Biowar and the Apartheid Legacy

By SalimMuwakkil, In These Times
June 6, 2003

A two-part story in the Washington Post on April 20 and 21 revealed that biological agents developed by
the South African government during its apartheid days have fallen into private hands. Written by Post
reporters Joby Warrick and John Mintz, the piece noted that unique, race-specific strains of
biotoxinswere available on the world market ± for the right price or the right ideology.

[...] The top-secret program that Basson directed was called Project Coast, and it lasted from 1981 to
1993. The South African National Defense Force created it at a time when the white-minority regime
was under increasing threat by indigenous black South Africans. DaanGoosen, the former director of
Project Coast¶s biological research division, told the Post he was ordered by Basson to develop ways "to
suppress population growth among blacks" and to "search for a ¶black bomb,¶ a biological weapon that
would select targets based on skin color."

[...] The Washington Post even noted, "Goosen says many scientists kept copies of organisms and
documents in order to continue work on ¶dual-use¶ projects with commercial as well as military
applications." A May 2002 story on Project Coast in the Wall Street Journal reported that Goosen said
he has been "visited by scores of people looking for ¶stuff to kill the blacks.¶" Race-specific weapons
naturally are in hot demand among racists, so it¶s no surprise that South Africa¶s race-specific research
is highly coveted.

[...] Reported links between Israel¶s ethnic weapons and South Africa¶s Project Coast are tentative;
some would say tenuous. But the possibility of such links is terrifying, and justifies as much scrutiny as
was focused on Iraq¶s imaginary arsenal.

It also appears that the anthrax incidents of 2001, in which five people died and 13 were sickened, may
also have a South African connection. The Post noted that officials found evidence in a Frederick,
Maryland, pond that may explain how the perpetrators of the deadly attacks used water to handle the
lethal toxin without infecting themselves or loosing the anthrax spores.

On May 11, the Post said the water theory is the result of the FBI¶s interest in one person, Steven J.
Hatfill, a medical doctor and bioterrorism expert who formerly worked for the U.S. Army, and who lists
South African diplomas in diving and underwater medicine on his résumé.

A June 2002 article in the Hartford Courant reported that Hatfill also worked with a guerilla unit of the
white-supremacist Rhodesian army from 1978 to 1980, when "an anthrax outbreak killed hundreds and
sickened thousands of villagers." He also lived in South Africa, "where he completed various military-
medical assignments."
The Apartheid regime in South Africa. Israel. The United States. Not the most progressive regimes in the
world.

Note the reference to the Great Anthrax Scare following 9/11, the ability to manipulate the anthrax virus
without getting infected. And the connection of this to Steven J. Hatfill. Curious, isn¶t it, how the anthrax
story just died when it was discovered that the strain used to attack Americans wasn¶t from a foreign
source but came from a military base in Maryland?
Anthrax Attacks Pushed Open an Ominous Door

22 September, 2002

PURCHASE, N.Y. -- On this first anniversary of the anthrax attacks, a number of conclusions can be
drawn even without an arrest by the FBI. First, the strain and properties of the weaponized anthrax
found in the letters show that it originated within the U.S. biodefense program, where the necessary
expertise and access are found. Government officials recognized that the anthrax source was domestic
less than two weeks after they learned of the letters, and nothing in their investigation has led them to
say otherwise since.

One can also conclude that, given the origin of the anthrax and the warnings contained in the letters, the
perpetrator¶s motive was not to kill but rather to raise public fear and thereby spur Congress to increase
spending on biodefense. In this, the attacks have been phenomenally successful.[...]

Although biodefense has gotten a shot in the arm, it is important to understand that the goal of
defending against bioweapons is not primarily public protection--which is largely impossible, as last
year¶s attacks demonstrated.

It is rather "to allow the military forces of the United States to survive and successfully complete their
operational missions ... in battlespace environments contaminated with chemical or biological warfare
agents," according to the annual report of the Department of Defense¶s Chemical and Biological
Defense Program. [...]

Two weeks ago, I attended an informal meeting in Geneva where diplomats from six continents
struggled in the face of U.S. Intransigence to map out a joint strategy for combating the global biological
threat. The United States had demanded that a formal Biological Weapons Convention conference,
scheduled to take place during two weeks in November, should instead disband in one day with only an
agreement not to meet again until 2006.

To make sure that the American resolve prevails in this setting where international consensus is de
rigueur, the U.S. demand was accompanied by an overt threat to disrupt any further proceedings with
accusations that would make productive international action impossible.

At that Geneva meeting, the assembled diplomats, representing the political spectrum from our closest
allies to declared enemies, were uniformly frustrated. They find it hard to comprehend why a country that
has just been the victim of bioterrorism should stand in the way of peaceful efforts supported by all its
allies to deter bioterrorism.
The following article suggests that the evidence for a link between the Israeli program and the South
African program is neither tentative nor tenuous as the above would suggest. It is the same author
writing earlier. Perhaps he found new info. Perhaps something else happened...
DOUBLE STANDARDS HAUNT AMERICA¶S FOREIGN POLICY

By SalimMuwakkil.
Published: Monday, November 23, 1998

Goosen¶s comments jibe well with conclusions reached by South Africa¶s recently concluded Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, which heard testimony that WouterBasson, the director of the country¶s
chemical-biological warfare program, conducted extensive research on weapons that exclusively
targeted blacks.

Incidentally, the commission¶s concluding report noted that South Africa¶s chemical-biological weapons
team received considerable assistance from their American counterparts during the apartheid era. And
it¶s easy to see why: Ethno bombs are a dream weapon on a planet so preoccupied with ethnic conflicts.
Of course, that¶s also why such weapons are so remarkably menacing.

[...] The article noted that the ethno-bomb claims were given further credibility by a report in "Foreign
Report," a publication of the respected Jane¶s group, that Israeli scientists used some of "the South
African research in trying to develop an ¶ethnic bullet¶ . . ."
Once more the thread comes back to the US:
"South Africa¶s chemical-biological weapons team received considerable assistance from their American
counterparts during the apartheid era".
So let¶s look more at America¶s links to the development of these weapons. We saw above that this
started after World War II. But, in fact, there are links back to the Eugenics program started in the US at
the turn of the century.
#16 Human Genome Project Opens the Door to Ethnically Specific Bioweapons

The U.S. has a long history of interest in such genetic research. The current home of the Human
Genome Project is the Cold Springs Harbor laboratory on Long Island, NY²the exact site of the
notorious Eugenics Research Office that was started in 1910 by the Harriman family. The project¶s 1910
agenda included governmental imposition of sanctions on such human rights as reproduction, and on
U.S. immigration, based on the alleged inferiority of particular ethnic groups.
The Eugenics Research Project established medical and psychological conditions that would qualify one
for sterilization or euthanasia. Prominent advocates of the program such as the Rockefeller family,
Henry Ford, and Margaret Sanger helped smooth the way for the passage of forcible sterilization laws in
25 states. These laws allowed the forcible sterilization of tens of thousands of people, mostly of minority
status, during the first half of the 20th century.
                                                  th
So we have one policy, begun in the early 20 century, funded by the Rockefellers, Henry Ford,
theHarrimans, many of the same people who were financing the Nazi Party in Germany during the
thirties. The work goes underground after the Second World War until it reemerges as part of the new
"genetic research".
Biological Warfare: Genetically-Engineered Weapons Cannot Be Excluded

By K.P. Kavanaugh
Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (F.A.S.)
Volume 52, Number 2
March/April 1999

It has long been rumored that modern biological weapons could be designed to attack specific
vulnerabilities of particular ethnic groups. Early in the development of the US offensive biological
weapons program Colonel Creasey, Chief of Research and Engineering of the US Chemical Corps,
suggested that agents may be selected because of known susceptibility of the target population.

This shows that the differential susceptibility of different populations to various diseases had been
considered at that time and, according to scientists at Defense Advance Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), is continuing today.

Indeed ethnic-specific biological warfare predated the advent of the biotechnology revolution. Smallpox
was almost certainly deliberately used against the Native Americans centuries ago and there are other
examples. U.S. and British officials believe an ethnic-specific weapon would be used today if it became
available during a severe conflict between two deeply antagonistic groups. [...]

Today, warnings are coming not only from the medical community, but also from other specially credible
sources. There have been indications, for example, that the US Secretary of Defense is concerned
about the possible development of genetic weapons.

In June 1997, Jane¶s Defense Weekly reported that Secretary Cohen
"quoted other reports about what he called ¶certain types of pathogens that would be ethnic specific so
that they could eliminate certain ethnic groups or races.¶"
Then after a later interview with the Defense Secretary in August 1997, it was stated again in Jane¶s
Defense Weekly that
"he also continued to insist that the science community is ¶very close¶ to being able to manufacture
¶genetically engineered pathogens that could be ethnically specific¶".
Early Accounts, Then Silence

In accounts during the 1980s of the possible development of genetic weapons, a frequent source of
scientific data was a paper by Carl A. Larson, then head of the Department of Human Genetics,
University of Lund, Sweden, published in the journal Military Review in November 1970. Larson¶s paper
was mainly concerned with the possible development of a new range of chemical weapons, including
incapacitants.

Individual differences in response to chemical agents had been known for some time, but Larson
reviewed what was known of differences between populations in reaction to drugs and saw the basis of
such population differences as genetic. Larson seems to have been pointing to possible future
developments rather than near-term practical possibilities. The question is whether, almost 30 years
later: have genetically engineered weapons become a practical possibility?
There does not appear to have been subsequent detailed open publication by reputable scientists of the
application of modern biotechnology to genetically -engineered weapons until the 1990s. Then in 1992
the journal Defense News carried a report which noted a scientist arguing that genetic engineering may
enable us to:
...recognize DNA from different people and attach different things that will kill only that group of people...
You will be able to determine the difference between blacks and whites and Asians and Jews and
Swedes and Finns and develop an agent that will kill only a particular group.
Shown this quotation in February, scientists within the DOD confirmed that defensive research was
being done specifically in this area. Thus the threat would appear to slide along the spectrum from the
merely theoretical through the potentially possible to the patently workable.

Such arguments have been set out at greater length in an appendix to the 1993 Stockholm Peace
Research Institute¶s Yearbook . The most pertinent aspect of the appendix entitled, "Benefits and threats
of developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering," reads:
While modern biotechniques are revolutionizing medicine and agriculture, the possibility exists of their
misuse for political ends, for clandestine production and refinement of biological weapons (BW), and for
future development of weapons of mass extermination which could be used for genocide.
Particular reference is then made to the possible misuse of knowledge gained from the Human Genome
Project and knowledge about genetic diversity. The element of critical significance here is contained in
the last sub-section of section VI where the question is clearly stated, "Can¶t genetic weapons be
developed?" The answer is that if:
investigations provide sufficient data on ethnic genetic differences between population groups, it may be
possible to use such data to target suitable micro-organisms to attack known receptor sites for which
differences exist at a cell membrane level or even target DNA sequences inside cells by viral vectors...
[...]
Flashback:Scientists¶ deaths are under the microscope
So we have governments financing the development of these weapons, envisioning them as the
Ultimate Weapon in their battles against their enemies. Or should we say "Final Solution" because it is
racially based. It makes targets of people because of their genes.

Note: It is governments that do these things. But when this is discussed in the press, where are our
fears turned? Who are portrayed as the real villains?
Genetic weapons: a 21st-century nightmare?

EthirajanAnbarasan

Most of the nearly 30,000 scientists who were involved in biological research in the USSR during the
1980s are now out of a job because of the country¶s economic difficulties. Last year, some of them
disclosed that they had been approached by certain countries which have shown particular interest in
learning about microbes that can be used in war to destroy or protect crops, as well as genetic
engineering techniques that could be used to make deadly germs for which there may be no antidotes.

One prospect that alarms arms control experts is that biological weapons will fall into the hands of
terrorist or cult groups.
But they are already in the hands of the Israelis who have not ratified a single international treaty
allowing inspections of their nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. No, what is important is to vilify
the invisible "terrorist", the "cult", to inculcate in the minds of the readers that the danger is widespread,
invisible, and ready to pounce at any moment. Be afraid. Be very afraid.

Yes. But be afraid because these governments are prepared to use them on their enemies... and that
may well include their own citizens.
Mystery pneumonia is being caused by America¶s weapons of mass destruction: A theory

by Steve Hesske
August 8, 2003
Could America¶s mainstream media be any more perfidious and derelict in its so-called reporting of the
current so-called pneumonia epidemic among U.S. service personnel in Iraq and a few nearby
countries?

A quick, informal survey of this week¶s coverage of the pneumonia story by our bastions of truth and
enlightenment ² CNN, Fox, CBS, ABC, MSNBC, The New York Times, The Washington Post ² shows
that while all covered the story, none mentioned Gulf War Syndrome which befell maybe as much as
20% of the 700,000 Americans who served in the 1991 Persian Gulf War (PGW) or depleted uranium
(DU) a radioactive weapon of mass destruction (WMD), outlawed by international treaty and world
courts, that was used exclusively and extensively by the United States during the PGW and that was
used by the U.S. during the recent invasion of Iraq at 10 times its PGW rate.

Here¶s what the mainstream press does tell you: Army brass have dispatched teams to Iraq and to
Landstuhl Army Hospital in Germany to investigate over 100 mysterious cases of pneumonia that have
stricken American troops currently serving in the Persian Gulf. The puzzling disease has killed two and
put another dozen or so in serious peril. According to the Army, a common geographical thread can not
be established, a common bacteriacan not be isolated.

True enough. A military spokeswoman goes on to say that those who have fallen ill have not been
exposed to biological or chemical weapons, a bald-faced lie. DU is a chemical WMD of the most
destructive and virulent kind. The documentation is in. And the connection between DU and a
"mysterious pneumonia-like disease" was established over 10 years ago. [...]

The [British] government¶s microbiological research establishment at Porton Down spread bacteria
through the London Underground system in the 1960s are contained in two files released to the public
record office in Kew yesterday.

The trials, which were revealed in the Guardian last year, show how a powder compact filled with
bacteria was dropped on to the Northern line and samples taken to see how contamination spread over
the network.
We again refer you to our Timeline of Cosmic COINTELPRO subversion through the last few centuries
to see more of this.

Given that these new strands of bioweapons need to be tested, we might think that the recent outbreak
of SARS could be a field test. The pneumonia from Iraq. But these are not the only ones. There have
been so many of these new strains recently that the US Government has set up centers to watch for
"Unexplained Deaths" in four US states:
Unexplained Deaths Due to Possibly Infectious Causes in the United States: Defining the
Problem and Designing Surveillance and Laboratory Approaches

EID Volume 2 * Number 1
January-March 1996

Many new infectious diseases have been identified in the United States during the last several decades
(1). Among these are AIDS, Legionnaires¶ disease, toxic-shock syndrome, hepatitis C, and most
recently, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome; all caused serious illness and death.

In each instance, the disease was recognized through investigation of illness for which no cause had
been identified. Retrospective studies of these and other newly recognized infectious diseases often
identified cases that occurred before the recognition of the new agent; therefore, a more sensitive
detection system may make the earlier recognition of new infectious agents possible.

[...] A more systematic public health approach for the early detection of unknown infectious agents is
needed. This need was acknowledged in Addressing Emerging Infectious Diseases Threats: A
Prevention Strategy for the United States, a CDC publication about emerging infections (13). CDC has
established an emerging infections program (EIP) network to conduct special population-based
surveillance projects, develop surveillance methods, pilot and evaluate prevention strategies, and
conduct other epidemiologic and laboratory studies.

In late 1994, CDC funded four programs based at state health departments and academic institutions in
California (Alameda, Contra Costa, Kern, and San Francisco counties), Connecticut, Minnesota, and
Oregon. Some projects are conducted at all program sites and others, depending on local interest and
expertise, at only one or two sites.

Surveillance for unexplained deaths due to possibly infectious causes (UDPIC) for early detection of
new infectious diseases is one of the core activities being conducted at all sites.
Great way to track the field tests, is it not?

In looking over the press reports in the last few years, we see that Israel is being singled out, especially
since the "suicide" of David Kelly. This is somewhat normal because much attention has been focused
in recent years on the barbarity of the Israeli actions against the Palestinians.

As Greg Bishop writes above, the Germans considered the Jews "insects". Now the Jews turn on the
Palestinians in the same way. So Israel, from the Balfour Declaration through today, is being set up and
portrayed as villains, maneuvered into a particular situation.

What they do is odious. But is there something even more odious behind the curtain?


Relations Between Israel and the Apartheid Regime in South Africa
We looked yesterday at the issue of Ethnic Weapons, biological and chemical weapons that can be built
to single out populations by their genetic characteristics. We saw evidence that Israel may be building
such weapons to be used in their final solution against the Palestinians.

The technology for this program came from the apartheid regime of South Africa, that is, the Boers who
ruled over the Blacks until the last decade of the 20th century.

The close relations between Israel and the apartheid regime go back to the mid seventies.
Profile of Bilateral Relations

State of Israel
HISTORY OF RELATIONS

Israel established a Legation in South Africa in 1952 and in 1974 it was upgraded to an Embassy. In
1972 South Africa established a Consulate General in Tel Aviv which was upgraded to an Embassy in
December 1975. Israel continued to enjoy close relations with the Apartheid Government in South
Africa.

While many African countries had seen Israel as an ally in the fifties and early sixties, another country
struggling to survive in a hostile climate, after the wars of 1967 and 1973, their view had changed and
Israel was now the neighborhood bully. For more on this, see the article Africa, Arabia, and Israel: Forty-
Five Years of Relations.

South Africa had seen two of its neighbors become "Popular Republics" under Marxist-inspired
"People¶s Armies" after the fall of the Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974. So both Israel and South
Africa had a siege mentality, believing they were surrounded by enemies.


Africa, Arabia, and Israel Forty-Five Years of Relations
(Originally published as Sheen-File #053)

[«] In the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and the joint forces of Egypt and Syria,
almost all of sub-Saharan Africa broke off diplomatic relations with Israel completely. And in 1975, the
Arab League states succeeded in passing a motion on the floor of the United Nations General
Assembly, equating Zionism with racism and South African apartheid. It passed in large measure to the
near-automatic support the resolution received from the sub-Saharan African states.

Although there is evidence that several African nations wished to maintain covert relations with Israel,
privately insisting that its public condemnation of Israel was merely an act for show, designed to placate
the Arab states, to many Israelis, this hypocrisy was an unimaginable slight that could not easily be
forgiven. It was said that, in response to this overwhelming rejection, "Israel pursued its relationship with
South Africa with an element of vindictiveness."


Israel and South Africa

excerpted from the book
Israeli Foreign Policy
by Jane Hunter
South End Press, 1987

Israel has also been connected with the mercenary forces deployed by South Africa against Angola and
Mozambique. In the 1970s Israel aided the FNLA (Angolan National Liberation Front) proxy forces
organized and trained by the CIA to forestall the formation of a government led by the MPLA (Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola-now the ruling party of Angola).

John Stockwell, who ran the CIA operation against Angola, recollected three arms shipments Israel
made in cooperation with the CIA: a plane full of 120 mm shells sent via Zaire to the FNLA and Unita; a
shipment of 50 SA-7 missiles (all of which were duds); a boat-load sent to neighboring Zaire in a deal
that the Israelis had worked out with President Mobutu, even though the Zairian strong man had broken
ties with Israel two years earlier.


South Africa¶s Nuclear Policy

RuchitaBeri,
Research Fellow, IDSA

The political changes in the Southern African region heightened the security concerns of South Africa.
The end of Portuguese rule in Africa after the 1974 Lisbon coup and the subsequent accession to power
of Communist regimes in Angola (MPLA) and Mozambique (Freelimo) enhanced the encirclement by
Communist forces regionally. The mid- 1970s also saw the intensification of the anti-apartheid struggle
within South Africa-in the apartheid government¶s perception, sponsored by the Communist forces.

Thus, perceiving itself to be encircled by Communist forces, the South African government promoted a
militarist ideology legitimizing the use of force by the state to counter that threat, codified in the concept
"Total National Strategy" to coordinate its national security planning. This ultimately involved a nuclear
deterrent capability.

The arrival of Cuban troops in Angola after the establishment of the MPLA regime provided the final
stimulus. Defence Minister P.W. Botha spelled out the defense requirements to meet this challenge as
"South Africa can establish a balanced defense force to defend itself against terrorism...and this we are
fully able to do....Secondly, we must have a deterrent to be able to resist a fairly heavy conventional
attack on South Africa."3 This statement was quite ambiguous; however, one could reach the conclusion
that both conventional and nuclear capabilities would be pursued by South Africa. Ambiguity became the
trademark of the South African nuclear policy in the apartheid era.
The attitudes of the two countries can be summed up by this comment from Jane Hunter, cited above:
It has also been said that those arms sales are understandable, given the striking similarities between
the two countries in their day-to-day abuse and repression of their subject populations, South African
blacks and Palestinians under Israeli rule; in their operating philosophies of apartheid and Zionism; and
in their similar objective situations: "the only two Western nations to have established themselves in a
predominantly nonwhite part of the world," as a South African Broadcasting Corporation editorial put it.
That understanding, however, is somewhat superficial, and the focus on similarities of political behavior
has somewhat obscured the view of the breadth and depth of the totality of Israeli-South African
relations and their implications.
As she suggests, this understanding is "somewhat superficial, as we will see below.

Another factor cementing the relationship was the embargo placed on South Africa following the riots of
1975 and the international outcry over the death of Stephen Biko.
SOUTH AFRICA: 1962 - 1989
Access to Critical Events in Recent U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

The second period (1976-1980) deals primarily with the response of the U.S. government and the
international community to the South African government¶s brutal reaction to the June 1976 student
revolt, the death of Steve Biko (the leader of the Black Consciousness Movement), South Africa¶s
subsequent security crackdown on opponents of apartheid and the adoption of the U.N. Security Council
Resolution that called for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

Because of this, South Africa was isolated, at least "officially", from the world.
One of the projects Israel and South Africa undertook together was the development of nuclear
weapons.

Hunter continues:
Israel¶s relations with South Africa are different than its interactions with any of its other arms clients.
That Israel gave South Africa its nuclear weapons capability underscores the special nature of Tel Aviv¶s
relations with the white minority government and begins to describe it - a full-fledged, if covert,
partnership based on the determination of both countries to continue as unrepentant pariahs and to help
each other avoid the consequences of their behavior.

Arms industry
Nuclear Apprentice

There are few areas where the respective needs and advantages of Israel and South Africa dovetailed
so perfectly as in the field of nuclear cooperation.

"The most powerful reason for Israeli willingness to bear the undesirable consequences of expanded
and more open trade with South Africa may be her desire to acquire material necessary to manufacture
nuclear weapons," wrote a military analyst in 1980.¶ To that must be added Israel¶s great desire to test
the nuclear weapons it already had, and the attractions of South Africa¶s vast territory and proximity to
even vaster uninhabited spaces-the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

Then at the point in its nuclear development where it was fashioning sophisticated bombs (devices
which use less nuclear material but have infinitely greater explosive force than the "primitive" bomb
dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima), Israel would find it particularly helpful to observe the performance,
explosive force and fallout of a detonated weapon.

Since 1984, Israel had been operating a plutonium extraction plant in a secret underground bunker at
Dimona in the Negev Desert. Built by the French in the late 1950s, the Dimona plant also included
facilities for manufacturing atomic bomb components. At the time of the 1976 accords, Israel was
preparing to build an adjoining plant for the extraction of lithium 6, tritium and deuterium, materials
required for sophisticated thermonuclear weapons.

Israel¶s reasons for devoting what had to have been a significant portion of its scant resources to such
an ambitious nuclear weapons program - nuclear experts have recently ranked it as the world¶s sixth
nuclear power, after the U.S., the USSR, Britain, France and China - have been variously offered as the
desire to develop a credible deterrent to attack by its neighbors and the desire to substitute that
deterrent for at least part of the costly conventional arsenal that Israel, with one of the world¶s most
powerful military forces, maintains, and also (with much less frequency) as an "umbrella" over a partial
withdrawal from the occupied territories.
This cooperation is discussed as well here:
Abstract

Note: Details about the Blaauw case are provided in the Africa Confidential article. ..... According to
information released regarding the secret mid-1980s extortion trial of Johann Blaauw, a brigadier in the
South African army, South Africa and 'Israel' participated in four clandestine nuclear deals in the mid-
1970s. Blaauw was found not guilty of trying to extort mining concessions from Minister of Mines Fanie
Botha in a trial in 1989 [1]

The first nuclear deal occurred in shortly after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 when "Benjamine," a
member of the Israel Council for Scientific Liaison, asked Blaauw to acquire South African yellowcake
which Israel could use for weapon-grade plutonium. ("Benjamine" is believed to be Benjamin
Blumberg, the head of the Israeli Intelligence division LishKa l-Kishrei (Lakam) [2].)

After discussions with Gen. Hendryk van den Bergh, head of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS),
South African Prime Minister John Vorster eventually agreed to sell 50 metric tons of yellowcake to
Israel. The deal was handled by Minister of Mines Fanie Botha, who replaced Piet Koornhog [Koornhof]
after Koornhog opposed the sale. Uranium Enrichment Corporation Chairman Ampie Roux was also
aware of the deal.

During his testimony, Blaauw said that "a high degree of confidence was developing between the South
African and Israeli governments which involved the exchange of military technology, joint aeronautic
ventures, and the supply of ¶know-how¶ by Israel to South Africa in regard to the manufacture of
weaponry."
There is evidence of a joint nuclear test carried out in the Indian Ocean in September, 1979.
RuchitaBeri, cited above, writes:
1979 Nuclear Test

On September 22, 1979, a US Vela satellite detected an unusual "double flash" indicative of a nuclear
test, in an "area of the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic including portions of the Antarctic continent, and
the southern part of Africa." In fact, some have claimed it to be a joint Israeli-South African nuclear test.
South Africa denied that it had conducted a nuclear test. As late as March 1993, the AEC¶s Chairman,
Waldo Stumpf, is reported to have said,
"If it was a nuclear explosion, South Africa was definitely not involved. I doubt that it was a nuclear [test]
because no radioactive fallout was detected."
Eighteen years after the event, Aziz Pahad, the Deputy Foreign Minister, confirmed that South Africa
conducted a nuclear test in the South Indian Ocean in 1979. This admission has laid to rest the
controversy surrounding the test.
We can see that the relations between the two countries were very close.

Not only were nuclear weapons part of the partnership, but strategy and tactics in dealing with their
enemies, both internal and external were also an important part of the collaboration. Jane Hunter again:
The South Africans began teaching the lessons of Israel¶s 1967 war at their maneuver school, and
Israeli advisers began teaching the Boers the arts of suppressing a captive population and keeping
hostile neighbors off balance...
The white government¶s practice of domestic counterinsurgency combines outright military brutality with
the extensive use of informers and collaborators. It is impossible to know how many refinements of
these age-old techniques have been borrowed from the Israelis¶ occupation of the West Bank, Gaza,
and the Golan Heights.

The Israeli system of village leagues is obviously comparable to the hated town councils imposed on
segregated townships by the apartheid government. The collective punishment employed by the Israelis,
such as the destruction of a whole family¶s home when one of its members is arrested as a suspect in
an act of resistance, has lately been matched by the recent South African practices of sealing off
townships, and assaulting entire funeral processions.

What is perhaps more salient is the South African victims¶ perceptions of Israel¶s involvement in their
oppression and how readily that perception is communicated...
And when the population you are systematically trying to annihilate fights back, how do you justify it? Of
course, you call it "terrorism". Hunter continues:
The Frontline States

The South Africans noted that their May, 1983 aerial attack (dubbed Operation Shrapnel) on
Mozambique¶s capital, Maputo, was analogous to Israel¶s attack on Beirut the previous summer. One
analyst, Joseph Hanlon, believes that one of South Africa¶s objectives in the attack was to see how its
version of events would play in the media. It was received very well indeed, according to Hanlon, with
the Western press accepting South Africa¶s claim that its attack was in "retaliation" for an ANC attack
and that ANC "bases" were hit.

Instead, the South African Air Force hit a child-care center and private houses with "special
fragmentation rockets," leaving 6 dead and 40 wounded. This follows the Israeli practice in Lebanon of
speaking about PLO installations while civilians are the actual targets, and attacking with particularly
heinous anti-personnel weapons-cluster bombs and phosphorous bombs.

The victims of South Africa¶s angst are not blind to the similarity of attacks-or motives.

President SamoraMachel likened the Israeli Government to the Pretoria regime. He said that because of
its inability to contain the fury of the Palestinian people led by the PLO, the Zionist regime is trying to
transfer the war to other regions.

So reported Mozambican radio shortly after Israeli aircraft bombed PI headquarters in Tunisia in October
1985.

The model provided by Israel, which punishes every internal act of resistance and violent act outside its
jurisdiction with a bombing raid on Palestinian targets in Lebanon-almost always refugee camps
cynically identified by the Israelis as "terrorist bases" or "headquarters" - has served South Africa well. In
January 1986, the white government¶s radio delivered a commentary on "the malignant presence" of
"terrorism" in neighboring states and said "there¶s only one answer now, and that¶s the Israeli answer."
Israel had managed to survive "by striking at terrorists wherever they exist."

In May 1986, South Africa demonstrated that it had assumed the right to attack its neighbors at a time
and on a pretext of its own choosing. The chosen time was during a visit by the Eminent Persons Group
of the Commonwealth of Nations, which was attempting to establish negotiations between the apartheid
regime and its opposition. The victims-Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe, all Commonwealth members-
were chosen for their alleged harboring of "terrorists"; the real victims were South African exiles and an
employee of the government of Botswana. The South Africans said they had attacked "international
terrorism" and compared their raids to the Israeli attack on Tunisia and the U.S. attack on Libya in April
1986.

The attack was similar in style to Israel¶s 1985 attack on Tunisia. Initially, the Israelis had been
threatening Jordan and perhaps because King Hussein of Jordan was at the time on an official visit to
the U.S., the Israelis chose to take revenge for the killing of three Israelis (believed to be top Mossad
agents) in Larnaca, Cyprus on the PLO in Tunisia.

Two weeks after its three-pronged attack on its Commonwealth neighbors, South Africa attacked the
Angolan harbor of Namibia, firing their version of the Israeli Gabriel missile.

When Israel reestablished relations with Zaire (in 1982) and began to train Zairian forces in the Shaba
border province, Angola had cause for concern. The leader of the FNLA had been Holden Roberto,
brother-in-law of Zairian president Mobutu, Israel¶s new client. In 1986, it would be established that Zaire
acted as a funnel for "covert" U.S. military aid for the Unita forces of Jonas Savimbi.

In 1983, the Angolan News Agency reported that Israeli military experts were training Unita forces in
Namibia. Since Zaire began receiving military aid and training from Tel Aviv, Angola has been ill at ease.
Its worries increased after discovering that:

Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was personally involved in the organization, training and equipping
of "commando" units of the army of Zaire, especially organized for missions along the borders of the
RPA [Angola].

In 1984, the Financial Times (London) wrote of "joint Israeli-South African support for Unita forces."
Other sources also report the transfer of Israeli arms and financial support to Unita.

In 1983, Angola¶s President Jose Eduardo dos Santos told Berkeley, California Mayor Eugene (Gus)
Newport that an Israeli pilot had been shot down during a South African attack. The Angolan President
showed Newport pictures of captured Israeli weapons. The following year, Luanda reported the capture
of three mercenaries who said they had been trained by Israeli instructors in Zaire.

Israel has also been involved with the Mozambican "contras," the South African-backed MNR
(Mozambique National Resistance or "Renamo"), which has brought great economic and social distress
to Mozambique. Renamo has a particular reputation for ideological incoherence, being regarded by
most other right-wing insurgencies as a gang of cutthroats.

For several years there have been stories coming from Southern Africa of captured mercenaries of
Renamo who say they were trained in neighboring Malawi-one of the four nations to maintain relations
with Israel after the Organization of African Unity (OAU) declared a diplomatic embargo in 1973-by
Israelis. And more than one report has told of "substantial Israeli aid" to the MNR, thought to have been
funded by the CIA and Saudi Arabia as well as South Africa and former Portuguese nationalists.
Two countries, both with the mentality of the "besieged", begin carrying out attacks against their
neighbors under the cover of "defence". Sometimes "to see how its version of events would play in the
media".

In fact, it looks as if they were field-testing the strategies and tactics that the Bush Reich is now
imposing upon the US population and the rest of the world.

The links between Israel, the apartheid regime, and the CIA are well-established. It is not too much to
suspect that this information was being shared by the intelligence agencies of the three countries.

But as we are trying to see "behind the scenes", as it were, we leave you with one last item to reflect
upon. Remember a few years ago how the anti-globalization forces were growing stronger? Remember
the Conference Against Racism held in South Africa? Remember how Israel was becoming isolated
because of its butchering of the Palestinians in the period following Sharon¶s provocative visit to the
Temple Mount in September 2000?
Israel and US walk out of UN conference on racism
By Chris Marsden
6 September 2001
The joint US-Israeli walkout from the United Nations conference on racism in Durban, South Africa was
something of a foregone conclusion. It was a stage-managed affair, the purpose of which was to portray
all opposition to the Zionist state¶s persecution of the Palestinians as inherently racist.

The original draft resolution to the UN conference stated its "deep concern" at the "increase of racist
practices of Zionism and anti-Semitism" and spoke of the emergence of "movements based on racism
and discriminatory ideas, in particular the Zionist movement, which is based on racial superiority." It
made direct criticisms of Israeli repression against the Palestinians on the West Bank as a "new kind of
apartheid, a crime against humanity."

The US and Israel insisted on the removal of any direct reference to Israel.

[«] Israel has also achieved some success in winning a more friendly response from Russia, which is
again seeking to challenge US domination of Middle Eastern affairs by offering itself as an honest broker
between Israel and the Arab regimes. During the Durban conference Sharon visited Moscow for talks
with President Putin to discuss the common threat posed by Islamic terrorism - Sharon has even
indicated sympathy for Russia¶s bloody suppression of Islamic rebel forces in Chechnya - the possibility
of a further one million Jewish immigrants from Russia to Israel, armaments and other trade deals.

[«]Shimon Samuels, the head of the Jewish caucus in Durban, declared,
"We saw an NGO document that would have made [Hitler¶s Nazi Party propaganda chief] Goebbels
happy. And now it is clear that we are going to see, at the end of the government conference,
resolutions that can be called the UN¶s Mein Kampf."
MordechaiYedid, Israel¶s official spokesman at the conference, insisted there could be no
condemnation of Israel in the resolution. He told the plenary meeting prior to the US-Israeli departure,
"anti-Zionism, the denial of Jews the basic right to a home, is nothing but anti-Semitism, pure and
simple."

Yedid derided the Arab regimes proposals to criticize Israel¶s treatment of the Palestinians as "a group
of states for whom the terms ¶racism¶, ¶discrimination¶, and even ¶human rights¶ simply do not appear in
their domestic lexicon".

The UN resolution, he continued, was "the most racist declaration in a major international organization
since World War Two".

His remarks prompted a walkout by Egypt¶s Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher, who represents one of the
most pro-US of all the Arab states.

Announcing its withdrawal from the conference, US Secretary of State Colin Powell denounced any
attempt to single out "only one country in the world, Israel, for censure and abuse¶" and any suggestion
that apartheid existed in Israel. For his part, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres proclaimed,
"We were portrayed in an insulting and baseless manner as a colonial nation... The Arab League, all of
it, has come out against peace."
The right-wing media in Israel marched to the same tune. An article in the September 4 Jerusalem Post
by Yossi Olmert described the Durban conference as
"the mirror image of the Nuremberg rallies, in which the Nazis propagated their anti-Jewish messages,
striving hard to delegitimise the Jews, as an inevitable step leading to their eventual liquidation."
He conceded reluctantly that "not all the participants in Durban are Nazis, maybe not even a majority of
them, but too many are, and they clearly give this shameful gathering its true character".
We wonder what Sharon was discussing with Putin, aside from the "common threat posed by Islamic
fundamentalism".

Did you happen to notice the date?

Five days latterthe world would explode. The field trials carried out for thirty years by the Israelis and
South Africans would be implemented throughout the world. The battle against "terrorism" would
become the justification for imposing the New American Tyranny on the world.

Coincidence? We think not.




              Israel Planning ¶Ethnic¶ Bomb
                                     as Saddam Caves In
                                       by Uzi Mahnaimi and Marie Colvin
                          Additional reporting: Matthew Campbell in Washington, Hugh McManners
          Originally posted in the London Times (November 1998) http://www.thetimes.co.uk/section/0,,158,00.html
                                                     fromPeace Website

ISRAEL is working on a biological weapon that would harm Arabs but not Jews, according to Israeli
military and western intelligence sources. The weapon, targeting victims by ethnic origin, is seen as
Israel¶s response to Iraq¶s threat of chemical and biological attacks.

Yesterday Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, backed away from the brink of war and agreed to resume
co-operation with the inspection teams seeking his suspected chemical and biological weapons plants.

Kofi Annan, the United Nation secretary-general, said he believed Iraq had met UN requirements. As
Britain and America stood by to bomb Saddam, however, Tony Blair¶s office said compliance must be
unconditional.

The White House, which is threatening Iraq with the biggest onslaught since the Gulf war, said President
Bill Clinton¶s advisers were assessing whether Iraq¶s offer was adequate. The Pentagon is ready to
bomb within days.

Last week Downing Street warned Labour MPs that Saddam could be only weeks away from completing
the construction of offensive biological weapons mounted on Scud missiles. Israel was hit by Scuds
during the Gulf war and fears it would be the prime target.

In developing their "ethno-bomb", Israeli scientists are trying to exploit medical advances by identifying
distinctive genes carried by some Arabs, then create a genetically modified bacterium or virus.

The intention is to use the ability of viruses and certain bacteria to alter the DNA inside their host¶s living
cells. The scientists are trying to engineer deadly micro-organisms that attack only those bearing the
distinctive genes.

The programme is based at the biological institute in NesTziyona, the main research facility for Israel¶s
clandestine arsenal of chemical and biological weapons.

A scientist there said the task was hugely complicated because both Arabs and Jews are of semitic
origin. But he added:
"They have, however, succeeded in pinpointing a particular characteristic in the genetic profile of certain
Arab communities, particularly the Iraqi people."
The disease could be spread by spraying the organisms into the air or putting them in water supplies.

The research mirrors biological studies conducted by South African scientists during the apartheid era
and revealed in testimony before the truth and reconciliation commission.

The idea of a Jewish state conducting such research has already provoked outrage in some quarters
because of parallels with the genetic experiments of Dr Josef Mengele, the Nazi scientist at Auschwitz.
DediZucker, a member of knesset, the Israeli parliament, denounced the research yesterday.
"Morally, based on our history, and our tradition and our experience, such a weapon is monstrous and
should be denied," he said.
Some experts said that although the concept of an ethnically targeted weapon was feasible, the practical
aspects of creating one were enormous.

DrDaanGoosen, head of a South African chemical and biological warfare plant, said his team was
ordered in the 1980s to develop a "pigmentation weapon" to target only black people. He said the team
discussed spreading a disease in beer, maize or even vaccinations but never managed to develop one.

However, a confidential Pentagon report warned last year that biological agents could be genetically
engineered to produce new lethal weapons. William Cohen, the American defense secretary, revealed
that he had received reports of countries working to create "certain types of pathogens that would be
ethnic-specific". A senior western intelligence source confirmed last week that Israel was one of the
countries Cohen had in mind.

The "ethno-bomb" claims have been given further credence in Foreign Report, a Jane¶s publication that
closely monitors security and defense matters. It reports unnamed South African sources as saying
Israeli scientists have used some of the South African research in trying to develop an "ethnic bullet"
against Arabs.

It also says Israelis discovered aspects of the Arab genetic make-up by researching on "Jews of Arab
origin, especially Iraqis".

The British Medical Association has become so concerned about the lethal potential of genetically based
biological weapons that it has opened an investigation, which is due to report in January.

Dr. Vivienne Nathanson, who organized the research, said:
"With an ethnically targeted weapon, you could even hit groups within a population. The history of
warfare, in which many conflicts have an ethnic factor, shows us how dangerous this could be."
Porton Down, Britain¶s biological defense establishment, said last week that such weapons were
theoretically possible.
"We have reached a point now where there is an obvious need for an international convention to control
biological weapons," said a spokesman.



                    Ethnic Weapons For Ethnic Cleansing
                                            Greg Bishop

                                     (exclmid@primenet.com)

If we are to believe a recent AP report culled from the Sunday Times (London), it would appear
that the Israelis have announced or intentionally leaked a report that its military was considering
the development of so-called "ethnic weapons." The info is credited to "unidentified Israeli
military and Western intelligence sources" which generally brings up the red flags with regard to
authenticity, and more likely, the motive for such leaks. The article ends with a comment from
an unnamed source at Britain's "biological defense facility" that pathogens which can kill on the
basis of ethnicity are "theoretically possible."
This PR seemingly ignores the fact that this "theoretical possibility" was recognized over 25
years ago, if not before. It was originally brought to the attention of potential customers with the
publication of an article in the Military Reviewof November 1970. This journal for command-
level military personnel was published by the US Army Command and General Staff College in
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The feature, entitled "Ethnic Weapons," authored by Carl A. Larson,
outlines the history, desirability, and possibilities of engineered biological pathogens which
would affect only those races which historically have no natural defense against certain "enzyme
inhibitors." Larson is listed as head of the "Department of Human Genetics at the Institute of
Genetics, Lund, Sweden" as well as a licensed physician. The Hippocratic oath was apparently
not administered in Sweden when Larson received his accreditation.

Larson explains that many of the chemical activities and functions within the human body are
caused by the interactions of enzymes. One of the more significant activities enabled by enzyme
chemical reactions are the contraction and relaxation of muscle tissue. If the activities of these
enzymes are blocked, the victim will be paralyzed, even to the point of death by asphyxiation.
Not coincidentally, the enzyme-blocking action of compounds called organophosphates were
discovered in Germany in the 1930s when experimental insecticides killed the people unlucky
enough to have used them. This discovery led to the mass production of a substance named
"Trilon," later used to impressive effect in the extermination of groups of people the Nazis
considered little more than insects. This substance and others of similar makeup became known
as "nerve gas." A concentration of 40 milligrams per cubic meter can kill in about 10 minutes.
Stronger agents were later developed which can do the job with a single drop on the skin.

The author points out that genetic variation between races is mirrored in concurrent differences
in tolerance for various substances. As an example, it has been noted that large segments of
southeast Asian populations historically display a lactose intolerance, due to the near absence of
the enzyme lactase in the digestive system. A chemical or biological weapon (CBW) which takes
advantage of this genetic variance could conceivably kill or incapacitate entire populations,
leaving invading armies relatively unscathed, as long as they are ethnically homogenous, or the
at-risk members had at least been prepared to tolerate the attack. In effect, the poison or viruses
would not be recognized by their bodies.

The Sunday Times article states that Israeli researchers have "pinpointed 'a characteristic in the
genetic profile of certain Arab communities, particularly the Iraqi people.'" This may be more
palatable to westerners, since some consider the Iraqi race the enemy, and excluding other Arab
gene pools might seem like a more "humane" way to carry on more studies.

Larson is even more explicit in a way that would probably never make it into the mainstream
press. In a passage that would make Doctor Strangelove proud, he muses uncontrollably on the
possibilities of genetically-sensitive chemicals to subdue enemy populations: "Friendly forces
would discriminatingly use incapacitants in entangled situations to give friend and foe a short
period of enforced rest to sort them out. By gentle persuasion, aided by psychochemicals,
civilians in enemy cities could be reeducated. The adversary would use incapacitants to spare
those whom he could use for slaves." This was published in a serious, staid professional journal
read by US military strategists. He concludes with the statement that "the functions of life [now]
lie bare to attack."
According to Charles Piller and Keith Yamamoto in their 1988 book Gene Wars, Larson's article
was the first time that the subject of ethnically targeted CBWs was broached publicly, and that in
"the military's private circles it was old news." The authors further state that in 1951 the
Mechanicsburg, PA Naval Supply Depot was the site of a classified test using a benign organism
delivered to personnel to mimic the behavior of an actual bioweapon: "According to documents
declassified in the late 1970s, the site was chosen because 'Within this system there are
employed large numbers of laborers, including many Negroes, whose incapacitation would
seriously affect the operation of the supply system.'" The black workers in the Depot were
supposedly more susceptible to a strain of Valley Fever than were whites, but instead of using
the actual virus, a substitute fungal organism was used. Valley Fever is more often fatal to blacks
than to whites. It was recently revealed that the truth and reconciliation hearings in South Africa
had presented witnesses who testified that scientists working for the apartheid regime had
pursued efforts along similar lines.

Another possible example of field testing of ethnic weapons (or at least an interesting case for
study by those interested in their development) may be the famed "Four Corners" virus, which
seems only to affect Native Americans living in northern New Mexico and Arizona. Most reports
identified or compared the disease to the Hantavirus, which killed victims relatively quickly
following the occurrence of a prolonged fever and fluid which rapidly filled the lungs and
asphyxiated the patient. Supposedly contracted through deer mice droppings, the mystery disease
has claimed at least a dozen victims in the last ten years. The most recent outbreak occured this
last summer, coming on the heels of El Niño, which the major news media blamed for the
renewed threat. Some area residents believe that the virus may have been released either
accidentally or intentionally from a bioweapons cache at Fort Wingate, an army facility a few
miles east of Gallup. The munitions storage at Wingate is now officially closed.

In the 28 intervening years since the Military Review article was published, the study of genetics
has advanced to levels undreamed of by Dr. Larson at the time. The human genome project is
slated to map all locations and functions of human DNA by early in the next century. There may
be little reason to doubt that subtly selective and perhaps overtly unnoticeable biological agents
can be introduced into a native population simply by flying over a chosen area with little more
than a crop duster attached to the wings of a B52. The recent revelation that Israel may be
working on their own bioagent based on well-known and tested principles may only be a
psychological deterrent, but given the well-documented history of ethnic weapons, there is ample
reason to suspect that the threat is not an idle one.




     Human Genome Project Opens the Door to Ethnically
                  Specific Bioweapons


Washington Free Press
Jan./ Feb. 2000

Titles: Genetic Bullets, Ethnically Specific Bioweapons

Author: Roy Blake



Konformist

March 2000

Title: Ethnic Weapons for Ethnic Cleansing

Author Greg Bishop

www.konformist.com



North Coast Xpress

Fall 2000

The Human Genome Project and Eugenics

Author Robert Lederman



Corporate news coverage: Daily Telegraph (London) 7/7/00, Agence France Presse 1/21/99, The
Gazette (Montreal) A-4, Baltimore Sun 1/22/99 A-18, The Salt Lake City Tribune 1/27/99 A-13,
The Times Union (Albany) 2/2/99 D-2,



Faculty/Community Evaluators: Rabbi Michael Robinson, Velma Guillory-Taylor, Ed.D.

Student Researchers: Terrie Girdner, Karen Parlette, Jennifer Swift



The Human Genome Project may now open the door to the development and use of genetic
weapons targeted at specific ethnic groups. This project is currently being conducted under the
auspices of the U.S. Energy Department, which also oversees America¶s nuclear weapon arsenal.
In October 1997, Dr. Wayne Nathanson, chief of the Science and Ethics Department of the
Medical Society of the United Kingdom, warned the annual meeting of the Society that "gene
therapy" might possibly be turned into "gene weapons" which could potentially be used to target
particular genes possessed by certain groups of people. These weapons, Nathanson warned,
could be delivered not only in the forms already seen in warfare such as gas and aerosol, but
could also be added to water supplies, causing not only death but sterility and birth defects in
targeted groups.

Current estimates of the cost of developing a "gene weapon" have been placed at around $50
million, still quite a stretch for an isolated band of neo-Nazis, but well within the capabilities of
covert government programs.

On November 15, 1998, the London Times reported that Israel claimed to have successfully
developed a genetically specific "ethnic bullet" that targets Arabs. When an Israeli government
spokesman was asked to confirm the existence of ethnic weapons, he did not deny that they had
them, but rather said, "we have a basket full of serious surprises that we will not hesitate to use if
we feel that the state of Israel is under serious threat."

Some scientists worry that the modified genes that corporations have spliced into fish, fowl, fruit
and vegetables have permanently altered the world¶s food supply. Some may be intended to
reduce populations.

The U.S. has a long history of interest in such genetic research. The current home of the Human
Genome Project is the Cold Springs Harbor laboratory on Long Island, NY²the exact site of the
notorious Eugenics Research Office that was started in 1910 by the Harriman family. The
project¶s 1910 agenda included governmental imposition of sanctions on such human rights as
reproduction, and on U.S. immigration, based on the alleged inferiority of particular ethnic
groups. The Eugenics Research Project established medical and psychological conditions that
would qualify one for sterilization or euthanasia. Prominent advocates of the program such as the
Rockefeller family, Henry Ford, and Margaret Sanger helped smooth the way for the passage of
forcible sterilization laws in 25 states. These laws allowed the forcible sterilization of tens of
thousands of people, mostly of minority status, during the first half of the 20th century.

The November 1970 issue of the Military Review published an article entitled "Ethnic Weapons"
for command-level military personnel. The author of the article was Dr. Carl Larson, head of the
Department of Human Genetics at the Institute of Genetics in Lund, Sweden. Dr Larson wrote of
how genetic variations in races are concurrent with differences in tolerances for various
substances. For instance, large segments of Southeast Asian populations display a lactose
intolerance due to the absence of the enzyme lactase in the digestive system. A biological
weapon could conceivably take advantage of this genetic variance and incapacitate or kill an
entire population.



Update by Greg Bishop
The ubiquitous nature of racism and the ruling power structure's history of handling
"undesirables," as well as dealing with an enemy (almost always of different racial stock than a
dominant aggressor) virtually assures us that the more powerful countries and their allies are
continuing to look into new and better ways of subduing and killing whole (or major parts of)
foreign populations.

When the London Times broke the story of the Israeli bioweapons project and interest in the
development of pathogens that would disable or kill by ethnicity, they quoted an unnamed
British intelligence source that said that these sorts of weapons were "theoretically possible."
They were not only "theoretical" but had been researched for nearly 50 years. The lynchpin of
the Times article was the writer's reliance on a specifically genetic explanation for ethnic
weapons.

Bioweapons have been used since at least the Roman Empire, when armies dumped dead
animals into an enemy's water supply to spread disease. Research into ethnic-specific
bioweapons was first broached publicly in 1970, when Dr. Carl Larson's article "Ethnic
Weapons" appeared in the Military Review. Larson discussed the possibility of utilizing differing
races' sensitivity or low resistance to specific compounds (such as lactose intolerance among
Asians) as either a bioweapon in itself, or as a "vector" that would allow other poisons or
microorganisms to more easily enter a human body when defenses were lowered or destroyed.
This method was not as surgically accurate as the military might want it to be, since many
populations are not completely homogenous. The strange thing about the Times coverage was
that it completely ignored this history and the fact that any technology for killing more of the
enemy than your own would most likely be (and has been) looked upon with interest by military
strategists.

No updates have yet appeared (or I have been unable to locate any) on the subject of Israeli
ethnic weapons. In this country, continuing a historic policy toward Native Americans, it has
been revealed that the American Indian Health Service (IHS²funded by the Federal
Government, who employ the doctors and nurses) coerced Native American men and women
into forced sterilizations in the early to mid 1970s. The General Accounting Office (GAO)
estimated that 3,400 people (mostly women) underwent the treatment, but their study only
covered four of twelve IHS regions for four years. Activists put the estimate much higher, at
60,000 to 70,000. This, coupled with the suspicion raised by the hantavirus outbreak in the Four
Corners region of Arizona/New Mexico/Colorado/Utah keeps suspicion and fingers pointed at
the federal government and at least some government policies toward the American Indian
population. (Hantavirus is one of many "new" diseases that have come under suspicion of having
their origins in genetic engineering or biowarfare labs.) As reported in a 1994 Project Censored
update, Utah's Dugway Proving Grounds biowarfare research site was also reopened despite
local residents' protests over fears that the facility was originally closed because of safety
concerns. Fort Dietrick, the site of the most notorious CIA drug and army biowarfare research in
the United States now houses major research facilities of the National Cancer Institute, raising
issues of conflict (or collusion) or interest.
No major press outlets were consulted about publication of the story. It was written to appear on
the Konformist.com website. Public awareness spread from there. There appears to have been no
followup in the mainstream media on the original 1998 London Times story.

For more information on this story:

Cole, Leonard A. Clouds of Secrecy: The Army's Germ Warfare Tests Over Populated Areas,
Rowman& Littlefield, Totowa, N.J. , 1988.

Hersh, Seymour M. Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal, Bobbs-
Merrill, Indianapolis, 1968.

Murphy, Sean. No Fire, No Thunder: The Threat of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Monthly
Review Press, New York , 1984.

Piller, Charles. Gene Wars: Military Control Over the New Genetic Technologies, Beech Tree
Books, New York , 1988.

Spiers, Edward M. Chemical and Biological Weapons: A Study in Proliferation, St. Martin's
Press, New York, 1994.



Websites:

www.disinfo.com/pages/dossier/id293/pg1.html

Article by Preston Peet on U.S. biowarfare testing in Puerto Rico in the 1930s. Island population
was deliberately infected with cancer in a program run by Dr. Cornelius Rhodes, who went on to
win seats on the Atomic Energy Commission and the Rockefeller Institute, as well as running
U.S. chemical warfare programs in WWII. Many useful links.

www.ratical.org/ratville/sterilize.html

Long and detailed article on the American Indian sterilization program.

cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/zilin.htm

This Center for Nonproliferation Studies site features text of threat assessment presented to
Congressional subcommittee in October 1999, by Dr. Raymond Zilinskas. Includes information
on bioweapons and ethnic weapons.

www.gene.ch/gentech/1999/Jan-Feb/msg00070.html

Genetech discussion list featuring exchanges on ethnic weapons.Concentrates on possibility of
genetically engineered versions.
Update by Robert Sterling, Editor of the Konformist

Let me add personal knowledge of response to the article of which the author Greg Bishop was
unaware. While the media response was predictably non-existent, I did receive numerous
comments that spoke volumes. The main thrust of "EthnicWeapons for Ethnic Cleansing" was
reports of an Israeli biowarfare program targeting Arabs. One of the key groups of readers of the
Konformist are Zionist Jews, courtesy of the promotion of the provocative writings of Israel's
Barry Chamish, a dedicated Zionist who has done tremendous work investigating the Rabin
assassination and the suppressions involved with it. What is interesting is that, though I received
quite a few Emails from the Zionist community, none denied the accuracy of the story. Instead,
they brashly admitted it was true, then added it was necessary because Israel needed to defend
itself from its Arab neighbors. What is most telling is that many letters included references to
Arabs that were derogatory and dehumanizing. That such a destructive philosophy is accepted by
so many uncritically in Israel explains much of the vicious thuggery performed against the
Palestinians over the last four months (not to mention the last 33 years). This is why I submitted
the story, because it underscored an important point that no group has a monopoly of hatred and
oppression, and that authoritarian values of all flavors must be rejected and battled with words.



Update by Robert Lederman

While the average person has no particular interest in nor any tangible use for the Human
Genome Project it, more than the economy or whichever political party is in power in
Washington, will very significantly mold the future of human life on this planet. Like its origin,
Eugenics, the Human Genome Project (HGP) has been presented to the public as an effort by our
government to help people live happier, healthier, and more productive lives. Nothing could be
further from the truth.

When I first wrote the article "The Human Genome Project and Eugenics" I received a lot of
correspondence from media people and scientists who felt I was unfairly associating the HGP
with Eugenics and its expression in Nazi Germany during the Holocaust. Since then I've found
on the HGP's own website an introduction to the project that makes exactly the same connection
in no uncertain terms.

From vector.cshl.org/eugenics.html:

"Although it is easy to conceive of the Human Genome Project and genetic engineering as an
entirely new epoch in scientific history, this is not our first-scale involvement with human
genetics. Our current rush into the "gene age" has striking parallels to the eugenics movement of
the early decades of the 20th century. Eugenicists sought an exclusively genetic explanation of
human development, neglecting the important contribution of the environment. Their flawed data
were the basis for social legislation to separate racial and ethnic groups, restrict immigration
from southern and eastern Europe, and sterilize people considered "genetically unfit." Elements
of the American eugenics movement were models for the Nazis, whose radical adaptation of
eugenics culminated in the Holocaust."

As of this writing, the human genomes of the populations of Estonia, Tonga, and Iceland have
been bought and patented by private corporations with many more such corporatized human
lineages to follow. James Watson, the discoverer of the structure of DNA and the project's first
director, has spoken publicly of his enthusiasm for human germline engineering²making
permanent inheritable changes in the human populations' DNA. In the brief time since I wrote
the article, insurance companies have publicly admitted that they will use prospective clients'
DNA in deciding whether to grant them health insurance. Mayors and governors across America
are following NYC Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in demanding that DNA samples be taken from
every person arrested regardless of how minor their crime. Man-made transgenic organisms are
being introduced into the human food supply and environment under the guise of distributing
vaccines and improving nutrition with what can only be described as either reckless enthusiasm
or an intent to do harm. In short, we will soon be living in a society in which Eugenics science
applied by government may play a greater role in ones destiny than any other factor.

While all of this is happening the public is being misled into believing that the Project's main
purpose is to cure diseases and extend human life. Once this genie is out of the bottle, it will
never be put back in. While it may seem like science fiction to most people, the Human Genome
Project represents the single biggest threat to human freedom that has ever been devised.

The following websites contain a great amount of scientific, historical, and propaganda material
on Eugenics and the Human Genome Project. Some of the sites are anti-eugenics and others,
including a neo-Nazi site, are pro-eugenics and blatantly racist. My including them in this list
should not be construed as an endorsement of any of the statements contained therein, other than
those in my own articles.

Baltech.org/lederman/spray/

www.hli.org/issues/pp/bcreview/index.html

www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/scopenotes/sn28.htm

www.biol.tsukuba.ac.jp/~macer/SG.html

www.notdeadyet.org/eughis.html

www.techreview.com/articles/as96/allen.html

www.hli.org/issues/pp/bcreview/index.html

www.csu.edu.au/learning/ncgr/gpi/grn/edures/scope.28.2.html

users.erols.com/straymond/EUGENICS2.htm
home.att.net/~eugenics/

www.sightings.com/general3/eugene.htm

www4.stormfront.org/posterity/




                                         fromWorldMysteries Website



                        To suppose that earth is the only populated world
                         in infinite space is as absurd as to believe that in
                                   an entire field sown with millet,
                                       only one grain will grow.
                                           Metrodorus of Chios
                                            4th century B.C.

ADNA molecule consists of a ladder, formed of sugars and phosphates, and four nucleotide bases:
         y adenine (A)
         y thymine (T)
         y cytosine (C)
         y guanine (G)
The genetic code is specified by the order of the nucleotide bases, and each gene possesses a unique
sequence of base pairs.

Scientists use these base sequences to locate the position of genes on chromosomes and to construct a
map of the entire human genome.

The Human Genome Project (HGP) is an international research program designed to construct detailed
genetic and physical maps of the human genome, to determine the complete nucleotide sequence of
human DNA, to localize the estimated 50,000-100,000 genes within the human genome, and to perform
similar analyses on the genomes of several other organisms used extensively in research laboratories
as model systems.

The scientific products of the HGP will comprise a resource of detailed information about the structure,
organization and function of human DNA, information that constitutes the basic set of inherited
"instructions" for the development and functioning of a human being. Successfully accomplishing these
ambitious goals will demand the development of a variety of new technologies.

It will also necessitate advanced means of making the information widely available to scientists,
physicians, and others in order that the results may be rapidly used for the public good. Improved
technology for biomedical research will thus be another important product of the HGP.

From the inception of the HGP, it was clearly recognized that acquisition and use of such genetic
knowledge would have momentous implications for both individuals and society and would pose a
number of policy choices for public and professional deliberation.
Analysis of the ethical, legal, and social implications of genetic knowledge, and the development of
policy options for public consideration are therefore yet another major component of the human genome
research effort.

The Human Genome project revealed that human beings have 30,000-40,000 genes. That number is
much lower than expected. For example, fruit fly has 13,300 genes, roundworm - 18,300 genes, mustard
weed - 25,700 genes.

According to genetic analysis, though, more than 98% of human DNA is identical to chimpanzee DNA.

In fact, chimpanzees are more closely related to humans than orangutans and gorillas.
          "Humans are simply odd looking apes," psychologist Roger Fouts of Central
          Washington University in Ellensburg, Washington, writes in his 1997 book, Next of Kin:
          My Conversations With Chimpanzees.

        "A traveler from an antique land... lives within us all," claims Sykes, a professor of
        genetics at Oxford.
This unique traveler is mitochondrial DNA, and, as this provocative account illustrates, it can help
scientists and archeologists piece together the history of the human race.

Find out more by reading this book: The Seven Daughters of Eve: The Science That Reveals Our
Genetic Ancestry by Bryan Sykes.




Controversial Discoveries

                        A 3.5-million-year-old fossil, flat-faced human from Kenya -
                      Kenyanthropus platy-ops, suggests the human family tree is a lot
                    more complicated than we knew. Implication is clear: More than one
                      species of pre-human was wandering around Africa a few million
                    years ago, and it's anyone's guess which of them evolved into human
                                                      race.
                                                  Fred Spoor
                                          University College, London

Several years ago, spearpoints and other tools of modern man were found under a layer of volcanic ash.

When Dr. McIntyre, a member of the U.S. Geological Survey, was invited to date the overlying ash, the
archaeologists thought it could be as old as 20,000 years old, pushing the arrival of man in the New
World back around 5,000 years.

No one was prepared when uranium series dating and fission tracking methods provided the astounding
age of 250,000 years. Dr. McIntyre shares what happened next:
        "I thought, okay, we got something big here but I'm going to stick with the dates. I didn't
        realize it was going to ruin my whole career."



Tree of Life
                     Mesopotamian "Tree of Life"




        The Olmec "Tree of Life" (Mesoamerican Cosmology).
The lineage founder, 2 Grass, is being born from a twisting World Tree.
           Detail from Selden Codex page 2. Source: FAMSI
DNA - our modern "Tree of Life"
The Human Genome Project
Summary of the Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome
fromWhiteHeadInstitute Website
recovered through WayBackMachine Website


Over the last decade, genomes have been sequenced for more than 40 species, mostly bacteria.

The human genome sequence is 8 times larger than all the previously sequenced genomes put
together. In 1990, the Human Genome Project (HGP) began as an international collaboration propelled
by the hope that global views of entire genomes would allow researchers to attack scientific problems in
systematic and unbiased ways. In its early years, the HGP produced maps of the human and mouse
genomes and sequenced the genomes of yeast and nematode worm.

Now, it has produced a 94%-complete working draft of the human genome sequence, the totality of
human DNA, where each letter in the draft has been read an average of 5 times. About 30% of the
human genome has been sequenced with more than twice this redundancy, resulting in highly accurate
"finished" sequence.

For example, the whole of chromosomes 21 and 22 have been sequenced to a finished state. No later
than 2003, all the human chromosomes will be sequenced to a finished state.

The Human Genome Project first separated the genome into large "clones" ² segments of DNA each
representing about 0.005% of the whole genome ² before chopping the clones and sequencing small
fragments. Using such clones whose positions are known added to the confidence that the genome
sequence would be assembled properly and allowed effective international collaboration.

All collaborators in the project made sequence data publicly available without restriction within 24 hours.
Large blocks of highly repetitive sequence, for example at the tips of chromosome arms and at the
centromeres (the portions of chromosomes that appear as pinched centers when chromosomes are
condensed) have been avoided, because current technology cannot yet sequence these regions.
The total human genome, contained in a set of 23 chromosomes, is now estimated to contain 3,164.7
million letters (or nucleotides).

Genome size does not always correlate with the apparent complexity of a species because of the large
amounts of repetitive sequence in many genomes. In humans the actual part of the genome that codes
for proteins makes up less than 2% of the genome while repeated sequences make up at least 50% of
the genome.

Repetitive sequences are thought to have no direct functions, but they shed light on chromosome
structure and dynamics. They hold important clues about evolutionary events, help chart mutation rates,
and by seeding DNA rearrangements, they can modify genes and create new ones. They also serve as
tools for genetic studies.

The vast majority of repeated sequences in the human genome are derived from transposable elements
² sequences like those that form viral genomes ² that propagate by inserting fresh copies of
themselves in random places in the genome. A full 45% of the human genome derives from such
transposons. A major surprise of this new global analysis of the human genome is that many
components in this diverse array of repeated sequences, traditionally considered to be "junk," appear to
have played a beneficial role over the course of human evolution.

Genes are sprawled over much larger regions in humans compared with fruit fly and nematode worm.
Genes remain difficult to identify in humans because they form such a small portion of the genome and
are so spread out, but it appears that the total number of genes is 30,000-35,000, close to the number
originally estimated some 20 years ago, but much smaller than more recent estimates.

Apparently, humans have only twice as many genes as the fly or worm, but they have on average three
times as many kinds of proteins because of "alternative splicing," a process that can yield different
protein products from the same gene.

Compared with the organisms whose genomes have been sequenced before, humans have a particular
abundance of proteins involved in cell structure, defense and immunity, DNA copying, the synthesis of
RNA and proteins, and communication between cells. Humans have an unusually high number of
complex proteins that fit into more than one functional category and many proteins that are embedded in
the surface of cells.

Since the genome sequence has been released as it was generated over the last four years, a large
number of discoveries have already been spawned by the sequence data. At least 30 different disease
genes have been identified by directly using sequence produced by the HGP. In the coming years, the
human genome should be sequenced to a finished state, where all gaps are closed and the sequence is
at least 99.99% accurate.

Genome sequence from other species will provide crucial insights about genes and the regions that
regulate their activity.

There will be a pressing need for improved methods to analyze the abundance of information being
generated. And genetics will become an increasingly important part of the medical mainstream.

The pressure will grow to encourage educated use of genetic information and to set thoughtful limits on
its use.
                                 Siebefindensich: Infos>Aktuelles> 02.02.19
                             LetzteAktualisierung: Thursday, February 21, 2002

         Pentagon Tests Ethnically-Targeted Crowd Control Weapons


                                          Sunshine-Project
                                          19. Februar 2002

US Army documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reveal disturbing
efforts to design crowd control weapons that target people on an ethnic basis. The weapons, a
group of foul-smelling chemicals called malodorants, are being developed for US soldiers to use
overseas.

According to the Sunshine Project, the US has crossed a dangerous line. Successful or not,
development of any ethnic weapon is intrinsically racist, and the international community
should consider their development, stockpiling, or use by any country a violation of
international law.

The Research

The Sunshine Project has obtained US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
contracts that detail testing of malodorant chemicals on human subjects. Malodorant weapons
are used to provoke vomiting and psychological effects including fear and panic.

Almost sixty years ago, the US developed a nauseating 'bathroom odor' chemical for use as a
weapon. But according to the Army, the old malodorant will not work outside of the US and
Western Europe, because "it was found that people in many areas of the world do not find
'fecal odor' to be offensive, since they smell it on a regular basis." Therefore, according to the
Army, new agents are needed for overseas missions. These new malodorants are to be
specifically adapted for their victims. According to a 1998 document: "The objective of this
work is the development of a comprehensive set of [malodorants] that can be applied against
any population set around the world to influence their behavior."

The documents describe the Army research procedure. A group of subjects selected "based on
a diversity of geographic origins and cultural heritage" is systematically exposed to candidate
malodorants to develop "culture-response data" based on ethnic categories. That data is
aggregated into "odor response profiles" that suggest the types and quantities of malodorants
necessary to "elicit a favorable behavioral response" (i.e. incapacitation, panic, or flight) when
used for crowd control on a particular ethnic group.

Malodorants themselves generally do not cause serious injury or death; but their physical and
psychological effects can be very powerful. They can be loaded in shells, grenades, mortar
rounds, and other devices. Malodorants can be used to control civil unrest (e.g. to halt
protests), and in combination with lethal weapons as a 'force multiplier' in counterinsurgency
and close combat in urban and enclosed areas.

The documents generally do not include details about research subjects and how researchers
categorize them. Some experiments have been conducted outside the United States, or on
immigrants. A February 2000 draft report refers to testing on "a group of South Africans".
Another Army document contains unexplained images of indigenous women and girls from
Panama or Colombia and southern Africa. Additional pictures appear to be from Africa and Asia,
and one shows a boy dressed as a typical US high school student.

Not Since Apartheid

Past research on ethnic weapons has been rare. The last known attempt to create ethnic
weapons was a widely condemned program conducted in the 1980s by the apartheid regime of
South Africa, which tried to develop an agent to selectively sterilize black women.

The new US malodorant program began in 1998 and is the first known US work on population-
specific weapons since "Project Agile" in 1966. In Agile, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) commissioned the Battelle Institute to assess the possibility of
making malodorants to specifically target Vietnamese people. Agile was short-lived and did not
reach a laboratory phase.

The Army's Partners

The US Army Soldier Chemical and Biological Command (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland)
has important partners in the malodorant research. The US Marine Corps-managed Joint Non-
Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP, Quantico, Virginia) is funding the research. Contracts signed
with the Monell Chemical Senses Center of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, include DAAD13-99-M-
0071 ("Behavioral Odor Study") and DAAD13-98-M-004 ("Establish Odor Response Profiles").

By Pentagon standards, the research is a small program, with five scientists. Contracts
between SBCCOM and Monell total US $195,000. The overall budget is unclear because the
Marine Corps and Army also conduct work internally, whose details have not been released.
JNLWP is, however, very active developing new delivery technology for malodorants including
chemical mortar rounds and payload systems for unmanned aerial vehicles.

Ethnic Weapons: Prima facie Evidence

Whether the malodorants work or fail, research on any ethnic weapon raises serious legal
questions and could set a very dangerous precedent. If the Pentagon saw any major legal
barriers to ethnic weapons it would not have approved the malodorant research. The
Pentagon's conclusion that ethnic weapons are permissible must be challenged. All such
weapons should be universally considered intrinsically racist and to repudiate international law.
To do this, governments should establish that the development, stockpiling, or use of ethnic
weapons is prima facie evidence of intent to violate international law prohibiting racism,
including prohibitions on genocide.

Inside the US, the malodorants research program must be cancelled, and the secretive Joint
Non-Lethal Weapons Program opened to public scrutiny and transparency. Among the
questions that the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program must publicly discuss is how its focus on
building weapons systems that primarily target civilians is legally and ethically justified.

About the Sunshine Project's Research on Malodorants

Early last year, the Sunshine Project began investigating US military work on malodorants and
calmatives (another type of crowd control agent). The Project's underlying concern is that
some of these weapons may violate treaties prohibiting chemical and biological warfare.

In July 2001, the Project published "Non-Lethal Weapons Research in the US: Calmatives and
Malodorants". In the course of preparing that paper, cryptic language in Army documents
caused the Project to become concerned that some crowd control research was designed to
develop population-specific weapons. Some Army documents indicated it was pursuing a single
'one-size-fits-all' malodorant that would affect people equally, regardless of ethnic background.
But other Army papers showed a disturbing preoccupation with ethnicity. After publishing the
first paper, the Sunshine Project filed additional FOIA requests, the results of which are first
reported here.

The information (and all double " " quotes) in this news release is from the Army response to a
   FOIA request from October 2001, which was not answered (and then only partially) until
   February 2002. Additional FOIA requests on this topic are pending, the results of which will be
   presented in Sunshine Project publications.




Non-Lethal Weapons Research in the US:
Calmatives and Malodorants



This paper is the first in a series of three reports on United States government research on chemical
and biological non-lethal weapons. Shaken by experiences such as its disastrous mission in Somalia,
the US has concluded that it lacks appropriate weapons for peacekeeping and other ³military
operations other than war´. To address this problem, the US has embarked on a program to develop
new non-lethal weapons to control both armed enemies and civilians. Militaries and domestic law
enforcement agencies in the United States and elsewhere are closely following this research and, in
some instances, participating. The non-lethal weapons research detailed here raises questions about
protection of civil liberties, particularly freedoms of thought and expression, and US compliance with
arms control agreements including the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. The second and third reports in this series will be published over the course of
2001 and will address genetically modified anti-materiel agents and new riot control technologies,
respectively.



This paper details research on two types of non-lethal weapons in the United States that threaten and
could undermine important international arms control agreements and basic personal freedoms of
thought and expression. Calmative and malodorant agents and their delivery systems are designed for
use against armed enemies, riots, and ³potentially hostile´ civilians. (1)

Calmative agents include an array of psychoactive substances whose effects range from inducing sleep
to overpowering hallucinations. In the past, use of calmatives has been understood to violate the
Chemical Weapons Convention; but new and dangerous interpretations of this agreement by US
military strategists threaten to open the way for use of calmatives by armed forces or even police,
especially in non-traditional conflicts such as peacekeeping. The United States Marine Corps and Army
are researching delivery technology for calmatives and using computer models of calmative agents¶
effects in offensive wargames.

Malodorant agents (³stink bombs´) have existed since the Second World War. Attempts were made as
late as 1966 to develop malodorants that target particular ethnic groups. Disastrous military
experiences such as that in Somalia and renewed interest from law enforcement has sparked a
renaissance of interest in malodorants for use in riot control and, possibly, war. Use of malodorant
agents, particularly by militaries, could promote use of chemical weapons in conflict and destabilize
controls on both chemical and biological weapons.



Calmative Agents
Calmatives are chemical or biological agents with sedative, sleep-inducing or similar psychoactive
effects. Chemical calmative weapons such as BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate, a compound related to
scopolamine) were developed during the Cold War. (2) Proponents of calmatives are creating a new
and alarming legal ambiguity surrounding their use.
In the US, new weapons must undergo legal review by the Judge Advocate General (JAG) prior to
development and again before production. In 1997, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy approved
a list of proposed new, advanced, or emerging technologies for weapons research. Among these were
gastrointestinal convulsives and calmative agents. (3)

The US Department of Defense (DoD) arguments imply the creation of two loopholes in the Chemical
Weapons Convention: the possible definition of psychoactive substances as riot control agents, (4) and
a distinction between ³military operations other than war´ and armed conflicts. In the latter, DoD
argues that even toxic chemicals would be of operational utility. In an article on legal aspects of non-
lethal weapons, Lieutenant Colonel M.A. Coppernoll pointed out that:

"Calmative and gastrointestinal convulsives, if classified as riot control agents, can be acceptable.
Once these technologies evolve into actual weapons or weapons systems, the Navy JAG will analyze
them again as to their toxic properties and compliance with international laws, treaties, and domestic
restrictions before final approval for series production, or rejection." (5)

Another article published by military strategists highlighted the ambiguity concerning calmatives and
similar agents in the US. In the view of the authors the use of calmative agents is not clearly
prohibited by the CWC; but instead subject to decisions made by the Pentagon:

"NLWs [non-lethal weapons] such as neural inhibitors, gastrointestinal convulsives,
neuropharmacological agents, calmative agents, and disassociative hallucinogens, and sedatives, may
be considered ´ temporary incapacitants´ and therefore defined as toxic chemicals prohibited by the
CWC for any purpose. («) If the Pentagon interprets the term ´ toxic chemicals´ to include
incapacitating NLWs, such as calmative agents, their utility in MRC [major regional conflict] is
questionable. The sole operational utility of chemical-based anti-personnel NLWs will then be in
MOOTW [military operations other than war], not MRC." (6)

The US debate over use of calmatives is not only a theoretical and legal exercise. The US armed forces
are conducting ongoing research on calmatives. In the 1999 Annual Report of the US Joint Non-Lethal
Weapons Program (JNLWP), calmatives are included as potential candidates for non-kinetic weapons
(i.e. those that do not use blunt trauma). Last year, a wargaming exercise (³Limited Objective
Experiment 001´) was planned to investigate the use of non-kinetic weapons, including ³calmative and
malodorant payloads´. The purpose of the calmatives experiment was:

"... to identify alternate means of offensive operations that will provide the National Command
Authority (NCA) and Joint Force Commanders (JFC) additional operational options when executing a
coercive campaign." (7) (Emphasis added)

Weapons with calmative payloads were modeled for wargames on the Joint Conflict and Tactical
Simulation (JCATS) computer simulation developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the
US military. (8)

JNLWP work to date has been based on the assumption that calmatives are legal weapons for use in
military operations. The outcome of the wargame exercise has not been released. (9)

In another project, the US Army is testing aerosolized ketamine, (10) an anesthetic and psychoactive
substance similar to BZ that has been identified as a potential chemical weapon agent. (11) Currently,
the US Army is funding a clinical Phase I/II trial for aerosolized ketamine through a ³Dual Use Science
and Technology Grant´. Innovative Drug Delivery Systems, Inc. (IDDS), a recently founded
pharmaceutical company in New York City, is working on special drug delivery platforms such as
metered nasal sprays. In 2000, IDDS was awarded a grant by the US Army to support clinical trials for
transmucosal ketamine use in acute orthopedic/traumatic injury. The trial will be performed at Johns
Hopkins University Medical Center. (12) While this trial¶s objective is to evaluate medical uses of
ketamine, it will also generate data and know-how on the use of ketamine or other calmatives as
sprays for non-lethal weapon purposes.



Malodorants
Why would somebody patent the odor of human feces? In June 2001, Ecological Technologies
Corporation, a small Texas company run by a retired US Navy Commander and former Naval
Laboratories researcher (13) obtained US patent 6,242,489 on ³malodorant compositions´. Ecological
Technologies claims the use of organic sulfur compounds and skatole ± the compound that makes
feces stink ± to produce the perfect ³stink bomb´. The rationale behind the invention is clarified in the
patent:

³The use of obnoxious olfactory stimuli to control and/or modify human behavior in this way is an
attractive concept for modern warfare « Heretofore malodorant compositions have been too toxic for
use when seeking to incapacitate and/or disperse an individual, or group of individuals «´ (14)
(emphasis added)

Malodorants are high on the list of non-lethal research priorities. US strategists have concluded that
odor-producing chemicals "are likely to be permitted under the CWC´. (15) The Joint Non-Lethal
Weapons Program sponsors a project that ³investigates odorants and their effects on behavior. It can
be used for riot control, to clear facilities, to deny an area, or as a taggant.´ (16) At the US Army
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center in Maryland, sophisticated experiments were performed to
identify the most obnoxious smells, one of which turned out to be ³US Government Standard
Bathroom Odor´. (17)

Interestingly, one of the key criteria for odorant selection was that they be ³not incapacitating or a
sensory irritant´, (18) an attempt to lay the groundwork to evade the CWC by preemptively and
unilaterally defining military malodorants as anything but chemical weapons. But the Army¶s criteria
are clearly faulty. The key function of malodorants is to irritate the chemical sense of humans.
Malodorants could indeed be seen as sensory irritants and thus as riot control agents. Article II of the
CWC defines riot control agents as follows:

7. "Riot Control Agent" means: Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in
humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following
termination of exposure. (emphasis added)



 Malodorants and Ethnic Warfare
Modern military use of malodorants dates to the Second World War when the US Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency, developed tubes of foul-smelling
substances for use in espionage.Malodorants have since been studied for use in riot control and other
military operations. (19)

The most disturbing of these studies was a 1966 effort by the United States to identify culturally
specific malodorants. A study on this kind of ethnic weapon was commissioned by US Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and conducted by the Battelle Institute in Ohio. The
purpose was ³to determine whether intercultural differences in olfaction exist, particularly with respect
to offensive smells, and if they do, to what extent they can be utilized in psychological warfare.´ (20)
Intercultural Differences in Olfaction is deeply imbued with racist ideas and contemplates the
questions ³Would an obnoxious odor precipitate flight from a contaminated area« [and] « Would it
prevent access to this area on a culturally selective basis?´ The idea was to disrupt Vietnamese
guerillas, control strategic areas, and capture pockets of resistance (e.g., urban conflict zones, caves,
bunkers) by using a carefully selected odor that overwhelmed Vietnamese; but left US troops
unaffected.

DARPA scoured anthropological literature on Asia, and particularly its indigenous peoples, to find
possible weapons and ways to use them. One conclusion was that malodorants might be used in
conjunction with anti-personnel bombing to manipulate the behavior of large, apparently civilian,
populations: ³« it might be possible to condition adverse behavior to specific odors« For example, if
bombs emitted a given odor upon explosion, the odor itself should become a fear-producing stimulus
because of its association with the fear experienced during the bombing.´ (21)

The researchers concluded that there was much work to do before effective ethnically targeted
malodorant weapons would exist. Fortunately, it appears that DARPA proceeded no further. The
report, however, indisputably confirms that the United States considered developing ethnically specific
weapons as late as 1966.

The resurgence of military interest in malodorants presents the danger that some may attempt to pick
up where DARPA¶s work left off. Scant publicly released details from recent studies of malodorants at
the US Army¶s Edgewood Chemical Biological Center may indicate that there is new interest in
ethnically tuned malodorants. (22)



Thus, malodorants used in military operations would clearly violate the Chemical Weapons Convention,
although law enforcement might be tempted to argue that they could be used as riot control agents,
falling into the same category as tear gas or pepper sprays. But there are at least three major arms
control problems that would result from the development and use of malodorants. First, on a
battlefield, malodorants pose the same escalating risk as riot control agents, which have been deemed
unacceptable in armed conflict because they could easily be confused with chemical weapons of a
more lethal nature. This could tragically turn a conventional conflict into all-out chemical war.

Secondly, development and weaponization of malodorants threatens the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC). This is because many of the most offensive smells are produced by living
organisms or are toxins derived from them. Even synthetic malodorants often mimic biologically
produced foul-smelling substances. Biologically based malodorants that are toxic are unquestionably
biological weapons. While malodorants typically pose little threat to human life, especially when
compared to pathogen weapons, there is considerable danger that malodorant development will
encourage lax interpretation and violation of the Bioweapons Convention.
Thirdly, at the development stage, malodorants could be used as a disguise for the development and
production of large scale and long distance chemical or biological weapons payload-dispensing devices.
These systems could be used with no further adaptation to deploy any other chemical (riot control
agents, calmatives or even lethal substances). No distinction will be possible between permitted
delivery devices for non-lethal malodorants and prohibited ones.

Finally, like all non-lethals, malodorants are not necessarily stand-alone weapons and might be used
as a ³force multiplier´ in an insidious combination with lethal arms (see box above).
Delivery devices
Malodorants have been used as a lead example agent in the development of microencapsulation
techniques, including binary compounds. (23) Microencapsulated weapons are very small pellets of an
agent coated with a shell that acts as a wall, protecting the active ingredient from the environment.
The agent is released when the pellet is crushed, in response to an environmental stimulus (e.g. a rise
in temperature or exposure to moisture) or, in one case of binary weapons, when the pellets are
exposed to a chemical that breaks down the protective wall. Alternatively, two precursors to a
chemical weapon could be pelletized together. When physical pressure (e.g., a footfall) is applied, the
chemicals mix and become active.

Other delivery devices currently under development by the US Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program that
go beyond domestic riot control purposes are chemical land mines, (24) 81mm chemical mortar shells
with a 1.5 km range, and a 120mm frangible mortar. (25) The development of one new chemical
mortar round, called the ³Overhead Chemical Agent Dispersal System´ (OCADS), has been contacted
out to the Primex subsidiary of General Dynamics, a major US weapons builder. According to the
JNLWP, the mid-air exploding OCADS is to ³rapidly disperse non-lethal chemical agents over large
areas« for crowd control or to provide a remotely generated protective barrier.´ (26)

In November 2000, the US Navy was granted a patent on a ³frangible payload-dispensing projectile´.
Frangible projectiles, such as bullets, do not use kinetic energy to incapacitate a target; but instead
break open upon impact and spray a chemical payload. The Navy¶s new patent on frangible bullets
contains detailed descriptions of using irritant and inflammatory rounds containing CS, CN and OC.
(27) While this projectile with a delivery range of 10-50 meters has application in riot control, the
question remains why the Navy is involved in R & D pertaining to the delivery of chemical riot control
agents.

Importantly, the general prohibition of chemical weapons in the CWC does not only include toxic
chemicals, but also munitions and delivery devices. The definition of chemical weapons in the CWC
(Article II, 1. (b)) reads in part:

« (b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic
properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result
of the employment of such munitions and devices;

If the development or production of prohibited chemical weapons systems was justified with
malodorants or other purposes that some argue are permitted under the Chemical Weapons
Convention, this important provision would become meaningless. This could result in opening the door
to development of a range of chemical weapons that were previously banned.



Conclusions
International arms control treaties must unambiguously prohibit any military or other coercive use of
psychoactive and malodorant substances. Military use of calmative agents not only violates the
Chemical Weapons Convention; but by virtue of the way calmatives work ± manipulating the
consciousness of victims ± pose threats to fundamental human rights including freedom of thought.
Malodorants, while comparatively benign in terms of psychological effects, are also destabilizing
because they can be easily confused with other, more deadly, chemical weapons, might be
detrimental to biological weapons controls, and could be used to multiply the effect of conventional
lethal weapons.

The research and development of calmative and malodorant weapons systems by the United States
thus creates serious challenges for arms control. Unfortunately, US military strategists are already
doing serious damage to the international consensus against these weapons by defining them as riot
control agents, thereby promoting a loosening of controls on these weapons.

The development of calmatives, malodorants and long-range delivery devices for chemical substances
threatens to open the way for use of chemical weapons in warfare. By deliberately pushing this line,
the US is threatening to undermine and severely weaken international arms control agreements,
particularly the Chemical Weapons Convention.



(1) See A Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command,
January 1998. URL: http://192.156.75.102/nonleth.htm

(2) Destruction of the US Cold War-era BZ stockpile began in 1988. See the Medical Management of
Chemical Casualties Handbook. URL:
http://ccc.apgea.army.mil/Documents/RedHandbook/001TitlePage.htm.

(3) Coppernoll MA (1999). The Non-Lethal Weapons Debate, Military Press, Spring 1999. URL:
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/1999/spring/art5-SP9.htm

(4)Toxic chemicals are defined in CWC Article II.2. as causing, inter alia, ³temporary incapacitation´,
while in Article II.7. riot controls are defined as producing, inter alia, ³disabling physical effects´. This
distinction is obviously less scientific than it is political.

(5) Coppernoll MA (1999). The Non-Lethal Weapons Debate.

(6) Coppernoll MA, Maniyama XK (1998) ³Legal and ethical guiding principles and constraints
concerning non-lethal weapons technology and employment.´ Presentation at the Non-Lethal Defense
III Symposium. URL: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/NLD3/copp.pdf

(7) JNLWP 1999 Annual Report, page 20. URL:
http://www.jnlwd.usmc.mil/Documents/1999AnnualReport.pdf

(8) For more information on JCATS, see http://www.llnl.gov/nai/group/JCATS.html.

(9) At time of writing, Limited Objective Experiment 001 is the subject of a Sunshine Project Freedom
of Information Act request.

(10) Ketamine is a powerful disassociative anesthetic and hallucinogen provoking ³out of body´
experiences. Related to phencyclidine (PCP), ketamine was used to treat combat casualties in
Vietnam. It remains in use by doctors and veterinarians (to tranquilize large animals). Ketamine is
also abused as an illegal recreational drug. It is a controlled substance in the US, where possession
carries a federal first offense penalty of up to five years in prison. See:
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/concern.htm.

(11) Bunker R J (1995). Non-Lethal Weapons: Terms and References, INSS Occasional Paper 15,
USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado. URL:
http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp15.htm

(12) See information at IDDS¶s website: http://www.idds.com/corporate/profile/
(13) ³A Body by Any Other Smell´ in Techbeat, National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology
Center, Spring 2001.

(14) US Patent 6,242,489.

(15) Coppernoll MA, Maniyama XK (1998) Legal and ethical guiding principles and constraints
concerning non-lethal weapons technology and employment. Presentation at the Non-Lethal Defense
III Symposium. URL: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/NLD3/copp.pdf

(16) JNLWP 1999 Annual Report, Annex. URL:
http://www.jnlwd.usmc.mil/Documents/1999AnnualReport.pdf

(17) Bickford L et al. Odorous Substances for Non-Lethal Application, slide No. 9. Presentation at NDIA
Non-Lethal Defense IV, 20-22 March 2000, URL: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/nld4/bickford.pdf

(18) ibid. Slide No. 6

(19) Bickford L et al (2000). Odorous Substances for Non-Lethal Application, Presentation at NDIA
Non-Lethal Defense IV, 20-22 March 2000, URL: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/nld4/bickford.pdf . Bickford
and three co-authors are researchers at the US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.

(20) Albert S and Hitt W. (1966) Intercultural Differences in Olfaction, Remote Area Conflict
Information Center, Battelle Memorial Institute, 2 May 1966. Part of DARPA¶s ³Project Agile´, Sunshine
Project DOD Freedom of Information Request 01-F-1021.

(21) Albert S and Hitt W., page 4.

(22) See Bickford L et al (2000). This presentation and related work is the subject of a current
Sunshine Project Freedom of Information Act request.

(23) Durant Y, Thiam M, Petcu C, VashistaN : Developing microcapsules for NLW applications.
Presentation at the NTAR II Symposium, November 2000 at the University of New Hampshire. URL:
http://www.unh.edu/ntar/PDF/Durant2.pdf

(24) See Alternative anti-personnel land mines: the next generations, a report by the German
Initiative to Ban Land Mines and Landmine Action (UK). URL:
http://landmine.de/fix/english_report.pdf

(25) Annual Report 1999 of the JNLWP, Annex. URL:
http://www.jnlwd.usmc.mil/Documents/1999AnnualReport.pdf

(26) Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program News, v.2, n.2, February 1999, page 4. URL:
http://www.jnlwd.usmc.mil/default2.htm.

(27) US patent 6,145,441, granted on November 14, 2000 to the US Secretary of the Navy.




GE Biological "Ethnic" Weapons Loom on the Horizon
Date: Thu, Jan 21, 1999
By Patricia Reaney
LONDON (Reuters) - Biological and genetic weapons designed to kill
specific ethnic or racial groups are no longer the stuff of science
fiction, British researchers said Thursday.
A designer plague that would only kill Serbs or a toxin engineered to
affect Israelis or Kurds does not exist yet but advances in biotechnology
and the mapping of all human genes could be misused to develop lethal
weapons within five to 10 years.
Dr Vivienne Nathanson, the head of health policy research at the
British Medical Association (BMA), said genetic information is already
being used to enhance biological weapons.
"It would be a tragedy if in 10 years time the world faces the reality
of genetically engineered and possibly genetically targeted weapons," she
told a news conference to launch a new book entitled "Biotechnology Weapons
and Humanity."
"It is not technology and information that is available today, but it
is becoming increasingly available. We do have a window of opportunity
before weapons of that type are manufactured to make sure we have effective
measures of prevention."
The book by Professor Malcolm Dando, of the Department of Peace
Studies at the University of Bradford in northern England, paints a
terrifying picture of the power of biological weapons.
The release of 220 pounds of anthrax spores from canisters planted in
a major city could wipe out up to three million people.
The book traces the history of the development and use of biological
weapons and warns that scientific knowledge has been exploited in the past
and is likely to be misused in the future unless international action is
taken.
"We believe biological weapons will become an increasing weapon in
terrorist activity," said Nathanson. "An ethnically targeted weapon becomes
more of a reality."
The designer weapon works on a similar principle to gene therapy but
instead of replacing faulty genes that don't work it exploits genetic
variations to target its victims.
For example, micro-organisms could be genetically engineered to attack
known receptor sites on the cell membrane or viruses could be targeted at
specific DNA sequences inside cells.
William Assche, the chairman of the BMA's board of science and
education, said the report is designed to raise public, medical and
political awareness about the dangers of biological weapons.
It urges the international community to strengthen the 1972 Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention to improve verification procedures. It also
calls on doctors and scientists to protect the integrity of their work and
to monitor the potential use of genome mapping.
"Getting rid of weapons once they are produced is very difficult.
Governments may be reluctant to give up weapons that the rest of the world
find unacceptable. Terrorists certainly will be," said Nathanson.
"We still have the chance to strengthen the ban on these weapons. We
must do so now and we must make sure the ban is policed effectively."
REUTERS




Biowar and the Apartheid Legacy
From 1981 to 1993 the South African National Defense force developed bioweapons for
the purpose of 'suppressing population growth among blacks.'

June 6, 2003 |


Just as the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction now seems a neocon-concocted mirage, word
has begun leaking out about the spread of bioweapons far more threatening than anything in Saddam
Hussein's purported arsenal.


A two-part story in the Washington Post on April 20 and 21 revealed that biological agents developed by
the South African government during its apartheid days have fallen into private hands. Written by Post
reporters Joby Warrick and John Mintz, the piece noted that unique, race-specific strains of biotoxins
were available on the world market -- for the right price or the right ideology.


WouterBasson, the man who directed South Africa's clandestine bioweapons program, "spoke candidly
[to federal officials] of global shopping sprees for pathogens and equipment, of plans for epidemics to be
sown in black communities and of cigarettes and letters that were laced with anthrax." The Post said
Basson "revealed the development of a novel anthrax strain unknown to the U.S. officials, a kind of
'stealth' anthrax that Basson claimed could fool tests used to detect the disease."


The top-secret program that Basson directed was called Project Coast, and it lasted from 1981 to 1993.
The South African National Defense Force created it at a time when the white-minority regime was under
increasing threat by indigenous black South Africans. DaanGoosen, the former director of Project Coast's
biological research division, told the Post he was ordered by Basson to develop ways "to suppress
population growth among blacks" and to "search for a 'black bomb,' a biological weapon that would select
targets based on skin color."


Goosen and others involved with Project Coast have insisted, at least publicly, that Basson's orders were
never carried out. Researchers who have studied the issue are not so sure. According to a 2002 book by
Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, "Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Weapons
Programme," there has never been any serious outside scrutiny of the project's products and "no records
are available to confirm that the biological agents were destroyed."


The Washington Post even noted, "Goosen says many scientists kept copies of organisms and
documents in order to continue work on 'dual-use' projects with commercial as well as military
applications." A May 2002 story on Project Coast in the Wall Street Journal reported that Goosen said he
has been "visited by scores of people looking for 'stuff to kill the blacks.'" Race-specific weapons naturally
are in hot demand among racists, so it's no surprise that South Africa's race-specific research is highly
coveted.


In January 1999, the British Medical Association (BMA) began warning the world of the dangers of ethnic
weapons. Although the report, "Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity," made no direct charge, it said
the BMA could no longer ignore the varied reports that such weapons were currently being developed.
The report concluded: "Weapons could theoretically be developed which affect particular versions of
genes clustered in specific ethnic or family groups." The possibilities of producing such weapons have
been enhanced with the 2002 completion of the Human Genome Project.


The 1999 BMA study was provoked in part by a 1998 story in the London Sunday Times alleging that
Israel already had developed a genetically specific weapon. "Unnamed South African sources," according
to a report cited by the Times, "[say] Israeli scientists have used some of the South African research in
trying to develop an 'ethnic bullet' against Arabs." Reported links between Israel's ethnic weapons and
South Africa's Project Coast are tentative; some would say tenuous. But the possibility of such links is
terrifying, and justifies as much scrutiny as was focused on Iraq's imaginary arsenal.


It also appears that the anthrax incidents of 2001, in which five people died and 13 were sickened, may
also have a South African connection. The Post noted that officials found evidence in a Frederick,
Maryland, pond that may explain how the perpetrators of the deadly attacks used water to handle the
lethal toxin without infecting themselves or loosing the anthrax spores.
 On May 11, the Post said the water theory is the result of the FBI's interest in one person, Steven J.
 Hatfill, a medical doctor and bioterrorism expert who formerly worked for the U.S. Army, and who lists
 South African diplomas in diving and underwater medicine on his résumé. A June 2002 article in the
 Hartford Courant reported that Hatfill also worked with a guerilla unit of the white-supremacist Rhodesian
 army from 1978 to 1980, when "an anthrax outbreak killed hundreds and sickened thousands of
 villagers." He also lived in South Africa, "where he completed various military-medical assignments."


 Hatfill's connections to South African and Rhodesian apartheid are much more apparent than his alleged
 link to the anthrax mailings. But the legacy of Project Coast blurs that distinction considerably.


 SalimMuwakkil is a senior editor of In These Times, where he has worked since 1983, and a weekly op-
 ed columnist for the Chicago Tribune.




                              Analysis of the Anthrax Attacks
                                            Barbara Hatch Rosenberg,
                                         Federation of American Scientists


   I.     LA Times Op-Ed, 22 September, 2002
  II.     Letter and Victim Chronology, Updated 29 August, 2002
 III.     Statement by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, 11 August 2002
 IV.      Commentary 5 February 2002: Is the FBI Dragging Its Feet?
  V.      Letter Chronology, Updated 31 January 2002
 VI.      Notes on the Letters, 31 January 2002
VII.      Analysis of the Attacks, 17-31 January 2002
VIII.     Appendix: Laboratories That Have Worked with the Ames Strain of Anthrax
 IX.      Ancillary Materials
            1. FBI Letter to ASM Members, 29 January 02
            2. White House Press Briefing, 25 February 02


 (note: an archive of anthrax related news articles can be found here.)

 I. LA Times Op-Ed

    Anthrax Attacks Pushed Open an Ominous Door
    By Barbara Hatch Rosenberg
    22 September, 2002
PURCHASE, N.Y. -- On this first anniversary of the anthrax attacks, a number of
conclusions can be drawn even without an arrest by the FBI. First, the strain and
properties of the weaponized anthrax found in the letters show that it originated within
the U.S. biodefense program, where the necessary expertise and access are found.
Government officials recognized that the anthrax source was domestic less than two
weeks after they learned of the letters, and nothing in their investigation has led them
to say otherwise since.

One can also conclude that, given the origin of the anthrax and the warnings contained
in the letters, the perpetrator's motive was not to kill but rather to raise public fear and
thereby spur Congress to increase spending on biodefense. In this, the attacks have
been phenomenally successful.

Paradoxically, however, by breaking the taboo on using biological weapons, the
attacks have engendered a threat that could dwarf September 11. Modes of successful
attack and public responses have now been demonstrated for the instruction of future
terrorists. What's more, it seems to have been easy to hide incriminating evidence,
and, after a whole year of FBI bumbling, it looks likely that the attacker will get away
with the crime. Although the death toll was relatively low, the strikes crippled
business, government and postal services. Contamination in buildings has proved
difficult, costly and time-consuming to remove, with some facilities still not restored;
the public health system was strained beyond capacity.

Although biodefense has gotten a shot in the arm, it is important to understand that the
goal of defending against bioweapons is not primarily public protection--which is
largely impossible, as last year's attacks demonstrated. It is rather "to allow the
military forces of the United States to survive and successfully complete their
operational missions ... in battlespace environments contaminated with chemical or
biological warfare agents," according to the annual report of the Department of
Defense's Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

Biological weapons are preeminently anti-population weapons. But it would be
impossible to provide the entire country with protective suits, masks, detectors,
shelters, training and vaccinations against the large and growing array of potential
agents. In any event, vaccinations can have serious side effects and can be overcome if
the dose of the pathogenic agent is large or if the agent has been engineered to evade
the vaccine.

Instead of protection, the civil defense response is entirely concerned with limiting the
damage should an attack occur. There are also paradoxes here. Because of the rush to
"do something," large amounts of government money are being thrown, without
sufficient forethought, at research involving potential biological weapons agents.
Scientists go where the money is, and we're now seeing a crowd of biologists lacking
in relevant experience trooping to the trough.
The number of research laboratories and personnel handling dangerous pathogens is
about to mushroom, making oversight and adequate safety and security control much
more difficult to impose--particularly with the increased emphasis on secrecy.
Ultimately, the very problem that made the anthrax attacks possible will be magnified.

One can confidently expect the U.S. to squander resources that could far better be used
to extend the modest improvements being made in the public health system. Natural
outbreaks of disease, including rapidly emerging new diseases for which we are
unprepared, are a far more likely hazard for most people. Improving the public health
system's ability to respond would help combat these diseases as well as biological
attacks.

The anthrax probe has disclosed an astounding degree of irresponsibility and lack of
security at Ft. Detrick, Md., home to the nation's premier existing biodefense
laboratory. The problems stretch back for decades and extend beyond the anthrax
attacks. In spite of a security crackdown there following the attacks, two incidents
have occurred this year at Ft. Detrick in which spores escaped from a high-
containment laboratory and were found in hallways, offices and locker rooms. One
case was recognized only when an unauthorized employee took swabs outside the
laboratory to check for anthrax contamination--something no one had thought of doing
there before.

The anthrax investigation has raised questions about the nature and value of the work
at Ft. Detrick and has brought to light the granting of security clearance and free
access to highly dangerous biological agents to someone with falsified credentials--
very disturbing whether or not he turns out to be the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks.

Even more serious concerns have been raised by the discovery of secret biodefense
projects that push against the limits of international prohibitions. It was recently
revealed that an Army laboratory in Utah has been secretly making weaponized
anthrax for some years. Another secret project involved the construction of bomblets
designed for dispersion of biological agents, although the Biological Weapons
Convention explicitly prohibits developing, producing or possessing "means of
delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes." Such projects
have raised suspicions abroad that the U.S. continues to develop biological weapons--
suspicions that, even if not true, are likely to spur a new biological arms race.

Experts agree that a significant bioterror attack today would require the support of a
national program to succeed. But for two years now, the U.S. has opposed every
international effort to monitor the ban on the development and possession of
biological weapons by states or to strengthen the toothless Biological Weapons
Convention in any way.

The anthrax attacks have not altered that stance. Two weeks ago, I attended an
informal meeting in Geneva where diplomats from six continents struggled in the face
of U.S. intransigence to map out a joint strategy for combating the global biological
  threat. The United States had demanded that a formal Biological Weapons Convention
  conference, scheduled to take place during two weeks in November, should instead
  disband in one day with only an agreement not to meet again until 2006. To make sure
  that the American resolve prevails in this setting where international consensus is de
  rigueur, the U.S. demand was accompanied by an overt threat to disrupt any further
  proceedings with accusations that would make productive international action
  impossible.

  At that Geneva meeting, the assembled diplomats, representing the political spectrum
  from our closest allies to declared enemies, were uniformly frustrated. They find it
  hard to comprehend why a country that has just been the victim of bioterrorism should
  stand in the way of peaceful efforts supported by all its allies to deter bioterrorism.

  It is surprising how quickly public terror in response to the anthrax attacks turned to
  public indifference. But the story isn't over. The likelihood of bioterrorism is
  increasing, and the American public is still the preferred target. Government decisions
  will be critical in determining the sequel. The preservation of public health and safety,
  like freedom, will now require public vigilance.


II. Letter and Victim Chronology
    Updated 29 August, 2002

  Sept.
                       Mailing of anthrax letters to NBC and NY Post and probably to the
  18,      Trenton
                       National Enquirer.
  2001
  Sept.    St.        Mailing of hoax letters to NBC and probably to NY Post [and National
  20       Petersburg Enquirer?]
  Sept.                Mailing of accusatory letter to Quantico Marine Base accusing Dr. Asaad,
           place?
  21                   former USAMRIID scientist, as terrorist.
  Sept.                NBC received and opened ANTHRAX letter (brown granular sandy); not
           NYC
  19-25                recognized as dangerous, and not reported by media.
  Sept.                NBC received and opened HOAX letter postmarked 20 Sept; notified FBI
           NYC
  25                   but incident not reported by media.
  Oct. 1 DC            Washington Times article quoting SH (reprint from 11 Aug 97).
           Boca
  Oct. 2               Stevens (AMI) checked into hospital, near death, undiagnosed.
           Raton
           Boca
  Oct. 4               First report of anthrax case, 5pm (Stevens, AMI).
           Raton
           Boca
  Oct. 5               Death of first anthrax victim (Stevens, inhalation anthrax).
           Raton
  Oct. 5 St.           Mailing of hoax letters hoax letters to J. Miller at NY Times and H.
         Petersburg Troxler at St. Petersburg Times.
Oct. 5-
        US media     Suspicion of possible bioterrorism is increasing but mail not implicated.
8
Oct. 6- Boca
                     At AMI, spores found in 2nd worker and on Stevens' computer keyboard.
7       Raton
                     2nd worker (Blanco, mailroom worker) at AMI sick, nasal spores detected;
         Boca
Oct. 8               FBI takes over investigation, seals AMI office. Blanco later confirmed to
         Raton
                     have inhalation anthrax.
Oct. 9 US media      Looks like bioterrorism (letters not yet recognized as source).
         St.
Oct. 9              Troxler (St. P Times) opened hoax letter.
         Petersburg
Oct. 9 Trenton       Mailing of anthrax letters to Daschle and Leahy.
Oct.     Boca        3rd AMI worker (2nd in mailroom) tests positive for anthrax. FBI now
10       Raton       conducting criminal investigation. Anthrax strain appears to be Ames.
Oct.                 First suspicion that source of anthrax at AMI might be a letter (not
         US media
10-12                found), since two of those affected work in mailroom.
Oct.
         NYC         Miller at NYT opened hoax letter.
12
Oct.
         US media    First reports of any anthrax of hoax letters to media.
12-13
Oct.                 NBC cutaneous anthrax case reported (Brokaw's Assistant). First symptom
         NYC
12                   was 25 Sept.
                     NBC anthrax letter and hoax letter first reported. (FBI had ignored NBC
Oct.                 hoax letter, opened 25 Sept., until anthrax diagnosed on 12 Oct.) Brokaw's
         NYC
13                   Assistant now recalls seeing a second letter, weeks earlier, containing a
                     brown, granular substance, most of which was discarded but letter retained.
Oct.     Boca        At least 6 workers at AMI have tested positive for anthrax and are on
13       Raton       antibiotics.
Oct.
         US media    Copycat hoax letters now appearing.
14 ff
Oct.
         DC          Daschle's office opened anthrax letter.
15
Oct.                 Infant who was at ABC office on 28 Sept. has cutaneous anthrax. No
         NYC
16                   further evidence at ABC, suggests case due to cross-contamination of mail.
Oct.                 Two postal workers report possible symptoms; by 20 Oct both diagnosed
         Trenton
16                   with inhalation anthrax.
Oct.                 NY Post anthrax employee diagnosed with cutaneous anthrax (symptoms
         NYC
19                   started 22 Sept); letter with anthrax found unopened in mailroom.
                       Employee remembers opening a similarly-addressed (hoax) letter earlier.
  Oct.
          US Media     First mention that source of anthrax letters is probably domestic.
  20
                       Several DC postal workers may have anthrax. By 25 Oct, two DC postal
  Oct.
          DC           workers were dead and two more ill, as well as a State Dept. mail processer,
  21
                       all with inhalation anthrax.
  Oct.
          US media     Increasing concentration on domestic source for letters.
  24 ff
                       Dead from inhalation anthrax: Kathy Nguyen, hospital worker. No source
  Oct.
          NYC          found; presumed cross-contamination of mail, although clinical
  31
                       observations suggest a large initial dose.
                       FBI released profile of sender of anthrax letters, implying the source is
  Nov. 9 US Media
                       domestic.
  Nov.
          UK           Mailing of hoax letter to Daschle office in Capitol.
  15
  Nov.                 Anthrax letter to Leahy found unopened in bag of Congressional mail held
          DC
  16                   without distribution since Daschle letter received.
  Nov.                 Connecticut woman dies of inhalation anthrax; source probably cross-
          CT
  16                   contamination of mail.
  Jan.
                       Daschle's Capitol office opened hoax letter (delay in receipt due to
  03,     DC
                       irradiation of Capitol mail).
  2002


III. Statement by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg
   11 August 2002

  I have never mentioned any names in connection with the anthrax investigation, not to
  the FBI, nor to media, nor to Senate Committees or staffs, not to anyone. I have never
  said or written anything publicly that pointed only to one specific person. Anyone who
  sees parallels is expressing his own opinion.

  It is the FBI that has gone out of its way to make one suspect's name public. I presume
  they must have had some good reason for doing that; only time will tell. But if the
  publicity was not an important part of their investigative strategy, I think it was
  reprehensible.

  Barbara Hatch Rosenberg
IV. Commentary: Is the FBI Dragging Its Feet?
  February 5, 2002

  For more than three months now the FBI has known that the perpetrator of the anthrax
  attacks is American. This conclusion must have been based on the perpetrator's
  evident connection to the US biodefense program. In addition to this signpost, the
  perpetrator has left multiple, blatant clues, seemingly on purpose: second letters,
  addressed similarly to the anthrax letters and containing powder, sent to most (and
  possibly all) the anthrax recipients; similar letters sent to several other media
  organizations; even a letter, addressed to the Military Police at the Quantico Marine
  Base, accusing a former USAMRIID scientist (with whom the anonymous writer says
  he once worked) of having bioterrorist intentions. Almost all the letters were mailed
  before there were any reports of anthrax letters or of hoax letters sent to media (see
  "Analysis of the Anthrax Attacks" below for a chronology and discussion of the
  available data). The postal addresses and dates of these letters map out an itinerary of
  the perpetrator(s) and indicate certain connections, which taken together must single
  out the perpetrator from the other likely suspects.

  This evidence permits a more refined estimate of the perpetrator's motives. He must be
  angry at some biodefense agency or component, and he is driven to demonstrate, in a
  spectacular way, his capabilities and the government's inability to respond. He is
  cocksure that he can get away with it. Does he know something that he believes to be
  sufficiently damaging to the United States to make him untouchable by the FBI?

  The perpetrator is surely too smart to believe that either the FBI's ludicrous recent
  actions or the White House protestations of ignorance mean that the authorities are not
  on to him. Blanketing Central New Jersey with fliers showing handwriting that was
  obviously disguised can't possibly evoke useful information, nor can letters to 32,000
  American microbiologists, 31,800 of whom live in a different world from the
  perpetrator. This is no way to instill public confidence in the competence of the FBI.
  The press is increasingly questioning the situation, and other scientists have
  independently raised similar issues (see, for example, "In Search of the Anthrax
  Attacker" http://www.redflagsweekly.com/nassanthrax3.html). Most importantly, the
  apparent lack of action is sending a dangerous message to potential bioterrorists.



V. Letter Chronology
   Updated January, 31 2002

  Four letters with anthrax have been found, and a fifth (to AMI) was apparently
  discarded after opening. In addition, at least three of the five anthrax recipients also
  received "hoax" letters containing an innocuous powder; and several different media
  offices received similar hoax letters. Some of the hoax letters were mailed BEFORE
  the first anthrax case (in Florida) was reported, and all but one hoax letter were mailed
    BEFORE there were any reports of anthrax letters or hoax letters. Therefore the hoax
    letters targeting media are not simply a copycat phenomenon. The envelopes on most
    or all of the hoax letters were addressed in block capitals similar to the addresses on
    the anthrax envielopes, even though they were mailed before the anthrax envelopes
    became known. A photograph of one hoax letter (to St. Petersburg Times) has been
    published, and descriptions or comparisons of others have been reported. If analysis
    confirms that the hoax letters were sent by the anthrax perpetrator, their postmarks
    will indicate his itinerary (or the assistance of an accomplice)-see chronology below.

    At least three hoax letters, known to have been mailed from St. Petersburg, are similar
    in many ways to each other and to the anthrax letters: addresses written in similar
    block capitals, tone of letters, unconvincing misspellings. Were the enclosed letters
    also xeroxed? no fingerprints? stamps not licked? Are the other hoax letters similar?

    Furthermore, an anonymous letter accusing a former USAMRIID scientist of plotting
    terrorism was sent to police BEFORE any anthrax letters or disease were reported.
    The letter contains evidence that the anonymous writer had probably worked at
    USAMRIID. This letter may also come from the anthrax perpetrator.

s
Your Ad Here
    DATE        LOCATION EVENT
    Sept. 18,                    Mailed anthrax letters to NBC and NY Post (and probably to National
              Trenton
    2001                         Enquirer).
    Sept. 20    St. Petersburg Mailed hoax letter to NBC and possibly to NY Post** [& Natl. Enq.?]
    Sept. 19-                    NBC received & opened anthrax letter (brown granular sandy); not
    25                           recognized as dangerous.
    Sept. 25                     NBC received & opened hoax letter.
                                 Mailed letter to Quantico Marine Base accusing Dr. Asaad, former
    late Sept. place?
                                 USAMRIID scientist, of being a terrorist.
    Oct. 4                       First report of anthrax case (in Florida).
    Oct. 5                       Death of first anthrax victim (in Florida)
                                 Mailed hoax letters to J. Miller at NY Times and H. Troxler at St.
    Oct. 5      St. Petersburg
                                 Petersburg Times.
                                 Mailed hoax letters to CBS (DC), Fox News and possibly to NY
    Oct. ~5-9 place?
                                 Post**
    Oct. 9                       Troxler (St. Petersburg Times) opened hoax letter.
    Oct. 9      Trenton          Mailed anthrax letters to Daschle and Leahy.
    Oct. 12                      Miller at NYT opened hoax letter.
    Oct. 12-
                                 First reports of any letters to media.
    13
                             NBC anthrax case and both suspicious letters first reported. (FBI had
  Oct. 13
                             previously overlooked events at NBC.)
  Oct. 13                    CBS News (D.C.) received envelope with powder visible on outside.
  Oct. 8-13                  Fox News received hoax letter.
  Oct. 15                    Daschle's Hart office opened anthrax letter.
                             NY Post anthrax case diagnosed and letter with anthrax found
  Oct. 19                    unopened in mailroom. Employee remembers opening a similarly-
                             addressed (hoax) letter**, earlier.
  late Nov. UK               Mailed hoax letter to Daschle office in Capitol.
  Jan. 03,                   Daschle's Capitol office opened hoax letter (delay in receipt due to
  2002                       irradiation of Capitol mail).


VI. Notes on the Letters
    January 31, 2002

   1. Florida anthrax letter: postal traces show that a letter containing anthrax must have been
      sent to the National Enquirer at its previous address, then forwarded to the AMI office.
      This indicates that the perpetrator was not familiar with AMI and the Natl. Enquirer.

   2. Florida hoax letter?: Possibly a hoax letter was discarded without notice, as the anthrax
      letter was. In addition, on approximately 4 Sept. AMI received a fan letter containing
      powder and a star of David, addressed to actress Jennifer Lopez c/o The Sun (one of the
      AMI tabloids). Because the anthrax letter was evidently addressed to the National
      Enquirer, not The Sun, the Sun letter is probably irrelevant.

   3. Hoax letter to NY Post: was received and thrown out sometime before 19 Oct. It was
      addressed to the Editor in block capitals, similar to the anthrax letter received by the NY
      Post. The NY Post hoax letter could have been mailed on 5 Oct. from St. Petersburg,
      along with the hoax letters to the NY Times and St. Petersburg Times, or it could have
      been mailed earlier (eg, on 20 Sept., when the hoax letter was mailed to NBC). The
      anthrax letters to NBC and the NY Post had been mailed at the same time (18 Sept) and it
      is possible that the perpetrator mailed hoax letters on 20 Sept to all of those previously
      sent anthrax.

   4. Hoax letter to NBC: letter contained talcum and was mailed from St. P on 20 Sept., two
      days after the anthrax letter was mailed to NBC from Trenton. Both letters contained
      threats to Israel.

   5. Hoax letters to Judith Miller at the NY Times and Howard Troxler at the St. Petersburg
      Times: these were mailed on 5 Oct. from St. Petersburg and were similar in appearance
      and content to the NBC hoax letter mailed from St. P on 20 Sept. but not yet reported.
      The NY Times and St. P Times letters were in stamped, plain envelopes with no return
      address. A photo of the St. P. envelope was published in the St. P Times, showing great
      similarity to the printing on the anthrax letters (which had not yet been reported-in two
      cases-or mailed-in the other two cases). The NY Times letter contained talcum and
      threatened the Sears Tower in Chicago and President Bush. The St P Times letter
      contained what looked like sugar or salt and said "Howard Toxler...1st case of disease
      now blow away this dust so you can see how the real thing flys. Oklahoma-Ryder Truck!
      Skyway bridge-18 wheels."

   6. Hoax letters to CBS News in Washington, DC and to Fox News: were received on or
      shortly before 13 Oct. No further information has been reported. They could have been
      mailed from St. Petersburg on 5 Oct., along with the NY Times and St. P Times letters;
      or from a place between St. Petersburg and Trenton between 5-9 Oct. Oct. On 12 Oct. an
      FBI official said they were investigating multiple mailed envelopes from St. Petersburg.
      The St. Petersburg Police Chief would not comment on whether that included other
      letters in addition to those sent NBC, NY Times and St. P Times.

   7. Hoax letter to Senator Daschle: was received and opened by Sen. Daschle's office in the
      Capitol on 3 Jan. 02, after a delay for irradiation. The letter was mailed from the UK. The
      envelope contained a powder and a threatening letter unlike those that were mailed with
      anthrax, according to the FBI. This letter was mailed much later than the others,
      sometime in late Nov., a month after the other hoax letters and the anthrax letters had
      been reported. Whether the letter was addressed in block printing, like the anthrax letters,
      has not been revealed.

   8. Anonymous letter of accusation: contained a long, typed letter with good command of
      English language, displaying considerable knowledge of Dr. Assaad, his work at
      USAMRIID and his personal life and accusing Assaad of planning terrorism. The letter
      was shown by the FBI to Assaad and his lawyer. The FBI subsequently
      exhonoratedAssaad. The letter, sent to the Marine base at Quantico, VA., asserts that the
      accuser formerly worked with Assaad. It was sent before any cases of anthrax were
      discovered.



VII. Analysis of the Source of the Anthrax Attacks
   January 17-31, 2002

   1. The Present Situation
         y The FBI has surely known for several months that the anthrax attack was an
            inside job. A government estimate for the number of scientists involved in the US
            anthrax program over the last five years is 200 people. According to a former
            defense scientist the number of defense scientists with hands-on anthrax
            experience and the necessary access is smaller, under 50. The FBI has received
            short lists of specific suspects with credible motives from a number of
            knowledgeable inside sources, and has found or been given clues (beyond those
            presented below) that could lead to incriminating evidence. By now the FBI must
            have a good idea of who the perpetrator is. There may be two factors accounting
            for the lack of public acknowledgement and the paucity of information being
           released: a fear that embarrassing details might become public, and a need for
           secrecy in order to acquire sufficient hard evidence to convict the perpetrator.

2. Anthrax Strain
      y All letter samples contain the same strain of anthrax, corresponding to the AMES
         strain in the Northern Arizona University database (which has been used for
         identification). The Ames strain possessed by N. Arizona University is referred to
         herein as the "reference strain." That strain was obtained by LSU from
         PortonDown (UK) in 1997 (the sample was marked "10-32" meaning no. 10 of 32
         samples sent); Porton had gotten it from Fort Detrick. Fort Detrick got it from
         Texas A&M (but mistakenly attributed it to the USDA laboratory in Ames, Iowa)
         in 1981. Earlier anthrax isolates from Ames, Iowa have caused some confusion
         but they are no longer relevant to the situation, thanks to recent genetic analyses
         (see below).

       y   Contrary to early speculation, there are no more than about 20 laboratories known
           to have the Ames strain. The names of 15 of these have been found in the open
           literature (see Appendix). Of these, probably only about four in the US might
           possibly have the capability for weaponizing anthrax. Those four include both US
           military laboratories and a government contractor.

       y   Genetic analysis performed at Northern Arizona University on Ames strain
           samples from Fort Detrick (USAMRIID), Dugway Proving Ground, the UK
           defense establishment at Porton, Louisiana State University and Northern Arizona
           University has shown that all of these laboratories possess identical anthrax stocks
           that match the letter anthrax perfectly (in the limited analyses that have been
           done). All these stocks were originally derived from Fort Detrick's 1980 Ames
           strain. USAMRIID acknowledges that it also provided Ames to the Canadian
           defense establishment at Suffield, the University of New Mexico, and Battelle
           Memorial Institute (a large contracting organization with laboratories and
           personnel in many locations including military laboratories).

       y   Excluding the three academic institutions, two of which are intimately involved in
           the investigation, and the two foreign defense laboratories, places the focus on
           USAMRIID, Dugway and Battelle as the source of the Ames strain for the letters.

       y   The complete sequence has been determined for the genomes of both the anthrax
           used in the Florida attack and the Ames reference strain to which it corresponds.
           This work was done under government contract by the Institute for Genetic
           Research, a private non-profit organization. The results have not been made
           public but they are in government hands and there has been no retraction of the
           oft-repeated official statement that the letter anthrax matches the Ames reference
           strain.

       y   Analysis of trace contaminants in the letter anthrax has probably been carried out
           but not reported. The results could indicate whether the anthrax was grown in
           liquid medium (and what kind of medium), or on petri dishes; the latter would
           likely rule out large-scale preparation. It has been estimated that the perpetrator
           used a total of about 10g in the letters.

3. Anthrax Weaponization
      y "Weaponization" is used here to mean preparation of the form of anthrax found in
         the Daschle letter: fine particles, very narrow size range, treated to eliminate static
         charge so it won't clump and will float in the air. The weaponization process used
         was extraordinarily effective. The particles have a narrow size range (1.5-3
         microns diameter), typical of the optimal US process.

       y   The extraordinary concentration (one trillion spores per gram) and purity of the
           letter anthrax is believed to be characteristic of material made by the optimal US
           process.

       y   The optimal US weaponization process is secret-Bill Patrick, its inventor, holds
           five secret patents on the process and says it involves a combination of chemicals
           . There is no evidence that any other country possesses the formula.

       y   Under the microscope, the letter anthrax appears to be unmilled. Milled anthrax
           spores are identifiable because they contain debris. The optimal US process does
           not use milling.

       y   The Daschle sample contains a special form of silica used in the US process. It
           does not contain bentonite (used by the Iraqis).

       y   A "coating" on the spores in the letter sample, indicative of the secret US process,
           has been observed.

       y   The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Washington, DC has studied the
           sample using an energy dispersive X-ray specroscope, which can detect the
           presence of extremely tiny quantities of chemicals; traces of several chemicals
           have been found (but not reported, presumably for security reasons).

       y   All the letters probably contained the same material. The clumping of the anthrax
           in the two letters mailed on Sept 18 (to NBC and the NY Post) probably resulted
           from the letters getting wet in the course of mail processing or delivery, according
           to Army scientists. This conclusion is strengthened by the similarity of the Florida
           anthrax (the first to be observed, probably also mailed on Sept 18) to that in the
           Daschle letter, mailed Oct 9.

       y   The letter anthrax was made after 1980 (when the Ames strain used was obtained)
           using a process similar to the secret, optimal US process. If the anthrax was
           weaponized by the perpetrator himself, there may be some differences from
           anthrax weaponized by the government, depending on the availability of materials
           to the perpetrator and the conditions of preparation.

4. Other Clues
y   Scientists formerly at USAMRIID say that it would have been easy for a scientist
    working with anthrax to remove a sample of the Ames strain from the lab. Only a
    miniscule amount would be needed, and security has been lax.

y   On the other hand, experts believe that it would be extremely difficult to steal 10g
    of weaponized anthrax from a government lab. Thus, the perpetrator very likely
    grew and weaponized the letter anthrax himself.

y   There was only one week between Sept 11 and Sept 18, when the first two letters
    (and probably another letter, never found, to AMI) were postmarked. This
    suggests that the anthrax was already in hand, and the attack largely planned,
    before Sept 11.

y   A classified report dated February, 1999 discusses responses to an anthrax attack
    through the mail. The report, precipitated by a series of false anthrax mailings,
    was written by William Patrick, inventor of the US weaponization process, under
    a CIA contract to SAIC. The report describes what the US military could do and
    what a terrorist might be able to achieve. According to the NY Times (12 Dec.
    01) the report predicted about 2.5g of anthrax per envelope (the Daschle letter
    contained 2g) and assumed a poorer quality of anthrax than that found in the
    Daschle letter. If the perpetrator had access to the materials and information
    necessary for the attack, he must have had security clearance or other means for
    accessing classified information, and may therefore have seen the report and used
    it as a model for the attack.

y   An anonymous letter was sent to police, apparently in September, accusing an
    Egyptian-born American scientist who had been laid off by USAMRIID of being
    a terrorist. The FBI questioned and released the accused scientist as innocent.
    Details of the letter have not been released. Could this letter have been sent by the
    perpetrator (who would likely have known about the USAMRIID lay-offs) to
    cover his traces?

y   The perpetrator did not aim to kill but to create public fear. The letters warned of
    anthrax or the need to take antibiotics, making it possible for those who handled
    the letters to protect themselves; and it is unlikely that the perpetrator would have
    anticipated that the rough treatment of mail in letter sorters, etc, would force
    anthrax spores through the pores of the envelopes (which were taped to keep the
    anthrax inside) and infect postal workers and others.

y   The perpetrator was probably ready before Sept. 11 and simply took advantage of
    the likelihood that Sept. 11 would throw suspicion on Muslim terrorists. Was the
    perpetrator trying to push the US toward some retaliatory military action?

y   The perpetrator must have realized in advance that the anthrax attack would result
    in the strengthening of US defense and response capabilities. This is not likely to
    have been a goal of anti-American terrorists, who would also be unlikely to warn
    the victims in advance. Perhaps the perpetrator stood to gain in some way from
           increased funding and recognition for biodefense programs. Financial
           beneficiaries would include the BioPort Corp., the source of the US anthrax
           vaccine, and other potential vaccine contractors.

       y   Expert analysts for the FBI believe that the letters were written by a Westerner,
           not a Middle Easterner or Muslim, although the text was clearly intended to imply
           the latter.

       y   The choice of a variety of media as targets seems to have been cleverly designed
           to ensure a broad spectrum of publicity about the attacks. The choice of Senators
           Daschle and Leahy suggests that the perpetrator may lean to the political right and
           may have some specific grudge against those Senators.

       y   The perpetrator successfully covered every personal trace when he prepared and
           mailed the letters, which suggests that he had forensic training or experience.

       y   Even if the perpetrator did not make the anthrax himself, just filling the letters
           with it was a dangerous operation. The perpetrator therefore must have received
           the anthrax vaccine recently (it requires a yearly booster shot). The vaccine is in
           short supply and is not generally accessible, and vaccination records are
           undoubtedly available. The perpetrator also appears to have special expertise in
           evading contamination while handling weaponized anthrax.

5. Government Statements, Actions and Chronology
     y On 13 Jan. 02 Homeland Security Director Thomas Ridge said "the primary
         direction of the investigation is turned inward" toward domestic terrorists.

       y   On 2 Dec. 01 a law enforcement official close to the federal investigation called
           the concept of a government insider, or someone in contact with an insider, "the
           most likely hypothesis«it's definitely reasonable." Another American official
           was quoted in the same article saying that, in addition to military laboratories,
           "there are other government and contractor facilities that do classified work with
           access to dangerous strains, but it's highly likely that the material in the anthrax
           letters came from a person or persons who really had great expertise. We haven't
           seen any other artifacts that point us elsewhere."

       y   Secret or questionable biodefense projects tend to be given to the CIA, DOE or
           other agencies and contractors instead of to DOD, in order to maintain deniability
           (for example, only DOD programs have been reported by the US in the annual
           information exchange about biodefense activities, under the Biological Weapons
           Convention). Many contractor scientists work in government labs. A CIA
           spokesman says that CIA scientists work with other government agencies and
           contractors on the biodefense program.

       y   Chronology: Analytical data on the anthrax in the letters became available to
           investigators in late October, 2001. The FBI then began questioning former
           government scientists. On 31 Oct. it was reported that the US rejected a UN
           resolution offered by France to condemn the anthrax attack, on the grounds that it
           could have been domestic terrorism. On 9 Nov. the FBI released a profile of the
           perpetrator as a lone, male domestic terrorist, obviously one with a scientific
           background and laboratory experience who could handle hazardous materials. In
           early Dec. the FBI said it was investigating government and contractor labs
           possessing the Ames strain, and individuals who had access to them. On 16 Dec.
           the FBI said it was focusing on a contractor that worked with the CIA. At about
           the same time the FBI said it was interested in non-military individuals who had
           received the anthrax vaccine.

       y   John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
           Security, said on 19 Nov. that "We don't know«at the moment, in a way that we
           could make public, where the anthrax attacks came from." Senate Majority Leader
           Thomas Daschle, recipient of one of the anthrax letters and in frequent contact
           with investigators, said on 8 Dec. that the perpetrator was probably someone with
           a military background. Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, said on 17
           Dec. that it is increasingly "looking like it was a domestic source."

       y   After a series of uncontrolled statements to the media, relevant experts have been
           asked to keep quiet and, in some cases, appear to have been asked to "correct"
           former statements.

6. Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator
      y Insider in US biodefense, doctoral degree in a relevant branch of biology
      y Middle-aged American
      y Experienced and skilled in working with hazardous pathogens, including anthrax,
          and avoiding contamination
      y Works for a CIA contractor in Washington, DC area
      y Has up-to-date vaccination with anthrax vaccine
      y Has clearance for access to classified information
      y Worked in USAMRIID laboratory in the past, in some capacity, and has access
          now
      y Knows Bill Patrick and has probably learned a thing or two about weaponization
          from him, informally
      y Has had training or experience in covering evidence
      y May have had an UNSCOM connection
      y Has had a dispute with a government agency
      y Has a private location where the materials for the attack were accumulated and
          prepared
      y Worked on the letters alone or with peripheral encouragement and assistance
      y Fits FBI profile
      y Has the necessary expertise, access and a past history indicating appropriate
          capabilities and temperament
      y Has been questioned by FBI

7. Comments
     y A recent report by the Congressional General Accounting Office, as well as many
       recent statements by military and non-governmental experts in the BW field,
               holds that terrorists are unlikely to be able to mount a major biological attack
               without substantial assistance from a government sponsor. The recent anthrax
               attack was a minor one but nonetheless we now see that it was made possible by a
               sophisticated government program. It is reassuring to know that it was probably
               not perpetrated by a lone terrorist without state support.

           y   It is not reassuring, however, to discover that secret US programs may have been
               the source of that support, and that security is so dangerously lax in military or
               defense contractor laboratories. US government insistence on pursuing and
               maintaining the secrecy of elaborate biological threat assessment activities is
               undermining the prohibitions of the Biological Weapons Convention and
               encouraging biological weapons proliferation in other countries, which in turn
               may support bioterrorist attacks on the American public. Future deterrence, and
               the peace of mind of the American people, require that the perpetrator must be
               publicly identified and brought to justice without delay.



VIII. Appendix
LABORATORIES THAT HAVE WORKED WITH THE AMES STRAIN OF ANTHRAX
                 (Information obtained from open sources)


   1. USAMRID # +
   2. Dugway Proving Ground (Utah) # * +
   3. Naval Research Medical Center/Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and other associated
       military labs (MD) #
   4. Battelle Memorial Institute (Ohio; plus laboratories in many other locations) # * +
   5. Duke University Medical School, Clinical Microbiology Lab (NC)
   6. VA Medical Center, Durham (NC)
   7. USDA laboratory and Iowa State College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames (Iowa)
   8. LSU College of Veterinary Medicine * +
   9. Northern Arizona State University (Arizona) * +
   10. Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute (IL)
   11. University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center, Albuquerque (NM) * +
   12. Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, Porton Down (UK) * +
   13. CAMR, Porton (UK) *
   14. Defense Research Establishment, Suffield (CA) * +
   15. BioPort Corp (MI)

In addition, CDC, NIH, Los Alamos and a few others may have the Ames strain; the Institute for
Genomic Research (MD) says they have the Ames DNA but not the bacteria.

# indicates laboratories in the US that are estimated to be more likely than the others to have
weaponization capabilities
* Obtained through a FOIA request by the Washington Post (article Nov 30, 01)
+ indicates acknowledged recipients of the Ames strain from USAMRIID
IX. Ancillary Materials From Other Sources
   Particularly relevant quotations are bold-faced.

1. FBI Letter to Members of the American Society for Microbiology
   January 29, 2002

FROM:     Van Harp, Assistant Director, Washington Field Office
          Federal Bureau of Investigation

On September 18, 2001, two copies of an identical letter were mailed in separate envelopes from
Trenton, NJ, one to "Editor, New York Post" and the other to "Tom Brokaw, NBC TV." Each
letter contained a significant quantity of the bacterium Bacillus anthracis.

On October 9, 2001, two additional copies of a slightly different letter were mailed from
Trenton, NJ, the first to "Senator (Tom) Daschle" and the second to "Senator (Patrick) Leahy."
Each of these letters again contained Bacillus anthracis but of a better quality than the letters
mailed to New York.

As a result of these mailings and the resulting bacterial infections, there are five innocent persons
who are dead, including a ninety-four year old Connecticut Woman. Additional cases of
cutaneous anthrax have infected numerous individuals including a seven month old baby in New
York City.

I would like to appeal to the talented men and women of the American Society for Microbiology
to assist the FBI in identifying the person who mailed these letters. It is very likely that one or
more of you know this individual. A review of the information-to-date in this matter leads
investigators to believe that a single person is most likely responsible for these mailings. This
person is experienced working in a laboratory. Based on his or her selection of the Ames
strain of Bacillus anthracis one would expect that this individual has or had legitimate
access to select biological agents at some time. This person has the technical knowledge
and/or expertise to produce a highly refined and deadly product. This person has exhibited
a clear, rational thought process and appears to be very organized in the production and
mailing of these letters. The perpetrator might be described as "stand-offish" and likely
prefers to work in isolation as opposed to a group/team setting. It is possible this person
used off-hours in a laboratory or may have even established an improvised or concealed
facility comprised of sufficient equipment to produce the anthrax.

It is important to ensure that all relevant information, no matter how insignificant it may seem, is
brought to the attention of the investigators in this case. If you believe that you have information
that might assist in the identification of this individual, please contact the FBI via telephone at 1-
800-CRIME TV (1-800-274-6388) or via email at the following website:
Amerithrax @ FBI.gov
There is also a $2.5 million reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the
person(s) responsible in this case.

[Note: The ASM cover letter, explaining the FBI request for the mailing, contains the following
statement: "The action was criminal and not ideological."]

2. White House Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer
   February 25, 2002
   FBI Probing Several Anthrax Suspects

Q Ari, what can the White House say about this report on anthrax, that there's been a suspect for
three months?

MR. FLEISCHER: I've noted that report and I've done some digging into the topic. I wish it was
that easy and that simple right now, but unfortunately, there still are several suspects. There's not
as if there's only one. And so the FBI is continuing its investigative efforts. That story, I think,
was a little overreaching in saying there's just one. The FBI has not narrowed it down to just one;
they are continuing their investigation.

Q Well, is it an American, and is it a scientist from Fort Dietrick that is being looked at out of the
group that you're saying, possibly?

MR. FLEISCHER: All indications are that the source of the anthrax is domestic. And I can't give
you any more specific information than that. That's part of what the FBI is actively reviewing.
And I just can't go beyond that.

Q And on a personal note for the victims, some of the victims who are still alive who suffered
from the anthrax have not heard from the Homeland Security Director, have not heard from the
President, have not heard from congressional -- like the ones who represent the Brentwood
Postal facility. And some say there's insensitivity on the part of the federal government. What do
you say about that, for these victims who are still suffering, who still can't read well, who are still
going through years of possible rehabilitation after this?

MR. FLEISCHER: I would hope that's not the case.

Q Well, it is the case. They have not been contacted.

MR. FLEISCHER: Well, I think that in all instances that the appropriate health authorities,
whether they were federal government or state government or a collaboration of both, have been
in touch. Very often, in the case of people who are hospitalized, the federal Centers for Disease
Control was intimately involved in all areas involving the anthrax that was -- the anthrax attacks.
So it's been a very difficult chapter for all concerned, particularly the families of those who lost
their lives in the attack. It was difficult moments for the government.

Obviously, anybody who would engage in that type of terrorism through the mail puts people in
a position where it becomes very difficult not only for them, but for local communities, for all
the people who were affected by all the hoaxes that followed those attacks. But I think the
federal government responded as well as it could, given the knowledge the federal government
had, as quickly as it could. And if any individuals who were involved had anything more specific
where they want to talk to anybody in the federal government, I know the federal government
throughout the various agencies would want to respond.

...

Q Back on to anthrax for a minute, what's the sense here about the pace of the investigation?

MR. FLEISCHER: I think that the experience that we're seen in this investigation is that these
things are often very difficult to catch who did something like this. Obviously, the person who
did this is very smart, has employed means that are very difficult to track. The block handwriting
on the letters was chosen most likely by design, knowing how hard it is to track that type of
handwriting.

And so the President would like to get this, obviously, resolved as quickly as is possible. The
pace of justice is a methodical one. It's very important for them to build a case that will stand up
in court, that is thorough, and is conclusive. And that's the effort of the FBI, and the President
believes the FBI is doing a good, solid job.

Q Does the White House feel the government has a full handle now on the inventories of anthrax
at universities, at military facilities?

MR. FLEISCHER: To the best of all the information that we have received here, that was never
a question. The military laboratories, other laboratories accounted for their anthrax -- the military
laboratories accounted for their anthrax, those under federal purview. And so that has not been a
question, the best that I've been briefed on that topic.



CONTACT: Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, PhD
Chair, Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Biological Weapons
Professor,SUNY-Purchase
barbarar@ purvid.ns.purchase.edu



Meet Jerome Hauer, 9/11 Suspect Awaiting Indictment

PROJECT ANTHRAX Part 1

Saic - 9/11 Encyclopedia

Anthrax Attacks 9-11 Review
Anthrax - 9/11 Encyclopedia

Stephen Hatfill - 9/11 Encyclopedia

Battelle 9/11 Encyclopedia

Porton Down - 9/11 Encyclopedia

BioPort - 9/11 Encyclopedia

Hadron - 9/11 Encyclopedia

Jerome Hauer - 9/11 Encyclopedia

7 World Trade Center - 9/11

Anthrax riddle baffles FBI - BBC


Alex Constantine
Iran Contra and ties to 9/11

September 11 conspiracy new orleans for truth links 9/11

Katherine Smith 9/11 Encyclopedia

www.fas.org
The Strange Death of American Democracy: Endgame ...

9/11 review


search September 11th articles 911review
http://911review.org/search.html




                   SalimMuwakkil's Recent Columns
                        In the Chicago Tribune
                               DOUBLE STANDARDS HAUNT
                               AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY
By SalimMuwakkil.
Published: Monday, November 23, 1998
Section: COMMENTARY

In the chaotic wake of another canceled threat to bomb the Iraqi people for Saddam Hussein's
transgressions, an alarming report emerged that Israel is developing ethnic weapons.

This disturbing news was reported in the Nov. 15 edition of the Sunday Times of London, but
was thoroughly drowned-out here by the sound of beating war drums and lingering national
chatter about the increasingly irrelevant impeachment inquiry.

American pundits of varied stripes and persuasions were demanding Hussein's head for blocking
UN weapons inspectors.

But while we were busy damning Saddam, it appears that Israel, our closest ally in the region,
was busy devising fearsome weapons designed to target specific ethnic groups without any
scrutiny whatsoever.

"In developing their `ethno-bomb,' Israeli scientists are trying to exploit medical advances by
identifying distinctive genes carried by some Arabs, then create a genetically modified bacterium
or virus," the publication noted, citing Israeli military and western intelligence sources. Written
by Uzi Mahnaimi and Marie Colvin, the article explained that Israel's intention is to "use the
ability of viruses and certain bacteria to alter the DNA inside their hosts living cells. . . . to
engineer deadly micro-organisms that attack only those bearing the distinctive genes."

The paper noted that the genetic weapons research has provoked considerable outrage among
many Israelis because of its parallels with the eugenic experiments of Dr. Josef Mengele, the
Nazi scientist at Auschwitz. It quoted DediZucker, a member of Knesset, the Israeli parliament,
who said, "Morally, based on our history, and our tradition and our experience, such a weapon is
monstrous and should be denied."

The article noted that the ethno-bomb claims were given further credibility by a report in
"Foreign Report," a publication of the respected Jane's group, that Israeli scientists used some of
"the South African research in trying to develop an `ethnic bullet' . . ."

News of this Israeli research is ominous enough, but its connection to apartheid science adds a
chilling touch. Mahnaimi and Colvin write, "Dr. DaanGoosen, the head of a South African
chemical and biological warfare plant, said his team was ordered in the 1980s to develop a
`pigmentation weapon' to target only black people . . . but never managed to develop one."

Goosen's comments jibe well with conclusions reached by South Africa's recently concluded
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which heard testimony that WouterBasson, the director of
the country's chemical-biological warfare program, conducted extensive research on weapons
that exclusively targeted blacks.
Incidentally, the commission's concluding report noted that South Africa's chemical-biological
weapons team received considerable assistance from their American counterparts during the
apartheid era. And it's easy to see why: Ethno bombs are a dream weapon on a planet so
preoccupied with ethnic conflicts. Of course, that's also why such weapons are so remarkably
menacing.

Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense William Cohen revealed he had received reports of certain
countries working to create "certain types of pathogens that would be ethnic-specific." The
Sunday Times report noted that a "senior western intelligence source" confirmed that Israel was
one of the countries Cohen had in mind.

There's no mystery why the story about these weapons has sparked such anger in Israel. Many
residents of the Jewish state still have direct memories of the Nazi's deadly obsession with genes.
But despite this anger it seems unlikely that the hard-charging, Likud government of Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will sever such a fruitful (though odious) branch of weapons
research.

What's more, there's a general consensus that Israel already has developed weapons of mass
destruction (including nuclear warheads). Still, it has steadfastly refused to sign the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and bars any international inspections.

But seldom is Israel challenged in its defiance of international weapons protocol.

Meanwhile, whenever Iraq makes any move to protest the intrusive inspection regime imposed
as part of the Gulf War cease-fire in 1991, the U.S. begin rattling sabers.

American punditry went into overdrive clamoring for another Iraq attack and seems to be
intensely frustrated by President Clinton's recent pullback of the airstrikes.

Many of the responses from U.S. commentators embarrassingly resembled adolescent, school-
yard bluster. "Clinton has again proved that he's a wimp, George will observed from the front
lines of his word processor," writes columnist Norman Soloman.

Often, the paramount U.S. media concerns have been framed in macho terms.

Recent news coverage focused on a question that led off a front page New York Times article:
"Who blinked?"

The coincidence of the ethno-bomb story breaking during another macho mobilization for a
high-tech attack on Iraq is eerily emblematic. It reveals starkly the double standard that taints our
foreign policy and endangers international peace.

                                      Return to Top of Page
READY, AIM . . . CLINTON MISFIRES ONCE AGAIN
WHEN THE TARGET IS A STEREOTYPE

By SalimMuwakkil.
Published: Monday, August 31, 1998
Section: COMMENTARY
Page: 13

After he authorized the launch of about 75 cruise missiles in illegal attacks in Afghanistan and
Sudan, President Clinton declared we're in a new war on terrorism. The U.S. attack reportedly
was in response to the terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. But in this
war, an abstraction is our enemy and stereotypes often are used to fill in the blanks.

When Clinton announced that the U.S. was targeting terrorism, it's a safe bet that our public
mind conjured up images of fiery-eyed "Islamic fundamentalists," rather than our own
homegrown terrorists who look like the "boy next door." Such images light our ire and tap into a
rich vein of Western antagonism to Islam. In that regard, Osama bin Laden, the bearded and
turbaned Saudi exile, seems sent by central casting.

Thus, it's likely that few Americans agonized over our blatant violation of international law in
alleged retaliation for the embassy bombings. "No state has the right to exact retribution through
an armed attack on another country," wrote James C. Hathaway in the Aug. 23 edition of The
New York Times. Hathaway, a professor of international law at the University of Michigan at
Ann Arbor and one of the foremost authorities on the subject, added that "even the Security
Council of the United Nations can order an attack only in the interest of restoring peace and
security, not to punish."

But, what red-blooded American cares about such legalistic niceties when the enemy is so
despicable and his crime so heinous? Why should we doubt that the targeted sites in Afghanistan
and Sudan were anything other than what our intelligence agencies said they were (even if the
U.S. has a history of creating false pretexts for military assaults--Gulf of Tonkin resolution in
Vietnam, Manuel Noriega's drug dealing in Panama, protecting medical students in Grenada,
etc.)?

Even black leaders like the Rev. Jesse Jackson and Rep. Danny K. Davis (D-Ill.), who previously
have criticized the military's trigger-happy tendencies, solidly back Clinton's cruise missile
attacks. The grim toll of more than 240 Africans killed in the embassy bombings undoubtedly
helped secure African-American support for America's avenging response. But retaliatory anger
is seldom a wise motive for foreign policy--especially when the target is a stereotype.

In his address announcing the missile attack, President Clinton sternly warned that this country
faced "a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and
terrorism." Therefore, whoever the U.S. fingers as the enemy is a terrorist fanatic, by definition.
Demonizing opponents may help rally our xenophobic impulses, but it reveals little about the
nature of their grievances. A mature democracy demands informed citizens, not sycophants.
When harm is being done in our names we need to know why.
We need a better explanation for the double standards used in defining terrorism (targeting
innocent civilians). How can we justify a 1996 UNICEF report that noted at least 4,500 children
have died every month in Iraq as a consequence of U.S.-backed economic sanctions?

Those sanctions have been in effect since 1991; do the math and it adds up to tens of thousands
of dead innocent civilians. Isn't that terrorism?

We also need to know why discussion of Israeli policy is considered out of bounds in this
country? Why is the right-wing government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu being
allowed to completely abrogate the 1993 Oslo accords, which painstakingly worked out a
formula for Palestinian autonomy and Israeli security? Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
who was assassinated by a right-wing zealot in 1995, had done what many thought unthinkable
by striking a deal with demonized Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. For the first time in many
years, a glimmer of hope for peace flashed in the region.

But after Netanyahu's Likud government assumed power in 1996, Israel resumed and accelerated
the annexation of land, the demolition of Palestinians' homes, the construction of new
settlements and the expansion of others--all of which are actions explicitly forbidden by UN
resolutions, as well as by the Oslo agreement. Israel is in defiance of dozens of UN Security
Council resolutions, but seldom does the U.S. demand its compliance.

Meanwhile, Iraq is threatened with massive bombing if it makes the smallest infraction.

"The Arab world is immensely concerned about the fate of the Iraqi people," Gary Sick, a former
National Security Council official who was Jimmy Carter's point man on Iran, told In These
Times magazine in March. "And the Arab world is very upset right now about the United States
and its willingness to use maximum force against an Arab state, at the same time that Israel is
flouting all kinds of resolutions and the United States does nothing about it."

If the U.S. is serious about combating terrorism, the least we can do is stop committing and
condoning it ourselves.




Biological Warfare: Genetically-Engineered Weapons
Cannot Be Excluded
By K.P. Kavanaugh

It has long been rumored that modern biological weapons could be designed to attack specific
vulnerabilities of particular ethnic groups. Early in the development of the US offensive
biological weapons program Colonel Creasey, Chief of Research and Engineering of the US
Chemical Corps, suggested that agents may be selected because of known susceptibility of the
target population. This shows that the differential susceptibility of different populations to
various diseases had been considered at that time and, according to scientists at Defense
Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA), is continuing today.

Indeed ethnic-specific biological warfare predated the advent of the biotechnology revolution.
Smallpox was almost certainly deliberately used against the Native Americans centuries ago and
there are other examples. U.S. and British officials believe an ethnic-specific weapon would be
used today if it became available during a severe conflict between two deeply antagonistic
groups.

Genetics Not Necessarily Involved

Nor is it essential to focus on the genetic constitution of a particular group in order to attack it in
an ethnic specific way. Vaccination of the attacker against the intended biological agent would
give specificity if the target population was not vaccinated. Attacking a particular population
with lethal toxins could achieve the same effect. Equally clearly, attacking a principal food
source of one side which the other side did not consume (as an example, swine induced diseases
are being studied by the US Department of Defense in this area) could produce a specific attack
on a designated population.

Despite such possibilities, however, most discussion of ethnic-specific weapons has centered on
what are termed 'genetically engineered' weapons, which involve the attempt to target genetic
differences between ethnic groups.

Genetically-engineered weapons are clearly an emotive issue and have long been the subject of
vocal claims of wrongdoing and counterclaims of false accusation.

Today, warnings are coming not only from the medical community, but also from other specially
credible sources. There have been indications, for example, that the US Secretary of Defense is
concerned about the possible development of genetic weapons. In June 1997, Jane's Defense
Weekly reported that Secretary Cohen "quoted other reports about what he called 'certain types of
pathogens that would be ethnic specific so that they could eliminate certain ethnic groups or
races.'" Then after a later interview with the Defense Secretary in August 1997, it was stated
again in Jane's Defense Weekly that "he also continued to insist that the science community is
'very close' to being able to manufacture 'genetically engineered pathogens that could be
ethnically specific'".

Early Accounts, Then Silence

In accounts during the 1980s of the possible development of genetic weapons, a frequent source
of scientific data was a paper by Carl A. Larson, then head of the Department of Human
Genetics, University of Lund, Sweden, published in the journal Military Review in November
1970. Larson's paper was mainly concerned with the possible development of a new range of
chemical weapons, including incapacitants. Individual differences in response to chemical agents
had been known for some time, but Larson reviewed what was known of differences between
populations in reaction to drugs and saw the basis of such population differences as genetic.
Larson seems to have been pointing to possible future developments rather than near-term
practical possibilities. The question is whether, almost 30 years later: have genetically
engineered weapons become a practical possibility?

There does not appear to have been subsequent detailed open publication by reputable scientists
of the application of modern biotechnology to genetically -engineered weapons until the 1990s.
Then in 1992 the journal Defense News carried a report which noted a scientist arguing that
genetic engineering may enable us to:

...recognize DNA from different people and attach different things that will kill only that group of
people...You will be able to determine the difference between blacks and whites and Asians and
Jews and Swedes and Finns and develop an agent that will kill only a particular group.

Shown this quotation in February, scientists within the DOD confirmed that defensive research
was being done specifically in this area. Thus the threat would appear to slide along the spectrum
from the merely theoretical through the potentially possible to the patently workable. Such
arguments have been set out at greater length in an appendix to the 1993 Stockholm Peace
Research Institute's Yearbook. The most pertinent aspect of the appendix entitled, "Benefits and
threats of developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering," reads:

While modern biotechniques are revolutionizing medicine and agriculture, the possibility exists
of their misuse for political ends, for clandestine production and refinement of biological
weapons (BW), and for future development of weapons of mass extermination which could be
used for genocide.

Particular reference is then made to the possible misuse of knowledge gained from the Human
Genome Project and knowledge about genetic diversity. The element of critical significance here
is contained in the last sub-section of section VI where the question is clearly stated, "Can't
genetic weapons be developed?" The answer is that if:

investigations provide sufficient data on ethnic genetic differences between population groups, it
may be possible to use such data to target suitable micro-organisms to attack known receptor
sites for which differences exist at a cell membrane level or even target DNA sequences inside
cells by viral vectors...

While SIPRI notes that ethnic differences do not match political borders well, and therefore it
might be necessary for a user of genetic weapons to take risks with regard to his own population,
there can be little doubt that the development of genetically-engineered weapons is a significant
risk.

While genetic warfare is not, in all probability, a practical possibility today, the Fourth Review
Conference of the BTWC, was correct to argue that:

It cannot be ruled out that information from such genetic research could be considered for the
design of weapons targeted against specific ethnic or racial groups.
It would seem to be a mistake to assume that genetically-engineered weapons can never be
developed.




Unexplained Deaths Due to Possibly Infectious Causes in the
United States: Defining the Problem and Designing
Surveillance and Laboratory Approaches
Download Article

Many new infectious diseases have been identified in the United States during the last several
decades (1). Among these are AIDS, Legionnaires' disease, toxic-shock syndrome, hepatitis C,
and most recently, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome; all caused serious illness and death. In each
instance, the disease was recognized through investigation of illness for which no cause had been
identified. Retrospective studies of these and other newly recognized infectious diseases often
identified cases that occurred before the recognition of the new agent; therefore, a more sensitive
detection system may make the earlier recognition of new infectious agents possible.

Delays in recognizing new infectious agents have often been substantial. For instance, Legionella
pneumophila was established as the cause of Legionnaires' disease in 1976 after an epidemic in
Philadelphia, but sporadic cases in 1947 and an outbreak in 1957 were retrospectively identified
(2, 3). Similarly, toxic shock syndrome was recognized in late 1979 and early 1980, but
retrospective reporting and chart reviews documented cases as early as 1960 (4). HIV was
identified in 1983 (5) yet retrospective investigations documented AIDS cases in the late 1970s
and possibly as early as 1968 in the United States (6, 7).

The difficulty of identifying unknown etiologic agents is part of the reason for delays between
the occurrence and recognition of new infectious diseases. Until recently, to identify new
infectious agents we relied primarily on culture techniques. For fastidious bacteria such as
Legionella sp., and new viruses, such as HIV, which have very specific growth requirements,
successful isolation usually required numerous attempts with various culture systems, often
extending over years. Advances in molecular techniques, including polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) amplification and other DNA- (and RNA-) based techniques (e.g., representational
difference analysis), allow identification and classification of unknown etiologic agents without
having to culture them (8-10) and provide clues concerning appropriate conditions for
subsequent isolation of the agent in culture (11,12).

A more systematic public health approach for the early detection of unknown infectious agents is
needed. This need was acknowledged in Addressing Emerging Infectious Diseases Threats: A
Prevention Strategy for the United States, a CDC publication about emerging infections (13).
CDC has established an emerging infections program (EIP) network to conduct special
population-based surveillance projects, develop surveillance methods, pilot and evaluate
prevention strategies, and conduct other epidemiologic and laboratory studies. In late 1994, CDC
funded four programs based at state health departments and academic institutions in California
(Alameda, Contra Costa, Kern, and San Francisco counties), Connecticut, Minnesota, and
Oregon. Some projects are conducted at all program sites and others, depending on local interest
and expertise, at only one or two sites.

Surveillance for unexplained deaths due to possibly infectious causes (UDPIC) for early
detection of new infectious diseases is one of the core activities being conducted at all sites. This
paper estimates the number of UDPIC at the EIP programs and summarizes the surveillance and
laboratory approaches that will be used to identify their cause. This is the first attempt to conduct
surveillance for early detection of new infectious diseases in a large U.S. population.

To estimate the number of deaths that might be identified in surveillance for UDPIC, we used
multiple cause-of-death data for the United States for 1992 from the National Center for Health
Statistics (14). The year 1992 was the most recent for which national data were available at the
time of this study. The analyses of death records were restricted to the EIP program populations
and age group (1-49 years of age) in which surveillance for UDPIC was planned. Multiple cause-
of-death data listed on the National Center for Health Statistics death record allow for analysis of
mortality data based on the different causes (15). The International Classification of Diseases,
9th Revision (ICD-9) was used to define UDPIC (16). We selected 77 codes likely to represent
UDPIC when listed on the death record (Table 1)(17).


 Table 1. Selected codes from Intemational Classification of Diseases, 9th revision (ICD-9)
      used to identify unexplained deaths due to possibly infectious causes (UDPIC)

007.9 unspecified             420.9 other and unspecified          785.6 enlargement of lymph
      protozoal                     acute pericarditis                   nodes
      intestinal disease
008.5 bacterial enteritis,    421.0 acute and subacute             786.0 dyspnea and
      unspecified                   bacterial endocarditis               respiratory abnormalities
008.8 intestinal infectious   421.9 acute endocarditis,             792 nonspecific abnormal
      due to other                  unspecified                          findings in other
      organisms:                                                         body substances
      other organism, not
      classified elsewhere
009.0 infectious colitis,     422.9 other and unspecified          792.0 cerebrospinal fluid
      enteritis, and                myocarditis
      gastroenteritis
009.1 colitis, enteritis,     424.9 endocarditis,                  792.1 stool contents
      and gastroenteritis           valve unspecified
      of presumed
      infectious
      origin
009.2 infectious diarrhea     425.4 other primary                  792.2 semen
                                    cardiomyopathies
009.3 diarrhea of          425.9 secondary cardiomyopathy,       792.3 amniotic fluid
      presumed                   unspecified
      infectious origin
027.9 unspecified zoonotic 446.6 thrombotic                      792.4 saliva
      bacterial disease          microangiopathy
038.9 unspecified          465.0 acute laryngopharyngitis        792.9 other nonspecific
      septicemia                                                       abnormal findings
                                                                       in body substances
041.9 bacterial infection    465.8 acute upper respiratory        795 nonspecific abnormal
      in conditions                infections of multiple or           histologic and
      classified                   unspecified sites: other            immunologic findings
      elsewhere and of             multiple sites
      unspecified site:
      bacterial infection,
      unspecified
046.9 unspecified slow       465.9 acute upper respiratory        795.3 nonspecific positive
      virus                        infections of multiple or            culture findings
      infection of the             unspecified sites: unspecified
      central                      site
      nervous system
047.9 unspecified viral      466.0 acute bronchitis              795.4 other nonspecific
      meningitis                                                       abnormal histologic
                                                                       findings
049.9 unspecified        466.1 acute bronchiolitis               795.7 other nonspecific
      non-arthropodborne                                               immunologic findings
      viral diseases of
      central nervous
      system
057.9 viral exanthem,    480.9 viral pneumoma,                   796.4 other nonspecific
      unspecified              unspecified                             abnormal findings:
                                                                       other abnormal
                                                                       clinical findings
079.9 viral infection in    482.9 bacterial pneumonia,            798 sudden death,
      conditions classified       unspecified                          cause unknown
      elsewhere and of
      unspecified site:
      unspecified
      viral and
      chlamydial infection
099.0 venereal disease,      485 bronchopneumonia,               798.1 instantaneous death
      unspecified                 organism unspecified
136.9 other and              486 pneumonia, organism             798.2 death occurring in less
      unspecified                 unspecified                          than 24 hours from the
      infectious and                                                   onset of symptoms, not
      parasitic                                                         otherwise explained
      diseases: unspecified
      infectious and
      parasitic diseases
283.1 non-autoimmune        511.9 unspecified pleural effusion    798.9 unattended death
      hemolytic anemias
284.8 other specified       518.4 acute edema of lung,             799 other ill-defined and
      aplastic anemias            unspecified                           unknown causes of
                                                                        morbidity and mortality
286.6 defibrination         518.8 other diseases of lung          799.0 asphyxia
      syndrome
287.3 primary               519.9 unspecified disease             799.1 respiratory failure
      thrombocytopenia            of respiratory system
287.5 thrombocytopenia,      558 other and unspecified            799.3 debility, unspecified
      unspecified                 noninfectious gastroenteritis
                                  and colitis
320.9 meningitis due to     780.6 pyrexia of unknown origin       799.4 cachexia
      unspecified
      bacterium
322.9 meningitis,          782.1 rash and other                   799.8 other ill-defined
      unspecified                nonspecific skin                       conditions
                                 eruption
323.9 unspecified cause of 782.7 spontaneous ecchymoses           799.9 other unknown and
      encephalitis                                                      unspecified cause
357.0 acute infective      785.5 shock without
      polyneuritis               mention of trauma


Analyses for UDPIC were restricted to previously healthy persons 1 to 49 years of age by
excluding persons outside this age-group and those who had any of the following ICD-9 codes as
an underlying cause of death: 140 to 239.9, neoplasms; 250.0 to 250.9, diabetes mellitus; 279.0
to 279.9, disorders involving the immune mechanism; 295.5, other disease of spleen; 800 to
999.9, injury and poisoning; E800 to E998, supplementary classification of external causes of
injury and poisoning. Patients with HIV disease listed anywhere on the death record were also
excluded (codes 042, 042.0, 042.1, 042.2, 042.9, 043, 043.0, 043.1, 043.2, 043.3, 043.9, 044,
044.0, 044.9, and 795.8) (18).

Deaths meeting the study criteria were identified along with patient age, gender, race (black,
white, and other), and autopsy status for the four EIPs (aggregate and by EIP program). To
determine rates of UDPIC, we used 1992 census estimates for the four EIP programs (19).

In 1992, 744 UDPIC were identified among previously healthy persons 1 to 49 years of age in
the four EIP sites. These deaths accounted for 14% of all deaths (n = 5,304) among persons 1 to
49 years of age in hospitals and emergency rooms. Most of the 744 UDPIC occurred among
male patients (60%) and whites (72%) (Table 2). Overall rates among blacks were almost four
times as high as those among whites (29.5 vs. 7.7 per 100,000). By site, overall rates ranged
from 5.6 (in Minnesota) to 14.5 (in California) per 100,000 population. These geographic
differences could be accounted for only in part by differences in the proportions of blacks by
site. In Minnesota and Oregon the proportions of blacks were 2.8% and 1.9%, respectively,
whereas in California and Connecticut the proportions were 14.7% and 12.4%, respectively.

Figure 1 shows the age-specific rates of UDPIC for persons 1 to 49 years of age. Persons 1 to 24
years of age accounted for only 19% of deaths, while persons 40 to 49 years of age accounted for
50%.




Figure 1. Age-specific rates of unexplained deaths due to possibly infectious causes (UDPIC)
among previously health persons 1 to 49 years of age in the four emerging infections program
sites, 1992.

Of selected ICD-9 codes (Table 1), the six disease classifications (and codes) accounting for the
most of the UDPIC are shown in Table 3. A selected ICD-9 code was listed as the underlying
cause of death in 253 (34%) of 744 UDPIC. Autopsies were performed in 293 (39%) of the 744
UDPIC.

Two approaches for surveillance were proposed as a basis for the EIP project. In the first,
clinicians will be asked to report unexplained deaths and serious illnesses from possibly
infectious causes. In the second, death certificate databases will be used to select patients with
ICD-9 codes likely to represent UDPIC. The first approach allows prospective collection of data
and specimens for deaths and serious illnesses. In the second approach, UDPIC will be identified
retrospectively through information on death certificates.


 Table 2. Unexplained deaths due to possibly infectious causes (UDPIC) among previously
             healthy persons by emerging infection program (EIP) site, 1992
                                         Rate (per 100,000 population aged 1-49 years)

                                                    Gender                         Race

                      No. of
EIP site              UDPIC        Overall      Female        Male    Black        White     Other

California*                 316          14.5         10.8     18.5         34.0     12.2         8.9
Connecticut‚                 83          14.2         10.5     18.5         37.9     11.4          --
Minnesota                   189           5.6          4.8      6.6         11.0      5.4         9.5
Oregon                      156           7.2          6.9      7.7         21.8      7.0         7.8
Total                       744           8.9          7.4     10.9         29.5      7.7         8.7

*Alameda, Contra Costa, and San Francisco counties.
‚New Haven County.


 Table 3. Of selected ICD-9 codes, disease classifications accounting for most unexplained
      deaths due to possibly infectious causes (UDPIC) in the four study sites, 1992

                                                   UDPIC with ICD-9 code included on death
                                                          record by age group (%)

                                                   1-49 yr;     1-14 yr;     15-39 yr;     40-49 yr;
Disease classification (ICD-9)*
                                                   n = 744       n = 75       n = 295       n = 374

Respiratory failure (799.1)                         205 (28)      14 (19)       91 (31)      100 (27)
Unspecified septicemia (038.9)                      108 (14)       8 (11)       42 (14)       58 (16)
Pneumonia, organism unspecified (486)               101 (14)        7 (9)       33 (11)       61 (16)
Other primary cardiomyopathy (425.4)                 84 (11)        5 (7)        26 (9)       53 (14)
Shock without mention of trauma (785.5)              83 (11)      10 (13)       29 (10)       44 (12)
Other unknown or unspecified (799.9)                 75 (10)       9 (12)       35 (12)        31 (8)
Totals‚                                             505 (68)      39 (52)      193 (65)      273 (73)

*More than one of these disease classifications (ICD-9 code) may be listed on a death record.
‚UDPIC with at least one of the six disease classifications included on the death record.


Clinicians in the EIP areas have been asked to report by telephone to EIP program surveillance
personnel all previously healthy persons 1 to 49 years of age who are hospitalized (or admitted to
an emergency room) with a life-threatening illness with hallmarks of an infectious disease for
which no cause is identified. Inclusion and exclusion criteria are shown below.
Inclusion criteria

   1. 1 to 49 years of age
   2. Admitted to a hospital or emergency room with life-threatening illness of potentially
      infectious etiology
   3. No cause for illness identified by preliminary testing

Exclusion criteria

   1. Preexisting chronic medical condition: malignancy; HIV infection; chronic cardiac,
      pulmonary, renal, hepatic or rheumatologic disease; or other known underlying chronic
      illness (e.g., diabetes mellitus)
   2. Immunosuppressive therapy
   3. Trauma
   4. Toxic ingestion or exposure
   5. Nosocomial infection

Clinicians and pathologists in the four EIP programs were informed of the surveillance system
through a combination of mailings, oral presentations, and posters.

Classifying patients as having one or more infectious disease-related syndrome(s) as listed below
should help identify groups of patients with similar illnesses for laboratory testing.

   1. Acute abdominal symptoms (e.g, diarrhea, pain, nausea/vomiting) and history of (h/o)
       fever
   2. Arthritis or osteomyelitis and h/o fever
   3. Blood cell dyscrasia or coagulopathy and h/o fever
   4. Conjunctivitis, keratitis, endophthalmitis, or periocular infection and h/o fever
   5. Endocarditis, myocarditis, pericarditis and h/o fever
   6. Hepatitis or hepatic insufficiency/failure and h/o fever
   7. Meningitis, encephalitis, encephalopathy, dementia, or other neurologic syndrome with
       or without a h/o of fever
   8. Rash, skin or mucosal membrane lesions, cellulitis, myositis, lymphadenitis, or
       lymphangitis and h/o of fever
   9. Renal insufficiency/failure and h/o of fever
   10. Respiratory failure, pulmonary infiltrates, or other pleuropulmonary manifestation and
       h/o of fever
   11. Shock or sepsis and h/o of fever or hypothermia
   12. Other

Information about exposures (e.g., travel or contact with animals or insects) resulting in
infectious diseases will be collected. For patients who are still alive or have died recently,
clinical and pathology laboratories will be asked to save clinical specimens (including biopsied
tissues) obtained during clinical care and diagnostic evaluation. Range of specimens will vary
but be appropriate for the given illness and organ systems affected. These specimens will be
collected, divided into aliquots, and stored. Autopsies will be encouraged. With the exception of
pathology specimens, specimens will be initially banked at the EIP sites. Fixed or frozen tissue
specimens (premortem and postmortem) will be sent directly to CDC for examination. A CDC
pathologist will be available to consult with the local pathologist and to discuss preparation and
transport of tissues. Pathology results are expected to guide further laboratory testing on
specimens.

Clinical and epidemiologic data will be periodically reviewed locally at each EIP and at CDC in
aggregate. Each EIP will identify UDPIC not reported through the clinician-based system by
using state-based (rather than national) electronic data systems to reduce delays in relaying
information. When deaths not reported through the clinician-based system are identified, the
medical chart will be reviewed, the patient's illness will be classified by syndrome and
information available in the medical record concerning exposures will be collected. Samples of
specimens will be obtained at autopsy. Deaths will be handled as in the clinician-based system
with regard to periodic review and laboratory testing, although it is expected that fewer clinical
specimens will be available from patients whose deaths were not reported through the clinician-
based system.

Additional reference level laboratory tests for known pathogens will be done in state health
laboratories and CDC. CDC will test for previously unrecognized infectious agents.

Initial identification of unrecognized etiologic agents at CDC will primarily rely on serology,
immunohistochemistry, and nucleic acid probes. When a sufficient number of patients with
similar illnesses are identified, a customized strategy for laboratory testing will be designed.
Serology and immunohistochemistry will be used to narrow the scope of possible etiologies.
Nucleic acid probes will be used with PCR to amplify from clinical specimens specific fragments
of genetic material that can be sequenced and used for phylogenetic comparisons to known
infectious agents. Clinicians who reported cases will be informed of laboratory results, but
information will usually not be available in time to affect treatment of individual patients.

Until now, unexplained deaths and serious illnesses due to possibly infectious causes have not
been addressed as a specific public health problem. The data obtained in the first phase of this
project suggest that UDPIC in previously healthy persons account for 13% of hospitalized deaths
among persons 1 to 49 years old in the EIP sites. Experience in recent years with new infectious
diseases suggests that systematic study of UDPIC and similarly unexplained serious illnesses
may allow earlier detection of emerging infections. This has been made more feasible by newly
developed nucleic acid-based methods for identification of unknown etiologic agents.

Use of the 1992 National Center for Health Statistics multiple cause-of-death data to estimate the
number of UDPIC has its limitations. The most important is in the selection of ICD-9 codes to
identify these deaths. Even with codes such as 038.9 ("unspecified septicemia"), which seem
relevant, without reviewing the medical record it is impossible to know if the cause of the
septicemia was known by the clinician but not specified or was nosocomial. Codes representing
potentially infectious deaths (e.g., 799 for "other ill-defined and unknown causes of morbidity
and mortality") might also be assigned to noninfectious deaths. Another critical limitation is
failure to identify deaths that are, in fact, unexplained but have been given an incorrect diagnosis.
For several reasons, our surveillance is limited to persons 1 to 49 years of age who have been
healthy. The 1-year lower age limit was selected to avoid confusion with congenital problems in
infants but include most children in day-care, where infectious diseases are common and a new
infectious disease might spread rapidly. The upper age limit was set to exclude an expected
increased proportion of unexplained deaths from noninfectious causes in persons 50 years and
older. Many of the recently recognized life-threatening infectious diseases would have been
detected among previously healthy persons in this age-group. Previously healthy persons might
also be considered better sentinels for new infectious diseases because of their generally more
vigorous interaction with people and higher likelihood of exposure to infections (e.g., travel or
contact with animals or insects). However, restricting surveillance to previously healthy persons
is likely to decrease the sensitivity of our system.

Patients who are immunocompromised whether from HIV infection, malignancy, or
immunosuppressive therapy and many patients with other chronic illnesses, are more susceptible
to known and unknown infectious diseases. New infectious diseases first identified in persons
who are immunocompromised or have chronic illnesses have subsequently been found to also
cause infection in persons with normal immune systems (20, 21). Although sensitivity could be
improved by including these populations in surveillance, available resources and a concern that
laboratory evaluation would be complicated by the broader range of infectious possibilities
compelled us to focus on previously healthy persons.

Clinician-based and death certificate based systems for surveillance and laboratory evaluation
are being used in combination because of their complementary strengths and weaknesses. The
notable strengths of the clinician-based system are the contribution of clinicians and the
timeliness of reporting. Because of their training and their relationship with patients, clinicians
can recognize unusual and potentially new infections. This system also offers opportunities to
collect and store clinical specimens (pre-mortem and postmortem) that would not normally be
saved, in addition to providing systematic and timely collection of exposure information that
might not be available in the medical record. This system might also increase the likelihood of an
autopsy. However, reporting is time-consuming and is not likely to affect the patient's care,
which may lower the sensitivity of this approach.

The primary strengths of the death certificate based system are its completeness and relative
ease, once the data are electronically available. The completeness may make it sensitive for
detection of new infections resulting in death (but assumes that the correct ICD-9 codes are
selected and that they are coded accurately). Sensitivity is important because, to be effective, the
combined approaches should detect relatively rare illnesses (e.g., in the range of one case per
100,000 to 1,000,000 population per year). The main disadvantages of this system are the
vagaries of ICD-9 classification: codes are not designed to identify new infectious diseases and
are assigned by persons not directly familiar with the case. The list of ICD-9 codes used to
identify UDPIC is likely to be modified on the basis of information collected in this system and
in the clinician-based system. Another problem is the delay in getting information on the death
certificate into the database for review, which makes this system relatively slow. Further, the
only clinical specimens likely to be available for laboratory evaluation are those collected at
autopsy.
The goal of our project is early detection of new life-threatening infectious diseases. However, it
is likely that in the process, we will identify cases in which known, but poorly recognized,
infectious diseases are responsible, either because the diagnostic tests being used clinically are of
poor sensitivity or because the diagnosis was unexpected by clinicians. Findings concerning such
cases may be useful in identifying areas in which better diagnostic capabilities are needed and in
improving estimates of infectious disease prevalence (22). A population-based bank of clinical
specimens will be invaluable in current and future testing for newly recognized etiologic agents
and for developing diagnostic tests. This project will better clarify surveillance strategies and
help standardize nucleic acid-based techniques for identification of previously unknown etiologic
agents. Through it, we expect to build U.S. capacity for detecting and responding to newly
recognized infectious diseases not only at the EIP sites but elsewhere, nationally and
internationally.

Bradley A. Perkins,* Jennifer M. Flood,‚ Richard Danila,Á Robert C. Holman,* Arthur L.
Reingold,‚ Laura A. Klug,* Michael Virata,§ Paul R. Cieslak,¶ Sherif R. Zaki,* Robert W.
Pinner,* Rima F. Khabbaz,* and the Unexplained Deaths Working Group#

*National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA,
Atlanta, Georgia; ‚School of Public Health, University of California at Berkeley, California,
USA;
Á Minnesota Department of Health, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA; §Yale University School of
Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, USA; Oregon Department of Human Resources, Portland,
Oregon, USA

#The Unexplained Deaths Working Group: GrechenRothrock, University of California at
Berkeley; DucVugia, California Department of Health Services; James Hadler, Matt Cartter,
Connecticut Department of Public Health and Addiction Services; James Meek, Robin Ryder,
Mark Wilson, Yale University School of Medicine; Michael Osterholm, Kristine L. MacDonald,
Jean Rainbow, Norman Crouch, Kathy LeDell, Minnesota Department of Health; David
Fleming, Katrina Hedberg, Oregon Health Division; Don Brenner, Mark Eberhard, James Olson,
Pierre Rollin, R. Gibson Parrish, CDC.

References

   1. Institute of Medicine. Emerging infections: microbial threats to health in the United
      States. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1992.
   2. McDade JE, Brenner DJ, Bozeman FM. Legionnaires' disease bacterium isolated in 1947.
      Ann Intern Med 1979;90:659-61.
   3. Osterholm MT, Chin TDY, Osborne DO, et al. A 1957 outbreak of Legionnaires' disease
      associated with a meat packing plant. Am J Epidemiol 1983;117:60-7.
   4. Osterholm MT, Forfang JC. Toxic-shock syndrome in Minnesota: results of an active-
      passive surveillance system. J Infect Dis 1982;145:458-64.
   5. Barre-Sinoussi F, Chermann JC, Rey F, et al. Isolation of a T-lymphotropic retrovirus
      from a patient at risk for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Science
      1983;220:868-71.
6. CDC Task Force on Kaposi's Sarcoma and Opportunistic Infections. Epidemiologic
    aspects of the current outbreak of Kaposi's sarcoma and opportunistic infection. N Engl J
    Med 1982;306:248-52.
7. Garry RF, Witte MH, Gottlieb A, et al. Documentation of an AIDS virus infection in the
    United States in 1968. JAMA 1988;260:2085-7.
8. Relman DA, Loutit JS, Schmidt TM, Falkow S, Tompkins LS. The agent of bacillary
    angiomatosis: an approach to the identification of uncultured pathogens. N Engl J Med
    1990;323:1573-80.
9. Nichol ST, Spiropoulou CF, Morzunov S, et al. Genetic identification of a hantavirus
    associated with an outbreak of acute respiratory illness. Science 1993; 262:914-7.
10. Chang Y, Cesarman E, Pessin MS, et al. Identification of herpesvirus-like DNA
    sequences in AIDS-associated Kaposi's sarcoma. Science 1994;266:1865-9.
11. Koehler JE, Quinn FD, Berger TG, LeBoit PE, Tappero JW. Isolation of Rochalimaea
    species from cutaneous and osseous lesions of bacillary angiomatosis. N Engl J Med
    1992;327:1625-31.
12. Elliot LH, Ksiazek TG, Rollin PE, et al. Isolation of the causative agent of hantavirus
    pulmonary syndrome. Am J Trop Med Hyg 1994;51:102-8.
13. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Addressing emerging infectious disease
    threats: a prevention strategy for the United States. Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health
    and Human Services, Public Health Service, 1994.
14. National Center for Health Statistics. Public use data tape documentation. Multiple cause
    of death for ICD-9 1992 data. Hyattsville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human
    Services, 1994.
15. Israel RA, Rosenberg HM, Curtin LR. Analytical potential for multiple cause-of-death
    data. Am J Epidemiol 1986;124:161-79.
16. World Health Organization. Manual of the international statistical classification of
    diseases, injuries, and causes of death, based on the recommendations of the Ninth
    Revision Conference, 1975, and adopted by the twenty-ninth World Health Assembly.
    Vol. 1. Geneva: World Health Organization, 1977.
17. Chamblee RF, Evans MC. TRANSAX, the NCHS system for producing multiple cause-
    of-death statistics, 1968-78. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1986.
    DHHS Pub No. [PHS] 86-1322).
18. National Center for Health Statistics. Vital statistics of the United States 1987, Vol. II,
    mortality, part A, technical appendix. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and
    Human Services, Public Health Service, 1990. (DHHS Pub No. (PHS) 90-1101).
19. U.S. Bureau of Census. Intercensal estimates of the population of counties by age, sex
    and race: 1970-1992 (machine-readable data file). Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of
    Census, 1995.
20. MacKenzie WR, Hoxie NJ, Proctor ME, et al. A massive outbreak in Milwaukee of
    Cryptosporidium infection transmitted through the public water supply. N Engl J Med
    1994;331:161-7.
21. Tappero JW, Koehler JE, Berger TG, et al. Bacillary angiomatosis and bacillary splenitis
    in immunocompetent adults. Ann Intern Med 1993;118:363-5.
22. Pinner RW, Teutsch S, Simonsen L, et al. Trends in infectious diseases mortality in the
    United States. JAMA 1996;275:189-93.
<>

EID Volume 2, Number 1, January-March 1996


Unexplained Deaths Due to Possibly Infectious Causes in the United States: Defining the
Problem and Designing Surveillance and Laboratory Approaches,
Bradley A. Perkins,* Jennifer M. Flood,‚ Richard Danila,Á Robert C. Holman,* Arthur L.
Reingold,‚ Laura A. Klug,* Michael Virata,§ Paul R. Cieslak, Sherif R. Zaki,* Robert W.
Pinner,* Rima F. Khabbaz,* and the Unexplained Deaths Working Group#
*National Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA,
Atlanta, Georgia; School of Public Health, University of California at Berkeley, California,
USA;
Minnesota Department of Health, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA; §Yale University School of
Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, USA; Oregon Department of Human Resources, Portland,
Oregon, USA

     y   Adobe Acrobat File (81,192 bytes)
     y   ASCII File (38,454 bytes)
     y   PostScript File (790,218 bytes)




                                   Profile of Bilateral Relations
                                           State of Israel




HISTORY OF RELATIONS

Israel established a Legation in South Africa in 1952 and in 1974 it was upgraded to an Embassy. In 1972
South Africa established a Consulate General in Tel Aviv which was upgraded to an Embassy in
December 1975. Israel continued to enjoy close relations with the Apartheid Government in South Africa.
Following the democratic transition in South Africa and the establishment of full diplomatic relations with
Palestine, after South Africa adopted an approach which favors resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict
through peaceful negotiations, on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

In September 1995 Foreign Minister Alfred B Nzo paid an official visit to Israel and signed an Agreement
establishing a Joint Commission of Co-operation with the Israeli Government. The first meeting of this
Joint Commission took place in June 1996. On this occasion, five bilateral agreements were negotiated
for co-operation in the following spheres: Agriculture, Tourism, Culture, Environment and Science, as well
as Nature Conservation.

Israel contributes to development in South Africa through two farming projects worth nearly R2.5 million in
Gauteng and the Eastern Cape.
SOUTH AFRICAN REPRESENTATION IN ISRAEL

H E Mr J Marx
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

South African Embassy

Office hours
Mon-Thurs: 07:00-16:00
Friday: 07:00-12:00




TRAVEL

Visa Requirements for South Africans

Visas are not required for South African passport holders not intending to stay for more than three
months. Persons holding temporary or emergency passports are excluded and it is imperative for persons
with such travel documents to obtain visas prior to departure.


Health Requirements

Tetanus immunisation is recommended for travel to rural areas.

For further information go to Travelers' Health.


Climate

Winters are cool and rainy, this is from mid-November to mid- February. Summers on the other hand can
be very hot during June to August, especially in the south.

For up-to-date weather information click here


Currency

The monetary unit is the New Israeli Shekel.

Exchange rate as on 17 January 2002: R1.00 = NIS 0.39

For current exchange rates click here




ISRAELI REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Embassy of Israel




TRADE STATISTICS (all figures in ZAR)

                                   SA EXPORTS                             SA IMPORTS
1994                                      1 066 589 021                                    609 991 373
1995                                      1 396 599 222                                    613 234 090
1996                                      1 648 796 342                                    735 498 477
1997                                      1 733 851 777                                    788 819 579
1998                                      1 911 811 210                                    995 619 990
1999                                      2 090 911 316                                  1 149 317 286
2000                                      2 186 756 014                                  1 172 826 506
2001                                          4 344 861                                      1 119 098
2002: 01-10                                   4 790 206                                      1 320 578

Stats SA


AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL

   i.   Agreement for the Establishment of a Joint Commission of Cooperation (1995).
  ii.   Memorandum of Understanding on Multiple Cooperation (1991).
 iii.   Double Taxation Agreement on Income from Shipping and Aircraft (1978).
 iv.    Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
        respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (1978).
 v.     Extradition (1959) and Amendment to Extradition Treaty (1976).
 vi.    Visa Agreement (1956)




                     Israel and South Africa
                                   excerpted from the book


                       Israeli Foreign Policy
                                    by Jane Hunter
                                    South End Press, 1987
History
lsrael's ties with South Africa seem to be especially disturbing to many who
follow Israel's international activities. Perhaps it is natural that Israel has
been castigated more harshly for its arms sales to South Africa than for its
sales to other countries: first, because there has been for a decade an arms
embargo against South Africa; and second, because of the unsurpassed
criminality of the white regime and the uses to which it puts the Israeli-
supplied weapons.

It has also been said that those arms sales are understandable, given the
striking similarities between the two countries in their day-to-day abuse and
repression of their subject populations, South African blacks and Palestinians
under Israeli rule; in their operating philosophies of apartheid and Zionism;
and in their similar objective situations: "the only two Western nations to
have established themselves in a predominantly nonwhite part of the world,"
as a South African Broadcasting Corporation editorial put it. That
understanding, however, is somewhat superficial, and the focus on
similarities of political behavior has somewhat obscured the view of the
breadth and depth of the totality of Israeli-South African relations and their
implications.

Israel's relations with South Africa are different than its interactions with
any of its other arms clients. That Israel gave South Africa its nuclear
weapons capability underscores the special nature of Tel Aviv's relations with
the white minority government and begins to describe it - a full-fledged, if
covert, partnership based on the determination of both countries to continue
as unrepentant pariahs and to help each other avoid the consequences of
their behavior.

***

Arms industry
Nuclear Apprentice

There are few areas where the respective needs and advantages of Israel
and South Africa dovetailed so perfectly as in the field of nuclear
cooperation.

"The most powerful reason for Israeli willingness to bear the undesirable
consequences of expanded and more open trade with South Africa may be
her desire to acquire material necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons,"
wrote a military analyst in 1980.' To that must be added Israel's great desire
to test the nuclear weapons it already had, and the attractions of South
Africa's vast territory and proximity to even vaster uninhabited spaces-the
Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

Then at the point in its nuclear development where it was fashioning
sophisticated bombs (devices which use less nuclear material but have
infinitely greater explosive force than the "primitive" bomb dropped by the
U.S. on Hiroshima), Israel would find it particularly helpful to observe the
performance, explosive force and fallout of a detonated weapon.

Since 1984, Israel had been operating a plutonium extraction plant in a
secret underground bunker at Dimona in the Negev Desert. Built by the
French in the late 1950s, the Dimona plant also included facilities for
manufacturing atomic bomb components. At the time of the 1976 accords,
Israel was preparing to build an adjoining plant for the extraction of lithium
6, tritium and deuterium, materials required for sophisticated thermonuclear
weapons.

Israel's reasons for devoting what had to have been a significant portion of
its scant resources to such an ambitious nuclear weapons program - nuclear
experts have recently ranked it as the world's sixth nuclear power, after the
U.S., the USSR, Britain, France and China - have been variously offered as the
desire to develop a credible deterrent to attack by its neighbors and the
desire to substitute that deterrent for at least part of the costly conventional
arsenal that Israel, with one of the world's most powerful military forces,
maintains, and also (with much less frequency) as an "umbrella" over a
partial withdrawal from the occupied territories.

***

The South Africans began teaching the lessons of Israel's 1967 war at their
maneuver school, and Israeli advisers began teaching the Boers the arts of
suppressing a captive population and keeping hostile neighbors off balance...

The white government's practice of domestic counterinsurgency l combines
outright military brutality with the extensive use of informers and
collaborators. It is impossible to know how many refinements of these age-
old techniques have been borrowed from the Israelis' occupation of the West
Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. The Israeli system of village leagues is
obviously comparable to the hated town councils imposed on segregated
townships by the apartheid government. The collective punishment
employed by the Israelis, such as the destruction of a whole family's home
when one of its members is arrested as a suspect in an act of resistance, has
lately been matched by the recent South African practices of sealing off
townships, and assaulting entire funeral processions. What is perhaps more
salient is the South African victims' perceptions of Israel's involvement in
their oppression and how readily that perception is communicated...

***

The Frontline States

The South Africans noted that their May, 1983 aerial attack (dubbed
Operation Shrapnel) on Mozambique's capital, Maputo, was analogous to
Israel's attack on Beirut the previous summer. one analyst, Joseph Hanlon,
believes that one of South Africa's objectives in the attack was to see how its
version of events would play in the media. It was received very well indeed,
according to Hanlon, with the Western press accepting South Africa's claim
that its attack was in "retaliation" for an ANC attack and that ANC "bases"
were hit.

Instead, the South African Air Force hit a child-care center and private
houses with "special fragmentation rockets," leaving 6 dead and 40
wounded. This follows the Israeli practice in Lebanon of speaking about PLO
installations while civilians are the actual targets, and attacking with
particularly heinous anti-personnel weapons-cluster bombs and phosphorous
bombs.

The victims of South Africa's angst are not blind to the similarity of attacks-
or motives.

President SamoraMachel likened the Israeli Government to the Pretoria
regime. He said that because of its inability to contain the fury of the
Palestinian people led by the PLO, the Zionist regime is trying to transfer the
war to other regions.

So reported Mozambican radio shortly after Israeli aircraft bombed PI
headquarters in Tunisia in October 1985.

The model provided by Israel, which punishes every internal act of resistance
and violent act outside its jurisdiction with a bombing raid on Palestinian
targets in Lebanon-almost always refugee camps cynically identified by the
Israelis as "terrorist bases" or "headquarters"-has served South Africa well.
In January 1986, the white government's radio delivered a commentary on
"the malignant presence" of "terrorism" in neighboring states and said
"there's only one answer now, and that's the Israeli answer." Israel had
managed to survive "by striking at terrorists wherever they exist."
In May 1986, South Africa demonstrated that it had assumed the right to
attack its neighbors at a time and on a pretext of its own choosing. The
chosen time was during a visit by the Eminent Persons Group of the
Commonwealth of Nations, which was attempting to establish negotiations
between the apartheid regime and its opposition. The victims-Zambia,
Botswana and Zimbabwe, all Commonwealth members-were chosen for their
alleged harboring of "terrorists"; the real victims were South African exiles
and an employee of the government of Botswana. The South Africans said
they had attacked "international terrorism" and compared their raids to the
Israeli attack on Tunisia and the U.S. attack on Libya in April 1986.

The attack was similar in style to Israel's 1985 attack on Tunisia. Initially,
the Israelis had been threatening Jordan and perhaps because King Hussein
of Jordan was at the time on an official visit to the U.S., the Israelis chose to
take revenge for the killing of three Israelis (believed to be top Mossad
agents) in Larnaca, Cyprus on the PLO in Tunisia.

Two weeks after its three-pronged attack on its Commonwealth neighbors,
South Africa attacked the Angolan harbor of Namibia, firing their version of
the Israeli Gabriel missile.

Israel has also been connected with the mercenary forces deployed by South
Africa against Angola and Mozambique. In the 1970s Israel aided the FNLA
(Angolan National Liberation Front) proxy forces organized and trained by
the CIA to forestall the formation of a government led by the MPLA (Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola-now the ruling party of Angola). John
Stockwell, who ran the CIA operation against Angola, recollected three arms
shipments Israel made in cooperation with the CIA: a plane full of 120 mm
shells sent via Zaire to the FNLA and Unita; a shipment of 50 SA-7 missiles
(all of which were duds); a boat-load sent to neighboring Zaire in a deal that
the Israelis had worked out with President Mobutu, even though the Zairian
strong man had broken ties with Israel two years earlier.

When Israel reestablished relations with Zaire (in 1982) and began to train
Zairian forces in the Shaba border province, Angola had cause for concern.
The leader of the FNLA had been Holden Roberto, brother-in-law of Zairian
president Mobutu, Israel's new client. In 1986, it would be established that
Zaire acted as a funnel for "covert" U.S. military aid for the Unita forces of
Jonas Savimbi.

In 1983, the Angolan News Agency reported that Israeli military experts
were training Unita forces in Namibia. Since Zaire began receiving military
aid and training from Tel Aviv, Angola has been ill at ease. Its worries
increased after discovering that:
Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was personally involved in the
organization, training and equipping of "commando" units of the army of
Zaire, especially organized for missions along the borders of the RPA
[Angola].

In 1984, the Financial Times (London) wrote of "joint Israeli-South African
support for Unita forces." Other sources also report the transfer of Israeli
arms and financial support to Unita.

In 1983, Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos told Berkeley,
California Mayor Eugene (Gus) Newport that an Israeli pilot had been shot
down during a South African attack. The Angolan President showed Newport
pictures of captured Israeli weapons. The following year, Luanda reported
the capture of three mercenaries who said they had been trained by Israeli
instructors in Zaire.

Israel has also been involved with the Mozambican "contras," the South
African-backed MNR (Mozambique National Resistance or "Renamo"), which
has brought great economic and social distress to Mozambique. Renamo has
a particular reputation for ideological incoherence, being regarded by most
other right-wing insurgencies as a gang of cutthroats. For several years there
have been stories coming from Southern Africa of captured mercenaries of
Renamo who say they were trained in neighboring Malawi-one of the four
nations to maintain relations with Israel after the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) declared a diplomatic embargo in 1973-by Israelis. And more
than one report has told of "substantial Israeli aid" to the MNR, thought to
have been funded by the CIA and Saudi Arabia as well as South Africa and
former Portuguese nationalists.




                                Israeli Foreign Policy

                                  by Jane Hunter
                                  South End Press, 1987




" Throughout the years of untrammeled slaughter that left at least 45,000 dead, and, by early
   1983, one million in internal exile - mostly indigenous Mayan Indians, who comprise a
   majority of Guatemala's eight million people - and thousands more in exile abroad, Israel
stood by the Guatemalan military. Three successive military governments and three brutal and
     sweeping campaigns against the Mayan population, described by a U.S. diplomat as
    Guatemala's "genocide against the Indians," had the benefit of Israeli techniques and
                              experience, as well as hardware. "




                              Israeli Foreign Policy:

                Weapons Manufacturing Industry
                               excerpted from the book


                               Israeli Foreign Policy

                                by Jane Hunter
                                South End Press, 1987




... By the end of the 1970s, the Israeli military industry was supplying 40
percent of Israel's military needs. But production runs solely for the domestic
market resulted in high costs per item. The longer production runs necessary
to lower unit costs created an imperative to export.

The government began a concerted marketing campaign, through diplomatic
and military contacts, as well as news releases and exhibits at fairs. In later
years a sales force of retired military officers eager for commissions fanned
out over the globe. While the secrecy of the Israeli government makes it
impossible to exactly calculate the volume of Israel's weapons sales abroad,
the general consensus of analysts of the international arms trade indicates
that between 1972 and 1980 Israel's arms exports soared, particularly in the
latter part of that span, rising from $50 million to top $1 billion, and, with the
possible exception of 1983, have remained over $1 billion annually. A 1986
estimate puts annual sales at "more than $ 1.25 billion. Since 1982 Israel has
been ranked among the world's top ten arms producers.
The importance to the overall economy of the arms manufacturing sector
also increased, with weapons exports estimated to have comprised 31
percent of industrial exports in 1975, up from 14 percent in 1967 and more
recently 30 to 40 percent of Israel's industrial output. The arms industry
employs "anywhere from 58,000 to as many as 120,000 Israelis," or, taking
the lower figure, percent of the industrial labor force, with the biggest unit,
Israel Aircraft Industries, the nation's largest employer, carrying 20,000 on
its payroll.

The export imperative, in turn, brought its own set of problems, these
centering on the overseas markets available to Israel and on its choice of
customers from that list. For varying reasons, Israel was largely shut out of
the Eastern Bloc, the Arab world and NATO countries. That left its potential
clientele to be found on the peripheries: pariahs such as South Africa and
Guatemala, the strong-man regimes of Taiwan, Zaire, and Chile, and the
occasional government wary of strings-attached arms purchases from the
superpowers. Over the years Israel has sold weapons-and often along with
the weapons come Israeli advisers-to Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua (under Somoza),
Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru,
Venezuela, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria,
Rhodesia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Australia, China,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua-New Guinea, Philippines,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Iran, and a number of European
countries and several non-governmental actions. Sometimes even the least
desirable customers have required some softening up: "Greatly detailed
stories abound of the huge bribes Israel has used to suborn defense
ministries, with the sole objective of nailing down arms deals."

As time went on an additional problem arose: arms sales became the motor
driving Israel's foreign policy. In times of economic crisis it became the
supreme exigency. In September 1986, the Israeli defense minister
explained to a press conference what was behind a raft of scandals involving
Israeli arms exports and technology thefts (these last, most frequently from
the U.S., have been an inevitable hallmark of a small country attempting to
sustain a full-scale armaments industry). "...We cut our orders in our military
industries..." he said, "and I told them quite frankly: 'Either you'll fire people
or find export markets."

The export markets open to Israel are frequently among the world's most
unsavory; indeed, to be off limits to the superpowers they often are located
inside the very gates of hell. Already under international censure for its
oppression of the Palestinians in the territories it occupies, Israel's dealings
with the scum of the world's tyrants-including the white clique in South
Africa, Somoza of Nicaragua, Gen. Pinochet of Chile, Marcos of the
Philippines, Duvalier of Haiti, Mobutu of Zaire, the allegedly cannibalistic
Bokassa of the Central African Republic-invariably result in its further
exclusion from more "respectable" circles. "A person who sleeps with dogs
shouldn't be surprised to find himself covered with fleas," comments the
military correspondent for Israel's major daily newspaper.

Israeli critics, who term the phenomenon "arms diplomacy," warn that the
export imperative has motivated a sequence of ad hoc, opportunistic
decisions that have precluded the development of a coherent foreign policy,
which, in turn, might over the long term mitigate Israel's isolated position in
the world. Yet these critics are far from sanguine about the ability of Israel
to set itself on a different course.

They point to the power of the "security establishment lobby," comprised of
the upper echelon of Israel's political leadership (this has remained
remarkably constant since the founding of the state), the top levels of the
military, and the officials of the parastatal arms industries. As in the U.S.,
there is a "revolving door" in Israel, with many of the top figures serving
successively in two or all three of these sectors. It is these men who find the
clients and have insider access to the Ministerial Committee on Weapons
Transfers (MCD)-its members are the prime minister and the ministers of
defense, foreign affairs, and trade and industry which will make the final
decision on every sale. Such decisions are made secretly- the Israeli
parliament, the Knesset, excluded. The cabinet, too, is often excluded. Critics
of the hegemony of the arms export business say it has relegated the foreign
ministry to a subordinate role in Israeli foreign policy making, and they see
in its wake grave social and political consequences.

' A sector has evolved in Israel, headed by an elite with identical social
characteristics and marked by a fairly high degree of cohesiveness, whose
decisions and actions have a significant effect not only on the country's
economy and its foreign and | defense policy but also on its social and value
systems. No less important, however, is the issue of whether a closed system
has been created whose activities and decisions undergo less public
supervision and scrutiny than any other area of life in the country. '

A Co-equal Type of Proxy

Israeli analysts often argue that Israeli arms sales are dependent on U.S.
approval; in a limited sense this is true. The U.S. has blocked-at the behest of
Britain-the delivery of A-4 Skyhawks to Argentina, and it has in the past
vetoed the export of the Kfir aircraft, leverage it is able to exert because of
the Kfir's U.S. engine. However, the Carter Administration was unable to
prevent Israeli nuclear cooperation with South Africa, and the Reagan
Administration was unsuccessful in persuading the Israelis to halt their arms
sales to Iran in the early 1980s (assuming it wanted to). The Israeli success
in persuading the Reagan Administration to incorporate Israeli arms sales to
the Islamic Republic into a bizarre and controversial series of contacts with
Iranian leaders is probably more typical of the operative U.S.-lsraeli dynamic.

On the other hand, Israel has often obliged this or that sector of the U.S.
government, selling arms where it would be embarrassing or illegal for the
U.S. to do so: the contras, the Peoples Republic of China in the early 1980s,
and the Derg government of Ethiopia are examples. In 1975, Israel followed
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's advice and helped South Africa with its
invasion of Angola. Even after the passage the following year of the Clark
Amendment forbidding U.S. covert involvement in Angola, Israel apparently
considered Kissinger's nod a continuing mandate.

Given the export imperative under which the Israeli government operates,
this 1981 proposal from the chief economic coordinator in the Israeli cabinet,
YacovMeridor, should be taken with great seriousness:

" We are going to say to the Americans, 'Don't compete with us in South
Africa, don't compete with us in the Caribbean or in any other country where
you can't operate in the open.' Let us do it. I even use the expression, ' You
sell the ammunition and equipment by proxy. Israel will be your proxy,' and
this would be worked out with a certain agreement with the United States
where we will have certain markets...which will be left for us. "




                          Israel and El Salvador

                          excerpted from the book


                           Israel Foreign Policy

                           excerpts from a book by

                              Jane Hunter
                            South End Press, 1987
From its earliest attempts to establish itself as an arms exporter, Israel had
enjoyed the patronage of the military of El Salvador, which ruled that small,
densely-populated country on the Pacific side of the Central American
isthmus on behalf of a powerful plantation oligarchy.

In 1973 Israel took orders from El Salvador for 18 DassaultOuragan jet
fighter aircraft. Israel had obtained these planes from France for its own use.
Refurbished and delivered to El Salvador in 1975, they were the first jet
fighters in Central America, representing a significant jump in the level of
military sophistication in a region where war had flared between Honduras
and El Salvador in 1969.

Other aircraft ordered from Israel by El Salvador in 1973 included six French-
made Fouga Magister trainers and 25 Arava short-take-off-and-landing
aircraft. The Arava is produced by Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) and is
advertised for a variety of uses from hauling cargo, to medical evacuation, to
transporting troops in counterinsurgency warfare. The Salvadorans also
bought a quantity of small arms, ammunition and rocket launchers.

Military links with El Salvador actually began around 1972, when the Israeli
Defense Ministry carried out a youth movement development program there.
Alongside their arms sales, the Israelis also sent advisers to El Salvador.
Former Salvadoran Army Col. and Undersecretary of the Interior Rene
Francisco Guerra y Guerra recalled that during the 1970s ANSESAL, the
Salvadoran secret police, had security advisers from Israel. According to
Guerra, as a low-ranking ANSESAL officer, Roberto D'Aubuisson, who would
later rise to prominence as leader of a far-right faction linked to death
squads, was a student of the Israeli instructors.

At least one Salvadoran officer, Col. Sigifredo Ochoa was taught by Israeli
trainers in El Salvador and also went to Israel for training in the mid- 1970s.
Ochoa, who was credited with a massacre of civilians in 1981 i° made no
secret of his preference for his Israeli mentors over the U.S. advisers who
came to El Salvador after 1981. The Americans, he noted scornfully, "lost the
war in Vietnam." During the Israeli siege of Beirut in 1982, Ochoa proffered
an "Israeli solution" for Central America: a combined assault by El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala and the anti-Nicaragua contras against Nicaragua.

When the Carter Administration took office in 1977 it wasted little time
putting into practice a principle enunciated during the presidential campaign
and by Congress in 1976: U.S. aid would be cut off to recipients who were
gross and persistent abusers of human rights. The idea was to encourage
dictatorial regimes to modify their behavior and reinstate themselves in
Washington's good graces.

It was a fairly reasonable assumption; after all, many of these tyrants had
been through U.S. military programs and had adopted the anticommunist line
that a succession of U.S. governments had encouraged. Washington had
sired both the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan regimes, and ~ was not without
profound influence in El Salvador.

In the 1960s, the U.S. had presided over the foundation of CONDECA, a
regional military council intended "to coordinate and centralize military
command of the region under U.S. military supervision." In El Salvador, the
Kennedy Administration set in motion a series of meetings among Central
American leaders that led to the establishment of the feared ANSESAL secret
police and its "parallel domestic security agencies in Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Panama, Honduras, and Costa Rica." Years later the CIA connections of
ANSESAL would come to light in close connection with the death squads
which have terrorized El Salvador since the 1970s. Also in the 1960's AIFLD,
(the American Institute for Free Labor Development, the AFL-CIO's foreign
operation dedicated to foiling the formation of left wing unions) tried to
organize a "tame" network of rural cooperatives in El Salvador. According to
one report the project was budgeted at $ I .6 million and had the assistance
of the Israeli Histadrut labor federation.

Even the prideful way that El Salvador and Guatemala responded when their
aid was terminated-both preempted the U.S. move by cutting military ties
with the U.S.-might have been expected to blow over. That was without
reckoning on Israel, which was quick to fill the gap. Indeed, one analyst
believes the "surprisingly defiant position" of the Central American clients
was based on their advance knowledge that they could maintain their
military capacity by dealing with Israel.

El Salvador simply began to buy its weapons from Israel. Between the 1977
U.S. cutoff and the resumption of U.S. aid in 1981, El Salvador obtained over
80 percent of its weapons from Israel. The balance came from France and
Brazil. The earlier aircraft orders still in the pipeline were delivered and small
arms and ammunition from Israel undercut the intent of the Carter policy. By
1979 came the first report that Israeli advisers had been giving the
Salvadoran military counterinsurgency training both in Israel and El
Salvador.

During this period as well, Israeli technicians began installing a computer
system able to monitor utilities usage, thus giving the military the ability to
pinpoint houses where the telephone is heavily used, presumably signifying
that political organizing is going on. (A similar system provided by Israel to
Guatemala does the same with water and electricity use. According to former
Col. Guerra, the Israelis began work on the system in 1978. As an electronic
engineer familiar with El Salvador's telecommunications installations, he did
not believe that another company would be brought in to finish the work,
despite two changes of government and the reentry of the U.S., following the
installation of the Reagan Administration.

It is quite certain that installation was completed. A CIA source described a
telephone-monitoring computer system to a journalist in El Salvador, and
Arnaldo Ramos of the FDR (the Democratic Revolutionary Front, the political
grouping fighting against the U.S.-backed government) has spoken of
another use to which the Salvadoran regime puts the computer equipment:

They periodically block several downtown areas and take the ID's of people,
just to check who they are. If they find the person happens to be downtown
in an area where he's not supposed to be too often during the week, that
right away makes him a suspect.

Once the new human rights policy was implemented, little attention was paid
in the U.S. to what was going on in El Salvador. The Carter policy had the
virtue of slackening the long embrace between Washington and Central
American dictatorships; it had the obvious fault of not offering redress for
the century of manipulation of Central American governments by the U.S.
government and corporations. And it had the predictable ground-level
threshold for tolerating a strengthening of the left-which in El Salvador
would bring Washington running to the assistance of the old order in 1980.
But in the early years of the Carter Administration there was little fretting
over El Salvador and even less over the fact that Israel had quickly filled the
traditional U.S. shoes.

***

"Pacification"

In March 1985, El Salvador's Deputy Minister of Defense and Public Security
Col. Reynaldo Lopez Nuila visited Israel. Lopez was the strongest advocate in
the Duarte cabinet of "citizens defense committees" to guard plantations and
businesses against insurgent attacks. By July 1984, the Salvadoran Assembly
had passed a law approving the creation of such units. In 1985 an
enthusiastic Col. Sigifredo Ochoa began establishing "self-defense"
committees in Chalatenango province, in towns which the military had
succeeded in occupying. In May, Ochoa boasted that his troops had
organized 30 such committees. These forces, argued Lopez Nuila,
"haveworked in many other countries." Later Lopez Nuila and the director of
the Salvadoran police academy visited Guatemala for advice on
counterinsurgency; while there they set up permanent links with their
counterparts. Israel has long advised the Guatemalan military and police. It
is more likely, however, that Nuila's mission was related to the "self-
defense" forces which the Salvadoran government was trying to set up.

These attempts came in the context of efforts the U.S. had been making to
establish the same kind of rural "pacification" program that it had employed
in Vietnam, the well-remembered Phoenix Program of winning hearts and
minds with a combination of civic amenities and murder. In El Salvador it
was called the National Plan. Begun in 1983, the program in San Vicente
province was a monumental failure. "Guerrillas stole medicines from National
Plan hospitals and held night classes at National Plan schools." Corruption in
the ranks of Salvadoran officials accomplished what the insurgents could not.

The military then began an intensified bombing campaign to depopulate
areas whose residents were thought to support the rebels. It developed its
own pacification plan, and it was probably inevitable that Israel would
become involved.

***

On New Years Day in 1986, El Salvador's ambassador to Jerusalem presented
his credentials to the Israelis. (Ambassador Enrique GuttfreundHanchel was
a former president of the Jewish community in El Salvador and also of the
Central American Confederation of Jewish Communities. The following
month Israel's ambassador in El Salvador said, "We will be reinforcing our
technical cooperation in the agricultural and community development fields,
in which we are considered specialists." By that mouthful of euphemisms the
ambassador meant that Israel would help El Salvador strip the last shreds of
dignity and hope from thousands of civilian victims.

Harking back to the scorched earth military pacification plan which Israel
had helped Guatemala implement a non-governmental community
development worker spelled out the nature of Israel's specialization: "Once
you have Israeli technicians coming into the country, you can have military
trainers coming in under the guise of agricultural technicians. That is what
they did in Guatemala." An adviser to President Duarte said the government
hoped that Israel's agricultural assistance would prop up the agrarian reform
program and "keep thousands of peasants from joining rebel ranks out of
frustration." The Israeli ambassador said that his country's aid would be
channeled through the government agency supporting the military's
relocation projects, Dideco.
                          Israel and Guatemala

                          excerpted from the book


                           Israel Foreign Policy

                           excerpts from a book by

                              Jane Hunter
                           South End Press, 1987




Guatemala

... The history of Israel's relations with Guatemala roughly parallels that of
its ties with El Salvador except the Guatemalan military was so unswervingly
bloody that Congress never permitted the ... Reagan Administration to undo
the military aid cutoff implemented during the Carter years.

Weaponry for the Guatemalan military is the very least of what Israel has
delivered. Israel not only provided the technology necessary for a reign of
terror, it helped in the organization and commission of the horrors
perpetrated by the Guatemalan military and police. And even beyond that: to
ensure that the profitable relationship would continue, Israel and its agents
worked actively to maintain Israeli influence in Guatemala.

Throughout the years of untrammeled slaughter that left at least 45,000
dead, and, by early 1983, one million in internal exile - mostly indigenous
Mayan Indians, who comprise a majority of Guatemala's eight million people
- and thousands more in exile abroad, Israel stood by the Guatemalan
military. Three successive military governments and three brutal and
sweeping campaigns against the Mayan population, described by a U.S.
diplomat as Guatemala's "genocide against the Indians," had the benefit of
Israeli techniques and experience, as well as hardware.

***

Israel began selling Guatemala weapons in 1974 and since then is known to
have delivered 17 Arava aircraft. In 1977 at the annual industrial fair,
Interfer, Israel's main attraction was the Arava. "An operative Arava is to be
parked outside the IAI pavilion for public inspection, although its silhouette
in flight is a common sight over the capital and countryside."'

Referring to the Aravas, Benedicto Lucas Garcia, chief of staff during the rule
of his brother Romeo Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) said, "Israel helped us in
regard to planes and transportation-which we desperately needed because
we've had problems in transferring ground forces from one place to another.
By 1982, at least nine of the Aravas had been mounted with gun pods.

Among the other weapons sold by Israel were 10 RBY armored personnel
carriers, three Dabur class patrol boats armed with Gabriel missiles, light
cannons, machine guns and at least 15,000 Galil assault rifles. The Galil
became Guatemala's standard rifle and Uzis were widely seen as well.

According to Victor Perera, "Uzis and the larger Galil assault rifles used by
Guatemala's special counterinsurgency forces accounted for at least half of
the estimated 45,000 Guatemalan Indians killed by the military since 1978"

***

When the Reagan Administration took office it was determined to do
everything it could for Guatemala. It had promised as much during the
election campaign. Never had Ronald Reagan seen a rightist dictatorship he
didn't like; during his 1980 campaign he met with a representative of the
right-wing business lobby Los Amigos del Pais, and, referring to the Carter
Administration's aid cutoff, told him, "Don't give up. Stay there and fight. I'll
help you as soon as I get in."

The Guatemalan far-right apparently helped Reagan get in.

Guatemalan business leaders reportedly pumped large illegal contributions
into the Reagan campaign coffers. Their tentacles reached right into the core
of the new administration through the lobbying activities of the Hannaford-
Deaver law firm of White House troika member Michael Deaver. Within three
days of the Republican victory on 7 November 1980, Hannaford-Deaverwere
busy arranging a Capitol Hill briefing for Amigos del Pais.

Congress, however, did not change its attitude about Guatemala, and as late
as 1985 remained adamant about denying it military aid. In 1981, Reagan's
Secretary of State Alexander Haig "urged Israel to help Guatemala." In July
1985 Israel helped the administration move a shipment of 40 assault rifles
with advanced night sights and 1,000 grenade launchers from Israel to
Guatemala on a KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines) flight.
In late 1983, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) issued a communiqué
saying that the previous May a munitions factory producing bullets for Galil
rifles and Uzi submachine guns had begun operation in Alta Verapaz.
Subsequently the director of Army Public Relations confirmed that the
military was producing Galil rifle parts, had begun armor plating its vehicles
at the factory, and that the facility would soon be capable of building
grenade launchers. The following year the factory began manufacturing
entire Galil rifles under license from Israel.

Israeli advisers set up the factory and then trained the Guatemalans to run it,
said Gen. Benedicto Lucas Garcia, who had headed the army at the time.
"The factory is now being run by Guatemalans," he added. There are hopes in
Guatemala that 30 percent of the plant's output can be sold to Honduras and
El Salvador.

The EGP said in 1983 that there were 300 Israeli advisers in Guatemala,
working "in the security structures and in the army." Other reports were less
specific as to numbers, but suggested that these Israeli advisers, "some
official, others private," performed a variety of functions. Israelis "helped
Guatemalan internal security agents hunt underground rebel groups."

Gen. Lucas said Israeli advisers had come to teach the use of Israeli
equipment purchased by Guatemala. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the
Guatemalan police agencies had had extensive U.S. training in "riot control
training and related phases of coping with civil disturbances in a humane and
effective manner," a euphemism for the terror campaigns in which these
forces participated that in 1967-1968 took 7,000 lives while ostensibly
fighting a guerrilla force that never numbered more than 450. When
Congress forbade U.S. forces to train the internal police forces of other
countries-passed in 1974, this law was supplanted in 1985 by legislation that
put the U.S. back in the police-guidance business - the Israelis stepped in
and "set up their intelligence network, tried and tested on the West Bank and
Gaza."

Israeli noncommissioned officers were also said to have been hired by big
landowners to train their private security details. (Under Marcos, Israel did
the same in the Philippines. These private squads, together with "off-duty
military officers formed the fearsome 'death squads' which later spread to
neighboring El Salvador, where they have been responsible for an estimated
20,000-30,000 murders of left-wing dissidents."

Not only did the Israelis share their experiences and their tactics, they
bestowed upon Guatemala the technology needed by a modern police state.
During the period Guatemala was under U.S. tutelage, the insurgency spread
from the urban bourgeoisie to the indigenous population in the rural
highlands; with Israeli guidance the military succeeded in suppressing ... the
drive for land and political liberation. The Guatemalan military is very
conscious of that achievement, even proud of it. Some officers argue that
with the help of the U.S. they could not have quelled the insurgency, as
Congress would not have tolerated their ruthless tactics.

In 1979, the Guatemalan interior minister paid a "secret and confidential"
visit to Israel, where he met with the manufacturers of "sophisticated police
equipment." In March of the following year Interior Minister Donaldo Alvarez
Ruiz was in Israel to conclude an agreement for police training. Following the
overthrow of Lucas Garcia, the home of Interior Minister Alvarez was raided,
"uncovering underground jail cells, stolen vehicles...[and] scores of gold
graduation rings, wrenched from the fingers of police torture victims."

Israeli advisers have worked with the feared G-2 police intelligence unit.
overseen by the army general staff, the G-2 is the intelligence agency -
sections charged with "the elimination of individuals" are stationed at every
army base - which has been largely responsible for the death squad killings
over the last decade. The present civilian government has dissolved the DIT,
a civilian organization subordinate to G-2, but not G-2 itself.

In 1981, the Army's School of Transmissions and Electronics, a school
designed and financed by the Israeli company Tadiran to teach such subjects
as encoding, radio jamming and monitoring, and the use of Israeli equipment
was opened in Guatemala City. According to the colonel directing the school,
everything in it came from Israel: the "teaching methods, the teaching
teams, the technical instruments, books, and even the custom
furniture...designed and built by the Israeli company DEGEM Systems."

At the opening ceremony the Israeli ambassador was thanked by Chief of
Staff Gen. Benedicto Lucas Garcia for "the advice and transfer of electronic
technology" which, Lucas said, had brought Guatemala up to date. Calling
Guatemala "one of our best friends" the ambassador promised that further
technology transfers were in the works.

Perhaps the most sinister of all the equipment supplied by Israel to
Guatemala were two computers. One was in an old military academy and
became, as Benedicto Lucas called it, "the nerve center of the armed forces,
which deals with the movements of units in the field and so on." The other
computer was located in an annex of the National Palace. The G-2 have a
control center there, and, since the days of Romeo Lucas Garcia, meetings
have been held in that annex to select assassination victims. According to a
senior Guatemalan army official, the complex contains "an archive and
computer file on journalists, students, leaders, people of the left, politicians,
and so on. " This material is combined with current intelligence reports and
mulled over during weekly sessions that have included, in their respective
times, both Romeo Lucas and Oscar Mejia Victores.

The bureaucratic procedures for approving the killing of a dissident are well-
established. "A local military commander has someone they think is a
problem," the officer explains. "So they speak with G-2, and G-2 consults its
own archives and information from its agents and the police and, if all
coincide, it passes along a direct proposition to the minister of defense. They
say, 'We have analyzed the case of such and such a person in depth and this
person is responsible for the following acts and we recommend that we
execute them."

***

Control of the Rural Population

The aspect of Israeli cooperation with Guatemala with the most serious
implications is the role played by Israeli personnel in the universally
condemned rural "pacification" program. Extreme maldistribution of land-
exacerbated by encroachment on indigenous land-was a major cause of the
present rebellion. After trying several different approaches, the military,
under Rios Montt, embarked on a resolution of the problem, substituting
forced relocation and suppression for equitable land distribution.

In 1982 Israeli military advisers helped develop and carry out 'Plan Victoria'
the devastating scorched earth campaign which Rios Montt .unleashed on
the highland population. In June 1983, the Guatemalan embassy in
Washington confirmed that "personnel sent by the Israeli government were
participating in the repopulation and readjustment programs for those
displaced." Rios Montt himself told the Washington Times that the Israeli
government was giving his administration help with the counterinsurgency
plan called "Techo, tortilla y trabajo" (shelter, food and work). The "three
T's" followed an earlier Rios program called Fusiles y Fridoles, or beans and
bullets, where wholesale slaughter was combined with the provision of life's
necessities to those willing to cooperate with the military.

The success of the government's initially savage but sophisticated campaign
against the rebels has come without significant U.S. military assistance, and
top field commanders say that none is necessary now to finish the guerrillas.

"We declared a state of siege so we could kill legally," Rios Montt told a
group of politicians. The Roman Catholic Conference of Bishops called what
Rios was doing "genocide." Following Rios' overthrow, his successor Mejia
Victores continued the program, proclaiming that model villages would be
extended throughout the country.

As the army bombed, strafed and burned village after village, an estimated
100,000 peasants escaped across the border to Mexico or to the
mountainous territory controlled by the guerrillas. Others were captured by
the military. Many of those who went to the guerrillas were later forced by
hunger to surrender themselves to the military. Their fate was confinement
in model villages, what were called strategic hamlets during the U.S. assault
on Vietnam.

***

One of the most oppressive features of Guatemala's pacification program is
the "civilian self-defense patrols" whose ranks are filled by coercion, with
most joining out of fear of being called subversive, and thus marked for
torture or execution.

Those who do serve in the patrols must "turn in their quota of 'subversives."'
Otherwise, "they will be forced to denounce their own neighbors and to
execute them with clubs and fists in the village plaza."'

The patrols are believed by most analysts to have been suggested by Israelis.
They have had a profound effect on Mayan society, both psychologically, "a
permanent violation of our values or a new negative vision," as the country's
Catholic bishops charged, and practically, as long shifts on patrol prevent
fulfillment of family and economic obligations

In 1983 the Guatemalan government estimated that 850 villages in the
highlands had "self defense" units. The following year the U.S. embassy in
Guatemala estimated that 700,000 men had been enrolled in the units,
armed with Israeli assistance. Currently 900,000 men are organized into the
civil patrols.

***

It is no accident that the Guatemalans looked to the Israelis for assistance in
organizing their campaign against the Indians, and having followed their
mentors' advice, wound up with something that looks quite a bit like the
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the
Gaza strip. As the Israelis wrecked the local economy and turned the
occupied territories into a captive market and a cheap labor pool, the
Guatemalan military has made economic activity in the occupied highlands
all but impossible.
As it is openly acknowledged in the Israeli media that the Palestinian
population must not be allowed to exceed the Jewish population, it is
common knowledge that the Guatemalan military would like to reduce the
Mayan population to a minority.

But most of all there is the unyielding violence of the suppression. The
occupation regime Israel has maintained since 1967 over the Palestinians
(and its occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, the Egyptian Sinai and
Southern Lebanon) has trained "an entire generation of Israelis...to impose
Israeli rule over subject peoples." "The Israeli soldier is a model and an
example to us," Gen. Benedicto Lucas said in 1981.

It was in the coercive resettlement program that Israel's activities in
Guatemala intersected most directly with those of the Christian right
surrounding the Reagan Administration. This was particularly true during the
reign of Rios Montt. Montt was a so-called "born-again Christian," a member
("elder") of the Arcata, California based Church of the Word, a branch of
Evangelical Gospel Outreach.

In Guatemala, the Christian right was interested in converts by the end of
1982 reactionary Protestants had succeeded in recruiting 22 percent of the
population to their theology of blind obedience and anti-communism. They
were particularly hostile to Catholicism, especially "Liberation Theology,"
which many of the Guatemalan military deemed responsible for the
insurgency.

Right-wing Christian organizations seemed to be especially drawn to the
harsh social control being exerted on the highland Mayans. During the Rios
Montt period, foreign fundamentalists were permitted access to military
operational zones, while Catholics were turned away-or attacked. During this
period "many Catholic rectories and churches in Quiche [a highland province]
[were] turned into Army barracks. In late 1983, the Vatican itself protested
the murder of a Franciscan priest in Guatemala and the (exiled) Guatemalan
Human Rights Commission (CDHG) charged that in the space of several
months 500 catechists had been disappeared. In October the police caught
and tortured some religious workers.

Meanwhile, Rios Montt surrounded himself with advisers, both North
American and Guatemalan, from his Verbo church, and what appeared to be
a loose coalition of right-wing fundamentalist organizations, most notably
Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network, began an extensive
fundraising drive and also started sending volunteers to Ixil Triangle villages
under military control. Rios Montt chose Love Lift International, the "relief
arm" of Gospel Outreach, Verbo's parent church, to carry the food and
supplies purchased with the money raised. Verbo representatives, along with
an older evangelical outfit, the Wycliffe Bible Translators (WBT/SIL, the
latter initials for the Summer Institute of Linguistics, an organization whose
CIA connections are long and impeccable and which has often been charged
with involvement in massacres of indigenous peoples throughout the
Americas), arranged with the government "to take charge of all medical work
in the Ixil Triangle, and for all education in Indian areas up to the third grade
to be taught in Indian languages with WBT/SIL assistance," through the
Behrhorst Clinic. WBT/SIL and the Clinic's parent, the Behrhorst Foundation,
incorporated with Verbo Church into the Foundation for Aid to the Indian
People (FUNDAPI), whose stated purpose was to channel international
Christian donations to refugees and which coordinated volunteers from U.S.
right-wing religious organizations.

Although nothing has yet emerged which definitively ties Israeli activities in
Guatemala to those of the religious right, it is reasonable to assume there is
contact. Since the late 1970s the government of Israel has devoted
considerable energy to befriending such political luminaries of rightist
evangelism as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, having turned to these
groups after the National Council of Churches passed some mildly reproving
resolutions about the Middle East. The Christian extremists tell Israel what it
wants to hear. Jerry Falwell found justification in the Bible for an Israel
encompassing parts of "lraq, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and
all of Lebanon, Jordan, and Kuwait. Pat Robertson praised the Reagan
Administration's veto of a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel's
invasion of Lebanon with some gobbledygook tying the invasion to the
fundamentalist superstition that Israel will be the site of the last battle,
Armageddon: "Israel has lit the fuse, and it is a fast burning fuse, and I don't
think that the fuse is going to be quenched until that region explodes in
flames. That is my personal feeling from the Bible." Robertson urged his
viewers to call the White House and voice their support for the Israeli
invasion.

Untroubled by the scene in Armageddon when all the Jews will be converted
(or damned), Israel welcomed the "Christian Voice of Hope" radio station and
its companion "Star of Hope" television to Southern Lebanon, and, even
though proselytizing is illegal in Israel, provided the stations with Israeli
government newscasts. Supported by donations from U.S. right-wing
evangelicals, and in particular by Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting
Network, the stations were "used as a military tool" by the Israeli proxy
South Lebanon Army.

Aside from the religious right and their secular allies, the Guatemalan model
villages have been universally condemned. Until 1985 a bipartisan majority
opposed the granting of any U.S. aid that would strengthen the development
poles. This, of course, stopped short of undercutting support for the
"pacification" program, as funds received from U.S. AID and other foreign
sources freed up government funds for use on the model villages. In 1984,
U.S. AID granted Guatemala $1 million which was used for constructing
infrastructure for the model villages. Americas Watch Vice Chairman
AryehNeier pointed out that humanitarian assistance from the U.S. has
"played an essential role in the Guatemalan Army's counterinsurgency
programs," enabling the army to distribute (or withhold) food to exact
compliance with its resettlement program.

***

Abdication of Responsibility

... When the U.S. intervened in Guatemala and overthrew its liberal,
democratically elected government in 1954, it effectively transferred rule to
the country's military, which has held power ever since. Even the civilian
presidency of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro was (with U.S. acquiescence)
immediately subjugated by the military. To cite only one example of the
continuity that makes the last three tragic decades of Guatemala a U.S.
responsibility: the dossiers that formed the basis of the intelligence unit G-
2's death squad selection process also date back to 1954. After the fall of the
government of JacoboArbenz, the army confiscated the membership lists of
the many organizations which had blossomed during the all-too-short hiatus
between repressive regimes- Guatemala was ruled by the oppressive dictator
Jorge Ubico until 1945, when he was bloodlessly replaced by a popular
government under Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo-and from these lists culled 70,000
"communists." These files were updated during the 1960s and used for
assassinations during a U.S.-supported counterinsurgency. In the 1970s
Israel stepped in and helped with the computerization of the whole bloody
system.

It does not take convoluted reasoning to conclude that "both the U.S. and
Israel bear rather serious moral responsibility" for Guatemala.




                   Israel, Nicaragua and the Contras

                           excerpted from the book
                          Israel Foreign Policy

                          excerpts from a book by

                             Jane Hunter
                           South End Press, 1987




Nicaragua Under Somoza

With few qualms and minimal outside criticism, Israel came to the rescue of
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle and, from September 19 7 8
to July 19 7 9, helped him stave off history. Later it would be thrown up to
Israel that when Washington and just about every other government in the
world was boycotting Somoza, Israel had been willing to provide him with
weapons. ,

***

Somoza had been introduced to Israeli weapons in 1974 at a special showing
arranged for him in Managua. He had bought Dabur class patrol boats and
Arava STOI. aircraft; by the time he fought his final battle he would have 14
Aravas to rush his troops from place to place.S

Soon after Somoza's U.S. aid was blocked, insurrection flared against him. In
Septcmber 1978, there was fighting in most of Nicaragua's cities and a
massive general strike in Managua that was supported by virtually the entire
business community. Somoza shot his way out of it. His National Guard used
1,000 Uzi submachine guns and Galil rifles from Israel, and Somoza was
expecting "thousands more" Galils.9 Although most Latin American leaders
were hoping for his downfall, Somoza survived the September challenge. "Is
eli-made weapons helped to save the Somoza dynasty," read one headline.

That autumn, Israeli rifles and ammunition arrived in large quantities. Some
of the Galil rifles were "sent directly to a special terror unit commanded by
Somoza's son, which carried out the murder of political opponents, among
them women and children."" The Guard also used the new Israeli weapons in
its "clean-up" operations, which went on during October 1978 in half a dozen
cities. The majority of the victims-many of them were shot by the Guard at
their own front doors were between 14 and 21 years of age and were marked
for execution simply because they lived in neighborhoods where the
Sandinista National l.iberation Front (FSLN) had been active.

An Israeli adviser "who presented himself as an Israeli army officer" was also
present in Nicaragua and worked in Somoza's bunker in Managua. The
adviser allegedly represented David Marcus Katz, the Mexico-based Israeli
arms dealer with close ties to the right wing Israeli settlers movement, Gush
Emunim.

Israeli arms shipments continued to arrive. Several shipments came by air
and were delivered at night during a curfew. Among the weapons delivered
this way were surface-to-air missiles (although the Sandinistas did not have
an air force). Israel had at one point given its word that it would not ship
arms to Somoza. Now it denied doing so, but U.S. officials said that Israeli
arms were still arriving in Nicaragua. "Our people in Managua tell us that the
streets are starting to look like TerusaLembec.aus.e the National Guard is
wearing 1sraeli berets," said one U.S. official.

By the following spring Israel was sending Somoza really big stuff: nine
combat-armed Cessna aircraft and two Sikorsky helicopters. The FSLN shot
down seven of the Cessnas. ~s Somoza got better use out of the helicopters,
which he called "skyraiders." He had his Guards use them as platforms for
machine gun strafing; and from 3,000 feet above ground, soldiers rolled
bombs out of the helicopter doors.

"The Government is dropping 500-pound bombs from helicopters on rebel-
held shantytowns, reportedly killing as many as 600 people in one day.
Soldiers routinely kill suspected rebels they capture," wrote the New York
Timescorrespondentin Managua ofthe final weeksofthewar. After having all
but five cities and a great part of Nicaragua's industrial infrastructure
destroyed, on July 17, 1979, Somoza cleaned out the national treasury and
fled the country.

***

Israel and the Contras

Some accounts set the commencement of Israeli aid to the contras as far
back as their launching in 1979. It is even possible that Israel made a
seamless transition from Somoza to the contras through its contacts with
some of the figures in the private network that was exposed when the Iran-
contra scandal broke in November 1986 (see below). A part of this network
"began funneling aid to Somoza via Israel and EATSCO," a shipping company
created by other members of the network to take advantage of the U.S.
weapons Egypt would be receiving as a result of the Camp David accords,
after the Carter Administration cut off aid to Nicaragua. When the dictator
was ousted, network associates of former CIA agent Edwin Wilson-now
serving time in federal prison for selling explosives to Libya, among other
deeds-and former CIA agent Thomas Clines transferred a "security assistance
program" they had put together for Somoza to the contras. This would have
involved outfitting the dregs of Somoza's secret police in Honduras, a cynical
holding operation that continued until January 1981, when the Reagan
Administration took office.

One of the administration's first moves was to arrange with Argentina for
trainers for the contras. Veterans of the Argentine "dirty war" were
enthusiastic about exporting their skills and their politics. They trained the
contras until Washington and Buenos Aires came to a parting of the ways,
after the Reagan Administration sided with Britain during the Malvinas
/Falklands War. During the Argentine period, the Israeli ambassador

to Costa Rica supplied the contras with passports and aliases so that they
could travel through Central America. Besides traveling for their own
"business," at least one contra has been implicated in a Central American
assassination: that of the revered Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo
Romero.

At the same time, the administration approached Israel to become involved
in the assault on Nicaragua: in a pattern that was later to become apparent
as the raison d'etre of the Iran-contra scandal, sometime before June 1981
Israel was provided with satellite pictures of Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak
"within the framework of an appeal to Israel for help to the contras." Israel
used the pictures to destroy the reactor. It is not known to what extent, if
any, Tel Aviv responded to the administration's appeal.

By late 1982, however, Nicaragua was accusing Israel of arming and aiding
the rag-tag bands of National Guardsmen in Honduras.

The best-substantiated knowledge of Israel's entry into the war against
Nicaragua is its agreement with the CIA in either 1981 or 1982 to supply East
bloc weapons to the then-covert mercenary operation. After having been
"restrained" a bit by Congress during the 1970s, the CIA was experiencing
difficulty procuring "untraceable" weapons for the contras and was
embarrassed when some of the mercenaries appeared on U.S. television in
early 1982 brandishing U.S. weapons. In a display of caution that would
mark all their dealings with the contras, the Israeli government made a
pretense of refusing U.S. requests for such weapons "through normal
diplomatic channels," while some former Israeli intelligence officials
approached the CIA with an offer to supply East bloc arms, which Israel has
in abundance. The Agency assumed that the offer had the backing,
awareness or sponsorship of the Israeli government. There is some question
as to whether the CIA accepted this particular offer, but an arrangement was
indeed made in the early 1980s to supply the contras with East bloc light
arms and shoulder-fired missiles, selling the weapons through the CIA, which
in turn passed them on to the contras and the Afghan rebels. This particular
arrangement apparently continued until 1986, "[w]hen the Israelis
presented their bill for $50 million...[and] the CIA pleaded poverty, paying
$30 million in arms, not cash."

Former FDN Director Edgar Chamorro said the contras were speaking of
Israel as an international supporter in 1982.'7 In December of that year, the
FDN leadership met with Ariel Sharon, Israel's defense minister, while he
was on a visit to Honduras. An arrangement was made at that time to funnel
Israeli-held East bloc arms to the contras through Honduras.




                    Israel, Honduras and Costa Rica

                          excerpted from the book


                           Israel Foreign Policy

                          excerpts from a book by

                             Jane Hunter
                           South End Press, 1987




Honduras

Honduras was one of Israel's first arms customers in Central America.
Between 1975 and 1977, this second poorest of all countries in the Western
Hemisphere bought 20 French super-Mystere fighter planes from Israel.
Delivered at a time when it was U.S. policy to discourage the acquisition of
sophisticated weaponry in Central America, these were the first supersonic
aircraft in the region; some were equipped with Israeli-made Shafrir heat-
seeking missiles.

The Hondurans bought a range of other Israeli arms: Arava STOL aircraft, a
fleet of armored vehicles mounted with recoilless rifles, and Galil rifles and
Uzi submachine guns. For all its poverty, when Ariel Sharon visited Honduras,
he was calling on one of Israel's three biggest clients. In the wake of
Sharon's visit came more arms and training-both in Israel and Honduras for
officers, pilots and troops.

In 1981, Israeli radar operators were at work at a Honduran airbase.
Honduran officials never chafed at the Israeli presence-on the contrary, on
one occasion, exasperated with the on-again off-again contra war, Honduran
military leaders suggested that Israel, Chile, Colombia or Brazil take over the
contra program for the U.S. Gen. Julio Perez, the Honduran army logistics
chief, signed false end user certificates for Israeli weapons shipments to the
contras.

Israel also benefited from the fits and starts with which Honduras assented
to serve as a U.S. "aircraft carrier." In October 1986, in an effort to get
Honduras to agree to tolerate U.S. training of contras on its soil, the U.S.
revived the notion of selling the Hondurans advanced aircraft. Emblematic of
Israel's in-touch status in Honduras, before Washington could prepare the
papers for the F-5Es it was offering, Israel had the Tegucigalpa government's
signature on a preliminary agreement to buy 24 Kfir combat aircraft-a deal
that could be worth as much as $200 million. To coax their quick agreement,
Israel had assured the Hondurans that Washington would finance the deal.
An incredulous State Department official said no such approval had been
given. At the time the Jerusalem Post said that the National Security Council
would have final say on the arrangements. Later it would be revealed that
the Kfir sale was one side of a quid pro quo which would have sent Israeli
advisers to the contras. Still later, the Kfir sale fell through.

***

Costa Rica

Someday it may be precisely known how great a role Israel played in
subverting the government of Costa Rica to accede to Washington's use of its
territory as a secondary base in the war against Nicaragua. More is presently
known about how the U.S. bribed Costa Rican officials to turn a blind eye to
the contras; how they ran a CIA and then a "private" operation the northern
part of the country, which included foreign mercenaries, drug running, a
clandestine airstrip, and at least two assassination attempts and managed to
exercise a progressively greater influence on the small, relatively democratic
nation's media, as the contra campaign wore on.

Israel, however, had the inside track. Luis Alberto Monge, elected to the
Costa Rican presidency in 1982, is probably one of the strongest Zionists in
Central America. Formerly Costa Rican ambassador to Israel, during his
presidential campaign Monge promised to move Costa Rica's embassy to
Jerusalem, while his foreign-minister-to-be said that the National Liberation
Party would hold relations with Israel to be a "principal preoccupation." In
May 1982, Costa Rica became the first government to return its embassy to
the city which all other nations had deserted when Israel annexed and
declared Jerusalem its undivided capital in 1980

Costa Rica did not have an army, but it did have one of the highest foreign
debts in the world, and that gave Israel somewhat of a handle. Soon after his
election, Monge met in the U.S. with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin,
who introduced him to a number of leading bankers thus helping him to
renegotiate Costa Rica's debt to private banks.

Begin pressed Monge hard to abandon the neutrality Costa Rica had
maintained since 1948, in effect seconding the words of Reagan's UN
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, that if Costa Rica wanted aid from
Washington, it would have to create an army.

Begin offered military aid and in January 1983 the Costa Rican Public
Security Minister visited Israel, touring defense plants and meeting with
Defense Minister Sharon, Begin and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Shamir
had been in Costa Rica the previous October and offered non-military
cooperation.

Limited amounts of Israeli military aid began to flow to Costa Rica's police
forces, and Israelis came to train the security police, special tactical squads
and intelligence agents. Israelis themselves carried out various "intelligence
activities" in Costa Rica.

Israel's parastatalTahal collaborated with with U.S. AID to develop a border
barrier comprising roads, electronic barriers, and an agribusiness/
settlement scheme. It was an open secret that this installation was part of
the campaign against Nicaragua.
                            South Africa's Nuclear Policy
                               RuchitaBeri,ResearchFellow,IDSA



"Apartheid South Africa, as a part of its national security policy, embarked on a nuclear weapons
programme. Democratic South Africa sees the international and regional security being achieved
by complete nuclear disarmament."

² Alfred Nzo

These words of Alfred Nzo, the South African Foreign Minister, capture in essence the nuclear
policy of the South African government past and present. South Africa represents the world's
first instance of nuclear rollback, a state which has unilaterally and voluntarily relinquished
nuclear weapons. On March 24, 1993, President F.W. de Klerk declared to a special joint session
of the South African Parliament that South Africa had developed a small nuclear arsenal and
then dismantled and destroyed it. Mainly due to the secrecy surrounding South Africa's nuclear
weapons programme there were a number of questions which were left unanswered, particularly
regarding the scope and sophistication of the nuclear programme as well as its rationale. What
has been the nuclear policy of the new government led by President Nelson Mandela of the
African National Congress (ANC) ?Ever since the establishment of the democratic government,
South Africa has been making strides in the international arena. It is the present Chairman of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and is set to assume the Chairmanship of
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) this year. Moreover it is actively seeking a position in the
United Nations Security Council. Of late, it has shown interest in taking a leadership role in
matters related to nuclear arms control and disarmament. As a former nuclear threshold power, it
feels it has the technical and diplomatic expertise to play a bridging role between Non-Nuclear
Weapon States (NNWS), on the one hand, and the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), on the other.
This paper is divided into two sections: the first section analyses the nuclear policy of South
Africa in the apartheid era, while the second, in the post-apartheid era.

I

APARTHEID ERA

South Africa's nuclear programme apparently reflects perseverance, patience and technical
competence. The scale of the programme was small²at its peak it could produce only one or
two weapons a year. When the programme was cancelled, it was poised to develop more
advanced weapons, including warheads for ballistic missiles. In the apartheid era, South Africa
launched the nuclear weapons programme as part of its national security policy. This was based
on the perception of a domestic, regional and international threat, encapsulated in the theory of
"Total Onslaught".1 A core stand of this theory was the belief that South Africa was under the
total onslaught of Communist forces globally, regionally and domestically. Global Communism
was a principal external threat to South Africa and thus the country had common security
interests with the West. South Africa considered the Soviet Union as the main orchestrator of
global Communism and believed that in Africa this would ultimately lead to a direct
conventional assault on its territory. In the view of Admiral Bierman, the Commandant General
of South African Defence Forces (SADF) in the early 1970s, " In the final analysis it is a
prerequisite for the successful defence of the Southern Hemisphere that the deterrent strategy
based on nuclear terror and the fear of escalation should also be applicable in the region."2 This
was one of the first pronouncements of a South African interest in nuclear deterrent capabilities.

The political changes in the Southern African region heightened the security concerns of South
Africa. The end of Portuguese rule in Africa after the 1974 Lisbon coup and the subsequent
accession to power of Communist regimes in Angola (MPLA) and Mozambique (Freelimo)
enhanced the encirclement by Communist forces regionally. The mid- 1970s also saw the
intensification of the anti-apartheid struggle within South Africa²in the apartheid government's
perception, sponsored by the Communist forces. Thus, perceiving itself to be encircled by
Communist forces , the South African government promoted a militarist ideology legitimising
the use of force by the state to counter that threat, codified in the concept "Total National
Strategy" to coordinate its national security planning. This ultimately involved a nuclear
deterrent capability. The arrival of Cuban troops in Angola after the establishment of the MPLA
regime provided the final stimulus. Defence Minister P.W. Botha spelled out the defence
requirements to meet this challenge as "South Africa can establish a balanced defence force to
defend itself against terrorism...and this we are fully able to do....Secondly, we must have a
deterrent to be able to resist a fairly heavy conventional attack on South Africa."3 This statement
was quite ambiguous; however, one could reach the conclusion that both conventional and
nuclear capabilities would be pursued by South Africa. Ambiguity became the trademark of the
South African nuclear policy in the apartheid era.

Like other threshold countries, South Africa's nuclear programme was also a recipient of external
assistance. In the 1950s and 1960s, it received extensive assistance from abroad. Scientists were
sent for training to Europe and the United States. The United States also supplied the Safari
research reactor which was commissioned in 1965 and was subjected to International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. During the ten years, United States supplied about 100 kg of
weapon grade uranium fuel, This was suspended in 1975 as a result of international sanctions
against the apartheid regime in 1975. Faced with sanctions, South Africa organised clandestine
procurement networks in Europe and the United States and also began a secret collaboration with
Israel. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa and Israel reportedly cooperated on a
nuclear and missile programme. The 1979 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document noted:
"Israelis have not only participated in certain South African nuclear research activities over the
last few years but they have also offered and transferred various sorts of advanced non-nuclear
weapons technology to South Africa."4

Enrichment Programme5

The South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB), the predecessor to the Atomic Energy
Corporation (AEC), was established in 1948 by an Act of the Parliament. It assumed general
nuclear research and development activities at its Pelindaba site near Pretoria in 1961. Activities
in the early years were based on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and since South Africa
is a leading producer of uranium, attention was given to gain material benefit out of these large
reserves. In the 1960s, the AEC started researching in methods for producing both separated
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). The latter part of the programme was abandoned
in 1969 because it was not competitive and was draining resources from the enrichment
programme. The uranium enrichment programme made steady progress through the 1960s. By
the end of 1967, the programme had succeeded in enriching uranium on a laboratory scale
through a process based on a stationary wall vortex tube. After an external review of the process,
the government decided in early 1969 to develop a pilot plant. Until then, the enrichment
programme was a kept under cover; however, as more organisations and individuals became
aware of it, the government decided to reveal the programme publicly. In 1970, the Prime
Minister , John Vorster, informed the Parliament about the uranium enrichment project and
building of the pilot plant (Y-plant) at Valindaba next to the Pelindaba Research Centre. He
stated, "The South African process which is unique in its concept is presently developed to the
stage where it is estimated that under South African conditions a large scale plant can be
competitive with existing plants in the West." Prime Minister Vorster emphasised that South
Africa's nuclear research and development programme was directed towards peaceful purposes
and that South Africa was prepared to collaborate in the exploitation of the process " with any
non-Communist country desiring to do so". He also declared South Africa's willingness to accept
international safeguards subject to certain conditions.6

The government also created a separate state corporation, the Uranium Enrichment Corporation
(UCOR) to run the enrichment programme. (The UCOR and the AEB were merged into the AEC
in 1982). The Y-plant was commissioned in 1974 and began producing HEU in 1978. After
overcoming several technical and chemical problems, the plant was able to produce a steady
output of HEU for the weapon programme. In addition, the plant produced 45 percent enriched
uranium for the Safari research reactor, low enriched uranium (LEU) test assemblies for the
Koeberg nuclear power reactors near Cape Town, and LEU blending stock. The plant was
originally designed to produce about 10,000-15,000 separate work units (SWUs) a year, but the
design improvements increased its potential annual output to 20,000. Chemical reactions and
inefficient mechanical processes ("mixing") caused losses in the enriched uranium output and the
plant never achieved its design output. Assuming that it averaged about 10,000 SWUs per year,
the plant could have produced about 60 kg of 90 percent enriched uranium in a year, or roughly
enough for one of the devices of South African design. Because the plant was also producing
enriched uranium for reactor fuel, it never produced weapon-grade uranium at that rate. During
its lifetime, the Y-plant produced a total of about 400 kg of uranium enriched above 80 percent,
the minimum enrichment used in South Africa's nuclear weapons. The Y-plant closed in 1990²
the first official hint that the still secret weapons programme had ended. Next door to the Y-
plant, South Africa built a much larger (300,000 SWU/annum) semi-commercial plant for the
Keoberg power station's need of 3.25 per cent enriched material. It was commissioned in 1984
and started full production in 1988. However, it was closed down in 1995 due to the relatively
high production costs in a heavily over supplied world market. Apart from this unique
enrichment process, South Africa also developed both gas centrifuge and molecular laser
enrichment processes. Both these processes have been terminated now due to economic reasons.

Nuclear Explosives Programme
The South African efforts to develop nuclear explosives began in the 1960s under the cover of
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosives (PNEs) programme.7 According to the AEC's Chairman, Waldo
Stumpf, the early investigations were very modest and restricted to literature studies. Since South
Africa has a significant mining industry, these investigations were primarily launched for
evaluating the feasibility of employing nuclear explosives for future construction purposes. In
1971, with the HEU in sight, the AEB received permission from the Minister of Mines to begin
secret research and development work on the nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes.
These investigations were based on literature studies, theoretical calculations and preliminary
studies of the ballistics of gun-type devices. In addition, limited theoretical studies of implosion
devices were conducted, according to J.W Villiers, former Chairman of the AEC, who is widely
believed to have headed the nuclear explosives programme in the 1970s. Due to lack of facilities
at Pelindaba this research was undertaken at a propulsion laboratory at the Somchem
establishment in the Cape province.8 At Somchem, the AEB design team produced a scale model
of a gun-type device which, with a projectile constructed of non-nuclear material, was tested at
Somchem in the Cape province in May 1974.

There is some disagreement about the shift from the peaceful nuclear explosives programme to
weaponisation i.e. the development of a limited deterrent capability. One school of thought
maintains that it was already conceived in 1974. According to this view-point, an investigation of
the available options convinced Prime Minister Vorster that the most cost effective would be
development of a limited nuclear deterrent capability, and the decision was then taken to this
effect. However, six years elapsed between the policy decision and its initial implementation.
The other view holds that although the development of a limited nuclear explosive capacity and
construction of an underground test site was approved by Prime Minister Vorster in 1974, the
programme was still civilian and that the formal shift occurred only in 1978. It is difficult to say
which interpretation is correct it. In fact, it took a full six years. During the three years, the AEB
developed internal ballistic and neutronic computer programmes, conducted experiments to
determine properties of materials in the devices, designed and constructed the critical facility at
Pelindaba, and experimented with propellants for the gun-type device. The team working at
Somchem tested the first full scale model of this device using a natural uranium projectile in
1976. The test proved the mechanical integrity of the design.

Meanwhile the AEB selected the test site in the Kalahari Desert. Two test shafts were completed
in 1976 and 1977. In 1977, the AEB established its own high security weapons research and
development facilities at Pelindaba, and during that year, the programme was transferred from
Somchem to Pelindaba. In mid-1977, the AEB produced a gun-type device without an HEU
core. As has happened in programmes in other nations, the development of the devices outpaced
the development of the fissile material. A cold test was apparently planned for August 1977.
According to officials, the test would have been a fully instrumented underground test with a
dummy core. The major purpose was to test the logistical plans for an actual detonation.

How that test was cancelled has been well publicised. Soviet intelligence had detected test
preparations and had alerted the United States. US intelligence quickly confirmed the existence
of the test site. The Soviet and Western governments were convinced that South Africa was
preparing for a full scale nuclear test site. For two weeks, the Western governments pressed
South Africa not to test. The test was called off, the site was abandoned and the shafts sealed.
However, the nuclear explosives/weapons programme continued. South Africa was suspended
from participation in the UN General Assembly and the Specialised Agencies; it was subjected to
a mandatory weapons embargo and a voluntary oil embargo in the Security Council and denied
its designated seat on the IAEA Board of Governors.

In 1978, a second , smaller device was built by the AEB. It was not until the second half of 1979,
however, that enough HEU had been produced to load a device. The second device was
consequently kept for demonstration purposes, without ever being converted into a deliverable
weapon. By 1979, the government gave the South African Armaments Corporation (Armscor)
the job of manufacturing additional nuclear devices. Armscor used the new Kentron Circle
facility about 15 km east of Pelindaba (this site was later renamed Advena) for this purpose. The
Armscor approached the problem very differently from the AEB. Armscor considered the AEB's
1979 device to be an unqualified design that could not meet the rigid safety, security and
reliability specifications then under development by them. Moreover, the first device was not
deliverable. Armscor manufactured its first device in 1983, a "prequalification" model which
could be kicked out of the back of a plane. The first gun-type device was not completed until
August 1987. This model could be delivered by a modified Buccaneer bomber. By the time the
programme was cancelled, three more deliverable devices had been completed. In 1985, the
government decided to fund a new facility (Advena Central Laboratories) about five minutes
away from the Circle building. This was just being completed when the programme was
cancelled in September 1989. By the late 1980s, Armscor had been preparing to upgrade seven
gun-type devices. These would have been replaced by seven upgraded devices when they
reached the end of their estimated life by the year 2000. These replacement devices would have
been deliverable by aircraft and most likely also by ballistic missiles, although a final decision
about missiles had not been made. Apparently, the weapon scientists were never serious about
building implosion devices. According to an Armscor official, a decision to build implosion
weapons was still ten years away when the weapons programme was cancelled.

South Africa's Nuclear Deterrent Strategy

South Africa's deterrent strategy , described at the time of disclosures made by President De
Klerk, was based on three phases.

* Phase one: The first was " strategic uncertainty" during which South Africa's nuclear capability
would be neither acknowledged nor denied.

* Phase two: Should South African territory be threatened militarily then the government would
covertly acknowledge the existence of its nuclear weapons to leading Western governments,
particularly the United States.

* Phase three: If this partial disclosure failed to lead to the required assistance in defusing the
situation, South Africa would publicly acknowledge its capability or demonstrate it with an
underground test.

This strategy was designed to bring Western governments to South Africa's aid in the event of an
overwhelming attack by the Soviet supported military forces in Southern Africa. However, in the
view of some, South Africa's objective of developing a limited capability was to force the West,
particularly the United States, to provide a nuclear guarantee to offset the Soviet Union's
capacity for "nuclear escalation dominance" in a situation in which South Africa was under
attack. Thus, it appears the policy was that of political bluff intended to blackmail the United
States or other Western powers into coming to South Africa's assistance.9

Another objective in espousing such a deterrence doctrine was the desire to increase Western
concerns about South Africa's nuclear intentions. Though South Africa apparently never
intentionally moved beyond phase one, some officials have said that they believed that Western
or Soviet intelligence discovered that Armscor had been checking the condition of at least one of
the shafts in the Kalahari for a possible underground test during the mid-1980s and that this
exercise convinced the Western powers that it was serious about nuclear weapons. This, in turn,
led them to start putting pressure on the Soviet Union and Cuba to withdraw from Angola.
Whether the weapons and the strategy ever served this purpose has not been proved and is
impossible to determine.

1979 Nuclear Test

On September 22, 1979, a US Vela satellite detected an unusual "double flash" indicative of a
nuclear test, in an "area of the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic including portions of the
Antarctic continent, and the southern part of Africa." In fact, some have claimed it to be a joint
Israeli-South African nuclear test.10 South Africa denied that it had conducted a nuclear test. As
late as March 1993, the AEC's Chairman, Waldo Stumpf, is reported to have said, " If it was a
nuclear explosion, South Africa was definitely not involved. I doubt that it was a nuclear [test]
because no radioactive fallout was detected." Eighteen years after the event, Aziz Pahad, the
Deputy Foreign Minister, confirmed that South Africa conducted a nuclear test in the South
Indian Ocean in 1979. This admission has laid to rest the controversy surrounding the test. The
dispute stemmed from the record of two distinct flashes of bright light- indicative of a nuclear
test detected by the Vela 6911 satellite over the Indian Ocean in September 22, 1979. However,
since the optical data were not corroborated by other information, the Carter Administration
vigorously challenged the military and nuclear laboratory analyses. That position was based on
the general mistrust of the aging satellites, and refusal to accept supporting data from other
sources. As a result, the Administration assembled a panel of scientists from academia, which
decided the event could not be classed as a nuclear test without conclusive supporting data.11

Denuclearisation

According to the South African officials, the changes in the security environment in the late
1980s, both regionally and internationally, played an important role in their country's
denuclearisation.12 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independence of Namibia, the
cessation of hostilities in Angola and the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban troops from that
country, there was a remarkable improvement in the security situation, thereby, making a nuclear
deterrent superfluous. The election of F.W. De Klerk as the President in 1989 precipitated this
strategy. De Klerk embarked on a programme of political reform to normalise South Africa's
international relations. He also appointed a committee to consider the benefits and liabilities of
maintaining the nuclear deterrent and of joining the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In
November 1989, the committee recommended complete dismantling of the nuclear weapons
programme, a decision which De Klerk approved. This involved the decommissioning of the
pilot enrichment plant (the Y-plant was closed on February 1, 1990) and to dismantle and destroy
the nuclear devices. The committee advised against publicising the nuclear arsenal and its
dismantling for the fear of inviting Iraq like sanctions. In fact, the decision to terminate its
nuclear weapons programme opened the prospects of accession to the NPT. Until then, South
Africa had not shown any interest in joining the NPT. When the NPT draft treaty was being
debated at the 1968 UN General Assembly, South Africa outlined its official attitude. Its main
concern was that the IAEA safeguards might infringe its commercial secrets mainly related to
gold and uranium extraction technology and later also its enrichment programme. It was also
concerned that the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of a nuclear explosion might
be withheld²contrary to Article V of the NPT. Moreover, it expressed doubts about the
credibility of the security guarantees provided by the NWS to the NNWS signatories. South
Africa followed this stance till 1989. Towards the end of the 1980s, the government realised that
accession to the NPT would have distinct advantage for South Africa's international relations,
specially those with African countries. However, the more plausible reason for South Africa's
1991 decision to sign the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards was its "concern about the future."
The South African government did not want any undeclared nuclear material or infrastructure
falling in the hands of the ANC.13

South Africa joined the NPT on July 10, 1991. The safeguards agreement entered into force on
September 16, 1991. The stockpile of HEU was put under IAEA safeguards. In an attempt to
intensify its non-proliferation efforts in the last few years, the De Klerk government worked to
establish a strict regime to control the export of sensitive nuclear missile and chemical
technologies. On June 23, 1993, De Klerk signed the Non- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act which prohibits South African citizens from assisting in any programme related
to construction of nuclear weapons. This was one of the last policies which the apartheid
government made in relation to the nuclear issue, the most constructive of them being the
rollback of the nuclear programme.

II

POST-APARTHEID ERA

In the post-apartheid era , the ANC-led government which came to power in April 1994, has
continued South Africa's non-proliferation efforts. Given the ANC's anti- nuclear stance in the
past, it is not surprising. For years, the ANC led efforts to expose and cancel the nuclear
programme. The bulk of its members remain firmly opposed to nuclear weapons. President
Nelson Mandela has declared that South Africa must never again allow its resources , scientists
and engineers to produce weapons of mass destruction. This has been reflected in the further
implementation of the national non- proliferation policy by the new government. It has acceded
to all major conventions on weapons of mass destruction²the NPT, Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)²and the supplier groups²the
Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). It played an important role in the completion of the Pelindaba-African Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1995. This treaty commits African states not to research, develop,
stockpile manufacture or otherwise possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device. It
is also participating in the preparations for a possible Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).
During the review and extension conference of the NPT, it played a key role.

NPT Review and Extension Conference

South Africa's role in the extension of the NPT has won it praise from some and criticism from
others. The South African position was presented at the review and extension conference of the
NPT by Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo. In a statement, he committed South Africa to an indefinite
extension of the NPT without any preconditions or linkages. He also proposed changes to
strengthen the review process and yardsticks for assessing progress in implementing the treaty.
Some Western analysts hailed South Africa's role, arguing that it played a key role in ensuring
the survival of nuclear non-proliferation. But some in South Africa dismissed its intervention as
a sell-out of the non-aligned position on extension. The criticism levelled against South Africa
has primarily sparked from the shift in its position on the NPT extension. Initially, it appears
South Africa extended tentative support for a fixed extension and its position was close to the
official NAM stance. South Africa's representative at the third preparatory meeting (PrepCom)
said that South Africa...."calls on State parties to comply with all the provisions of the treaty,
whether they relate to non- proliferation, disarmament or peaceful uses."14 Moreover, the South
African position differed from the ANC's, which was put forward at the ANC-convened 1994
conference on the "Nuclear Policy of the Democratic South Africa." The ANC's Denis Goldberg
was the key protagonist at the meeting, drawing attention to the NPT extension question and
advancing three proposals :

* South Africa should not opt for limited extension, as this would undermine the non-
proliferation regime;

* it should support a 15-year fixed period extension ;

* and it could not support permanent extension without serious modification of the non-
proliferation regime, addressing disarmament by the five nuclear powers and the conclusion of
the CTBT.15

South Africa did not accept this advice. The government had an internal review of the extension
issue before the conference began. In the review, it was decided to support indefinite extension.
Abdul Minty, an official at the Department of Foreign Affairs claims that South Africa might
have supported the NAM; however, he felt there was no official NAM position. This argument
appears to be weak, and there were other factors which influenced the South African decision.
The first was related to its own security situation. According to Nzo, "South Africa took the
decision to destroy nuclear weapons and become a state party to the NPT because we saw our
own security being guaranteed by its provisions. It is for this reason also that South Africa has
become an active sponsor of an African nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, which will be
indefinite."16 The United States may have pressurised South Africa too. It is well known that in
the months preceding the conference, the United States was employing a quiet carrot and stick
policy to drum up support for an indefinite extension. According to a news report, Princeton
Lyman, the US Ambassador to South Africa, had warned Nzo on March 10, 1995, that an
unwelcome position on the NPT would affect Washington's view of Pretoria's "non-proliferation
credentials." And that failure to support an indefinite extension "would constrain the ability of
the nuclear supplier states to engage in the peaceful nuclear cooperation."17 Hinting probably at
the South African bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group. However, the South African officials
insist that they did not "cave in" to the US pressure. They opine that the position which South
Africa reached on the basis of national consensus was similar to the one the US wanted it to
take.18

In doing so, it endorsed some of the NWS' arguments, i.e. rejecting the linking of permanent
extension to conclusion of the CTBT, other nuclear disarmament measures or a time-bound
framework for disarmament, thereby adopting a narrow interpretation of Article VI. At the
plenary session of the conference, South Africa's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, stated
that it supported, in principle, indefinite extension "without any preconditions or linkage to other
nuclear disarmament measures such as CTBT." South Africa also endorsed the NWS' argument
that fixed period extension would erode confidence in the NPT, endangering the non-
proliferation regime. This implicitly rejected the non-aligned countries position that limited
extension sought to strengthen rather than weaken the NPT. South Africa expressed the fear that
placing conditions or extending it for a fixed period, might lead to termination of the treaty.
South Africa's stance also stemmed from the position that the NWS had an upper hand in the
negotiations. It rejected the linkage on the grounds that "...(this) raises the question, inter alia, of
what would happen if for one or other reason, the conditions were not met"²implying that
nothing would. Therefore, it claims to have sought a middle course between the two positions.

South Africa's middle course is explained in the terms that while acceding to the NWS' position
for the indefinite extension of the NPT, it also attempted to put pressure on them for their Article
VI commitments by suggesting that the NPT process be strengthened. It also suggested
yardsticks for assessing progress towards nuclear disarmament. These were in the form of non-
binding "Principles for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament", which were subsequently
adopted by the conference for future review conferences.

* restating a commitment to the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons;

* strengthening and full adherence to IAEA safeguards agreement;

* access to nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes;

* progress in the cut- off convention

* progress in the reduction of nuclear weapon arsenals;

* commitment to establishing nuclear-free zones;

* enforcing binding security assurances for non- nuclear states.19

The key objection to South Africa's position is that it removed the only source of leverage on the
NWS, because the treaty's extension can no longer be linked to dismantling of their arsenals. The
"Principles" which it proposed and were adopted to ensure strengthened review processes are not
binding and do not set deadlines for their goals. In the absence of a binding time-frame, the
nuclear powers are free to adopt their own notions of the right time to disarm. This was a logical
consequence of South Africa's endorsement of the restrictive reading, since a time-frame would
have implied a form of linkage.

South Africa claims to have bridged the gap between the two sides at the review and extension
conference²that it nudged the conference towards a compromise. However, this is strictly not
true. The review conference deadlocked on language addressing the implementation on Article
VI. Despite agreement on indefinite extension, the 1995 extension conference ended without
narrowing the divide between the conflicting positions on nuclear disarmament. In the view of
some, this was partly due to the NWS stressing extension at the expense of a review of the
treaty's implementation. The NWS were more concerned about the survival of the treaty than in
pushing forward the disarmament agenda.

CTBT

South Africa is a signatory to the CTBT. On August 6, 1996, President Nelson Mandela had
announced that following the passage of the comprehensive nuclear test ban text through
multilateral negotiations, South Africa intended to sign the treaty at the earliest opportunity.
Which it did on September 25, the day the treaty opened for signature. South Africa believes that
the treaty would not only establish an internationally legally binding obligation on the states
which signed and ratified it but also establish a norm in international law from which no state
could escape. It would achieve the end of nuclear test ban explosions and inhibit the proliferation
of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically.20

South Africa views the CTBT as an instrument of disarmament and non-proliferation and feels
that the CTBT is an integral part of the programme which will lead to the full implementation of
Article VI nuclear disarmament obligations of the NPT. Paragraph four of the Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament identifies the initial elements of such
a programme of action for nuclear disarmament.21

South Africa also opposed linkages of any kind to the treaty negotiations. It viewed linkages as a
way to "block progress on all fronts," therefore, not to be relied on. It rejected the proposal made
by Egypt of linking the CTBT to a pledge made by the NWS towards non- use of nuclear
weapons and signing of the FMCT. Similarly, South Africa rejected India's proposal of placing
the CTBT in a disarmament framework as part of a step-by-step process aimed at achieving
complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.22

PrepCom I & II

The NPT is to come for review in the year 2000. At the two Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)
meetings held up to now, South Africa put forward its proposals. At the first session of the NPT
PrepCom for the year 2000 review conference held in New York in April 1997, South Africa
pushed for time to be specifically allocated at the next PrepCom to address the issue of security
assurances. It proposed that the PrepCom should decide to take up the work on security
assurances envisaged in the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament" with a view to completing this work before the year 2000 so as to make
recommendations to the review conference. The issue at stake, according to the South African
delegate, was granting of legally binding security assurances to the NNWS parties of the NPT,
thereby fulfilling the undertaking which should be given to the states which have voluntarily
given up the nuclear weapons option, becoming parties to the treaty. It was stated that the
argument that declarations made by the NWS are sufficient or that these assurances should only
be granted in the context of nuclear weapon-free zones are not valid. Neither is the argument that
such an initiative would not fall within the mandate of the PrepCom. South Africa's proposal was
accepted by the Chairman.23

However, at the second PrepCom, South Africa was not successful. Its request for special time to
be devoted to nuclear disarmament at the 1999 Prepcom was rejected by the Chairman. South
Africa had argued that such a step would provide the NWS with the structured opportunity to
state what they are doing; the NNWS could then engage the NWS as to "the practical steps and
systematic and progressive efforts" which have been identified; the international community
could then jointly support or assist initiatives undertaken or agreements achieved. Such a
discussion in 1999 would prepare the way for the establishment at the 2000 Review of a
subsidiary body to Main Committee I, which traditionally includes Article VI among many other
issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapon-free zones and security assurances. The
subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament would then be ingrained into future Reviews and
Prepcoms, thus putting a clear spotlight on NWS actions, or lack thereof, in implementing
Article VI.

But apparently this spotlight was precisely what the Western NWS (with Russia) objected to. In
the Chairman's consultations, the South African proposal was repeatedly rejected by the US, the
UK, France and Russia. The NWS argued that the traditional Main Committees, which allow for
working groups are sufficient for these discussions. This showed the reluctance of the NWS for a
debate on the comprehensive programme to eliminate nuclear weapons.24

Implications for India

Since the dismantling of the apartheid regime, India's relations with South Africa have
strengthened. This is obvious with the signing of the Strategic Partnership Accord between the
two countries in March 1997. South Africa's nuclear policy in the post-apartheid era has emerged
as a constant irritant in the relations between the two countries. India had hoped that the
inauguration of President Mandela's government in South Africa would give a fillip to its effort
towards achieving comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The ANC in the past had been quite
vocal in its support to nuclear disarmament. It "shared the commitment of the United Nations to
general and complete disarmament under effective international control as resolved by the
General Assembly at the special session on disarmament in 1978."25 In the recent years,
however, there has been a dilution in the stance of South Africa and it has apparently supported
the Western approach towards nuclear arms control . This was quite visible during the
negotiations of the NPT and the CTBT. While the decision of the previous government to accede
to the NPT may have been motivated by the desire not to bequeath a nuclear capability to a
government dominated by the ANC, there are few doubts on the decision in Pretoria . India and
the other members of the G-21 have in the past called for the establishment in the Conference on
Disarmament, of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to start negotiations on a phased
programme with the eventual aim of eliminating nuclear weapons within a time-bound
framework.26 South Africa, while appreciating India's position does not agree with its time-
bound programme of nuclear disarmament. It appears to favour a step-by-step approach
(incremental) without a firm time-frame being defined.

South Africa's position on nuclear non-proliferation is linked to the foreign policy focus of the
country. The Mandela government has stressed the economic basis of its foreign relations. The
European Community (EC) and the United States are its largest trading partners, therefore, South
Africa would not benefit from alienating them. To quote Alfred Nzo, South African Minister of
Foreign Affairs, "Although we believe our future will be closely linked to the development of the
South-South concept, there are certain realities that we dare not ignore. The US and the G-7
countries constitute the undeniable economic power base of the world today. These countries are
essential to the economic well-being of the developing world, including South and Southern
Africa. Furthermore, the G-7 countries have been most supportive of the GNU and have been
generous in their commitment to our economic process. For this we are grateful, and we will
continue to build on this sound foundation in the future."27 These thoughts were echoed by
President Mandela at last year's ANC conference where he said, "We will need the fullest
cooperation of the developed countries of the North to achieve our objectives of an African
renaissance."28 The South African position in the field of nuclear disarmament could be also be
explained through their desire to avoid being isolated in the world community. After years of
being dubbed a pariah, from the South Africans' perspective, it had very little to lose and a lot to
gain in terms of "diplomatic dividends" from the negotiations on nuclear disarmament. At the
same time, South Africa did not want to alienate its neighbours in the region. After facing years
of destabilisation, the establishment of the ANC government had brought forth an era of peace
and stability in Southern Africa, and the continuance of the nuclear weapons programme and not
signing the NPT and CTBT could have given the wrong signals.

In the backdrop of the Indian nuclear tests, South Africa has enhanced the efforts towards global
nuclear disarmament. It appears to have been quite disenchanted by the NPT review process and
the slow progress towards disarmament, mainly due to the rejection of its proposal for devoting
special time at the second PrepCom. In fact, in what seems to be a clear endorsement of the
traditional Indian stand, South Africa joined the NAM countries just ten days after India
conducted its nuclear tests in condemning the NWS for maintaining their atomic arsenals without
any participation in the post-Cold War era. They called for a universal and legally binding
multilateral agreement for total elimination of such weapons.29 It is difficult to ascertain whether
there is truly a shift in its position: some have accused South Africa of "posturing" in its attempt
to win over the non-aligned countries for their support in its bid for a position at the United
Nations Security Council. Whatever be the case, it is hoped that perhaps India can influence the
Mandela government to reconsider its position on this thorny issue and work together for a more
peaceful and nuclear-free world.



NOTES
1. See K. Grundy, The Militarisation of South African Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988).

2. Robert S. Jaster, South Africa's Narrowing Security Options, Adelphi Papers, 159 (London:
IISS, Spring, 1980), pp. 4-6.

3. Ibid., p. 28.

4. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," The Bulletin
of Atomic Scientists, April 1993, p. 36.

5. This section is based mainly on Waldo Stumpf, Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear
Weapons Programme, a paper given at the conference "50 Years After Hiroshima" organised by
USPID and held in Castigioncello, Italy, September 28 to October 2, 1995.

6. South Africa would in no way be limited in promotion of the peaceful application of nuclear
energy; it would not run the risk of details of the new process leaking out as a result of the
safeguards inspection system; and the system would have to be implemented on such a basis as
to avoid interference with the normal efficient operation of the particular industries. (One of the
main reasons for continuing this research was the possibility of selling enriched uranium in the
international market under appropriate safeguards.)

7. See n. 5 for details on South Africa's nuclear weapons programme.

8. Somchem is one of the South African defence manufacturing units, involved in the
development and manufacture of explosives, propellents and rocket launchers. Until the early
1990s, Somchem was an Armscorfacility, it is now a division of Denel.

9. Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "Nuclearisation and Denuclearisation in South Africa,"
Survival, vol. 35, no. 3, Autumn 1993, p. 158.

10. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (New York: Random House, 1991) pp. 271-283.

11. Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 21, 1997.

12. On this issue, see J.W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave
up the Bomb" Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 5, November/December 1993.

13. See Albright and Hibbs, n. 4.

14. See ZondiMasiza and Chris Landsberg, "Fissions for Compliments: South Africa and the
1995 Extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation" Policy: Issues and Actors, vol. 9, no. 3, September
1996, p. 23.

15. See Denis Goldberg, A Nuclear Policy for a New Democratic South Africa, unpublished
paper presented at the ANC Nuclear Policy Conference, February 11-13, 1994.
16. Tom Zamora Collina, "South Africa Bridges the Gap," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol. 51,
no. 4, July/August 1995, pp. 30-31.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Alfred Nzo's address to the NPT conference in New York, April 19, 1995.

20. See statement by K.J. Jele, at the General Assembly on September 9, 1996, GA/9081.

21. See statement made by Ambassador J.E. Selebi, South Africa's permanent representative at
the CD on January 25, 1996, CD/PV.722.

22. See Masiza and Landsberg, n. 14, p. 37.

23. Peter Goosen, "Security Assurances: A South African Perspective and Approach," UNIDIR
Newsletter, no. 37, 1998.

24. Douglas Roche, "An Analysis of the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2000
Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty" April 27-May 8, 1998 Geneva.

25. See ANC, Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa, December 1994.

26. Sally Morphet, "The Non-Aligned and their 11th Summit at Cartagena, October 1995," The
Round Table, no. 340, October 1996, pp. 455-463.

27. See speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, in the National Assembly on May
18, 1995, in Chris Landsberg, Garth le Pere and Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Mission Imperfect:
Redirecting South Africa's Foreign Policy (Johannesburg: Foundation for Global Dialogue and
Centre for Policy Studies, 1995) p. 115.

28. See "Mandela Outlines ANC Foreign Policy to Conference," SAPA News Agency,
Johannesberg, December 16, 1997 in BBC's Summary of World Broad- casts (SWB) Part 5,
Africa, Latin America & the Caribean, p. A/4.

29. SWB, AL/3234, May 23, 1998, p.L/1.
                                        SOUTH AFRICA




                                             1962-1989


Nelson Mandela, Secretary Baker, and a security officer during Baker's visit to Namibia in celebration of Namibian
                         independence, March 1990 (Photograph: Greg H. Bradford).




   y    Overview
   y    South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962-1989
   y    Focus of the Collection
   y    Access to Critical Events in Recent U.S. Policy Toward South Africa
   y    Unprecedented Indexing Makes Every Document Accessible
   y    The Collection Will Be a Necessity For:
   y    Sample Document Titles
   y    The South Africa Editorial Board
   y    Praise for South Africa, 1962-1989
   y    Picture: Police in Sharville, South Africa spray tear gas on fleeing protesters to
        disperse township residents who stormed the police station after police blocked a
        trade union march, March 26, 1990 (AP/Wide World Photos).
   y    Document1: This confidential memo from Nicolas Platt, Executive Secretary,
        explains State Department strategy to increase public support for U.S. policy of
        "sustained and positive involvement" in South Africa.
   y    Document2: In a secret cable released to the Archive in 1991, Secretary of State
        Kissinger directs the ambassador to relay U.S. intentions regarding the U.N. vote on
        sanctions in South Africa.
               South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962-1989


Coveted for its resources, supported as an ally, empowered by its nuclear capability and hated for
its policy of apartheid, South Africa remains a country of extremes. Reactive in nature, U.S.
relations with South Africa provide a case study of a controversial foreign policy that sought to
reconcile the pursuit of political and economic interests in a country with a limited commitment
to human rights.




                                 Focus of the Collection




The South African document collection contains 2,500 documents totaling more than 12,000
pages. The collection provides primary source documents which describe U.S. support,
implementation, enforcement and violations of the U.N.-sponsored sanctions against South
Africa. The documents provide a case study of a U.S. foreign policy lacking in strategy and
driven by reaction to events.




    Access to Critical Events in Recent U.S. Policy Toward South Africa
This set deals with all major events both domestic and foreign relating to South Africa during
three time periods. The first period (1962-1976) focuses on the response of the U.S. and the
international community to the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the arrest of the leadership and
banning of the ANC and PAC, United Nations Security Council Arms Embargo Resolution
against South Africa in 1963, subsequent resolutions, arms sales, technology transfers,
commerce and trade, nuclear collaboration, joint U S.-South African covert activities in Angola,
Kissinger shuttle diplomacy in southern Africa and U.S. government support for South Africa in
international forums.

The second period (1976-1980) deals primarily with the response of the U.S. government and the
international community to the South African government's brutal reaction to the June 1976
student revolt, the death of Steve Biko (the leader of the Black Consciousness Movement), South
Africa's subsequent security crackdown on opponents of apartheid and the adoption of the U.N.
Security Council Resolution that called for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.
Additionally, primary source documents describe the Carter Administration's prohibition of all
sales to South Africa's military and police, the U.N.-proposed economic sanctions, South African
Defense Force incursions into neighboring countries, U.S. violations of the U.N. embargo,
technology transfers, nuclear collaborations, efforts by the Contact Group to negotiate Namibian
independence with the South African government, and aspects of the civil and anti-colonial wars
in Zimbabwe and Angola.

The third period (1981-1989) focuses on developments during the Reagan Administration and
emphasizes South Africa's circumvention of arms embargoes, technology transfers, nuclear
collaboration, U.S.-South African support for rebels in Angola, the developments within South
Africa and internationally that led to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and the
diplomatic maneuvers that led to Namibian independence.




         Unprecedented Indexing Makes Every Document Accessible


The Archive prepares extensive, printed finding aids for its collections. Praised by librarians and
scholars, these finding aids are valuable, stand-alone reference tools. The Guide contains a
detailed events chronology, glossaries of key individuals, organizations, events, legal terms and
acronyms, a selected bibliography of relevant secondary sources and a document catalog. The
Catalog, organized chronologically, provides bibliographic information about the documents and
lists all the indexing phrases generated for each. This facilitates browsing through the document
descriptions and allows researchers to preview key details about documents before perusing the
microfiche. The Index contains rich contextual references to subjects, individuals and
organizations. The detail provided in indexing allows researchers to pinpoint relevant documents
in specific areas of study.




                        The Collection Will Be a Necessity For:



       y Scholars and students of U.S. foreign policy and international relations

       y Africanists and regional specialists on southern Africa

       y Government and business consultants

       y Librarians and bibliographers

       y Investigative reporters

       y Newspaper, television and radio reporters

       y Concerned citizens

Documents in this collection include:

       y Embassy cable traffic

       y Memoranda

       y Intelligence reports

       y Briefing papers

       y Congressional reports
       y Proposals for AID funding

       y Situation reports

       y Official letters

       y Press reports

Previously unpublished documents originate from:

       y Department of State

       y Department of Defense

       y Defense Intelligence Agency

       y Central Intelligence Agency

       y Nuclear Regulatory Commission

       y Treasury Department

       y The White House

       y Agency for International Development

       y Export-lmport Bank

       y Congressional Committees

       y National Security Council




                                 Sample Document Titles



   y   08/12/63 U.S. and South African Economic Leverage on Each Other (DOS Memorandum)
   y   02/19/71 Reflections on 'Black Power' in South Africa (DOS Airgram)
    y    04/15/75 Supply of Highly Enriched Uranium to South Africa (DOS Cable)
    y    07/01/76 Kissinger--Vorster Talks (DOS Cable)
    y    07/12/76 South Africa--Israel: Military Cooperation (Defense Intelligence Appraisal)
    y    03/25/81 Ambassador Lichtenstein's Report on Ambassador Kirkpatrick's Conversation with
         SADF Lt. Gen. Van Der Westhuizen and Anglican Bishop Tutu (DOS Memorandum of
         Conversation)
    y    03/08/84 [Regarding Duane Clarridge Visit to South Africa to Secure Assistance for Contras] (CIA
         Cable)
    y    12/12/86 Implementation of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (DOS Cable)
    y    05/11 /88 Briefing: Developments in the Military Situation in Angola since July 1987 (DIA
         Briefing Paper)
    y    07/05/89 South African Launch of a Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) (DIA Intelligent Report)




                                              Overview



Title:

         South Africa: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1962- 1989

Content:

         Reproduces on microfiche 2,500 documents totaling more than 12,000 pages recording
         U.S. policy toward South Africa from the Kennedy Administration through the Reagan
         years.

Arrangement and Access:

         Documents are arranged chronologically. For ease of use, the unique identification
         numbers assigned to the documents are printed in eye-legible type at the top right hand
         corner and precede each document on the microfiche strip.

Standards:

         Documents are reproduced on silver halide positive- reading microfiche at a nominal
         reduction of 24x in envelopes. They are archivally permanent and conform to AIIM, BSI
       and ANSI standards. Any microfiche found to be physically substandard will be replaced
       free of charge .

Indexing:

       A printed guide and index totaling approximately 2,000 pages accompanies the
       microfiche collection. The Guide contains an events chronology, glossaries of names and
       organizations, a bibliography of secondary sources and a chronological listing of
       documents. The Index provides in-depth, document-level access to subjects, individuals
       and organizations.

Date of Publication:

       Fall 1991

Orders and Inquiries




                           The South Africa Editorial Board


       y Pauline Baker, Senior Fellow Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

       y N. Brian Winchester, Associate Director African Studies Program Indiana University

       yWitney W. Schneidman, Senior Analyst Investor Responsibility Research Center

       y Michael Clough, Senior Fellow Council on Foreign Relations

National Security Archive Project Staff

   y   Kenneth Mokoena, Project Director for the South Africa collection, coordinated documentation
       efforts on U.S. policy toward South Africa and the front-line states. Mr. Mokoena worked in
         Africa for the United Nations and the government of Botswana before joining the Archive in
         1986. He now works for the Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs
    y    Kathi Austin, Research Assistant
    y    Katherine Perkins, Research Assistant




Praise for South Africa, 1962-1989

"An extraordinary resource. The staff of the National Security Archive has spent thousands of
hours researching and filing Freedom of Information Act requests and cataloging and indexing
them to produce a documentary record of U.S. foreign policymaking unavailable anywhere
else...it would have taken individual scholars years to do what the Archive has done.

N. Brian Winchester, Associate Director
African Studies Program
Indiana University

"Carefully assembling a vast array of formerly classified documents dealing with South African,
Namibian, Angolan and Mozambican issues, this collection gives the reader a unique insight into
the thinking of various U.S. officials and branches of government on the highly complex and
important problems of this area. Taken as a whole, they represent an excellent resource for
specialists dealing with the area as well as for classes on international relations, U.S. foreign
policy, and southern Africa. This informative set of papers deserves wide utilization."

Donald Rothchild
Department of Political Science
University of California, Davis



Return to National Security Archive Microfiche Sets.



Headline:                               Israeli Friends
Date:                                   1 May 1994
Bibliography:                           ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 5
Orig. Src.:




Abstract:
Note: Details about the Blaauw case are provided in the Africa Confidential article. ..... According to
information released regarding the secret mid-1980s extortion trial of Johann Blaauw, a brigadier in the
South African army, South Africa and _Israel_ participated in four clandestine nuclear deals in the mid-
1970s. Blaauw was found not guilty of trying to extort mining concessions from Minister of Mines Fanie
Botha in a trial in 1989 [1]. The first nuclear deal occurred in shortly after the Yom Kippur War in 1973 when
"Benjamine," a member of the Israel Council for Scientific Liaison, asked Blaauw to acquire South African
yellowcake which Israel could use for weapon-grade plutonium. ("Benjamine" is believed to be Benjamin
Blumberg, the head of the Israeli Intelligence division LishKa l-Kishrei (Lakam) [2].) After discussions with
Gen. Hendryk van den Bergh, head of the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), South African Prime Minister
John Vorster eventually agreed to sell 50 metric tons of yellowcake to Israel. The deal was handled by
Minister of Mines Fanie Botha, who replaced Piet Koornhog [Koornhof] after Koornhog opposed the sale.
Uranium Enrichment Corporation Chairman Ampie Roux was also aware of the deal.

During his testimony, Blaauw said that "a high degree of confidence was developing between the South
African and Israeli governments which involved the exchange of military technology, joint aeronautic
ventures, and the supply of 'know-how' by Israel to South Africa in regard to the manufacture of weaponry."

The second transfer of nuclear material included tritium. Van den Bergh asked Blaauw to procure 30 grams
of tritium from Israel, which the trial record stated was "enough to manufacture 12 atomic bombs." Tritium
is used to increase the power of nuclear weapons by creating fusion for thermonuclear bombs [2]. In a
project with the code name "Teeblare" (or "Tea Leaves"), Israel delivered many small shipments of tritium
to South Africa in capsules which contained 2.5 grams each. Blumberg and Information Ministry Secretary
EschelRhoodie served as escorts on the flights [2]. The South African Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) has
admitted to the IAEA that it did import tritium but has refused to name its sources.

Blaauw received $1 million from Israel as a "gift for what I had done for them" [1]. [Note: It is unclear
whether the "gift" was provided as a reward for arranging the tritium deal, the yellowcake deal, or both.]

In reports to the IAEA, the AEA has also admitted to performing lithium-6 separation which results in the
production of tritium [2]. A September 1993 IAEA document said that in the early 1980s South Africa was
planning to construct a 150 MW reactor at Gouriqua, near Moussel Bay, that would be capable of producing
tritium and plutonium indigenously [2]. The reactor was never built [2].

The third transaction involved the export of 50 metric tons of South African yellow cake to Israel. The fourth
transaction involved the release of 500 metric tons of South African yellowcake that was already inexplicably
located in Israel.

The details of each transaction are also recorded in the book, "Critical Mass" by William Burrows and Robert
Windrem [1]. Despite these occurrences, South African President de Klerk stated in a speech to parliament
in March 1993, "I wish to emphasize that at no time did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons technology or
materials from another country, nor has it provided any to any other country, or cooperated with another
country in this regard" [1]. When asked why South Africa was importing tritium from Israel, de Klerk
responded, "Although tritium may be used in initiators of nuclear explosive devices, (although not in the
devices produced by South Africa) it has many other commercial uses. South Africa has been active in the
commercial exploitation of tritium for some time and has procured this material from various sources in the
past" [1].

Some of the information about the Blaauw case was revealed in March 1993 and April 1993 by Des Blow of
the Johannesburg City Press.

Supporting Sources:

[1] Weekly Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), February 1911-17/94, p. 2; in JPRS- TND-94-006, pp. 1-2,
"De Klerk Not Telling 'Truth' About Nuclear Program." [2] Africa Confidential, 4 February 1994, pp. 1-3,
"South Africa: a Nuclear Nightmare."

				
DOCUMENT INFO
Description: New World Order-one world government-related documents.