Document Sample
NOTEBOOK ON Powered By Docstoc

   MBS Litigation
                            BY P R AV I N R AO A N D S U L E E N L E E

       The Securities and Exchange Commission could be going to school
            on private litigation being brought against MBS issuers.

                            M O R TG A G E B A N KI N G | A P R I L 2 0 1 1
                 espite recent statistics showing an overall decline in

D                  securities lawsuits stemming from the subprime
                    mortgage crisis, civil claims against the banking
                    industry for losses related to mortgage-backed secu-
                   rities (MBS) do not appear to be slowing anytime
                 soon. G Plaintiffs in these cases—mostly institutional
             investors—have alleged that banks misrepresented the
underwriting standards used to evaluate the borrowers’ ability to repay
the loans underlying the securities. For instance, in February, Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., Springfield, Massachusetts, filed a
lawsuit against Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., an indirect subsidiary of
Frankfurt, Germany–based Deutsche Bank AG, alleging that the bank
had misrepresented certain characteristics of loans backing its MBS
and disregarded or abandoned underwriting guidelines. G The
Allstate Corporation, Northbrook, Illinois, has filed similar suits against
JPMorgan Chase & Co., New York, and Countrywide Financial (now
Bank of America, Charlotte, North Carolina), seeking damages related
to its purchases of nearly $1.5 billion in MBS from these banks. Even
before the Allstate suit was filed, Bank of America disclosed in its
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quarterly 10-Q report for
the third quarter of 2010 that it was facing multiple lawsuits alleging
misstatements or omissions in the issuance of $375 billion in MBS. G
Citigroup Inc., New York, similarly disclosed in its fourth-quarter 10-Q
that it was facing at least five investor lawsuits involving billions of
dollars more of these same securities. G In terms of actual recovery,
however, the investors filing these suits have faced a number of

                         M O R TG A G E B A N KI N G | A P R I L 2 0 1 1
challenges—including stringent pleading standards and                  SEC enforcement priority
statutes of limitation. Yet, the uncertain track record     As investors attempt to seek remedies through private
resulting from civil litigation over MBS will not necessar- class-action suits, speculation swirls as to whether the SEC
ily translate to similar outcomes in potential enforcement  will pursue enforcement actions against banks that played
actions pursued by the SEC.                                 a large role in securitizing the MBS. It appears likely that
   For one thing, procedural technicalities such as plead-  the SEC could pursue fraud claims questioning the truth-
ing standards and statutes of limitation that have ham-     fulness of disclosures made in selling the MBS.
pered civil suits will not impede an SEC action. In fact, it   SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro has stated, “When-
appears that the SEC has already begun focusing its         ever there are suggestions that there may have been any
investigative resources on MBS-related improprieties;       kind of issues with respect to disclosure, misrepresenta-
sources have confirmed that an SEC investigation was        tions or omissions, we are always looking at that kind of
well under way as of December 2010.                         conduct.”
   This article discusses how MBS have become a signifi-       Schapiro’s statement was made on Oct. 19, 2010—
cant priority for the SEC’s investigative resources,        around the same time that a state court dismissed a suit
describes what might constitute a potential SEC action      against Countrywide Financial for its MBS due to proce-
against banks, and suggests proactive measures banks        dural technicalities. The SEC has already shown a fairly
should take to ensure they do not become ensnared by        aggressive stance against Wall Street fraud through its
regulatory or private litigants.                                                 action against Goldman Sachs Group
                                                                                 Inc., New York, for disclosures related
Background                                                                       to collateralized debt obligations
MBS emerged from a small niche in the
bond market to a multi-trillion-dollar
segment in the years leading up to the
subprime mortgage meltdown. Large
                                                 S  peculation swirls
                                              as to whether the SEC
                                                                                    CDOs are slightly more complex
                                                                                 than MBS in that they involve an
                                                                                 additional layer of securities; instead
banks (mostly Wall Street firms) quick-                                          of being backed by the actual mort-
ly learned that individual mortgage         will pursue enforcement              gages themselves, CDOs are backed by
loans could be transformed into finan-         actions against banks             securities that are in turn backed by
cial commodities. Thus, the banks                                                mortgages. Although the SEC eventu-
(called depositors in this process)           that played a large role           ally settled with Goldman Sachs for
began purchasing loans from smaller                                              $550 million, the Goldman Sachs
lenders (also called originators), pool-     in securitizing the MBS.            action could serve as a template for
ing residential real estate mortgages                                            cases against MBS-issuing banks.
together, and then transferring these                                               In its enforcement action against
assets into the possession of trusts cre-                                        Goldman Sachs, the SEC alleged that
ated by the depositors.                                     the bank had defrauded investors by not disclosing that
   The assets then were securitized and partitioned         a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc., New York, played
off as MBS, being sold to institutional investors who       a significant role in selecting the underlying bonds
would receive cash flows generated from the underly-        within a CDO. Paulson, a client of Goldman Sachs, essen-
ing mortgages in exchange for their purchase of these       tially wanted to bet against the housing market.
securities.                                                    Paulson discussed with Goldman Sachs the idea of
   In the years leading to the housing collapse in          putting together a CDO full of mortgage-related assets
2007, smaller lenders became increasingly willing to        that Paulson believed were likely to lose value. Goldman
lend money to borrowers with little documented abil-        Sachs knew that the CDO would be a difficult sell if
ity to repay the loans, then reselling these loans to       investors were aware that Paulson had input in deciding
larger banks. Some of the larger banks buying up the        what went into the CDO and then bet against it; thus,
loans appeared to become lax in their own securities        Goldman Sachs brought in a third-party company, ACA
underwriting, having underwriters (charged with the         Management LLC, New York, to select assets for the
task of evaluating the pool of mortgages) accept the        CDO. ACA, which was allegedly misled into thinking that
entire pool—even if the pool included borrowers             Paulson was investing in the CDO, worked with Paulson
who were likely to default.                                 to select assets going into the CDO. Ultimately, when the
   Once the mortgage crisis hit, investors realized that    CDO lost value, Paulson paid Goldman Sachs a $15 mil-
their purchases of MBS were not as safe as they initially   lion fee but profited to the tune of $1 billion.
appeared. Shortly thereafter, investors began filing suits     Although misrepresentation about mortgage-backed
in both state and federal courts alleging misstatements     securities appears less deliberately crafted than the plan
and omissions in connection with the purchase of these      between Goldman Sachs and Paulson, the SEC could
mortgage-backed securities.                                 view the banks’ assurances about the quality control of
   Not only have private suits against banks prolifer-      the underlying mortgages as “misleading” or a “misrepre-
ated, but it has also become increasingly apparent          sentation” in the same vein as the alleged scheme in the
that the SEC is focused on investigating any miscon-        Goldman Sachs case. Moreover, since MBS transactions
duct surrounding the mortgage securitization                are not as difficult to unravel and explain as CDOs, the
process.                                                    SEC may be more apt to bring an enforcement action
                                             M O R TG A G E B A N KI N G | A P R I L 2 0 1 1
against the banks—especially if there are fewer inves-                   dant’s knowledge of the fraud on the part of the defen-
tigative resources required.                                             dant before pre-trial discovery can begin. Otherwise, the
   According to press reports, the SEC has been expand-                  plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed. This heightened
ing its probe of the mortgage industry, launching a new                  pleading standard requires plaintiffs to present factual
phase of its investigation by sending out a fresh round                  allegations based on items such as confidential witness
of subpoenas to banks including Bank of America, Citi-                   statements and the bank’s awareness of the decline in
group, JPMorgan Chase and San Francisco–based Wells                      the origination standards in subprime lending.
Fargo & Co.                                                                 Given this tough standard, plaintiffs in private suits
   The SEC had already been looking into foreclosure                     against banks have gravitated toward sections 11 and
practices, investigating allegations that mortgage ser-                  12(a)(2) rather than tackle the more particularized plead-
vicers were using subpar paperwork to process foreclo-                   ing of a rule 10b-5 action.
sures against borrowers who had defaulted. Although                         As the trend with private litigants continues, we may
the SEC initially probed the role of these servicers, the                also see the SEC looking to this framework for its own
SEC is now asking banks about the early stages of the                    investigations. Although the PSLRA’s stringent plead-
mortgage securitization process.                                         ing requirements do not apply to an SEC action under
   SEC Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami, when                      rule 10b-5, it seems likely that the SEC would at least
announcing the Goldman Sachs action, stated, “We’re                      explore using sections 11 and 12(a)(2) as its statutory
looking at a wide range of products. If we see securities                framework.
with similar profiles, we’ll look at them more closely.”                    To understand how the SEC may bring a potential
This, in conjunction with Chairman Schapiro’s Oct. 19,                   enforcement action under these sections, two putative
2010, statement, makes it seem plausible that the SEC                    class-action suits brought under sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
may turn its investigation of the MBS arena into an                      and one recent state law filing may serve as a model for
enforcement action if sufficient evidence is uncovered.                  SEC cases in this area.
Furthermore, political pressure to hold Wall Street
accountable for the mortgage meltdown has intensified,                      Example: Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund
so the SEC may have added motivation to restore its                      v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corporation
credibility as a capable watchdog in the wake of the                        In Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura
financial crisis.                                                        Asset Acceptance Corporation (U.S. Court of Appeals for
                                                                         the First Circuit, 2011), institutional investors filed a
Model for SEC action                                                     class-action suit under section 11 and section 12(a)(2)
The securities laws that apply to misstatements and omis-                against eight trusts and the bank that organized the
sions involved in issuing MBS are rule 10b-5 of section                  trusts. The suit alleged that the registration statements
10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange                 and prospectus supplements (together, the offering docu-
Act) and sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of               ments) for the mortgage-backed securities contained
1933 (the Securities Act). Section 10b of the Exchange Act               false and misleading statements as to the underwriting
is a vehicle for alleging fraud in general, while sections 11            standards used.
and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act apply to disclosures                     The plaintiffs argued that as a result of these false and
made in connection with registration statements and                      misleading statements, the securities’ true value when
prospectuses, respectively.                                              purchased was less than what they paid. The district
   The litigation trend since 2009 seems to be that a                    court ruled that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged
greater portion of MBS-related claims have involved sec-                 that the offering documents contained false and mislead-
tions 11 and 12(a)(2).                                                   ing statements with respect to the underwriting stan-
   This increase may be due to the fact that plaintiffs                  dards under section 11 and section 12(a)(2).
bringing claims under sections 11 or 12(a)(2) do not                        The appellate court, however, disagreed with the dis-
have to plead and show knowledge of the fraud on the                     trict court, pointing to representations in the offering
part of the bank, which is a difficult, necessary showing                documents that the originators had used lending guide-
for a rule 10b-5 action. This knowledge requirement of                   lines to determine the borrower’s creditworthiness and
rule 10b-5 is often a tough hurdle for private litigants to              ability to repay the loans.
overcome.                                                                   One statement in particular found in the prospectus
   Furthermore, in all class-action suits brought under                  supplement stated that one of the larger loan originators
rule 10b-5, strict requirements for stating facts in a com-              of the trusts, First National Bank of Nevada (FNBN), Las
plaint apply through the Private Securities Litigation                   Vegas, used “underwriting guidelines [that] are primarily
Reform Act (PSLRA). Since its enactment in 1995, Con-                    intended to evaluate the prospective borrower’s credit
gress has tried to curb lawsuits brought by individuals                  standing and ability to repay the loan, as well as the
intent on extracting a settlement prior to going to court.               value and adequacy of the proposed mortgage property
There was a sense that these were baseless suits filed to                as collateral.”
merely initiate discovery to dig for ammunition.                            Plaintiffs had argued that FNBN routinely violated the
   By imposing more stringent standards in stating facts                 lending guidelines, approving as many loans as possible
at the early complaint stage, the PSLRA requires plain-                  and even “scrubbing” loan applications of potentially dis-
tiffs in a securities class action to allege facts with partic-          qualifying material. Throughout this process, plaintiffs
ularity that give rise to a strong probability of defen-                 claimed borrowers never had to show an established ability
                                               M O R TG A G E B A N KI N G | A P R I L 2 0 1 1
to repay indebtedness in a timely fashion or verify their             allegation through confidential witnesses, who main-
employment history. Plaintiffs allege this absence of                 tained that Wells Fargo representatives would push
verification was part of FNBN’s business model, and                   appraisers they worked with to inflate the value of the
that the bank misrepresented the standards used by                    real estate underlying the mortgage loans. One confi-
these originators.                                                    dential witness believed that more than 70 percent of
   In its January 2011 ruling, the appellate court                    the loans he had worked with had an LTV higher than
agreed with the plaintiffs, and emphasized that the                   95 percent.
“less stringent” and “limited documentation” wording                     Finally, the court also held that the plaintiffs provided
was not sufficient to warrant dismissal of the plain-                 sufficient support for their allegations of misstatements
tiffs’ claim at this stage of the action. Furthermore, the            concerning the high investment rating awarded to the
appellate court noted that the bank’s argument that no                MBS, as the plaintiffs presented statements by execu-
detailed factual support was provided to support the                  tives at rating agencies who admitted that they were
plaintiffs’ allegation was invalid, as the sharp drop in              aware the rating models were outdated at the time the
the credit ratings after the sale of the MBS and the                  subject ratings were made.
specificity as to FNBN’s practices offered enough of a                   Once again, sections 11 and 12(a)(2) served as a vehi-
basis to initiate discovery aimed at the allegations.                 cle for bringing suit against the banks where rule 10b-5
   Thus, the use of sections 11 and 12(a)(2) by the plain-            would not.
tiffs allowed them to withstand chal-
lenges that normally would have sig-                                                             Example: Massachusetts Mutual
naled defeat had they relied on rule                                                          Life Insurance Co. v. Deutsche Bank
10b-5 to bring their claims.

  Example: In re Wells Fargo Mort-
gage-Backed Certificates Litigation
                                            T    his latest filing, in the
                                             authors’ view, seems to
                                                                                              As one of the most recently filed
                                                                                          suits in the realm of MBS litigation,
                                                                                          Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
                                                                                          Co.’s (MassMutual’s) complaint filed
  Similarly, in In re Wells Fargo Mort-       illustrate an emerging                      in February 2011 against Deutsche
gage-Backed Certificates Litigation,                                                      Bank and other defendants in the
(U.S. District Court for the Northern           trend of relying on                       U.S. District Court for the District of
District of California, 2010), plaintiffs                                                 Massachusetts may be a harbinger of
brought an action against Wells Fargo         sections 11 and 12(a)(2)                    the shift to sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
also under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) for       to bring cases against                      type claims.
misrepresentations of its underwrit-                                                          Although the plaintiff here brought
ing standards. Here, the district court        banks for their MBS.                       its action under the Massachusetts
held in April 2010 that the plaintiffs’                                                   Uniform Securities Act, Chapter
allegations were sufficient to state a                                                    110A, section 410, this action is analo-
claim, as the plaintiffs presented                                                        gous to a sections 11 and 12(a)(2)
statements from confidential witnesses who asserted                   action, as the plaintiff frames its allegations with respect
that Wells Fargo (here, both the originator and depositor             to misrepresentations found in the offering materials of
of the pooled loans) placed “intense pressure” on its loan            the MBS.
officers to close loans.                                                 While the state law here does not impose strict lia-
   This alleged pressure came in the form of coaching                 bility like sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of federal securities
borrowers to provide qualifying income information                    law, it does allow for plaintiffs to prevail on claims
and accepting implausible or falsified income informa-                arising in connection with a prospectus if they can
tion. Although Wells Fargo argued that the plaintiffs’                show the defendant’s negligence with respect to the
allegations were insufficiently linked to the types of                misstatement or omission. Like the cases discussed ear-
mortgages that were packaged into the securities at                   lier, MassMutual similarly alleges that the statements
issue, the court agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that            in the offering materials were materially false and mis-
this type of conduct systematically infected the entire               leading, as they misrepresented underwriting stan-
underwriting process, and thus made it unnecessary to                 dards applied to the loans backing the MBS and
distinguish between those that were packaged and oth-                 appraisal information.
ers that were not.                                                       Although the prospectus supplements of the MBS
   Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiffs              stated that conservative underwriting guidelines were
had also stated a claim for misstatements and omissions               followed, the plaintiff claims that the defendants made
concerning the appraisal value and loan-to-value (LTV)                no attempt to verify any information in the loan files,
ratio of the underlying mortgaged properties. While the               showing the defendants’ “disregard and abandonment”
prospectuses for the mortgage-backed securities stated                of underwriting guidelines.
that “mortgage loans will not generally have had at origi-               This latest filing, in the authors’ view, seems to illus-
nation a loan-to-value ratio in excess of 95 percent,” the            trate an emerging trend of relying on sections 11 and
plaintiffs alleged that this statement was misleading                 12(a)(2) to bring cases against banks for their MBS. Often,
because the home’s value calculation was often based on               claims under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) will be brought in
an inflated appraisal.                                                conjunction with a rule 10b-5 claim (see, for example, Put-
   Like their prior claim, the plaintiffs supported this              nam Bank v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, [2011] ).
                                            M O R TG A G E B A N KI N G | A P R I L 2 0 1 1
Although MBS litigation in general has also been                     Proactive measures
brought pursuant to rule 10b-5, these plaintiffs often               While as of early March, it remains to be seen whether
find themselves unable to surpass the initial hurdle of              any enforcement actions against banks will result from
showing the defendant’s knowledge (see Security Capi-                the SEC investigations currently under way, banks may
tal Assurance Ltd. Sec. Litig., 729 F. Supp. 2d 569                  want to consider the following proactive measures to pre-
[2010], in which the investors’ putative class action                pare for this possibility:
against financial guaranty insurance providers was dis-                 I S t a y u p d a t e d o n p e n d i n g p r i va t e l i t i ga t i o n
missed due to the investors’ failure to sufficiently                 involving MBS. The SEC will likely frame its investi-
allege the defendant’s knowledge; and Ellington Man-                 gation based on the allegations found in the plain-
agement Group LLC v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. [2009], in              tiffs’ complaints.
which investors failed to allege that mortgage com-                     I Gather documentation on communications between
pany representatives acted with the requisite knowl-                 bank personnel and underwriters. Flag communications
edge). Thus, the SEC may decide to shift its focus away              that would negate the idea that bank personnel exerted
from its commonly used rule 10b-5, and use sections                  pressure on underwriters charged with the task of evalu-
11 and 12(a)(2) to avoid running into a potential prob-              ating the pool of loans for securitization.
lem with proving knowledge. Although the aforemen-                      I Understand that certain hurdles facing private liti-
tioned model cases brought under sections 11 and                     gants do not apply to actions brought by the SEC. For
12(a)(2) were still pending as of March 2011, one                    example, the statute of limitations for claims under sec-
might glean from their facts that the SEC may craft a                tions 11 and 12(a)(2) do not apply to actions brought by
potential enforcement action against banks using these               a government agency like the SEC; be prepared to make
sections.                                                            alternative arguments in favor of dismissal.
   As the SEC looks deeper into the securitization                      I Be cognizant that private litigation involving a
process, it is likely examining statements contained in              bank’s MBS could morph into an SEC investigation, and
offering documents as they relate to the underwriting                later an SEC enforcement action; the plaintiff’s attorneys
standards, the LTV and the investment ratings of the                 regularly share their allegations with the SEC. MI             B
MBS. Because sections 11 and 12(a)(2) do not require
showing that banks knew of any misrepresentations, the               Pravin B. Rao is a litigation partner in the Chicago office of Perkins Coie LLP,
SEC can argue that banks are strictly liable for material            where his practice focuses on white-collar and securities enforcement defense.
misstatements in their registration statements and                   Suleen Lee is a real estate associate in the Chicago office at Perkins Coie. They
prospectuses.                                                        can be reached at and


                                           M O R TG A G E B A N KI N G | A P R I L 2 0 1 1

Shared By: