IRAN FRONTLINE by alicejenny


									Georgia Novice Packet
Draft Negative

                                                                DRAFT NEGATIVE

Hegemony/overstretch advantage answers
overstretch frontline ................................................................................................................................................... 1-3
extension #2 – draft hurts morale .............................................................................................................................. 4-5
extension #3 – retention .................................................................................................................................................6
extension #4 – draft = casualties ....................................................................................................................................7
extension #4 – casualties = withdrawal .........................................................................................................................8
extension #5 – low troop quality ............................................................................................................................. 9-10
at: unilateral aggression ............................................................................................................................................... 11

Iran advantage answers
iran frontline .......................................................................................................................................................... 12-14
extension – doesn’t cause regional prolif..................................................................................................................... 15

Racism advantage answers
at: racism advantage .............................................................................................................................................. 16-18
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                                  1
Draft Negative

                                      OVERSTRETCH FRONTLINE

Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the Cato Institute, ―The Ill-Wind of the Draft‖ The Independent
Institute, April 27, 2004 (
Conscription—which undermines the liberties of young Americans and harms the civilian economy by their absence
from highly productive labor—allows politicians to avoid the tough choice of getting rid of outdated military
commitments or making the Army more efficient. Although putting young peoples’ lives at risk for paltry
compensation might save the government money at a time of budget deficits, these hidden (off-budget) societal costs
and inefficiencies of a draft would be staggering. The civilian economy would be drained of billions of dollars
worth of skilled labor.


Zalmay Khalilzad, Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Washington Quarterly, Spring 19 95

Preserve U.S. Economic Strength
The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if the U.S. economy declines
seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish
and the United States would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward-looking, and
abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the

Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at Cato, ―Feeling a Draft?‖ March/April 19 99
Then there’s the issue of quality. If you look at any measure of quality today, our volunteer force is far superior to a conscript
force, and there’s a very real reason for that. The question is, who wants to be in the military? In a conscript military you have
people who don’t want to be there. Today you can discharge somebody who abuses drugs. You can refuse to bring in lower
quality recruits. It’s much harder if you have a conscript force to make those decisions because restrictions on drugs and so on
just give unhappy conscripts a way out. That’s a completely different dynamic in terms of discipline and all the measures that are
important to an effective force.


Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at Cato, ―Feeling a Draft?‖ March/April 19 99

Conscription has nothing to do with careerism. Conscription brings you first- termers, not long-term soldiers. Indeed, conscripts
are far less likely to reenlist than are volunteers. The extra difficulty of maintaining a high-tempo military with all the new
commitments that we’ve been making is reflected, for example, by the reenlistment rate of people who have been in Bosnia. If
you factor out higher bonuses, you find lower retention rates. A draft would exacerbate the problem.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                                              2
Draft Negative

                                          OVERSTRETCH FRONTLINE

Walter Y. Oi, Elmer B. Milliman Professor of Economics at the University of Rochester, ―The Virtue of an All
Volunteer Force‖ July 29, 2003 (
This shift appears to have had a dramatically positive effect on U.S. military preparedness. A dozen years ago, the Gulf War was
waged successfully with a total of 147 battlefield deaths. More recently, the American military experienced 74 deaths in
Afghanistan and 137 deaths in Iraq. In comparison, during the Selective Service era, the U.S. military experienced 33,741 deaths
in Korean and 47,414 in Vietnam. But even if an all-volunteer force is more effective and fights with a dramatically lower loss of
life, is it unacceptable because its demographics do not represent the U.S. population? According to Rep. Rangel, "We must be
certain that the sacrifices we will be asking our armed forces to make are shared by the rest of us." But compulsory service did
not produce an equal sharing of sacrifice. In 1964, for example, 35.6 percent of draft-eligible young men were exempted from
military service for physical or mental reasons. Under the draft, women made up only four percent of the active duty forces, as
compared to 15 percent in 2000. Today, college-educated African Americans comprise some 12 percent of the officer corps, yet
only 7.6 percent of college graduates are Black. African American enlisted men in the all-volunteer Army are under-represented
in the infantry and special forces, and over-represented in logistical support and administrative occupations - positions that they
can serve in to retirement and that provide them skills valued in the civilian world. Would it be acceptable to use compulsory
service to bring those numbers in line with national demographics? The draft is a poor way to provide an effective common
defense. It discourages the adoption of military technologies that can reduce the loss of life and improve effectiveness during
military operations. It increases the full economic cost of producing defense capability. And it does not make the military more
representative. In a free society, individuals who serve by choice and not by compulsion should meet the call to arms.


Hyde 2000 [Maj. Charles K., College of Naval Command and Staff, ―Casualty Aversion,‖ Aerospace Power
Journal, Summer,]
THE EVENTS OF the last one hundred years have witnessed dramatic changes in American foreign policy and, in particular, the use of force in
support of national objectives. From a sleeping giant with overt isolationist tendencies prior to World War II, the United States has
evolved at the beginning of the twenty-first century into the world’s only superpower. The transition from a body politic wedded to the
charge of George Washington’s farewell address that we should avoid ―entangling alliances‖ to a recognized superpower with global interests
and responsibilities has been marked by the commitment of the United States to stand up for its values and principles with military might. This
might, in combination with other elements of national power, defeated Nazism and Japanese hegemony in World War II and hastened the end of
the cold war, which saw the collapse of Soviet-dominated communism and global bipolar confrontation. The end of the cold war, however,
unleashed an uncertain world that has not developed into a new world order or seen the end of conflicts. Challenges to the interests of the
United States and free people around the world remain, and the United States is currently positioned as the only nation
with the global capabilities and power to provide leadership for an uncertain future. As stated in A National Security Strategy
for a New Century, ―Our nation’s challenge—and our responsibility—is to sustain that role by harnessing the forces of global integration for the
benefit of our own people and people around the world.‖1 In order to meet these challenges and remain the ―world’s most powerful
force for peace, prosperity and the universal values of democracy and freedom‖ that the president’s strategy champions,2 the
United States has to show leadership in an anarchical world by acting like a great power. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise
of global communism, many countries have challenged the ability of the United States to maintain its position as world leader. Conventional
wisdom has it that the United States is unwilling to commit the military power required to influence events, settle
disputes, and act as the force for democracy, peace, and economic freedom that our national strategy promulgates. The
perception among our enemies and allies alike is that the American public is unwilling to commit to any military operation in
which one can expect even a minimal number of casualties. Furthermore, they believe that once an enemy engages the United States, it
can force the latter to withdraw from its commitments when American casualties mount. Because of our casualty aversion, in the eyes of the
world, we are becoming ―a sawdust superpower.‖3
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                                          3
Draft Negative

                                        OVERSTRETCH FRONTLINE


Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, January 2003, Responding to terrorism: conscription is not the
answer   - National Affairs – Column, USA Today

Moreover, America fields a professional force of extraordinary quality. Soldiers today are far brighter and better
educated than the draft-era force. They are therefore much more capable of handling high-tech weapons. Technical
skills will become even more important in the future, especially since antiterrorism has surpassed conventional
defense as America's most-important security goal. Masses of cannon fodder are of dubious value even in a typical
conventional war, given the killing potential of well-trained soldiers using the latest technology. Conscripts would
be even less helpful in attempting to track down an elusive foe, such as terrorists operating worldwide. The value of
special forces was obvious in the attack on the Taliban government in Afghanistan. They are the only ones that can
help to train Philippine troops in their war with Muslim insurgents. Action in Somalia or elsewhere would require a
similar, well-targeted approach, not a large occupying army. Even the Army sees a need for quicker, lighter, and
more-lethal forces in the future. That means an elite, not a mass, army and a volunteer, not a draft, force. As Philip
Gold of the Discovery Institute observed in the Tacoma News Tribune, "The present military is in an Industrial Age,
labor-intensive structure ill-suited to 21st-century technologies and threats. Properly organized, equipped and with
more superfluous bases closed and many support functions privatized, it could easily drop to 1.2 million or less."
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                                   4
Draft Negative

                          EXTENSION #2 – DRAFT HURTS MORALE


Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at Cato, ―Draft Would Cast Chill Over the Military‖ 10-21-2002

The all-volunteer force is superior in another way: The armed services are filled with people who desire to serve,
reducing discipline problems. Those who are discontented are released. With conscription, the services can ill afford
to kick out even the worst performers, since doing so would reward those wanting out.


Virginia Pilot 7-8-2004 lexis
*Note -- David S.C. Chu is the undersecretary of defense for manpower and readiness

Chu also suggested that adding draftees to the modern military would lower its effectiveness. In the 30 years since
conscription ended, the U.S. has built a force of "professionals," he said; "they want to perform at high levels of
competence ... I cannot see replacing those fine volunteers with a set of people who don't want to volunteer."


Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the Cato Institute, ―The Ill-Wind of the Draft‖ The Independent
Institute, April 27, 2004 (

More practically, the U.S. armed forces do not want a return to conscription. The military has deduced that soldiers who
volunteer for military service are more motivated to become better soldiers than are unwilling draftees. Very few military
analysts would argue that the Vietnam-era conscript military was better than the all-volunteer armed forces of today—by far, the
best in the world. Only imperial overstretch to the breaking point induced by the politicians could compel the generals to consider
reinstating the draft. The U.S. military is huge (2.3 million active and reserve forces) but is spread all over the world to fulfill
outdated security commitments. For example, even after the Cold War ended, the United States retains 100,00 troops in East Asia
and 100,000 troops in Europe. In East Asia, U.S. forces are there to counter a potential invasion of South Korea by North Korea.
Yet times have changed since the Korean War and South Korea’s economy is now almost 24 times that of destitute North Korea.
The United States should withdraw its forces and let the wealthy South Koreans assume more of the burden for their defense.


Max Friedman, Winston-Salem Journal (Winston Salem, NC) July 5, 2004
The draft, by nature, forces men and women into situations they did not choose. U.S. Rep. Ron Paul, R-Texas, said
in a speech to Congress in 2002 that feuds develop between those forced into the armed forces and those who
volunteer. He said that this "undermines the cohesiveness of military units, which is a vital element of military
effectiveness." Because the soldiers in an army of conscripts are not in place by choice, the army as a whole ends up
with low morale.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                                5
Draft Negative

                          EXTENSION #2 – DRAFT HURTS MORALE


Center For Military Readiness March 4, 2003
         Representative Rangel’s Radical Move to Reinstate the Draft,

Talk of patriotism aside, the fact is that reinstitution of the draft would weaken, not strengthen, readiness and morale
in America’s 21st century military. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld notes that the cost of training and
deploying unwilling soldiers would be extremely high and less productive in terms of military readiness. During a
recent appearance on the Lehrer News Hour, Rep. Mark Kirk (R-IL) amplified the point:
―[Most men and women in the military] prefer to be there with other colleagues who volunteered to be there. Morale
is higher, the professionalism is higher. We carry out our mission with far greater loss of any combat power. And
people die in fewer numbers when we have that degree of professionalism.‖ (PBS, Jan. 9)

New York Times, October 31 2004
         ―Need for Draft Is Dismissed By Officials At Pentagon‖ Lexis

Perhaps the most often-cited reason for opposition to a draft is the motivation of the all-volunteer force. ''The most
important thing about a draft is that the people you draft, by definition, don't all want to be there,'' Mr. Chu said.
''The great strength of the volunteer force is the ranks of people who all made a positive, voluntary decision that this
is what they want to do.'' The current American military ''is also smarter than the general population'' from which
conscripts would be drawn, according to the study by Mr. Chu's office. ''Over 90 percent of new recruits have a high
school diploma, while only 75 percent of the American youth do; 67 percent score in the upper half of the enlistment
(math/verbal aptitude) test,'' it stated. ''These attributes translate to lower attrition, faster training and higher
performance,'' it concluded. Mr. Chu said that studies of the military also showed that the all-volunteer force had
fewer disciplinary problems than a draftee service. ''All that comes together in the performance of the force in the
field, which is the ultimate test,'' Mr. Chu said. ''How does this force fight? How well does it carry out the nation's
objectives? How disciplined is it in the face of challenges? I don't think anyone can look at the events of the three-
plus years since 9/11 and not see the payoff in the volunteer force.''


New York Times, October 31 2004
         ―Need for Draft Is Dismissed By Officials At Pentagon‖ Lexis

But senior officers stress that the all-volunteer military is also more competent, better educated and more disciplined
than in the final years of the draft. ''I served in the draftee Army,'' said Gen. Richard A. Cody, who is now vice chief
of staff for the Army, the service most under stress from worldwide deployments. ''Those soldiers were just as loyal
as today,'' he said. ''But it was like Forrest Gump. You know, 'Life is like a box of chocolates.' With conscripts, you
never know what you're going to get.'' General Cody said the strain to meet current global commitments cannot be
minimized -- nor the strain to meet recruiting goals. But he said the young men and women who signed up today
were of a higher quality than any he had seen in 29 years of command. ''I don't have rose-colored glasses on,''
General Cody said. ''But we don't need the draft and we don't want the draft. There are plenty of Americans who still
want to be in the military.''
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                         6
Draft Negative

                                        EXTENSION #3 – RETENTION


New York Times, October 31 2004
         ―Need for Draft Is Dismissed By Officials At Pentagon‖ Lexis

Today's high-technology military also benefits from personnel who are committed to staying in the service for
several years, allowing the armed services to reap full benefit from their costly training. During the draft, soldiers
were required to stay in the service for only two years. But Pentagon studies show that current recruits need one to
three years to reach full competency in combat or support skills. A study by Mr. Chu's office makes that point in
arguing against reinstating a draft that was allowed to lapse on July 1, 1973. ''Draftees quit early; volunteers stay --
so today's midgrade and senior noncommissioned officers are well experienced,'' said the study, written by Bill Carr,
deputy under secretary for military personnel policy. ''During the most recent draft, 90 percent of conscripts quit
after their initial two-year hitch, whereas retention of volunteers is five times better -- about half remain after their
initial (normally four-year) military service obligation,'' said the study, which was published in the spring 2004
edition of ''World Defense Systems,'' a military journal. Those statistics may not be persuasive to those who believe
the United States is poised for a broader array of offensive military operations against other adversaries that would
require a draft, nor to those who feel that a program of required national service would benefit the nation and
America's 18-year-olds.


Human Events, January 27,2003                                           Proquest
         ―Pentagon rebuts Rangel’s rase-based call for draft‖

Rangel's draft resolution also has the backing of Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), a fellow member of the
Congressional Black Caucus. But only last March, Conyers co-sponsored a resolution (H. Con. Res. 368) opposing
the draft. "[R]einstating the military draft or implementing any other form of compulsory military service in the
United States would be detrimental to the long-term military interests of the United States, violative of individual
liberties protected by the Constitution, and inconsistent with the values underlying a free society as expressed in the
Declaration of Independence," the Conyers-backed resolution stated. The Rangel and Conyers offices did not return
calls from HUMAN EVENTS asking for comments on the Pentagon report and last year's resolution. The Pentagon
document lists several reasons conscription is not practical and would harm, rather than help American military
efforts. Included among them: the higher turnover rate of a conscripted force, the lack of motivation typical of
compulsory recruits, and greater budget needs for training.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                         7
Draft Negative

                         EXTENSION #4 – DRAFT = CASUALTIES


Robert Scales, Ret general, former commandant of the Army War College, Time Magazine, 1-5-2004

A return to the draft is a very bad idea whose time passed with the world wars, Korea and Vietnam. These wars were
tragically wasteful because in large measure they were fought with drafted soldiers. Drafted soldiers are far more
likely to die in combat than long-service professionals. Military leaders know from painful experience that it takes
years to produce a fully competent combat soldier. They also know that older soldiers live longer in combat.
Drafting teenagers and committing them to combat within only a year of enlistment will create an Army of
amateurs. Our Army in particular has a sad history of committing to battle men who are too young and
inexperienced to have much hope of surviving against a hardened and skillful enemy. Drafted units can be kept
together for only a short time and invariably march to war as random collections of strangers. Our soldiers
performed so superbly in Iraq because they were seasoned. Good soldiers, like good wine, can be produced only
with careful cultivation and patient aging. Unfortunately, amateur armies learn to fight only by fighting. Inevitably,
the cost of that education is too horrific for the American people to bear.


Max Friedman, Winston-Salem Journal (Winston Salem, NC) July 5, 2004

Jehn also points out that, since the military has adopted an all-volunteer force, the quality of our troops has risen
significantly. Not only are our troops, on average, more educated, but there are also fewer discipline problems,
greater retention (resulting in greater experience) and a much greater overall strength in versatility and ability. A
draft would result in a loss of these excellent statistics, and, more important, because of the reduced experience that
troops would have, casualties on the battlefield would rise. The best determinant of survival on the battlefield is
experience, just as experience is the best determinant of success in any job. Inexperienced troops and a dangerous
battleground do not mix.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                                                  8
Draft Negative

                       EXTENSION #4 – CASUALTIES = WITHDRAWAL


Eichenberg 05 [Richard C., Prof of PoliSci @ Tufts, ―Victory Has Many Friends,‖ International Security,
Summer 2005, ln]
Although previous studies have examined U.S. public support for the use of military force in particular historical cases, and have even made
limited comparisons among cases, a full comparison of a large number of historical episodes in which the United States contemplated, threatened,
or actually used military force has been missing. An analysis of U.S. public support for the use of military force in twenty-two historical episodes
from the early 1980s through the Iraq war and occupation (2003-05) underscores the continuing relevance of Bruce Jentleson's principal policy
objectives framework: the objective for which military force is used is an important determinant of the base level of public support. The U.S.
public supports restraining aggressive adversaries, but it is leery of involvement in civil-war situations. Although the
objective of the mission strongly conditions this base level of support, the public is also sensitive to the relative risk of different
military actions; to the prospect of civilian or military casualties; to multilateral participation in the mission; and to the
likelihood of success or failure of the mission. These results suggest that support for U.S. military involvement in Iraq is
unlikely to increase; indeed, given the ongoing civil strife in Iraq, continuing casualties, and substantial disagreement about the prospects
for success, the public's support is likely to remain low or even decline.


The Guardian 06 [5-15, ln]
According to a morgue report, last month sectarian fighting claimed 1,100 Iraqi lives in Baghdad alone. Meanwhile, the death toll of US
soldiers has risen to roughly three a day - back to the higher levels of last year. According to a Pew poll in March, half of
Americans favour immediate troop withdrawal and less than a third approve of the way Bush is handling the war. In the UK, a
Newsnight poll showed 60% believed that the invasion of Iraq was a mistake.


Mueller 05 [John, foreign policy guru, ―The Iraq Syndrome,‖ Foreign Affairs, Dec., ln]
American troops have been sent into harm's way many times since 1945, but in only three cases -- Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq – have they been
drawn into sustained ground combat and suffered more than 300 deaths in action. American public opinion became a key factor in all
three wars, and in each one there has been a simple association: as casualties mount, support decreases . Broad enthusiasm at the
outset invariably erodes. The only thing remarkable about the current war in Iraq is how precipitously American public support has dropped off.
Casualty for casualty, support has declined far more quickly than it did during either the Korean War or the Vietnam War. And if
history is any indication, there is little the Bush administration can do to reverse this decline.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                         9
Draft Negative

                            EXTENSION #5 – LOW TROOP QUALITY
Louis Caldera, former secretary of the army, 2004
        ―Should the draft be reinstated?‖ Time. Dec. 29, 2003-Jan 5,2004. vol. 162, iss. 26/1; p.101 proquest

Talk about reinstating the draft is more about nostalgia for a time when military service was perceived to be a near
universal and often beneficial rite of passage for young men in our country than it is about keeping our military at
full strength. Given the success of the all-volunteer force in manning today's smaller and more highly skilled
military, a return to a large, general draft is neither necessary nor desirable for maintaining U.S. military
effectiveness. Worries about whether the military can attract enough recruits are unfounded. Unless the U.S. is
going to prohibit anyone from volunteering or being recruited and only swear in draftees, the number of slots that
would need to be filled by a draft would be very small indeed. How fair would any draft be that asked only a few
thousand high school graduates out of the millions of eligible men and women to serve each year? Attempts to
reinstate the draft could tear the nation apart for zero gain-and possibly a net degradation in military effectiveness.
Instead of honoring the diverse Americans serving in the ranks today, draft supporters devalue their patriotism and
commitment. They fail to acknowledge that today's all-volunteer military recruits only motivated, trainable people
who, by definition, have other options but who choose to stay in the military because they find satisfaction in
serving their country. What draft supporters should be asking is, How can we challenge every young American to
ask "Whose responsibility is it to serve if not mine?"

Cindy Williams, Principal Research Scientist in the Security Studies Program at the MIT 2004
         Government Executive vol 36, iss 16 pg 74, Sept 15, Forget the Draft, Proquest

Structural ills are best treated by structural remedies. The nation must find a way to bring greater variability to
military pay, allowing the services to pay competitive wages. The Defense Department and Congress should work
together to improve bonuses for people in critical, understaffed occupations. New bonuses could be offset in the
budget by minimizing across-the-board raises that fuel the structural imbalances. Over the longer term, they should
work toward a more flexible pay structure that accounts for differences among occupations. In addition, work should
begin now to develop a less rigid military retirement system with earlier vesting opportunities and greater variation
by military occupation. Bringing back the draft could help populate the lowest ranks with young, inexperienced
recruits, but America's military power depends on well-trained professionals serving in the right jobs. Filling the
ranks to meet our future needs requires structural reform, not a new draft.

James Carafano senior research fellow in defense at The Heritage Foundation, 2004., May 3, 2004, page 3, Draft Reinstatement Is a Bad

Plus, we should be wary of those who urge us to scrap the all-volunteer military force that has served this nation
well for three decades. Nearly every expert who studies the issue concludes that all-volunteer -- or professional --
militaries perform more efficiently, more bravely and with less corruption and other breakdowns than conscripts.
The U.S. military stands as a shining example of this. Our all-volunteer service is the most skilled, disciplined and
motivated force on the planet. From the jungles of Panama to the sands of Iraq to the skies over Kosovo and the
mountains of Afghanistan, our military has performed nearly flawlessly over the last 30 years. Abandoning this --
disrupting this professional force -- makes no sense.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                            10
Draft Negative

                             EXTENSION #5 – LOW TROOP QUALITY

An all Volunteer Force empirically performs more effectively than a drafted force

James Carafano 2004 Draft Reinstatement Is a Bad Idea, The Heritage Foundation May 3, 2004

    Plus, we should be wary of those who urge us to scrap the all-volunteer military force that has served this
    nation well for three decades. Nearly every expert who studies the issue concludes that all-volunteer -- or
    professional -- militaries perform more efficiently, more bravely and with less corruption and other
    breakdowns than conscripts. The U.S. military stands as a shining example of this. Our all-volunteer service
    is the most skilled, disciplined and motivated force on the planet. From the jungles of Panama to the sands of
    Iraq to the skies over Kosovo and the mountains of Afghanistan, our military has performed nearly flawlessly
    over the last 30 years. Abandoning this -- disrupting this professional force -- makes no sense. The United
    States has resisted a draft for most of its history because the draft is not part of our tradition. Americans view
    voluntary military service as a hallmark of democracy.

Michael O’ Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, October 13, 2004
          Los Angeles Times, Nobody Wants a Draft, but What if We Need One,

And almost all policy arguments work against the draft too. Today we have a truly professional military that
performs far better than do conscription forces. The typical soldier, Marine, sailor, airman or airwoman today has
five or more years of experience, high aptitude, a high school degree and quite possibly some college education,
technical skills and a real commitment to the armed forces.


Cindy Williams, Principal Research Scientist in the Security Studies Program at MIT, 2004
          Government Executive vol 36, iss 16 pg 74, Sept 15, Forget the Draft, Proquest

Some members of Congress have jumped to the conclusion that the United States should restore conscription. But
returning to the draft is the wrong answer. The military faces people problems that are deeper and more serious than
the troop shortages, but the problems can and should be solved in the context of the all-volunteer force. Even if the
nation decided to double the number of active-duty troops in deployable Army units (currently about 300,000), it
could do so by adding military recruiters and increasing the bonuses paid to individuals when they join or re-enlist.
Moreover, bringing back conscription would greatly compound discipline problems and increase turnover, straining
the training system and potentially compromising military outcomes. A draft would do nothing to help the Defense
Department solve its more serious military personnel problems. Indeed, the biggest problem the department faces is
not that it lacks people, but that it has the wrong people for many of its jobs. In recent years, the services were
overstaffed in about 40 percent of their occupations, even as they suffered shortages in about 30 percent. True, the
Army is short of infantry and military police, but it has temporary authority to increase its ranks by 30,000 troops.
By contrast, the Air Force is overstaffed by Z4,ooo members and the Navy wants to thin its ranks by 25,000 sailors.
Both the Navy and the Air Force are short-staffed in critical skills such as electronic systems repair and some
information specialties, and they have too many people in mundane occupations.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                 11
Draft Negative

                              AT: UNILATERAL AGGRESSION


Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a Senior Adviser to the Center for Defense
Information, ―Debating the Draft‖ PBS, April 8, 19 99 (

PHIL PONCE: Joseph Califano is with us now, along with Lawrence Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense during
the Reagan administration and now a vice president at the Council on Foreign Relations. Gentlemen, welcome. Mr.
Korb, let's pick up on that point that Mr. Califano made in his op/ed piece. Does an all-volunteer force make it
easier for the president to lead troops into war and into other dangerous peacekeeping missions? LAWRENCE
KORB: Absolutely not. Even though we switched to a voluntary military in the early 70's, Americans are still very
concerned about casualties. Look at what happened in Somalia when 18 Americans were killed; the American
people, their elected representatives demanded that we get out of the operation. Ironically, during the War in
Vietnam that Secretary Califano was talking about we had conscription, and yet, we had 50,000 Americans died in a
very, very flawed military operation.


Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at Cato, ―Feeling a Draft?‖ March/April 19 99

Some people are concerned that a volunteer military can become a Praetorian Guard that is more dangerous than an
army drawn from the whole people. It can be used for undemocratic purposes. But our history disproves this
argument. The Vietnam War showed how a conscription apparatus run by the government can be maintained even in
the face of an increasingly unpopular war. It took years of protests to stop the draft because the costs were
immediately felt by 18-, 19-, 20-year-olds as opposed to the entire society.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                                      12
Draft Negative

                                                   IRAN FRONTLINE


Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow Middle East Studies Council On Foreign Relations, Federal Document Clearing
House, June 8, 2006 lexis

The lessons of the Operation Iraqi Freedom are that the United States was ultimately neither deterred by Iraq's large
conventional army nor by the perception that Saddam possessed chemical weapons. In the meantime, the Korean
peninsula offers its own tantalizing lessons, namely the possession of nuclear capability not only negates the
American danger but also generate potential economic and security benefits. The fact that the very hawkish Bush
administration has reversed its policy of not negotiating with Iran and is contemplating its own package of
incentives reveals the bargaining value of the nuclear program. As Iran plots its nuclear strategy, the American and
European demands that it relinquish its fuel-cycle aspirations, granted to it by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), have aroused an intense nationalistic uproar. As a country that has historically been the subject of foreign
intervention and the imposition of various capitulation treaties, Iran is inordinately sensitive of its national
prerogatives and sovereign rights. The new rulers of Iran believe they are being challenged not because of their
provocations and previous treaty violations, but because of superpower bullying. In a peculiar manner, the nuclear
program and Iran's national identity have become fused in the imagination of the hardliners. To stand against an
impudent America is to validate one's revolutionary ardor and sense of nationalism. It is time to confront the reality
that the Middle East is likely to feature an Iran with a robust nuclear infrastructure. Through imaginative multilateral
diplomacy, and provision of a clever mixture of penalties and incentives, it is perhaps possible to prevent Iran from
crossing the nuclear threshold and assembling a weapon, but the notion of complete disarmament is increasingly


Caroline Ziemke, Research Staff Member at IDA, ―The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A
Counterproliferation Perspective‖ The Coming Crisis, ed. Utgoff       2000     p. 114

What if the Iranian porcupine grows nuclear quills? Three elements of the Iranian myth should figure prominently in any attempt
to counter an Iranian nuclear strategy. First, Iran believes it is the center of the universe and the eventual seat of paradise; hence,
it is culturally and morally stronger than any of its adversaries, especially the corrupt West. Moreover, its Zoroastrian and Shi’a
traditions instill in Iran the confidence that it is destined, sooner or later, to defeat the forces of evil through the power of its
righteousness and the favor of God. Therefore, it is not necessary or even desirable to pursue extremely risky strategies,
especially ones in which the stakes are high (survival) and the chances of prevailing nearly nonexistent. Second, Iran will assume
(as did Saddam Hussein) that the Great Satan does not have the mettle to stand up to pain and suffering – that the United States is
unlikely to risk significant casualties in any conflict with Iran. Third, Iran’s concept of ―victory‖ is driven by its sense of shame
over past foreign domination and the determination to defend its territorial, cultural, and religious integrity. It is not necessary
that Iran defeat its adversaries, merely that it prevent their violating Iran’s frontiers. Iran’s national myth will constrain its use of
nuclear weapons. Because it sees the United States as the Great Satan that operates without moral constraints and with the aim of
destroying the Islamic way of life, Iran has to assume that if it uses its nuclear weapons, the United States will not hesitate to
retaliate in kind. The Iranians also contend that Iranian lives are expendable in the U.S. view, as demonstrated in its failure to
condemn Iraqi gas attacks against Iran. Given these assumptions, Iran almost certainly will assume that U.S. retaliation would be
far greater that the degree of damage Iran could inflict on the United States, Saudi Arabia, or Israel. Similarly, Iran (like its Arab
neighbors) is acutely aware of Israel’s vast military superiority, and its ability and willingness to punish far in excess of any pain
Iran could inflict on Israel. Iran is also aware of Israel’s national myth: that it will fight to the last Israeli to defend its right to
exist and will be little constrained by international criticism.
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Draft Negative

                                             IRAN FRONTLINE


Dave Lindorff,, 11-3-2003 (

Purely in mechanical terms, a draft is a complicated and difficult thing to get off the ground. It would require an act
of Congress, first, and then the signature of the president. Young men are already required to register with the
Selective Service system, but if the bill were signed into law, it would still take half a year or more to get the new
troops into the system. Federal law would require the Selective Service to immediately set up a lottery and start
sending out induction notices. Local draft boards would have to evaluate them for medical problems, moral
objections and other issues like family crises, and hear the appeals of those who are resisting the draft.


Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, ―We
Can Live With a Nuclear Iran‖ New York Times, 2-27-2006

Cambridge, Mass. - THE intense concern about Iran's nuclear energy program reflects the judgment that, should it
turn to the production of weapons, an Iran with nuclear arms would gravely endanger the United States and the
world. An Iranian nuclear arsenal, policymakers fear, could touch off a regional arms race while emboldening
Tehran to undertake aggressive, even reckless, actions. But these outcomes are not inevitable, nor are they beyond
the capacity of the United States and its allies to defuse. Indeed, while it's seldom a positive thing when a new
nuclear power emerges, there is reason to believe that we could readily manage a nuclear Iran. A Middle Eastern
arms race is a frightening thought, but it is improbable. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, among its neighbors, only
Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey could conceivably muster the resources to follow suit. Israel is already a
nuclear power. Iranian weapons might coax the Israelis to go public with their arsenal and to draw up plans for the
use of such weapons in the event of an Iranian military threat. And if Israel disclosed its nuclear status, Egypt might
find it diplomatically difficult to forswear acquiring nuclear weapons, too. But Cairo depends on foreign assistance,
which would make Egypt vulnerable to the enormous international pressure it would most likely face to refrain from
joining an arms race. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has the money to acquire nuclear weapons and technology on the
black market, but possible suppliers are few and very closely watched. To develop the domestic scientific,
engineering and industrial base necessary to build a self-sustaining nuclear program would take Saudi Arabia years.
In the interim, the Saudis would need nuclear security guarantees from the United States or Europe, which would in
turn apply intense pressure on Riyadh not to develop its own arms. Finally, Turkey may have the resources to build
a nuclear weapon, but as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it relied on American nuclear
guarantees against the mighty Soviet Union throughout the cold war. There's no obvious reason to presume that
American guarantees would seem insufficient relative to Iran.
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Draft Negative

                                                  IRAN FRONTLINE


Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces and Resources Division of the ISA, ―The Specter of
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Proliferation‖ The Coming Crisis, 2000 p. 9
In Chapter 4, ―The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counterproliferation Perspective,‖ Caroline F. Ziemke
argues that every nation has a strategic personality that defines how it is disposed to behave toward other nations. Ziemke states
that this personality can be discerned by studying a nation’s public myth, the stories and themes it uses to illuminate for itself its
social and ethical norms and its collective identity. Thus, an understanding of a proliferator’s national myth may provide
important insights into why it might want nuclear weapons and the purposes to which it might put such weapons. Ziemke’s
reading of Iran’s national myth indicates that Iran is supremely confident of the superiority of its culture. It sees its troubled
history since the glory of the Persian Empire solely as the result of invasions and evil influences from the outside world.
Consistent with this, the United States, with its corrupting material culture and its decades of meddling in Iranian affairs, is seen
as the embodiment of foreign evil, the ―Great Satan.‖ Ziemke employs Iran’s national myth to interpret its foreign policy and
intentions for nuclear weapons. She argues that Iran wants most of all to win the respect that its superior culture deserves. It also
wants hegemonic influence over the Persian Gulf region, which requires that the United States leave, and it wants to be safe from
potential enemies, particularly Iraq. However, it is not interested in actually conquering its neighbors. Thus, Ziemke sees Iran
wanting nuclear weapons to inspire respect and fear, and as insurance against invasion, but not as backing for conventional
aggression. Ziemke also argues that Iran is very unlikely to risk the first use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its
allies unless it were about to be overwhelmed. Iran ―knows‖ the ―Great Satan‖ is perfectly willing to annihilate it in response to
any first use of nuclear weapons against the United States. Its national myth also points to a ruling elite that will not risk the
survival of the Iranian faithful, to whom it sees itself accountable.

New York Times 9-7-2005
A leading British research institute said Tuesday that Iran was at least five years away from producing sufficient material for ''a
single nuclear weapon,'' and that it could make one only if it chose to ignore international reaction and ''throw caution to the
wind.'' The researchers, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the conclusions were based on public sources of
information, including visits to nuclear sites arranged by Iranian authorities. ''Nevertheless,'' the institute's director, John
Chipman, told reporters, ''there remains a good deal that cannot be known for certain from the outside.'' Dr. Chipman presented
the report at a diplomatically delicate time. Iran angered Western negotiators by resuming limited uranium conversion at Isfahan
on Aug. 8, ending a suspension of nuclear activities agreed with the European Union last November. And on Sept. 19, the board
of the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency is to meet to consider the next step. Western nations, including the United States,
have threatened to refer Iran to the Security Council, where it could face an array of penalties over its nuclear policies. The
United States argues that Iran is using its program to further its ambitions to produce nuclear weapons, but Iran maintains that the
program has only peaceful purposes. The new report broadly concurs with one completed in May by American intelligence
agencies, which concluded that Iran was not expected to build a nuclear weapon before the next decade. The institute's report
suggests that Iran has two principal options to produce highly enriched weapons-grade uranium, one at a relatively small pilot
centrifuge at Natanz and the other at a planned industrial-scale centrifuge there, which might take more than a decade to build. ''If
Iran threw caution to the wind and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible without regard for international
reaction, it might be able to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this decade,'' and
then only if it overcame an array of technical difficulties, the report said. By contrast, ''if Teheran does not feel compelled to
acquire nuclear weapons urgently or judges that the risk of breaking out with a marginal capacity is too great, it could wait until it
completes the industrial-scale centrifuge plant at Natanz.'' While that might take more than 10 years, it would make it easier ''to
pursue covert enrichment options,'' the report said. It said Iran's ''ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium seems more
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                     15
Draft Negative



Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, ―Living With a Nuclear Iran‖
Survival, Autumn 1999

How might Iran’s neighbours respond to a nuclear break-out? They would have four basic options: -tension-
reduction and confidence-buildings measures; -accommodation or appeasement; -forge alliances with nuclear
powers to reap the benfits of extended deterrence; or –acquire an independent retaliatory capability (not necessarily
nuclear). Israel would probably send reassuring messages to Iran via third parties, as Jerusalem did when tensions
with Iraq rose during 1989-90 in response to Baghdad’s fears of an Israeli attack on its WMD facilities. Israel would
also probably take steps to reduce further the increasingly thin veneer of ambiguity still surrounding its own nuclear
capabilities, while seeking to deepen military cooperation with the US. Most of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) states would probably opt for a mixture of approaches. Kuwait, Qatar and Oman – whose relationship with
Tehran in recent years has been correct, if not cordial – might put priority on improving relations with Tehran, while
maintaining strong security links with the US as an insurance policy. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
– whose relationship with Tehran has been strained – might put priority on deepening their security relationship with
the US, while nonetheless cautiously seeking to improve relations with Tehran. Saudi Arabia – which currently is in
the process of mending relations with Tehran – is likely to move forward aggressively on parallel tracks, further
intensifying contacts with Tehran, while enhancing security cooperation with the US. And several of these countries
might respond by developing a retaliatory capability and CBW – if they are not trying to do so already.
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Draft Negative

                                     AT: RACISM ADVANTAGE


Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow at Brookings, Japan Times, 1-29-2003 (

Fourth, there is not an excessive representation of minorities in today's armed forces. Yes, African Americans make
up a larger share of the Army than of the population as a whole, for example. But the U.S. military is one of the best
integrated and most equitable institutions in the country. The country's top officers have recently included an
African American, a Polish American and a Japanese American. As a recent excellent article in USA Today showed,
minorities do not make up a disproportionate share of frontline combat forces either. If anything, it is the rural white
man, not the minority individual, who holds that latter job. Fifth, the U.S. military provides good opportunities and
good training for minorities and for disadvantaged members of society. We should not take that opportunity away
from those who really want it in an effort to somehow make the armed forces more diverse. The recruiting ads don't
lie—the military is a fantastic place to learn computer skills, electronic skills, mechanics and other technical skills,
as well as leadership and teamwork.


Victor Hanson, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, National Review, July 4, 2005

The problem most often raised, however, is not so much the cost or size of our military, but rather the
disproportionate sacrifice of the underprivileged. Yet statistics of combat fatalities from Iraq are kept current, and
the most recent numbers suggest that the continual cries of unfairness are not substantiated by hard data. Indeed, the
claim is eerily similar to the past hysteria that blacks and Latinos died in disproportionate numbers in Southeast
Asia, when, in fact, statistics confirmed that they did not. Data on combat deaths in Iraq as of March 2005 surprised
critics of the war. Contrary to the perception that citizen soldiers are bearing an inordinate portion of the overall
burden, National Guardsmen constitute about 24 percent of all military personnel but accounted for 16 percent of
those lost in Iraq. Some 95 percent of the fatalities had high-school diplomas, though only 85 percent of all
Americans have finished high school. Blacks and Latinos made up 10.9 and 11.5 percent of the dead, respectively
— about their same percentages in the general population, but in the case of blacks less than the 18.6 percent
currently serving in the military. Twenty-nine percent of those who died attended high schools in poverty-stricken
areas, versus about a 30 percent poverty rate for all high-school graduates. Seventy percent of those lost were white
men, although they currently make up only about a third of the U.S. population.
Georgia Novice Packet                                                                                                    17
Draft Negative



Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at Cato, Time Magazine, January 5, 2004

America deploys the most powerful military on earth because its soldiers freely choose to serve. Today's military is
picky. In 2003 more than 9 of 10 enlistees had a high school diploma. The military takes virtually no one who
doesn't score in the top three of five categories of the Armed Forces Qualification Test. Equally important, the all-
volunteer force (AVF) is staffed by soldiers who want to be there. Draft advocates want "citizen soldiers." But 4
million young people turn 18 every year, while the military inducted 185,000 recruits in 2003. A system that took
just 5% of those eligible would be highly arbitrary. The worst lie told by conscription advocates about the AVF is
that it is an underclass military. Overrepresentation of blacks is modest; Hispanics are actually underrepresented.
While there may be few sons and daughters of Wall Street in uniform, the military is an overwhelmingly middle-
class force. The most obvious reason to maintain the AVF is practical: it's the best way to raise the world's finest
military. What sets American society apart from totalitarian hellholes like Saddam Hussein's Iraq is its dedication to
individual liberty. Conscription sacrifices the very values we are supposed to be defending.


Counterpunch, Decmber 31, 2002
          Ron Jacobs, Draft Beer, Not Kids,

As my friend and colleague Jay Moore likes to point out in his History of the Sixties course at the University of Vermont, the
draft was/is not only about putting men in the military. It is also about maintaining the stratification of society based on society's
current economic needs. Prior to 1969, the military draft consistently deferred men who were considered to be "college material."
In addition those in college whose studies might have been useful to the war machine-say in the areas of technology and science-
were granted deferments. This policy was called channeling and was defended as being in the national interest. Its converse-the
channeling of men who weren't considered "college material" to the front lines, was by default, also considered to be in the
national interest. After 1969, when the national draft lottery was introduced in the name of supposed fairness, the policy of
channeling was continued via the AFQT. Those young men whose numbers were drawn who were sent to the front lines were
more likely to have scored lower on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT). Those young men whose numbers were drawn
who scored higher, usually because they had received a better education, were assigned to units more likely to be out of harm's
way, probably in another part of the world. As any observer of the educational system in the U.S. knows, neighborhoods with
more money usually have better schools. Plus, many wealthy families often send their children to private schools. This, of course,
usually provides even stupid rich children with a better education than that received by their peers in poor and working-class
school districts.
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Draft Negative

                                          AT: RACISM ADVANTAGE


John Judge, military high school worker in DC, September 27, 2003
         Letter to Rangel on the Draft,

5. This is perhaps my most telling point. Even if you could somehow pass a law that would bring a truly diverse and
demographically representative cross-section of the population to the gate of the US military and force them to serve
(and I would argue you cannot), they will be entering the most structured racist, classist and sexist institution in the
society. Their placement, job assignments, rank and treatment will reflect the biases of the greater society in an even
more dramatic way. The front lines of Vietnam were predominantly Black and Hispanic with a few white officers.
This has not changed substantially, though women and white troops make up more of the combat support ranks
nowadays. Fearing the same response that the Vietnam war brought from troops of color near its end, GI's massed
at the border of Kuwait during the first Gulf war were never issued live rounds for their weapons until they day they
actually engaged into Kuwait to fight the Iraq forces. The educated, well to do sons and daughters of Congress will
not be serving on the front lines of combat, but would be afforded jobs in intelligence and other work far from actual
war zones. The ASVAB test used to determine every enlisted member's MOS (military occupation specialty) has
been evaluated by educational testing experts who say it is both race and gender biased. Thus, even if you could
draft in a diverse swath of society, the roles they would play and the burdens they would face would remain
essentially the same in my view.

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