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WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg Index Iran Iran Advantage: 1AC ................................................................................................................... 4 A2 Iran Not Space Power ............................................................................................................. 6 A2 Iran Not Space Power ............................................................................................................. 7 China China Advantage: 1AC Cards ..................................................................................................... 8 Asteroids Asteroid Advantage: 1AC .......................................................................................................... 11 Asteroid Adv: 2AC ...................................................................................................................... 13 Russia Russia Advantage ........................................................................................................................ 14 2AC Russia .................................................................................................................................. 16 Economy Economy Advantage: 1AC ......................................................................................................... 17 Aerospace Adv. 1AC ................................................................................................................... 23 Plan Solves Aerospace ................................................................................................................ 25 Aerospace Down .......................................................................................................................... 26 Aerospace K2 Heg ....................................................................................................................... 28 Terrorism Terrorism- SW k2 Solve terror ................................................................................................. 30 Terrorism-Space k2 solve ........................................................................................................... 31 Terrorism- Space Weapons k2 Stop Attacks............................................................................ 32 Terrorism- Terrorists attack! .................................................................................................... 33 **Space Weapons Good** A2 Accidents ................................................................................................................................ 34 A2 Destablizing............................................................................................................................ 35 A2 Political Backlash .................................................................................................................. 37 WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg A2 Arms Races ............................................................................................................................ 38 Space Weapons K2 Space Deterence......................................................................................... 40 A2 OST prevents weapons ......................................................................................................... 41 A2 Accidents ................................................................................................................................ 42 A2 Escalation/Miscal .................................................................................................................. 43 Solvency-SW Advantages ........................................................................................................... 44 Solvency-SW =/= Confusion for WMDs ................................................................................... 45 Solvency-Advantages .................................................................................................................. 46 Solvency-SW k2 airpower .......................................................................................................... 47 WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg ***Negative*** A2 Aerospace Advantage ........................................................................................................... 48 A2 Aerospace Advantage ........................................................................................................... 49 A2 Iran Advantage...................................................................................................................... 50 A2 Iran Advantage...................................................................................................................... 51 A2 China Advantage ................................................................................................................... 52 A2 Asteroid Advantage............................................................................................................... 53 A2 Asteroid Advantage............................................................................................................... 54 A2 Russia Advantage .................................................................................................................. 55 A2 Terrorism Advantage ........................................................................................................... 56 **Space Weapons Bad** Accidents ...................................................................................................................................... 57 Micalculation ............................................................................................................................... 58 International relations ................................................................................................................ 59 WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg Iran Advantage: 1AC Advantage ____ is Iran Iranian satellite launch shows Iran‘s expanding technology in space and weapons Mazol 09 (James, a research associate at the George C Marshall Institute, February 2009, ―Persia in Space: Implications for U.S. National Security‖, Marshall Institute) The state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that Iran successfully launched a Safir-2 rocket carrying an Omid research and telecommunications satellite into orbit on February 2.1 The Omid satellite‘s capabilities are not as troubling as the advanced rocket system used to deliver the Iranian Sputnik into space. Indeed, the former head of Israel‘s space program, Isaac Ben-Israel described the Omid as ―quite primitive‖ and ―not so much a satellite as a box that can collect data.‖2 The Safir rocket that propelled the Omid through the atmosphere is a much more serious concern for U.S. national security. Iran has now joined the elite ranks of space-faring nations. The launch‘s timing, of course, coincided with the 30th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution‘s triumph in Tehran and just days before the U.N.‘s Security Council members plus Germany met in Frankfurt to discuss Iran‘s uranium enrichment program. Iran first orbited a satellite in 2005, but aboard a Russian rocket. This 3 indigenous launch shows Iran‘s growing technical capacity and mastery of ballistic missiles. The Iranian government said ―promoting the national space industry‖ remains the main objective of its indigenous space program. Iranian President Ahmadinejad told state television, ―We need [space-related] 4 science for friendship, brotherhood, and justice.‖5 America should be skeptical: Iran can and probably is using space-related science to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying nuclear payloads. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) expressed similar concerns after confirming Iran‘s claims. A spokesman said: ―The mere fact that this launch involves dual-purpose capabilities is that‘s used to…propel this satellite into space is one that could also what causes concern to us in this government. The technology be used to propel long-range ballistic missiles.‖ A newly space-faring Iran only provides further impetus for constructing the comprehensive, 6 multi-layered missile defense system America has begun building in Europe and at home. The Safir-2 is a two- (or possibly three-) staged liquid-propulsion rocket. Safir-2 is ―a product of nearly 20 years of ballistic missile cooperation between Iran and North Israeli experts stated the Korea, whose No-Dong served as the baseline for Tehran‘s Shihab [or Shahab] series.‖ 7 February 2‘s launch represents a significant advance for Iran‘s space program; an earlier attempt to test the Safir-2‘s suborbital capabilities failed in August 2008. The Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) probably powers the Safir‘s initial boost before an additional propulsion system takes over. Iran‘s successful Shahab-3 test in July 2008 was confirmed by western intelligence services, despite Tehran‘s awkward choice to manipulate official photographs of the test.8 Iran advances in technology lead to weapons being used against US Mazol 09 (James, a research associate at the George C Marshall Institute, February 2009, ―Persia in Space: Implications for U.S. National Security‖, Marshall Institute) The Safir-2 vehicle significantly increases the Shahab-3‘s 1200 kilometer (km) range. If the Iranians can reach low earth orbit (LEO), they are on track to build an ICBM. Last November, Iran improved its effective targeting range by demonstrating the two-stage Sajjil intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). In contrast to the liquid-fueled Shahab, the solid-fueled Sajjil is more mobile and less susceptible to preemptive strikes.9 ran could utilize its space- launch capability in other ways besides building long-range ballistic missiles to threaten the U.S. and its friends and allies. Tehran might mimic the Chinese and develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. The ASAT presents a challenge to the American military‘s ―Achilles heel: its space based assets and their related ground installations.‖ On January 11, 2007, the Chinese military destroyed an aging 10 weather satellite in LEO using an MRBM. The ballistic missile‘s ―kill vehicle‖ collided with the satellite at an altitude of 864 kilometers. The Chinese realize both the importance and vulnerability of American military space assets. One People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) analyst concluded U.S. military space assets constitute its ―soft ribs‖ and ―for countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the U.S. pace system may be an irresistible may take the necessary steps, including developing a kinetic kill vehicle, to build up an and most tempting choice.‖11 Iran ASAT program (perhaps, with Chinese assistance). Also, Iran could punch America‘s soft ribs by launching an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) attack in space. In 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission warned that the United States could face a ―space Pearl Harbor.‖12 The consequences of a space Pearl Harbor would be particularly harmful to the United States given our dependence on space. As space defense analyst Robert Butterworth notes: ―Far more than any other country, the U.S. depends on space for national and tactical intelligence, military operations, and civil and commercial benefits. A ‗scorched space‘ attack…would hurt the U.S. most of all.‖ This option is particularly salient in light of Iranian reluctance to suspend its nuclear program. Iran could elect to detonate a nuclear weapon (or multiple 13 weapons) in space, causing an EMP. In this worst-case-scenario, the mere ability to wreak havoc on U.S. satellites in orbit affords the Iranians significant leverage. The Claremont Institute‘s Brian Kennedy reminds us, ―Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP.‖14 WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg Iran Advantage: 1AC Iranian space attack destroys US space assets Mazol 09 (James, a research associate at the George C Marshall Institute, February 2009, ―Persia in Space: Implications for U.S. National Security‖, Marshall Institute) In 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission warned that the United States could face a ―space Pearl Harbor.‖12 The consequences of a space Pearl Harbor would be particularly harmful to the United States given our dependence on space. As space defense analyst Robert Butterworth notes: ―Far more than any other country, the U.S. depends on space for national and tactical intelligence, military operations, and civil and commercial benefits. A ‗scorched space‘ attack…would hurt the U.S. most of all.‖13 This option is particularly salient in light of Iranian reluctance to suspend its nuclear program. Iran could elect to detonate a nuclear weapon (or multiple weapons) in space, causing an EMP. In this worst-case-scenario, the mere ability to wreak havoc on U.S. satellites in orbit affords the Iranians significant leverage. The Claremont Institute‘s Brian Kennedy reminds us, ―Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP.‖14 A separate Commission, specifically designed to assess the EMP threat, concluded a space-based EMP detonation would probably produce ―widespread and long-lasting disruption and damage to the critical infrastructures that underpin the fabric of U.S. society.‖15 The gamma rays from the explosion would obliterate most electronic devices and, more importantly, shut down the transformer stations distributing power throughout the country. Communication channels, lights, and water treatment stations would cease operation, among many other critical services reliant on electricity.16 Such an attack would have ―longterm catastrophic consequences.‖17 Rather than exploding the nuclear warhead in space, the Iranians could conceivably forgo space and fly an ICBM over the United States before detonating the warhead. The aforementioned EMP Commission examined the consequences of a high-altitude, terrestrial EMP attack over the continental U.S. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, EMP Commission Chairman William Graham said such an explosion would cause ―unprecedented cascading failures of major infrastructures.‖ 18 Systemic failures in interdependent infrastructure sectors (e.g., transportation, emergency services, finance and banking, and water delivery) might become ―mutually reinforcing until at some point the degradation of infrastructure could have irreversible effects on the country‘s ability to support its population.‖ 19 Chairman Graham also discussed the Iranian EMP threat in his testimony before Congress: Space Assets Key to Economy Lord 05 (Lance W, retired four-star general in US Air Force, September 2005, Why America Needs Space: The Prerequisites for Success, spacedebate.org) For many Americans, the most visible images of space are the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. These programs have accomplished amazing things and have greatly contributed to our quality of life. However, that's just the tip of the iceberg. Most of what goes on in space is transparent to the average person. We do not see space at the Automatic Teller Machine or at the checkout counter in the supermarket, but it is there. Precise timing signals from the Global Positioning System synchronize financial transactions, making them possible. Most people probably don't think about space when they are cooking dinner, but it plays a role there too. Farmers use space assets to map the mineral and moisture content of their fields. The cost savings farmers achieve are then passed to consumers. Similarly, it takes space capabilities to get accurate weather forecasts and provide seamless world-wide communication connectivity. In total, today's space industry exceeds $100 billion annually world-wide, and is projected to exceed $150 billion per year by 2010. We could do without space capabilities, but only if we are willing to step back in time about 30 years Global nuclear war Mead 92 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy – Council on Foreign Relations, New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer, p. 30) The failure to develop an international system to hedge against the possibility of worldwide depression- will open their eyes to their folly. Hundreds of millions-billions-of people around the world have pinned their hopes on the international market economy. They and their leaders have embraced market principles-and drawn closer to the West-because they believe that our system can work for them. But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates, or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia. China. India-these countries with their billions of people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to world order than Germany and Japan did in the 1930's. WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg A2 Iran Not Space Power Iran will be one of the top space powers BBC 11 (February 22, 2011, Iran to become major aerospace power in world-official, lexisnexis.com) Tehran, 22 February: Iran will turn into one of the three major aerospace powers in the world by 2025, said the deputy defence minister here on Tuesday [22 February]. Talking to IRNA, Ebrahim Mahmudzadeh added that the four satellites 'Fajr', 'Zafar', 'Rasad' and 'Amir Kabir' were unveiled in an exhibition featuring Iran's capabilities in the field of aerospace several days ago. He also said that Fajr Satellite will be sent to space earlier next year (April). This is the second satellite that has totally been built within the country, besides Omid Satellite. Mahmudzadeh, also managing director of Iran Electronic Industries Company (SaIran), further noted that the first satellite launched into space by Iran was Sina Satellite which was jointly built by Iran and Russia. He also said that launching satellites into space as a long-term plan started since President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad came in office. Fajr Satellite is a fully professional one based on the technology used in Omid Satellite, he said, noting that it was in space for 90 days and rotated round the Earth 1200 times. Iran is able to obtain ASAT technology to use against US space assets Schendzielos 8 (Kurt, US Air Force Major, 2008, Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485553&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Currently there is no public evidence that Iran possesses any disruptive or destructive ASAT capability. Iran is also not expected to indigenously produce any such system in the foreseeable future.65 The concern, however, is a marginalized and threatened Iran would not necessarily have to domestically produce its own ASAT system. It is not unreasonable to suspect that disruptive or destructive ASAT technology could be proliferated to Iran by sympathetic nations seeking to reap the benefits of Iran degrading U.S. space dominance while simultaneously enjoying plausible deniability of the act. China is a perfect candidate for that role. Iran has been working closely with North Korea to help accelerate the Iranian space program capabilities.66 It is conceivable that Iran could obtain North Korean destructive ASAT technology or use North Korea as a broker to obtain Chinese destructive ASAT technology. Iran desires to increase its prestige throughout the Middle East. It is clearly working on establishing a space presence to obtain that goal.67 Iran is very aware of the advantage provided by space exploitation. It has built and orbited its own remote-sensing satellite and is working to produce a domestic launch capability.68 Iran has countered Voice of America signals being broadcast via satellite into Tehran using ground-based electronic warfare jamming techniques which is one of the first steps toward producing an OCS capability. WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg A2 Iran Not Space Power Iranian launch shows possibility of EMP desires Clark 9 (Colin, editor of DoDBuzz and former foreign correspondent, February 4th, 2009, ―Iran Launch Could Mean EMP Weapon Iran, after a decade of trying to develop space capabilities, today joined the small club of countries able to build and launch a satellite into orbit. In and of itself, the Iranian technological success worries American and other countries national security experts because it places Iran much closer to being able to deliver a nuclear warhead against an enemy. But there is another reason American military and national security officials are so worried: in at least two earlier ballistic missile launches, the Iranians launched in ways that appear they were designed to optimize an EMP burst, according to a Pentagon source with detailed knowledge of the Iranians efforts and of space technology. Iran launched the satellite on the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the clerical state, a fact noted by its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as he declared the countrys success. EMP stands for electro-magnetic pulse and it is one byproduct of a nuclear blast. EMP destroys power sources, communication capabilities and would cripple or destroy the abilities of most satellites to function. A percentage of military communication and other satellites are hardened against EMP but the gravest effect would be on the ground, the space expert said. As bad as the space part of this is, that is pretty bad, but the ground part of it is much, much worse. Effectively, whoever was subjected to an EMP burst would be shoved back to an agricultural state. Few civilian assets such as power grids, generators, telephone systems and commercial communications satellites are hardened against EMP. A 2007 report by the congressionally-mandated Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack detailed the devastation that could result from a relatively unsophisticated EMP strike. It also detailed how EMP works and what measures the U.S. government might take to reduce the risk from it. One independent study, Initial Assessment of Electromagnetic Pulse Impact Upon Baltimore-Washington-Richmond Region, says a Scud-type missile launched from a small ship 200 miles off our coast could cause up to $771 billion in damage, equal to 7% of gross domestic product. This is part of the reason why the State Department has expressed great concern about the development. Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said the satellite launch appeared to indicate Iran was working on a ballistic missile capable of increasingly long range. Combine a long-range ICBM with a nuclear payload and you get a new member of an even smaller club, the countries such as the U.S., Russia, China, France and Britain who can play the deadly serious global strategic game of hitting places around the globe with nuclear weapons WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg China Advantage: 1AC Cards Advantage ___ is China China pursuing further space weapons Schendzielos 8 (Kurt, US Air Force Major, 2008, Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485553&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Chinese research exploring various ASAT technologies is publically prolific. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission reported to Congress in 2007 that, ―Using open source material, the commission's researchers found 30 Chinese ASAT concepts have been formulated by the People's Liberation Army. They include several involving ‗covert deployment of a sophisticated anti-satellite weapons system to be used against the U.S. in a surprise manner.‘‖84 The January 2007 direct-ascent kinetic ASAT demonstration conducted by China destroying their own LEO weather satellite is the most visible and notable measure of their progress in these endeavors.85 But China is hardly content with only one means to destroy or disrupt satellites. The Office of the Secretary of Defense concluded in a 2007 report to Congress that, ―In addition to the direct ascent ASAT program demonstrated in January 2007, China is also developing other technologies and concepts for kinetic (hit-to-kill) weapons and directed-energy (e.g., lasers and radio frequency) weapons for ASAT missions.‖86 China has recently shown a great deal of interest in the evolving field of microsatellites which may offer a vast array of ASAT options including the concept of space mines or sleeper co-orbital ASATs. Chinese space dominance makes war inevitable, only US weaponization can deter conflict Tellis 7 (Ashley: Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, former Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, ―China's Military Space Strategy,‖ Survival 49:3 p41-72, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf) Finally, the growing Chinese capability for space warfare implies that a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait would entail serious deterrence and crisis instabilities. If such a clash were to compel Beijing to attack US space systems at the beginning of a war, the very prospect of such a 'space Pearl Harbor'94 could, in turn, provoke the United States to contemplate pre-emptive attacks or horizontal escalation on the Chinese mainland. Such outcomes would be particularly likely in a conflict in the next decade, before Washington has the opportunity to invest fully in redundant space capabilities. Already, US Strategic Command officials have publicly signaled that conventionally armed Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles would be appropriate weapons for executing the prompt strikes that might become necessary in such a contingency.95 Such attacks, even if employing only conventional warheads, on space launch sites, sensor nodes and command and control installations on the Chinese mainland could well be perceived as a precursor to an all-out war. It would be difficult for all sides to limit the intensification of such a conflict, even without the added complications of accidents and further misperception.96 *** The emergence of potent Chinese counter- space capabilities makes US military operations in Asia more risky than ever. The threat has not arisen due to a lack of a space arms-control regime, or because of the Bush administration's disinclination to negotiate an accord that bans the weaponization of space. Rather, it is rooted entirely in China's requirement that it be able to defeat the United States in a regional conflict despite its conventional inferiority. This strategic challenge has compelled Beijing to exploit every anti-access and battle-space-denial technology potentially available. The threat posed by this Chinese effort cannot be neutralized by arms-control agreements, even though all countries stand to profit from the absence of threats to their assets in space. There is a temptation, especially in the United States, to view China's counter-space programs in moralistic terms. This approach is undesirable and best avoided: Beijing's desire to defeat the stronger by asymmetric means is not a reflection of its deviousness, nor provoked by mendacity on the part of the United States or the Bush administration. It is grounded in the objective conditions that define the relationship between the United States should seek, as the the two countries: competing political goals, likely to persist whether or not the Taiwan conflict is resolved. In such circumstances, Bush administration's own National Space Policy declares, to protect the 'use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity'. But if this fundamental goal is threatened by Chinese counter- space activities aimed at American space assets, the United States has no choice but to run an offence-defense arms race, and win. WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg China Advantage: 1AC Cards A Space War would cause space debris, threatening US military and communications satellites Gertz 8 (Bill, geopolitics editor, national security correspondent and columnist for Washington Times and author of four national bestselling books, January 11, 2008, U.S. Satellites dodge Chinese missile debris, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/) Two orbiting U.S. spacecraft were forced to change course to avoid being damaged by the thousands of pieces of space debris produced after China carried out an anti-satellite weapon test one year ago today. The maneuvering, ordered by ground controllers and conducted several months after the test, is an example of lingering problems caused by China's Jan. 11, 2007, missile firing in a bold demonstration of space weaponry against a weather satellite, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Ted Kresge, director of air, space and information operations at the Air Force Space Command in Colorado. Gen. Kresge, a F-15 fighter pilot, said the Chinese ASAT weapon test changed the equation for the military, which is working to better understand strategic threats posed by China's satellite-killing missiles, ground-based lasers, cyberwarfare and other ground station attack capabilities. The Space Command is conducting a series of reviews to better identify threats and develop defenses for U.S. and allied military and commercial satellites against future attack. "We have embraced the notion that we now operate in a contested domain," the one-star general said. However, other defense officials said the test set off a debate within the Bush administration over how to respond. Officials who seek to minimize China's arms development within the U.S. intelligence and policy communities are said to be playing down the seriousness of the ASAT weapon test, arguing in interagency meetings that it was a one-time event that poses no strategic threat. Military officials, including Gen. Kresge and Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Chinese anti-satellite weapons as new threats that could cripple the U.S. militarily and economically in a future conflict. They said the U.S. needs to step up spying efforts to learn more about the secret Chinese weapons program and develop defenses against it. Chinese military writings have revealed that space weapons should be built in secret and used for "shock and awe" attacks against U.S. satellites, said defense analyst Michael Pillsbury who revealed the plans in a report to a congressional commission. Gen. Cartwright testified before a Senate subcommittee last year that conventionally armed Trident missiles are needed to pre-empt space attacks through strikes on ASAT missile launchers in China. But, Congress restricted funding for the program in the latest defense spending bill, and Pentagon civilians did not fight to keep the conventional Trident program going. The White House opposed the curbs on the Trident conversion that are part of what the Pentagon calls "prompt global strike" weapons. The restrictions "limit the ability to field a near-term capability to strike globally, precisely, and rapidly with non-nuclear kinetic effects against high-priority, time-sensitive targets," the statement said. The Chinese anti-satellite test used a ground-based mobile "direct ascent" missile that destroyed the orbiting Feng Yun-1C weather satellite by ramming into it. By some estimates, China could produce enough space weapons to knock out all low-Earth orbit U.S. satellites by 2010. China tried to carry out the test in secret but it was detected by U.S. intelligence agencies days before the launch. The Bush administration rejected State Department appeals to try and head off the test, fearing it would disclose U.S. spying capabilities. Instead, the administration organized a formal diplomatic protest to Beijing, that was joined by several other nations, including Britain, Japan and India. China's government, which advocates a United Nations ban on space weapons, confirmed the test several weeks later, but Chinese officials have refused to reveal details of the arms program. Beijing also is asserting national sovereignty over all space above Chinese territory, setting up the potential for a future confrontation with the U.S., which operates intelligence and other satellites that pass over China. Gen. Kresge said international treaties protect space from such claims of national control, "so from my perspective that is an illegitimate claim on their part." "If their intent was to enforce that, then we run into a space protection problem, and that is why we are so aggressively working the issue," he said. Options for countering China's space arms include dissuading China from attacks through political, economic and diplomatic means, and deterring attacks by threatening U.S. counterstrikes, Gen. Kresge said. Developing international coalitions with nations that operate satellites is being considered to help share satellites in an emergency, and "provide an adversary with a targeting problem," he said. Defensive measures include maneuvering satellites or shielding them from damage from ground-based lasers. China fired a laser at a U.S. satellite in December 2006. The broad area of wreckage in space is called the "Feng Yun-1C debris" and threatens about 800 satellites in space, 400 of which are American. According to the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, the commercial communication satellite Orbcomm FM 36 maneuvered to avoid passing within about 123 feet of the debris field on April 6. A NASA Earth observation satellite Terra was moved June 22 to avoid coming within about 90 feet of the debris. Gen. Kresge said the Chinese ASAT weapon test, after two misses, "made a mess" in space. There are no indications China is preparing more tests but doing so would create a "huge" problem, he said. "Essentially what it did was increase the amount of space debris orbiting the Earth by about 20 percent," he said. The debris threatens spacecraft for up to 100 years, he estimated. WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg A space-debris-destroyed or Chinese destroyed US satellite would serve as a cover for China to invade Taiwan Chun 2k (Clayton, Ph.D in policy analysis as well as full career in US Air Force, April 2000, Shooting Down a Star: program 437the US Nuclear ASAT System and Present Day Copycat Killers, spacedebate.org) A future enemy may not be able to achieve space superiority, but it may be able to deny this advantage to the United States. A nation with a few ASATs might use that capability as a deterrent, offensive weapon, or terrorist device. Such a nation may not want the United States to use its space resources over a particular area or during a certain time period. For example, because it might not want a US reconnaissance satellite to detect or watch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, or support a US counterstrike against the PRC, China might use its ASATs to blind or disable a number of US military space satellites until the successful conclusion of the operation. Additionally, without space support, a US attempt to help Taiwanese forces recapture their territory would be more difficult. The destruction of US space satellites might also serve as a warning not to interfere in this situation. Any nation that wanted to warn the United States that it should not meddle in that state's affairs or intervene in a dispute could build and deploy a rudimentary ASAT system at least as capable as Program 437. By doing so it would gain the capability to inflict serious damage on US space systems. U.S.-China war will go nuclear and destroy the planet. STRAITS TIMES 2k [―Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,‖ June 25, 2000, LEXIS] THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted , Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg Asteroid Advantage: 1AC Advantage __ is Asteroid protection Asteroid detection near earth is increasing now Garretson and Kaupa 8 (Peter, Lt. Col. Chief Headquarters USAF, and Douglas, test pilot and test director for chief of staff of Air Force, Fall 2008, Planetary Defense: Potential Mitigation Roles of the Department of Defense, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/garretson.html) Since detection efforts began in the mid-1990s, NASA and supporting teams (using only ground-based telescopes and a meager budget of $5 million/year) have catalogued over 4,000 near-Earth asteroids (NEA).15 The discovery rate has increased each year during the past decade (fig. 4). We predict that a subset of the total NEAs shown in figure 4—potentially hazardous asteroids (PHA)—will come within 750,000 km of our home, less than two times the distance between Earth and the moon. PHAs are too massive to burn up in Earth‘s atmosphere. As of November 2006, we have detected 843 of them, 700 larger than 1 km and capable of regional destruction.16 No known asteroids target Earth now or for the next several years. However, this information can change rapidly. Nobody knows how long Earth will be spared. Our planet has not been so fortunate in the past. With 843 PHAs and counting, we must seriously consider mitigation options. Rather than debate whether we need planetary defense, we must determine when we will need it. From a policy perspective, we know that at least 843 asteroids prowling our neighborhood could cause local, regional, or global destruction, so we have just begun to understand the total threat. We won‘t comprehend its full extent until we overcome the ―giggle factor‖ and stop erroneously ascribing such thinking to science fiction. We need to create contingency plans and establish guidelines as an insurance policy—a far less expensive proposition than the consequences of suffering a direct hit. Weapons in space are best option to protect against asteroids and comets Kunich 97 (John, professor of constitutional law, 1997, Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival, spacedebate.org) Mitigation, or response, could take several forms, depending in part on the nature and magnitude of a given threat, once it has been detected and evaluated. One possible response would be evacuation of the impact zone, to minimize loss of life. A closely related response is preparation to minimize the resultant damage due to fires, tidal waves, earthquakes, acid rain, and other after-effects, and to provide medical care to the victims. These forms of response, though important, would be grossly inadequate when dealing with a truly massive threat such as those discussed previously. In the event of a massive strike from space, the resultant apocalyptic disasters would render such efforts as fruitless as rearranging the deck chairs while the Titanic sinks. The only meaningful response to a massive strike is some form of direct intervention. Direct intervention may entail deflection or destruction of the approaching space object to prevent or mitigate any impact with Earth. The means for achieving this fall partially within the realm of existing military capabilities, and partially within the ambit of technologies superficially similar to some proposed/experimental aspects of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Depending on the physical size and other attributes of the threatening object, a variety of countermeasures might be effective in diverting or destroying it. Earth-based nuclear devices such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) or their submarine-launched counterparts might suffice. Non-nuclear options conceivably would work, including kinetic energy or laser systems such as were explored under SDI. Some of these may require space-basing to be effective, while others may work in an Earth-based mode. WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg Asteroid Advantage: 1AC Impact of an asteroid on Earth is worse than impact of a nuclear weapon. Garretson and Kaupa 8 (Peter, Lt. Col. Chief Headquarters USAF, and Douglas, test pilot and test director for chief of staff of Air Force, Fall 2008, Planetary Defense: Potential Mitigation Roles of the Department of Defense, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/garretson.html) This article divides potential Earth-impacting asteroids into four categories. Generally, asteroids with a density less than or equal to that of rock and less than .5 km across can cause ―local damage,‖ defined as destruction of an area equivalent to a moderate-sized city, such as Kansas City, Missouri. These ―city-killers‖ would reduce most houses and buildings to rubble, and any combustible material within 8 to 16 km of the impact would burn. Debris would scatter for tens of kilometers, possibly causing widespread fires. If the asteroid fell into the ocean, it could produce tsunamis more powerful than the Indian Ocean earthquake of 2004, leaving thousands dead. Based on lunar- cratering studies, local-damage asteroids collide with Earth every 200 to 300 years, on average.6 (Other studies indicate every few thousand years. A defined planetary defense would refine such estimates of the danger of impact.)7 A city-killing asteroid hit Tunguska, Siberia, in 1908, missing Moscow, Russia, by only three hours.8 This atmospheric explosion flattened a forested area three times as large as the District of Columbia.9 Definitive research published in Nature magazine indicates that the Tunguska bolide had asteroid origins and detonated approximately 10 km above the ground with a force of 10 to 20 megatons of TNT, making it over 1,000 times more powerful than the first atomic weapons.10 Asteroids with diameters between .5 and 2 km, known as ―nation destroyers,‖ can create ―regional destruction,‖ wiping out countries such as the United Kingdom or India. Having the potential of killing and injuring a substantial portion (up to 25 percent) of the human population, these asteroids could significantly disrupt our modern way of life. Asteroids between 2 and 10 km in diameter could cause ―global effects‖ due to impact casualties and debris thrown into the atmosphere. Clouds of ash and dust might circle Earth, devastating crop production for months or even years. They could also induce acid rain, which would pollute fisheries and contaminate farming. The consequent elimination of more than 25 percent of the human population would greatly affect civilization, setting it back several decades. Finally, asteroids more massive than 10 km can become ―planet killers,‖ imparting kinetic energy equivalent to 100 million megatons of TNT—hundreds of times greater than all the nuclear weapons in the world (fig. 3).11 Impacts of this size would destroy the entire ecosystem and cause mass extinctions. Earth might have suffered a few of these since life began. An impact nearly 65 million years ago that created the Chicxulub crater off the Yucatan peninsula might have eliminated the dinosaurs.12 WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg Asteroid Adv: 2AC Many Asteroids and Comets cannot be predicted well enough in advance Garretson and Kaupa 8 (Peter, Lt. Col. Chief Headquarters USAF, and Douglas, test pilot and test director for chief of staff of Air Force, Fall 2008, Planetary Defense: Potential Mitigation Roles of the Department of Defense, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/garretson.html) Zipping near Earth‘s orbit, most of these potentially hazardous objects travel in predictable orbits, allowing us to spot them decades in advance. However, we have only begun to comprehend the threat. Comets such as Shoemaker- Levy 9 orbit too infrequently for us to characterize them and arrive with very little warning. This particular one hit Jupiter in 1994, raining down approximately 20 fragments several hundred meters in size and delivering several hundred megatons of explosive power per fragment.13 Furthermore, city killers can arrive without warning due to the spotty nature of our current surveillance. One such minimal warning occurred on 18 March 2004, when an asteroid came within 3.4 Earth diameters or 43,000 km from Earth, having been identified only 48 hours prior.14 This distance lies just outside the geostationary orbits of satellites circling our home. 2- Extend the Garretson and Kaupa 8 impact card in the 1AC. Simply evacuating would not protect people from larger impacts or even many ―city killers‖ as the impact would cause mass fires as well as food shortages. The only way to save people is to not allow the asteroid to hit the ground. Once the asteroid hits the ground, all the problems and impacts get put in motion. Chances of Dying from asteroid are greater than those of more ―normal‖ ways of dying France 2k (Martin, Lt.col in USAF, 2000, ―Planetary Defense: Eliminating the Giggle Factor‖, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA430995) The current estimate of Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) larger than one kilometer in diameter is about 2,000, based on confirmed sightings of just over 200 and the amount of space that remains to be fully searched. Based on this information and other data 5 concerning the frequency of large-scale impacts on the Moon and from regions of the globe with more complete historical record of impacts (e.g., Australia, where the sparse vegetation and arid climate combine to limit weathering of craters), scientists estimate the chance of dying from an asteroid or comet impact in the United States is 1 in 20,000.10 By comparison, the chance of dying in an aircraft accident is also about 1 in 20,000, dying in a tornado is a 1 in 60,000 shot and death by venomous bites or stings is 1 in 100,000. You are, however, more likely to die in a car accident (1 in 100), be murdered (1 in 300) or electrocuted (1 in 5,000) than die as a result of a cosmic impact.1 WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg Russia Advantage Advantage __ is Russia Russia is the most capable space-weaponizing nation currently Schendzielos 8 (Kurt, US Air Force Major, 2008, Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485553&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Russia is the largest and most capable OCS nation in the world. Russia has a long history concerning ASAT development. It is the only nation to currently possess an operational conventional destructive ASAT system.75 According to DoS reports, the OCS capabilities that Russia has openly admitted to and publicly tested are, ―laser, radio frequency, jamming, and electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) systems that could be employed against U.S. space capabilities.‖76 Russia still bases its HAND anti-ballistic missile ASATs in a defensive ring around Moscow. The HAND missiles are intended to defeat an incoming ICBM salvo but could also be used against LEO and potentially MEO satellites.‖ Russia pursuing more ASAT technology now Day 6/13 (Dwayne, Ph.D in political science and space historian/policy analyst, June 13, 2011, The Space Review: Hubble in the Crosshairs, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1865/1) Jump to the present day. Right now there is an aircraft in Russia that is being flight tested with a laser onboard. Painted on the side of the aircraft are the words ―SOKOL-ESHELON,‖ which translate to ―Falcon Echelon‖, and an image of the Hubble Space Telescope being zapped by a lightning bolt. The aircraft, which is designated the Beriev A-60, is an awkward-looking bird featuring a bulbous nose and several other large bulges to the fuselage. Although some reports have stated that the nose houses a tracking laser in a turret, like the US Air Force‘s 747-based Airborne Laser, close up photographs of the nose reveal no openings or indications that it rotates to expose a laser emitter. One December 2010 Russian article indicates that this is a ―Ladoga-3‖ radar for detecting aerial targets. Two bulges on either side of the lower fuselage reportedly house auxiliary power unit generators for the laser. A large bulge on the upper back of the aircraft, which is not easily visible in photos from the ground, is apparently a sliding port for a 1-megawatt laser turret. The laser is clearly intended to fire up, at something above the plane, rather than to the sides or down, to engage ground targets or other aircraft. It apparently has an effective range of 300–600 kilometers. Although a Russian artist has chosen to paint the Hubble on the plane, it is obvious that this is actually meant to symbolize an American spy satellite. The satellite‘s path indicates a polar orbit that goes black over Russian territory—the obvious implication being that the laser is intended to blind or otherwise disable American surveillance satellites. It is likely, however, that this is somewhat fanciful and that this is a test program and not an operational laser system. The Russians are apparently open that this is an ASAT program, but at least one source indicates that the aircraft is supposed to operate with an A-50U AWACS plane for detecting airborne targets such as cruise missiles. According to Russian-language articles on the Internet, this aircraft was taken out of storage in the middle of the last decade and modernized. The plane can be seen in a Google Earth image, but Russian plane spotters have also gotten up close to take photographs. Security at many Russian military sites is rumored to be lax (and you can find Internet sites filled with photographs taken by military enthusiasts who have simply walked onto bases through unattended and open gates and then wandered up to sensitive objects like surface-to-air missile batteries), but it is clear that some of these enthusiasts have gotten very close to a plane that is clearly carrying specialized gear, which would not happen in the United States. Pursuing weaponization of space deters Russia from pursuing more ASAT technology Schendzielos 8 (Kurt, US Air Force Major, 2008, Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485553&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Lastly, building an overwhelming defense may actually discourage adversary nations from pursuing offensive capabilities against the U.S.165 ―If a weapon is vulnerable, yet capable of dramatically affecting the outcome of a conflict, the state that possesses it has an even more powerful incentive to employ the weapon early on in a conflict‖166 Conversely, if a weapon is vulnerable and not capable of affecting the outcome of a conflict, which satellite self-defense would achieve against current generation ASATS, then there would be little motivation to resort to ASATs. WFI 11 Space weapons Aff/Neg Russia Advantage That prevents Iran and North Korea obtaining space weapons Schendzielos 8 (Kurt, US Air Force Major, 2008, Protection in Space: A Self-Defense Acquisition Priority for U.S. Satellites, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA485553&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) Russia is hardly resting upon its laurels. In recent years the Russian military has gone through a rapid and dramatic renewal effort reminiscent of the heyday of President Reagan‘s military improvements in the mid-1980s.78 Russia is specifically renewing efforts to update and improve current OCS systems. One such example is the recent development of the S-400 Air Defense System (NATO codename: SA-21 Growler). While officially not designed to specifically counter ICBMs, the Commander of the Russian Air Defense Forces Special Command, Colonel-General Yury Solovyov, made remarks that the S-400, ―could also be used for limited purposes in missile and space defense.‖79 As an air defense system it is mounted on trucks and is capable of moving. This makes it highly mobile and significantly reduces the physical infrastructure required to support the missile system. The result is that the S- 400 is readily exportable and deployable. In fact, the Russians are expecting to start exporting the system concurrent with their own fielding within the next two years.80 Although it is likely that the S-400 will be very expensive and only large countries like China will be able to afford it initially, there is still a chance that it could be proliferated to smaller nations interested in doing almost anything to obtain a limited destructive ASAT capability, such as Iran or North Korea, or even an NGA with vast financial resources. The likelihood of ASAT proliferation to an NGA directly from Russia is, thankfully, fairly remote. WFI 2011 16 Space Weaponization Affirmative 2AC Russia 1. Russia‘s stance towards space weapons is only to trick the US so they can get there first, that‘s Brown 09‘ 2. Russia might be to far behind now but if the US doesn‘t weaponize then Russia will surly pass us 3. As for the Link Turn, Russia unlikely to follow if US developed Space weapons, just because they have threats doesn‘t mean that they will follow through Podvig 08 (Pavel, affiliate and former research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and former researcher at Center for Arms Control Studies at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 2008, Russian and Chinese responses to Even if the United States decided to introduce weapons in space, Russia would be unlikely to follow. Its experience with anti-satellite programs is discouraging— the capabilities of the Soviet system were very limited and if used would have had virtually no impact on the ability of the United States to operate its own space-based systems.With the increase in U.S. capabilities in space, a system of the kind that the Soviet Union had in the 1970s would be other factors that would make development of space-related weapons even less useful today. Among systems less likely are the very high cost of such systems and the lack of a proper organizational structure to support a development project in this area WFI 2011 17 Space Weaponization Affirmative Economy Advantage: 1AC US Economy declining Chen 11 (Vivien Lou, Bloomberg Reporter, ―San Francisco Fed Researcher Says U.S. Economy Has Lost Momentum,‖ http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-18/san-francisco-fed-researcher-says-u-s-economy-has-lost- momentum.html The U.S. economy has lost momentum and will expand 2.6 percent this year, a percentage point less than a forecast made in March, said a researcher with the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The bank cut its projection amid signs that some of the recent slowdown is ―persistent,‖ Mary Daly, vice president and head of the applied microeconomic research department, said in a July 14 paper posted on the bank‘s Web site today. The bank also lowered its 2012 estimate for growth to 3.3 percent, calculated on a fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter basis. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told Congress last week that the central bank is prepared to take further action if the economy appears to be in danger of stalling, and yet isn‘t ready to embark on a third round of government bond- buying. Much of the economy‘s slowdown should prove to be temporary as commodity prices stabilize and supply disruptions from Japan‘s earthquake ease, Daly said. ―On net, the easing of some of the economic headwinds combined with an apparent stabilization of the housing market should allow growth to pick up in coming quarters,‖ she wrote. ―Although we expect the economy to gain additional momentum in 2012, evidence suggests that some of the recent weakness is persistent.‖ At the same time, deteriorating skills will limit the ability of some of the long- term unemployed to find jobs, the economist said. Structural unemployment will remain above pre- crisis levels ―for some time,‖ she said. The space industry benefits the economy on a wide range of aspects Lord ‘05 [Lance W. Lord, a retired four star general in the U.S. Air Force, and was the Commander of Air Force Space Command at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, High Frontier Journal. Vol. 2, No.1 , ―Why America Needs Space: The Prerequisites for Sucess‖, 2.3.2005, p. (http://spacedebate.org/evidence/1828/)//wfi-hdm] For many Americans, the most visible images of space are the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. These programs have accomplished amazing things and have greatly contributed to our quality of life. However, that's just the tip of the iceberg. Most of what goes on in space is transparent to the average person. We do not see space at the Automatic Teller Machine or at the checkout counter in the supermarket, but it is there. Precise timing signals from the Global Positioning System synchronize financial transactions, making them possible. Most people probably don't think about space when they are cooking dinner, but it plays a role there too. Farmers use space assets to map the mineral and moisture content of their fields. The cost savings farmers achieve are then passed to consumers. Similarly, it takes space capabilities to get accurate weather forecasts and provide seamless world-wide communication connectivity. In total, today's space industry exceeds $100 billion annually world-wide, and is projected to exceed $150 billion per year by 2010. We could do without space capabilities, but only if we are willing to step back in time about 30 years. The money the U.S. invests in space has a 8x economic return Hubbard ‗08 [Scott Hubbard, professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics at Stanford University and former director of the NASA Ames Research Center, ―Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics Quorum,‖ 1.11.08, (http://www.freakonomics.com/2008/01/11/is-space-exploration-worth-the-cost-a-freakonomics-quorum/) //wfi- hdm] There are five arguments that are advanced in any discussion about the utility of space exploration and the roles of humans and robots. Those arguments, in roughly ascending order of advocate support, are the following: 1. Space exploration will eventually allow us to establish a human civilization on another world (e.g., Mars) as a hedge against the type of catastrophe that wiped out the dinosaurs. 2. We explore space and create important new technologies to advance our economy. It is true that, for every dollar we spend on the space program, the U.S. economy receives about $8 of economic benefit. Space exploration can also serve as a stimulus for children to enter the fields of science and engineering. 3. Space exploration in an international context offers a peaceful cooperative venue that is a valuable alternative to nation state hostilities. One can look at the International Space Station and marvel that the former Soviet Union and the U.S. are now active partners. International cooperation is also a way to reduce costs. 4. National prestige requires that the U.S. continue to be a leader in space, and that includes human exploration. History tells us that great civilizations dare not abandon exploration. 5. Exploration of space will provide humanity with an answer to the most fundamental questions: Are we alone? Are there other forms of life beside those on Earth? UGA 10 18 File Title Economy Advantage: 1AC A follow up space program is not in place to secure U.S. economic growth Luscombe ‗11[Richard Luscombe, a freelance correspondent for the Guardian who specializes in NASA research, Guardian , ―End of the space shuttle programme spells disaster for local economy‖, 7.7.2011, (http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2011/jul/07/space-shuttle-programme-local-economy /) wfi-hdm] When the space shuttle Atlantis returns to Earth, 2,000 Kennedy Space Centre employees will be laid off, bringing job losses from the shuttle program close to 10,000. Similar numbers lost their jobs at Kennedy, and tens of thousands more nationally, when Richard Nixon pulled the plug on the Apollo moon missions in the 1970s, ironically to free up funding for space shuttle development. But unlike the end of Apollo, Nasa has no follow-on project to soak up some of those made redundant. Barack Obama scrapped the next-generation Constellation program – his predecessor George W Bush's grand vision to return astronauts to the moon by 2020 – on cost grounds. The decision to scrap the shuttle means that after Atlantis is grounded later this month American astronauts will have to hitch a ride to the space station from Kazakhstan aboard Russia's Soyuz spacecraft – at least until private sector companies such as SpaceX are deemed ready to ferry humans into low Earth orbit by about 2015. Community leaders here, therefore, are pinning their hopes for job creation in the short term on the expansion of the private space industry, while lobbying the government to make a strong longer-term commitment to Nasa."Our challenge is to make sure we play a role in maintaining our country's number one position in space," said Robin Fisher, a commissioner for Brevard County, which includes the space centre and surrounding towns from which its workers are drawn. "Can we get Washington to stop playing games and accept the fact that we need this heavy lift rocket? We need to know where we are going and we need to make this decision really quick. Do we want to lose that brain power and talent?" Space program equate for a majority of state economies, and thus the U.S. economy overall Rockville ‗09[Rockville, NASA reporter, Vol. 32, Iss. 16 ―Cutting Space Programs Could Make A Nosediving Economy Even Weaker‖, 3.20.2009, (http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu) //wfi-hdm] As President Obama and Congress prepare to decide future funding levels for NASA, a study released today suggests cutting space spending could make an already staggering U.S. economy even weaker. The study by the California Space Authority (CSA) shows not only that space programs provide immense numbers of jobs directly, they also support innumerable other jobs thanks to space workers spending their paychecks to buy homes, cars, food and much more. While the CSA study focuses on how space programs affect the California economy -- which is larger than the gross domestic products of many nations -- space programs provide a similar boost in other states and in the American economy overall. In California alone, the space industry contributes $31 billion in revenues, the report shows. Considering employment, that translates to 71,000 people directly employed by space endeavors, who in turn spend their paychecks to support another 300,000 jobs, all totaling up to a whopping $19 billion in California wages. Beyond these benefits, the space industry -- at the cutting edge of technology -- also leads to further economic strengthening by fostering innovation and new commercial products and small businesses, the report stated. (Think computer chips, global positioning system units in cars, XM Radio, satellite TVs, space medicine and much more.) Every area where space programs operate thus is well positioned to capture a share of commercial sector growth in such high-wage industries as spacecraft, rocket launching and satellite services, the report continued. Too, the presence of space industry employers attracts highly educated individuals, and bolsters the universities that educate them, meaning such a region boasts a highly skilled and experienced workforce, the report notes. California is home to Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory fostered by NASA and the California Institute of Technology, plus the NASA Ames Research Center, and a huge aerospace industry. According to the report, California has a 21 percent share of the global space market and a 44 percent share of the U.S. space market. Some 34 percent of satellites, worldwide, are built there. UGA 10 19 File Title Economy Advantage: 1AC The space economy has an effect on everyday ways of life Wilson ‘07 [J.R. Wilson, A Senior Writer on Defense Media Network, NASA, ―Space Program Benefits: NASA‘s Positive Impact on Society‖, 2007, (http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/benefits.html) //wfi-hdm] In a speech kicking off NASA‘s 50th anniversary year, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin said: ―We see the transformative effects of the Space Economy all around us through numerous technologies and life- saving capabilities. We see the Space Economy in the lives saved when advanced breast cancer screening catches tumors in time for treatment, or when a heart defibrillator restores the proper rhythm of a patient‘s heart….We see it when weather satellites warn us of coming hurricanes, or when satellites provide information critical to understanding our environment and the effects of climate change. We see it when we use an ATM or pay for gas at the pump with an immediate electronic response via satellite. Technologies developed for exploring space are being used to increase crop yields and to search for good fishing regions at sea.‖ While lawmakers back in 1958 anticipated NASA‘s potential for spurring technological innovation, it is unlikely these legislators largely anticipated even a fraction of the impact the new agency would have as an engine of economic growth, and as a benefactor to society, not just in the United States, but worldwide. Innovation, leadership, and competitiveness in space are key to U.S. economic growth Dale ‗08 [Shana Dale, served as the Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the George W. Bush administration, NASA, ―Space Economy‖, 3.11.2008, (http://blogs.nasa.gov/cm/blog/Shana's-Blog/posts/post_1207932511786.html) //wfi-hdm] Today, we find ourselves in a new competitive landscape that centers on the global economy. In this global environment, innovation and competitiveness become keys to economic growth and an improved quality of life. Because of NASA's uniquely challenging mission, our scientists and engineers are constantly pushing the technological envelope and the limits of knowledge — this leads to advances that not only break boundaries in space but on Earth as well. These advances in science, technology, manufacturing, services, materials and other fields and products have contributed to economic growth, broadened our knowledge of our world and the universe, and improved the quality of our lives in countless ways. Based on expert internal and external advice, we are defining the Space Economy as "the full range of activities and resources that create and provide value and benefits to human beings in the course of exploring, understanding, and utilizing space." Examples of these activities include: Infrastructure — Space operations, suppliers, contractors. Applications — Global Positioning System (GPS), weather, climate, defense, imagery. Transactions — Finance, medicine, communications. Commerce — Tourism, services, logistical support. Through the Space Economy, we demonstrate that space is ubiquitous in our daily lives and enhances our well-being. It provides a broad context that captures the myriad benefits and services that are enabled by space-based activities and resources such as telemedicine, long-distance learning, GPS, satellite radio/DirecTV, bank card transactions, and many others that touch and improve our lives every day. It also enables a dialogue on the role of space to innovation in potentially transformative fields such as quantum computing, artificial have seen an explosion in space investment from emerging intelligence, robotics, nanotechnology and hydrogen fuel cells. We economic powers such as India and China. The most visible expression of technical leadership is through a robust and successful space program. The nations at the top of that technical pyramid are positioned to successfully compete in the global economy. We must not be complacent in this new race for technical leadership and cede our hard-won leadership position. The Space Economy will provide a vital means of measuring, understanding and expressing the significance of this new paradigm, our position in it and the relevance of our Nation's space program to our global economic leadership. U.S. taxpayers would lose half a trillion dollars if space technology is obstructed Krepon & Black ‗09 [Michael Krepon & Samuel Black, Michael Krepon is co-founder of Stimson, and director of the South Asia and Space Security programs, Samuel Black is a Research Associate in the Space Security and South Asia programs at the Stimson Center, ―Space Security or Anti-satellite Weapons?‖, May2009, (se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../Stimson_Space_Booklet_2009.pdf) //wfi-hdm] The US economy and international commerce rely on satellites that enable financial markets and investors to make transactions quickly and securely. Credit card users at gas pumps sometimes use satellites. War in space could disrupt financial markets and create havoc in stock exchanges. Businesses such as delivery services that use satellite communication and tracking devices could be badly disrupted. From 1959 to 2007, US taxpayers invested over one and a half trillion dollars in space. These sunk costs could be nullified if the use of weapons in space trashes the orbits used by essential satellites. UGA 10 20 File Title Economy Advantage The American economy is heavily reliant on space technology- loss of satellites would destroy economic growth The Heritage Foundation ‗11 [―A Strong National Defense: The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost‖, 4.5.2011( http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/04/A-Strong-National-Defense-The-Armed- Forces-America-Needs-and-What-They-Will-Cost)//wfi-hdm] Space assets and access to those assets are essential components of military power and are vital to the prosperity of the American people. The military depends on space systems for a variety of functions, including communications, early warning of attack, battle damage assessment, intelligence, navigation, and weather forecasting. Control of space is necessary to defend the people, territory, institutions, and infrastructure of the U.S. against ballistic missile attacks, including an EMP attack. The American economy depends on satellites for communication, financial transactions, navigation, and logistical support among other priorities to sustain the American way of life. The economy would be far less efficient and competitive if these satellite systems were degraded or lost. Accordingly, preserving freedom of access to space is a vital interest. U.S. satellites are vulnerable to attack, and the Earth satellite orbits are becoming increasingly congested and contested. Even nations such as Iran and North Korea are pursuing space systems. In 2007, China successfully tested its direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Russia also has ASAT capabilities. Losing access to space systems and satellites because of disruption or destruction would deprive the U.S. military of one of its most important and valuable ―force multipliers.‖ Its loss would eliminate a major portion of the U.S. military‘s technological edge over potential enemies. Economically, the loss of access to or destruction of space systems would inhibit economic growth and could push America into economic decline. Satellite technology has advanced the U.S. in a multitude of ways. Easton ‘09 [Ian Easton, Research Fellow at the 2049 Project Institute, 2009. ―The Great Game in Space,‖ (http://www.project2049.net/documents/china_asat_weapons_the_great_game_in_space.pdf )//wfi-hdm] One senior Air Force officer said that thanks to satellite technology the U.S. no longer fights in the fog of war, but in a ―huge cloud of electrons.‖ However, because four-fifths of America‘s military data is transmitted through unhardened commercial satellites, and a single Global Hawk unmanned surveillance drone flying over the Middle East can consume several times more bandwidth than was used in the whole of the 1991 war against Iraq, Air Force officers commonly describe space as being America‘s ―Achilles Heel.‖ 34 Referring to China‘s January 11, 2007 direct-ascent ASAT test, General Hamel of the Air Force‘s Space and Missile Systems Center said ―if they take our asymmetric advantage in space, we go from an information age war machine to an industrial age war machine…shifting the balance; the edge will go to the adversary.‖ 35 Many specialists also argue that, the aside from the U.S. military dependency on orbital space U.S. economy, and in turn, much of the world economy, is also rapidly becoming dependent on space-based systems. They posit that, in effect, the U.S. is now a ―space faring‖ nation whose very way of life is tied to the myriad capabilities provided by the orbital space medium. A loss of American space capabilities would be disastrous to the U.S. and world economy Dolman ‘05 [Everett C. Dolman, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies, ―US Military Transformation and Weapons in Space‖ 9-14-05, (http://www.e- parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20&%20Space.p df )//wfi-hdm] No nation relies on space more than the United States—none is even close—and its reliance grows daily. For both its civilian welfare and military security, a widespread loss of space capabilities would prove disastrous. America‘s economy, and along with it the world‘s, would collapse. Its military would be obliged to hunker down in defensive crouch while it prepared to withdraw from dozens of then-untenable foreign deployments. For the good of its civilian population, and for itself, the United States military—in particular the United States Air Force—is charged with protecting space capabilities from harm and ensuring reliable space operations for the foreseeable future. As a martial organization, the Air Force naturally looks to military means in achievement of its assigned ends. And so it should. UGA 10 21 File Title Economy Advantage: Cards Damage to U.S. satellites will prove catastrophic to the economy Akir ‗04 [Ziad I. Akir, Director of Distance Learning at Washington State Community College, Instructional Technology Systems Manager at Western Illinois, University Ph. D Student , Instructional Technologist at Ohio University, , Issue No. 6 Satellite Security, ―Space Security: Possible Issues and Potential Solutions‖, 2004 (http://spacejournal.ohio.edu/issue6/overview1.html )//wfi-hdm] Without doubt, the world is becoming more and more dependent on commercial space systems for economic, social, and military purposes. The question is: What are the consequences of not protecting commercial space systems? The paper addresses first the economic implications. Imagine the annual investments of the commercial space industry. The process of designing, manufacturing, and launching a satellite is a multi- million dollar venture that many countries in the world still cannot afford. Countries that offer launching sites and facilities charge their clients millions of dollars. For example, U.S.-owned satellites represent an investment of more than $100 billion; and the cost of the Space Shuttle Endeavour is approximately $2.1 billion. These represent huge investments by the commercial sector as well as by governments. Business sectors such as telecommunication, energy and utilities, transportation, and banking and finance, rely on satellite systems. Damage to satellite operations will cause huge and painful monitory losses to the operators of such services. The more dependent countries become on the information and services provided by satellites, the more significant the impact of failure are sure to be. For a country such as the United States, an attack on its commercial satellite systems will create an "Information Pearl Harbor." Such an attack can damage the U.S. economy via its financial markets. Moreover, economic consequences can also be due to hijacking satellite links that provide telephony and television broadcast. Defense spending is essential to the U.S. economy, without it the economy would collapse Borch ‗10 [University of Alabama Birmingham study led by Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. 6.17.2010, ―UAB Study Confirms Military Spending Helps States Survive Poor Economy‖ (http://main.uab.edu/Sites/MediaRelations/articles/78097/) //wfi- hdm] States in which defense spending is high are better equipped to withstand the effects of an economic downturn than others, according to a new study led by The University of Alabama at Birmingham Assistant Professor of Sociology Casey Borch, Ph.D. The study, published this week in the June issue of the journal Social Forces, confirms that states with high levels of defense spending have lower poverty rates, less income inequality, lower unemployment and higher median family income. It also demonstrates that the U.S. economy is increasingly dependent on military spending. "Politicians always have assumed that military spending helps the economy, but there have been very few studies to prove that it's true. No studies have examined the effects of military spending on as many measures of economic well-being at the state level as our study," said Borch, who teaches in the UAB Department of Sociology and Social Work. For this study, Borch and his team examined data taken from 49 states during the post-Vietnam War era, from 1977 to 2004, to determine the role of military spending in a peacetime economy. The time span coincided with a 30-year decline in and dependence on manufacturing in the United States, Borch said. The researchers reviewed spending on defense contracts and military personnel and compared it to changes in economic indicators over time - poverty and unemployment rates, median family income and income disparities. The researchers also adjusted for variables such as the dominant political party in a state, strength of labor unions, number of Fortune 500 companies, gross state product (GSP) from manufacturing and proportion of military and non-military federal spending. The researchers found, for example, that an increase in a state's dependence on military spending, from 5 to 10 percent of its total GSP, increased employment about 1 percent - despite nationwide declines in manufacturing - and a $14,000 per household increase in median family income. In addition, the Gini Index, a measure of income distribution across a population, fell about 6 percent. Poverty rates fell about 2 percent. Data in the study showed that decreased military spending coincided with times of economic hardship in the states. For example, the 1990s were marked by slowdowns in military spending, and many state economies dependent on military spending suffered higher unemployment, slow economic growth and widening income inequality, Borch said. "For some cities and states, military spending is an incredibly important part of the local economy," said Borch. "For example, in places like Virginia, which has military bases and a shipbuilding center, there is an enormous amount of military spending, and Huntsville, Ala., is the third most dependent metropolitan statistical area in the country. Other states like Montana and Idaho enjoy less. Therefore, you have politicians and community leaders who work to get military spending funneled into their states because it helps the state economy." The United States ranks No. 1 in the world for military spending, said Borch. Russia ranks second, with a military budget about seven times smaller than the United States. The U.S. is dependent on space capabilities and the revenue they return Lambeth ‘03 [Benjamin Lambeth, Writer for RAND, 2003, ―Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next steps in the Military Use of Space‖ UGA 10 22 File Title (http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1649.pdf)//wfi-hdm] The most compelling reason for moving forward with dispatch toward acquiring at least the essential elements of a serious space control capability is that the United States is now unprecedentedly invested in and dependent on on-orbit capabilities, both military and commercial. Since these equities can only be expected to grow in sunk cost and importance over time, it is fair to presume that they will eventually be challenged by potential opponents. In 1997, then CINCSPACE General Howell M. Estes III pointed out that with more than 525 satellites then on orbit (including more than 200 U.S. satellites) and with more than $250 billion likely to be invested by 46 nations in space assets by 2000, space had indisputably become an economic center of gravity and, hence, a major vulnerability of the United States and its allies. UGA 10 23 File Title Aerospace Adv. 1AC A. The aerospace industry is being cut and that might be detrimental to the economy By David Alexander, Writer for the Washington Post, Fri Jul 1, 2011, Warnings sounded over precipitous U.S. defense cuts, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/01/usa-defense-budget- idUKN1E76010120110701 WASHINGTON, July 1 (Reuters) - Cuts in defense spending as part of President Barack Obama's bid to trim the $1.4 trillion U.S. budget deficit could hurt the economy or imperil security unless undertaken as part of a careful review of military needs, an industry representative and a key lawmaker said. Marion Blakey, head of the Aerospace Industries Association, warned House Speaker John Boehner in a letter released on Friday that precipitously cutting the defense budget could make the U.S. "fiscal and broader economic situation even worse." Any cuts to defense should be done in a "careful and thoughtful manner guided by our military leaders" and carried out only after the Pentagon completes its review of military force structure and capabilities, said Blakey, whose group represents hundreds of defense and aerospace companies. Lockheed Martin (LMT.N), the Pentagon's largest defense contractor and developer of the troubled F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, announced on Thursday that it planned to cut 1,500 aerospace jobs in response to flattening defense spending. Senator Daniel Inouye, head of the Appropriations Committee that approves military funding, voiced his own concerns about defense cuts in a statement released on Thursday. He said defense spending had grown 74 percent since 2001 in real terms but cautioned against a rush to trim the Pentagon base budget. B. If we don‘t invest is aerospace with the plan then we lose competitiveness and Heg Michels, Jennifer. Commercial Aviation Editorial Team Leader at Aviation Week. "U.S. Could Lose Competitive Edge Without Investments." Aviation Week. Aviation Week, 13 Jul 2011. Web. 16 Jul 2011. <http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=aviationdaily&id=news/avd/2011/07/14/03.x ml&headline=U.S.%20Could%20Lose%20Competitive%20Edge%20Without%20Investments> If the U.S. does not invest in aerospace and technology soon—not to mention find a way to attract more students into engineering—it risks losing its competitive edge as the leading country for aviation and aerospace in the world, says Jim Albaugh, president and CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes. Noting that half of Boeing‘s engineers, and those of other companies, could opt to retire by 2015, he noted that more needs to be done within the U.S. to bolster engineering schools. Boeing has With the space shuttle program now at a standstill a partnership in Russia to attract engineers, and Albaugh says it is looking at several other countries as well. following the retirement of the Atlantis space shuttle, those engineers could be ―lost forever‖ to retirement or other industries, he says. On the commercial airline side, the U.S. and Europe have led the way in innovation, but going forward, if investments are not made, Brazil, Canada, China and Russia will close the gap, Albaugh says. "The U.S. aerospace industry has both enormous opportunity and challenges ahead. The question is, will we rise to the challenges or watch as other companies and other nations seize both the opportunity and the mantle of aerospace leadership?" He notes that Boeing—and especially the Aerospace Industries Association—has been working these issues hard in Washington. His comments come two weeks after AIA President and CEO Marion Blakey made the same plea for investment and export reforms for aerospace before the June 30 Aero Club of Washington luncheon (Aviation Daily, July 1). Albaugh was speaking yesterday at the National Aeronautic Association‘s luncheon. C. Lack of U.S. competativness in aerospace will destroy its heg Adam Segal, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow in China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of ―Digital Dragon: High Technology Enterprises in China‖, November/December 2004, ―Is America Losing its Edge?‖ Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60260/adam- segal/is-america-losing-its-edge The United States' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new technologies and industries faster than anyone else. For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and military power. It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor, the personal computer, and the Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead. Today, however, this technological edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the Indian quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation of future innovations. The percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published by scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. companies are quickly becoming the second-largest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of software for clients around the world. South Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing. Although the United States' technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the American system. Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S. technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing new technologies; it can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than everyone else. But this won't be easy; to keep its privileged position in the world, the United States must get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home. UGA 10 24 File Title Aerospace Adv. 1AC D. Incert Heg Impact E. Space Weapons increase the aerospace industry J.R. Wilson, 2001, A full-time freelance writer, focusing primarily on aerospace, PUTTING SPACE WEAPONS ON THE FAST TRACK, A U.S. space-based laser could attempt its first shootdown of a ballistic missile years earlier than expected, given accelerated funding, Wilson http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=111&ArchiveIssueID=16 Technicians at TRW‘s Capistrano test site verify the alignment of components inside the Alpha Laser‘s 20-ft-tall optical resonator. Test models are used to predict performance of the high-energy laser required for an experimental space-based missile defense system proposed by the Air Force and the BMDO. Money and politics, more than technology, will determine when the U.S. is ready to attempt its first shootdown of a ballistic missile from space. Officials with the Space-Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment (SBL-IFX) say the test now scheduled for 2013 could be advanced to as early as 2010 if the Bush administration decides to accelerate the program‘s funding. "This is a funding-limited project. If you look at the POM [program objective memorandum], it will take a long time before we get to fly," Barry Waldman, program director for the Team SBL-IFX joint venture, told Aerospace America. "On the other hand, the administration is going through a review of what the country‘s response should be to the missile threat. If they decide they want a space-based laser sooner, they can do that, but must put more funding into it. If that happens, we can shorten the schedule by several years. UGA 10 25 File Title Plan Solves Aerospace Without a clear purpose, such as the plan, the aerospace industry will fail AIAA, (American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics) March 30th 2011, U.S. Must Develop a Clear and Comprehensive Space Policy, AIAA Corporate Membership Committee Chair Testifies, http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110330006210/en/U.S.-Develop-Clear-Comprehensive-Space-Policy-AIAA RESTON, Va.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Jim Maser, chairman of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Corporate Membership Committee, and president, Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, Calif., testified today before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space and Technology‘s Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics on ―A Review of NASA‘s Exploration Program in Transition: Issues for Congress and Industry.‖ ―A Review of NASA‘s Exploration Program in Transition: Issues for Congress and Industry.‖ Addressing the need to clarify current space policy, Maser told the committee: ―The need to move forward with clear velocity is imperative if we are to sustain our endangered U.S. space industrial base, to protect our national security, and to retain our position as the world leader in human spaceflight and space exploration. I believe that if we work the aerospace industry, which directly supports more together we can achieve these goals, and we are ready to help in any way we can. But the clock is ticking.‖ In his prepared testimony, Maser stated that than 800,000 jobs nationwide, is imperiled by the lack of a clear space policy. Maser explained that the uncertainty that the current space policy imposes on the industrial base creates three unique problems for the nation: first, it makes it impossible for the space industrial base to plan for current or future needs, harming the industry‘s ability to meet NASA‘s needs and retain its engineering and science workforce; second, it harms the industry‘s ability to recruit future workers because students who are currently enrolled in science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) programs will be wary of entering an enterprise that lacks a clear direction and mission, and which has no guarantee of longevity; and last, it harms U.S. national security by driving up short-term fixed costs for the Department of Defense to offset the uncertainty in the needed volume of materials for a robust military presence in space. Maser noted that while there is uncertainty about the best way to address these problems through the creation of a focused space policy for the nation, there is no doubt that ―unfortunately, though, we do not have the luxury of waiting until we have all the answers. We must not ‗let the best be the enemy of the good.‘ In other words, selecting a configuration that we are absolutely certain is the optimum configuration is not as important as expeditiously selecting one of the many workable configurations, so that we can move forward.‖ UGA 10 26 File Title Aerospace Down Obamas Plan for the aerospace industry destroys America‘s space dominance Joel Achenbach, Writer for the Washington Post, March 10, 2010, Obama‘s plans for NASA changes met with harsh criticism, http://sweetness-light.com/archive/obamas-destruction-of-nasa-is-criticized Harrison Schmitt‘s credentials as a space policy analyst include several days of walking on the moon. The Apollo 17 astronaut, who is also a former U.S. senator, is aghast at what President Obama is doing to the space program. "It‘s bad for the country," Schmitt said. "This administration really does not believe in American exceptionalism." Schmitt‘s harsh words are part of a furious blowback to the administration‘s new strategy for NASA. The administration has decided to kill NASA‘s Constellation program, crafted during the Bush administration with an ambitious goal of putting astronauts back on the moon by 2020. Obama‘s 2011 budget request would nix Constellation‘s rocket and crew The new strategy, however, has been capsule, funnel billions of dollars to new spaceflight technologies, and outsource to commercial firms the task of ferrying astronauts to low-Earth orbit. met with outrage from many in the aerospace community. The entire congressional delegation from Florida, Democrats and Republicans alike, has sent a letter of protest to the president. Doubters fill op-ed pages and space blogs. Once again, notice how Mr. Obama is bringing together bipartisan agreement. The administration apparently senses that it is losing the public-relations battle… states rich in space jobs, have sharply Everything is just ―public relations‖ to this administration. Congress must approve NASA‘s strategic change. Lawmakers in Florida, Alabama and Texas, criticized the Obama plan as a job-killer. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tex.) says that under Obama‘s strategy "America‘s decades-long dominance of space will finally come to an end." In fact, Obama‘s budget boosts NASA‘s funding by $6 billion over the next five years. The extra money is less than the $3 billion-a-year hike that a presidential advisory panel said would be necessary for a robust human space flight, but it‘s still an increase when many agencies are being squeezed. Never mind that NASA‘s Change doesn‘t come easily in the aerospace industry, with its long mission has been turned from exploring space to monitoring ‗climate change.‘ timelines and abundance of customized technology. Thousands of aerospace contract workers were already going to lose their jobs with the retirement of the aging fleet of space shuttles. Constellation, conceived after the space shuttle Columbia accident in 2003, was designed with architecture that would let some shuttle jobs migrate to the new program. NASA has already poured $9 billion into the development of a new rocket, Ares 1, and a new spacecraft, After the Orion. Terminating the program and closing out contracts will cost $2.5 billion more, the administration estimates. Which puts the lie to this being about cutting costs. It‘s about changing NASA‘s mission. last shuttle flies — the final mission is scheduled for September — the United States will rely entirely on Russian spacecraft to carry astronauts to the international space station… What could possibly be wrong with that? Haven‘t Mr. Putin and the Russians shown us time and again that we are the closest of friends with identical interests in the world? "Should science people be nervous if they continue Constellation? Absolutely," a senior NASA official said Tuesday. The strategic change has been dictated by budgetary realities, the administration has said. An advisory committee appointed by Obama, and headed by former Lockheed chief executive Norman Augustine, determined that under a realistic budget NASA probably wouldn‘t have a moon rocket until 2028, and still wouldn‘t have the hardware to land… What a shock. Mr. Obama commissioned an ‗advisory committee‘ to tell him what he wanted to be said. After all, NASA can‘t afford to explore space and monitor ‗global warming.‘ And we certainly know which is more important to our nation‘s vital interests. By the way, when is all of the promised ‗green technology‘ going to start paying off? We suspect not before 2028 — if ever. Oh, and never mind that Mr. Obama specifically promised to continue NASA‘s Constellation mission – way back when he needed to win the Florida primary. UGA 10 27 File Title Aerospace Down Obama is destroying the aerospace industry along with U.S. leadership Neil Armstrong Lovell and Gene Cernan, Updated 5/24/2011 4:45 PM, Is Obama grounding JFK's space legacy? |http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-05-24-Obama- , Jim grounding-JFK-space-legacy_n.htm President Obama's proposed 2011 budget did not include funds for Constellation, therefore essentially canceling the program. It sent shock waves throughout NASA, the Congress and the American people. Nearly $10 billion had been invested in design and development of the program. Many respected experts and members of Congress voiced concern about the president's proposal. Some supported the president's plan, but most were critical. The supporters' biases were often evident, particularly when there was a vested or economic interest in the outcome. Obama's advisers, in searching for a new and different NASA strategy with which the president could be favorably identified, ignored NASA's operational mandate and strayed widely from President Kennedy's vision and the will of the American people. "We intend to be first. In short, our leadership in science and in industry, our hopes for peace and security, our obligations to ourselves as well as others, all require us to make this effort, to solve these mysteries, to Congress, realizing the devastating effects to the solve them for the good of all men, and to become the world's leading space-faring nation." — President Kennedy plans, program and morale of those trying to keep America in the forefront of exploring the universe and expanding the human frontier, worked diligently to steer NASA's program back toward Kennedy's goals. Congress passed an authorization bill directing NASA to begin development of a large rocket capable of carrying humans toward the moon and beyond and to continue development of a multipurpose spacecraft based on the However, the president's 2012 budget reduced funding significantly below configuration that was being developed in the Constellation program. the authorized amount for both the big rocket and the multipurpose crew vehicle. On the other hand, the president's budget had significantly increased funding over the congressional direction in the area of space technology research programs and the development of rockets and spacecraft by the commercial entrepreneurs. Congress stated that rather than depending on NASA subsidies, the development of commercial sources to supply cargo and crew to the International Space Station should be a partnership between government and industry. Entrepreneurs in the space transportation business assert that they can offer such service at a very attractive price — conveniently not factoring in the NASA-funded development costs. These expenditures, including funds to insure safety and reliability, can be expected to be The response to Kennedy's bold challenge a half-century ago has led substantially larger and more time consuming than the entrepreneurs predict. to America's unchallenged leadership in space. We take enormous pride in all that has been accomplished in the past 50 years. And we have the people, the skills and the wherewithal to continue to excel and reach challenging goals in space exploration. But today, America's leadership in space is slipping. NASA's human spaceflight program is in substantial disarray with no clear-cut mission in the offing. We will have no rockets to carry humans to low-Earth orbit and beyond for an indeterminate number of years. Congress has mandated the development of rocket launchers and spacecraft to explore the near-solar system beyond Earth orbit. But NASA has not yet announced a convincing strategy for their use. After a half-century of remarkable progress, a coherent plan for maintaining America's leadership in space exploration is no longer apparent. UGA 10 28 File Title Aerospace K2 Heg Aerospace is key to U.S. leadership Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, Final Report of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November, http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf) Aerospace will be at the core of America‘s leadership and strength in the 21st century. The role of aerospace in establishing America‘s global leadership was incontrovertibly proved in the last century. This industry opened up new frontiers to the world, such as freedom of flight and access to space. It provided products that defended our nation, sustained our economic prosperity and safeguarded the very freedoms we commonly enjoy as Americans. It has helped forge new inroads in medicine and science, and fathered the development of commercial products that have improved our quality of life. Given a continued commitment to pushing the edge of man‘s engineering, scientific and manufacturing expertise, there is the promise of still more innovations and new frontiers yet to be discovered. It is imperative that the U.S. aerospace industry remains healthy to preserve the balance of our leadership today and to ensure our continued leadership tomorrow. (v) Our Urgent Purpose The contributions of aerospace to our global leadership have been so successful that it is assumed U.S. preeminence in aerospace remains assured. Yet the evidence would indicate this to be far from the case. The U.S. aerospace industry has consolidated to a handful of players—from what was once over 70 suppliers in 1980 down to 5 prime contractors today. Only one U.S. commercial prime aircraft manufacturer remains. Not all of these surviving companies are in strong business health. The U.S. airlines that rely upon aerospace products find their very existence is threatened. They absorbed historical losses of over $7 billion in 2001 and potentially more this year. Aerospace is vital to hegemony and the economy Wright, 93 - Major, USAF [Stephen, ―AEROSPACE STRATEGY FOR THE AEROSPACE NATION‖, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/research_pubs/p195.pdf] The transition and development of the U.S. into an aerospace nation underwent many starts and stops in both its economic and military elements. What this paper showed was the absolutely essential contribution aerospace power makes to the security and well-being, economically and militarily, of the United States. There can be no doubt that America is an aerospace nation. However, many problems cloud U.S. aerospace power necessitating a national strategy that encompasses both elements of its power. The aerospace industry provides the jobs, skills, and products that serve to increase the U.S. standard of living. It serves as a visible symbol of the technological expertise and economic power of America. Militarily, the U.S. faces uncertainty about potential threats; however, as long as she can control and exploit aerospace at will, her future is secure from hostile intent. Aerospace is vital to the U.S. economy and leadership Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2000 (―What‘s at Stake in US Aeronautics Decline‖ COL. 153, NO. 14, PG. 82 10-2-2000, LN) // DCM Several huge national problems will result for the U.S. if these trends are not reversed: -- If air traffic expands to meet the expected demand, twice as many passengers will be flying 10 years hence, and within 20 years there will be triple the number flying today. But that is only a market projection. If ATC is not modernized, the system will choke in 8-10 years. Tweaking the current system will not do enough. What is required is new approaches to air traffic management and the application of new technologies. -- If aviation cannot continue to expand, growth of the ''new economy'' will be stifled. Few Americans realize how much ecommerce depends on aviation. The Internet can handle the front end of a transaction, but it takes airplanes to deliver the goods. -- The ''old'' economy would suffer, too. Airlines and aircraft manufacturing account for an estimated $ 436 billion in annual economic activity and a net 3% of the Gross Domestic Product. More important, aerospace is the largest net exporter in the U.S. economy -- more than $ 40 billion annually. But Boeing is losing market share to Airbus Industrie and has fewer recently designed aircraft to offer. And, the U.S. does not even manufacture regional jets. Such trade surpluses cannot last without new products and the better technology they require. -- Finally, national security could be threatened if the U.S. does not maintain leadership in aeronautics. The Defense Dept. has no strategy that does not assume U.S. air superiority. But that cannot be assumed if R&D spending continues to flag. No one in Congress set out to gut U.S. leadership in aeronautics. It was just easy to cut. The trouble, as former NASA Administrator James M. Beggs points out, is that a nation can postpone investment in R&D without suffering any ill effects -- until a decade or so later. But the erosion must be stopped now. First, Congress should adequately fund aviation R&D in the NASA, Defense Dept. and FAA budgets in Fiscal 2001. The Administration requests would begin to reverse the downward trend. But more needs to be done to address the nexus of problems in U.S. aviation and aerospace. No candidate for President has indicated much recognition of the problems or what is at stake, much less articulated a vision for aviation in the nation's future. Perhaps that is too much to ask in a campaign year. But it is not too much to ask of an incoming administration. We applaud the planned creation of a national commission on the future of the U.S. aerospace industry, Aviation and aerospace are vital to the U.S.' future. If Americans and we urge the next President to become personally involved to ensure its success. fail to support aeronautics and aviation-related research, there will be no next generation of professionals to solve the obvious looming problems and create products the world will demand. And without that, the U.S. puts at risk a linchpin of its economy, national security and quality of life. UGA 10 29 File Title Aerospace K2 Heg Incentives for the aerospace industry are necessary to sustain the US economy, quality of life, and national security Marburer, 1 -- Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy; White House Sponsor for Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry (John, ―the Future Belongs tthe Mobile‖ 11-27-01, http://www.ostp.gov/cs/commission_on_the_future_of_the_united_states_aerospace_industry_the_future_belongs_to_the_mobile) // DCM . The nation has depended on the aerospace industry for decades to ensure that The President strongly supports your effort America leads the world in high technology, including the manufacturing of military and commercial aircraft, satellites, space launch vehicles, weapon systems and telecommunications systems. As a result, our military is the best in the world, our economy has benefited from a positive aerospace balance of trade, and our people and shippers have benefited from having the best and safest aviation system in the world. The public has also benefited from the numerous spin-offs from the aerospace industry, including cellular telephones, precision farming, new medical devices, improved weather forecasting, and hundreds of others. The President wants to make sure that U.S. aerospace leadership continues in the 21st Century. The critically important tasks of this Commission are to help the President establish the direction for the U.S. aerospace industry in this new century, and to support national initiatives on education, defense, security, and energy. This Commission is taking place at a landmark period in our history. The events of September 11 require a national response similar to that following the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957. UGA 10 30 File Title Terrorism- SW k2 Solve terror Space warfare systems are critical to the War on Terror Lakos 07 (Lt. Col. Michael L, Political-Military Relations Officer, USAF, USEUCOM (European Command), ―How Can the Space Medium be Further Exploited to Combat Terrorism?‖, High Frontier Journal, Vol. 3, #2, March 2007, http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf) Precision Engagement as defined in Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1 ―is the ability to command, control, and employ forces to cause specific strategic, operational, or tactical effects.‖18 Global Attack is ―the ability of the Air Force to attack rapidly and persistently with a wide range of munitions anywhere on the globe at any time.‖19 These two ―missions‖ can and will be conducted from space in the future. To do so, the US needs new platforms. SMVs, SOVs, and CAVs are possible future space vehicles that the DoD, led by the US Air Force and major defense contractors, is evaluating, and for which it is seeking funding.20 The US Air Force already employs precision munitions and conducts wargames with global attack capabilities from Figure 1. DAGR in the field. Figure 2. Artist depiction of a SMV. Figure 3. Artist depiction of a SOV. Figure 4. Artist depiction of a CAV. 33 High Frontier and through space. In fact, ―The combination of space- based navigational and timing services with precise weapons guidance is making the promise of air power‘s precision strike an aerospace power reality.‖21 The Chief of Staff, US Air Force‘s (CSAF‘s) Title X, US Code wargame, Global Engagement, has showcased several types of space capabilities including tungsten rods (fragmentary penetrators) launched from space at speeds up to Mach 17 and CAVs that will deliver these precision weapons anywhere on the globe in less than 60 minutes. To use an example of speed and precision, consider the raid on Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi‘s safe house. A US Air Force F-16 used a laser guided bomb and a global positioning system (GPS)-aided precision guided munition to destroy the safe house. If you staged tungsten rods or CAVs on-orbit for potential future targeting, the timelines of a precision strike could be reduced even more , thereby further denying a terrorist safe passage and/or cover. Transporting or delivering these new weapons leads into the rapid global mobility mission area. Rapid Global Mobility as defined in AFDD 1 ―refers to the timely movement, positioning, and sustainment of military forces and capabilities through air and space, across the range of military operations.‖22 Prior to the decision to cancel the X33 program, there were several Military Space Plane concepts on the drawing board : A military space plane architecture has many compelling advantages … global access from either the continental United States or the world‘s oceans without overflight constraints, reduced risk of lost crew (from traditional piloted aircraft) or reduced dependence on a dwindling number of increasingly unwelcome overseas bases (making forward staging/basing harder and harder).23 Another concept with momentum is exploiting ―near-space,‖ which is the atmosphere between 65,000 and 325,000 feet.24 For example, Raytheon Corporation is working on concepts involving short duration (hours or less), medium duration (hours to weeks), and long duration (weeks to months) type space platforms. Such platforms include unmanned aerial vehicles, airships, steerable balloons, and static balloons.25 Why would the US want to go back to the past? The answer is persistence over the battlefield. Near-space offers persistence and is a key enabler when combined with low, medium and geosynchronous orbit platforms. ―With our current space capabilities, it‘s not that the information isn‘t available; it‘s just that relevant battlespace awareness doesn‘t always reach our forces … with near-space, we believe we can provide persistence, payload and deterrence.‖26 These near-space platforms also are quickly recoverable, can be developed/launched more quickly and, once again, provide another asset to the Joint Force commander. Imagine a near-space platform high over the mountains of Afghanistan tracking terrorist squads that are continuously on the move. This type of surveillance could be of significant value if traditional overhead reconnaissance assets are either out of line of sight or not currently over the battlefield. Additionally, ground forces and air forces may not be in the proper positions at all times so near-instantaneous queuing from a near-space platform could be the key discriminator in a strike mission. Finally, Agile Combat Support, is defined in AFDD 1 as ―how the Air Force supports the forces we deploy forward … and the need to provide highly responsive force support.‖27 Once again, drawing from Global Engagement and other wargames, such as Air University‘s former Tandem Challenge wargame and the joint land, air, and sea simulation, the Air Force is wargaming with fully reusable single-stage-to-orbit space launch vehicles (e.g., VentureStar), space maneuvering, and space operations vehicles that could put ―bombs on target .‖ A VentureStar vehicle could possibly ferry troops and logistics from the CONUS to anywhere on the globe. With this in mind, future combat support could include, ―support missions enabled by military space planes for satellite deployment and rapid constellation replenishment, to force enhancement missions like theater, space and global reconnaissance .‖28 Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) could become a tremendous asset to our warfighting arsenal. Once again, using the mountainous Afghanistan terrain as an example, troop resupply is a dangerous and complicated endeavor. But, a VentureStar type space vehicle or transport that could get supplies, additional troops, and so forth into theater or into denied or hard-to-reach areas would enhance the joint warfighter‘s ability to track down and capture terrorists and other types of enemy forces. Agile combat support could also involve an on-orbit space depot that provides logistical support for continuous space force reconstitution missions. Additionally, the strike mission may be accomplished against surface, air, or space targets. Strikes from space may also enable attacks on targets which would otherwise be beyond the reach of air, land, and sea forces, thus enabling Precision Engagement/Global Attack missions to be executed quicker and more effectively.29 Precision Engagement, Global Attack, Rapid Global Mobility, and Agile Combat Support are significant capabilities that the US Air Force currently provides to the warfighter. Enhancing these competencies and moving deeper into the realm of space warfare will further complement the existing arsenal in the fight against terrorism. UGA 10 31 File Title Terrorism-Space k2 solve Development of space assets key to deterring and dissuading terrorists Berkowitz 07 (Marc J, Former Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, ―Protecting America‘s Freedom in Space‖, High Frontier Journal, Vol. 3, #2, March 2007, http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf) Given that America‘s potential adversaries may include nearpeer nation states, rogue states with weapons of mass destruction, and transnational terrorist groups, the threat of nuclear retaliation may not be a credible means of establishing deterrence. The new US strategic Triad, comprised of nuclear as well as non-nuclear (kinetic and non-kinetic) capabilities, gives defense planners a broader set of tools for creating strategic effects that can be tailored for specific adversaries. Increased flexibility in the design and conduct of military campaigns provides a more credible basis upon which to base deterrent threats. It also gives policy-makers an expanded set of options. Deterrence will not work, however, if the US fails to convince the adversary (or the adversary misunderstands) that it is committed to the protection of our vital interests. Given the current asymmetry of space dependence between the US and prospective adversaries, this will be a challenge if the US does not reduce the vulnerability of its space assets . It must be noted, of course, that it is also possible for a madman, religious fanatic, or terrorist to be beyond deterrence. Consequently, while deterrence could contribute to the survivability of US space systems, it would be imprudent to rely upon deterrence alone as the means to achieve mission protection. Rather, passive and active defenses are also essential to ensure the resilience and endurance of space assets in the event of conflict. UGA 10 32 File Title Terrorism- Space Weapons k2 Stop Attacks Space weaponization critical to preventing asymmetrical attacks, including against space assets Lakos 07 (Lt. Col. Michael L, Political-Military Relations Officer, USAF, USEUCOM (European Command), ―How Can the Space Medium be Further Exploited to Combat Terrorism?‖, High Frontier Journal, Vol. 3, #2, March 2007, http://www.spacedebate.org/hf/v3n2.pdf) Although the United States enjoys certain space advantages over other space fairing nations, it must continue to design, develop and even deploy new space capabilities to further exploit the medium of space . In particular, this continued exploitation of space will enable the US to more effectively fight terrorism. There are numerous definitions of the word ―terrorism.‖ A working definition of terrorism is needed to describe how space applies to countering terrorism. It would also be of use in analyzing the nature of terrorism and its differences with conventional warfare, as well as the application of space power in the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). For example, how can the US leverage space to interrupt terrorism or even prevent terrorism? Can space assets be used to interrupt a terrorist financial network? Can information operations and information warfare applications from space be used to identify terrorism cells, terrorist targets, plans, and so forth? With this in mind, how can present and, more importantly, future space capabilities be used to combat terrorism? Further discussions of conducting counter terrorism operations in and from space will be analyzed by showing how some of the US Air Force‘s distinctive capabilities are related to space power and how these capabilities could augment counter terrorism operations. Finally, what is the future of US space power? What does the US need to do to prepare for the eventuality of space combat? Space is a unique medium to operate through in order to infiltrate transnational terrorism. Using space applications to interfere with states that sponsor terrorism is becoming ever more part of the today‘s political and military landscape. How will space power and future warfighting in, from, and through space enhance global strike operations and maintain the ultimate high ground? Terrorists and terrorist cells seek to defeat us at our own game, asymmetrical warfare . Using asymmetrical attacks, they have used air warfare (9/11 airplane attacks on the US), land warfare (fighting in the hills of Afghanistan and streets of Iraq) and sea warfare (attack on the USS Cole). Space is the next logical medium for terrorists to act in unless the US prepares for this eventuality and remains vigilant. Using a space layer for offensive or defensive actions would help protect the United States and its allies against asymmetric threats designed to exploit coverage and engagement gaps in our defenses. UGA 10 33 File Title Terrorism- Terrorists attack! Terrorists will attack terrestrial space assets, eventually gain the ability for catastrophic attacks in orbit Klein 06 (Com. John J, author on use of maritime strategy to develop space strategy, Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and Policy, pg. 124-5) Differing from insurgents, terrorists do not seek a purely political objective or autonomous governance, and they include individuals wanting anarchy, chaos, or a state's disestablishment. Although the actions of many insurgents may be called "terrorism," insurgents and terrorists are considered separately, since the motives and methods of attack will commonly be quite different. Albeit terrorists may cite political reasons for their actions, their primary motivation is frequently to cause fear in others. Because of these motives, terrorists will prefer attacking easily accessible locations that cause the most sensational reactions by the local populace. To this end, terrorist actions will include inflicting large numbers of casualties, damaging major infrastructure, and targeting symbolic locations-" Actions by lesser powers I25 Based on the intent and preferred methods of terrorist groups, it is possible to predict those assets and locations most likely to be targeted. Those corporate headquarters involved in the development or use of space systems are included on this list, because of their extensive economic involvement and sizable infrastructure. Manned spacecraft readying for launch may also be targeted, since destroying them will cause sensational reactions and gain media attention. Less sensational targets, but equally plausible, include those ground-based relay stations scattered around the globe that support space-based commerce and trade, because they are numerous and often not well protected. Perhaps those targets least likely to be attacked by terrorists are systems in orbit, such as manned space stations. This view is held since the technological challenges with getting something into space that can detect, locate, and engage its intended quarry are quite formidable. Nevertheless, a space-based system - especially a manned one - will be the most sought-after kind of target by terrorists, since its destruction can achieve the casualties, damage to space infrastructure, and sensationalism desired. Considering current and projected technological trends, one plausible scenario in the future includes a terrorist group launching an undetected small satellite aboard a third-party launch vehicle that is destined for a low-earth orbit. The satellite would then detach from the host when near a space station and ram itself into the station's environmental control system, while detonating its onboard incendiary munition. If the blast mixes with enough of the station's onboard oxygen, the results could be catastrophic. <Insert Terrorism Impact here> UGA 10 34 File Title **Space Weapons Good** A2 Accidents Current International protocols solve any ―accidental‖ problem Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 9 (2009, ―Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-first Century‖ spacedebate.org) Further, even if a [Brilliant Pebble] ―got away‖ to ―run wild,‖ it would quickly burn up in the atmosphere. And in the case of an accidental shoot-down involving the mistaken identity of someone‘s ―innocent‖ missile (such as one carrying a communications satellite), Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocols and international notification procedures that have long governed an unwarranted response by offensive nuclear weapons against another nation: when a country plans to launch a nonthreatening rocket – such as for a weather or communications satellite or to ferry astronauts and supplies to the international space station or the moon or to send robots to Mars or to orbit telescopes – those powers possessing offensive nuclear weapons are notified well in advance, so as to avoid a terrible misunderstanding that could trigger a massive retaliatory nuclear strike against the country of origin. Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocol of advance notification and, of course, their automated systems would be switched off, even as offensive nuclear weapons would be taken off hair-trigger alert and ordered to ―stand down.‖ UGA 10 35 File Title A2 Destablizing Space weapons don‘t destabilize, rather people and their motivations Lambakis 1, Steven. is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy "Space Weapons: Refuting The Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001) When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons. There is no proof that space militarization would be destabilizing Lambakis 1, Steven. is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy "Space Weapons: Refuting The Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001) Insofar as we have no experience in space warfare, no cases exist to justify what is in essence a theoretically derived conclusion — that space combat must be destabilizing. We do know, however, that the causes of war are rarely so uncomplicated. Small events, by themselves, seldom ever explain large-scale events. When ardent Israeli nationalist Ariel Sharon visited this past fall the holy site around the Al Aksa Mosque at Jerusalem‘s Temple Mount, his arrival fired up a series of riots among impassioned Palestinians and so widened the scale of violence that it kicked up the embers of regional war yet again. Yet the visit itself would have been inconsequential were it not for the inveterate hostility underlying Israeli-Palestinian relations. Even an attack on satellites would not bring war Lambakis 1, Steven. is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy "Space Weapons: Refuting The Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001) In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing — so we are not always in the dark. Space Weapons would be stabilizing Lambakis 1, Steven. is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, On the Edge of Earth: The Future Of American Space Power. Lexington, KY: University Press Of Kentucky, 2001. The United States continues to deploy intercontinental nuclear forces having the power to utterly devastate foreign lands. Yet few maintain the this force-in-being is "provocative," and many, especially in the arms- control community will argue vigorously that the mutal assured destruction capability is actually stabilizing. Indeed, the United States continues to carry on routinely with its international relationships in a multitude of forums despite fielding and exercising with forces capable of atomizing its enemies. The logic of deterrence and the disciplined, responsible display and use of U.S. military power is accepted internationally and even praised and courted by ally - except as a U.S. power might be manifested in space. Or so it is often portrayed. UGA 10 36 File Title A2 Destabilizing Space militarization would be stabilizing Park 6, Andrew T. "Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space." Houston Journal of International Law. Vol. 28, No. 3 (2006) The fact of the matter is that the world has not fallen apart after sixty years of increasing military activity in space. The evolution of the militarization of space has been particularly shaped by pressing national security requirements of the United States, and as many space hawks firmly believe, ―this is how it will continue to be.‖ The U.S. quest for space dominance may arguably serve to further selfish military desires, but it can also provide a degree of stability that the current legal regime has been unable to provide. Space weapons can improve security and deterrence Lambakis 2, Steven. . is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy "Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs. Ed. James Clay Moltz. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002 There are sound political and strategic justifications for looking to space. First, a weapon that exploits Earth's orbit may increase the number of foreign policy and military options available to our leaders and commanders. More options mean that a leader may not be forced to take a more destructive or weaker course of action , that he has choices on how his country should act in a dynamic, complex, and often dangerous world. Effective military options, in other words, can work to improve deterrence and stability and help leaders deal more intelligently, even more diplomatically, with surprises. ASAT conflict wouldn‘t escalate Lambakis 1, Steven. is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001 Critics of ASATs frequently maintain that satellite destruction would be "escalatory," implying that such actions will take the confrontation to new levels of horror and cause the United States' enemies to exploit its vulnerabilites in space. This depiction of satellite warfare was reinforced in the Clinton Pentagon by conscious reference to "tactical" space control, implying that the deliberate destruction of satellites escalates the level of engagement to "strategic." We have all grown accustomed, after all, to understanding the dire consequences of "strategic confrontation." Yet ASAT weapons do not approach strategic nuclear weapons in their destructive power or indiscriminate effects. Stigmatizing ASATs ("ASATs = Armageddon") obscures the fact that counterspace operations can be very precise, highly discriminate, and locally nonlethal. Far from being "precipitous," satellite destruction could prove to be the most rational and militarily effective course of Action For Our Leaders To Take In Some Situations. UGA 10 37 File Title A2 Political Backlash Political backlash would be short lived Lambakis 1, Steven. Is A Senior Defense Analyst At The National Institute For Public Policy "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001) Recent criticisms surrounding the MIRACL test and the U.S. National Missile Defense program were well orchestrated and vociferous, but numerically shallow when put up against the larger body of international opinion. In fact, voices will inevitably rise, from all corners of the globe, to condemn U.S. military decisions and actions. Political assault is the price the United States pays for having global interests and power. There will always be attempts by foreign leaders and vocal minorities to influence U.S. procurement decisions through arms control and public condemnation. It costs little, and the potential gains are great. Would a vigorous military space program alienate foreign governments to the point at which Washington could never again assemble a coalition similar to the one that defeated Saddam Hussein in 1991? This is doubtful. Leading up to the onset of war, the Iraqi leader's actions, not President Bush's initiatives, dominated foreign policy discussions abroad. Indeed, many Arab countries joined the coalition, despite America's stout support for the much-hated Israel. Any significant anti-American rhetoric was quickly overshadowed by the Singular Goal Of Turning Back Naked Aggression Allies would support U.S. space weaponization in times of crisis Lambakis 1, Steven. Is A Senior Defense Analyst At The National Institute For Public Policy "Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics." Policy Review. (February 2001) Similar international support may be expected in the future, even if the United States were to deploy space-based interceptors to slap down ballistic missiles aimed at New York or Los Angeles or antisatellite weapons to blind prying eyes in times of crisis or conflict. When the stakes are high and the United States must act militarily in self-defense or to protect its interests, allies and friends are likely to judge U.S. activities in space to affect politico- strategic conditions on Earth appropriately and in context The protection, deterrence, peace and stability that space weapons could bring outweigh any impacts Dolman 3, Everett C. is Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Forces School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Space Power and US Hegemony: Maintaining a Liberal World Order in the 21st Century. . : , 2003 If the United States were to follow the simple policies advocated here (and it seems extremely unlikely that it will do so), there would undoubtedly be a huge outcry from supposedly aggrieved international interests. Boycotts of American products would be called for, condemnation resolutions would ring from every political hall, and mass demonstrations would be broadcast continuously on CNN. It is even remotely possible that preliminary military planning and action would be initiated in response. Yet this would be the response regardless of how the United States chooses to use its power. Let us move beyond hand wringing over hurt feelings and cultural or ideological relativism and do the right thing. Let us create for ourselves and for all peoples of the world a safe and prosperous future. The immediate seizure and control of near-Earth space is one clear method to that end UGA 10 38 File Title A2 Arms Races Multiple causes to arms races Payne 1, Keith R. American political scientist and academic CEO And President, National Institute For Public Policy"Action-Reaction Metaphysics and Negligence." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 2001): 109-121. Why have missile defense critics been so wrong in their predictions? In short, numerous factors drive armament decisions, and the simplistic action-reaction formulation does not account for most of them. For example, the theory ignores such basic factors as: * competing foreign policy goals and defense requirements, * inter- and intraservice rivalries, * bureaucratic politics, * the specific character and style of political and social systems, * electoral politics, * resource availability or limitations, * organizational momentum, and * technological innovation/limitation. Even highly personal and idiosyncratic factors can drive armament decisionmaking. Adolf Hitler, for example, canceled the V-2 program on the basis of a bad dream he had about the missile. Only the combined Efforts Of Albert Speer And Wernher Von Braun Got The Program Back On Track. Historical Record Demonstrates that not all Defensive Weapons Spark an Arms Races Payne 1, Keith R. American political scientist and academic CEO And President, National Institute For Public Policy"Action-Reaction Metaphysics and Negligence." Washington Quarterly. Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 2001): 109-121. From the late 1960s to the present, the first-order response to U.S. missile defense initiatives by political opponents has been to assert this logic with confidence, pointing to all historical evidence as proof. The supposed historical proof of the 'inevitable' superiority of the offense, however, is nonsense. Defensive measures have frequently, and for long stretches of history, dominated the offense. Athens's defensive walls, for example, precluded a bloody invasion by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. The defensive walls of Constantinople provided security for nearly a thousand years. British air and naval defenses shut down the planned Nazi invasion of the British Isles, Hitler's "Operation Sea Lion." Of course, Karl von Clausewitz considered defense in general to be the stronger form of warfare. Obviously, the lethality of nuclear weapons would necessitate extremely effective defenses if comprehensive protection for cities against a large-scale ballistic missile attack by a peer challenger were the goal. This, however, is not the declared U.S. goal, and whether powerful new defensive technologies, such as 'exotic' beam weapons, will make this type of defense possible in the future is not known; but it hardly can be ruled out as if by some inevitable law of history. Historical evidence supports neither the assertion that offense must dominate defense nor the argument that an action-reaction arms race cycle is inevitable. In fact, predictions based on the action- reaction model have often proven to be far different from the subsequent course of events History Demonstrates that Deployment of Space Weapons or Space-Based Missile Defense Unlikely to Start Arms Race Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 6. Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 Report. . Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, August 28, 2006. Indeed, far from producing a costly and deadly arms race, the deployment of a robust, global, space- based missile defense is likely to make it more expensive, and therefore less attractive, for other states to build missiles or to engage in regional arms races based on the deployment of missiles. There is no empirical or historical basis for the contention that such an effort will lead other states to step up their missile-related programs, leading to an escalating race to deploy missiles designed to overcome whatever missile defense is deployed by the United States. In fact, following the ABM Treaty in the 1970s, the Soviet Union nevertheless deployed large numbers of advanced missile systems, negating the logic that the ABM Treaty reduced the incentive or need to deploy new generations of missiles designed to defeat deployed missile defenses. The ABM Treaty codified a strategic relationship of mutual vulnerability in which the Soviet Union nevertheless built large numbers of additional intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads whose purpose was to increase U.S., not mutual, vulnerability – and to assure that, in the event of nuclear war, the Soviet Union would have had strategic superiority. UGA 10 39 File Title A2 Arms Races Arms races would have occurred previously if at all Lambakis 2, Steven. . is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy "Putting Military Uses of Space in Context." Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs. Ed. James Clay Moltz. Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002 States, of course, have many incentives to start a weapons program, (not just reacting to what Washington does). So we can't ignore unique national security requirements. I would also observe that there is no evidence that unique capabilities residing in U.S. stealth bombers and fighters, its aircraft carriers, advanced satellites, and superior land power forces have sparked in-kind arms racing, although governments do seek ways to counter U.S. superiority in less direct, unconventional ways. The rise of American aircraft carriers did not spark hell-bent arms racing for carriers. The appearance of U.S. stealth planes, and specialized advanced satellites, did not turn the world upside down, with adversaries focused single-mindedly on matching the United States in these areas. Why do we presume that other states will not jump to space simply to counter the operational advantages the United States currently enjoys there? History tells us that this is what will happen. States will not need the incentive of an American ASAT Program To Do So Arms Races will Inevitably Occur, regardless of Missile Defense Plans Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 9. Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty- First Century. . Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009. To begin with, arms races stem from competition for offensive weapons and while it is true that some arms races are designed in part to overcome someone‘s defenses, the converse that the absence of defenses breeds the absence of offensive weapons is without historical basis. Indeed, this proposition is supported by irrefutable evidence that the United States never has had missile defenses for its population, much less its military installations (save for selective use of limited "point" defense, such as the Patriot). But that reality has not prevented either nuclear proliferation or nuclear arms buildups; it has in all probability been the reverse. The evidence also is clear that the past 40 years, most especially the last decade, have seen relentless buildups and bold moves to spread the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as witness evolving events in Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran (discussed elsewhere in this report). One of the few times there has been a significant slowing of momentum was in the brief period 1985-93, which was the height of missile defense development in the United States. UGA 10 40 File Title Space Weapons K2 Space Deterence U.S. Should Develop Space Weapons to Deter and Dissuade Attack Against its Space Assets Spencer, Jack and Kathy Gudgel 5. The Heritage Foundation‘s research fellows in Nuclear Energy Policy "The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review: China and SpaceThe Unmentionable Issues." . WebMemo #819 (August 11, 2005). Currently, satellites are expensive and fragile and can be disrupted by relatively inexpensive weapons. Although several countries possess the latent capability to engage in space warfare, this option has never been exercised. A direct attack against a satellite would be a first and would be unlikely to be an isolated attack. The consequences of engaging in such a conflict would likely be severe. Depending on the scale of the exchange, it is possible that many low-Earth orbit assets could be affected, thereby denying both military and civilian users these resources. This is precisely why the United States must work to dissuade hostile parties from further developing these capabilities, deter them from using them if they do develop them, and be prepared to both respond and minimize the consequences should deterrence fail Space-Based Missile Defense will Dissuade Adversaries from Developing Ballistic Missiles Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 6. Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 Report. . Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, August 28, 2006. The benefits of space-based defense are manifold. The deployment of a robust global missile defense that includes space-based interdiction capabilities will make more expensive, and therefore less attractive, the foreign development of technologies needed to overcome it, particularly with regard to ballistic missiles. Indeed, the enduring lesson of the ABM Treaty era is that the absence of defenses, rather than their presence, empowers the development of offensive technologies that can threaten American se- curity and the lives of American citizens. And access to space, as well as space control, is key to future U.S. efforts to provide disincentives to an array of actors seeking such power. UGA 10 41 File Title A2 OST prevents weapons Outer Space Treaty does not Prohibit Space Weapons Shaw, John E 2. Major Shaw is an award winning author on aerospace issues and is currently assigned to Headquarters USAF at the Pentagon. His previous assignments have included tours in Air Force Space Command. Whither Space Power?: Forging a Strategy for the New Century. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 2002. The Outer Space Treaty does not ban military activities or weapons in space: "The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited." It goes on to add that use of any facility or equipment for "peaceful purposes" is allowed. The only weapons banned are those of mass destruction and those stationed on the Moon or other heavenly bodies. The key to all these activities is the meaning of the phrase, "peaceful purposes." In fact, this phrase encompasses defensive military activities as discussed under the UN Charter. Thus, all of our military space pro-grams today are fully compliant with the Outer Space Treaty, including future ones that could involve weapons. We have already noted that the US Supreme Court defined the blockade of goods and services as a permissible defensive activity in 1863. We have also noted that the development of space weapons will most likely follow the highly kinetic high-precision route, rather than mass destruction path. UGA 10 42 File Title A2 Accidents International protocols would resolve accidents from space based weapons Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ‘09 [―Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century‖, 2009, p. 91//wfi-hdm] Brilliant Pebbles could be programmed to Deactivate in Low-Risk Orbits to Avoid Accidents. The oranges are different. They would be space-based interceptors, defensive weapons, designed to save lives and property. They would be small and compact defensive weapons, in this case Brilliant Pebbles (BP), that would use not explosives but their own body weight to provide kinetic energy. This would occur when the device (pebble) first ―sees‖ the hostile nuclear weapon as it is launched, and locks on to the ascending missile. The device, powered by a mini- rocket, then would streak down or out or up to strike the missile (like a large pebble) and knock it out of commission. Obviously, seconds count, because once the pebble ―sees‖ the missile firing, it must respond instantly or it is too late and the hostile missile is well on its way to its target. The problem of accidental activation, however, would be virtually eliminated, because the autonomous system – like cruise control on an automobile – would be designed to be switched off as the BPs pass over friendly or non-hostile territory and turned on again over potentially hostile territory and programmed to do so automatically. A reasonable comparison is the average home security system, which must be real-time automated, to activate its alarms the second an unwanted intruder shows up, so that law enforcement can respond effectively. Obviously, a prudent owner will turn off the alarm when moving about the premises or when expecting guests, but otherwise the owner wants the system armed to be able to respond quickly when needed. Space based weapons would be programmed to avoid allied satellites and nonthreatening allied weapons Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis ‘09 [―Missile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century‖, 2009, p. 91//wfi-hdm] Further, even if a [Brilliant Pebble] ―got away‖ to ―run wild,‖ it would quickly burn up in the atmosphere. And in the case of an accidental shoot-down involving the mistaken identity of someone‘s ―innocent‖ missile (such as one carrying a communications satellite), Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocols and international notification procedures that have long governed an unwarranted response by offensive nuclear weapons against another nation: when a country plans to launch a nonthreatening rocket – such as for a weather or communications satellite or to ferry astronauts and supplies to the international space station or the moon or to send robots to Mars or to orbit telescopes – those powers possessing offensive nuclear weapons are notified well in advance, so as to avoid a terrible misunderstanding that could trigger a massive retaliatory nuclear strike against the country of origin. Brilliant Pebbles and other SBIs would fall under the same protocol of advance notification and, of course, their automated systems would be switched off, even as offensive nuclear weapons would be taken off hair-trigger alert and ordered to ―stand down.‖ Critics continuously exaggerate the risks of space weapon accidents Lambakis ‘01 [Steven Lambakis, Managing Editor, Comparative Strategy, Press of Kentucky, ―On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power.‖, 2001, p. 259//wfi-hdm] Even if a spacecraft were shot down by accident, the implications would not be so grave when compared, for example, to an accidental launch of a nuclear tipped missile. So, asked Walter McDougall, "why is it more important to protect pristine space, where nothing lives, than the crowded earth?" This is a good question. It is a question that has never been addressed fully by the space sanctuary enthusiasts (apart from making the apolitical, astrategic point that attacking unmanned targets in space makes wars "more likely" or is escalatory), who tend to use only one "strategic" framework for assessing the implications of space weapons: the framework of apocalypse. Any use of weapons in or from space will bring doom to "our planet." Arms races will drain the life blood out of that national budget. Interception of nuclear-tipped ICBMs in space is a precursor to a treacherous instability, that kind that could lead to nuclear holocaust. A decision by the United States to use the space environment for protection will bring the acrimony of the entire world against Washington, asphyxiating U.S. national and economic security. This is not strategic though -- this is the worst case, even unimaginable-case scenario played to the hilt. UGA 10 43 File Title A2 Escalation/Miscal Historical examples of crises and accidents prove no escalation would occur with space weapons Lambakis ‘01 [Steven Lambakis, Managing Editor, Comparative Strategy, Press of Kentucky, ―Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics.‖, Policy Review. February 2001//wfi-hdm] To these examples we may add a long list of tactical blunders growing out of ambiguous circumstances and faulty intelligence, including the U.S. bombing in 1999 of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Kosovo operations. Yet though these tragic actions occurred in near-war or tinderbox situations, they did not escalate or exacerbate local instability. The world also survived U.S.-Soviet "near encounters" during the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 1961 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Guarded diplomacy won the day in all cases. Why would disputes affecting space be any different? UGA 10 44 File Title Solvency-SW Advantages Space Weapons have 5 distinct advantages:  Access and far reach,  Rapid response,  Distance from hostile defense,  Distinction from ICBMs,  Difficulty of defense Preston et. al. 02 (Bob, Space Analyst for RAND Corporation, Space Weapons, Earth Wars, pg. xxi) Advantages Access and reach. Space weapons can attack targets that may be inaccessible to other weapons, could provide access to targets without concern for transit of denied airspace, and could provide global power projection to nations that possess them. . Rapid response. In contrast to weapons launched from ships or aircraft, which could take a few days to some weeks to reach a theater of operations far from the United States, space-based weapons could offer response times from several minutes to several hours. only long-range ballistic missiles can achieve similar performance. Distance. The great distance of space-based weapons from earth and from other objects in space has two key advantages . First, it makes space-based weapons less vulnerable to attack. Second, it would help distinguish them from terrestrial ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons. Difficulty of defense. Space-based kinetic-energy weapons directed at surface targets are very difficult to defend against because of their very high velocity and very brief flight through the atmosphere. The difficulty is similar to that involved in defeating reentry vehicles from ICBMs but is complicated by the possibility of a much shorter warning time . UGA 10 45 File Title Solvency-SW =/= Confusion for WMDs Space weapons won‘t be confused with WMDs- Empirically proven and based on system derivations Preston et. al. 02 (Bob, Space Analyst for RAND Corporation, Space Weapons, Earth Wars, pgs. 48-9) One might think that space launch vehicles could be confused with ballistic missiles during launch. However, basing location, number launched at one time, and signature (infrared intensity over time) indicate the vehicle type at launch. As the launch proceeds, when tracking no longer provides a predicted impact point on the earth, i.e., when the trajectory achieves orbit, there is no doubt that the launch is a spacecraft rather than a ballistic missile. Aircraft, cruise missiles and shorter range ballistic missiles that have a historical association with nuclear weapons have later been used for conventional warheads without confusion. Some- such as the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers, the air-launched cruise missile, and the Tomahawk cruise missile- have been converted from nuclear warheads to conventional warheads while retaining nuclear capability. If the kind of responsiveness and reach possible with long-range ballistic missiles is desirable, it should be possible to avoid the confusion with nuclear weapons through some combination of vehicle characteristics, operational practice, basing, and arms control. Achieving distinguishable vehicle characteristics might be a natural consequence of developing a vehicle similar to a ballistic missile but with better economy, possibly through reuse or derivation from a space launch vehicle. UGA 10 46 File Title Solvency-Advantages Space weapons effective at rapid response against high-value targets in hostile theaters Preston et. al. 02 (Bob, Space Analyst for RAND Corporation, Space Weapons, Earth Wars, pg. 58) The most attractive attribute of space forces is their availability on short notice without the need to ask permission for access or the need for a substantial footprint in theater ." Whenever access is opposed; infrastructure (airfields, ports, fuel, water, etc.) is lacking; or land, sea, or air forces simply are not available, space forces could initiate or support operations. In such a theater, space forces should be the first, or among the first, forces employed. However, unless they themselves are backed up with suitable replenishment logistics, they cannot operate alone for long before sharing some of the burden with other forces arriving in theater. Even if the space forces have the logistical staying power to operate alone for an extended time, it would be better for other forces with complementary strengths to join in as soon as possible. Extended operations by only one kind of force will quickly teach the opponent to adapt to its limitations. Instead, the preference should be to combine complementary forces quickly in a concentrated, joint operation. With these general caveats, the duration of a space-only or space-heavy period of operations would depend on the specifics of the threat and theater and on the reach and speed of the air, land, and naval forces joining the fight. When air, land, and naval forces do join the fight, they should fill the gaps and relieve some or most of the space force's burden. Aircraft and surface-to-air missiles should be able to prosecute air targets in bad weather that space-based lasers cannot penetrate. As enough assets arrive, they should take over the burden in fair weather where they can reach. As airborne lasers and surface-to-air missiles arrive, they should prosecute ballistic missile targets within their reach, leaving the targets out of reach to the space-based lasers. Aircraft and cruise missiles should be able to attack interdiction targets. When other forces are in play, the special attributes of space weapons should enter into decisions about when and how to employ them. Because of their quick response, space weapons may be the only ones that can reach fleeting targets in time -provided that the value of the target is worth expending the weapon. UGA 10 47 File Title Solvency-SW k2 airpower Space weapons are key to air power effectiveness and more attractive than current alternatives Preston et. al. 02 (Bob, Space Analyst for RAND Corporation, Space Weapons, Earth Wars, pg. 58-9) When the risk of using manned aircraft is unacceptable, space weapons could accomplish many strategic attack and interdiction objectives traditionally reserved for the air component. Currently, the low-risk alternatives are to drop precision-, laser- or Global-Positioning System-guided bombs from aircraft that are beyond the reach of air-defense artillery (once the surface-to-air missile threat is suppressed), to drop precision bombs from stealthy airplanes (when the threats are not suppressed), or to use cruise missiles. However, even stealthy aircraft are vulnerable to the ―golden BB‖ of random antiaircraft fire. Cruise missiles can be shot down en route to their targets and may be logistically expensive as space alternatives, depending on how launch platform costs are counted. Opponents may withhold and hide some air defense missiles to prevent suppression. In hostile air defense environments in which the chance of losing a pilot is high, space weapons could be an alternative to high-altitude aircraft or cruise missiles. For small numbers of heavily defended, high-value targets, space weapons could be the weapon of choice. This may make them particularly attractive for strategic attacks on enemy economic and infrastructure targets, which are often fixed and may be protected. Because the responsiveness of space weapons is high relative to the sortie times and scheduling complexities of long-range stealth bombers, it may be easier to achieve the shock effects of mass and concentration against such targets using space weapons, either alone or in conjunction with the aircraft for restrike after damage assessment. If they are being used for the first time against an opponent, their unfamiliarity might also add to the shock. Because of the difficulty in defending against space weapons that provide destructive suppression or radio frequency jamming, they may also be helpful in suppressing enemy air defenses at targets that need a heavier air attack. But if the attacks are not suitably synchronized with air operations, they may only alert air defenses. On the other hand, because of the agility and reach of space weapons, this effect might be exploited to misdirect and confuse air defenses. UGA 10 48 File Title ***Negative*** A2 Aerospace Advantage The Aerospace industry will rebound without the plan, just with a new set of goals Written by Marcia Smith, Monday, 11 July 2011, End of Shuttle Not End of US Aerospace Leadership, http://spacepolicyonline.com/pages/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1689:aiaa-end-of-shuttle-not-end-of-us- aerospace-leadership&catid=83:news&Itemid=76 The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) issued a statement following the final launch of the space shuttle program asserting that it did not signal the end of NASA or the end of U.S. aerospace leadership. The statement from AIAA's Public Policy Committee says in part: "The launch of space shuttle Atlantis on 8 July closes an important epoch in American science, but does not signal the end of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA]. Nor, does the launch of Atlantis signal the end of American leadership in aerospace. Today, the United States is better positioned to continue leading the world in space exploration, understanding our planet's environment, and making discoveries which benefit all of humankind. Just as in aviation, where in one hundred years we have seen the creation of hundreds of thousands jobs in small and large businesses across America selling products globally, in the next fifty years we will see the same in the field of space exploration." AIAA Executive Director Bob Dickman acknowledged in a separate statement that the Atlantis launch evokes "mixed feelings," but that "we recognize the promise of a bright future in which industry and commerce will play a greater role as we work together to build on the shuttle's legacy engineering and science achievements." The ITAR will destroy aerospace regardless of the plan NASA Academy ‘08 (NASA Academy, ROADMAP TO A SPACE FARING CIVILIZATION, http://www.eng.buffalo.edu/~cheetham/index_files/NA08_GSFC_RSFC_VER_1.0.pdf) JL Another area of concern with ITAR is its effect on the United States aerospace industry as a competitor in the global market. Because the process to obtain export licenses can be so costly, foreign customers often choose to deal with ITAR-free or non-U.S. companies. According to research done by the Department of Commerce and the Bureau of Industry and Security, between 2003 and 2006, the US share in the global market has decreased by 20% for all commercial communications satellites and by 10% for geosynchronous satellites. The reported loss of all foreign sales due to ITAR during the four year period was $2.35 billion. Furthermore, the study found that the average yearly cost of compliance industry-wide was $49 million. Many countries who would usually buy from the United States are instead researching the technologies themselves which is essentially proliferating the same technology that ITAR is intended to protect., The aerospace industry wont thrive until we git rid of ITRA, which the plan dosent do ASA Administrator on November 26, 2007, November 26, 2007, Fix ITAR to Protect our National and Economic Security, http://aerostates.org/media-releases/fix-itar-to-protect-our-national-and-economic-security, One positive step would be for Congress to approve legislation that would prohibit the Defense Department from giving contracts to companies that use Chinese launch vehicles. However, ITAR is a problem even when Chinese rockets are not involved. The law actually has encouraged other countries to go into competition with U.S. satellite component makers by building factories to make satellite parts they once had to buy from U.S. companies. Instead of discouraging the spread of these technologies, ITAR is speeding it up. That hurts U.S. security and U.S. companies. On a panel at the 58th International Astronautical Congress held this fall in Hyderabad, India, Ray Williamson, a research professor at George Washington University‘s Space Policy Institute in Washington, stated, ―In the long run ITAR is going to be destructive of U.S. industry.‖ Congress must act to reform ITAR regulations to strengthen our commercial space industries. The current regulations allow export licenses tobe granted when a part is available commercially elsewhere in the world. In fact, the very existence of what Thales calls its ―ITAR Free Satellite‖ suggests most satellite parts no longer belong on the list of prohibited exports. Are-evaluation of the ITAR controlled technologies is critical to ensure U.S. competitiveness and jobs. Congress would do well to heed the words of Ronald Regan: ―Trust but verify.‖ It takes more than trust to ensure that laws written to strengthen the United States are actually doing so. Congress needs to verify that U.S. laws are working as intended. Today ITAR is not working as intended and must be reformed in order to produce a stronger America. Brian Dubie is Vermont‘s lieutenant governor and chair of the Aerospace States Association (ASA), whose mission is to grow the U.S. aerospace sector and to promote the education of America‘s next generatio n. UGA 10 49 File Title A2 Aerospace Advantage ITAR is the one thing between the US and a thriving aerospace industry, and space supremacy the plan doesn‘t solve for that By ANTONIE BOESSENKOOL, Writer for defense news, 13 May 2011, ITAR Hurts U.S. Innovation, Industry Group Says http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3524389&c=AME&s=TOP The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) that govern the export of defense-related goods is hurting innovation in the U.S. space industry and threatening national security, said retired U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Craig Weston, an associate fellow at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. The U.S. companies most affected by ITAR in the aerospace industry are second- and third-tier satellite component suppliers, not prime contractors, and those suppliers have provided much of the innovation within the industry, Weston told reporters at a May 12 AIAA press briefing. "Second- and third-tier suppliers invest significantly more in their internal research and development when compared to U.S. prime contractors," he said. "As these suppliers lose market share in the global marketplace, rapidly emerging foreign industrial the long-term impact is a reduction in the funding they have available to invest in cutting-edge technological development." At the same time, " capabilities are challenging U.S. space superiority, which is contrary to the intent of ITAR," Weston said. "Moreover, ITAR has blocked the U.S. from benefiting from the growth of foreign space capabilities." The AIAA recommends several steps, including taking some satellite components made by U.S. companies off the list of products regulated by ITAR, thereby giving those companies a broader market. AIAA has put together a team of technical experts to compare the commercial performance levels of U.S. commercial satellite components with that of equivalent foreign components and will recommend that U.S. components that perform at or below a set commercial performance level no longer be controlled by ITAR, Weston said. Those components "will not be militarily useful to foreign nations." AIAA has just begun work on this initiative but hopes to have initial findings by early summer. ITAR also has discouraged foreign companies from working with the U.S., Weston said. "U.S. satellite capabilities have historically benefited from foreign collaboration" and hiring foreign workers, he said. "ITAR has increasingly discouraged open exchanges of ideas and innovations, to the point that collaborative efforts with the U.S. are no longer considered as viable or desirable models and are often presumed to be prohibited by foreign companies," Weston said. The AIAA also talked about the aerospace work force: Many employees are preparing to retire in the next five to 10 years, yet finding, attracting and retaining qualified replacements is becoming more difficult. The average age of employees in the aerospace industry is 45, said incoming AIAA President George Muellner. "Despite the fact that the U.S. graduates almost 200,000 engineers and scientists every year, the aerospace industry is finding a much more competitive environment to bring them in and keep them in, and there just aren't enough engineers and scientists out there," Muellner said. Last year, Aviation Week identified almost 40,000 jobs in aerospace that weren't filled, he said. Shortfalls in science and engineering education are part of the problem. "Right now, America is the most productive nation in the world," Muellner said. "We run the risk of losing that. The reason is because of our lack of investment, the education issues and various [research and development] issues … where other nations are spending more time and energy in those areas." UGA 10 50 File Title A2 Iran Advantage Iran does not have enough technology to be considered a space power or threat CIA-DI 10 (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, November 16, 2010, Russia: Security Concerns About Iran’s Space Program Growing, http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iran-space.pdf) Most statements from Russian officials and legislators—in contrast to the views of Russian scientific experts—have consistently focused on Iran‘s current limited capability in missile technology while asserting Iran‘s benign future intentions or its inability to develop ICBMs. • Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in March 2010 said that Iran currently has no missiles with a long-range strike capability and is unlikely to develop such missiles in the foreseeable future. • Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin during a press conference in March 2009 cited the 2009 assessment by the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces that ―Tehran only possesses missiles with a limited range of up to 1,000 km.‖ • Chairman of the Russian Federation Council‘s Committee on International Affairs Mikhail Margelov in a February 2009 interview said that the Iranian space launches do not mean that ―Iran is capable of using its achievements for military purposes‖ and that ―there is no reason to believe that Iran‘s space program poses some kind of a global threat.‖ • Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko in August 2008 said that concern over Tehran‘s intentions to use space rocket technology for the development of an indigenous ballistic missile is groundless and that, ―if Iran strictly adheres to its announced plans to use space for peaceful purposes, then its space program will pose no threat for international stability and security.‖ • In November 2007, Army Gen. Yuri Baluevsky, then Joint Chief of Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, was quoted by the Strana.ru online news agency as saying that the Iranian missile threat is grossly exaggerated and that Iran would not be able to build an ICBM until at least 2020. (U//FOUO) Iran has no desire to use satellite technology for offensive military purposes. Bayyenat 7/7 (Abolghasem, Ph.D candidate from Syracuse University and independent political analyst, July 7, 2011, Pride in the Future: The Politics of Iran‘s Space Program, http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Pride_in_the_Future_The_Politics_of_Iran_s_Space_Program.htm) This line of argument suffers from two main problems. First, Iran is already subject to harsh economic sanctions imposed by Western powers and would not need the luxury of a cover to develop long-range ballistic missile technology. Even though long-range ballistic missiles are largely associated with nuclear warheads, theoretically speaking nothing prevents Iran from the perspective of international law from developing long-range ballistic missiles if they are only capable of delivering conventional warheads. Iran could thus openly work on the development of such technology while ignoring Western accusations. Second, Iran does not define for itself a global military role that necessitates the development of long-range ballistic missile technology. Long-range ballistic missiles cannot significantly increase Iran‘s deterrence against extra-regional powers given that these countries are already equipped with missile defense shield technology which enables them to destroy incoming missiles in the air. This can be performed especially more easily if they are launched by countries which are less advanced in the area of missile technology. Iran simply pursues military deterrence against regional adversaries, which are located within the striking distance of its various missiles, as well as against those extra-regional powers which have military bases in the region. Iran‘s modest military expenditures as compared to even some of its small neighboring countries and the overwhelmingly defensive nature of its military capabilities all point to the fact that Iran does not seek military roles beyond its means. Just to get a better sense of this reality, it helps to know that, for example, according to a paper published in fall 2010 in the Middle East Journal, the six Arab members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, with a combined population of less than one third of Iran, spent 7.5 times as much on their defense as Iran in the ten-year period 1997–2007. Similarly, they spent 15.6 times as much on arms procurement as Iran during the same period. Iran‘s main goal for developing satellite technology is presence in space not for the sake of military technologies incidental to a space program but for the strategic and political benefits emanating from the very space presence itself. Possessing the technology to build satellites and lunch them into space gives Iran strategic benefits in both civilian and military arenas over the long run . Self-sufficiency in the production and launch of satellites to provide telecommunications and possible military reconnaissance services is an important national security goal for Iran. Iran‘s arch rivals in the region either already possess such technologies or can rely on Western support for providing these services. Facing a hostile West, Iran cannot rely on already-existing satellite services and technologies and thus has to help itself. UGA 10 51 File Title A2 Iran Advantage Iran unlikely to use ballistic missiles against U.S. space assets Weston 9 (Scott, USAF Major/ instructor and evaluator pilot, March 1, 2009, Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks and U.S Policy Implications) Finally, any scenario involving conflict with Iran includes the possibility that that country would use its ballistic missiles to attack US space assets. Because attacking a specific satellite would involve tracking and targeting resources that Iran does not possess, such an attempt would amount to a blind strike against the orbital environment. By scattering debris at altitudes used by the United States‘ ISR satellites, Iran could hope to degrade or disable as many such satellites as possible. Although this threat is real, many reasons argue against carrying it out. First, debris clouds are indiscriminate and would potentially damage satellites from every nation that uses those specific altitudes. The guaranteed international condemnation would only serve to strengthen the US political position globally with respect to the conflict. Second, the United States‘ ability to model and track debris clouds to a certain extent would enable it to mitigate some postattack risk from debris. Finally, the use of Iranian ballistic missiles in this manner would make them unavailable for attacks against US forces on the ground. UGA 10 52 File Title A2 China Advantage A US space deployment would inevitably lead to an arms race with China Lewis 4 (Jefferey, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New American Foundation, July 2004, What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios, spacedebate.org) It is important to understand that there is another, more likely "inevitability" involved if the United States pursues these capabilities, that is: other nations almost assuredly would, too. Although Russia and China have declared a moratorium on ASAT testing, it would be irresponsible for either state not to acquire their own deterrent to potential U.S. ASAT attacks. Russian and Chinese ASATs may, in turn, be a reason (or, perhaps, just an excuse) for states such as India to follow suit. Still other countries -- and this includes North Korea and probably Iran -- that have the desire, but not yet the skills, would then be able to "draft" in the wake of the big powers through espionage, declassification and, perhaps, the black market. The point is this: once the United States has gone down the ASAT road, there likely won't be an option of negotiating a ban on ASATs or discouraging the proliferation of legitimate dual-use technologies such as microsatellites. As we have learned with nuclear and missile proliferation, once the genie is out of the bottle, it is out for good Arms Race leads to increased risks of miscalc and misinterpretation, escalating conflict Wright and Grego 10 (David, senior scientist and co-director of the UCS Global Security Program, and Laura, senior scientist in the Global Security Program of the UCS, November 15, 2010, Securing the Skies: Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/securing- the-skies-full-report-1.pdf) Third, threats to satellites can amplify the risks of other undesirable outcomes, such as the creation or escalation of terrestrial crises. The development of ASAT capabilities by one country could create enough suspicion and tension to spur the development of ASAT weapons by others. Because so much of satellite and space-launch technology is dual-use, development of space systems would increase the chances of dangerous misinterpretations, especially in the absence of clearly stated policies and meaningful communication between countries. Moreover, if ASAT weapons are being developed and tested, the loss of an important satellite during a time of political tension could be interpreted—rightly or wrongly—as an attack. Quickly determining the reason for the satellite‘s disruption might be difficult or impossible, and this incomplete information together with the absence of reliable channels for communication between countries that are not close allies could exacerbate the crisis even further, possibly leading to its escalation. Recent ―war game‖ conflict simulations confirm that such a satellite loss could have very serious consequences. Miscalc leads to nuclear war PR Newswire 98 (April 29, 1998, ―NEJM Study Warns of Increasing Risk of Accidental Nuclear Attack; Over 6.8 Million Immediate Deaths Possible‖, lexisnexis.com) An 'accidental' nuclear attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading nuclear war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators. Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games" it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a nuclear counterattack that could trigger full-scale nuclear war with billions of casualties worldwide. The authors describe the immediate effects of an "accidental" launch from a single Russian submarine that would kill at least six to eight million people in firestorms in eight major U.S. cities. With hospitals destroyed and medical personnel killed, and with major communications and transportation networks disrupted, the delivery of emergency care would be all but impossible, according to Forrow and his colleagues. UGA 10 53 File Title A2 Asteroid Advantage Asteroids can be predicted well in advance Garretson and Kaupa 8 (Peter, Lt. Col. Chief Headquarters USAF, and Douglas, test pilot and test director for chief of staff of Air Force, Fall 2008, Planetary Defense: Potential Mitigation Roles of the Department of Defense, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/garretson.html) The good news is that, unlike predicting earthquakes and hurricanes, we can actually see most asteroids and comets arriving years or decades in advance and do something about it. The technology required to avert a catastrophe lies within our reach, at a comparatively modest expenditure. However, no one is in charge, no one owns the problem, and no one has been assigned the mission—not NASA, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We have no on-the-shelf contingency plans, tabletop interagency scenarios, interagency memoranda of agreements, standard operating procedures, or hardware available for a mitigation mission. There are better options than weaponizing in order to detect and protect from asteroids Tonry 11 (John, astronomy professor at the University of Hawaii and leader on ATLAS project as well as Pan-STAARS, December 15, 2011, ―An Early Warning System for Asteroid Impact‖ http://www.jstor.org/) Earth is bombarded by meteors, occasionally by one large enough to cause a significant explosion and possible loss of life. It is not possible to detect all hazardous asteroids, and the efforts to detect them years before they strike are only advancing slowly. Similarly, ideas for mitigation of the danger from an impact by moving the asteroid are in their infancy. Although the odds of a deadly asteroid strike in the next century are low, the most likely impact is by a relatively small asteroid, and we suggest that the best mitigation strategy in the near term is simply to move people out of the way. With enough warning, a small asteroid impact should not cause loss of life, and even portable property might be preserved. We describe an early warning system that could provide a week‘s notice of most sizeable asteroids or comets on track to hit the Earth. This may be all the mitigation needed or desired for small asteroids, and it can be implemented immediately for relatively low cost. This system, dubbed Asteroid Terrestrial- Impact Last Alert System (ATLAS), comprises two observatories separated by about 100 km that simultaneously scan the visible sky twice a night. Software automatically registers a comparison with the unchanging sky and identifies everything that has moved or changed. Communications between the observatories lock down the orbits of anything approaching the Earth, within one night if its arrival is less than a week. The sensitivity of the system permits detection of 140 m asteroids (100 Mton impact energy) three weeks before impact and 50 m asteroids a week before arrival. An ATLAS alarm, augmented by other observations, should result in a determination of impact location and time that is accurate to a few kilometers and a few seconds. In addition to detecting and warning of approaching asteroids, ATLAS will continuously monitor the changing universe around us: most of the variable stars in our Galaxy, many microlensing events from stellar alignments, luminous stars and novae in nearby galaxies, thousands of supernovae, nearly a million quasars and active galactic nuclei, tens of millions of galaxies, and a billion stars. With two views per day ATLAS will make the variable universe as familiar to us as the sunrise and sunset. UGA 10 54 File Title A2 Asteroid Advantage Impact of asteroids are very improbable and the timeline is unrealistic Tonry 11 (John, astronomy professor at the University of Hawaii and leader on ATLAS project as well as Pan-STAARS, December 15, 2011, ―An Early Warning System for Asteroid Impact‖ http://www.jstor.org/) We are therefore left with some uncertainty about the frequency of damage from asteroid impact. The calibration by Brown et al. (2002) of small NEOs is based on the rate of large fireballs from atmospheric impacts and a conversion from optical to explosion energy, and this is joined onto estimates from counts of asteroids as a function of H magnitude. The rate of impacts by large asteroids (140 m and larger) is estimated to only one per 20,000 yr or more, the rate of impacts by 50 m Tunguska-sized objects (5 Mton arrival kinetic energy) is about one per 1000 yr, and the rate of 10 m (40 kton arrival kinetic energy) impacts is about one per decade (NRC 2010). These rates are probably uncertain to a factor of at least two, and the work of Boslough and Crawford (2008) illustrates the difficulty in predicting surface damage from the incident kinetic energy. UGA 10 55 File Title A2 Russia Advantage Russia too far behind in the technology to challenge US and become a space power. RIA Novosti 10 (Russia International Agency, May 13, 2010, ―Russia‘s Space Defense in Shambles-experts‖, http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100513/159003853.html) A group of retired Russian generals warned on Thursday that the country's space defenses are obsolete and have a limited capability to counter possible threats from space. "Frankly, our space defense capabilities are limited and insufficient to ensure our national security," former Air Force commander Anatoly Kornukov told a roundtable on the future of Russia's air and space defenses in Moscow. He said Russia is lagging behind the United States in the development of space-based weapons and space defense systems by at least 25-30 years and the Russian defense industry cannot meet the demand for advanced weaponry. The Russian political and military leadership have long announced plans to develop strong missile and space defenses by 2020, but no concrete steps have been taken so far and the country doesn't even have a well-defined command structure to tackle this problem, Kornukov said. The former head of armament procurement for the Russian Armed Forces, Anatoly Sitnov, said Russia had lost more than 300 unique technologies in the sphere of space and missile development in the past few years. There is no interest or infrastructure in Russia to pursue space weapon technology Krepon and Podvig 9 (Michael, co-founder of Stimson and director of South Asia and Space Security, and Pavel, affiliate and former research associate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and former researcher at Center for Arms Control Studies at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, April 7 2009, Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/npc_space_nuclear1.pdf) [Podvig] It would be actually be fairly difficult to do that in practical terms. In terms of actual programs and developments, things are not very good for either space weapons or ASAT in Russia because most of the industrial and organizational infrastructure that supported those programs has been scattered around, and we don‘t have either the military service dedicated to this kind of thing but also Russia does not have a unified ministry in the defense industry that would carry enough weight to lobby for this kind of a program. Besides, looking from the other direction, Russia, the discussion about ASAT and space, military uses of space, is actually influenced by the fact that Russia doesn‘t really have a lot of space assets to protect. The integration of military satellites into the actual military operations is actually not very good. Again, on a positive note, access to space is basically controlled largely by the space forces, by Roscosmos, the civilian agency, to a certain extent the rocket forces, and none of those institutions actually has great interest or any real investment in any kind of an ASAT capability or any weapon-in-space developments. Link Turn – The only way that Russia would obtain space weapons would be if specifically the US did first New York Times, Thursday, September 27, 2007, Russia issues warning on space-based weapons,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/world/europe/27iht-russia.4.7662417.html MOSCOW — The chief of Russia's space forces said Thursday that the nation would have to retaliate if others deployed weapons in space - a stern warning to the United States. While Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin did not name any specific country, he was clearly referring to U.S. plans for space-based weapons, which the Kremlin has vociferously opposed. "We don't want to wage a war in space, we don't want to gain dominance in space, but we won't allow any other nation to dominate space," Popovkin said in televised remarks. "If any country deploys weapons in space then the laws of warfare are such that retaliatory weapons are certain to appear." President Vladimir Putin has criticized U.S. plans for space-based weapons, saying they could trigger a new arms race. When China tested an anti-satellite missile in January, Putin said that the move was a response to U.S. plans for space-based weapons. Russia and China have strongly pushed for an international agreement banning space weapons, but their proposals have been stymied by the United States. "It's necessary to legalize the game rules in space," Popovkin said. He warned that the complexity of space weapons could trigger a war. Satellites may fail on technical reasons, but their owner could think they were incapacitated by an enemy and could be tempted to retaliate, he said. "If that happens, a nation might ask a legitimate question: could it be the beginning of an effort to deafen and blind it." President George W. Bush signed an order in October 2006 tacitly asserting the right of the United States to space weapons and opposing the development of treaties or other measures restricting them. UGA 10 56 File Title A2 Terrorism Advantage SPACE WEAPONS HAVE NO UTILITY FOR ADDRESSING TERROR THREATS EISENHOWER INSTITUTE, staff, A European Perspective on Current Trends in Military and Civilian Space, July 15, 2002, www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/fos/newfrontier/parismeeting.htm //mac-dch. The panelists recognized international terrorism as the foremost current threat to the US, and acknowledged that it is a threat against which the US must defend itself, including its space assets. One participant, however, argued that the worldwide struggle against terrorism will not be a space war, but an information war. Terrorists, he said, are more likely to engage in cyber attacks and suicide bombings than in a direct attack on objects in orbit, and it is these contingencies for which the US should concentrate on preparing itself. Another member of the group concurred, noting that terrorist groups rely on information-based networks rather than on a particular geographical location as bases from which to launch since one cannot strike against a network from space, let alone with any other conventional military their attacks. And weaponry, he continued, space weapons have very little utility for countering the terrorist threat. However, the renewed threat of terrorism does indeed provide impetus for carefully considering various means for shielding space assets. It was also noted at the meeting that given budgetary constraints and limited political will, it will be difficult to wage a campaign for space control and the war on terrorism at the same time. TURN: WEAPONIZATION INCREASES TERROR RISKS Bryan Dorn, M.A., International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington, ―The Weaponisation of Space: Justification and Consequences,‖ NEW ZEALAND INTERNATIONAL REVIEW v. 30 n. 3, May 20 05, p. 2+, LN. Those nations unable to match US space dominance would be compelled to adopt asymmetrical challenges, including chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism. Threatened nations could feel compelled to develop space-based weapons, thus increasing the threat to US ground forces and strategic assets, and neutralising the unique advantage Washington currently possesses. Many experts also argue that there would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemming from the need to counter other asymmetric challenges from those who could not afford to be participants in the race itself. The financial costs of establishing space-based missile interceptors, the consequent arms race, complemented by the vulnerabilities of space weapons and satellites, indicate that there will be limited strategic advantage if the United States pursues the weaponisation of space. While a space arms race may naturally emerge due to the US reliance upon space-based systems for terrestrial military operations, America's weaponisation of space will reinforce attention upon its dependence on space and encourage an opponent's desire to target space-based systems. The deployment of missile defence and the stationing of space-based interceptors will foster brewing Chinese and Russian strategic competition. Contrary to belief, the post-Cold War environment is still influenced by Cold War nuclear anxieties. While Beijing and Moscow can ill afford to compete against the United States in a space arms race, strategic anxieties regarding US intentions will compel both nations to pursue an ASAT capability. China will most likely continue its interest in space weaponry and possibly increase the alert level of its nuclear forces, to avoid a decapitating US flint strike. This could have substantial implications for India's and consequently Pakistan's nuclear deterrents. The ability of missile defence interceptors to perform an ASAT role will raise the alert levels of nuclear forces, increase the attractiveness of launching a pre-emptive strike, and heighten political tensions. (18) SPACE-DEPENDENT U.S. MILITARY MIGHT INVITES TERRORIST ATTACKS Rebecca Johnson, Director, Disarmament and Arms Control Program, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, ―Security Without Weapons in Space: Challenges and Options,‖ DISARMAMENT FORUM n. 1, 2003, pp. 53-65. At a time when much political and military attention is focused on terrorism, why should the international community be concerned about some future possibility of weapons in space? The ‗Desert Storm‘ Gulf War of 1991, the strikes This space-reliant ‗revolution in on Yugoslavia in 1999, and the 2001 war in Afghanistan have demonstrated the enhanced power and precision of weaponry that depends on US military satellites. military affairs‘ (RMA), funded by a US defence budget that in 2002 exceeded the combined total of the next nineteen largest national defence expenditures, has placed the United States far ahead of any other country in the technology and hardware of warfare. Such levels of dominance are not necessarily good for the United States or its allies. Potentially destabilizing, they may also be self-defeating in security terms, provoking adversaries to direct attacks at the ‗soft belly‘ (i.e. undefended civilians), as happened on 11 September. UGA 10 57 File Title **Space Weapons Bad** Accidents The threat of a space arms race would lead to extensive amount of accidents Mizin ‘10 [Viktor Mizin, Leading Research Fellow With the Center of International Security, Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy, and Security, ―Non-Weaponization of Outer Space‖ Copyright 2010 // wfi-hdm] In the long term, the growing threat of a space arms race and the prospect of conflicts in space would inevitably lead to vertical and horizontal nuclear and missile proliferation, and create an irreversible crisis for the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime. Furthermore, if outer space, which lacks national borders, were to become filled with weapons, there would be a substantial danger of accidents, false alarms, command system malfunctions, and so on. Space weapons would ignite an arms race and cause fatal accidents Mizin ‘10 [Viktor Mizin, Leading Research Fellow With the Center of International Security, Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy, and Security, ―Non-Weaponization of Outer Space‖ Copyright 2010 // wfi-hdm] Several recent attempts to develop legal barriers to a space race have failed. But, the authors argue, an agreement on a framework governing space—which lacks borders—must be reached. if outer space should fill with weapons—including highly survivable space systems and information transmission systems used for military purposes—the risk of accidents, false alarms, and command system mal-functions becomes substantial. The potential risks increase as nations with growing political, military, and economic ambitions—notably China, India, and Pakistan—quickly develop expertise. Their use of space information systems for military purposes could create a tipping point that would make reversing an arms race impossible. If countries fail to find areas of cooperation, the growing threat of a space arms race and the prospects of conflict in space would inevitably lead to nuclear and missile proliferation, and create an irreversible crisis for the entire nonproliteration regime. Russia and the U.S. agree that space weapons would have terminal consequences Mizin ‘10 [Viktor Mizin, Leading Research Fellow With the Center of International Security, Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy, and Security, ―Non-Weaponization of Outer Space‖ Copyright 2010 // wfi-hdm] Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR, continues to follow this line, while currently pursuing the goal of countering U.S. plans to deploy BMD systems and components, as well as space-based antisatellite weapons? The logic of this approach is obvious: Russia needs to maintain strategic parity and strives to prevent the United States from gaining a unilateral strategic advantage, while at the same time trying to avoid a new and costly arms race} As early as the very first round of disarmament negotiations of the last century, the Soviet leadership applied the unique tactic of linking progress at the ―space talks‖ to limits on defensive and offensive strategic weapons, which was what Soviet experts believed the United States sought however, both sides began to recognize the potentially destabilizing nature of space weapons and tried to avoid anything that would spur the positioning of weapons systems in space. This was especially true with respect to nuclear weapons, whose deployment in outer space would be fraught with unpredictable military and strategic consequences and the possibility of horrific technological accidents. Space warfare would make for a ‗use‘ it or ‗lose‘ it policy which leads to accidental conflict Mitchell ‗1 [Dr. Gordon Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, ―Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads,‖ London: Centre for Defence Studies, 2001 //wfi-hdm] The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense ‗use or lose‘ pressure into strategic calculations with the spectra of split second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated ‗hair trigger' devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed ‗complexly interactive, tightly coupled" industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other‘s flawless performance. According to Perrow this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, 'the odd term "normal accident‖ is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failure are inevitable. UGA 10 58 File Title Micalculation Space weapons make war inevitable due to accidents and miscalculation Mitchell ‗1 [Dr. Gordon Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, ISIS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, ―Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at a Crossroads,‖ London: Centre for Defence Studies, 2001 //wfi-hdm] Deployment of space weapons with predelegated authority to tire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to ‗normal accidents‘. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage - even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!" In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defense analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived. ―One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people." Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and for chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen. An arms race would lead to many technological miscalculations Hitchens ‘10 [Theresa Hitchens, Director of the Center for Defense Information, ―Space Wears- Coming to the Sky Near You?‖ Scientific American, 3.1.2008// wfi-hdm] Yet any arms race in space would almost inevitably destabilize the balance of power and thereby multiply the risks of global conflict. In such headlong competition—whether in space or elsewhere—equilibrium among the adversaries would be virtually impossible to maintain. Even if the major powers did achieve stability, that reality would still provide no guarantee that both sides would perceive it to be so. The moment one side saw itself to be slipping behind the other, the first side would be strongly tempted to launch a preemptive strike, before things got even worse. Ironically, the same would hold for the side that perceived itself to have gained an advantage. Again, there would be strong temptation to strike first, before the adversary could catch up. Finally, a space weapons race would ratchet up the chances that a mere technological mistake could trigger a battle. After all, in the distant void, reliably distinguishing an intentional act from an accidental one would be highly problematic. Failures are an inevitability when it comes to space based technologies including advanced space weapons Kislayov ‘08 [Andrei Kislyakov, Scientific Commentator, RIA Novosti, ―Outside View: Space race warnings.‖ United Press International, 6.5.2008// wfi-hdm] Now back to Col. Gen. Popovkin's idea that space-based weapons could spark a war. He says that present space systems and complexes are very sophisticated and susceptible to failures, and "in such cases, I cannot guarantee that a failure was not caused by hostile action." Is this statement logical? Surely it is. Strategic nuclear stability -- that is to say, a high-degree guarantee against a surprise nuclear missile strike -- depends on the trouble-free operation of early warning and intelligence satellites. If a satellite fails with another country's attack weapons deployed in orbit, there will be an increase of mistrust, which could lead to a military disaster. Besides, it is well known that tests involving satellite destruction result in a growing amount of orbital debris, which is difficult to counter. According to NASA and the U.S. Air Force, China's anti-satellite weapon tests in January 2007 left up to 2,000 baseball-sized fragments orbiting at altitudes of 120 to 2,340 miles above the Earth. High speed makes these fragments extremely dangerous for man-made space objects. UGA 10 59 File Title International relations Space weapons miscalculation will cause communication errors between nations Wright and Laura ‘10 [David Wright and Grego Laura, Senior Scientists, Global Security Program, Nuclear Weapons & Global Security-Space Weapons , ―Securing the Skies: Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space.‖Union of Concerned Scietists, 11.15.2010// wfi-hdm] Third, threats to satellites can amplify the risks of other undesirable outcomes, such as the creation or escalation of terrestrial crises. The development of ASAT capabilities by one country could create enough suspicion and tension to spur the development of ASAT weapons by others. Because so much of satellite and space-launch technology is dual-use, development of space systems would increase the chances of dangerous misinterpretations, especially in the absence of clearly stated policies and meaningful communication between countries. Moreover, if ASAT weapons are being developed and tested, the loss of an important satellite during a time of political tension could be interpreted—rightly or wrongly—as an attack. Quickly determining the reason for the satellite‘s disruption might be difficult or impossible, and this incomplete information together with the absence of reliable channels for communication between countries that are not close allies could exacerbate the crisis even further, possibly leading to its escalation. Recent ―war game‖ conflict simulations confirm that such a satellite loss could have very serious consequences. False alarms are common with space weapons- NORAD proves Lewis ‘10 [Jeffrey Lewis , Center for Defense Information, ―What if Space Were Weaponized? Possible Consequences for Crisis Scenarios ‖ 4.2004 // wfi-hdm] What might happen if the debris strike occurred shortly after a false alarm showing a missile launch? False alarms are appallingly common -- according to information obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) experienced 1,172 "moderately serious" false alarms between 1977 and 1983 -- an average of almost three false alarms per week. Comparable information is not available about the Russian system, but there is no reason to believe that it is any more reliable. Assessing the likelihood of these sorts of coincidences is difficult because Russia has never provided data about the frequency or duration of false alarms; nor indicated how seriously early warning data is taken by Russian leaders. Moreover, there is no reliable estimate of the debris risk for Russian satellites in highly elliptical orbits. The important point, however, is that such a coincidence would only appear suspicious if the United States were in the business of disabling satellites -- in other words, there is much less risk if Washington does not develop ASATs. Space weapons would alert falsely and cause tensions between suspected countries Coffelt ‘05 [Christopher A. Coffelt, T, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, ―The Best Defense: Charting the Future of US Space Strategy and Policy‖ Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Air University 4.2005 // wfi-hdm] Those that operate satellite systems are familiar with space operations know the difficulties in determining the exact cause of many satellite malfunctions or ―anomalies.‖ It is oftentimes difficult if not impossible to determine if satellite failures or problems are due to an everyday system anomaly, a natural event caused by the harsh space environment, the result of unintentional interference, or due to a malicious attack. If the US fields weapons that can interfere with spacecraft, failures on adversary spacecraft may be attributed as a attack even when no such attack occurred. This would obviously heighten tensions which could escalate into larger conflict, and be quite destabilizing. Moreover, this is already beginning to occur. According to a GAO report, in 1997 ―Indonesia intentionally interfered with and denied the services of a commercial satellite belonging to the south pacific island kingdom of Tonga because of a satellite orbital slot dispute.‖ Attribution of this attack was easy because Indonesia admitted to the attack, but is not likely to be so easy for most cases. Accurate attribution may, however, be irrelevant in future cases where a country merely perceives that a satellite failure or denial is the result of an attack by rival country B. Whether or not an attack actually occurred, the result will be the same as if it had. Increased tensions between the two countries will result, and country A is likely to act/respond, causing a counter reaction by country B and so on. In the end, there will be no proof that the failure was simply a system anomaly, an actual attack by country B, or possibly even an attack by a third party, country C, to instigate a conflict between A and B for their own purposes. Once measures are employed against these spacecraft, it also sets an international precedent for the use of such systems as an accepted, legal form of warfare. One can only expect proliferation of these systems and their use to become more common, as seen in the Indonesian case and others that have occurred since that time. Most importantly, the mere development and deployment of these systems starts the US down the slippery slope of offensive space strategy that may have serious, negative, unintended consequences that make it harder for the US to protect its own systems and access to space.
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