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POST CONVICTION ISSUES

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POST CONVICTION ISSUES Powered By Docstoc
					Courtney Valle Bisbee, Defendant, Pro Per
ADC#205168
Arizona Department of Corrections
ASPC- Perryville- Lumley
PO Box 3300
Goodyear AZ 85395
                               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

                     COUNTY OF MARICOPA, STATE OF ARIZONA

                                                             NO. CR 2004-008034-001 DT
                                                             CA-CR 06-0372
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,                     )
                                          )                  MOTION FOR RELEASE
      Plaintiff.                          )                  PURSUANT TO Rule 6 or 7.2b
                                          )
      v.                                  )                  (Emergency / Accelerated Hearing
                                          )                  Requested to Appear Telephonically)
COURTNEY VALLE BISBEE,                    )                  Hon. Warren Granville
      Defendant.                          )
_________________________________________ )

       COMES NOW Defendant/Petitioner, Courtney Bisbee, pursuant to Rule 6 or 7.2b (c),
Ariz.R.Crim.P., and prior Order of this Court.

I      INTRODUCTION

       Ms. Bisbee's entire case comes down to a single motivation, opportunity for financial
gain. The accuser's mother, Janette Sloan, learned of a woman with outward signs of wealth,
Ms. Bisbee, and chose to target her.
       Janette Sloan was a 38 year old, absentee, grifter mother who had a checkered financial
and criminal history. As well as, a history of manipulating the system for personal gain. when
she made the false allegation claims against Ms. Bisbee, but Detective Christopher Kinder failed
to pass this information on to the State prosecutor. The State and Defense counsel failed to
introduce into evidence Ms. Sloan's records of previous perjured testimony, criminal convictions,
meritless litigation claims, and long history of financial trouble. The State and Defense counsel
never interviewed nor questioned Janette Sloan.
       Defense counsel failed to show the evidence at the trial of Ms. Bisbee being a successful
single mother with a spotless record, and her accusers, as the troubled, lying teens that they were.




                                                  1
The State and Defense counsel failed to question the teenagers about their characters, their
reputations and their veracity at truth telling. (Exhibit #20.)

         Ms. Bisbee was convicted on the basis of incompetent evidence. Three years later, the
accuser's brother, now a legal adult, swears that Courtney Bisbee is innocent, and that his trial
testimony was false and induced by coercion, in a sworn affidavit (Exhibit #4). The same
prosecutors, and detective used the same improper methods with the other teenage witnesses that
have been condemned in other cases. Defendant asserts that the state witnesses each testified
falsely at trial, and have since recanted.


         Defendant asserts her conviction and sentence were based upon a violation of her Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights which denied her effective assistance of counsel,
due process and under both Federal and State Constitutions. Defendant asserts her conviction is
a violation of common law principles of fundamental fairness. [Exhibit #01]


II.      Authority. Ariz R. Crim. Pro. Rule 7.2. b provides for a release following conviction,
         reciting,
         b. After conviction.
         (1) Superior Court. After a person has been convicted of any offense for which the
         person will in all reasonable probablility suffer a sentence of imprisonment, the person
         shall not be released on bail or on his or her own recognizance unless it is established
         THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE
         CONVICTION MAY BE SET ASIDE ON A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL,
         REVERSED ON APPEAL, OR VACATED IN ANY POST-CONVICTION
         PROCEEDING. The release of a person pending appeal shall be revoked if the person
         fails to prosecute the appeal diligently.

        The Rule clearly provides for a release when there are reasonable grounds that establish
the conviction will be vacated in any post-conviction proceedings and Ms. Bisbee is not a danger
to society or a flight risk.

      III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS SUPPORTING CLAIMS

A.       Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Arizona Department of Corrections in Goodyear,
Arizona 85395.

B.       The petition concerns the underlying case of People v Courtney Valle Bisbee, Case



                                                  2
#CR2004-008043-001-DT. Petitioner was tried and convicted on two counts of child
molestation involving a single teenager. The crime encompassed alleged touching of the
accuser's private parts over clothing, and the accuser touching petitioner's private part for two to
three minutes on February 05, 2004.

C.     Evidence adduced at trial in January 9-18, 2006, indicated that the accuser and the
petitioner knew each other less than two weeks prior to alleged criminal activity. Petitioner was
working as a registered nurse, full-time graduate student with a 3.95 GPA, a single mom to her
4-1/2 year old daughter, residing in Scottsdale, Arizona 85255. The accuser was a best friend of
the petitioner's 16-year-old babysitter, Brittney Heehler.

D.     Petitioner provided transportation on February 05, 2004, for the 16-year old babysitter,
Brittney Heehler, so, that she could provide childcare for the Petitioner's daughter. According to
the accuser, this is when the alleged crime was to have occurred.

E.     Petitioner was found guilty of a single alleged sexual encounter based upon the
       testimony of the accuser's close-knit friends.

F.     On January 18, 2006, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of child molestation for
       fondling involving the single accuser. On April 14, 2006, petitioner was sentenced to
       two, eleven (11) year terms (in state prison) to run concurrently with each other, as well
       as lifetime sex offender registry.

G.     On the same day, Petitioner files a notice of appeal. Appeal still pending.

H.     On October 29, 2007, Petitioner files a Notice of PCR in Maricopa County Superior
       Court to begin collateral proceedings; State v. Jones 182 Ariz. 432, 879 P.2d 734
       (App.1995)


I.     Material Evidence Not Presented At Trial

1.     The Motion includes an affidavit from Nikolas Valles, a state witness and the accuser's
brother, which attested that Ms. Bisbee committed no crime on or about February 05, 2004,
similarly, he claims that he and his brother (the accuser), were coerced to testify falsely against
the Ms. Bisbee, and did so out of fear of their mother's retaliation (Exhibit #4).




                                                  3
2.        Defendant contends that there is new evidence that the State's witnesses were part of a
conspiracy to wrongfully convict Ms. Bisbee. This evidence includes Sarah Babcock's
Deposition statements indicating that this case was based on coercion and a false allegation
created by the accuser's mother, Janette Sloan. (Exhibit #5.)

3.        New evidence exists to further prove that Janette Sloan and Jonathan Valles were not
qualified to testify at Ms. Bisbee's trial.


4.        New evidence has also surfaced that state witness Janette Sloan had been convicted of a
crime of moral perpitude prior to the commencement of Ms. Bisbee's 2006 Bench trial but this
fact was unbeknownst to defense counsel and the trier of fact. (Exhibit #1.)


5.        Each remaining item of evidence offered against Ms. Bisbee at trial is equally susceptible
to a reasonable interpretation or defense that is entirely consistent with her claim of innocence.
To wit, the State's statements that their witnesses had no motive to lie, was undermined by the
undisputed, countervailing fact that the accuser and his mother retained civil attorney prior to
trial against Ms. Bisbee and the Paradise Valley School, regarding the outcome of this case.

6.        The credibility and reliability of State's witnesses, Janette Sloan, Michael Kemp,
Donovan Kemp, Brittney Heehler, and Jonathan Valles are countered by (among other things)
false police reports, perjured injunctions, and perjured court documents in this case as well as
others.
7.        In recent years, forensic interview experts publicly decried the errors and unreliability of
the interview techniques used by case investigator Detective Christopher Kinder, Scottsdale
Police Department, used to convict Ms. Bisbee. Numerous high publicity cases from around the
nation in which defendants were convicted on the basis of tainted and false testimony had their
convictions reversed based upon new and exculpatory evidence. (Exhibit #15.)


8.        Expert testimony at trial was critical to show that Detective Kinder's lack of specialized
training in child molest cases and improper interviewing techniques elicited false and unreliable
testimony.




                                                    4
9.      The new evidence is "of such character as to create a probability that had such evidence
been received at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant," which is
all that is required to obtain relief pursuant to her.

10.     In Arizona, a defendant is entitled to have a conviction and sentence vacated after trial
upon the presentation of new evidence which "could not have been produced by the defendant at
trial even with due diligence on his part and which is of such character as to create a probability
that had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to
the defendant".

11.     The new evidence requires the court to vacate her conviction and sentence. It supports
her longstanding claim that she is innocent.

12.     Defendant contends that there is other evidence which supports this claim for relief that
were not presented at trial, but which creates even a greater likelihood had the trier of fact
known, would harbor - at the very least - a reasonable doubt about Ms. Bisbee's guilt.


13.     There is evidence, which supports this claim for relief that Ms. Bisbee's conviction was
the result of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

14.     The legal significance of new evidence such as these is so self-evident, that there are
precious few reported decisions in this state or nationally in which courts have actually been
required to rule on a contested motion for a new trial based on such evidence.


        Defendant Bisbee faces an extremely severe penalty of eleven calendar years with no

chance of early release, as well as lifetime sex offender registry, based almost exclusively on the

uncorroborated testimony of perjurers. The lawless behavior of the state prosecutors undermines

justice and fairness in Ms. Bisbee's wrongful conviction. The prosecution and law enforcement,

made no effort to secure evidence and the defense was prevented from securing such evidence,

leaving the court only the perjured statements of these teenagers upon which to base its

judgment. The court should not indulge in the convenient excuse offered by the prosecution, that




                                                    5
these teenagers should not have much expected of them. The defendant's rights and the

defendant's freedom are at stake and the court should expect and indeed demand evidence equal

with the seriousness of the charged offenses and the consequences thereof.

       In January 2006, Ms. Bisbee's week long trial was a close credibility contest. Ms. Bisbee

took the stand and denied that she ever had sexual contact with accuser, Jonathan Valles. In

summation, the State argued that there was no evidence that Jonathan Valles, and his friends had

a motive to lie. That argument by the State was false; in fact the prosecution was made

aware of the State Witness's potential lawsuits against Paradise Valley School District

when Ms. Bisbee was arrested on February 11, 2004. State's witnesses, Jonathan Valles,

the accuser, and his mother, Janette Sloan, filed a 28 count civil suit against Ms. Bisbee on

January 31, 2006, one week after trial. The accuser and his mother had the time and opportunity

to fabricate and maintain the false allegations against Ms. Bisbee. The State knew before and

during trial, and withheld from the defense, Jonathan Valles and Janette Sloan's intentions to sue

the School District, (and Ms. Bisbee). (Exhibit #1.)

       In summation, the State made inflammatory comments that there was no evidence or

reason for the accuser to lie, that without such evidence of a motive to lie, the notion that the

accuser would testify falsely made no sense:

       Prosecutor Kittredge (pg. 08 (L8-10): "Ms. Bisbee, um, is probably the main player in

this case who has a reason to come into the court and tell a story other than the truth"

       Pg. 10 (L20-24) "Even when I asked the defendant why would Jonathan come into this

       court and lie about this, the defendant didn't even have a response to that, because the

       response is he would have no reason to have come into this court and lie."

       Following the court's twenty minute deliberation on January 18, 2006, Judge Warren

Granville returned with a guilty verdict on two counts of child molestation, but acquitting her




                                                  6
three counts of public sexual indecency involving state witnesses, Nikolas Valles, Brittney

Heehler, and Donovan Kemp. Although she had been out on $100,000 bail from April 17, 2004

until the verdict, Ms. Bisbee was remanded after the verdict, and has been confined ever since.

       At her sentencing on April 14, 2006, the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report contained

material misrepresentations (but Ms. Bisbee was never allowed to review the report PRIOR to

her sentencing). Nowhere in the Pre-Sentence Report, was there any hint that the accuser and his

mother had filed a lawsuit against Ms. Bisbee, and were about to file lawsuits against Paradise

Valley School District for damages based on the conduct for which Ms. Bisbee was convicted.

The court sentenced Ms. Bisbee to eleven calendar years of imprisonment on count four, and

eleven calendar years of imprisonment on count five, to run concurrently, sex offender registry,

and suspension of her nursing license. As a result, Ms. Bisbee is now serving

an eleven-year prison term, flat time, not eligible for parole, nor early release. Ms. Bisbee filed

the Opening brief of her appeal on December 21, 2006, filed by former counsel.



                                         GROUND ONE
                   THE STATE WITHHELD EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
                                      SUPPORTING FACTS


       As part of the defense investigation, counsel served a motion, on May 14, 2004, to the

State requesting their witnesses prior bad acts and prior records. The State failed to comply. In

her pretrial motions, Ms. Bisbee moved to require the people to produce all Brady material,

including all favorable or otherwise exculpatory information -- (including) evidence or

information which tends to lessen the probability of conviction -- "such as prior convictions of

the State's Witnesses, their counseling records which contained impeachment evidence, as well




                                                 7
as, the State's Witnesses' personal notes possessed by the State that demonstrate the accuser's

lack of credibility. (Exhibit #1, pg. 20.)     .

        During the investigation of Ms. Bisbee's case, the state improperly examined witnesses,

made material misrepresentations, and put their own interest above their ethical obligations. In

charging Ms. Bisbee, prosecutors overcharged her for bargaining purposes and filed charges

without sufficient evidence. Detective Christopher Kinder misstated evidence so that Ms. Bisbee

would be held on no bond. He then committed perjury in both of Ms. Bisbee's First and Second

Grand Jury proceedings. Detective Christopher Kinder failed to investigate and turn over

evidence in Ms. Bisbee's case. (Exhibit #1.)

1.     Defendant contends and asserts The State failed to investigate Janette Sloan February 06,
2004, Restraining Order which contained perjured sworn statements regarding Ms. Bisbee's case.

2.     Defendant contends and asserts that the State failed to investigate Janette Sloan's
February 06, 2004, false police report regarding Ms. Bisbee's case, which contained exculpatory
evidence.

3.     Defendant contends and asserts that the State failed to investigate the accuser, and his
mother. Records clearly prove that State Witness, Janette Sloan, was convicted of a crime of
moral perpetude, (and this exculpatory evidence). which was never disclosed to the defense, nor
the courts.

4.      Defendant contends and asserts that the State committed perjury in Ms. Bisbee's First and
Second Grand jury proceedings, as well as providing false, and misleading evidence to the
courts.

5.      Defendant contends and asserts that the State failed to comply with the defense request
for a factual basis on Count 6 of Ms. Bisbee's indictment in order to overcharge and place an
unfair pressure on her for bargaining purposes.

6.     Defendant contends and asserts that the State failed to turn over school personnel notes,
which contained exculpatory material.

7.      Defendant contends and asserts that the State Prosecutor Deborah Schumacher failed to
turn over, state witness, Brittany Heehler's personal handwritten notes regarding the criminal
allegations against Ms. Bisbee, even though they were under the possession and control of the
State, and contained exculpatory material.




                                                   8
8.     Defendant contends and asserts that the State Prosecutor Paul Kittredge failed to turn
over the original video interrogation of Ms. Bisbee for the defense to examine so that he could
introduce altered inadmissible evidence at trial.

9.      Defendant contends and asserts that the State Prosecutors interfered with the defendant's
access to witnesses.

10.    Defendant contends and asserts that attorney Bruce Cohen (Scott Bisbee's custody
attorney at the time) disclosed confidential family law materials to the prosecution in violation of
the court's orders. (Exhibit #1, pg.18.)

11.    Defendant contends and asserts that the State Prosecutors failed to contact defense
counsel regarding the State's contact with Ms. Bisbee's ex-husband, and State witness, Scott
Bisbee, and his family attorney, Bruce Cohen.

12.     Defendant contends and asserts that the State failed to disclose, that they offered State
witness, Brittney Heehler college recommendations in exchange for her testimony against Ms.
Bisbee.

13.    Defendant contends and asserts that the State knew or should have known that Janette
Sloan, Michael Kemp, Donavan Kemp, and Jonathan Valles discussed their testimony at great
lengths prior to and during defendant's Bench trial, in violation of court order.

14.     Defendant contends and asserts during Ms Bisbee's Bench trial the State sponsored
perjured testimony, withheld exculpatory evidence, and vouched for witnesses. The state failed
to report the rampid misconduct of their office.

       The State repeatedly abused it power in Ms. Bisbee's case. In October of 2004, the
accusers custodial father told the prosecutors that his son was being forced to lie by his mother,
Janette Sloan. The State's response was to intimidate and harass Ms. Bisbee by attempting to
revoke her release on a false violation. The prosecutor then instructed Pretrial Service officer,
Bertha Lopez, to sign a false criminal complaint and threatened that she would regret it, it she
didn't comply. Ms. Lopez refused and Pretrial Services Counsel had to intervene to protect itself
from the Maricopa County Attorney's office. Ms. Bisbee's Pretrial officer's record was then
subpoenaed by the Maricopa County Attorney's office and the evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct destroyed. When Ms. Lopez spoke at Ms. Bisbee's Sentencing, April 14, 2006, on
Ms. Bisbee's behalf, the State, once again, threatened Ms. Lopez's job. This was overheard by a
courtroom witness and has now been made part of the official court records in a sworn affidavit.




                                                 9
III. ABUSE OF PROCESS AND DEVIATIONS FROM STANDARD POLICE
PROCEDURES

1.     On February 10, 2004, (10:00 am) Detective C. Kinder was assigned Ms. Bisbee's case.

2.     On February 10, 2004, (2:10 PM) Detective Kinder misconducted interviews with Donny
       Kemp, Jon Valles and Nik Valles with improper "leading questions".

3.     On February 11, 2004, (1:00 PM), Detective Kinder entered Ms. Bisbee's residence with
       NO Search Warrant and seized Ms. Bisbee's laptop computer and video camcorder.

4.     On February 11, 2004 (3:00 PM) Detective Kinder sent Undercover / Special Unit to
       arrest Ms. Bisbee with NO Arrest Warrant and with no probable cause.
5.     On February 11, 2004, (6:00 PM), NO Miranda Rights were given to Ms. Bisbee.
6.     A medical physical exam of Ms. Bisbee was never conducted for the police report,
       which would have disproved the accuser's physical description of her.
7.     DNA analysis of the "alleged" blanket, and clothing, that Detective Christopher Kinder
       failed to secure was never done depriving the defendant of exculpatory evidence.
8.     Although Detective Christopher Kinder entered Ms. Bisbee's residence with NO search
       warrant, violating the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and while no one was
       present, he failed to locate any pornographic material, alcohol, or other incriminating
       evidence that was alluded to by the accuser.
9.     Detective Kinder's interview with the accuser, Jonathan Valles was so grotesquely
       suggestive and unreliable that experts compare it to a multiple choice test with no wrong
       answers.


       Prosecutor Deborah Schumacher and Prosecutor Paul Kittredge withheld exculpatory

evidence from the defense during pretrial discovery at Ms. Bisbee's Bench trial, at Sentencing

and post conviction proceedings. Both prosecutors used supposition and deliberately misrepre-

sented the truth to the court for a crime that never happened of which there was no physical

evidence or anything resembling a credible allegation.

       The first case to impose a due process obligation of disclosure was Brady vs. Maryland

373 U.S. 83 (1963) which held as follows:




                                               10
        We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or to

punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor. 373 U.S. at 87.

        In U.S. vs. Agurs 427 U.S. 97 (1976,) the Court stated that the rule in Brady applied in

three different situations:

        1. The prosecution's case included perjured testimony and the prosecutor either      knew
        or should have known of the perjury.

        2. The prosecutor failed to disclose specific evidence when the defense had
        requested it.

        3. The prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence when the defense had       made
        no request at all or had made only a general request. 427 U.S. at 103 thru 106.

        The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. It's purpose is to ensure that a

miscarriage of justice does not occur.

        In Kyles vs. Whitley 514 U.S. 419 (1995), the Court held the disclosure obligation

applied not just to material in the possession of the prosecutor but also to those under the control

of the prosecutor, such as the police. 514 U.S. at 437.

        In Davis vs. Alaska 415 U.S. 308 (1974) Davis was charged with theft, and one of the

state's crucial witnesses (Green) was a juvenile on probation both at the time of the theft and at

the time of the trial. Davis wanted to cross-examine Green, not just for general truthfulness and

impeachment purposes but also about his motive to lie and his susceptibility to police pressure

during his initial interview. The trial court granted the state's motion and precluded Davis from

making any reference to Green's juvenile record. The court reversed Davis's conviction and held

the trial court's order violated Davis's 6th Amendment rights to confront and cross-examine

Green. 415 U.S. at 315 - 318.




                                                 11
       In Jonathan Valles' October 23, 2006, civil deposition, he clearly states that at least three

state officials knew that his counseling records existed and that they never disclosed that to the

Court, nor to the defense. Prosecutor Paul Kittredge further knew that Jonathan Valles' trial

testimony was completely different than his police statement and therefore, Jonathan Valles'

counseling records clearly contained exculpatory material and therefore Ms. Bisbee's due process

rights were violated. (Exhibit #19.)

       Defendant contends, Brittney Heeher (22 times), Jonathan Valles (18 times), Donovan

Kemp (51 times), and Nikolas Valles (31 times), stonewalled a meaningful cross-examination.

It became apparent that they had been instructed, or decided among themselves to stonewall

being cross-examined on previous inconsistent statements that they had made. To virtually every

defense question asking anything specific, they answered, "I don't know" or "I don't remember".

       The State sponsored or failed to correct perjured testimony. Several State witnesses

admitted lying in pretrial interviews and a principal State Witness, Nikolas Valles, the accuser's

brother, admitted in a January 25, 2007, sworn Affidavit, that he was coerced to lie during the

defendant's trial.

       The State's witnesses had each learned that they could lie during criminal proceedings

with impunity, suffering no consequences, and they could thereby obtain the approval of parents,

victim's advocates, law enforcement officers, and the prosecution, when their testimony resulted

in more damage to the defense. This cavalier attitude toward the solemnity of their oath of

crucial testimony, should cast substantial doubt on the entire testimony, and in that way, on the

prosecution's entire case. Each State's witnesses indicated a willingness to lie in this case in

violation of Arizona Revised Statutes 13-2702 ("perjury by inconsistent statements"), as well as

to obstruct justice. (Exhibit #03.)




                                                 12
       Even setting aside the admissions by these teenagers of engaging in perjury, their

descriptions of the alleged crime were inconsistent as to time, duration, and location, and the

State's witnesses failed to agree on any of the details. The testified supposed act of sexual

molestation would have been demonstrably impossible. Given all these inconsistencies and

improbabilities, their testimony is worthy of little weight unless corroborated by other substantial

evidence, which it was not. State v. Scott (1976) 113 Az. 423, 555 P.2d 1117; State v. Williams

(1974) 111 Az. 175, 526 P.2d 714; Alvarado v. State (1945) 63 Az. 511, 164 P.2d 460.

       The State of Arizona has established standards, The Maricopa County's Multidisciplinary

Protocol for the Investigation of Child Abuse developed by the Interagency Council Maricopa

County Children's Justice Project. Detective Kinder, despite several years as a law enforcement

officer had never received training, prior to the investigation of Ms. Bisbee's 2004 case. An

examination of the police interviews with all the State's witnesses, indicates Detective Kinder

fell into most of the traps and made most of the errors that the Maricopa County's

Multidisciplinary Protocol for the Investigation of Child Abuse were designed to alleviate. The

resulting investigation was absurd and ludicrous.

       Interview techniques used by Detective Christopher Kinder resulted in unreliable

testimony of the teenage witnesses -- Jonathan Valles, Donovan Kemp, and Nikolas Valles. A

procedure that violates a defendant's due process rights, if it is so impermissibly suggestive that

it creates a very substantial likelihood of irreparable predjudice. State v Contereras (1993) 17

Cal. 4th 813, 819. Defendant contends that pretrial investigative and interview procedures were

so suggestive and coercive, that they similarly cast a veil of unreliability on the witness'

subsequent trial testimony about the very nature of the alleged offenses, so as to violate a

defendant's right to due process. Courts have applied this principal in the context of evaluating




                                                 13
the reliability of children's testimony in light of the pretrial interrogation process in child

molestation cases. See, e.g. State v Michaels (NJ 1994) 642, A 2d 1372, 1379-1364.

        In a study, psychologist Sena Garven used reinforcing answers consistent with the

interviewers' hunches and, in so doing invoked pressure to conform on children. Techniques

subsequently found by that court to be inappropriate and leading to false testimony. Garven

found a 58% false claim rate as to various behaviors in which an adult had supposedly

engaged, versus only a 17% error rate when weaker suggestions were used. (Ceci & Friedman,

supra, at p.54.)

        Ceci and Friedman assert that interviewers should avoid referring to statements made by

a child's peers, unless the child raises the matter first. In direct contradiction to this

recommendation, Detective Kinder repeated victim's statements to the other witnesses and

sometimes took new information revealed by on witness and shared it with another witness to

check it out instead of using the information to channel their line of questioning. This could

have influenced the responses and affected their memory of events.

        The resulting problem with using flawed interviewing techniques is one of taint. Studies

have shown the once children have been subjected to suggestive interviews; their inaccurate

reports are indistinguishable from accurate ones. Children come to incorporate interviewer

suggestion as truth and relate it as an actual experience. For this reason, once the child has been

subjected to a suggestive interview, there is no way for anyone (jury, judge, or even the child's

parent) to determine from the child's report, demeanor, or affect whether the child's story is

accurate or a reflection of interview bias and suggestion.

        The above-mentioned findings are the product of more than a decade of study. In the

face of hundreds of studies confirming the corrosive effects of suggestions on children's memory

and recall ability, there have been no studies suggesting that the methods described above cannot




                                                   14
corrupt a child's report or produce false reports under circumstances that are typical of many

cases. Thus, scientific research showing the effects of suggestion on children's reports is

uncontroversial.

       Interrogation techniques used in Ms. Bisbee's case violated established law enforcement

guidelines, that were established by Governor Napolitano, The Maricopa County

Multidisciplinary Protocol for the Investigation of Child Abuse.

       Psychologist and researcher Dr. James Wood, who has conducted extensive research on

interviewing minors, is reviewing the documents in this case and evaluating the interview

techniques used with the teen witnesses and to conclude if Detective Kinder's interview

techniques elicited inaccurate and unreliable statements from the teens and therefore, no

trier of fact should have relied on these teen's statements. It appears four improper techniques

were used repeatedly in Ms. Bisbee's case:


       (1) "The teens were interviewed with questions that were extremely leading and
       suggestive."
       (2) "The teens were given 'co-witness information.' That is, they were repeatedly told
       what other witnesses had already said (or had supposedly already said.)"
       (3 "The interviewers refused to accept the initial denials of abuse by the accuser's
       brother, Nikolas Valles.)"
       (4) The teen's answers were shaped by various forms of indirect reinforcement and
       implied threats or negative consequences", such as state witness, Brittany Heehler
       being offered a letter of recommendation for college, by Prosecutor Paul Kittredge in
       exchange for her testimony.
       (5) The use of authority and telling teens what they believed to be the facts in the case.


       During the civil discovery process over the past year, counsel learned that even BEFORE

Ms. Bisbee was indicted, Jonathan Valles and Janette Sloan, had spoke to civil counsel for the




                                                15
purpose of suing the Paradise Valley School District for damages based on Ms. Bisbee's alleged

conduct. Thus, unbeknownst to defense counsel, Joel Thompson, and the trier of fact, Judge

Warren Granville, the State's principal witnesses had a financial stake in the outcome of the

criminal case and a motive to fabricate this entire case against Ms. Bisbee.

       The State cannot dispute that their principal witnesses, Jonathan Valles, and Janette

Sloan, had a financial stake in the outcome of the case, which imbued them with a motive to lie.

This constituted Brady/ Giglio material, which the State was required to disclose to the defense

under the authority of State v. Wallert, 98 A.D. 2d 47 (1st Dep't 1983). The State was well

aware of their principal witnesses' intentions and actions to bring lawsuits for money damages

against Ms. Bisbee, and the Paradise Valley School District based on Ms. Bisbee's alleged

conduct in the event of her conviction. The State's awareness derived from at least three

unimpeachable sources:

       1.      Detective Christopher Kinder's interrogation of Ms. Bisbee on February 11, 2004

       2.      The August 19, 2004 interview of Michael Kemp by defense investigator, Cindy
               Stine, and County Attorney Deborah Schumacher. (Exhibit #01.)

       3.      Detective Christopher Kinder's interview of Eugene Valles on
               September 27, 2004. (Exhibit #07.)


       Ms. Bisbee's post-judgment should be governed by State v. Wallert, 98 A.D. 2d 47 (1st

Dep't 1983) a case on all fours in which the Appellate Division, reversing a rape conviction,

held that:

1.     Defendant was denied due process of law by the failure of the prosecutor to disclose his

       knowledge of the [accuser] civil suit while arguing in summation that defendant could

       point to no motive for the complainant to lie.




                                                16
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("the staff lawyers in the prosecutor's office

have the burden of letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing or has done. That the

lapse was inadvertent does not lessen its impact") Az v. Broyles Ariz at app. No. CA-CR95-

0928; Kimmel v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (failure to make meritorious suppression

motion constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel),

       Certainly Ms. Bisbee did all she could do, or could be expected to do, to ensure that her

defense lawyer was armed with the information. As a result, Ms. Bisbee cannot be blamed, and

it would be unconstitutional and unfair to make her pay the price, for the trier of facts ignorance

of the single most important impeaching fact in the entire case, i.e., the State's principal

witnesses intended to sue Ms. Bisbee, and Paradise Valley School District for money damages in

the event of Ms. Bisbee's conviction and had retained a lawyer for that purpose. (Exhibit #02.)

Ms. Bisbee should not have to suffer for the State's false argument in summation that Jonathan

Valles had "no reason to have come into this court and lie."

       One way or another, Ms. Bisbee was entitled to have the trier of fact know of the

existence of the highly exculpatory evidence which would have unquestionably changed the

verdict in her favor, either as a result of the State honoring their constitutional obligation to arm

defense counsel with classic Brady / Giglio material to present to the jury, or through a

competent defense investigation and presentation to the jury by her Sixth Amendment, right to

effective assistance of counsel. Either way, the trier of fact's ignorance of the States' witnesses'

motivation to lie violated Ms. Bisbee's constitutional rights.

       The State violated Ms. Bisbee's constitutional rights under Brady and Giglio. Probably

no principle is better established in criminal law, or better known, than the proposition that

"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good




                                                  17
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (non-

disclosure of co-defendant's confession violates due process rights of murder defendant). It is

equally well-established that "when the "reliability of a given witness may well be determinative

of guilt or innocence', nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general

rule [Brady]." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).

       Like the undisclosed promise of leniency to a cooperating witness in Giglio, evidence of

a prosecution witness' intention to file a lawsuit based on the defendant's charged conduct is the

paradigm of a Brady / Giglio violation such evidence bears directly and importantly on the

witness' credibility since it provides the witness with direct financial interest in the outcome of

the case, and therefore a motive to lie.

       In Wallert, the defendant's guilt turned on the credibility of the accuser who commenced

a multi-million dollar civil lawsuit against the defendant two days after the jury's verdict.

Although the prosecutor knew prior to trial that the accuser had consulted an attorney who was

only awaiting the outcome of the criminal case to commence the lawsuit, "the prosecutor felt no

duty to disclose this information to defendant's counsel." 98 A.D. 2d at 48. In reversing the

conviction the Appellate Division determined that the State's concealment of the accuser's

intended civil lawsuit, and therefore the accuser's motive to i.e., violated Brady and its progeny:

       Hence, given the nature of the State's evidence, it was fundamentally obvious that the

       accuser's credibility and motive for testifying would be a crucial issue. We have before

       emphasized a prosecutor's duty in such situations to, at the very least submit to the

       trial judge the question of whether disclosure is required… "It is upon such subtle factors

       as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty

may depend" Id. at 50.




                                                  18
          A successful Brady claim does not require a showing that the evidence was insufficient to

establish guilt, but must only put the case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in

the verdict. Strickler vs. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999). Where a Brady / Giglio violation is

accompanied by the prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony, a resulting conviction "is

fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. "United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,

103 (1976). The same standard applies where a prosecutor makes a false statement to the jury in

summation. State v. Velez, 118 A.D. 2d 116, 119 (1st Dep't 1986) (categorizing Wallert as a

"Class I" case for that reason, requiring a lesser standard of materiality).

          It is the black letter of the law that the prosecutors are chargeable with the knowledge

possessed by their office. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 ("since the prosecutor's office is an entity…..

promises made by one attorney must attributed … to the Government"); Santobelle, 404 U.S.

at 262.

          It may be true, although hard to believe, that the prosecutors carefully avoid discussing

with the accusers or their families the litigation that the accusers had taken steps to initiate civil

lawsuits against Ms. Bisbee and the Paradise Valley School District. If true, it reflects almost as

poorly on their professional ethics as if they had asked and not disclosed the results to the

defense, since it would represent a conscience avoidance of learning the truth.

          As a result of the falsity of the State's summation, this case falls squarely within what the

First Department has called a "Class I" case, the equivalent of a case involving "the use by the

prosecution of testimony that the prosecutor knew, or should have known, was perjurous." State

v. Velez, 118 A.D. 2d 116, 119 (1st Dep't 1986) (cited with approval in State v. Villardi 76 N. Y.

2d 67, 76 (1990). Indeed Velez characterized Wallert, a nearly identical case to this one, as a

Class I case based on the prosecutor's false statement in summation - "defendant could point to




                                                   19
no motive for the complainant to lie" -- a nearly identical case to this one made by the State in

this case.

        Aside from the other students who were part of the same tight-knit "circle" or "group",

there was no independent unbiased corroboration of the word of the accuser, who was far from

being a model student or citizen. Instead, the case was a credibility contest between

the accuser, and his friends, versus Ms. Bisbee, a devoted and respected single mom, full-time

registered nurse, and full-time (Graduate Honors) student. (State v. Finley 85 Az. 327, 338, P.2d

790 (1959).

        The court should not be willing to accept the implausible word of the prosecutors that

they were ignorant of the State's witnesses reputations, intentions and actions, despite the close

relationship that Prosecutor Deborah Schumacher, Prosecutor Paul Kittredge, Victim's Advocate

Michelle Johnson, Janette Sloan and Jonathan Valles, had during the course of the two years of

trial preparation. Defense counsel should have had the opportunity for cross-examination of

accusers, and then argued in summation their financial stake in the outcome of Ms. Bisbee's case,

and therefore a motive to lie.



                                         GROUND TWO
                    NEWLY DISCOVERED MATERIAL OF EVIDENCE
1.      The Motion includes an affidavit from Nikolas Valles, a state witness and the accuser's
brother, which attested that Ms. Bisbee committed no crime on or about February 05, 2004,
similarly, he claims that he and his brother (the accuser), were coerced to testify falsely against
the Ms. Bisbee, and did so out of fear of their mother's retaliation. (Exhibit #04.)


2.      Defendant contends that there is new evidence that the State's witnesses were part of a
conspiracy to wrongfully convict Ms. Bisbee. This evidence includes Sarah Babcock's




                                                 20
Deposition statements (September 20, 2006) indicating that this case was based on coercion and
a false allegation created by the accuser's mother, Janette Sloan. (Exhibit #19.)


3.      The new evidence is "of such character as to create a probability that had such evidence
been received at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant," which is
all that is required to obtain relief pursuant to her.

4.      In Arizona, a defendant is entitled to have a conviction and sentence vacated after trial
upon the presentation of new evidence which "could not have been produced by the defendant at
trial even with due diligence on his part and which is of such character as to create a probability
that had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to
the defendant".


                                         GROUND THREE
                         INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
                                       SUPPORTING FACTS


LAW AND ARGUMENT
        A.      THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AT EVERY CRITICAL STATE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN THIS
CASE.
        Defendant asserts and contends that, defense counsel, provided constitutionally

ineffective assistance by not discovering through his own investigation, not confronting the

accusers with, and not arguing in summation the existence of documents demonstrating

unequivocally, the principal accuser's motive to lie. People v. Hobot, 84 N.Y. 2d 1021 (1995)

("When a single, substantial error by counsel… seriously compromises a defendant's right to a

fair trial, it will qualify as ineffective representation"); State v. LoPrimo, 69 A.D. 2d 890 (2d

Dep't 1979) (ineffectiveness claim established where counsel fails to serve alibi notice, resulting

in preclusion of alibi defense).




                                                   21
        "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall… have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense" (sic). U.S. Const. Amend 6. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend 14; and Arizona's corollary provision, A.R.S.
Const. Art. II, 4; and Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (landmark case
establishing current standard for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel). Moreover,
the right to counsel has, for many years, extended to the right to "effective" assistance of
counsel:
               …[t]hat a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the
               accused…is not enough to satisfy the [Sixth Amendment]. The Sixth
               Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it
               envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial
               system to produce just results. *** For that reason, the Court has recognized the
               right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 685-86. "An accused is entitled to be assisted by an
attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is
fair." Frazer v. United States, 18F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
685).
        The Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been incorporated into the fourteenth

Amendment and made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (capital defendants); Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (felonies). If the accused's attorney fails to render adequate

legal assistance, the defendant is entitled to relief from the conviction. Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (1986) (holding that even a single isolated error of counsel can give
rise to relief under the Sixth Amendment, 106 S. Ct. at 2649); accord, State v. LaGrand, 152
Ariz. 483, 733 P.2d 1066 (1987); and State v. Rossi, 146 Ariz. 359, 706 P.2d 371 (1985).
The right applies to every criminal persecution, without regard to whether counsel is retained or
appointed, Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), and applies at every critical stage of a criminal
proceeding Strickland v. Washington, supra. The Strickland standard for ineffectiveness of
counsel has been adopted and applied by the Supreme Court of Arizona. State v. Valdez, 167
Ariz. 328, 330, 806 P.2d 1376 (1991). In fact, the test for ineffectiveness of counsel under




                                                 22
Arizona law is the same as the Strickland test. State v. Salazar, 844 P.2d 566, 581 (1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 3017 (1993)


       1.      The Two-Prong Test for Effective Assistance.
       Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority in Strickland, promulgated a two-
pronged standard courts to use in determining when a criminal defendant has suffered from
ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant must show: 1) that counsel's performance was
deficient; and 2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, supra.


       2.      the Definition of Deficient Attorney Performance.
       "Deficient performance" means that the attorney's performance was unreasonable under
prevailing professional standards. United States v. Blaylock, 20F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687). "the proper standard for evaluating attorney performance
is whether the assistance was reasonably effective under the circumstances." Sturgis v.
Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1986) (bold print added).


       As a matter of federal constitutional law, this requires the court to examine the facts of
the case. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690. In conducting its inquiry regarding deficient perform-
ance, a reviewing court must 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
9/24/07
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690. A defendant
overcomes the presumption by showing that his attorney's action could not be considered "sound
strategy or a legitimate tactical decision." Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690.
       3.      A Showing of Prejudice Ordinarily is Required.
       A court's determination of prejudice requires an assessment of the totality of the
evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 695. Ordinarily a showing of prejudice is required; 17 and,
to demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a "reasonable probability" that
but for counsel's unprofessional errors; the results would have been different. United States v.
Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1465, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687.


       4.      The Measure of Reasonable Probability is Lower than the Standard of
               Preponderance of the Evidence but Greater than A Mere possibility.




                                                 23
        A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1996). Importantly, the standard of
reasonable probability represents a fairly low threshold. Riggs v. Fairman, 399 F3d 1179, 1183
(9th Cir 2005). "Reasonable probability" is lower than the standard of "preponderance of the
evidence" but greater than "a mere possibility." State v. Vickers, 180 Ariz. 521, 527, 885 P.2d
1086, 1092 (1984), quoting State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 214, 689 P.2d 153, 157 (1984). See also
Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994).


The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair,
even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by preponderance of the evidence to have
determined the outcome.
        5.      The Preservation of Basic Fairness is the Proper Focus.
        The Strickland Court was careful to state that it was not announcing a mechanical rule,
and that "the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding
whose result is being challenged." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 696. Thus, a defendant
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel need not prove to a 100% degree of certainty that the
result would be different if the deficiency had not occurred, nor even by a preponderance of the
evidence:

        The Strickland ineffectiveness analysis is focused upon a basic fairness component,
holding that, because the Sixth Amendment provides for the assistance of counsel not for its own
sake, "but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial, [citation
omitted] [i]t follows from this that assistance which is ineffective in preserving fairness does not
meet the constitutional mandate [of Strickland]." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002).
        6.      The Doctrine of Harmless Error Does Not Apply to Claims of Ineffective
                Assistance of Counsel Once Prejudice Has Been Demonstrated.

        For Strickland claims (ineffective assistance claims), once a defendant has demonstrated
prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence, there is no harmless error analysis under Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 37 (1993). Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, note 7 (9th Cir.
2002) ("We need not conduct a harmless error review of Strickland violations under Brecht
[citation omitted], because {t}he Strickland prejudice analysis is complete in itself; there is no




                                                   24
place for an additional harmless-error review',"quoting Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148,
1154 n.2 (9th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1072 (2001). See also Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d
1160, 1169, n. 5 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding trial counsel's failure to request a diminished capacity
instruction constitutionally deficient and reversing denial of habeas corpus without conducting
harmless error analysis).


      B.      SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
           COUNSEL, SENTENCING COUNSEL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL

1.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate

further and to obtain, by subpoena if necessary, the accuser's retainer agreements with their civil

attorneys and the notices of claim filed, and then to confront the accusers with the documents on

cross-examination, could not possibly have been a strategic ploy, nor was there any downside or

disadvantage to defense counsel pursuing these investigative and trial strategies. On the

contrary, defense counsel's ineffectual attempts on cross-examination of the accuser at trial were

left on the record. Since there is no conceivable benefit to the defense in suppressing the

accuser's intentions to sue Ms. Bisbee and the Paradise Valley School District, Ms. Bisbee's

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be circumvented by claiming that counsel's

failure to investigate the matter more carefully and effectively, and to make use of the fruits of

such an investigation at trial, was a strategic ploy, State v. Donovan, 184 A. D. 2d 654 (2d Dep't

1992) (no strategic or legitimate explanation for failing to make suppression motion); State v.

Winston, 134 A.D. 2d 546 (2d Dep't 1987) (failure to impeach robbery victim concerning

discrepancies between victim's initial description or perpetrator and defendant's appearance).


2.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to assert a known

defense that went to the heart of the accuser's motive to lie and then call witnesses and present

evidence supporting, the unasserted defense theory. Because the defendant communicated to trial




                                                 25
counsel that the motive of the accuser and his mother was for financial gain, the defendant's trial

counsel had this defense available to him. This motive arose in Ms. Bisbee's February 11, 2004

arrest interrogation. Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective to assert this

defense, and failed to call witnesses. None of these witnesses were interviewed by trial counsel

and therefore there was no reasonable basis to forego this viable defense. (Exhibit #02.)

       Here, because of the errors and omissions of petitioner's trial attorney, it is impossible to
have confidence in the outcome of petitioner's trial. There is no sound strategy under any
circumstances that would justify defense counsels' actions. State v. Gerlaugh, 144 Ariz. 449,
455, 698 P.2d 694, 700 (1985). Defense counsel, Joel Thompson's failure placed him in direct
conflict with his client's best interests. Therefore the defendant was denied her constitutional
right to effective representation by a competent lawyer at every critical stage of the criminal
proceedings.
3.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to highlight
contradictions between the State's witnesses, previous statements and their trial testimony.
AZ Rules of Court 19.3 under AZ Rules of Evidence 613. (Exhibit #03.)

       All state witnesses had little credibility and had contradicted their own original accounts

given to the police. Defense counsel was ill-prepared to cross-examine the state witnesses and

failed to demonstrate their material inconsistencies and thereby, lack of credibility.

4.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to call persons to
testify as to whether or not the state witnesses had been tainted, coached, and influenced through
their contacts with Janette Sloan, Michael Kemp, Detective Kinder, and State Prosecutors, and to
determine the depth of their control. (Exhibit #05.)
       Ms. Sloan was inexplicably linked to major relevant issues in Ms. Bisbee's case. Defense

counsel failed to question whose control the teen's were under, which was a material issue. Ms.

Bisbee's Bench trial was a question of who was telling the truth and the state witnesses

credibility depended on who was driving the train behind the case.




                                                 26
       Ms. Sloan had a significant relationship with all the state witnesses. Ms. Sloan was the

one who contacted law enforcement regarding the alleged offense, and played the key role in the

prosecution of the charges. Ms. Sloan should have been called to testify about the nature of her

relationship with both her sons, Jonathan and Nikolas Valles, the Kemp family and the

defendant's ex-husband, and State witness Scott Bisbee. (Exhibit #07.)

5.     The defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to request
psychological records of the accuser, and his mother, Janette Sloan, in and challenge their
competency to testify. (Exhibit #06.)
       The court, in State v. Huskins (1996) 245 C.A. 2d 259, 54 Cal. Rptr. 253), dealt with a
new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence that the mother of an alleged victim of a
child molester had serious mental problems, and previously sought to fabricate evidence of a
similar crime. The court made it clear in that case that this evidence was not only admissible, but
of extreme importance to the defense case.

       This failure deprived the defendant of due process and the right to present a meaningful
defense (the reactions of rape victims (People v. Bledsoe (1984) 203 Cal. Rpt. 450, 36 C3d, 236).
The Supreme Court held that although "in some instances psychiatric testimony might be
extremely helpful to a jury in resolving the credibility of the prosecuting witness as in sex cases
that lacked an "abundance of corroborative evidence "proving the charged crimes."


6.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to call the
defendant's licensed psychiatrist, Dr. Buot-Smith, MD, to testify regarding examination,
evaluation, and the treatment that she had performed on the defendant and as to trait of character
relevant to the issues in this criminal case and to her reputation. Rule 803 AZ Rules of Evidence.
(Exhibit #13.)
       Dr. Teresa Buot-Smith was a key witness to the defendant's character, and her inability to
commit the allege crime. It was relevant under Rule 402, was admissible character evidence
under Rule 404(a), and would have assisted the trier of fact under Rule 702.
       Dr. Teresa Buot-Smith would have bolstered the weight of the defendant's credibility,
and testified to the defendant's character before, at the time, and after the allegations were made.




                                                 27
People v. Stoll, 783 P2d 698, 707-08(Cal.1989) Expert testimony that defendant's character did
not include "sexual deviance' was relevant to show that the defendant was not likely to commit
criminal sexual misconduct.
       Under prevailing professional norms trial counsel's failure to offer into evidence the
testimony of Dr. Buot-Smith deprived Ms. Bisbee of effective assistance of counsel and resulted
in clear prejudice.
       "Given state law regarding the use of character evidence on behalf of the accused and the
resources available to a criminal defense attorney in Maricopa County, as well as, the regular
practice of such attorneys in 2006, trial counsel's failure to offer psychological character
evidence that case a doubt on whether Ms. Bisbee was the type of person who would have
engaged in the acts with which she was charge, fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and constituted incompetent representation.


7.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to recall any State

Witnesses after having made a point of asking the court that they be subject to recall. Defendant

Bisbee, as well as others had been advised by defense counsel on January 15, 2006 that each

state witness would be recalled for further cross-examination. It was anticipated that the State

Witnesses would be challenged (according to Arizona rules of Court 19.3) concerning their prior

inconsistent statements and would corroborate Ms. Bisbee's testimony.

8.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to secure evidence

that was crucial to show that State Witnesses were all committing perjury regarding the February

05, 2004, phone call that led to Ms. Bisbee's conviction. The testimony provided by State

witness, Michael Kemp regarding the telephone conversation on February 05, 2004, was false.

School attendance records from University of Phoenix prove that Ms. Bisbee was signed into

class from 6:00 PM until 10:00 PM, that evening. Therefore, Michael Kemp's trial testimony that

he listened to a conversation between the accuser and defendant, Ms. Bisbee for an hour and 45

minutes from 10:00 PM until 11:45 PM, couldn't have happened.




                                                 28
       The testimony provided by State witness, Donavan Kemp regarding the telephone

conversation on February 05, 2004, was false. School attendance records from University of

Phoenix prove that Ms. Bisbee was signed into class from 6:00 PM until 10:00 PM (4 hrs) that

evening. Therefore, Donavan Kemp's trial testimony that he listened to a conversation between

the accuser and defendant, Ms. Bisbee for three hours, from 9:00 PM until 12:00 AM, couldn't

have happened. .

       The testimony provided by State witness, Jonathan Valles regarding the telephone

conversation on February 05, 2004, was false. School attendance records from University of

Phoenix prove that Ms. Bisbee was signed into class from 6:00 PM until 10:00 PM, that evening.

Therefore, Jonathan Valle's trial testimony said that he had a conversation with defendant, Ms.

Bisbee for one an hour and a half, from 11:30 PM until 1:00 AM, couldn't have happened.

       Evidence, witnesses and records prove that Ms. Bisbee was not available during that

duration and time period. This new Alibi evidence substantiates Ms. Bisbee's Bench trial

testimony and her February 11, 2004 original interrogation, thereby giving credibility to Ms.

Bisbee's testimony, and to refute the accusers. A witness who willfully testifies falsely, in a

material part of his testimony, is to be distrusted in others. The trier of fact should have rejected

the entire testimony of Michael Kemp, Donavan Kemp and Jonathan Valles, who willfully

testified falsely at Ms. Bisbee's Bench trial. (Exhibit #11.)

9.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to obtain cell

phone records that would have impeached each state witnesses' version of events of the alleged

crime and their entire characterization and interaction with Ms. Bisbee.

       The prejudice arising from trial counsel's ineffective assistance was that the jury verdict
of guilt was, in part, a product of a failure to adduce admissible evidence supporting the
alternative defense theory of the case.




                                                 29
       Put another way, the failure to adduce the available and known supporting evidence of
innocence contributed to the verdict and there is a reasonable probability of a difference in the
outcome when the additional testimony is considered.

       Under the law, a reasonable probability is less that a preponderance of the evidence but
greater than a mere possibility, State v. Vickers, 180 Ariz. At 527, 885 P.2d at 1092, quoting
State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. At 214, 689 P.2d at 157, and that standard of reasonable probability
represents "a fairly low threshold," Riggs v. Fairman, 399 F.3d at 1183.


10.    Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to interview and

to produce key witnesses to corroborate Ms. Bisbee on important relevant issues and to impeach

the state witnesses. (Exhibit #08, #12, #14. #16, #17, #18.)

                 Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective

                           for failure to call the following Witnesses:

1.     Anthony Capuano, Horizon High School Principal and Linda Ihnat, Horizon High School
       Vice Principal. (Exhibit #17.)
       a. These witnesses would have impeached Donavan Kemp's trial testimony, and mis-
       characterization of him and Ms. Bisbee "being friends".
       (Donavan Kemp Trial testimony pgs. 11, 13, & 33)
       b. These witnesses would have impeached Donovan Kemp's and Brittany Heehler's
       testimonies that they "hung out daily" at lunch with Ms. Bisbee (in the nursing office)
       (01/09/04, pg. 30 DK), (K58-K59), (Capuano 31)
       c. These witnesses would have testified to Ms. Bisbee's character and reputation of
       helping disadvantaged students. (K-19 Capuano 12-13)
       d. These witnesses would have testified that State's Exhibit #3, the apology letter from
       Ms. Bisbee to Mr. Kemp, was not connected to any of the criminal allegations in this
       case, but was the wording and adjectives that were used during to describe the
       February 02, 2004, "sign-out" problems.




                                                30
2.     Samantha Strandhagen was a direct witness to State witnesses, Brittney          Heehler and
       Donavan Kemp, stating that nothing happened between Ms. Bisbee and              the accuser,
       Jonathan Valles. (Exhibit #16.)
3.     Diane Kemp should have been called to testify regarding her interaction with Janette
       Sloan and threats she made against the Kemps about a lawsuit.

4.     David Valentine: This witness would have testified that Ms. Bisbee was interested in
       adult males at the time these allegations were made.

5.     Barb Napoletano, (Ms. Bisbee's neighbor since 1999) Character and reputation witness.
       She would have testified that she was asked by Ms. Bisbee to baby-sit on February 02,
       2004. (Exhibit # 14.)
6.     Brian Heehler (Exhibit #08 and #18) In his, September 2007 interview, Brian Heehler
       clearly states that he would have testified to the fact that:
       1. He asked Ms. Bisbee for help with his daughter, Brittany Heehler
       2. That Ms. Bisbee was a loving, devoted mother to Taylor Lee
       3. That Ms. Bisbee was a positive role model for his daughter
       4. That Ms. Bisbee never consumed alchohol, smoked nor displayed
       inappropriate behavior.
       5. That Ms. Bisbee's defense counsel never interviewed him prior to trial
       although he had made contact with them.
7.     Karen DeMoss (Exhibit 12) she would have testified to the fact that her daughter
was a nurse's aide for Ms. Bisbee in the Spring of 2004 at Horizon High School and that Ms.
Bisbee was a positive role model for her daughter.

       The content of the information, the independent nature of its source, and the concomi-tant

credibility attached to the witnesses and their information goes to the heart of two important

matters. On the one hand, there was a known and highly relevant basis for adducing this

supportive testimony; on the other hand, there was no reasonable or logical basis for trial counsel

to fail to interview or fail to call these witness and to provide the the trier of fact with evidence

supportive of the defense.




                                                  31
        Trial counsel's deficient performance arises from failing to investigate known and

supportive witnesses as well as from failing to assert known plausible meritorious defenses.

Defense counsel "has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision

that makes particular investigations unnecessary. "Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Here, trial

counsel did not investigate, did not even interview this witness, and therefore trial counsel did

not have any reasonable ground for foregoing the supporting evidence. Further, because trial

counsel failed to interview the witnesses, counsel could not professionally evaluate any

possibility of some (hitherto-unknown) reason for not using them as a witnesses at trial, thus

clearly violating his obligation under Strickland.

        The utter lack of a reasonable or even plausible strategic or tactical basis for the decision

not to call supportive witnesses militates strongly in favor of the defendant's claim for post

conviction relief. State v. Vickers, 180 Ariz. 521, 885, P.2d 1086 (1994) (granting post

conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assitance on the ground that there was no possible

reasonable basis for the trial strategy of advancing a conspiracy defense or allowing particular

witness to testify).

        Additionally, a recent Ninth Circuit case provides instructive discussion of the issue of

ineffective assistance arising from failure to investigate / interview witnesses within the context

of an absence of any reasonable strategic or tactical basis for failing to adduce available evidence

(testimony):

                While some of the facts may not be entirely clear, the law is. As we explain,
        counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective regardless of the extent of her
        knowledge of Mendoza and Terrones's awareness of the reward, and of their financial
        motivations, as a result of her conversation with the prosecutor. Whether she had direct
        or specific knowledge of their awareness of the reward, or whether she knew only in the
        most general sense of such a possibility, her failure to investigate the matter more fully,




                                                 32
       given the information she possessed, rendered her performance deficient. In addition,
       he failure at trial to question Mendoza and Terrones about the reward cannot under any
       theory be deemed a "sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U. S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052
       (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 100 L. Ed. 83 (1955)).



                 "A lawyer who fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce into evidence,
       [information] that demonstrates his client's factual innocence, or that raises sufficient
       doubts as to that question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient
       performance." Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hart v.
       Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)).
       Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F. 3d 1099, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006)

11.    Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to assert Ms.

Bisbee's good character and failure to adduce the testimony of Ms. Bisbee's co-workers, school

employees, students that she tutored, as well as, numerous other supportive witnesses. It is

logically impossible to determine that the defense failures did not contribute to the verdict and

therefore a new trial should be granted. If the trier of fact had heard from these witnesses, he

would have been more likely to attribute greater veracity and importance to the defendant's own

testimony. Accordingly, probability of a difference in outcome of the trial is quite reasonable

under the law.

12.    The defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge

the prosecution's mischaracterization of the relationship between herself and these troubled teens.

Ms. Bisbee was helping these kids at discrete points in time. The idea that Ms. Bisbee spent any

significant time lounging around with these teens was ridiculous. The demands of her life and

her responsibilities as a single-mother, new employee and part-time graduate student cast doubt

on the idea that she was spending much of her idle time developing relationships.




                                                 33
13.    The defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge

the alleged incident at the Valles’s home after the Super Bowl. The idea that as Ms. Bisbee was

returning from a cherished outing with her daughter and randomly received a phone call from

one of Brittany Heehler’s friends (Nikolas Valles) and that Ms. Bisbee then used the occasion to

"hook-up" with Jonathan Valles was absurd. The teens’s stories conflict and make no sense.

14.    The defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge

regarding the alleged incident at the Bisbee home. It was absurd that with an important meeting

with Ms. Bisbee's bosses at a job that allowed her to work near her daughter, that she used the

unexpected, unanticipated, uncontrollable occasion of her daughter having a fever to publicly

collect both her daughter and Jonathan Valles from school for a private kiss. Not only is the idea

ridiculous, but the details of his story again make no sense. The decision to have Jonathan

Valles assist at all is only made after attempts at finding an adult and in the context of being

given permission to call the Valles boys out by Mr. Gene Valles. Jonathan Valles was not her

first choice, but not an entirely unreasonable choice given the emergent nature of the situation

and that fact the Kemps trusted him to care for their daughters.

15.    The defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge

the alleged incident at the Kemp home. The notion that with all the trouble caused by signing

out Jonathan Valles that she was going to the Kemp home to publicly engage in sexual

interaction with him was completely absurd. The teens' stories are in conflict not only with each

other, but with the stories that they originally told Detective Kinder. Not only does Donavan

Kemp never see anything, he and Brittany Heehler, even call to apologize to Ms. Bisbee after

learning that she has passed a polygraph. Despite being all together in a small room, none of

these teens saw or heard anything regarding what Jonathan Valles alleges. Absurd.




                                                 34
16.    The defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge

the phone calls later that evening. The timing was not the implied notion of privacy and the

cover of the night, but the necessity of wanting to promptly but gently scold Jonathan Valles for

his inappropriate teenage actions after she returned from her graduate school class. The “what

are you thinking…” questions are really “What are you thinking?!?!” She was not encouraging

him to continue his unwanted inappropriate behavior, but asking him to reflect and figure out

that how he was acting, was wrong. She was just trying to do it gently because he was a

struggling, lost kid from a dysfunctional family. Michael Kemp was off and on, the phone

because he was sharing the receiver, so he cannot tell when Jonathan Valles or Donavan Kemp

was on the phone. Donavan Kemp was the one being discouraged from marrying young by the

“Utah” comments. Donavan Kemp clearly was not dissuaded given the fact that he pursued his

relationship with Brittany and wanted to marry young. Kemp was confused and concerned and

interjected. Ms. Bisbee was confused and calls back.

       Ms. Bisbee's wrongful conviction was the result of teenage a false allegation and bad

detective work. When Michael Kemp went to Jonathan Valles' mother and the police were

contacted, the result was not an investigation but rather an inquisition. Despite the many oppor-

tunities to openly investigate claims and to collect objective evidence through taped phone calls,

crime scene investigation, or physical examination, all that was done, was coercive questioning.

       These kids were and still are highly suggestible. Nikolas Valles recalls that he felt

coerced into answering certain ways by the questioning detective. Donovan Kemp was lead into

answering a series of questions by the prosecutor about seeing Ms. Bisbee in school long after

she has been fired and arrested. Moreover, the teens that were actually making claims, Jonathan

Valles, Donavan Kemp and Brittany Heehler are all still talking. Nikolas Valles told us that




                                                35
Jonathan Valles and Donavan Kemp continue to plot in secret. Without the objective

information that only good investigation can produce, we are left with nothing but confusion.

        Detective Kinder felt it was important to search Ms. Bisbee’s home without a search

warrant for fear of harm befalling someone, but he somehow could not manage to have a decent

medical physical exam performed to clarify the issue of the pubic hair despite her hospitalization

after her interrogation and her prolonged incarceration after arrest. The supposed confession.

The confession was nothing more than the desperate attempt of a scared woman tricked into

saying something to stop the threats and intimidation of a threatening and intimidating man.

There was no corroboration of any of the claims because Detective Kinder, put in his three days

of work and quit after recording a few meaningless statements. The families will forever live

with the consequences of Scottsdale Detective Christopher Kinder's choices.

17.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to object and

suppress the altered, tainted video tape (Trial Exhibit #2), that proved Ms. Bisbee's Miranda

rights were violated. The State's manipulation and control of discovery resulted in the denial of

Ms. Bisbee's right to a fair trial.

18.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to object and to

challenge police and prosecutorial misconduct.

19.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to file pretrial

motion to suppress anything emanating from illegal acts of this state.

20.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to include

evidence of an audio taped conversation between State witness Brittany Heehler and Ms. Bisbee

where Brittany Heeher states where the accuser, Jonathan Valles, is lying about the allegations to

avoid getting in trouble with his mother.




                                                 36
22.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure He failed to

review Jonathan Valles February 10, 2004, videotaped interview, which contained exculpatory

material not transcribed in the Bates pages and which impeached the accusers trial testimony.

23.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to object to

prosecutorial vouching during the summation.

24.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to obtain expert

witnesses, who should have testified on the defendant's behalf at the Bench trial. These experts'

testimonies were relevant under Rule 402 and would have assisted the trier of fact in determining

the verdict and understanding the evidence pursuant to Rule 702. These experts' testimony

would have impeached each state's witnesses' testimony by challenging their veracity and overall

reliability.

        The false accusations against Ms. Bisbee emerged in a context in which a complete

assessment of qualified expert, Dr. Robert Emerick, was vital to her defense. Defendant

contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to seek the appointment of a

qualified expert to testify on the subject of false allegations and the indicators that existed in Ms.

Bisbee's case. This expert clearly could have provided a reasonable answer to prosecutor's

summation questions of why would these teens lie and testify that these teens were clearly

sophisticated enough to wrongfully convict Ms. Bisbee.

25.     Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective for failure to seek the

appointment of a qualified voluntariness expert to testify at trial. Dr. Richard Ofshe is

examining Ms. Bisbee's video interrogation to determine if her statements were freely and

voluntarily given.

        In this case, the consideration of an independent expert basis for imputing greater

credibility to the defendant's testimony may well have put the case in a different light, and thus




                                                  37
caused a difference in the weighing process during which evidence is evaluated based on

credibility. The repeatedly varying stories provided by the juvenile witnesses, switching back

and forth from (it happened, it didn't happen, it happened, it didn't happen, as brought out on

cross examination) compared to the consistency in the defendant's discussions and testimony

militate in favor of concluding that there is more than a mere possibility that the case could have

reached a different outcome, if the expert testimony had been admitted and considered.

       Sentencing counsel was not trial counsel. On March 15, 2006, sentencing counsel was

denied her Motion to continue Sentencing, therefore, there was no possible way that she could

effectively prepare. The rationale, of course, is that a counsel who has been denied the oppor-

tunity to prepare is the equivalent of no counsel at all; "the denial of opportunity for appointed

counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare defense could convert the

appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance." (Avery v. State

of Alabama (1940) 308 U. S. 444, 446, 60 S. Ct. 321, 322, 48 L. Ed. 377.) Such an accused has

not been accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.

       The prompt disposition of criminal cases is to be commended and encouraged. But in

reaching that result a defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his right to

have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense. "(Powell v. State of

Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 58, 59, 53 S. Ct. 55, 60, 77 L Ed. 158.)"

       In Wattan a new Pre-Sentencing Report was required because the original Sentencing

was grounded in a PSR that the defendant was prohibited from correcting and from presenting

supplementary information for the courts Sentencing consideration. State v. McVay, 131 Ariz.

369, 371, 641 P.2d 857, 859 (1972). It is because the judge clearly was influenced by what

could be erroneous reports that we vacate the sentence imposed.




                                                 38
       The Pre-Sentencing Report was not challenged by the defense counsel. Counsel failed to

object on the record or otherwise assert the defendant's right to confrontation.

26.    Defendant contends and asserts that counsel was ineffective in his failure to subject the

statements in Janette Sloan's letter to cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

68-69 (2004) (holding that where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicum of

reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the constitution actually

prescribes: confrontation).

       Finally, this Court should note that, by failing to present known alternative defenses and

by failing to adduce the known testimony of witnesses that support the defenses, trial counsel

failed to put the States case to meaningful adversarial testing. The Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel is the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to

survive the ordeal of meaningful adversarial testing. Thus the State's theory of the case at bar

was not subjected to adversarial testing, a circumstance akin to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

648, 659 (1984) (holding that prejudice is to be presumed when defense counsel fails to subject

the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, because such a circumstance constitutes

a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively

unreliable, and the adversarial process is the essential core of the American system of criminal

justice. The lack of meaningful adversarial testing in this case constitutes ineffective assistance,

because the Constitution of the United States demands that the State prove every element of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and here the defendant's trial counsel failed to adduce a

known and available defense and known and available supportive evidence for that defense.

       This case could not have been closer, pitting the credibility of Ms. Bisbee, a respected,

devoted single-mom, and school nurse, against her teenage male accuser and the close knit circle

of his friends. At the Bench trial, it appeared to the trier of fact, that the State's witnesses had no




                                                  39
motive to lie and to fabricate evidence. Thus, any fact that impeached their testimony's

credibility assumed added importance at the Bench trial. Defense counsel's failure to question

the accuser and his mother, Janette Sloan, about making false perjurous, criminal and civil

complaints, was an important subject going directly to their credibility. It was, therefore,

particularly important for defense counsel to demonstrate the existence of their close-knit circle

of friends, and their ample motives and opportunity, to fabricate and maintain the false

allegations against Ms. Bisbee.

       With the accuser's direct financial stake in the outcome of the case, kept from or

unknown to the defense and the trier of fact, counsel's ability to argue to the court that the

students would lie for each other, and that they were not the clean-cut appearing teenagers the

State presented at trial, became even more critical. To make those arguments, however, counsel

needed all of the evidentiary ammunition available. Defense counsel's failure to present this

evidence supporting critical defense arguments was serious and prejudicial error.



                                       CONCLUSION

       Due Process is not only central but also essential to the unique American experiment

created by the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The remedy for a violation of

the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel should be tailored to the injury suffered

from the constitutional violation… United States v. Morrison, 449 U. S. 361, 364 (1981). The

defendant is entitled to a new trial with a properly constituted jury and the effective assistance of

counsel at multiple stages of the criminal proceedings. Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner

respectfully requests the Court grant post conviction relief in the form of ordering a new trial in

this matter.




                                                 40
       Wherefore, Ms. Bisbee respectfully requests that this court recognize that she will be

granted a new trial and in accordance with the dictates of Rule 7.2.B should release Ms. Bisbee

from custody on her own recognizance pending further proceedings and / or dismissal of the

underlying indictment. If the State does not join in Ms. Bisbee's Motion for Release, she

requests this court set a schedule for an evidentiary hearing, additional briefing, and oral

argument on the Motion.

       There is no need for Ms. Bisbee to be separated any longer from society, her family,

friends and only child, in a case based on a false accusation. The trial court has discretion and

jurisdiction to order Ms. Bisbee's release. Ms. Bisbee could not have possibly been convicted or

sent to prison if the material facts in this motion had been presented to the court trier of fact.




                                                  41
                            Respectfully submitted this ____ day of November, 2007


                            _______________________________
                            Courtney Valle Bisbee
                            Defendant, Pro per

                            Ms. Courtney Bisbee ADC#205168
                            Arizona Department of Corrections
                            ASPC - Perryville - Lumley
                            PO Box 3300
                            Goodyear, AZ 85395




Original filed and copy of the
Foregoing mailed / hand-delivered
This ____ day of November, 2007

Honorable Warren Granville
Maricopa County Superior Court Central Court 9-D
101 W. Jefferson
Phoenix, AZ 85003

______________________


County Attorney Andrew Thomas
Maricopa County Attorneys Office
301 West Jefferson, Ste. 800
Phoenix, AZ 85003


________________________




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