Navy League's Maritime Policy Statement

Navy League's Maritime Policy Statement The Navy League's annual Maritime Policy Statement is produced by the Navy League's Maritime Policy and Resolutions Committee and approved by the Board of Directors. The analyses and recommendations in the Maritime Policy Statement are derived from multiple sources, including the expertise and decades of experience of our members themselves, open source materials, and public information from the seagoing services. The views expressed are those of the Navy League of the United Sates and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard or Maritime Administration. NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES Citizens in Support of the Sea Services National Security Maritime Superiority Global Presence M A R I T I M E P O L I C Y 2 0 0 9 – 1 0 No nation has gained international prominence without having a strong maritime capability If America . succumbs to “sea blindness” we will lose control of the seas, which is critical to our economy … 2009–10 MARITIME POLICY NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY LEAGUE MISSION The Navy League of the United States is a non-profit organization dedicated to educating our citizens about the importance of sea power to U.S. national security and supporting the men and women of the U.S. Navy Marine Corps, Coast Guard , and U.S.-flag Merchant Marines and their families. COVER PHOTOS, LEFT TO RIGHT: U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. NAVY, MAERSK LINE, U.S. NAVY National Security Maritime Superiority Global Presence PREFACE Maritime superiority — what is it and why should America be concerned? No nation has gained international prominence without having a strong maritime capability. If America succumbs to “sea blindness” we will lose control of the seas, which is critical to our economy, world trade and our lead role as a force for protecting democratic freedoms globally. In 2020, 40 percent of our Gross Domestic Product will be dependent on ocean shipping and maritime trade. Without maritime superiority, our economy will be at risk due to our inability to ensure freedom of navigation across the oceans. Today America is being challenged for control of the seas. China, certainly, and a resurgent Russia have the capacity, desire and capability to equal or surpass the United States as the maritime leader of the world. This puts us in jeopardy militarily in both the war against terrorism and any major conflict. To maintain global maritime presence, we must have sufficient sea-going assets to provide forward presence, react to contingencies wherever they may occur and, when required, provide forceful control of the seas and the littorals. Only strong American maritime forces can ensure control the seas — above, on and below. Maritime superiority requires “hulls in the water,” just as victory on land is won by “boots on the ground.” The contributions of all of America’s maritime forces — the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marines — plus those of our partners worldwide, are welcome and important, but it is the U.S. Navy that blesses us with maritime superiority. The 313 ships that the service has set as a fleet goal should be viewed as the bare minimum, since the attrition that would occur in major combat is not considered. While there has been a focus in recent years on hull forms, stealth and other advanced technologies, it is the capability to find and put ordnance on the target that defines the true worth of a combatant ship. Only strong American maritime forces can ensure control of the seas — above, on and below. NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 1 Equally important is the capability for our Sailors and Marines to train realistically with those ships. The continuing emotion-based attacks on the Navy’s active sonar training are the most glaring, but not the only, example of how training capability is being dramatically eroded. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision to support active sonar training is a great help, but more is needed. The Navy League has argued repeatedly for legislation ensuring our forces have the ability to train as they will fight. We desperately need that legislation as special interest groups continue to impede essential training. The Navy League believes that shipbuilding is the most critical of all the programs in the Department of Defense (DoD) budget. The funds are not there to build and maintain a Navy of 313 ships including the amphibious ships mandated by our commitments to littoral warfare, or replace the aging Coast Guard fleet. The final Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2008, which is currently in working draft form, may call for a number greater than 313 and the Navy League wholeheartedly supports any escalation of that number. The Navy League applauds the decision to build more DDG 51-type ships versus the expensive DDG 1000s. Simply put, we need numbers of ships and we can get more hulls in the water with the less expensive but still very capable DDG 51s. Inflation is a fact in shipbuilding, and the increasing cost of commodities, weakness of the dollar and lack of long-term funding stability create cost growth. In recognition of these factors, the Navy needs $20 billion per year for shipbuilding and modernization, the Coast Guard needs $2.6 billion per year to effectively execute its Deepwater modernization program and the Marine Corps needs the 10th LPD amphibious transport dock ship and a total force of 34 amphibious ships. Though the Navy states that its aircraft shortfall is several years out, the fact is that there is currently a shortage of Hornets and, as a result, some of our active-duty Carrier Air Wings do not have a full complement of aircraft today. Our warfighting capability is being degraded. The question of affordability needs to be balanced against the impact of our loss of maritime superiority. To say we cannot afford these dollar amounts equates to saying we can afford to become a second-rate maritime nation. U.S. NAVY 2 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 The war on terrorism has rightfully become the priority for our maritime services. However, as the Navy League has repeatedly stated, the nation cannot lose focus on the need to be ready for a major combat operation (MCO). The vast majority of the maritime services’ response to humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions has been by forces designed for MCO — Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups, strategic logistics forces, etc. One of the essential elements of an MCO is the ability to strike from the sea. The Navy-Marine Corps team has not been able to train sufficiently in expeditionary warfare due to the enormous draw on the people and equipment resources to support the war on terrorism. Increasing our Marine Corps’ end strength to 202,000 will help alleviate the strain on our Marines so that the service can renew its focus on and rebuild its expertise in expeditionary warfare. However, more “national-level” emphasis must be placed on our ability to strike from the sea with our carrier and amphibious forces to ensure we have the ability to visit sea-facing geography without an invitation. The Navy League has supported instituting a single focus on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) for three years. In that vein, we applaud the Navy’s effort to consolidate its activities within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This is a significant step forward, but needs to be carried to the logical conclusion of encompassing all the diverse entities involved in MDA. The Department of Homeland Security, the Maritime Administration, Coast Guard and several other elements of the federal government are involved in MDA, as are our coalition partners and other nations. A single, coordinated, cohesive approach, through a Program Director, will ensure that all the pieces of MDA fit together to give a true picture of the traffic on the world’s oceans. Personnel are the engine of our maritime services. All the grand equipment and stellar strategies cannot work without people. Taking care of those who wear the cloth of the nation and ensuring adequate numbers to meet the nation’s needs are mandatory. The Marine Corps needs the 202,000 active-duty end strength to ensure the service can once again be the premier expeditionary force and relieve the stress created by multiple deployments in support of the war on terrorism. The Coast Guard needs 54,000 personnel to meet the ever-expanding roles and missions assigned to the service. The Navy is providing more Sailors on the ground in support of the war on terrorism than it has at sea in that area of the world. The Navy has based its personnel needs on the fact that new-technology ships will require fewer Sailors to man them, but these ships have not come on line as fast as the people have been drawn down. The number of Sailors committed to the war on terrorism was not envisioned when the personnel-reduction plan was developed, nor was the need for additional Navy personnel associated with increasing Marine Corps end strength. The Navy League believes that the Navy’s active-duty end strength needs to be 340,000 until the above factors are mitigated. Any changes contemplated and/or implemented by the new administration should be undertaken with robust consultation with military leadership to ensure they support — not undermine — our position as a global maritime leader. The maritime services must have the resources they need to maintain the highest state of readiness so that they can prosecute their wide-ranging missions, maintain freedom of navigation across all the world’s oceans and be ready to fight and win when called upon. U.S. COAST GUARD NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 3 THE SEA SERVICES TEAM There is no shortage of challenges facing the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Maritime Administration — the Sea Services Team. While all the services are engaged in the war on terrorism, it is necessary that they remain prepared for all future contingencies. The sea services are being asked to participate in humanitarian relief and counterterrorist operations to a greater extent than ever before. Given the interdependence of the United States and the global economy, preventing war is another important element. It is imperative that the United States maintain a strong force that convinces potential adversaries that we can win any future war. This is accomplished through investment in force modernization. The Sea Service Team provides the President and the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) with their only forcible entry option and brings a unique mix of capabilities to face these evolving operational requirements. Positioning resources at sea and Global Fleet Stations enables the Navy and Marine Corps to respond decisively, with precisely the right capabilities — at sea and ashore — as threats dictate. The Sea Services team should adhere to the clearly and simply stated core priorities in FY09: “Prevail in the war on terrorism; take care of our Sailors, Marines, their Families and particularly our wounded; and prepare for future challenges across the full spectrum of operations.” U.S. NAVY The Navy Mission is: “To maintain, train and equip combat-ready naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas.” Our Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Adm. Gary Roughead, has maintained his commitment to the following priorities which “will prevent war, dominate any threat, and decisively defeat any adversary”: ■ Build tomorrow’s Navy … with the right balance of capability and capacity — through a stable shipbuilding plan that provides an affordable, balanced force and preserves and stabilizes our shipbuilding industrial base; achieving a force of 313 ships, the absolute minimum necessary to provide global reach, persistent presence, and have strategic, operational and tactical effect — thus continuing to provide maritime superiority. Remain ready to fight today … with a Navy that is agile, capable and ready. As the nation’s strategic reserve, our Navy must be ready to generate persistent seapower anywhere in the world, maintain ■ 4 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 “A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER” dominance in traditional roles while meeting existing and emerging threats in asymmetric and irregular warfare. ■ Develop and support our Sailors and Navy civilians … by instilling in our military and civilian force a focus on mission and individual readiness underpinned by a warrior ethos. We must attract and retain a diverse, high-performing, competency-based and mission-focused force while ensuring the welfare of our Sailors, Navy civilians and their families. Maritime superiority is determined in large measure by the number of our ships. Stability in, and budgetary support for, the shipbuilding plan are essential, but our goal can only be achieved when our shipyards can sustain a stable work force over time. The Navy League advocates the restart of the DDG 51 production line currently in the Ship Construction Navy (SCN) budget plan as a means to achieving both ship count and industrial base stability. The Navy League of the United States: ■ Fully supports the CNO’s initiative to rebuild the fleet to a minimum level of 313 ships as well as the Navy’s consistency in articulating this requirement to Congress. Believes the Congressional Budget Office estimate of $27 billion per year (in FY09 SCN dollars) is realistic to achieve the 313-ship goal by 2030, assuming a 30-year hull life and a build rate of 10 to 11 ships per year, yet the requested and enacted FY09 SCN budget stands at $14.1 billion for the procurement of eight ships. Supports mid-life modernization of our existing Aegis fleet to retain war-fighting currency and sustain service life to the 30- or 35-year mark. The mix of modernization and new construction can more economically achieve the desired force strength, and we advocate use of the SCN appropriation for programmed modernization of the Aegis fleet as well as for new construction. The potential for a 35-year hull life of the modernized Aegis fleet would decrease the SCN funding level mentioned above, as would a 35-year hull life for new-construction ships. Supports sustainment of aircraft procurement, through the multi-year funding mechanism, at a procurement level of 200-250 aircraft per year in the current Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Steps must be taken now to alleviate a severe strike/fighter aircraft shortfall in the next decade. Acting on the 2009 congressional directive to explore a third multi-year procurement of the F/A-18E/F the Navy , should budget for the multi-year buy and fund that procurement through the FYDP . ■ ■ ■ To Project Precise, Persistent Offensive Power: ■ Supports sustaining the number of aircraft carriers at 11. Supports the sustainment of 10 carrier air wings. While we believe 10 air wings are insufficient to provide the capability required now and into the future, we recognize that there are only 10 air wings at present and, consequently, support that number as an absolute minimum. The aircraft carrier, with its embarked air wing, is unencumbered by geopolitical constraints and is the most recognizable symbol of American presence and power projection around the world. ■ U.S. NAVY NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 5 ‘Build tomorrow’s Navy … Remain ready to fight today … Develop and support our Sailors and Navy civilians…’ — CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD’S PRIORITIES TO ‘PREVENT WAR, DOMINATE ANY THREAT AND DECISIVELY DEFEAT ANY ADVERSARY.’ ■ Supports continued multi-year procurement of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the E-2C/D Hawkeye and full development of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. These programs, coupled with critical service-life sustainment and modernization investments, like the F/A-18 fuselage center-barrel replacement and the Advanced Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Radar program, are cornerstones for the naval aviation force structure of the future. Supports procurement of the first three of the DDG 1000 class of ships, leveraging the substantial research and development investment. We endorse the dual lead ship acquisition strategy and believe the Navy should use the DDG 1000 as a transition hull for development of technology for the CG(X), the next-generation cruiser. Supports the Aegis Cruiser Modernization Program as a means of maintaining our technological superiority, reducing operations and maintenance costs, and extending the service life of these very capable warships. Supports continued funding of the Aegis DDG Modernization Program to keep pace with technology and enable this ship class to maintain combat superiority as the first ship approaches 40 percent of its planned 35-year service life. Supports continued development of advanced technologies that will address the missile and submarine threats of 2050. ■ ■ ■ ■ To Project Global Defensive Assurance: ■ Supports continuing the development, procurement and deployment of the Navy portion of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), including the long-range surveillance and track (LRS&T) capability to queue groundbased intercept systems and ultimately the ability to detect, track and engage medium- and long-range ballistic missiles well distant from the United States. Supports continuing the construction of the high-speed, maneuverable, shallow-draft Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class, with modular mission payloads — including unmanned vehicles — to address littoral threats, including mines, air-independent propulsion submarines, surface swarms and shore-based cruise missiles. This 55-ship class is vital to achieving force structure goals as well as maintaining a portion of our shipbuilding industrial base. Supports continued enhanced cooperation between the Navy and the Coast Guard to improve homeland defense and national security, including counter-drug operations. In particular, we endorse the unified maritime approach detailed in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, issued jointly by the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in October 2007. Supports a robust network that would ensure Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) among our services and our allies, permitting us to know what is on the oceans and respond to threats to our homeland, that of our allies and our deployed forces. ■ ■ ■ 6 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 ■ Endorses the development and procurement of the next-generation maritime patrol aircraft, the P-8 Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA), as the replacement for the P-3C. To complement to the MMA, we also support the development of the Broad-Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) aircraft for unmanned aerial surveillance. Endorses the mission of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) in antiterrorist force protection, shore-based logistical support and Construction Battalion missions across the joint operational spectrum as well as control of the Navy’s Riverine Force performing brown and green water operations in support of the war on terrorism. Supports the Navy’s increased emphasis on the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and mine warfare missions to counter the mining and airindependent submarine capabilities of potential adversaries. LOCKHEED MARTIN ■ ■ To Project Joint Operational Independence: ■ Supports funding 34 amphibious ships including the LPD 17 class of ships, completion of the LHD class and funding of the LHA Replacement, with the goal of attaining12 ESGs. Supports continued funding for Combat Logistics Forces including Oiler/Ammunition carriers and Dry Cargo/Ammunition carriers, as well as Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships and new classes of special-mission vessels, all of which will be employed in the Maritime Preposition Force (Future) Squadrons. Supports funding for the development and procurement of high-speed connectors, both air and surface (including Landing Craft Air Cushion X), to move fighting units and their logistics requirements from advance bases to the sea base and from the sea base to shore. ■ ■ To Connect the Joint Force to Achieve Battlespace Dominance: ■ Most strongly endorses the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) initiative. Knowing what is on the world’s oceans is just as important as knowing what is in the airspace. Supports the integration of operational pictures across service lines and among air, ground and naval forces, the first integration being that of the existing Global Command and Control Systems (GCCS) of the Navy (GCCS-M) and the Army (GCCS-A). The goal is to have a single GCCS that services the entire Department of Defense. Endorses the establishment of globally networked Joint Force Maritime Component Commanders (JFMCCs), linking geographically dispersed units of the sea base — from the joint command level to the tactical level. This network must include Global Maritime Intelligence Integration in support of joint, Navy and interagency operations. ■ ■ NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 7 ■ Encourages the Department of the Navy to consolidate its networks so that any Navy or Marine Corps computer can be successfully connected to the network from any location, regardless of the service provider. That should be the goal of the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) which should have robust command and control capability. U.S. MARINE CORPS America’s Navy-Marine Corps Team remains engaged around the world in The Long War, deep in the fight for freedom, peace and security. Our Marines continue to be engaged in a generational battle against those forces dedicated to destroying our vital interests and our homeland. Those Marines have the raw courage, determination and dedication to defend their nation. As a nation, we must stand behind them and provide the training, support systems and equipment required to do their job and to preserve their lives. For more than seven years, these men and women have been making tremendous personal sacrifices in support of their country. Gen. Conway has repeatedly stated that “our Marines and Sailors, at home and in combat overseas, are the number one priority in all that we do.” The Marine Corps is undermanned for all that it is called upon to do. The deployment-to-dwell ratio is about 1:1; the Marine Corps’ target is for each Marine is to have two days at home for every one day deployed. This will allow for better training, building expanded skill sets and better care for our families. In that vein, the No. 1 priority is to build, train and equip the Marine Corps to a total active force of 202,000. This end strength is the number required for all the missions that the Marine Corps is called upon to execute around the globe. It is important that Congress continue its support to reach this goal and to provide a properly trained, manned and equipped force. The Navy League supports the requirement that the Marine Corps must be where the country needs it, when it needs it, and be ready to prevail over whatever challenges it encounters. To ensure this, the Navy League supports the following objectives and priorities: ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ U.S. NAVY Right size the Marine Corps for today’s conflict and tomorrow’s uncertainty. Reset the force and prepare for the next contingency. Modernize for tomorrow so as to be ready when called. Provide a naval force that is ready for any contingency. Sustain the individual Marines and their families. Right Sizing. The envisioned 202,000-strong force is an expeditionary Marine Corps ready to go to war with no additional preparation or sustainment required. The Marine Corps must be ready to support and defend the nation around the globe. This capability does not come free or easily. Maintaining and preparing this modern force calls for recruiting and retaining the right personnel, buying the right equipment, training to the full list of combat missions and providing modern and adequate life-support 8 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 facilities and quarters. The Marine Corps is on track to complete its five-year recruitment program in three years while continuing to exceed all DoD standards for personnel. As the force builds with new recruits, they must also retain quality, experienced Marines to ensure the proper grade and skill set mix. Continued Incentive Bonuses for re-enlistments will remain the most important tool. Marines have been dedicated to high-tempo operations since late 2001. Traditional training and skill sets have been replaced with desert training requirements. Because of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, there is an entire generation of young Marines who have never been aboard ship. Many missions and sophisticated skill sets, such as those required for jungle and mountain warfare, have been ignored because of the intense focus on ground operations. With the growth of the force, the Marine Corps will be able to return to its traditional expeditionary roles, once again operating from the sea. With a right-sized force the Marine Corps will regain these skill sets and will be ready for any contingency. Resetting: Combat operations have been continuous and the equipment has been subjected to intense use in harsh environmental conditions. Aside from the requirement to buy new equipment for the increased end strength, the entire force requires extensive rehabilitation, repair and replacement as weapons and equipment are rotated out of combat. Likewise pre-positioned stocks and training base stocks must be replenished. The current reset cost estimate exceeds $15.6 billion, of which only about $10.9 billion has been funded. As the fight continues, the reset costs will increase apace. Modernization: A ready force is a modern force. As the Marine Corps modernizes its combat forces, attention and funding must be given to individual survivability programs to include personal protective equipment, lighter weight gear and modern force protection systems. Ground mobility must be improved with the new Marine Armor System, the up-armored HMMWV, the Marine Personnel Carrier and the Joint Light … the No. 1 priority is to build, train and equip the Marine Corps to a total active force of 202,000. U.S. MARINE CORPS NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 9 Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). To enhance the forcible entry capability, the Commandant’s most critical ground system is the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. Likewise there is continued support needed for Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) fires improvements, particularly in the 155mm Howitzer and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). Within Marine Aviation, the MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor, the CH-53K heavy-lift helicopter, the UH-1 and AH-1helicopter and the F-35B short takeoff, vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter —the Commandant’s No. 1 aviation priority — will provide the MAGTF commander with unsurpassed warfighting capability. Building an Amphibious Force: Naturally, a key part of the Navy-Marine Corps Team is amphibious shipping. The Commandant’s top unfunded requirement again this year is the LPD 17. The nation requires a fleet of 34 amphibious ships to support the absolute minimum amphibious force of two brigades. Amphibious capability demands Sea Basing and the Maritime Prepositioning Force. Forcible entry and protecting U.S. interests around the globe are directly tied to these amphibious capabilities. Sustaining the Marine and Marine Family: With a focus on maximizing the real return on each limited dollar available for investment, the USMC is focused on making tomorrow’s vision a reality by strengthening key pillars that support warfighting capabilities. One such pillar is the support system for individual Marines and their families, such as continuous care for and attention to our wounded Marines. To provide this help, the Commandant has directed the establishment of the Wounded Marines Regiment, with a Battalion Headquarters on each coast dedicated to watching over and assisting those Marines, and Sailors serving with Marines, who have been wounded in the service to our nation. Therefore, in support of the ever-increasing demands on the Marine Corps as part of a larger joint force combat capability, The Navy League of the United States supports: ■ Funding for an end-strength of 202,000 which enables the Marine Corps to have a sustainable rotation policy and provide the training in traditional warfighting skills, especially expeditionary warfare. The full funding of costs associated with resetting the Marine Corps to meet the requirements of the Long War. The acquisition of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle to replace the aging and costly Amphibious Assault Vehicle force. The acquisition of the F-35B to replace the AV-8 Harrier and F/A-18 Hornet aircraft and the acquisition of unmanned air and ground vehicles to further enhance the flexibility and versatility of Marine Corps forces. Adequate Navy shipping and sealift platforms to provide the expeditionary lift and powerprojection capability to support present and future mission USMC requirements. Continued full-rate production of the MV-22 Osprey. Recent successful deployments to Iraq of the MV-22, reinforces the immediate need for this capability for both the Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 10 U.S. NAVY NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 ■ The re-capitalization of the workhorses of Marine Corps aviation — the KC-130J aircraft, equipped with an improved aerial refueling system, and the CH-53K — and the acquisition of UH-1Y Huey and AH-1Z Cobra helicopters. The acquisition of modern air, ground and logistics command-and-control systems such as Combat Operations Centers, the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Common Air C2 System, Joint Tactical Common Operational Picture Workstation and the Global Combat Support System to support joint and coalition operations. The successful and continuous armor upgrade effort of vehicles as well as anti-sniper technology and anti-improvised explosive device technologies. The continued acquisition of MAGTF fires improvements, particularly in the 155mm Howitzer, HIMARS, and sufficient naval surface fire for joint forcible entry operations. The Marine Corps infrastructure plan, which eliminates the single-Marine barracks shortfall and funds the Guam planning and design efforts. The ongoing reconstitution and modernization efforts in the wake of the extremely demanding rotation cycle of personnel and equipment in Afghanistan and Iraq. The transition to net-centric expeditionary forces able to execute the war on terrorism with ready, relevant and capable forces, supported by intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets that strengthen joint and combined capabilities, ensure presence and provide surge. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ U.S. COAST GUARD The Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime homeland security and provides validated support for the defense of our homeland. As such, the Coast Guard is required to maintain focus, operational expertise and awareness of everything happening in the maritime domain approaching the United States. This does not abrogate the requirement for Coast Guard extra-territorial engagement in influencing other countries’ activities. The strategy of layered defense requires that systems and operations are coordinated and integrated with the DoD as well as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other departments, including State and Justice. The stated goal is to collaborate and respond in an environment that brings together all elements of national power in the pursuit of national objectives. Whether it is a no-notice terrorist situation in our harbors or an action overseas, the Coast Guard must have the systems and personnel in place to respond. The Coast Guard is an integral player in the Maritime Cooperative Strategy which requires a role overseas as well as at home. The Coast Guard should not be duplicative, but should complement Navy capabilities to provide a more unified and effective maritime force. The relationship and collaboration with the Navy has never been better. NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 11 U.S. MARINE CORPS Whether it is a no-notice terrorist situation in our harbors or an action overseas, the Coast Guard must have the systems and personnel in place to respond. The Coast Guard’s ability to collaborate across government and with industry and international partners materially enhances its effectiveness. With its transfer to DHS, the Coast Guard has emerged as a critical link in the continuum from homeland security to homeland defense. Today, the challenges of prevention and response are much more complex than pre-9/11, when only law enforcement or safety of life at sea were considered. Today, the potential for attacks on U.S. soil is a reality. Natural or manmade disasters are spreading the Coast Guard even more thinly over the homeland security/defense landscape. These challenges require an acknowledgement that the value of the Coast Guard extends overseas as well. Coast Guard international relationships with other countries, especially China, and the critical expertise and relevance it brings to developing and developed countries can open doors and improve the dialogue between nations, which will result in a more secure world. COCOMs and the State Department have long realized this connection and have requested Coast Guard services that, to date, outstrip budgeted capacity. Polar icebreaking is required in the new national policy determination on the future of America’s icebreaker fleet. Global climate change is opening up polar sea lines of communication, increasing commerce and highlighting competing territorial claims. Capability and funding decisions are needed so that old icebreakers can be maintained until new icebreakers are built and put into service by 2011. Our territorial and energy independence require this funding. Upgrading shore infrastructure and recapitalizing the inland buoy tender fleet, which are critical to the movement of goods via inland waterways, are critical federal priorities that have been sorely under funded in the past. Our inland waterways are critical to economic vitality and may provide a comprehensive way to alleviate energy dependence through the Maritime Transportation System initiative of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the Department of Transportation. To ensure this happens, it is imperative we maintain the inland fleet while at the same time the service initiates a program to replace these old vessels. MDA is the portal through which we gain situational awareness and the ability to use limited resources in the most effective manner. The main players are the Coast Guard and Navy through the Director of Global Maritime Situational Awareness, who reports to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Director of Global Air and Maritime Intelligence Integration, reporting to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Program objectives must be transparent so that progress and security can be measured and observed. These separate programs need to be combined into a single U.S. COAST GUARD 12 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 The Coast Guard has assumed the lead system integrator role for all its acquisitions and provides the technical expertise in human resources, IT infrastructure and engineering services. As such, the personnel, systems and funding need to be in place to ensure that the Coast Guard is successful in this role. It is imperative to provide the resources necessary for continued success. The Coast Guard Commandant, Adm. Thad Allen, has outlined his intentions and made it clear there can be no turning back on modernization efforts. The future is filled with challenges and risks, but as resources and attention are focused on maritime security, safety and oversight, the Coast Guard’s ability to prevent, respond and deter continues to improve and must not stop or slow through lack of funding or support. Therefore, The Navy League of the United States: ■ Supports an overall acquisition budget of $2.5 billion to $3 billion per year to accelerate programs, commence needed programs and modernize the Coast Guard in an effort to offset deteriorating assets and information systems. The needs are great, but America demands that the security of its people, infrastructure and way of life be ensured. Supports funding for Deepwater recapitalization at no less than $2 billion per year in FY09 dollars, which includes $1 billion per year for large cutters in the out years. This figure represents what is needed to maintain and modernize aging assets and correct the persistent underfunding of this critical, transformational acquisition program. Delaying the program in any way increases program costs while leaving the nation more vulnerable due to old assets that cannot be relied upon to complete mission assignments. ■ ■ National Security Cutter (NSC): The program should deliver one ship per year, accommodate the requirement for global presence, for a total of 12 NSCs. Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC): The service needs to determine the fleet mix of vessels to meet mission requirements and then build these vessels as soon as feasible to replace outdated and unreliable 210 and 270 Medium Endurance Cutters. The total requirement is for 25 vessels delivered at two per year. FRC: The Fast Response Cutter (FRC-B) project is designed to close the critical 12-boat shortfall by 2012. This contract has been awarded for a proven hull design and should be expedited and expanded to the extent possible The HC-144A (CASA CN-235) Medium-range search aircraft project should be accelerated at every opportunity to ensure 20 fully missionized HC-144As are delivered no later than 2014. The missionization/upgrade of the HC-130 J and H models as well as the HH-60J helicopter should be accelerated to provide the “eyes in the sky” that is so desperately needed. Funding of $180 million per year is required. ■ ■ ■ ■ U.S. COAST GUARD interagency program office to gain efficiency and ensure interoperability across the several systems that will comprise MDA. Congress must recognize this need and provide the authorization, appropriations and oversight to make our maritime economic lifelines secure. Much has been done, more is required. NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 13 ■ The requirement for unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) needs to be identified and then systems purchased. Cooperation with Customs and Boarder Patrol regarding long-range UASs and marinized systems should be encouraged and expanded, as should work with the Navy’s UAS for shipboard use. Funding of $30 million is required for survey, design and purchase of equipment and systems. ■ Supports increased and accelerated funding for Rescue 21, a critical component of a modernized coastal command-and-control system. This figure accommodates the uncertainty of obtaining permits for tower construction or rental, the single most volatile aspect of this program. This project has demonstrated value in increased lives saved and more efficient use of limited assets. $120 million is required per year. Supports the purchase of systems by the Coast Guard as well as DoD, DHS, and the intelligence community in support of MDA. The MDA concept requires a world view of how to manage the maritime commons. It requires funding and integration of systems as well as the collaboration of commercial and coalition partners including the realization of a “virtual” Joint Inter Agency Task Force (JIATF) for America. Funding is identified in parent agency budgets, but $5 million is required for crossdepartment research, development, testing and evaluation, as well as system integration. Supports the continued acceleration of the highly successful Response Boat–Medium project. For increased operational security and response, production should be increased to the capacity of 33 boats per year. Recommends that the Coast Guard be expanded by 2,000 personnel per year for the next four years to fully staff and train individuals — civilian and military — in a wide variety of fields and specialties. This figure takes into account reinvested “personnel savings” from the organizational realignment that is taking place. Operational outcomes and mission performance cannot be met unless this level of service expansion is provided. Supports increased, recurring funding of not less than $150 million per year for the repair, rehabilitation and replacement of old shore infrastructure and command centers that are located virtually everywhere along the coasts and inland waters of the United States. Supports funding for training, technology and equipment that will enable the Coast Guard to meet its requirement as a full member of the national intelligence community. This recognizes the unique role the Coast Guard has to ensure it provides the DNI with that portion of Global Maritime Intelligence Integration for which it is uniquely responsible. Recurring funding of $10 million is required for these initiatives. Recognizes that the Navy and Combatant Commanders in support of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy have identified extra-territorial commitments and requirements for Coast Guard national security, homeland security, national defense as well as State Department program facilitation. $5 million per year is required to cover these overseas requirements. Supports increased operational, training and equipment funding of the Deployable Operations Group (DOG.) This increase will allow enhanced professional competency of the group. U.S. COAST GUARD ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 14 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 In addition, training equipment and operational synergies between the NECC and the DOG must be integrated to ensure a continuum of operational capability in the littoral regions off our coast as well as overseas. Enhanced funding of $5 million per year is required. ■ Recommends funding of $60 million per year for Command 21/IOC, an innovative and proactive program to replace legacy command-and-control structures and systems with focused, integrated, inter-agency maritime/border control command centers for deterrence as well as response missions. These systems must be connected to the Navy’s new Maritime Headquarters and Maritime Operations Centers. ■ Recommend special attention be focused on accomplishing the mandates of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 and to the requirements of the newly created Office of the Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship (CG-5). A recurring amount of $5 million is necessary for this critical training, regulation, and oversight program. Recommends full funding for a Reserve strength of 10,000 personnel. Recommends an additional $30 million funding to bring the Polar Star back into service. The need is documented in support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. New and updated polar icebreakers should to be available by 2015. A new Icebreaker will cost $1B. Recommends recapitalization and enhanced maintenance funding for the current fleet of inland river buoy tenders. This enhanced maintenance funding project will enable the fleet to operate until the Heartland Waterways Vessel acquisition project comes on line. A sum of $55 million is needed over the next five years for maintenance and $100 million is needed over that same period of time for replacement. Supports the Commandant’s efforts to restructure and modernize the way the Coast Guard delivers services in a highly fluid environment. It demands the structure, people and legislation to carry it out. This requires deliberate effort to enact a Coast Guard Authorization bill. Supports the overhaul, upgrade and replacement of the Coast Guard’s obsolete financial, logistics and accounting systems. The requirement to upgrade through an approved program is required. Initial funding should be provided in the amount of $10 million for already identified initiatives and the requirement to be developed for the identification of an open IT architecture system that can be upgraded and expanded over time. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT MARINE A viable U.S. commercial maritime capability is more critical than ever in today’s uncertain world. The ability to access U.S.-flag Merchant Marine ships and seafarers is essential to our national and economic security interests. Ninety-five percent of the equipment and supplies required to deploy the U.S. armed forces is delivered by ship. U.S.-flagged and government-owned vessels, manned by more than 8,000 U.S. citizen mariners, continue to play a significant and indispensible role in strategic sealift support for Afghanistan and Iraq operations. With increased requirements to support and sustain special operations U.S. COAST GUARD NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 15 U.S.-flagged and governmentowned vessels … continue to play a significant and indispensible role in strategic sealift support for Afghanistan and Iraq operations. forces, maritime coalition forces and ESGs, the military will need a substantial logistics force and commercial sealift capability. In-theater afloat, prepositioned war-fighting capabilities for immediate employment will require a variety of Navy and commercial vessels, in-stream cargo-handling systems and high-speed connector vessels to support Sea Bases, Global Fleet Stations and expeditionary or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. But, even as the United States’ need for reliable and efficient, safe marine transportation continues to grow in domestic and international trade, the base of skilled U.S. mariners is shrinking. This diminishing pool of skilled seafarers presents a crisis that threatens the nation’s ability to project timely action. The U.S. commercial fleet includes the 60 ships in the Maritime Security Program (MSP) and the 58 ships provided by the Voluntary Intermodal Agreement (VISA). These ships’ persistent global presence and robust intermodal capability have been the major contributors in providing critical strategic sustainment sealift. MARAD’s Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and the Navy’s Military Sealift Command fleet, sized to support DoD surge and special mission requirements, include Roll-On/Roll-Off, heavy-lift, offshore petroleum discharge, auxiliary crane and aviation logistics-support vessels, provide needed direct support and training missions. Therefore. The Navy League of the United States supports: ■ Budgetary and legislative measures — including capital and operationsrelated changes in U.S. tax laws — and the harmonization of domestic and international regulations to improve the competitive position of the U.S.-flag fleet in the world marketplace. Full funding for the 60-ship Maritime Security Program. Replacing the the lift capacity of this fleet would cost the DoD $8 billion in capital outlay. The Jones Act and Passenger Vessel Act, which provide for U.S. ships and crews in domestic trades and urges opposition to any legislation or trade agreements that would weaken these vital industry-support mechanisms. Maintenance of the 52- ship RRF until sufficient replacements are available. ■ ■ ■ Funding for the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and the federal programs at the state maritime colleges and maritime union/industry training facilities to ensure that sufficient numbers of licensed and unlicensed mariners are available to serve the nation’s needs. ■ U.S. NAVY Voluntary agreements to employ U.S. citizens on all vessels serving the United States. ■ 16 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 ■ Efforts by the U.S. Coast Guard to expedite the licensing and documentation of Merchant Mariners while striking a balance between security and maritime commercial interests. A strong Merchant Marine Reserve (MMR) component in the U.S. Naval Reserve. The MMR must be a high priority to preserve critical maritime skills. ■ MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM The U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) consists of waterways, ports and their intermodal connections, vessels and vehicles crucial to the U.S. economy. As the world’s trade leader, the United States requires a technologically advanced, secure and efficient, environmentally sound MTS. The MTS annually moves more than 2.3 billion tons of domestic and international cargo worth $2 trillion through 360 public and private ports and 25,000 miles of waterways. Additionally, 3.3 billion barrels of oil are imported to meet our energy demands, 180 million passengers are transported by ferry vessels, along with the movement of more than 7 million cruise ship passengers. Thirteen million people are employed in this industry, including 60,000 water transportation workers and 36,000 mariners. Eight thousand of this pool of mariners are qualified to crew DoD sealift ships. The U.S. domestic fleet of more than 38,000 vessels is a $48 billion investment. Roughly, one quarter of the world’s trade flows through U.S. ports. Our economic prosperity is dependent on international trade, of which 95 percent, by volume, moves by sea. Any disruption in this global supply chain would have a serious negative impact on the U.S. economy and, consequently, our national security. International and domestic trade is expected to double in volume by 2020, creating greater congestion on overburdened land, port, water, passenger and freight delivery systems. To address this, MARAD has created Gateway Offices in 10 key U.S. ports to work with federal, state and local organizations to reduce congestion and address environmental problems in the ports and waterways. Only a truly seamless, integrated, multimodal transportation system with an expanded Marine Highway System (short-sea shipping) and freight movement will meet the nation’s growing needs. The system should now include the Arctic area to use the navigable waters around and in the sea ice drifting in the warming Arctic Ocean. The Navy League of the United States supports: ■ The Department of Transportation’s National Strategy to Reduce Congestion on America’s Transportation Network to ensure that our intermodal freight system is capable of carrying our growing commercial cargo that supports our economy and military shipments in time of national need. MARAD’s comprehensive “green” program to promote sustainability (use resources today to preserve resources we’ll need tomorrow) throughout the MTS. Making MTS infrastructure projects permanently eligible for funding under Title 23 of the next surface transportation reauthorization legislation to ensure that marine transportation is fully integrated into the surface transportation system. America’s Marine Highway initiatives, such as the exemption of waterborne cargo trans-shipped between U.S. ports from the Harbor Maintenance Tax. This double tax is a major disincentive for increased waterborne transport. Additional resources, for the Army Corps of Engineers’ dredging projects and Coast Guard for upgraded navigational aids in river and harbor channels that connect U.S. ports to the world. Use the Inland Waterway Trust Fund (IWF) to repair/replace aging infrastructure on the inland waterway system and seek additional funds for the IWF The inland waterway system is capable of . ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 17 The quality of our new ships and submarines has never been better, but we are constrained in funding and thus cannot acquire adequate numbers. ■ ■ ■ ■ carrying huge additional amounts of freight and petroleum products at a fraction of the cost of other modes of transportation. Increased investment in maritime research and development. Funding for the Title XI Ship Construction Loan Guarantee Program to support replacement of existing Jones Act liner tonnage; Marine Highway shipping needs including vessels and infrastructure in ports and shipyards. Efforts by the Coast Guard, Navy and MARAD for MDA improvements. Efforts to develop a national capacity for the MTS to recover from major disruptions to the system to ensure the continuity of commercial and critical maritime activities. This should include the maintenance of a robust U.S. salvage vessel capability to ensure expeditious clearing of vital channels and harbors. SHIPBUILDING The sea services do not have an adequate number of ships to execute the Maritime Strategy. The requirement for conducting major combat operations, face new weapon threats, including defense against ballistic and cruise missile, have become more complex and demanding. The quality of our new ships and submarines has never been better, but we are constrained in funding and thus cannot acquire adequate numbers. Submarines, carriers, surface combatants and sealift numbers are inadequate. Service life is being extended where possible to make up for this shortfall. In addition, ship modernization is being advanced as rapidly as schedules and funding allow. The Navy needs a minimum of $20 billion annually in shipbuilding funds and the associated up-front research and development funds to support the requirements determination and design work. Over half of the cost of a surface combatant is used in producing, installing and testing the combat systems. The shipbuilding programs continue to undergo some essential changes. The carrier program is on track, but with the decision not to refuel USS Enterprise, the numbers will drop to 10 carriers for several years, creating a capability gap of great concern. Production of the Virginia-class submarine will increase to two subs a year starting in 2011, but submarine shortages persist. Primarily due to decreasing numbers of affordable ships, the DDG 1000 program is being truncated at three ships. There is significant new technology in these ships that can be thoroughly tested once these ships begin to operate after 2014. In place of the DDG 1000 production, the Arleigh Burke guided missile destroyers with the Aegis weapons system and ballistic missile defense capability will be restarted. After restarting the DDG 51 line, new, proven technology upgrades can be installed in later hulls. This will bridge the production gap until the new missile cruiser is ready to be designed and constructed. The combat systems for this cruiser must be developed without delay. 18 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 GENERAL DYNAMICS The entire Aegis surface warfare fleet must be modernized to meet the emerging ballistic missile and cruise missile threats posed by rapidly growing naval fleets of potential competitors. These ships also must see upgrades to their hulls, machinery and electrical systems to ensure that we achieve an extended service life. With the low construction numbers of warships, the fleet must be maintained and upgraded to match and defeat the threat. Our major shipyards at Bath, Maine; Pascagoula, Miss.; Groton, Conn.; Newport News, Va.; and San Diego are producing a minimal number of warships under contract. Their facilities are adequate for this task and, in many cases, have been upgraded in recent years. The critical resource in these operations is the work force. Aging work forces and competition for their skills from other industries present huge challenges. Technology growth requires additional workforce training. Two new classes of small warships, LCS-1 and LCS-2, are being constructed at smaller shipyards and it appears that the startup problems with design and production are very nearly overcome. These ships will eventually number 55. Surging these existing shipyards and the manufacturing companies that provide the equipment and systems that are installed in the ships to higher productive output would be a major challenge. However, with some degree of national mobilization, it could probably be achieved. The four nuclear-capable naval shipyards no longer construct new warships, but are essential in repairing and modernizing the fleet. Their facilities and work forces are aging too and require attention and funding. There is no substitute for these critical shipyards. Shipbuilding is not an activity that occurs only at shipyards. All of the equipment, components and systems that are installed in a new ship or submarine must be manufactured and tested by companies across the United States. Critical combat systems must be developed and integrated with other elements of the combat and weapons systems. Software must be written and thoroughly tested. There are a limited number of companies that perform this work for our Navy ships and they must be preserved and given enough work to sustain their work force and produce a profit. Beyond the major prime contractors, there is an array of second- and third-tier suppliers that are critical to the process that feed their products to the primes. They too must be sustained. Over the past years, selected field organizations such as the Supervisor of Shipbuilding offices, which oversee the new construction of Navy ships, have been driven to decrease manning and experience to the degree that they are unable to effectively oversee new construction programs. This must be corrected as soon as possible. The Navy must continue to strengthen, improve and reassess its design, procurement and integration process to produce affordable, combat-credible and survivable surface ships and submarines. The government must continue to take a stronger role in the design and engineering of these warships. The Navy also must continue to assist its sister maritime service, the Coast Guard, in its shipbuilding programs. There is a strong effort under way in the Navy Department to better understand, determine and control requirements for shipbuilding programs before contracts are awarded. This will reduce disruption and help constrain costs. However, meaningful cost reductions will not be achieved until ships of a class are constructed in numbers, each year in a given shipyard, and a serious production NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 19 learning curve is achieved for all endeavors. This essential learning curve also applies to the manufacturing of sensors, combat and weapon systems that will be installed in the ships. The Navy League of the United States supports: ■ Significant FY-10 and sustained out-year increases in appropriations to construct, maintain, modernize and support the force structure to meet current and predicted operational requirements. An increase of shipbuilding funds to the level of at least $20 billion per year, with the associated research and development dollars to fund the requirements and design work that precedes contracting. Enough throughput in the industrial base at all levels (government and industry) to maintain its health, availability and capacity to support the Navy at its current, planned and surge force levels. Modernizing all Aegis fleet warships to have ballistic and cruise missile defensive systems in addition to their normal capabilities of anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-underwater warfare. A balanced fleet of aircraft carriers, submarines, surface warfare ships, amphibious ships and logistic ships that meet the CNO’s goals of a 313-ship fleet as a minimum number. The continuation and expansion of MARAD’s Title XI loan guarantee program, which is essential to assist U.S. flag operations and persuade foreign owners to build in U.S. shipyards. Adequate funding to recover and sustain a vital organic Navy Shipbuilding Technical Authority, including a robust design and research capability and capacity which has dwindled and remains at a reduced size. Acquisition, conversion, or construction of two heavy-lift FLO/FLO vessels for use in transporting smaller vessels, damaged warships and for providing an interim method of transferring vehicles from RO/RO’s to smaller vessels to transport ashore in MPF operations. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ INDUSTRIAL BASE The Navy League of the United States has seen little improvement in the condition of the nation’s maritime industrial base in the past several years. This is still a grave concern. The base is operating on a sustaining level for the current naval programs, but would be hard pressed to expand quickly to meet a national emergency. The problems of low throughput, small numbers of manufacturing companies for essential equipments and systems, limited construction shipyards, and an extremely competitive environment for hiring a skilled and educated work force persist. The current work force is aging and not being replaced with mechanics, engineers, planners and managers with adequate skills. The output of engineers in the United States is woefully inadequate. We have seen our industrial base — required to support a strong navy — diminish over the past several decades. At the same time, the technology capability and production capacity required for a strong navy that can meet the worldwide threats have increased. Production lines in ship construction, combat systems, sensors and weapons are being sustained in a minimal fashion. A surge in requirements and orders could not be met easily or in a timely fashion. Maritime commerce is vital to our nation’s economic health and defense, and although commercial shipping is robust, most of the ships and products that support it are produced and constructed overseas. The offshore oil industry is another vital area in our industrial base associated with shipyards and small vessel builders that is supported mostly in this country, however its products are not generally of the type used by our Navy. The oil industry is in competition with our naval shipbuilding programs for basic commodities, engineers and skilled workers. 20 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 Materials such as steel, copper and aluminum have been in short supply due to world demand, with resultant high commodity prices. The recent economic downturn has resulted in some softening of prices for these materials, which are so important to our shipbuilding programs. No nation can support a capable and sizeable navy without a strong and sustaining industrial base manned with adequate numbers of skilled personnel. It is essential that this nation have a policy at the highest levels of government to support and sustain an adequate industrial base capable of providing and supporting a strong navy and maritime commerce. The Navy League of the United States urges: ■ The government to development and institute an effective industrial base policy that addresses critical issues such as the development of improved ships, ship systems and weapons with the capacity to annually produce multiple ships of a class and the capability to increase capacity rapidly in time of national need or emergency. A stable and increased level of predictable funding for the ships, submarines, aircraft and combat systems that are the essential elements of our fleet. The cost of these programs continues to rise beyond normal inflation rates, in part due to unstable funding and low production rates. Improving staffing, additional research and stable programs with a reasonable annual production rate will help contain rising costs. Costs are related to schedules and, at present, our production times are excessive and should be reduced. A strong industrial base will assist in achieving affordable pricing for the Navy’s programs. Capital investments in our existing infrastructure to allow us to stay abreast of the latest technological advances, attract the best young engineers and skilled workers, and ensure that we have the capability and capacity to surge repair, produce and construct the nation’s fleet in time of crisis. In this regard, we have reduced our level of battle spares and critical industrial materials to a dangerously low level, which would not allow us to make rapid battle repairs. Without adequate battle spares and major manufactured parts, the time to restore a damaged warship to the fight would be excessive. With small fleet numbers, this is a critical capability that has withered to a dangerous level. Expanded use of advanced acquisition strategies — including blockbuys, multi-year-priced options — with innovative funding approaches, such as time-phased and advance appropriations that stabilize accounts and avoid disruptive funding spikes and voids. Care with competition requirements. Competition should be used where appropriate, but not if it leads to the destruction of a prime source of equipment or services. Some of these sources have taken years to develop and must be preserved. Adopting incentives to cut costs and schedules and reward firms that achieve significant savings and time, while maintaining quality. This will create an U.S. NAVY ■ We have seen our industrial base — required to support a strong navy — diminish over the past several decades. ■ ■ ■ ■ NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 21 environment in which high-performing companies can achieve returns on capital comparable to those commercial enterprises of similar risk and capitalization. Contracts should be structured so that earning higher fees for higher performance is achievable. ■ Better methods of industry teaming and integration, especially in combat systems development, yet with the Navy fully in charge. All parties (government and industry) to spend more funds to train and educate the work force and endeavor to improve retention and recruiting of high-quality professionals. Support for rebuilding sufficient numbers of personnel with the required skills in the Naval Sea Systems Command to have the capability to fully research and produce preliminary and contract designs for new naval ships in-house. The final stages of ship design would be accomplished by industry. Support the selected modernization of the Navy’s infrastructure (naval shipyards, laboratories, and engineering stations), which has fallen behind in developing new technology and in the capability to repair and modernize the Navy’s fleet. ■ ■ ■ PERSONNEL POLICIES — IT’S ALL ABOUT PEOPLE! The national imperative to reset our maritime forces not only requires the replacement of equipment, but also demands the continued effort to attract, train and retain intelligent and capable men and women. The need for improved support infrastructure (i.e., housing, commissary and exchange availability, office and classroom modernization) has never been more important in providing a satisfying quality of life and rewarding military career. Recruiting and retention are dependent on compensation, health care benefits, retirement and quality of life to attract and retain dedicated and qualified professionals, while training and education are mandatory for operational readiness. The Navy’s goal continues to be a balanced force with the right mix of size, capabilities and cost to fight and win in major combat operations, as well as to succeed in irregular warfare and disaster response. The Navy has achieved its end-strength goal of 322,000 personnel through aggressive downsizing, but this presents new personnel issues for the Navy. The people-saving benefits of the new technology anticipated in next-generation ships may not being realized as quickly as envisioned due to the delay in bringing the new ships online. Assigning Navy personnel to the Individual Augmentee (IA) program creates shortfalls of personnel to man critical Navy billets both ashore and at sea. Additionally, the Navy expects its personnel costs to increase from 2 percent of its budget to about 10 percent per year. To achieve a balanced force, the Navy is committed to the U.S. NAVY 22 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 battle for talent through life/work integration incentives, flexibility and a menu of options both financial and intrinsic. Emphasis is needed on providing incentives for active duty/Selected Reserve health care professionals to join or remain in the service. A key priority for the Commandant of the Marine Corps is the individual Marine, with emphasis on quality-of-life issues such as improved single-Marine barracks and increased single-Marine and family service programs. This includes establishment of the Wounded Warrior Regiment in April 2007. This Regiment provides assistance to injured Marines and Sailors throughout all phases of recovery, and provides unity of command for all members regardless of duty status or location. In many cases, the recovered member is able to return to active duty through this program. The Marine Corps is on schedule to achieve its end-strength goal of 202,000 Marines. The Marine Corps planned infrastructure improvements are essential to support the larger Corps. War on terrorism training in the areas of urban operations, cultural awareness and combating the threat of improvised explosive devices has overridden traditional amphibious training, resulting in a reduced readiness to prosecute global contingencies. Right-sizing the Marine Corps mitigates this risk, however, achieving a dwell-to-deployment ratio of 2:1 is critical to successfully achieving the training goal. The Coast Guard’s strategic priorities are intended to defeat the asymmetrical, transnational threats to Americans in the maritime domain. This mission-rich sea service has adapted smartly to irregular warfare while succeeding at its core competencies. The growing daily demand for Coast Guard services takes a daily toll on service resources, which must be reconstituted. The Coast Guard needs to increase its current end-strength from 41,873 active and 8,100 Reserve personnel to 54,000 active duty personnel and 10,000 reservists. The national imperative to reset the maritime forces requires the will of the American people, the president and Congress to commit the necessary resources to bring this about. We can no longer demand more from an already stressed manpower pool to respond to worldwide disasters while redeploying to war zones and maintaining a high operational tempo. We can no longer reduce the number of personnel to fund force recapitalization and operations and expect to recruit and retain the men and women at the tip of the spear. To that end, U.S. MARINE CORPS We can no longer demand more from an already stressed manpower pool to respond to worldwide disasters while redeploying to war zones and maintaining a high operational tempo. NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 23 The Navy League of the United States supports: ■ Recruiting and retention policies that ensure adequate personnel for the current and future operational tempo to support the war on terrorism and natural/man-made disaster response, while ensuring the readiness to fight and win in a major combat operation. Increasing the Navy’s end strength to 340,000 until the envisioned savings due to new technology/lower manned ships are online and a decrease is seen in IA assignments. An authorized end-strength for the Coast Guard of 54,000 active and 10,000 Reserve personnel. Providing incentives for Navy active duty/Selected Reserve health care professionals and nucleartrained professionals to join or remain in the service. Adequate and affordable housing for service members and their families. Unencumbered training in traditional and non-traditional skill sets in order to meet the demands of full-scale combat and irregular warfare. A dwell-to-deployment ratio of 2:1 to allow the marines adequate time for training to fight the current and future wars. Pay raise of at least 3 percent per year commensurate with salary increases in the civilian sector, and concurrently providing incentives for retention in education, healthcare, child care and retirement benefits for the active duty, Reserve and their families. Expediting the licensing and documentation of Merchant Mariners to ensure an adequate pool of trained and capable Mariners for the maritime industry and military sealift. Monitoring all TRICARE programs, encouraging prompt payments and adequate reimbursements to stem the loss of participating physicians and provide eligibility for Prime Remote Care. Programs for educating and motivating America’s youth to achieve the highest standards of personal excellence, moral integrity, patriotism and mental and physical fitness. Among the top priorities in this area is increased support for the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps, as well as the Navy Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), the Navy and Marine Corps Junior ROTC, and maritime-related high school programs. Continuing care for our wounded warriors throughout the duration of their physical and/or psychological infirmity. The nation’s responsibility to those who are wounded in its service does not end when the emergent or even secondary medical support is completed. The Navy League salutes the Marine Corps for the establishment of the Wounded Warrior Regiment! An in-depth review of the new GI Bill’s impact on retention, as the bill may encourage many of our best young service members that have been trained at great expense to leave the service after their initial service obligation. We support the DoD initiative that military personnel have asked for, which is to allow service members to transfer their unused MGIB benefits to their spouses or children. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 24 NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 CONCLUSION In 2020, 40 percent of our gross domestic product will be dependent on ocean shipping and maritime trade. Thus maritime superiority is essential to our economy. The Navy League is committed to persuading, through education, the senior leadership in the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government, as well as the media and the American people, of the continuing need for U.S. sea power, both naval and commercial, to protect U.S. interests throughout the world and ensure the nation’s economic well-being. The most important “reform” that can be made in the field of national defense is to provide adequate funding for America’s sea services, which are today the greatest force for peace in the world. While specific funding initiatives are mentioned in the body of this document, the most critical requirement that demands our national attention is an adequate number of ships to accomplish the sea services’ missions. Since “presence with the capability to engage” is the primary strength of the sea services, and that is achieved though the global movement of our ships to provide diplomacy, humanitarian assistance or combat capability, it is imperative that we fund an aggressive shipbuilding and modernization program. Due to lengthy construction times, it will realistically take several years to return our fleet size to the numbers needed. Sustained maritime superiority is paramount to supporting the American economy. The Navy League of the United States believes that to provide for the common defense is, and must always be, the first and most important responsibility of the federal government. To that end, Navy League believes that a defense budget figure of 4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product is the minimum to ensure that all of our Armed Forces are ready to fight and win our nation’s wars as well as deter those who would seek to engage us. NLUS MARITIME POLICY 2009–10 25 U.S. COAST GUARD M A R I T I M E P O L I C Y 2 0 0 9 – 1 0 Navy League of the United States 2300 Wilson Boulevard Arlington, VA 22201-3308 PHONE 703-528-1775 FAX 703-528-2333 WEB www.navyleague.org