On June 15, 2009, the Court granted Defendant EverHome

							     Case 2:08-cv-02518-BWK           Document 57         Filed 07/17/2009      Page 1 of 2



                     IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

 SYLVIA ROCHE, et al.                            :       CIVIL ACTION
                                                 :
           v.                                    :       NO. 08-2518
                                                 :
 SPARKLE CITY REALTY, INC., et al.               :
                                                 :

                                             ORDER

       AND NOW, this 17th          day of July, 2009, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion

for Reconsideration (docket no. 54), and Defendant EverHome Mortgage Company’s opposition

thereto (docket no. 56), it is ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.1


       1
                 On June 15, 2009, the Court granted Defendant EverHome Mortgage Company’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. In that Memorandum and Order, the
Court found that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) were not defensive claims for “recoupment” and that both
claims were time-barred. The Court also dismissed all state-law claims for unfair and deceptive
trade practices against EverHome because Plaintiffs conceded that EverHome was not involved
with the loan’s formation. Plaintiffs now seek reconsideration of the Court’s rulings. The
purpose of a motion for reconsideration “is to correct manifest errors of law or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Max’s Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)
(quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)). However, “[a] motion for
reconsideration is not properly grounded on a request that the Court simply rethink a decision it
has already made.” Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (quoting
Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
         In the instant Motion, Plaintiffs argue that their TILA and RESPA claims for
“recoupment” are not time-barred and that the Order dismissing them should be vacated.
Plaintiffs rely on In re Coxson, 43 F.3d 189, 194 (5th Cir. 1995), in which the Fifth Circuit found
that “[t]he mere fact that the Coxsons were the plaintiffs in the case below does not preclude the
finding that their TILA claim was raised defensively” and that the TILA claim therefore was not
barred by the statute of limitations. However, the plaintiffs in Coxson filed a defensive claim for
recoupment in federal court in response to a pending foreclosure action. Id. at 190, 194. Coxson
is readily distinguishable from the instant case, where Plaintiffs filed a claim for recoupment
after the foreclosure action against them ended in a default. In short, Plaintiffs’ claim for
recoupment cannot be “defensive” because there is nothing to defend against. See, e.g., In re
Rocco, 255 F. App’x 638, 642 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the plaintiffs’ claim for
recoupment under TILA was untimely because it was filed over one year after the mortgage’s
creation and because the defendant already had foreclosed on the property in a separate
     Case 2:08-cv-02518-BWK            Document 57         Filed 07/17/2009       Page 2 of 2




                                                              BY THE COURT:



                                                               S/ BRUCE W. KAUFFMAN
                                                              BRUCE W. KAUFFMAN, J.




proceeding); Williams v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (S.D. Tex.
2007) (“Williams did not raise his TILA complaint as a defense to the lender defendants’
foreclosure notice in January 2003, December 2003, May 2004, or June 2005. . . . Williams
waited until after the bankruptcy court allowed the foreclosure sale to occur. Williams did not
file his TILA claims until April 2006. This chronology makes it clear that Williams’s claims for
TILA damages were not raised defensively to reduce the amount of the lender defendants’
claims, but as an affirmative claim.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that its prior decision reflects
no manifest error of law.
         Plaintiffs also seek leave to amend their Complaint a second time in response to the
Court’s dismissal of their unfair and deceptive practices claim under Pennsylvania state law.
However, given their admission that EverHome was not involved with the loan at issue until well
after its issuance, any amendment would be futile, as EverHome cannot be held responsible for
unfair or deceptive conduct simply because it is the assignee of Plaintiffs’ loan. See, e.g.,
Colanzi v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13278, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
22, 2008) (finding that a loan assignee could not be liable for deceptive conduct under
Pennsylvania state law where the assignee was not involved with the loan until after it was made
and was not alleged to have committed wrongdoing). Accordingly, the Court will deny
Plaintiffs’ request to amend their pleading a second time.