Land transactions in post-socialist Bulgaria Violeta Dirimanova BULGARIA Prague, 7-11 June 2004 IDARI Workshop Problem background • Land reform started in the beginning of 1990 • Liquidation of the old cooperatives • Reallocation of the land to original owners or their inheritors • 1.8 million landowners • Half of farms are less then 2 ha Fragmentations in Bulgaria Average farm’s and plot’s size Years 1908 1925 1934 1944 1997 Average size of a farms ha 6.5 5.7 4.9 4.3 1.8 Average size of a plot ha 0.460 0.370 0.360 0.350 0.320 Number of plots Number 14.13 15.4 13.6 12.28 5.63 Source: adapted from Yanakieva, 2002 Observation 1: the results of restructuring Type of farms and share of land Type of Farm Numbers Share of TAL Average size % ha Private farms 1 777 122 52.5 1.48 State farms 980 6.5 311 Co-operatives 2 900 40.8 815.3 Farming companies 122 0.7 283.5 Source: Davidova, 2002 Observation 2: the results of bargaining and contracting • Share cropping • Substance farmers (renting out/leasing out) • Cooperatives (leasing contract) • Large commercial farmers (renting contract) Observation 3: “Felt” Negative Effect • Land fragmentation • Land degradation • Land abandonment • Low productivity • Few formal land transactions The research problem • Agricultural reform in Bulgaria has led to land fragmentation • The government has been unsuccessful in its attempts to solve the problem Main research questions • What is the relation between land fragmentation and my observations? • How does land fragmentation affect actors behavior and what does it have to do with market development and low productivity? • What is the potential role of government to deal with land fragmentation, and what are the alternatives? Sub-questions • What type of problem is land fragmentation and the effect on the economic system? • What is the rational behavior when the rights are fragmented? How do people exchange their rights? • How can costs of exchanging ownership and user rights be minimized in Bulgaria? Purpose of the study To propose institutional options for solving land fragmentation caused problems on the basis of analyses of land transactions, the actors‟ behavior and institutional settings Theoretical model INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS CHARACTERISTICS OF ACTORS PROPERTY RIGHTS GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FORMAL MARKET INFORMAL HIERARCHY COOPERATION LAND TRANSACTIONS RELATIONAL CONTRACTING BETWEEN ACTORS CONTRACT Theoretical background • Transaction Cost Theory (Coase, Williamson) • Theory of Property Rights (Barzel) • Theory of Agricultural Contracting (Hayami and Otsuka) Proposition and research hypothesis Main proposition: Agricultural reform has led to land fragmentation and the current land transactions further deepened the problem. Sub-proposition 1: Land fragmentation has an impact on what is rational in contacting. Sub-proposition 2: Land fragmentation has an impact on restructuring process on farming structure. Sub-proposition 3: Land fragmentation has „negative‟ effects. Methodology (1) • Legislation and literature • Developing empirical study – set of „comparative‟ single studies – semi - structural interviews – two stages – pilot and main interview – social network method – frequencies of land transactions • Combination between qualitative and quantitative method Methodology (2) • Use empirical data and structure land transactions as “bargaining games” between owners and users (Hanisch 2003) • Analyze what is rational behavior in different bargaining situations (Hanisch 2003) • Analyze policy options in their impact on alternative „solutions‟ of these games Thank you very much for your attention!
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