SAPS’ COSTLY RESTRUCTURING A REVIEW OF PUBLIC ORDER POLICING CAPACITY BILKIS OMAR ISS MONOGRAPH SERIES • NO 138, OCT 2007 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii ABOUT THE AUTHOR v LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES vi ACRONYMS vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ix CHAPTER 1 1 Introduction and methodology CHAPTER 2 7 Background and legislative framework CHAPTER 3 15 SAPS restructuring in 2001 CHAPTER 4 25 SAPS restructuring in 2006 CHAPTER 5 39 Capacity to perform public order policing CHAPTER 6 53 The role of metro police and SAPS Visible Police in crowd management CHAPTER 7 63 Public order policing and the 2010 FIFA World Cup CHAPTER 8 77 Recommendations CHAPTER 9 81 Conclusion ENDNOTES 83 REFERENCES 85 III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The ISS would like to thank the Open Society Foundation South Africa for its generous support in the research and publication of this monograph. The author would also like to thank the following for their invaluable support and advice during the study: • Assistant Commissioner Moorcroft and Senior Superintendent Schnetler of SAPS National Strategic Management Division • Gauteng Provincial Commissioner Naidoo • Director Schutte, Head of Operational Response Service in Gauteng • Assistant Commissioner Groenewald of SAPS National Operational Coordination • The unit commanders of the Crime Combating Units in Gauteng, Superintendent Makhubela of the Johannesburg Unit, Superintendent Smith of the East Rand Unit, and Superintendent Heyneke of the Pretoria Unit • Captain Merkel and Inspector Van Der Merwe of the Johannesburg Crime Combating Unit and Captain Wilken of the East Rand Crime Combating Unit • Senior Superintendent Ally of SAPS National Training Division • Chief McBride and Director Armstrong of the Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department • Stefan Badenhorst from the Private Security Industry Regulating Authority • Monique Marks of the University of Kwazulu Natal • Mr Majola from the Premier Soccer League • Mr Phasha from South African Football Association • Mr Kwinika, Mr Machekela and Mr Truter from the South African Police Union • Ricky Meyer and Charlene Smith of Ellis Park stadium • Colleagues at the ISS’s Crime and Justice Programme The author would in particular like to express her sincere appreciation to Superintendent Vernon Day of SAPS National Operational Response iv A review of public order policing capacity Services for the many discussions and constructive comments he made from the start of the study. Finally, thanks to the many respondents without whom this study would not have been possible. v ABOUT THE AUTHOR Bilkis Omar is a researcher in the Crime and Justice Programme. She has been working at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) since 2002 and has a particular interest in policing and criminal justice issues. She has an honours degree in criminology from the University of South Africa. vi LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Table 1: Operational crime successes for the Johannesburg ACCU Figure 1: Organisational structure of Crime Combating Units Figure 2: Procedures of authorisation to gather or demonstrate Figure 3: Total crowd management incidents, 1997–2005 Figure 4: Total violent and peaceful crowd management incidents, 1997–2005 Figure 5: The seven Gauteng Area Crime Combating Units before the 2006 restructuring Figure 6: Organogram of the seven Gauteng Area Crime Combating Units before the 2006 restructuring Figure 7: The three Gauteng Crime Combating Units after the 2006 restructuring Figure 8: Organogram of the three Gauteng Crime Combating Units after the 2006 restructuring Figure 9: Organisational structure of Gauteng’s Crime Combating Units vii ACRONYMS ACCU Area Crime Combating Unit CAF Confédération Africaine de Football CCU Crime Combating Unit DFA Department of Foreign Affairs EMPD Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department ER East Rand FCS Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit FIFA Federation Internationale de Football Association FLOM First Line Operational Managers course FXI Freedom of Expression Institute HSF Hanns Seidel Foundation ICPRA International Council of Police Representative Associations INTERPOL International Police ISD Internal Stability Division IRIS-BIS Incident Registration Information System – Business Intelligence System JHB Johannesburg JMPD Johannesburg Metro Police Department JOINTS Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure JOC Joint Operational Centre LOC Local Organising Committee NATJOINT National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure NCCS National Crime Combating Strategy NIA National Intelligence Agency OCT Operational Commanders Training ORS Operational Response Service OSF Open Society Foundation PCT Platoon Commander Training PMT Platoon Members Training POP Public Order Police POPU Public Order Police Unit POPCRU Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union PSIRA Private Security Industry Regulating Authority PSL Premier Soccer League viii A review of public order policing capacity SATAWU South African Transport and Allied Workers Union SAFA South African Football Association SANDF South African National Defence Force SAP South African Police SAPS South African Police Service SAPU South African Police Union SSSBC Safety and Security Sector Bargaining Council SVC SAPS Serious and Violent Crimes (Unit) VISPOL SAPS Visible Police members from police station level VOC Venue Operational Centre ix EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The public order police units of the South African Police Service have undergone many changes in the last 15 years. Under the apartheid government, the units started off as the Riot Units, and in 1992 became the Internal Stability Division. In 1996 the units were reorganised as Public Order Police Units, and in 2002 they were transformed to become the Area Crime Combating Units. In 2006 they underwent yet another restructuring, and they now operate under the name of Crime Combating Units. Each of these changes has meant different chains of command as well as different training and deployment structures, which has affected the skills and capacity of the units. Some of the changes, particularly the most recent one in which the manpower of the units has been severely reduced at a time when crowd control incidents are on the increase, have not been to the benefit of the units or to public order policing. The task of this monograph is to assess the Crime Combating Units’ capacity to manage protest marches and the impending 2010 FIFA World Cup. The research was confined primarily to two Crime Combating Units in Gauteng: Johannesburg and East Rand. In addition, interviews were conducted with metro police in Ekurhuleni because the mandate of their newly established Public Order Unit overlaps to some extent with that of the Crime Combating Units. Interviews were also conducted with various other organisations concerned with security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup: the South African Football Association, the Premier Soccer League, the Private Security Industry Regulating Authority and the management at Ellis Park Stadium. The research shows that in its respect for human rights, public order policing has improved since the advent of democracy in South Africa. However, the size and distribution of the Crime Combating Units, and the maintenance of their skills, have been severely eroded. A full consideration of the findings leads to a strong recommendation that SAPS management reassess the recent restructuring of the CCUs. It is recommended that in Gauteng the public order policing structure should revert back to the more decentralised formation of the seven x A review of public order policing capacity previous Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). However, given the recent dissolution of the area policing level to which these former ACCUs were accountable, the reinstated public order units should be made accountable to the provincial police office. Thus Gauteng would have seven fully capacitated Provincial Public Order Policing Units, primarily performing crowd management and, when required, assisting neighbouring stations in the combating of crime. Concerning the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the way the police have coped with past international events in South Africa suggests that they will be able to undertake crowd management competently. However it is important to ensure that the public order/crowd control units are sufficiently resourced. In addition, the dynamics of soccer crowds internationally present some unique problems which the units will have to take into account. Given the media attention, the FIFA World Cup is a likely target for additional protest marches which will place even more demands on the already over-stretched Crime Combating Units. The following challenges and recommendations arise out of the study: Legislation, policy and regulations • The Regulation of Gatherings Act (Act 205 of 1993) governing crowd management needs to be updated. While the 14-year-old Act is a most useful piece of legislation, practical experience in the management of events has shown that there is a need to more clearly define the role and responsibility of march organisers and marshals. • Crime Combating Units need a new working document providing guidance on their new roles. With the dissolution of the area level, Standing Order 262 and other policy documents have become outdated and have to be revised. Management and restructuring • Decisions from the national level that affect provincial or local level police should be discussed with the provincial commissioner’s office before being made. Many directives issued at the national level supersede the provincial office, thus creating confusion and challenges for units, stations and the provincial office. Communication and consultation is essential. Bilkis Omar xi • The restructuring which diminished the role of the Crime Combating Units in September 2006 should be re-assessed. Trends show an increase in protest marches and the FIFA World Cup in 2010 is looming. The management of the South African Police Service is urged to reconsider the restructuring process. Although the area policing level has been disbanded, the buildings located in the previous policing unit areas could still be utilised; the units could become accountable to the provincial office, and be renamed Provincial Public Order Police. • The Crime Combating Units are experiencing serious human resource shortages. The restructuring has resulted in the units being depleted by 50 per cent, while continuing to service the same geographical areas. The additional travelling now required of members has exacerbated the problem. If this issue is not addressed, members could potentially suffer severe stress and fatigue. • The South African Police Service needs to, as far as possible, refrain from using the Crime Combating Units for tasks other than those which their specialist skills are intended to serve. In this respect the statistics showing the outcome of Operation Trio – a three month national crime prevention operation which drew on the units – will be telling. If the statistics look favourable for the police, this could spur the South Africa Police Service’s management to permanently or at intervals, call on the Crime Combating Units to support general policing operations. • Members of the CCUs who have been sent to stations to assist in crime combating should be returned to the units from which they came. If necessary, they can be deployed from their units to assist stations with crime prevention operations. • It is recommended that the CCUs be returned to the structure used under the ACCU arrangement, and be made accountable to the provincial office rather than the area office which has been disbanded. Training • While Crime Combating Unit members seem to be well informed about the Regulation of Gatherings Act, an in-depth refresher workshop spanning at least three days is required, and should be run at least once every three years. • Some of the outdated terminology that is still occasionally used by the members of Crime Combating Units needs to be addressed. ‘Crowd xii A review of public order policing capacity control’ is now referred to as ‘crowd management’, and ‘riots’ are referred to as ‘protests’. Unit commanders and trainers should ensure that the issue of terminology is addressed in training sessions. • Training must be made a priority by unit commanders even if it is at the expense of crime combating duties. In-service training had for some time been neglected by the units, and since the most recent restructuring it has come to a total standstill. This means that members are becoming de-skilled. Fortunately, the specialist crowd management skills have not been lost because the units are largely staffed by police officials with between 10 and 20 years relevant experience. Nonetheless the skills base is eroding, and more seriously, incoming members are not receiving in-service training. • With regard to the use of firearms in crowd control, the police need better and more regular training, including when and how it is appropriate to use firearms. The same applies to metro police officers, some of whom have tended to be over-zealous in their use of firearms. Role of private security in 2010 • The training of private security guards has to be made a priority in view of their role in the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Since this is not the responsibility of the SAPS, it could be co-ordinated at ministerial level. • The Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) has a vital role to play if the World Cup is to be a success. Private security companies have been tasked with an important role so proper training in crowd management and registration of stewards is essential. PSIRA must also ensure that security officers wear their registration cards. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY Introduction This monograph assesses the effectiveness of the SAPS Crime Combating Units (CCUs) in order to determine the extent to which they are able to ensure security both at protest marches and for the upcoming 2010 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. By way of background, it begins with a description and explanation of the legislation regulating gatherings and events, and the powers accorded to police to manage gatherings. It then moves on to describe the structural and functional changes made to the units during both the 2001 and the 2006 restructuring processes, examining the effect of these changes on the units, especially with regard to the specialist crowd management function. The capacity to perform public order policing is influenced by the challenges facing the police in relation to the legislation, the type of training received by units, the ongoing maintenance of the training, the equipment available, and the fitness, experience and age of members. These matters are considered in some detail. The capacity challenges of the units in relation to human resources and logistics, which are well known to police management, are also discussed. The main concerns relate to the impact of the changes that have been imposed on the units by the restructuring of 2006. The monograph interrogates the ultimate aim of policymakers – what their intention is with regard to the CCUs and how willing they are to act in order to reduce the harm caused to these units. Besides the official public order units, the metro police and the SAPS Visible Police (VISPOL) division have been given significant responsibilities for public order management and are receiving appropriate training. The metro police’s training is necessary because they are often the first to respond to spontaneous public order incidents. VISPOL’s training in crowd management aims to assist the Crime Combating Units in maintaining order 2 A review of public order policing capacity at medium to low risk gatherings, as well as during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. VISPOL’s role in public order is explained and examined. The 2010 FIFA World Cup will be one of the biggest international events ever to take place on South African soil. The security measures put in place have to take into account the general state of crime in the country, as well as soccer hooliganism, and the role of private security. Methodology In 2006, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) received permission from the South African Police Service (SAPS) to undertake a study of the Area Crime Combating Units in Gauteng1. The ISS considered the study necessary because of a noticeable increase in service delivery problems at local government level and also because South Africa is gearing up to host the FIFA World Cup in 2010. The purpose of the research was to assess the capacity of the police service’s Crime Combating Units (CCUs) to manage both protest marches and security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It also sought to look at the role played by the other policing agencies involved in crowd control and the management of events: the metro police, SAPS Visible Police division, and private security companies. Funding for the research was obtained from the Open Society Foundation South Africa (OSF-SA). At the outset, consultations were held with the SAPS, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and academics, in order to refine the methodology. Interviews were conducted with police members using a semi-structured questionnaire, on a one-on-one basis. Since a major focus was the capacity of the units, several of the questions related to the constraints imposed on the units as a result of the restructurings in 2001 and 2006. Training, specialised equipment and the fitness levels of members were also taken into account in determining capacity challenges. Further questions were asked regarding the relationship of the units to other role-players such as metro police, VISPOL members and private security companies. A time graph of protest marches taking place in South Africa was constructed to determine if these marches had increased or decreased in number and frequency. The necessary data was obtained from the SAPS Bilkis Omar 3 database and the Incident Registration Information System (IRIS), which registers violent and peaceful marches, as well as other policing functions. Interviews at the Johannesburg CCU began in November 2006. In total 49 members of a total of 225 operational members were interviewed. These included seven managers (Unit Commander to Captain level), 34 platoon members, and eight support services members including information officers and trainers. The members, who were chosen according to their availability, were interviewed one-on-one. The researcher observed the operation of the Crime Combating Unit members at gatherings and events, and attended ‘golden triangle’ meetings with the Johannesburg CCU information officer in order to determine the content of the meetings and how they were conducted. In December 2006, formal training of police station members in crowd management began at a SAPS training centre in Rooiberg. This was a new SAPS initiative and the Institute for Security Studies was invited to observe the training. Informal interviews with station members attending the course were conducted, as well as with five SAPS national trainers who were conducting the training. Interviews at the East Rand CCU commenced in early February 2007, with 57 members of a total of 197 operational members being interviewed. Ten managers, 32 platoon members, and 15 support services personnel, including information officers and trainers, were interviewed. The researcher also attended preliminary security meetings for a soccer event in Germiston, as well as the actual event, to observe the workings of the Joint Operational Command (JOC). The JOC is a committee of commanders from the SAPS, metro police, SAPS Visible Police, Disaster Management, Emergency Services, and other relevant departments, that oversees the execution of an event on the day of the event. Interviews at the Pretoria CCU started in late February 2007, but had to be stopped because the SAPS had just embarked on Operation Trio, a three- month high-density crime prevention operation. In this operation CCU members from all units in the country were redeployed to high priority stations. During this time, the Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department (EMPD) granted permission to the ISS researcher to conduct research at the department. Eight officers were interviewed, in addition to the chief superintendent of training, the director of operations of the southern region, and the director of training. 4 A review of public order policing capacity Permission to conduct the research at the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD) was denied because the JMPD management was in the process of finalising the structure of their Public Order Unit. To cover private security companies, the National Manager of Law Enforcement of the Private Security Industry Regulating Authority (PSIRA) was interviewed regarding regulation of private security companies, as well as the mechanisms that were being put in place for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The National Safety and Security Officer of the South African Football Association (SAFA), the National Safety Officer of the Premier Soccer League (PSL), and the General Manager of Operations and Events of Ellis Park Stadium, were interviewed regarding security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Research challenges and shortcomings The following challenges must be recognised: • The fact that the Johannesburg unit had been restructured only a few weeks prior to the interviews being conducted meant that some interviews were carried out with officers who had only recently joined the unit from other areas, including the West Rand and Soweto. These members had little experience in their new posts and were consequently unable to provide information about the working of the Johannesburg CCU. This was also the case in the East Rand unit. Members kept alluding to experiences they had had in their previous Area Crime Combating Units, with the result that not much detail was provided about the recently restructured and renamed Crime Combating Unit being studied. • The Johannesburg and East Rand interviews had to be conducted early in the morning before members went on duty, or sometimes while they were on duty. While this did not affect the quality of the interviews, in some instances an interview could not be completed because members had to attend to their duties. • While the focus of the research was on three CCUs in Gauteng (Johannesburg, East Rand and Pretoria), interviews were conducted only at the Johannesburg and East Rand units because members from Bilkis Omar 5 the Pretoria unit had been deployed to Operation Trio. The interviews at the Johannesburg and East Rand CCUs also included some interviews with members from four other units (West Rand, Soweto, Vaal Rand and North Rand) which were not part of the initial research study. This meant that the study actually looked at the issues affecting six units as opposed to the originally planned three. The broader focus did not compromise the study, because the issues highlighted by members from the additional four units (West Rand, Soweto, Vaal Rand and North Rand) were similar for all six units. In essence, the challenges that were commonplace in the Johannesburg and East Rand units were similar to those at the West Rand, Soweto, North Rand, and Vaal Rand units. Terminology The public order policing unit or crowd management component of the police has been renamed several times, with the result that the units have been known as the: Public Order Unit, Area Crime Combating Unit and Crime Combating Unit. Although the various names have at times been used interchangeably, the following table shows which name has been officially used for different periods. Date formed Establishment of public order units Early 1970s Riot Unit 1992 Internal Stability Division 1996 Public Order Police Unit 2002 Area Crime Combating Unit 2006 Crime Combating Unit The term ‘member’ is used to refer to all unit members of the SAPS who hold the rank of constable, sergeant, and inspector. The term ‘manager’ refers to captains, superintendents and senior superintendents. Metro police are referred to as ‘officers’. CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK Background The public order policing units of the South African Police Service (SAPS) are tasked with managing protest marches and events. They are also tasked with performing crime combating functions. The units have undergone considerable changes in the past 15 years. Operating as the notorious apartheid-era Riot Squads in the 1980s, then as the feared Internal Stability Division (ISD) in the early 1990s, the units had to be transformed after the democratic elections in 1994 to conform to international policing standards. They became the Public Order Police Units (POPU) in 1997 and their approach became more community-oriented, emphasising ‘crowd management’ as opposed to ‘crowd control’. Public order units have a unique organisational structure. At the head of the unit is the Unit Commander. Next in line are the Operational Commanders or Company Commanders. As the managers in charge of the operational planning of the units and they decide, for example, how many members will perform crowd management in a particular area on a particular day, and how many will assist in crime combating duties. The Operational Commanders or Company Commanders also oversee the information office of the units, whose members are tasked to attend events and ‘golden triangle’ meetings (meetings between those seeking permission to march and law enforcement agencies). The members of the information office, while falling under the ambit of support services, may also be tasked to perform operational duties. Each Operational or Company Commander has platoons that fall under his command. The number of platoons varies from unit to unit. While some units may have two platoons per command, others may have five. Ideally each platoon should consist of 36 members, but this number varies from unit to unit and according to the tasks that members are deployed to perform. Falling under each platoon are ‘sections’, with approximately eight to ten members in each section. Once again the number of sections and the number of members per section varies from unit to unit. 8 A review of public order policing capacity Figure 1: Organisational structure of Crime Combating Units (CCUs) Unit Commander Company Commander Company Commander Company Commander Platoon Platoon Platoon Platoon Platoon Commander Commander Commander Commander Commander Support Alpha Delta Charlie Foxtrot 1 services Section 1 Section 2 Section 1 Section 2 Section 1 Section 2 Section 1 Section 2 Information 10 members 9 members 9 members 9 members 9 members 10 members 10 members 9 members office 9 members Logistics 3 members Human Resources 5 members In 2002 the SAPS management made a decision to transform the Public Order Police Units into Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). The decision was based on the decrease in the number of protest marches since the demise of apartheid. In addition, the Public Finance Management (Act 1 of 1999) was demanding value for money in departments’ budgeting process; the implication being that the POPUs were not being utilised effectively. Under the post-2002 name of ACCUs, crime combating became the primary function of these public order units, while crowd management was relegated to a secondary function. The ACCUs were decentralised to the seven area policing levels in Gauteng, reporting to the area commissioner. Then in 2006, the ACCUs underwent a further restructuring and were renamed simply as Crime Combating Units (CCUs) reflecting the fact that the previous decentralisation of the ACCUs had been reversed. Although reduced in size in comparison to the ACCUs, and operating from a smaller number of more centralised locations, the CCUs were still required to service the same population and overall geographical area. In effect, the restructuring meant that there were fewer CCU members doing the same work as the former ACCUs. Of equal importance was that, in terms of the capacity of the newly formed CCUs, this restructuring had taken place at a time when the number of crowd control incidents was escalating quite Bilkis Omar 9 dramatically, due largely to the increasing number of demonstrations and protest marches. The Regulation of Gatherings Act Public gatherings in South Africa are regulated by the Regulation of Gatherings Act (205 of 1993). The Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) was developed in response to the findings of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry which was set up ‘to investigate and expose the background and reasons for violence, thereby reducing the incidence of violence and intimidation’ (National Peace Accord 1991). The Goldstone Commission found that violence and police brutality were widely prevalent at mass marches and demonstrations in the early 1990s. It recommended that citizens be accorded the right to participate in peaceful public gatherings, and that the role of the police in these gatherings be changed. Figure 2: Procedures of authorisation to gather or demonstrate Written notice to local council or metro police to gather Notice to SAPS Meeting between roleplayers (Golden Triangle meeting) Convenor metro police SAPS Authorisation of gathering Prohibition of gathering Challenging a decision to prevent or impose conditions The legislative framework considers the role of the police and event organisers in the planning and execution of mass gatherings, reflecting on the practical lessons learnt in the 11 years since the Act was passed. Procedures prior to an event The Regulation of Gatherings Act requires organisations and associations intending to hold gatherings to undertake certain procedures before permission to gather can be granted. These procedures require a meeting, 10 A review of public order policing capacity referred to as a ‘golden triangle’ meeting, between the convenor of the organisation making the application, the responsible officer (either a metro police officer or the local council representative responsible for authorising events), and the authorised member of the SAPS. At the meeting ‘the manner in which the gathering or demonstration will be carried out is discussed’ in relation to the planning and logistics of the event (A Guide to the Regulation of Gatherings Act 2007:6). To obtain authorisation for a gathering or demonstration, convenors have to submit a notification form to the responsible officer of the metro police or to a local council representative. There is a limited period within which this application may be submitted: it may not be submitted more than seven days before the planned date of the event, and it must be submitted at least 48 hours before the commencement of the event. Within 24 hours of the responsible officer receiving the notice, the convenor is notified of a date that has been set for a meeting with the responsible officer and the authorised member of the SAPS to discuss the logistical issues of the gathering or demonstration. The decision to authorise or prohibit a planned gathering is made according to the outcome of this meeting. If a gathering takes place without notice being given to the responsible officer, or when notice has been provided but authorisation to hold the gathering has been refused, then the gathering is regarded as unlawful. The court can impose a prison sentence of up to one year, or a fine of up to R20 000, or both (The Regulation of Gatherings Act 1993:17). The point regarding the punishment is significant because many unlawful gatherings take place and the public is in general unaware of the punishment involved. Planning the event The golden triangle meeting includes the convenor of the organisation making an application, the responsible officer (either a metro police officer or the local council representative responsible for authorising events), and the authorised member of the SAPS. These meetings play an important role in creating a cooperative environment between the various parties. The meetings allow law enforcement agencies to plan adequately for the event, and they make each party responsible for the behaviour of their members. In planning for an event (i.e. after authorisation), the SAPS Crime Combating Unit (CCU) information officer or designated person draws up a detailed operational plan. This includes: Bilkis Omar 11 • A Joint Operational Command (JOC) list consisting of the SAPS Crime Combating Units (CCU), metro police, disaster management, emergency services, SAPS Visible Police (VISPOL), a member of SAPS legal services, a SAPS media officer, and the convenor of the organisation. • A situation report on the gathering, which includes the route for the march and the key points (point of assembly, start of march, time of handing over of memo, and time of dispersal). The number of participants, marshals, and the venue for parking buses and taxis is also included. Possible threats and factors relating to disruption of traffic, blocking of entrances, refusal to disperse, looting, and damage to property is also furnished. The situation report also provides information on whether counter-participants2 will affect the event. The document also has to reflect the number of SAPS CCU members, metro police officers and SAPS VISPOL members who will be present. • The operational plan states the mission of the SAPS which is ‘to establish uncompromising security measures, limit the probability of critical incidents occurring, and limit the impact of any critical incidents through contingency planning’. • The operational concept of the SAPS is also clearly laid out in the operational plan: to ensure a safe and secure environment, for VISPOL and CCU members to protect the public and property from any dangers that may result from the marchers, for members of metro police to regulate traffic along the designated routes, for members of SAPS Crime Intelligence to gather and collect intelligence regarding threats before, during, and after the event, and assist the management of operations to confiscate dangerous weapons. All arrests are to be coordinated via the operational commander and reported immediately. The operational commander is also responsible for tactical decisions regarding the use of force, unless force is used in self defence by a member (Van der Merwe 2006a). The operational plan also provides information on procedures on the day of the event, as follows: • Execution or overseeing of the event is done by commanders of metro police, SAPS VISPOL and the CCUs. A Joint Operational Command is set up on the day of the gathering and each commander briefs his/her members prior to the event. The task of metro police is to patrol the 12 A review of public order policing capacity area, assist with escorting marchers and regulate traffic. VISPOL members patrol along the route to prevent crime, and CCU members patrol, keep ready, escort, and if necessary, block the participants. • Coordinating instructions are instructions designed to follow the operational plan, which serve to synchronise all the parties. An element of coordination is the provision of situation reports after every movement and incident, utilising the same communication channels, and radio procedures, coordinating members’ posts, registering the incident on the IRIS system, and providing instructions to the media officer. • Admin and control instructions pertain to instructions regarding equipment, uniforms, arrests, casualties and evacuations, supplies, record keeping, command posts and coordinating lines (Van der Merwe 2006a). The role of the police as defined in the Regulation of Gatherings Act The policing of gatherings and demonstrations has improved considerably since the introduction of the Regulation of Gatherings Act in 1993 and the political transition in South Africa in 1994. While ensuring that the police operate in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights, the Act does allow the police to take action if they have reasonable grounds to believe that people or property will be damaged as a result of a gathering or demonstration (Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 Chapter 3 [subsection 9(2)(a)]). The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 Chapter 3 (subsection 9(2) (a)) stipulates that police officers may take the following steps: • Ask the crowd to disperse. • In a loud voice and in two languages, order the crowd to disperse and depart from the place within a specified time. • If within the specified time, the crowd has not dispersed, a police member may order members under his command to disperse the participants and may for that purpose order the use of force, excluding the use of weapons likely to cause serious bodily injury or death. • The degree of force must not be greater than is necessary for dispersing the participant/s, and must be in proportion to the circumstances of the case and the object to be attained. Bilkis Omar 13 • If any person participating in the gathering kills or seriously injures or attempts to kill or seriously injure any person, or destroys or does serious damage to or shows a manifest intention of destroying or doing serious damage to, any movable or immovable property, a police manager can order members under his command to take the necessary steps to prevent the action, and if he finds other methods ineffective or inappropriate, order the use of force, including the use of firearms and other weapons. • The degree of force must not be greater than necessary and be proportionate to the circumstances of the case. Before calling for participants to disperse, ongoing negotiations between the police and the convenor have to take place. The police are also required in the interim to determine the level of threat based on available tactical information in terms of risk, discussions with the convenor, the history of the organisation, past experiences, aggravating factors, and the presence of weapons and firearms. The use of force, as mentioned above, means the use of minimum force, i.e. the use of shields, tonfas (rubber batons), stun grenades, water cannons, and shotguns with rubber bullets. Maximum force is only to be used when there is a threat to the life any person including a police member himself/herself. Training The formal crowd management course for police members consists of Platoon Members Training (PMT), and a formal crowd management course for commanders called Platoon Commander Training (PCT). The duration of these courses is two to three weeks, and they have theoretical and practical components. (See Chapter 6 on key issues affecting the capacity to perform public order policing for details on the training). The training course begins with theoretical work on crowd management. This includes an understanding of Act 205 and definitions and abbreviations. Other legislation includes the Constitutional Act, Road Traffic Act, and the relevant SAPS Standing Orders. The research attempted to determine the extent of Crime Combating Unit members’ knowledge and practice of the Regulation of Gatherings Act in the course of their duties. Findings included that every member interviewed from both the Johannesburg and East Rand units had attended formal crowd 14 A review of public order policing capacity management training courses. In addition, the contents and applicability of the Act were regularly studied during in-service training sessions. All the members stated that their units adhered to the requirements of the Regulation of Gatherings Act in their daily tasks. One manager stated that ‘the use and knowledge of the RGA is a skill and members use it all the time.’ Conclusion The Regulation of Gatherings Act is an important piece of legislation, particularly in the light of past human rights violations in the policing of public gatherings. While not without problems (see Chapter 5 for challenges facing the police), the Act serves to guide both civil society organisations and the police in the regulation of marches and demonstrations. Current procedure and practice ensures that all the relevant role-players are included, a cooperative relationship is established, and the outcome is to the satisfaction of all parties. Having said that, practical experience suggests that the time is right for the Act to be updated and revised. CHAPTER 3 SAPS RESTRUCTURING IN 2001 The policing of public order in South Africa has long been surrounded by controversy. The Riot Control Units, which were established under the banner of the South African Police (SAP) in the 1970s in response to the revival of the anti-apartheid resistance movements, remained in place until 1995 when they were merged into the new SAPS. In 1992, the Internal Stability Division (ISD) was formed for the purpose of ‘policing of unrest through proactive (preventive) and reactive measures and the prevention of crime in unrest-plagued areas’ (Meyer 1999). The Internal Stability Division adopted a paramilitary approach and became notorious for its use of abusive policing methods. Controversy led to the unit being disbanded in 1995, and its members being re-absorbed into the SAPS. After 1994, policing in general, but particularly public order policing, changed dramatically in its approach. In 1996, the Public Order Police (POP) unit was conceived under new SAPS policy. The focus of the unit was the ‘management’ of crowds as opposed to the ‘control’ of crowds. This initial overhaul of the public order units was clearly important to overcome the problems of the past. However, ongoing debate and internal issues within the SAPS meant that the policy was only adopted in 2002 into SAPS Standing Order 262 on Crowd Management during Gatherings and Demonstrations (Omar 2006:9). In 2002 the SAPS management decided on another structural change to the Public Order Police units. What had been the primary focus of the units – the management of crowds and events – became a secondary function, while combating and preventing crime became the primary focus. The units were decentralised to the area level, reporting to the area commissioner, and were deployed to attend to area priorities on a daily basis. Renamed as Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs) these units began assisting police stations and other units in VIP protection, domestic violence complaints, stop and search, roadblocks, vehicle check points, patrolling of malls and streets, monitoring hijack hotspots, and other crime combating functions. 16 A review of public order policing capacity The argument given by the SAPS management for the change was that public protests had decreased with the demise of apartheid, and the new Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 demanded ‘value for money’ budgeting (SAPS Policy 2004:1). The SAPS had also just launched its National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) in 2000 to combat crime in hotspots and was looking for more resources to ensure the success of the initiative. The Area Crime Combating Units could help to ensure that this was possible. While the broadening of the Area Crime Combating Units’ responsibilities made financial and operational sense, the concern was that a shift to crime combating would result in a dilution of the specialised crowd control skills of these units. This study set out to determine what impact the change in function had on the activities and effectiveness of Area Crime Combating Units. Views on the impact of restructuring The research results suggest that the change impacted differently on different units. Members of the Johannesburg ACCU said that the change was one of name only, because they had in fact always been involved in crime combating activities such as stop and search, roadblocks, vehicle check points, and patrolling of malls and streets. The perception of members of the East Rand unit was different, however. Both unit members and managers stated that their crime combating activities had increased with the restructuring. While this increase was noted by the members, it did not appear to concern them because they did not believe it detracted from their capacity to perform their original public order duties. To understand the different perceptions of the two units, some background is needed. As mentioned earlier, the effect of the restructuring (from Public Order Police units to Area Crime Combating Units) was to decentralise the units to the area level (they had formerly reported to the provincial commander of operational response services at the provincial office). For the Area Commissioners, the ACCUs represented a large pool of human resources that could be utilised for crime combating operations. The increase in the level of crime combating activities noted by the East Rand unit after the 2001 restructuring can therefore be attributed to a new trend whereby area commissioners’ utilised ACCU members largely for Bilkis Omar 17 crime combating operations. By contrast, for the Johannesburg public order police, tackling criminal activities had been commonplace before the creation of the ACCUs in 2002. It is also interesting that many members of the ACCUs attributed the restructuring (from POPs to ACCUs) to a change in crowd management tactics. Members spoke about ‘negotiating with the people instead of being aggressive’, and the ‘rights of people to march’, and ‘using different types of equipment’. The changes in the style of crowd management (more democratic and internationally acceptable) had in fact been introduced in 1997 in a SAPS policy document, but it was only in 2002 that the document directive was adapted as standing Order 2623, and then introduced to the members (Omar 2006:9). The ACCUs’ workload: Frequency of protest marches after 2001 The study also set out to determine if protest marches had increased or decreased after 2001 in the Johannesburg and East Rand policing areas. Issues of service delivery and other local government-related problems like transport were featuring prominently at this time, and trends were suggesting an increase in protest marches. More protest marches would have meant that the SAPS management would have had to revisit the roles and functions of the ACCUs. A study of the SAPS Incident Registration Information System, Business Intelligence System (IRIS-BIS), a system that records public events and marches, confirmed that protest marches between 2002 and 2005 had increased from 6 757 in 2002 to a high of 10 162 in 2005 – an increase of 50 per cent (Figure 3). This was significant because it meant that the specialist crowd management capability of the ACCUs was required more than ever. Research showed that protest marches in the Johannesburg area had increased. This was not surprising as protest marches generally tend to take place in areas where there are offices of both provincial and local government departments, which facilitates the handing over of petitions to relevant government officials. In the East Rand area by comparison, protest marches had not increased much between 2002 and 2005; in fact many members stated that the rate had decreased. The East Rand area (including the newly incorporated Vaal 18 A review of public order policing capacity Figure 3: Total crowd management incidents, 1997–2005 12,000 10,162 10,000 9,287 8,707 8,000 7,913 8,559 7,787 7,337 Number 6,000 6,190 6,757 4,000 2,000 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Source: SAPS Operational Response Services, Pretoria and North Rand areas) does not house many government head offices, but because it has many industries and businesses, disputes do arise, mostly in the form of strikes and protests at specific times of the year. Wage increases are generally negotiated between March and June, and a higher occurrence of protest marches at this time is not unexpected. Other disputes that are commonplace in the East Rand are taxi strikes and service delivery protests. Whatever the trends in crowd management incidents in specific areas, the 2002 decision to form the ACCUs was based on a police management perception that the number and intensity of major demonstrations, marches, and incidences of labour unrest throughout the whole the country had decreased since 1994. Apart from a sharp increase in 1998, this was indeed the case (Figure 3). After 2002, however, the picture changed dramatically. Data relating to incidents of violence or unrest at mass gatherings between 2002 and 2005 show a massive increase of 64 per cent over the period (Figure 4). This change necessitated an assessment of whether the ACCUs, in the light of the restructuring they had undergone, had managed to retain the ability and skills to deal with the increase in number of marches, and especially the increase in the violent nature of the marches, in addition to carrying out Bilkis Omar 19 Figure 4: Total violent and peaceful crowd management incidents, 1997–2005 12,000 10,000 8,000 Number 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Violent incidents 880 1,185 736 713 632 570 526 562 932 Peaceful incidents 5,310 8,102 7,971 7,074 7,281 6,187 6,811 7,997 9,230 Source: SAPS Operational Response Services, Pretoria their intensified crime combating duties. It also raised the question of whether the crowd management function was being neglected in favour of crime combating activities. One of the goals of the ACCUs at this point of the restructuring was ‘to maintain public order by combating serious and violent crime, policing public gatherings, rendering specialised operational support to other units/components/divisions and ensuring effective information management’ (SAPS Policy 2004:1). The changes from Public Order Police units to ACCUs saw the Gauteng units decentralised to seven policing areas. This meant that each ACCU had to focus on a specific policing area where it would perform both crime combating and crowd management functions. The demands on the units were further increased because their members were serving on both provincial and area task teams, as well as assisting neighbouring policing areas and performing border duties and other special duties. The number of ACCU police members on duty was further depleted because some members were also on annual leave or on sick leave. 20 A review of public order policing capacity Given the multiple tasks that the units had to deal with, a shortage in human resources was not unexpected. Despite this and despite the increase in the number of marches, members in both the Gauteng and East Rand ACCUs believed that they managed the operations of marches quite well. Even when asked to assist other areas, they said they were able to cope. The research showed that in terms of priority, crowd management was always seen as the foremost priority for the ACCUs, even when they were deployed to crime combating operations. Only a few Johannesburg ACCU members and managers stated that crowd management had been neglected in favour of crime prevention and other area-level priorities. However, despite their statements that they were able to manage the operations of marches, respondents indicated that juggling dual functions was not an easy task. While officially ACCU members were meant to be specialists in crowd management, the members of the Gauteng and East Rand units said they were ‘stretched to such a limit that sometimes a platoon was left with five members for the day’. The following statements from other ACCU members indicate similar perceptions regarding the diminished crowd management capacity of the units: ’The demand from area level was high’ ’Stations became dependent on the ACCUs’ ’Obtaining crime statistics was more important for station commissioners’ ’While crowd management was not neglected, logistically the units struggled’ ’The shortage of members or vehicles could not be an excuse in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act. When a march was scheduled to take place, the police had to ensure that it took place.’ Impact on specialist crowd management skills While the crowd management function of the ACCUs seemed to have been administered well despite the units’ dual function, the research sought to establish whether members were losing their specialist crowd management skills because of their other tasks. Specialist skills can be lost if training is not maintained, equipment is not upgraded, and if the members do not work together regularly. Bilkis Omar 21 Most Johannesburg and East Rand members agreed that their units had not lost their specialist skills. Almost all of the East Rand managers attributed this to the maintenance of in-service training. East Rand members and managers further stated that they had retained their skills because crowd management was (and had always been) a priority. Some Johannesburg ACCU members did, however, state that their unit had become deskilled because in-service training had not been done regularly. Views on ACCUs’ impact on crime Asked about their success rate in dealing with crime since the 2002 restructuring, the East Rand managers responded with very positive assessments: ‘East Rand was leading, especially over the weekends’. However the managers felt that they did not get credit for the successes. Some said that they were ‘number one’ in crime prevention in Gauteng. One manager stated that if they were deployed to an area for a long enough period then the successes were better, but this was not sustainable because they had other duties. The Johannesburg managers similarly believed that their success could be measured by the decrease in crime in the area, but the impact of the ACCUs on crime control was often not known. Ascribing credit was complicated, since the crime control operations were carried out jointly with station level police members. This meant that the police stations that took the credit because they had cells in which to lock up those who had been arrested. The ACCUs did however keep records of arrests that their own members had made, and the head of the operational response services at the provincial office was aware of their successes. Unfortunately, the successes of the ACCUs in crime combating could not be measured against the crime statistics of the individual stations. However the weekly operational statistics for the Johannesburg unit are available for the period 28 June to 10 October 2006 (Table 1). While the statistics cannot prove the ‘success’ of the Johannesburg unit, they provide sufficient information to illustrate the extent of crime combating undertaken by the ACCU. Furthermore, the provincial head of operational response services confirmed that the ACCUs have been beneficial to the stations (Schutte 23 July 2007). Similar statistics for the East Rand ACCU were not available. 22 A review of public order policing capacity Table 1: Operational crime successes for the Johannesburg ACCU 2006 Arrests Vehicle Firearm Ammun- Stations seizures seizures ition assisted4 seizures 28 June – 4 July 26 5 5 38 6 5 July – 11 July 10 2 4 107 18 12 July – 18 July 2 3 0 0 14 19 July – 25 July 4 5 2 55 11 26 July – 1 Aug 20 4 1 10 16 2 Aug – 8 Aug 7 0 0 58 4 9 Aug – 15 Aug 3 2 1 1 3 16 Aug – 22 Aug No stats No stats No stats No stats No stats 23 Aug – 29 Aug 2 5 0 20 7 30 Aug – 5 Sept 12 3 1 1 9 6 Sept – 12 Sept 6 7 3 5 5 12 Sept – 19 Sept 9 5 2 15 5 20 Sept – 26 Sept 11 7 4 33 8 27 Sept – 3 Oct No stats No stats No stats No stats No stats 4 Oct – 10 Oct 10 8 1 0 No stats Source: Johannesburg Crime Combating Unit Conclusion The decision to prioritise and increase the crime combating functions of the ACCUs could be said to have been beneficial, given the fact that there were more police to combat crime, and marches were showing a downward trend in the late 1990s. After 2002, however, protest marches and violent protest marches increased steadily with the result that ACCU members’ workload, in terms of both crime combating and crowd management, increased. The effects of the change from Public Order Police units to ACCUs in 2001 was summed up well by one member, who said: Bilkis Omar 23 It was a name change only…people thought that the function had changed; the primary function did not change. It may have changed for the [policies] of the national department, but not for the ground members. The units became accountable to the area level, and stations would fight for ACCU members to increase their statistics. From the interviews it appears that the crowd management function was not neglected in favour of crime combating and that it remained a priority for the units. ACCU members did not believe that they had become deskilled to the extent that they did not know how to perform their crowd management functions. However it is clear that, given the increased incidence of crowd management events subsequent to the 2002 restructuring, crime combating would necessarily have been relegated to a secondary role. CHAPTER 4 SAPS RESTRUCTURING IN 2006 Background to the restructuring In mid-2006 the SAPS announced5 a restructuring of the way in which the whole organisation would be managed. The changes were intended to address a duplication of functions, weak command and control, and poor service delivery at police station level. The restructuring meant that the area level of SAPS management – which was viewed as an unnecessary level of authority – was eliminated. This meant that SAPS management would now operate at national, provincial and station level in line with the requirement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996:119). The overall intention of the changes was to improve service delivery to the public. Specialised units affected were the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS), the Serious and Violent Crimes Unit (SVC), and the Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs). It was proposed that these specialist units should be decentralised to police stations. In Gauteng the restructuring was implemented in late September 2006. The Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences units and the Serious and Violent Crimes units were decentralised to stations. The Area Crime Combating Units, after much deliberation, were not fully disbanded but were reduced from seven to three units. Before this restructuring, when the area level management of the ACCUs was still in existence, the Gauteng ACCU had had 1 383 operational members within its seven units (see Figures 5 and 6). After the restructuring, and the dissolution of the area level management structures, the ACCUs were renamed Crime Combating Units (CCU). The three Gauteng units that remained comprised only 614 crowd management members. The remaining 769 members of the disbanded ACCUs were redeployed to police stations to perform ordinary crime combating activities as station members. The three new Crime Combating Units that exist currently in Gauteng are located in Johannesburg, East Rand and Pretoria. The Soweto and West Rand ACCUs were incorporated into the Johannesburg CCU (based in Diepkloof, 26 A review of public order policing capacity Figure 5: The seven Gauteng Area Crime Combating Units before the 2006 restructuring Figure 6: Organogram of the seven Gauteng Area Crime Combating Units before the 2006 restructuring Gauteng Policing Areas 7 areas 122 Police Stations 1 383 Operational ACCU members Vaal Rand North Rand East Rand Johannesburg Soweto West Rand Pretoria 12 stations 15 stations 24 stations Central 11 stations 11 stations 28 stations 21 stations ACCU ACCU ACCU ACCU ACCU ACCU ACCU 190 150 230 179 550 operational operational operational operational operational members members members members members Bilkis Omar 27 Johannesburg) with 225 operational members. The East Rand CCU (consisting of Vaal Rand and North Rand and based in Nufield) has 197 operational members. The Pretoria CCU (based in Rosslyn) has 202 operational members (Schutte 2006). The new arrangement means that the three Gauteng CCUs service the same geographical areas previously serviced by seven Area Crime Combating Units – but with far fewer operational members. The Johannesburg unit, which previously serviced a single policing ‘area’ with 197 operational members, is now servicing three such ‘areas’ with approximately 225 operational members. Johannesburg CCU members living in the West Rand area travel from as far as Krugersdorp to the Diepkloof base to report for duty, a distance of 30 km. In the East Rand, the situation is similar: some members travel from Vereeniging to Springs, a 103 km trip. And while the Pretoria CCU does not cover a greater geographical area within Gauteng province, parts of the North West province (Garankuwa, Mabopane, Loate, Dube, and Themba) have been incorporated into the Pretoria unit’s jurisdiction. Figure 7: The three Gauteng Crime Combating Units after the 2006 restructuring 28 A review of public order policing capacity Figure 8: Organogram of the three Gauteng Crime Combating Units after the 2006 restructuring Gauteng Policing Zones 131 Stations Gauteng CCU Bases 614 operational members Pretoria CCU Unit East Rand CCU Unit Johannesburg CCU Unit Rosslyn Nufield Diepkloof 202 operational members 197 operational members 225 operational members (including five stations from the North West Province) Vaal Rand North Rand Soweto West Rand Implementation of the restructuring By September 2006 the restructuring of the Johannesburg CCU was underway. The unit managers were uncertain of the details of the restructuring and could only confirm to members that a restructuring was in progress. The changes were not popular amongst the members, who felt that they had not been adequately consulted or informed about the process, and that it was too drastic. To exacerbate matters, rumours were circulating that units were to be closed down or scaled down, and that members above the age of 35 years were to be redeployed to stations. This resulted in members feeling insecure and uncertain about their futures Confirmation of the restructuring from SAPS head office came in the form of a list that was distributed to ACCUs in September 2006 giving the names of who was to be transferred. Letters were issued to individual members that confirmed their new posts at particular stations and units. The transfer was referred to as a ‘service arrangement’. In police management terminology, a service arrangement is a temporary movement of a member from a currently held position to another position, for any period of time. It is defined as a temporary measure and can therefore be rescinded at any time. Correspondence from the SAPS, dated 12 April 2007, to all heads of divisions informed them that they should finalise all interim service arrangements so that the restructuring process could continue. Rumours had circulated that an evaluation of the restructuring would take place after six months. Some understood this to mean that the restructuring Bilkis Omar 29 would be re-assessed and a decision about whether the original ACCUs would be re-formed and members reinstated to their former positions would then be made. In our interviews, senior managers of the SAPS refuted this claim. However, at a Safety and Security Sector Bargaining Council (SSSBC) meeting the SAPS management explained that they were ‘evaluating the achievements of strengthening the police station process’ (SSSBC 2007: 8). While it appears that this is a reference to the process that was implemented in September 2006, this is not a certainty. It may be that the six-month evaluation was intended to mollify members because of discontent about the restructuring. Be that as it may, the changes, and the rumours that accompanied them, have resulted in a great deal of uncertainty for members whose daily lives were affected by the transfers. Impact of the restructuring The restructuring of the ACCUs to a smaller number of CCUs proved to be damaging for the SAPS. One reason for this was that the planning process lacked transparency, and was not consultative. In addition, the implementation phase was too sudden and was viewed as being imposed on members. Issues such as logistics, resources, financial costs, travel and transport, relocation, teamwork, personal circumstances, and members’ wellbeing appear not to have been taken into account either when the changes were proposed or when they were implemented. These flaws are featuring prominently in the aftermath of the restructuring. Extensive commuting As mentioned already, many of the present CCU members must now commute substantial distances on a daily basis. In one example, a member of the Johannesburg CCU who lives in Krugersdorp must report for duty approximately 30 km away at the Johannesburg base, where he attends a parade, is assigned a duty for the day, and books out his firearms. If the duty is a crowd management event in Khutsong, he has to travel back to the West Rand (30 km) to carry out his function. If he is being transported in a Nyala (an armoured police vehicle) the trip takes almost twice as long as for a standard police vehicle – and this is assuming that the Nyala is in working condition (see Chapter 6 on equipment). After the day’s work is complete, this unit member must once again report back to the Johannesburg CCU base to book in his firearms and attend a debriefing and parade. He must then return home to Krugersdorp (30 km). In essence, the member will have 30 A review of public order policing capacity travelled approximately 120 km on that particular day and spent approximately three hours travelling (including travelling in peak hour traffic in the morning and evening and collecting three to four other members from the area who travel with him to the base). The problem is just as bad in the East Rand unit with members having to travel 103 km per trip from Vereeniging to Springs. Logistically the arrangement, as illustrated in the example above, is costly, inefficient, time consuming, and demanding on the individuals involved. While some concessions have been made to alleviate these problems, the consequence has been that some members of the unit do not participate in debriefings with their platoon commanders at the end of each day, and at times they do not check in their firearms, which are meant to be locked in safes at their respective units. These are matters of concern. Crowd management capacity diminished Of equal concern is the reduced number of CCU members who remain available for crowd control activities. As noted in the previous chapter, mass gatherings increased by 50 per cent between 2002 and 2005; and the number of mass gatherings at which there are incidents of violence increased by 64 per cent in the same period. These changes in themselves represent an increased demand on the units; yet the three units are now expected to service an increased geographical area with fewer members to do the job. As a result, the management of events has become a major challenge for the CCUs. In-service training is also being neglected due to the manpower shortages and the workload. Specialist teamwork affected The restructuring process, in transferring members to other units and stations, has destroyed the spirit of teamwork that is vital for a specialist unit. The expert capacity of the individual members remaining in the units, and of those who were redeployed, is now scattered and there is no central gathering point for members. As one trainer commented: ‘Units are effective because of in-service training and the core spirit of togetherness. Now that the togetherness is gone, the pride and joy is taken away’ (CCU trainer 2007). One member stated that under the previous structure he had been well accustomed to his work partner, but was now unsure of whom to trust. Bilkis Omar 31 Under the ACCUs, members with extensive crime combating training and experience had established networks of police informers within their respective areas. This vital component has also been lost with the restructuring. While the training and specialist skills of the ACCU members will enhance capacity at police stations, a member commented: ‘The fear is that the former ACCU members who have been redeployed to stations will have to take over work that should be done by station members who have a propensity to become lazy’, and will as a result, lose their specialist skills. Impact on well-being, morale and productivity The effect of the restructuring on the well-being of members is perhaps the greatest concern of all. A few were positive about the move, with comments such as: ‘It had to happen; the situation needed people’, or ‘it’s good because stations are strengthened’. In general, however, almost all of the members are harbouring ill feelings towards the SAPS management. This is mainly because of how the implementation was done. Questions have been raised about the criteria that were used to select members, the lack of proper consultation and transparency, and the financial implications for members in relation to transport and travelling times. Productivity has dropped, morale has been lowered and family life has been affected. Many members stated that they were considering leaving the SAPS for other jobs. Some members retained at CCUs have said that they would prefer to be transferred to stations closer to their homes. Some members regard the transfers as some sort of punishment by their superiors. The following comments are revealing: ‘Morale among members is very low’ ‘Members cried like babies when they realised they were sent away’ ‘The uncertainty was difficult to deal with’ ‘The process was not thought out’ ‘Managers who are making decisions don’t know what operations entails’ ‘Those sent away feel that they are bad’ ‘Good members were sent away’ ‘Experience has been lost’ 32 A review of public order policing capacity One manager stated that he looked like a fool to his members because he was not in a position to provide them with information about the restructuring. Members of the disbanded ACCUs who were dissatisfied with the new arrangement were told that they had to take up the new posts, and could then follow this up with a grievance letter to the provincial office. Thus far all grievances have met with the same response: a standard letter indicating that the position cannot be reversed. Despite the negativity surrounding the restructuring, by February 2007, five months after implementation, the members of the restructured CCUs seemed to have settled down and accepted the status quo. As one CCU member stated: ‘I was apprehensive of the new place, but I have settled down now. I like the job, it is challenging’. While the members of the CCUs are coming to terms with the changes, the fact remains that the restructuring has come at a huge cost to all members – those who were absorbed into station level policing; those who were retained under the new CCUs; and even to SAPS management. It remains to be seen whether the increase in the number of police members at station level and their ability to combat crime will show that the restructuring achieved its purpose. Operation Trio: another restructuring? Despite the turmoil created by the 2006 restructuring, more changes were to come. In February 2007, President Mbeki in his State of the Nation address spoke about ‘a sustained drive to improve community safety’, and said that ‘government will ensure that the decisions already taken about strengthening our fight against crime are effectively implemented’. In response, SAPS management embarked on an intensive crime prevention operation dealing with the most problematic types of crime. To succeed in this initiative, the SAPS had to rely on the CCUs. During the three-month period designated for the operation, which started in late February 2007, almost all CCU operational members had to report to priority police stations within their areas. Named ‘Operation Trio’, the primary objective was to reduce three categories of serious violent crime: residential robberies, business robberies and vehicle hijackings. A small Bilkis Omar 33 number of CCU operational staff, also deployed to stations, would be called up as reserves for the purposes of crowd management. The result was that Gauteng’s three CCUs were left with only their unit commanders and support staff to deal with any crowd management incidents that cropped up while Operation Trio was taking place. Any remaining operational members who had not been deployed to stations were either on detached duties6, sick leave, or rest days. In late February 2007, when interviews were conducted with members of the CCU in Pretoria, it was found that members of the unit’s support staff had been deployed to manage crowd management incidents in Shoshanguve. These support staff members did have some previous operational experience, but in recent years they had been involved only in support service and logistics. They therefore had little recent experience in managing crowds and had not received in-service training. They had not been given the danger allowance that operational members are entitled to, and their families would not have been able to access pensions in the event of their death while involved in an operation. They should therefore not have been deployed for crowd control operations, as their lack of experience presented a risk both to themselves and the participants in the gatherings. With the number of public service strikes peaking in May/June 2007, the CCUs were re-mobilised to attend to crowd management events. Operation Trio came to an end after this and the CCU members were returned to their respective units. The outcome of the operation, in terms of the successes at the different stations, is not known; suffice to say that the Gauteng MEC for Community Safety noted that ‘Operation Trio assisted the police to significantly improve their ability to target the perpetrators of violent and organised crime. This operation was successful as arrest rates for these crimes increased significantly over the first six months of this year’ (Cachalia 2007). Whether intentional or not, the latest arrangement of utilising CCU members at station level for crime operations appears to have been the original plan envisioned for the former ACCUs by the architects of the restructuring. Initially, when the decision was made to dissolve the area level offices, the plan was to close down all seven ACCU units and deploy all 1 383 operational members to the 25 accounting stations7 around the province. Under this arrangement, each accounting station would have had 55 ACCU members. Crime prevention support to stations would thus have 34 A review of public order policing capacity been increased, the crowd management capacity would have been closer to station level, and there would still have been capacity for borderline operations8 and assisting detectives with dangerous criminals. Operation Trio displayed all the elements of the initial SAPS plan. According to the MEC of Gauteng Community Safety, Operation Trio has been a success in terms of crime control. Given the success, SAPS management could well be tempted to make the situation permanent. For the CCUs this will be a travesty, because crowd management incidents are at an all time high and rising steadily, and the specialist capacity of the units needs to be maintained. Currently in-service training is being neglected to the extent that across the country, 75 per cent of units are not doing any in- service training (Day 2007a). Impact of Operation Trio on public order policing The research findings suggest that CCU members should not be expected to provide additional help to stations for crime combating operations. In addition, the CCUs need to maintain their skills with continuous in-service training. Since the implementation of the restructuring, the units have been performing crowd management operations with minimal capacity in addition to performing crime combating duties. Whereas once entire platoons were used to manage a gathering, the current situation sees subsidiary groups called ‘sections’ being utilised. It is noteworthy that despite the fact that 719 CCU members, in addition to members from the Serious and Violent Crimes (SVC) units and Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS) unit have been permanently deployed to stations, the need still remains to use additional CCU members for crime combating activities. A description of the organisational structure of the CCUs will give a more concrete idea of the extent to which the capacity of these units has been stretched (Figure 9). A Crime Combating Unit is headed by a Unit Commander. Some units have Company Commanders, while others have Operational Commanders. These commanders are in charge of the units’ operational planning. Below them are approximately two to five Platoon Commanders, who are in charge of approximately two to four sections each. Each section consists of approximately eight to ten members. The number of platoons and sections varies according to the different units. Bilkis Omar 35 Figure 9: Organisational structure of Gauteng’s Crime Combating Units Unit Commander Company Commander Company Commander Company Commander Platoon Platoon Platoon Platoon Platoon Commander Commander Commander Commander Commander Support Alpha Delta Charlie Foxtrot 1 services Section 1 Section 2 Section 1 Section 2 Section 1 Section 2 Section 1 Section 2 Information 10 members 9 members 9 members 9 members 9 members 10 members 10 members 9 members office 9 members Logistics 3 members Human Resources 5 members To give an example, in order to manage a gathering of 2 000 participants, under current circumstances a CCU will deploy one section consisting of around ten operational members. In the past, a whole platoon consisting of 36 members would have been deployed for a gathering of the same size. This gives an indication of the minimal capacity that is now being used by the units to manage marches. In relation to Operation Trio there were both benefits and shortcomings. The general public would have benefited in terms of the extra capacity devoted to crime control. Visible policing would have been stepped up, stations would have gained extra capacity, crime operations would have been enhanced, and response times would have been better. Overall, the extra capacity would have contributed to improving station statistics and enhancing the credibility of the police force. The negative impact of Operation Trio is that only some stations and areas would have benefited from the new arrangement. At the same time it is probable that criminal activity would have been displaced9 away from the stations that received extra capacity towards those that did not. The CCU members seconded to Operation Trio would have had to adapt to a new environment; in-service training would have been neglected for the duration that the members were deployed to stations; and mobilising members for any sporadic public order incident would have been difficult because the CCU members were scattered across the province. 36 A review of public order policing capacity The most serious concern, however, is that station commissioners could become dependent on CCU members for crime control. While for some this may appear to be a positive development, especially if the statistics show that crime is decreasing in the station areas, the ongoing dependence on the CCUs could result in stations utilising the units ever more frequently for crime combating operations. This is something the SAPS should guard against. The CCUs should not be called upon whenever it suits the police to provide crime combating assistance to police operations; as it stands the CCUs, since the 2006 restructuring, are already expected to respond to crowd management events with substantially depleted capacity. The primary function of CCUs is still the management of crowds and this must be retained. Whether SAPS operations such as Operation Trio are sustainable is difficult to predict. The CCU members should not be utilised for another Operation Trio – protests marches are occurring more frequently than ever and the 2010 FIFA World Cup is imminent. While there have been no major incidents at public gatherings thus far, and the CCUs seem to be coping, these units have not been tested to their full capacity. The test will arise when a spontaneous incident of violence occurs in a crowd situation. In the short term the restructuring of the ACCUs to CCUs is not working. What the long term plans of the SAPS are in relation to the CCUs only time will tell. There is a concern amongst members that these specialist units will eventually be closed down or relocated to stations. The comment of one member that ‘the restructuring is one of the biggest mistakes ever made by the SAPS management’, encapsulates what many members are thinking. Recommendations • In future when the SAPS requires extra capacity to undertake crime combating operations along the lines of Operation Trio, an alternative to using the CCUs must be found, for example, the utilisation of the National Intervention Unit. • The former Area Crime Combating Units were much better placed to provide crime combating assistance to the police. They functioned within smaller more localised geographical areas with more manpower, which meant they had the capacity and expertise to both manage public gatherings and provide crime combating support to stations. If the ACCUs were to be reinstated along the lines of the pre- Bilkis Omar 37 2006 arrangement, the issue of the dissolution of the area level command would not be of prime concern, since the reinstated ACCUs could be made accountable to the provincial office as Provincial Public Order Units. • It is evident that the restructuring of the ACCUs to the present CCUs was not a good idea from the perspective of crowd control. While one can understand that the intention was to strengthen capacity at police stations in order to bring down the crime levels, it is recommended that an assessment of the SAPS initiative be done to determine whether the outcome has been favourable overall. CHAPTER 5 CAPACITY TO PERFORM PUBLIC ORDER POLICING The capacity of any unit in this context depends on an adequate level of skills and the availability of appropriate equipment. In addition, the legislative framework governing Crime Combating Units (CCUs) – the Regulation of Gatherings Act (205 of 1993) – provides a cooperative environment between all the parties, allows the law enforcement agencies to plan adequately for events, and makes all the parties responsible for their organisation’s members. However, the Act also presents a number of practical and logistical challenges to both the police and those who wish to organise events. By focusing on these challenges, this chapter considers whether the police have the capacity to adequately perform public order policing. Challenges presented by the Regulation of Gatherings Act Unrealistically short notice period The period during which organisers of gatherings or demonstrations must both apply for permission to hold an event and receive a response, is unrealistically short. This is especially the case for large gatherings, which may include as many as 5 000 participants, and which need extensive planning prior to the event. As mentioned earlier in this monograph, the applicant may not apply for permission sooner than seven days before the event is due to take place, or later than 48 hours before the event. Effectively this means there is only a five-day window during which an application must be submitted and a response received; it also means that the outcome of the application can only be known shortly before the event is due to take place, creating considerable uncertainty for the event planners. Consideration should therefore be given to a 14-day notice period. Appropriate representatives for golden triangle meetings The person who is sent by the organisers to the meeting needs to have an overview of the planned event and a mandate to make decisions on behalf the organisation or organisations planning the event. Ideally this person 40 A review of public order policing capacity should have been involved in drafting the application. Sending an insufficiently informed person who does not have decision making powers can mean that the golden triangle meeting may have to be rescheduled and the permission may be delayed. Sufficient marshals for the gathering Marshals are expected ‘to control the participants in the gathering, and to take the necessary steps to ensure that the gathering at all times proceeds peacefully’ (Regulation of Gatherings Act 1993:12). Marshals are vital to ensure a peaceful event. They reduce the need for large numbers of police officers, and because they are there to assist and direct the crowd, they reduce the potential for antagonism between the police and participants. This frees the police to concentrate on criminal activities within the vicinity of the event and gather crime intelligence. The Regulation of Gatherings Act does not stipulate the ratio of marshals to participants. Current practice (at least in Johannesburg) is that marshals should make up 10 per cent of the total number of participants. There is a need to specify the ratio in the legislation. Regulations needed in relation to petitions If the purpose of a gathering is to hand a petition to a government official, convenors of gatherings and demonstrations are required to notify the relevant person of their wish to hand over a petition on a particular day. This notification should take place before the golden triangle meeting. However, the Act does not stipulate that the convenors of the event have to receive an acknowledgement of receipt of the petition, or a prior agreement that the petition will be received on the designated day. Since nobody can be legally compelled to accept a petition, the marchers may become angry and antagonistic when no designated person is present to receive the petition. The legislation must seek to address this problem of receiving the petition to avoid antagonism of the marchers (Van der Merwe 2006a). Clarifying who is liable for damages If damages occur, the convenors of all the organisations involved can be held accountable. Organisations making applications to participate in Bilkis Omar 41 marches often do not include particulars of other organisations intending to participate with the result that liability for damages becomes contentious. According to Chapter 4, subsections 11-16 of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993, if any riot damage occurs as a result of a gathering, every organisation under the auspices of the gathering, or its convenor, shall be jointly and severally liable for that riot damage. Convenors of gatherings have to sign indemnity forms protecting the authorities, and they need to realise the extent of their responsibility because they are ultimately liable for all participants. Accurate minutes of meetings needed The record keeping systems of the Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD) and social movements regarding golden triangle meetings are deficient. A report compiled by the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) found that ‘the records received from the JMPD were…not comprehensive, largely because of the deficiencies in the JMPD’s own record-keeping systems’. Similarly, the ‘actual records kept by these [social] movements were seriously lacking’ (Anon nd:5). There is a need for all parties to be required by law to keep detailed records of golden triangle meetings that take place before a gathering so that disputes that arise can be settled later. Despite these challenges, the Regulation of Gatherings Act, in stipulating that meetings take place between the police, local authorities and organisers of public gatherings, ensures that such gatherings are better planned and co-ordinated. Human resources When this research commenced in early 2006, the restructuring that would change the ACCUs into the CCUs which was due to happen later in the year had not yet been implemented, so the existing Area Crime Combating Units were still operating as before under the authority of the SAPS area commissioners. The ACCUs in Gauteng had 1 383 operational members distributed through seven units in the province. Each unit was based in one of the seven Gauteng policing areas, and performed both crowd management and crime combating functions. While crime combating duties consumed much of the 42 A review of public order policing capacity units’ time, crowd management was a key function, especially as there was an increase in mass gatherings. The Johannesburg Central (Diepkloof) ACCU consisted of approximately 179 operational members and 21 stations, and the East Rand (Springs) unit consisted of approximately 230 operational members and 24 stations. Despite the increase in workload, the unit members were still coping with their daily tasks. Members in these two ACCUs (Johannesburg and East Rand) said that although staff numbers were low they were able to cope with the workload, which included dealing effectively with protest gatherings and demonstrations. In 2006, with the sporadic protests in Khutsong10, which are still ongoing, and the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) wage strike, it became clear that the units were short of staff, but the problem was overcome by drawing in additional staff from other units. ACCU members also stated during interviews that they were able to cope effectively with the management of sporting and other events. However, despite this positive assessment they believed that increasing the number of staff in the units would make their job easier as they were short-staffed and needed the assistance of members from other units. In October 2006, the restructuring of the SAPS had just been implemented at the Johannesburg Central unit. At this stage, the SAPS area offices had already been closed down, over half the ACCU members had been redeployed to police station, and the seven original ACCU units had been collapsed into three units which, as described earlier, had been renamed as Crime Combating Units. There were 614 specialised crowd management members remaining in the three Crime Combating Units in Gauteng. The Johannesburg unit, based in Diepkloof, and incorporating the former West Rand and Soweto ACCUs, had a total of 225 operational members, while the East Rand unit, based in Springs, incorporated the former Vaal Rand and North Rand ACCUs and consisted of 197 operational members. As mentioned in the previous chapter, for some crowd control situations, members of the CCUs are now working in ‘sections’ as opposed to the larger platoons. Thus if a unit is deployed to control a gathering of 2 000 people, the ratio of CCU members to participants is 10 to 2 000, as opposed to the 38 to 2 000 ratio which was the case under the ACCUs when an entire platoon would be deployed for a crowd of the same size. The CCU members interviewed expressed the concern that a large spontaneous crowd control incident could lead to a fatality; some said that Bilkis Omar 43 a tragic event would make the national department realise that the restructuring of the CCUs was a mistake. As author Piet Pieters (2007:2) put it: ‘When discussing police capacity there is one vital question to keep in mind: are we capable of managing a long-term crisis situation of national scope, without hampering basic police service?’ Training On joining a crowd management unit, a member is obliged to attend a three-week formal training course. The course consists of Platoon Members Training (PMT – previously known as ‘POP Entry Level’) and Platoon Commander Training (PCT), which is a course for commanders, i.e. captain and higher. The more advanced operational courses include First Line Operational Manager (FLOM) courses 1,2 and 3, and Operational Commanders Training (OCT). These courses are held at the SAPS training centres at Verdrag, Jakkaldans, Maleeuskop, Grobelaarsdaal, Thabazimbi, Grootvlei, and Rooiberg. The courses last two to three weeks, and consist of both theoretical and practical work. They cover a rigorous programme that includes physical training, classroom work, and practical simulations of the theoretical work. Shooting practice also forms part of the crowd management training. As crime combating is also part of the CCU members’ functions, they periodically attend courses that are provided on an ongoing basis. These range from street survival to house penetration and weapons handling. Thus far all members of the Johannesburg and East Rand CCUs have been trained in the relevant crowd management skills. Many have also attended updating courses. In-service training Achieving change is difficult, but maintaining change and empowering employees to use new techniques or skills is impossible without a mechanism for continual reinforcement. Formal in-service training provides a way to maintain momentum and to build new skills (Sloan et al nd). According to a SAPS document (SAPS 2004:8), ‘Training policy, standards, and the presentation of national coordinated training [is] the responsibility 44 A review of public order policing capacity of the Operational Response Service: training and development section at national level. Decentralised in-service training [is] the responsibility of the Operational Response Services (ORS) training coordinator at provincial level’. The document11 stipulates that every unit must have dedicated trainers responsible for coordination of all in-service training at unit level. Trainers must allocate to each operational member a file listing all training needs and training received, and this must be updated and maintained by the trainer. In addition the document states that ‘the level of in-service training must be maintained by ensuring that there are an adequate number of well trained instructors to ensure the same standard of training is received by all ACCU members’ (SAPS 2004:8). Prior to the 2006 restructuring, the Johannesburg and East Rand ACCUs had four and nine trainers respectively. After the restructuring, some of the training capacity was lost to stations and other training components for crime combating and the training of reservists for support roles at crime scenes. The ‘establishment document’ does not specify how many in-service training sessions members should attend each month. This is a noteworthy omission as the number of courses attended provides an opportunity to measure and assess staff. A SAPS circular (SAPS 1997:2) exists that stipulates that in-service training be done ‘at least one day per month, for each member of a platoon’. Whether outdated or not, this appears to be the only document prescribing the amount of in-service training, and the frequency seems reasonable enough. Trainers interviewed concurred with this requirement and advised the following: • Shooting – one session a month for half a day • Crowd management – one session a month for one day including practical work. • Tactical – one session a month for one day including practical work Judging from the responses to interview questions, in-service training in the Johannesburg CCU was not a main priority, either before the restructuring or after. For the East Rand unit, in-service training had been undertaken as often as possible before the restructuring, but after the restructuring it slackened slightly. The reason for the decline was not because in-service Bilkis Omar 45 training was no longer seen as important or necessary for members, trainers, and managers, but because the training had diminished in importance relative to all the other tasks that members had to attend to. In other words, in-service training has become less of a priority because the CCUs are overstretched. The mandate of the CCUs is both crowd management and crime combating, but the shortage of manpower and resources, the increase in the number of marches, the utilisation of members in the various task teams and for special duties, the deployment of members to stations as part of SAPS crime prevention operations (like Operation Trio), and the great distances that some members now have to travel to get to work, have all taken their toll on in-service training. Whether carried out or not, reporting on in-service training is done via the SAPS reporting chain. Trainers submit reports on members’ performance to the unit commander. This is then directed to the provincial head of the Operational Response Services (ORS), and then submitted to the National Division of Operational Response Services. If issues need addressing, the divisional commissioner of Operational Response Services must appoint officers to address the concerns. Evaluations of in-service training at units are carried out by the Specialised Skills Development component of the ORS division. Their officers visit the units, perform an audit of members’ training files, submit a report to the component head, and then submit a report to the divisional commissioner. In 2006 an evaluation of in-service training was conducted at all the units in Gauteng (SAPS 2006). It was found that in-service training was being conducted in the East Rand unit, but that the Johannesburg unit, despite having planned a programme, was not doing training because they had so many crowd management events to attend to. Both units were found to have good record-keeping systems. The report (SAPS 2006) for the province recommended that: • All trainers undergo refresher courses pertaining to training • Unit commanders should deploy members in such a way that this does not compromise their training • A workshop be held to address training administration, record-keeping and standardising of the filing system • Platoon and company commanders also be compelled to attend in- service training 46 A review of public order policing capacity The outcome of these recommendations is unknown. Currently the ORS division has no mandate to carry out any of its functions because it is awaiting finalisation of its own organisational structure in terms of the 2006 restructuring of the SAPS. It is hoped that the recommendations are taken up once the formalities are sorted out. Additional training Most CCU members indicated that they would like more training in crowd management and crime combating. With regard to the latter they wanted courses in tracking, house penetration, reaction, drug identification, and shooting. Many members said that they needed more regular shooting training and noted that the level of skills was poor – even some of the older members could not use 9mm pistols, shotguns or R5 rifles. Fitness and age of members Another concern raised during the research was the poor fitness level of members. There is currently no mandatory physical training even and it is essential that a specialist unit maintains its standards by ensuring that members do regular physical training. Some individuals seem to be unwilling to train, although it was evident that other members were doing physical training on their own initiative and at their own expense. During interviews many CCU members mentioned that they would like to do physical training at the units. A Johannesburg member stated, ‘In 1996/7 I used to train in the mornings. This stopped because of the workload and the change of instructor. There is no concentration on physical fitness at the unit; it increases one’s lifespan and de-stresses a person’. A directive has now been sent from the provincial office for units to begin fitness training. Another concern is the age of members. At the time of restructuring a rumour was circulating that those above the age of 35 years were to be re- deployed to stations. Managers who were questioned were unsure about the source of this rumour. However, interviews revealed that many members (even the younger ones) felt that age was not a factor and that experience and fitness were more important. Members did, however, feel that the units should employ younger recruits who could be mentored by the older members. Trainers said that they preferred working with younger members because ‘they offer a better service and are less prone to injuries’. Bilkis Omar 47 Currently, the Johannesburg metro police, in their drive to recruit officers for 2010, have indicated that applicants must ‘bring along running shoes, track suits…’ to be tested for physical fitness (Minnaar 2007: 1). Equipment for public order policing Members of the CCUs have to adhere to the Regulation of Gatherings Act in the management of gatherings and demonstrations. One implication of this is that they have to ensure that ‘minimum’ force is used. This is accomplished by the use of specialised equipment and weapons that minimise the risk of injury or death. The objective is to ensure that violence is prevented or kept at a minimum. According to SAPS Standing Order 262 (p9), the following are prohibited or restricted during crowd management operations: • The use of 37mm stoppers is prohibited • The use of firearms and sharp ammunition, including birdshot and buckshot is prohibited • The use of rubber bullets and shotgun batons is restricted – these may only be used to disperse a crowd in extreme circumstances, if less forceful methods prove to be ineffectual or restricted South African Police Service members use the following equipment for public order policing: • Helmets • Shields • Tonfa (rubber batons) • Body armour • Pepper spray • Stun grenades • Gas masks • 12-gauge shotguns • Baton or rubber rounds • Vehicles • Nyalas (police armoured vehicle which seats 10 members) • Water cannons Full body armour in South Africa includes helmets, shields, and bulletproof vests. Police in other countries ‘use body armour…to protect vulnerable 48 A review of public order policing capacity parts not usually protected by standard military body armour; they include knee, shin, forearm, groin, thigh, and shoulder guards’ (Riot Control Equipment:4). Helmets with visors are used to protect members’ eyes from liquids and other objects. Helmets with grids offer less protection, and they can be gripped and used to forcibly shake the wearer. Both the visor and grid helmets are currently used by CCU members, although the general preference amongst members and trainers is for the helmets with visors. The drawback of the helmets with visors is that they are ineffective if not maintained. A new design of helmet has been procured by the SAPS, which according to a trainer, includes a knob that is harmful to the wearer’s head. Shields offer frontal body protection, however the shin area and below is protected only if the member is in a crouching position. Shields are also used as psychological tools to intimidate demonstrators, by repeatedly beating on them with tonfas. Members and trainers have said that the shields they use are rough at the edges and tend to cause lacerations to the hands. Members have also criticised the poor quality of boots issued and have stated a preference for the Magnum or Black Hawk Rebel boots. Trainers interviewed agreed with this point. The armoured vehicles (Nyalas) at both units are in a poor mechanical condition. The tyres are unsuitable and dangerous according to a trainer, and all the Nyalas in the units require full mechanical servicing. Managers of the units as well as more senior managers at national level have also agreed with this assessment. Interviews at the Johannesburg unit in 2006 ascertained that the vehicles at the unit were old, with high mileages, and that they were constantly breaking down. At the East Rand unit in 2007, it was found that the old vehicles at all units had been replaced with new 4x4 vehicles and bakkies.12 However, despite the replacement of the old vehicles, these units, according to management, are still facing a shortage of vehicles. Besides the above shortcomings, both the East Rand and Johannesburg units currently have sufficient public order equipment, i.e. helmets, shields, and tonfas. Subsequent to our interviews, we learned that new Nyalas and other equipment such as water cannons have been requisitioned for all CCUs in preparation for the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Schutte 2007). Bilkis Omar 49 Other equipment Among the equipment that has proven to be effective internationally while inflicting minimal injury are dyes added into water cannons, net-guns, and foam. However, some equipment deemed to be non-lethal can be fatal. In Boston USA, police killed a woman with a pepper ball gun at a baseball game that turned riotous. Apparently police did have ‘alternative crowd control measures that they could have used’ (Olsen 2004). The lesson here is that caution must be used in procuring new equipment and the requisite training must be undertaken. The best equipment can be ineffective if not maintained. While there are no actual figures available for equipment that is damaged and requires replacing, this was highlighted during the research as an issue needing attention by CCU managers and trainers. The general impression among CCU members regarding crowd control equipment is that the minimal, most essential, and most economical equipment has been issued. Thus far this seems to suffice. Recommendations During the research, the following recommendations were made with regard to improving the capacity to perform public order policing: Policy and legislation • As noted above, the challenges resulting from the Regulation of Gatherings Act suggest that the 14-year old legislation should be amended to reflect the experience gathered and the practice that has since emerged. In-service training • In-service training is vital for ensuring a consistent improvement in service level for the units. Lack of in-service training weakens the specialist capacity of the CCUs, and can even result in fatalities if members are not able to react appropriately in dire circumstances. This problem could be overcome through the allocation of dedicated funds 50 A review of public order policing capacity for CCU training in the provincial budget, as this would force managers to utilise the money, and ensure that training is done. • When officers from the Specialised Skills Development component at Operational Response Services undertake evaluations of in-service training at crowd management units, the audits should reflect the frequency of training. • After receiving reports on the in-service training, the ORS divisional commissioner should appoint officers to address the concerns. This does not seem to have been done, as in-service training has been neglected for quite some time. It may be that other divisions are prioritising tasks that run parallel to in-service training schedules, for example, crime combating operations. If so, the divisional commissioner should address this. • The SAPS training is facilitated at two SAPS national divisions: the Training division and the Operational Response Services division. A delineation of the tasks at the divisions is required to prevent duplication of functions and a clash of interests. While the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that there is in-service training for the units lies with the provincial head of the Operational Response Services and the provincial commissioner, many directives have over the years been issued from national divisions that have impacted on the units’ functioning, particularly those related to the 2001 and 2006 restructurings. The matter is a national issue and needs to be addressed at a more strategic level than at the provincial offices or the unit level. Instead of simply imposing more changes, the provincial and national offices should actively engage in talks amongst themselves before agreement on any further changes is reached. Equipment • The SAPS should consider investing in additional equipment such as knee, shin, forearm, groin, thigh, and shoulder guards, to offer greater protection for members. • When procuring new equipment for members, the SAPS procurement and training divisions should have the equipment tested before issuing it to members. This testing should be standard procedure for the training division. A system to test equipment must be put in place. Bilkis Omar 51 • While the development of quality standards for equipment is advised so that defective equipment can be replaced, maintenance of equipment by members is also essential. • If the nature and intensity of gatherings increases, the SAPS will have to consider more appropriate equipment than is currently being utilised by members. Physical fitness • At recruitment stage members have to be informed that physical fitness assessments will be conducted and that fitness will be a priority for the job, even to the extent that members’ employment contracts stipulate this after they exit from training college. • One method of getting members to do physical training is to increase shifts by one hour and to insist that members do at least one hour’s training daily. A system of rewarding members or providing members who have achieved weight loss goals with incentives should be devised. • Annual performance appraisals should be conducted on fitness, training and performance. Once a member performs poorly, he or she could be de-merited and re-deployed to an administrative function. CHAPTER 6 THE ROLE OF METRO POLICE AND SAPS VISIBLE POLICE IN CROWD MANAGEMENT The case of the Ekuruhleni Metro Police Department Background The Ekuruhleni Metro Police Department (EMPD), established in February 2002, is divided into three regions (northern, eastern and southern). Each region is in turn made up of ten precincts. The department has a staff component of 457 serving a population of 2.4 million people, giving a ratio of one police officer to every 5 252 people (Newham 2006:2). The department’s mandate includes securing municipal property, municipal bylaw enforcement, traffic law enforcement, and crime prevention. The mandate does not extend to conducting criminal investigations or detaining suspects – these functions are the responsibility of the SAPS. The crime prevention component consists of the following specialised service units: Freeway Unit, K9 Unit, Intervention Unit, CLU-Information Gathering, Equestrian Unit, Oliver Tambo International Airport, and Public Order Policing Unit. To qualify to be an officer in the metro police department, applicants must have a matriculation certificate and a driver’s licence. Officers undergo a six-month training programme in traffic law and crime prevention. With the inclusion of the SAPS training qualification that is being planned, the training curriculum will be extended to one year (Naidoo 2007). Establishment of EMPD’s public order unit Metro police officers (mainly those responsible for traffic policing) are very often the first to encounter crowd management incidents, including those that have the potential to turn violent (Ally 2006a). As first respondents, EMPD officers were often not aware of crowd management procedures, and at times did not follow correct procedures. Because of this, a directive to train metro police officers in crowd management was issued by the National Commissioner of the SAPS in 2005. 54 A review of public order policing capacity In January 2006, the Public Order Police (POP) unit of the Ekuruhleni Metro Police Department was established, consisting of 38 committed EMPD officers (Abbot 2007). The activities of these officers are governed by the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205, as well as the SAPS Act 68 of 1995 (Amendment 64 of 2000). Given the recent establishment of such public order units within metro police departments, and the potentially prominent role that metro officers play in crowd management, it was decided that the ISS research project should also briefly review their functioning. A questionnaire, similar to the one used for the CCUs, was developed. Questions regarding officers’ compliance and adherence to the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA) were asked. Responses from officers illustrated that the officers did understand the RGA: ‘Public order policing is about meeting the objectives of Act 205 regarding the rights of people’ ‘Democracy gives people rights, they are frustrated with service delivery issues, and SA is hosting the 2010 world cup, to monitor and manage gatherings within the framework’ ‘To protect public and property in case of public violence, not harass people when on strike’ ‘We adhere to the law even if the march is unlawful because marchers have the right to strike’ Asked whether they believed their training was sufficient to enable them to do their job, the EMPD officers noted that more training on the Regulation of Gatherings Act and joint training with the SAPS was necessary. One officer said that they needed revision courses on the provisions of the Act because, due to overwork, they had received no in-service training on the subject. Challenges related to training The initiative to train the metro officers began in 2005 with eight EMPD trainers being trained by the SAPS in crowd management (Abbot 2007). The EMPD training division currently has eight qualified trainers. Four concentrate on tactical training, and the other four focus on ‘soft’ skills, i.e. theory, accidents, and notices. The training division is responsible for training of in-service trainers, new recruits at colleges, crowd management training, special weapons and tactics (SWAT), law enforcement, traffic enforcement, and shooting. Bilkis Omar 55 Thus far, approximately 65 EMPD officers have been trained in crowd management. These officers have also completed the Platoon Members Training (PMT) course of the SAPS, which includes theory and practical training. Such specialist capability has to be maintained to be effective, which means regular in-service training as well as working together as a unit. It appears that this is taking place: ‘The EMPD POP unit does not have a fixed in-service training schedule, but in-service training does take place every two weeks’ (Naidoo 2007). Responses from officers about the in-service training schedule and its frequency could not, however, confirm this. Some officers stated that they did in-service training twice a month, while a few stated that it happened every two months. One officer said that there was no in-service training at all, and that they only did ‘demonstrations for guests’. These findings suggest that in-service training is not a priority for the POP unit. This was confirmed by one of the trainers who said, ‘On paper, training is scheduled for every Wednesday…the officers are very motivated, but there is no time for training because the needs in the field take precedence’ (Abbot 2007). Metro precinct officers (i.e. those that are not part of the POP unit) are also being provided with crowd management training by the EMPD trainers, even though there is already a fully committed POP platoon. The rationale is that all metro officers should be able to deal with any type of situation, especially one that has the potential to turn violent, whether this amounts to an angry crowd demanding justice for a criminal act, or spontaneous strike action. Metro precinct officers are usually first on the scene and therefore require the appropriate training. Precinct officers have at times proved to be overly zealous in controlling crowds. An EMPD public order officer said: Precinct officers who are not trained in crowd management and who arrive at the incident first, panic and shoot, and the crowds become uncontrollable. They don’t act within the framework of crowd management. The training of metro precinct officers is therefore well timed and appropriate, even if only to ensure that restraint is practised. It is vital that in-service training also be maintained to supplement the formal training. 56 A review of public order policing capacity A pressing issue that emerged from this study is the absence of a mechanism or process to enable the SAPS to assess the training of metro officers. The SAPS national training division responsible for the initial training of metro officers does not perform quality assurance on its training. Reports on officers’ training are submitted by the trainers to the director of training, as well as to the three regional directors of the EMPD policing areas. But there are no unit standards and no principles for maintaining the training of the EMPDs (Naidoo 2007). EMPD relationship with the CCUs The absence of a training assessment mechanism noted above points to more serious issues – the compliance or non-compliance of metro officers with procedures for crowd management, and the resultant impact on their relationship with the specialist Crowd Control Unit (CCU) members. Most EMPD officers regarded their relationship with CCUs as ‘good’, and confirmed that ‘the CCUs know and comply with the requirements of the RGA’. However some EMPD officers said that CCU members were ‘too soft’, ‘lenient’, ‘have fear of marchers’, and that ‘they use different steps to calm the crowd’, or ‘they don’t give instructions to use force’. Interviews with CCU members provided a different perspective. They described their relationship with metro officers as generally ‘not good’. They maintained that metro officers did not always comply with the Regulations of Gatherings Act and the procedures it stipulates. Some of the violations referred to were as follows: ‘They don’t negotiate with the crowds’ ‘They use maximum force’ ‘They are quick to shoot at the crowds’ ‘They use live ammunition’ ‘They are trigger-happy’ ‘They don’t respect the marchers’ rights to march and are not tolerant of marchers’ ‘They need re-training’ With respect to their relationship with the CCUs, concerns were that: ‘their commands are unlike those used by CCUs’, and that ‘they don’t respect the fact that CCUs are in overall command at a scene’. These perceptions Bilkis Omar 57 suggest that whatever training the EMPD officers have received has not been sufficient. The problem has been exacerbated by the at times provocative and disrespectful behaviour of EMPD officers as stated above. Not all CCU members said that their relationship with ‘metro officers’ was poor, although these positive views were not expressed in relation to the EMPD. The Vaal Rand CCU was incorporated into the Springs unit as part of the SAPS restructuring in 2006. The Vaal region does not have a metro police department, but instead has a Traffic Department. Former Vaal Rand CCU members’ regarded their experience with the Vaal traffic police as positive. In general, the CCU members’ opinions of EMPD’s capacity for public order policing gives cause for concern. There is no escaping the impression that EMPD officers have at times been remiss in applying the law when performing crowd management duties. When questioned, the officers appeared to know the procedure to follow in operations. They said that they first analyse the situation and then negotiate with the crowds. If the situation worsens, they give the crowd a warning and ask them to disperse. If the crowd becomes violent they use tonfas, and if the crowd throws stones, they use shields to block. If the crowd becomes uncontrollable, officers said they would fire rubber bullets, aimed to ricochet at a 45-degree angle. Officers did mention that they had had to fire bullets in many instances. They also said that they would only fire live rounds if their lives were in danger. These responses indicate that EMPD public order members are aware of the law and of their role in crowd management. Further questioning of the POP officers elicited responses to the effect that it is not the public order officers of the EMPD who are in violation of the RGA, but rather the precinct officers who have been over zealous. Command and control challenges When metro police officers and SAPS members do have to work together, it is vital to ensure a clear line of command. According to the powers and authority vested in SAPS officials through legislation such as the SAPS Act and the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, the police must have overall command in all criminal cases (Day 2007a). This includes crowd management, when police actions may result in a criminal charge or some form of civil liability (Day 2007a). 58 A review of public order policing capacity While most metro officers accepted that SAPS CCUs are in overall command at an incident, it was disturbing to note that according to one metro inspector: ‘CCUs are in charge unless it’s a junior officer, then the metro senior officer is in charge. If the Chief [of the EMPD] is at an event, he takes overall command, even over SAPS’. Misunderstandings of this sort during an incident can cause confusion, and a wrong command can be fatal. According to the SAPS Act, crowd management is not the function of metro police: their functions are limited to traffic regulation, by-law enforcement and crime prevention. There is thus no legal mandate for the metro police to undertake crowd control unless they are assisting the SAPS CCUs (Day 2007a). In any case, metro officers have not been trained as First Line Operational Managers (FLOM) or in Operational Commanders Training (OCT) (Day 2007a). As a consequence, metro officers cannot assume operational responsibility in a situation that requires the controlling of crowds. They do not have a legal mandate to act alone or to assume command at a mass gathering. Yet despite this clear legal imperative, there appears to be confusion in the EMPD with regard to what to do if the SAPS officer holds a junior rank to the most senior EMPD officer present. Capacity and equipment constraints Capacity Metro officers indicated that the number of trained crowd management officers in the EMPD is not sufficient for the size of the Ekurhuleni area which consists of nine municipalities amalgamated into one. One member estimated that the southern region alone consists of a population of one million people. With the current number of POP officers this would amount to only ten to 11 POP officers per region. Other reasons given for the need for more members were the upcoming national elections, political problems in the area, and the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The fitness levels of officers seems to vary. Some officers said they do physical training a few times a week during work hours, while others said there is no physical training. The age of officers is also a capacity issue. Many officers said that 40 years should be the cut-off age for POP officers. They stated that older officers should be used for negotiations and to groom younger officers. On the other Bilkis Omar 59 hand, some officers indicated that the older officers were experienced and fit despite their age. Equipment Metro public order officers use specialised equipment such as shields, helmets, tonfas, pepper spray, stun grenades and shin guards to carry out their functions. The leg or shin guards are additional items that regular SAPS members do not have. Metro POP officers are not equipped with bulletproof vests, although measurements for these have been taken in the past. One officer stated that ‘you have to hope and pray that you don’t get shot’. The EMPD has three Nyalas, but these are old and in need of frequent servicing. Other vehicles include a water cannon and ordinary vans that can carry two to three members per vehicle. Officers have stated that they need trailers in which to store equipment to prevent scratching of helmets and shields. Metro officers are issued with a 9mm pistol as a personal sidearm. They are also issued with 12-guage shotguns or pump guns and 12-gauge Strykers with six and 12 round magazine capacity for crowd control purposes. The ammunition provided for the 12-gauge firearms are the blue baton rounds for outdoor shooting and the peach baton rounds for indoor use. Other challenges An issue that emerged during the research relates to concerns about the additional fees paid to metro departments for services rendered at events. When a sporting or musical event is hosted and metro police officers are required to provide traffic services, the event organisers are required to pay the metro departments directly. There are different views about this requirement. One argument in favour of payment is the exorbitant cost to local councils of maintaining the metro police departments. Others contend that metro police, like the SAPS, should be regarded as essential services and should not be paid the additional fees. The role of SAPS Visible Police in crowd management SAPS Visible Police (VISPOL) are based at police stations and tasked with crime prevention duties. Their role in crowd management events is to 60 A review of public order policing capacity prevent crime and gather intelligence by patrolling the area, speaking with police informers, and ensuring the safety of both participants and non- participants. Since 2006, VISPOL members have received training in crowd management in order to prepare them for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and to provide assistance to CCU members. Station members will now be tasked to manage level one and two marches and gatherings, i.e. medium to low risk marches (Ally 2006b). VISPOL members will also, once training is completed, be equipped with crowd management gear and will undergo maintenance training every three months (Ally 2006b). The performance of VISPOL members in gatherings thus far has not been very positive. While many East Rand and Johannesburg CCU members said that VISPOL members had assisted them at gatherings, just as many CCU members said that VISPOL members had left the scene when the CCU arrived, and had not even carried out their crime prevention functions. CCU members further stated that VISPOL members lacked discipline, and were envious of the CCUs’ status as a specialist component. The EMPD members’ relationship with VISPOL members was similar. While some EMPD officers said the relationship was good, others stated that there was professional jealousy because metro officers also performed crime prevention functions. They also said that VISPOL members expected them to concentrate only on traffic law enforcement. CCU members also stated that VISPOL members did not know the procedures for crowd management. This is understandable given that VISPOL members were not, until recently, trained in crowd management. In this regard, the new initiative to train VISPOL members in crowd management is laudable. It will, however, be important to monitor how this function fits into the priorities of station commissioners; crime prevention operations and the containment of crime are sure to take preference. Conclusion and recommendations The establishment of public order units within metro police departments is sensible and beneficial. Not only do these officers supplement SAPS CCUs, but they also acquire vital knowledge and skills that allow them to respond appropriately to situations. The challenge lies in the establishment and maintenance of a cooperative working relationship between metro police Bilkis Omar 61 and the SAPS CCUs. While the Policing Co-ordinating Committees, the National Forum for Municipal Police Services, and joint crime combating operations involving the SAPS and the metro police have ‘resulted in generally improved relationships’ (Newham 2006:4), responses elicited from this research show that the relationship needs to be carefully fostered. The views of EMPD officers about the CCUs’ approach to managing public gatherings is worrying. CCU members have shed a long history of brutality and repression in public order policing. Changing organisational attitudes was a great challenge that took several years and required much training. These changes have borne fruit in the way in which the CCU members conduct themselves at gatherings and demonstrations. Their more restrained and professional behaviour should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness or cowardice. With regard to the role of SAPS visible police members, it is not clear whether the training of VISPOL members in crowd management will be a sustainable activity. If in-service training is not undertaken, the initiative is sure to fail. Maintaining in-service training once every three months, even for a full week each time, does not seem adequate, given that crowd management is a newly acquired skill. The following recommendations have been drawn from the research: • The metro police’s responsibility for crime prevention should be clarified. It is a wide and undefined term that leads to various interpretations and allows metro police to read functions into it (such as public order policing) that are not supported by other legislation. • The confusion among EMPD officers regarding which police officers assume command over a mass gathering should be addressed in training. The ill-feelings that CCU members have for metro police officers stem mainly from the fact that the metro officers do not always adhere to command and control procedures. The development of standards is also therefore essential. • The over-zealousness of EMPD precinct officers at crowd management incidents must be addressed urgently at management level as well as in training. In this regard, a recent meeting between the SAPS provincial head of operational response services, the heads of the CCUs and EMPDs to resolve the issue, is to be welcomed. The signing of a memorandum of understanding or a similar working document 62 A review of public order policing capacity between the EMPD and SAPS may help to ensure regulation of issues and challenges. • The absence of a mechanism to assess the training of metro police in crowd control is a matter of concern and should be taken up by both SAPS and the EMPD. In a related issue, EMPD management should ensure that schedules for in-service training are adhered to, and the SAPS training division should follow up on this. • The lack of bulletproof vests for EMPD POP officers is of concern and ought to be addressed. • SAPS VISPOL members need more regular refresher courses on crowd control to improve their performance and working relationship with CCU members. The SAPS Training Division at national level should ensure that regular assessments are done to ensure compliance. CHAPTER 7 PUBLIC ORDER POLICING AND THE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP The South African Police Service has a good track record for providing security at major international events. According to the deputy national Commissioner, Andre Pruis, ‘The security blueprint employed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development is being employed at all United Nations events’ (The Star 28 June 2006). The SAPS demonstrated its ability to provide security at the Rugby World Cup in 1995, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, and the Cricket World Cup in 2003. The 2010 FIFA World Cup will be the country’s most important test. Given the undeniably high levels of violent crime in the country and in particular the recent increases in armed robbery and murder (Burger 2007), the SAPS and government in general face a major challenge in both allaying negative perceptions around the FIFA World Cup, and ensuring the safety of those visiting the country in 2010. The SAPS will need a comprehensive strategy to cope with the expected increase in crime during the World Cup, while simultaneously attending to already high levels of crime, and the management of other public events. Considering that the World Cup is an opportunity for organisations to gain international publicity for various political purposes, the number of public demonstrations is likely to increase during the event. In addition to the high crime rate, the police will also have to deal with the phenomenon of soccer hooliganism. According to the Minister of Finance, Jabu Moleketi, ‘The SAPS is working together with the International Police (Interpol) to ensure that hooliganism will not ruin the soccer spectacular. The names of hooligans are recorded on a database and these people will be prevented from entering South Africa’ (Moleketi 2007). Internationally, the existence of the ‘database’ has become contentious because the process of determining who is a hooligan and who is not may infringe on civil liberties and human rights: The high turnover of ‘personnel’ in the hooligan firms (groups) hampers work to compile profiles on suspects, some members will 64 A review of public order policing capacity only attend a few high-profile games over a number of seasons and others will ‘retire’. At the other end of the scale the [United Kingdom] Home Office expressed concern about a ‘new generation’ of young hooligans that are as yet unknown to them…and there is substantial evidence that innocent fans have consistently fallen foul of mass arrests and deportations, particularly in Euro 2000, where only one of the 965 arrested was even charged with an offence (Stott & Pearson nd:6). Football hooliganism, whether spontaneous or socially organised, almost invariably culminates in violence. The victims may be players, soccer officials, fans or the police; the location may be stadiums, bars, clubs, shopping centres, or even different countries. According to Spaaij (nd:1) ‘trans-national dissimilarities complicate the conceptualisation of football hooliganism’. The SAPS will require the assistance and advice of a range of foreign agencies experienced in dealing with this complex phenomenon. In preparation for the 2006 World Cup in Germany, the German police introduced regulations banning hooligans from entering stadiums. Some 7 000 of the world’s 10 000 identified soccer hooligans were ranked as ‘most dangerous’ (Tshehla 2006:5). Those banned from stadiums were informed personally about the restriction and had to present themselves for registration at police stations twice a day for the duration of the World Cup so that their movements could be monitored and they could not leave their home cities (Tshehla 2006:10). Unfortunately, while these regulations could be enforced in Germany, they could not be applied to other European Union (EU) countries (Tshehla 2006:5). The SAPS will have to explore other dynamics associated with the phenomenon of soccer hooliganism, including police behaviour. Spaaij (nd:2) contends that ‘even if self declared hooligans are committed to the use of violence, their behaviour is more often triggered by more spontaneous elements, for instance aggressive policing or an unfortunate match result’. In addition, ‘the important issue to arise from…different but related bodies of research is that public order police tactics, fan/police interactions and crowd dynamics appear to play a very important role in determining the levels of "disorder" that occur in the context of international football tournaments’ (Stott & Pearson nd). This means that the SAPS will have to be especially aware of crowd–police dynamics when dealing with soccer fans. The CCU members are well placed to deal with this, given the training and reorganisation they have Bilkis Omar 65 undergone since 1994. However, the behaviour of other policing agencies like metro police, private security and SAPS VISPOL has to be refined if they are to address these factors. Stott and Pearson (nd), in addition to other international researchers, have suggested that: ‘low profile’ information-led policing (where officers interact with soccer fans in a friendly manner, on the basis on fans’ actual behaviour rather than their reputation), is the most effective at minimising major incidents of ‘disorder’ among ‘high risk’ fans. Internationally, there is agreement about the potential success of several measures in curbing soccer hooliganism. According to Spaaij (nd:3) these are: the segregation of ‘home’ and ‘away’ fans, fencing, closed circuit television (CCTV), conversion to all-seater stadiums, identity card schemes, and intelligence gathering. It should be noted that hooliganism is not confined to sports stadiums, so policing of the problem needs to be extended to other venues. A number of studies deal specifically with crowd management of hooligans. Special training is essential, and it would be valuable if CCU trainers and officers were sent abroad to learn more about dealing with the problem. This would be beneficial considering that Spaaij (nd:1) states that although international structures and concerted responses are required, prevention strategies should ultimately be based on local practices and designed to fit local needs. Structures governing 2010 security in SA Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is the world body governing international football. The South African Football Association (SAFA) is the governing body of local soccer. The Premier Soccer League (PSL), consisting of the soccer clubs in the country, is affiliated to SAFA which is in turn affiliated to the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF), the body governing African football on the continent, and CAF is affiliated to FIFA. FIFA safety guidelines prescribe safety measures that match organisers, associations and clubs must take to prevent spectator riots and to ensure safety and order within the confines and vicinity of stadiums for the World Cup (FIFA 2004:5). When South Africa was awarded the hosting of the 2010 event, plans had to be put in place to ensure that all FIFA requirements 66 A review of public order policing capacity would be met. Apart from infrastructure development, security was the most pressing issue. From the SAPS side, the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) Priority Committee was formed to deal with security. The committee falls under the auspices of the National JOINTS Committee, which reports to the Justice Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster and/or the National Security Council Director Generals Committee, which falls under the National Security Council at ministerial level. The NATJOINTS Priority Committee faces a mammoth task and has to prove to the world that South Africa can manage the World Cup. Standards for safety and security had to be put in place by all those involved: the SAPS, South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Johannesburg Metro Police Department (JMPD), and Ekurhuleni Metro Police Department (EMPD). Regarding the JOINTS and LOC Security Directorate’s roles in the operational plan for the World Cup, a clear distinction is made between the national security plan and the event safety plans. JOINTS will take responsibility for the national security plan while the LOC will be responsible for event security (Groenewald 2007). The National JOINTS Priority Committee was replaced by the NATJOINTS Planning Committee, which, with the backing of a planning support team, was to give operational effect to overall safety and security (Groenewald 2007). The NATJOINTS Planning Committee was to work in close consultation with the Local Organising Committee (LOC) Security Directorate, tasked to deal solely with the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Groenewald 2007). However, according to Phasha (2007), ‘The committee met for three to four months, but once again there was no consistency in the attendance of meetings and no follow up on agreements, and the committee fell away’. The Local Organising Committee has also been concentrating on the development of the Safety at Sports and Recreation Bill. The Bill was poorly received in many sectors with commentators raising concerns about the seemingly impossible requirements. According to Phasha (2007) ‘The Bill was confusing in terms of the reporting structure and going above the Local Government Act and the SAPS Act. The consultation process of the Bill was Bilkis Omar 67 flawed, there were no public hearings, the sports ministry was pushing for a response and said that FIFA wanted the Bill. In addition because of the "afro pessimism" in Europe, the Bill was being touted at all corners’. After being returned from the Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security and Cabinet for review, a new draft was submitted to Cabinet and approved. At the time of writing it was in the process of being promulgated. Despite these extensive efforts, there is still cause for concern about the security of the FIFA World Cup given that roleplayers’ commitment to the committees appears to have been minimal. What will be expected of the SAPS To be operationally ready for the FIFA World Cup, the SAPS has to comply with FIFA minimum standards, the Host City Agreement, and the Organising Association Agreement or the Bid Document (Groenewald 2007). The SAPS security plan comprises seven phases: the current phase being the Run-Up Phase, which ends in mid-June 2009. The subsequent phases are (Groenewald 2007): • Confederation Cup (17-24 June 2009) • Pre-tournament phase (July 2009-June 2010) • Opening ceremony (June 2010) • Tournament phase (11 June-11 July 2010) • Final and closing ceremony (July 2010) • Post world cup phase (debriefing) Given the different roles and functions of the various policing agencies in South Africa, more clarity is needed regarding the division of labour for the World Cup. A decision was taken by the JOINTS and LOC (Security Directorate) committees that 80 per cent of the responsibility for policing the main pavilion and the inner perimeter of the stadium will be done by private security companies and the remaining 20 per cent will be undertaken by law enforcement agencies (CCUs). Law enforcement agencies will take 80 per cent responsibility for the outer and city perimeters. SAPS VISPOL members will perform crime prevention duties on roads and areas surrounding the stadium. Metro police have been tasked to conduct traffic control outside stadiums. Uniformed and plainclothes police members will be stationed at strategic points and locations to police crowds outside stadiums. State-of-the-art 68 A review of public order policing capacity mobile command vehicles and helicopters, capable of transmitting live video footage to police commanders on the ground, will be used to police the event. The allocation of tasks between police and private security companies has not been well received by CCU members, particularly the decision that the CCUs will not be fully in charge of spectator areas. This is not surprising given the CCU’s expertise in crowd management and the private security companies’ lack of experience in this area. It is unclear if the decision was based on FIFA rules or those of SAPS management following the practice of the 2006 German Soccer World Cup and current practice in England: England has a highly trained security staff to deal with low levels of incivility, and for the more serious problems the police step in. In England matches are heavily micro-managed by stewards. Policing has to be…sensible (Williams 2007). There is a general rule in Germany that all private events/activities are a security responsibility of the organisers…the World Cup is a private event. If you send an active police officer, it means that the police would be taking over responsibility (Heimberger in Tshehla 2006:10). During the World Cup in Germany, deployment in the stadiums differed from state to state: some used a heavy police presence in the stadiums, others relied on private security (Heimberger in Tshehla 2006:10). The deputy president of the Munich police has stated that he was not in favour of police being stationed outside stadiums because if a problem were to occur inside, quick police action would be needed to prevent it getting out of hand (Heimberger in Tshehla 2006:11). ‘Fan parks’ – large open areas with big screen televisions – will be erected for spectators who are unable to attend matches at stadiums, and will have to be manned by police as well. Prior to the World Cup in Germany, police expressed great concern about the fan park concept saying the parks would ‘require serious interventions’ due to the large numbers of people using the spaces, the possible attraction of soccer hooligans to the parks, and the resultant disruptions (Tshehla 2006:4). Despite these concerns no major problems were experienced. According to Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, ‘The success of the security operation was "a quality landmark in international police work"’. Bilkis Omar 69 The role of private security Private security in South Africa has been granted a key role in 2010 – to provide security within the inner perimeter of stadiums. The concept, used in Germany during the 2006 Soccer World Cup, proved to be successful. Private security in South Africa is regulated by the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA). PSIRA has one million registered members, 300 000 active registered members, and 4 800 registered companies (Badenhorst 2007). When an application is made to register a company, PSIRA verifies the company, registers it, and ensures that the company complies with legislation (Badenhorst 2007). PSIRA also does the vetting of members and the SAPS looks at the applications. The requirements for registration are laid down in the PSIRA Act 56 of 2001. While some private security companies in South Africa already conduct security at sports events like Premier Soccer League (PSL) soccer matches and international cricket and rugby matches, most are involved in safeguarding the physical security of people and property. PSL has 400 PSIRA registered security guards and 1 000 unregistered stewards in its own security arm (Majola 2007). PSL stewards are positioned within the crowds, they monitor spectators and tear tickets: ‘PSL’s stewards are trained by the soccer clubs. This is an overseas concept and stewards are also taught to identify potential problems. They have great experience’ (Majola 2007). The Premier Soccer League’s security arm does management of high-risk events, while each soccer team’s own security provider offers security for low risk events, i.e. events where fewer spectators attend (Majola 2007). The decision on whether to treat an event as a high or low risk event is taken at planning meetings prior to the event. Security guards do body searches and access control, but they do not do crowd management (Majola 2007) and are not trained in special events (Pasha 2007). Of interest is that the security company within PSL is not registered with PSIRA. There is currently debate within PSL management about whether the company should be registered (Majola 2007). Although the 2010 event may lead to the mushrooming of new security companies, PSIRA believes that this is not likely since the industry has grown by 11-13 per cent in the last ten years, and the growth in the security business is constant (Badenhorst 2007). 70 A review of public order policing capacity A concern is that training for events management in the private security industry is insufficient. The Premier Soccer League (PSL) hosts approximately 200 matches per year, and it is considered too costly for security companies to train members in events management because of the relative infrequency of soccer matches. The SA Football Association (SAFA) cannot undertake the registration of private security officers – this would require the establishment of a security division, with high cost implications. In any case SAFA hosts only 20 to 40 matches per year. As a result, soccer clubs are tasked with the responsibility for security. But, as one roleplayer stated, ‘they don’t care about security; there is no statutory requirement for events’ (Phasha 2007). Private security companies have been accused of ‘picking untrained, unregistered people off the street on the day of the event, providing them with bibs and money, and expecting them to provide security for soccer matches’. PSIRA National Manager of Law Enforcement said that PSIRA was not aware of such practices, stating that ‘if complaints are received regarding this, then PSIRA investigators will undertake checks. Spot checks are also done on occasion’ (Badenhorst 2007). A PSIRA training programme for events management does exist and is offered with the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA). PSIRA has 600 trainers and each trainer undergoes a dual programme run by PSIRA and SASSETA. A training standard for monitoring, controlling and directing crowds at special events has been developed and registered by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) (Badenhorst 2007). It is designed to enable relevant personnel to competently assess venue sites, to monitor, observe and control crowd size, and to respond to behaviour and direction of spectators within the venue and its precincts (SAQA:1). Specific skills are developed to enable the following: • Inspecting and providing security presence at a venue. This means identifying stadium layout, communications between Venue Operational Command (VOC) (fire department, police, emergency medical services, and security of stadium), communication equipment, positions, and regular communication to VOC. • Monitoring crowd size, movement, stress, behaviour and safety. This also means understanding maximum stadium capacity, the number of spectators, crowd behaviour, identifying problem spots, stadium access, distress alarm response, identifying potential safety problems, back-up, and the amount of force to be used. Bilkis Omar 71 • Reacting to potential crowd problems and/or breaches of event etiquette. This means identifying people or situations that may cause a breach of safety, identifying potential problems, communicating with people behaving in disruptive manner, and recording information. • Directing crowds at special events. This requires directing people to correct locations, in an appropriate manner, with minimum risk of injury (SAQA:1). A workshop was held in March 2007 to consider developing the PSIRA events management course into a full qualification by the end of 2007. PSIRA will also be reviewing the training of security personnel, aligned with the National Qualification Authority (NQA) (Badenhorst 2007). A case study: Ellis Park stadium In 2002 Ellis Park stadium experienced the worst soccer disaster ever seen in South Africa in which 43 supporters died and 158 were injured. A commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the reasons for the tragedy. The following reasons were listed: • Poor forecast of match attendance • Failure to learn from lessons of the past • Failure by the role-players to clearly identify and designate areas of responsibility • Absence of overall command of the Joint Operation Centre • The inappropriate and untimely announcement that tickets were sold out • Failure to adhere to SAFA and FIFA guidelines • Unbecoming spectator behaviour • Sale of tickets at the venue and unreserved seating • The use of teargas or a similar substance • Corruption on the part of certain members of the security personnel • Dereliction of duty on the part of certain officials • Failure to use the big screen to show the game to spectators still waiting to enter the stadium • Inadequate public address system • Failure by the Public Order Policing Unit to react timeously and effectively (Independent Online 2002) Since the incident much has been done to improve Ellis Park stadium’s structure and its security. The stadium now contracts with private security 72 A review of public order policing capacity companies for crowd management during sporting events. The companies are registered and accredited with PSIRA and the responsibility to train the guards rests with the security companies (Meyer 1999). The security guards at Ellis Park serve as safety officers, chief stewards, zone wardens, and supervisors. They are used inside and outside the stadium and in the VIP areas, and a reaction group is always on standby. A Chief Safety Officer is employed by Ellis Park stadium to oversee the security companies. A separate company is contracted to do the 24-hour property security. Guards are provided with the standard bibs and issue numbers. The stadium is equipped with a fingerprint reader that checks each guard’s PSIRA-issued card against the database, which stores each guard’s identity. However PSIRA is slow to issue cards to guards registered with them, and it is difficult for stadium personnel to check every person (Meyer 1999). PSL and clubs do not have public liability insurance and rely on private security companies to cover public liability should anything go awry. If spectators lose their lives, the security company is liable. Ellis Park has public liability for its structure and third party insurance, but no cover for security (Meyer 1999). Ellis Park’s preparation ahead of 2010 In South Africa, standard practice prior to any soccer event is the planning meeting. Issues discussed at the meeting cover overall command, shifts, the number of CCU members, security personnel and VISPOL members working, relevant times, VIPs attending, venue of the Joint Operational Command (JOC) or Venue Operational Command (VOC), number of spectators expected, security plans, requests for venues to sell tickets, and the operational plans of each organisation. The planning meetings determine the threat level which takes into account the category of the event and the mechanisms that will be required to ensure safety. The Venue Operational Command is the working structure for law enforcement agencies, private security companies and other agencies to coordinate operations on the day of the event. The VOC of the Ellis Park stadium consists of representatives from the SAPS, CCUs, Metro Police, Disaster Management and Johannesburg Emergency Services. Ellis Park personnel include a safety officer, deputy safety officer, main radio controller, and maintenance radio controller. Private security companies have radio operators and a data capturer. PSL and SAFA representatives are also part of the VOC at certain events. Bilkis Omar 73 Ellis Park stadium is undergoing a physical restructuring (5 000 seats are being added) for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Organisational changes are also being undertaken to address the following problem areas: • Role players planning individually without consultation • Areas of responsibility are blurred • Competition amongst security providers • Little control over quality of service delivery/personnel (and high turnover) • Uncertainty regarding some aspects of public liability cover • Slow and complicated communications network among VOC • Out of date processes compared to international standards and proposed legislation The new structure will aim for: • A single plan for event safety and security • Clearly defined areas of responsibility and authority • All service providers share common goals under one plan • Full control and consistency (regulations, polices, standards, training, identification, bibs) • Collective and defined public liability plan • One communication network with quick reaction times • International standard complying with local regulations • Being a progressive structure It is unclear if this kind of structure is planned for all the 2010 stadiums or whether each stadium will develop its own plan to ensure the safety and security of spectators and players. The role of CCUs in the FIFA World Cup As stated above, the CCUs will police the outer perimeter of the stadium (areas from the entry gates to the entrances to the stands) and they will be summoned to assist private security guards in the inside perimeter when the need arises. Given the inexperience of private security guards and their lack of training in event management, combined with uncertainty regarding accreditation of PSIRA, many members of the CCU said in interviews that they were sceptical about the value of the participation of private security companies in the World Cup. One member stated, ‘PSL and SAFA are disorganised and don’t know what they are doing in security and crowd management. They pick people off the 74 A review of public order policing capacity streets, give them a bib, and pay them R50 a day to police an event. These members are not registered. The responsibility is then left on the police to manage.’ Members of the CCU also said they feared that there would be problems with private security guards managing crowds inside the stadium and with the CCU members being in the outer perimeter. If they were called to deal with a problem, it would take a while before they arrived and thus they might be ineffective. Despite their scepticism about private security companies, CCU members were very positive that South Africa would be able to manage the security for the World Cup. Most stated that South Africa had previously hosted many big events (CAF, Rugby World Cup, WSSD, Cricket World Cup, Under-23 Olympics) and that the FIFA World Cup would be just as easily managed. One member said that the SAPS management had already started working on a strategic plan for security so, operationally, South Africa will be ready. CCU members were adamant, however, that the success of the 2010 security was dependent on having more resources. Some of their suggestions were: an increase in human capacity, upgraded equipment, good intelligence, special intensive training for managing hooliganism, assistance from other countries, and the training of station members in crowd management. They said that more attention had to be given to the bad attitude of some of their SAPS colleagues, their lack of discipline and people skills, and the poor level of their policing. The role of metro police in the FIFA World Cup Metro police have been designated to perform traffic enforcement in the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The role of the Public Order Police Unit of the EMPD during the World Cup is unclear, but it could well be the reason they were trained in crowd management – as first respondents to spontaneous incidents. Ekurhuleni metro police officers’ views on the country’s management of security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup were positive. Some of their comments were: ‘Metro is now skilled in crowd management so they will manage security at the World Cup’, ‘South Africa previously did security at the rugby World Cup and cricket World Cup but they need more manpower and more training.’ One officer stated that communication and tolerance to work with one another is also important. Furthermore ‘EMPD excels and the POP unit is very successful, they have done many events.’ Only one officer was Bilkis Omar 75 sceptical. He said that with the current situation – meaning little capacity and too much work – the law enforcement agencies would not manage security for the World Cup: ‘The idea is to increase officers at EMPD to 2 000.’ A meeting between the Provincial Commissioner’s office, the Head of EMPD and Head of CCU East Rand has recently taken place to mend the poor relationship between the EMPD and the CCUs in the East Rand. Conclusion and recommendations The SAPS appears confident that the police can cope with security demands for 2010. Considering the challenges facing police, such as the high rates of violent crime, problems in the relationship between SAPS and the LOC, soccer hooliganism, and a likely increase in protest marches during the World Cup, the task should not be under estimated. The policing agencies, especially the CCUs, need specialised training in tactical techniques on how to deal with soccer hooligans. The SAPS also need to be cautious regarding the hooliganism issue because of the contentious issues surrounding the ‘database’ of offenders and the definition of a ‘soccer hooligan’. With regard to the role of private security organisations, the research findings suggest that: • There is confusion regarding the titles and roles of various types of private security personnel. Those designated to protect property and persons are referred to as ‘guards’ while others are called ‘officers’; there is no clarity regarding those providing functional duties at events, for example, tearing tickets, escorting spectators, etc. The FIFA Safety Guidelines document refers to private security personnel as ‘stewards’. These issues need to be addressed. • PSIRA has a vital role to play if the World Cup is to be a success. Private security companies have been tasked with an important role so proper training in crowd management and registration of stewards is essential. PSIRA must also ensure that security officers wear their registration cards. • In Germany a security steward has to undergo an examination at a public institution. FIFA requires that at least 50 per cent of security 76 A review of public order policing capacity stewards should have passed this examination, and that these stewards are deployed in areas of high sensitivity. ‘All security guards undergo a three-day training…specifically for the policing of the World Cup’ (Heimberger in Tshehla 2006:12). SAFA has to ensure that notwithstanding PSIRA and SASSETA training, a similar approach is followed prior to the World Cup. CHAPTER 8 RECOMMENDATIONS These recommendations hope to assist in achieving a coherent strategy for improving the quality of public order policing. Policy, legislation and regulations • The Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 governing crowd management needs to be updated. While the 14-year-old Act is a most useful piece of legislation, practical experience in the management of events has shown that there is a need to more clearly define the role and responsibility of march organisers and marshals. • CCUs need a new working document providing guidance on their new roles. With the dissolution of the area level, Standing Order 262 and other policy documents have become outdated and need to be revised. Management and restructuring • Decisions from SAPS national level that affect provincial or local level police should be discussed with the provincial commissioner’s office before being made. Many directives issued at national level supersede the provincial office, thus creating confusion and challenges for units, stations and the provincial office. Better communication and consultation is essential. • The restructuring which diminished the role of the Crime Combating Units in September 2006 should be re-assessed. Trends are showing an increase in protest marches and the FIFA World Cup in 2010 is looming. Although the area policing level has been disbanded, the buildings located in these unit areas could still be utilised; the units could become accountable to the provincial office and be renamed Provincial Public Order Police. • The Crime Combating Units are experiencing serious human resource shortages. The restructuring has resulted in the units being depleted by 78 A review of public order policing capacity 50 per cent, while continuing to service the same geographical areas. The additional travelling required by the restructuring has exacerbated the problem. If the problem is not addressed, members are sure to suffer severe stress and fatigue. • The SAPS should, as far as possible, not use the CCUs for policing needs other than those for which they have been specially trained. In this respect it will be interesting to assess the statistics showing the outcome of Operation Trio. If the statistics look favourable for the police, this could spur the SAPS management to permanently or at regular intervals call on the CCUs to support general policing operations. This would further undermine the capacity of the units to undertake public order policing. • The members of the CCUs who have been sent to stations to assist in crime combating should be returned to the units from which they came. If necessary, they can be deployed from their units to assist stations with crime prevention operations. Training • While CCU members seem to be well informed about the Regulation of Gatherings Act, an in-depth refresher course spanning at least three days is required, at least once every three years. • Some of the outdated terminology that is still sometimes used by CCU members needs to be addressed. ‘Crowd control’ is now referred to as ‘crowd management’, and ‘riots’ are referred to as ‘protests’. Unit commanders and trainers should ensure that the issue of terminology is addressed in training sessions. • Training must be made a priority by unit commanders even if it comes at the expense of crime combating duties. In-service training was being neglected by the units, but with the restructuring it came to a total standstill. This means that members are becoming de-skilled. Fortunately the specialist crowd management skills have not been lost because the units are manned largely by people with ten to 20 years’ experience in this field. Nonetheless the skills base is eroding, and more seriously, incoming members are not receiving in-service training. Bilkis Omar 79 • With regard to the use of firearms in crowd control, the police need better and more regular training, including training on when it is appropriate to use firearms and how they should be used. The same applies to metro police officers, who have tended to be over-zealous in their use of firearms. Role of private security in 2010 • The training of private security guards has to be made a priority in view of their important role in providing security for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Since this is not the responsibility of the SAPS, it should be coordinated at ministerial level. • The Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) has a vital role to play if the World Cup is to be a success. Private security companies have been tasked with an important role so proper training in crowd management and registration of stewards is essential. PSIRA must also ensure that security officers wear their registration cards. CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION This study has assessed whether the Crime Combating Units of the SAPS, with their existing capacity, can adequately manage crowds at events such as protest marches, as well as meeting the crowd management needs of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In must be noted that in terms of respect for human rights, public order policing has improved since the advent of democracy. However, the size and distribution of the units, as well as their skills maintenance, has been severely eroded. The main conclusion of this research is that the most recent restructuring of the SAPS CCUs in 2006 is the reason for the crisis in crowd management that the units are presently facing. A full consideration of the findings leads to a very strong recommendation that the SAPS management reassess the recent restructuring of the CCUs. The CCUs should be redeployed to their units in the previous seven policing areas. Given the dissolution of the area policing level, they should be made accountable to the provincial police office. Thus Gauteng would have seven fully capacitated Provincial Public Order Policing Units, primarily performing crowd management and, when required, assisting neighbouring stations in the combating of crime. With regard to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the way in which the crowd management component of the police has coped with past international events in South Africa suggests that they will be able to cope with the World Cup. However there is a need to ensure that the units are sufficiently well resourced. The dynamics of large soccer events internationally present some unique problems, which the units will have to take into account. In addition, the FIFA World Cup is a likely target for additional protest marches, which will place additional demands on the capacity of the Crime Combating Units. ENDNOTES 1 At the time when the study was conceived the public order units were still known as Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs) but later in the same year (2006), the units underwent a radical restructuring and were renamed Crime Combating Units (CCUs). 2 Counter-participants is a reference to opportunists planning to take advantage of a situation. 3 The policy, which was intended to be implemented throughout the SAPS was not accepted by all the members because certain ‘principles in the policy were deemed unsuitable’ with the result that a format that was suitable to everyone had to be adapted (Telephonic interview with Supt V Day 11 November 2005). 4 Stations assisted does not include strikes, gatherings, marches, evictions, and VIP protection. It only pertains to crime combating functions for stations. 6 See ISS website http://www.issafrica.org/index.php>Media Statement, Briefing Session on the Impact of the SAPS Restructuring on the Policing of Violence against Women and Children, 31 May 2006. Joint Media release by the SAPS and Institute for Security Studies. 7 Detached duties is a reference to members sent on duties other than those they are designated to do, for example, assisting in disaster management in another province. 8 An accounting station under the SAPS new restructuring plan is a large station providing administrative functions to approximately five to six police stations falling under it. 9 This is a reference to members deployed on the borders of the country to perform crime combating duties. 10 Displacement of crime occurs when, as a result of successful crime prevention operations in one area, crime shifts to a neighbouring area. 11 The Khutsong protests centre on the incorporation of a municipality from Gauteng province into the North West province. 12 The document is referred to by the SAPS as an Establishment Document because it was never made into a policy. 13 A bakkie is a motor vehicle or van that has side doors and is used for transporting goods and people. 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