Novice NMD Neg

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					66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                                                      DDW 2011
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                                                            Novice NMD Neg
Novice NMD Neg ................................................................................................................................................... 1
**Topicality ............................................................................................................................................................ 3
  T – Development................................................................................................................................................. 4
  Overview ............................................................................................................................................................. 5
  Limits XTN ......................................................................................................................................................... 6
  AT: We Meet ...................................................................................................................................................... 7
  AT: Ground ......................................................................................................................................................... 8
  AT: Education ..................................................................................................................................................... 9
  AT: Reasonability ............................................................................................................................................. 10
**Weaponization DA............................................................................................................................................ 11
  1NC ................................................................................................................................................................... 12
  Impact Overview ............................................................................................................................................... 14
  AT: Weaponization Now .................................................................................................................................. 15
  Link and Impact XTN ....................................................................................................................................... 16
  Impact – Ground Attacks .................................................................................................................................. 17
**GMD CP ........................................................................................................................................................... 18
  1NC ................................................................................................................................................................... 19
  AT: Perm do Both ............................................................................................................................................. 20
  Solves Rogue States .......................................................................................................................................... 21
  Solves Major Powers ........................................................................................................................................ 22
  Ground Based is Better ..................................................................................................................................... 23
  Ground Based Cheaper ..................................................................................................................................... 24
  Space Defense Causes ASATs.......................................................................................................................... 25
  Space based missile defense encourages new ASATs ...................................................................................... 25
  Space Defense Fails .......................................................................................................................................... 26
**Solvency............................................................................................................................................................ 27
  Solvency Frontline ............................................................................................................................................ 28
  XTN #1– BMD Doesn‘t Work ......................................................................................................................... 30
  XTN #2 – Countermeasures.............................................................................................................................. 32
  XTN #3 – BMD Will be Taken Out ................................................................................................................. 33
  AT: Perception Solves ...................................................................................................................................... 34
  AT: Lasers ......................................................................................................................................................... 35
**Heg .................................................................................................................................................................... 36
  Heg Frontline .................................................................................................................................................... 37
  XTN #1 – Weaponization not Inevitable .......................................................................................................... 40
  XTN #2 – Weapons Collapse Heg .................................................................................................................... 41
  XTN #3 – Ground Based Solves ....................................................................................................................... 42
  XTN #4 – China Turn ....................................................................................................................................... 44
**Rogue States...................................................................................................................................................... 46
  Rogue States Frontline ...................................................................................................................................... 47
  XTN #1 – Doesn‘t Solve Rogue States............................................................................................................. 50
  XTN #2 – Doesn‘t Solve Iran ........................................................................................................................... 51
  XTN #3 – No EMP ........................................................................................................................................... 53

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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                                                 DDW 2011
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  XTN #4 – No EMP ........................................................................................................................................... 55
**Links to Das ...................................................................................................................................................... 56
  Launch Based Environment DA Link – 5 to 10 Fold Increase ......................................................................... 57
  Deploying enough interceptors increases current launch rates 5 to 10 fold ..................................................... 57
  Spending Link – 44 Billion ............................................................................................................................... 59
  Spending Link – 27-78 Billion ......................................................................................................................... 61
  Plan Popular ...................................................................................................................................................... 63
  Plan Unpopular ................................................................................................................................................. 65




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                                           **Topicality




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                    DDW 2011
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                                                     T – Development
A. Development includes economic and commercial activities while exploration is venturing to
unknown areas
Hsu and Cox 09
[Feng Hsu, Sr. Fellow, Aerospace Technology Working Group and Ken Cox, Founder & Director Aerospace Technology Working
Group, 2/20/09, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=30702, Caplan]
In our view, even with adequate reform in its governance model, NASA is not a rightful institution to lead or manage the nation's
business in Space Development projects. This is because human space development activities, such as development of affordable
launch vehicles, RLVs, space-based solar power, space touring capabilities, communication satellites, and trans-earth or trans-lunar
space transportation infrastructure systems, are primarily human economic and commercial development endeavors that are not only
cost-benefit-sensitive in project management, but are in the nature of business activities and are thus subject to fundamental business
principles related to profitability, sustainability, and market development, etc. Whereas, in space exploration, by its nature and
definition, there are basic human scientific research and development (R&D) activities that require exploring the unknowns, pushing
the envelope of new frontiers or taking higher risks with full government and public support, and these need to be invested in solely by
taxpayer contributions.

B. The Aff increases space militarization capabilities- not tied to economic or commercial
development

C. Limits are necessary for negative prep and clash and they unlimit because they justify tiny
affirmatives that don’t have predictable economic value.

D. Voter because debate is impossible without limits




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                                           Overview
At the top – Our interpretation is that they have to increase commercial or economic
development of space. Our interpretation allows for SPS, colonization, space mining, and debris
removal. Onto the line by line.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                   DDW 2011
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                                           Limits XTN
They unlimit the resolution – They justify infinite unpredictable and tiny affs, for example, every
space weapon, like lasers, missile defense, THAAD, weather control, microsatellites, rods from
god, and so forth. They also justify infinite defensive forms of weaponization – Bumpers,
nanotech, maneuverability, and so forth.

Limits are key to debate – Without an idea of what affs people are going to read, the neg has to
do infinite preparation, which not only prevents the neg from having a cohesive strategy going
into rounds, but also undermines clash because in-depth arguments are unable to be developed.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                      DDW 2011
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                                           AT: We Meet
You don’t meet – You have to increase commercial or economic development of space, and they
weaponize it – That’s different because militarization is intended to secure assets, not develop
them.

At best, they’re effectually topical – That’s bad because it uniquely justifies infinite untopical affs
and the neg will always lose on untopical planks of the plan.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                       DDW 2011
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                                           AT: Ground
The case list proves that we still allow aff ground.

Ground by itself is nebulous and arbitrary – There’s always arguments the neg can read, the
question is if we are able to predict affs to write specific positions to respond to it. Limits allows
us to discover the best ground at the core of the resolution.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                DDW 2011
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                                           AT: Education
Education is inevitable – You could go to a library and read about whatever you think is most
educational – We want to debate.

They provide a bad model of education – A free for all where the 1AC lectures about its plan and
the neg has no way to respond – That kills clash, which is an education unique to debate.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                     DDW 2011
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                                           AT: Reasonability
You’re not reasonable – One untopical aff justifies infinite untopical affs.

Reasonability is arbitrary, allows for judge intervention. Under your model, even if we don’t
read T, the judge can still vote neg on it because they think the Aff isn’t topical. Evaluate debate.

Reasonability doesn’t help us strive for the best limit on the Aff to the resolution – It uniquely
unlimits.




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                                    **Weaponization DA




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                      DDW 2011
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                                                                 1NC
Space interceptors leads to space weaponization and rapid escalation of conflicts
Theresa Hitchens is the director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. She had served as director of the Center
for Defense Information. She has been editor of Defense News, Intern with Senator John Glenn and the Nato Parliamentary Assembly
in Brussels, and director of research at BASIC. Besides her duties as CDI director, Ms Hitchens leads CDI‘s Space Security Project.
The author of Future Security In Space: Charting a Cooperative Course (2004), she serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies and
Victoria Samson, Washington Office Director for Secure World Foundation and has more than twelve years of experience in
military space issues, consults on war-gaming scenarios for the Missile Defense Agency's Directorate of Intelligence, served as a
Senior Analyst for the Center for Defense Information (CDI), Summer/Fall 04, [―Space Based Interceptors Still Not a Good Idea,‖
CDI, www.cdi.org/news/space-security/space-based-interceptors.pdf] E. Liu

      Even if SBIS were technologically feasible and cost effective, there would still be one major concern regarding their
      development: basing interceptors in space would open the door to weaponizing space, a move that would prove extremely
      destabilizing to international security and thus to the United States. If the United States decides to deploy weapons in space,
      then it is guaranteed that other countries will follow: the United States is not only a model for accepted behavior by state
      actors all around the world, but other powers will also grow uneasy if the United States aggressively pursues space
      hegemony.24 One only needs to look at how Russia, no longer considered an adversary, has reacted to the planned U.S.
      missile defense deployment to gain an indica¬tion of the unease with which other nations are regarding U.S. efforts. In
      February 2004, Russia held the biggest exercise for its strategic forces in nearly two decades. Afterwards, Russian
      Presi¬dent Vladimir Putin announced that his strategic forces will soon "receive new hypersound-speed, high-precision
      new weapons systems that can hit targets at intercontinental distance and can adjust their altitude and course as they
      travel."25 According to Col.-Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces,
      this maneuver reentry vehicle "would make any missile defense use¬less."26 This whole new class of weapons is being
      developed to make sure that Russia is still relevant in the face of the U.S. missile defense deployment.27 This gives some
      context to the way U.S. actions can motivate arms development by other nations, and sets the stage for how Russia might
      react to the develop¬ment of space-based defenses. Current allies regard U.S. intentions in space with apprehension as well.
      The European Union has decided to estab¬lish its own version of a satellite naviga¬tion network, known as Galileo, so that
      it will not be beholden to the United States' Global Positioning System (GPS). The overall Galileo project is projected to
      cost 3-25 billion euros, with 200 million euros now expected from China and a similar contribution from India.28 That is a
      significant investment to confirm that the Europeans will not be harmed by a possibly uncooperative U.S. government in
      the future. U.S. allies in Europe are all on record as sup¬porting U.N. sponsored talks, known as the Prevention of an Arms
      Race in Out¬er Space (PAROS) aimed at an eventual space weapons ban. Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly
      has passed a resolution supporting PAROS every year since 1981; and PAROS became an item on the agenda of the
      Geneva-based Con¬ference on Disarmament in 1982 where it remains on the table today.29 While PAROS is supported by
      a majority of the world's nations, it has in the past fallen afoul of big-power politics among the United States, China, and
      Russia. Today, the discussions remain stalemated in large part due to shifting U.S. priorities and the Bush administration's
      disdain for international treaties. Snowball Effect. The mere act of weaponizing space will set in motion a series of moves
      by other countries that would threaten U.S. space assets. Despite the wide gap in capabilities and spending between the U.S.
      military and the rest of the world in space plans, the United States can be rendered vulnerable by rel¬atively inexpensive,
      rudimentary tech¬nologies. If other countries genuinely believe that the United States intends them harm using space
      assets, these counteractions cannot be ruled out. Regular ballistic missiles could possibly be modified to provide anti-
      satellite capabilities. U.S. ground stations could be attacked, harming command and con¬trol to the point where space
      systems would be made worthless. A low-yield nuclear warhead placed on a ballistic missile could menace satellites in
      Low Earth Orbit. Or something as basic as gravel, unleashed at the right time against a satellite, might degrade U.S. space
      capabilities to a dangerous low.30 Along those lines, orbital debris from space weapons cannot be overlooked. The
      smallest chips can prove lethal at the astonishing high speeds in which objects orbit the Earth—some IO km per second in
      Low-Earth Orbit.31 The destruction of satellites or space weapons would undoubtedly spawn scores of dangerous new
      objects that could collide with satel¬lites and spacecraft. Presently, the U.S. Air Force's Space Surveillance Network tracks
      some 13,000 on-orbit objects, only about 6 percent of which are work¬ing satellites and spacecraft, the rest being debris.32
      While improving U.S. space situational awareness is currently a high priority for the Air Force, space weapons would only
      add to this already-challenging space surveillance mission.33 Blinded Eyes in the Sky. Space weapons also would be
      highly destabiliz¬ing for global security. Space-based weapons would be high-value but highly vulnerable military assets,
      thus imparting a "use it or lose it" mentality on their operators. That is, because such space assets might be quickly made


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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                                       DDW 2011
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      useless by a first strike, the urge to employ them in a conflict before they are made ineffectual would no doubt be strong.
      Such hair- trigger weapons could lead the United States very quickly into a disaster in a time of hostilities.34 During recent
      war games, military commanders have been stunned at how quickly the employment of space weapons escalated conflicts
      into nuclear war. If mil-itary commanders cannot see what their adversaries are doing, an ability provided primarily by
      those same, highly vulnerable space based assets, they must assume the worst and act accordingly.35 The real-life
      implications of that fact are haunting.

Weaponization causes nuclear war
Rick Rozoff, writer for Stop Nato, 2009. ―Militarization of Space: The Threat of Nuclear War on Earth,‖
http://dandelionsalad.wordpress.com/2009/06/18/militarization-of-space-threat-of-nuclear-war-on-earth-by-rick-rozoff/
    That is, the militarization of space can result in a nuclear conflagration on earth not only by accident or the law of unintended
    consequences but fully by design. If the US plan is, by a combination of ground, sea and air delivery systems, to destroy any ability to
    retaliate after a devastating first blow, the Russian general warned of what in fact would ensue: ―The Americans will never manage to implement this
    scenario because Russian strategic nuclear forces, including the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, will be capable of delivering a retaliatory
    strike given any course of developments. ―After receiving authorization from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces it
    will not take our strategic missile force more than two-three minutes to carry out the task of launching missiles.‖ [38] What
    Solovtsov has described is the nightmare humanity has dreaded since the advent of the nuclear age: An exchange of nuclear-
    tipped intercontinental missiles. One that might result from an attack launched at least partially from space and in one manner
    or other in relation to space-based military assets. An analogous warning was issued last year by the then commander of Russia‘s Space Forces,
    General Vladimir Popovkin, who said, ―Space is one of the few places around not yet separated by borders, and any kind of military
    deployments there would upset the existing balance of forces on our planet.‖ [39] This past March American space researcher Matt Hoey
    stated that an arms race in space would be ―increasing the risk of an accidental nuclear war while shortening the time for sanity
    and diplomacy to come into play to halt crises.‖ ―If these systems are deployed in space we will be tipping the nuclear balance between
    nations that has ensured the peace for decades




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                   DDW 2011
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                                           Impact Overview
Disad outweighs – We’ve got the clearest link that that plan actively causes a response from
countries like Russia and China that results in nuclear war – They’ll be forced to respond to the
plan or feel unable to compete – That involves massive armies and nuclear arsenals

Our impact is most likely to escalate because if our warning satellites are taken out, military
leaders have to assume the worst and act with massive force, and the lack of borders in space
shortens the time for decisionmaking.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                   DDW 2011
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                                        AT: Weaponization Now
Status quo weaponization measures don’t cause foreign response because they’re not deployed in
space – The plan causes military assets to immediately be put into space.

Space is not weaponized now- difference between militarization and weaponization
Alvin Saperstein 2, Physics Dept., Wayne State University, [―Weaponization‖ Vs. ―Militarization‖ Of Space,
APS http://www.aps.org/units/fps/newsletters/2002/july/saperstein.pdf] KR
Currently, space is not weaponized. There are no weapons deployed in space or terrestrially (in air, sea, or on
the ground) meant to attack space objects, such as satellites; nor are satellite weapons deployed against
terrestrial targets. At the same time, space is an increasingly vital part of our military activities from which the
US obtains great advantages with respect to other nations. We use space for communication; for surveillance
and targeting over the battlefields; for weather prediction; for precise mapping and positioning of our own and
opposition military assets; for early warning of missile and air attacks; and for general military, economic, and
technological intelligence worldwide. Thus space is ―militarized‖ though not yet ―weaponized.‖




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                             DDW 2011
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                                              Link and Impact XTN
Missile defense increases uncertainty, causing Russian miscalculation
Thomas Graham, former special representative of the president for arms control, nonproliferation, and
disarmament, 12-05 (Jr ―Space Weapons and the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War,‖ Arms Control Today,
December, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_12/Dec-spaceweapons.asp)

The United States and Russia maintain thousands of nuclear warheads on long-range ballistic missiles on 15-
minute alert. Once launched, they cannot be recalled, and they will strike their targets in roughly 30 minutes.
Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the chance of an accidental nuclear exchange has far from
decreased. Yet, the United States may be contemplating further exacerbating this threat by deploying missile
interceptors in space. Both the United States and Russia rely on space-based systems to provide early warning
of a nuclear attack. If deployed, however, U.S. space-based missile defense interceptors could eliminate the
Russian early warning satellites quickly and without warning. So, just the existence of U.S. space weapons
could make Russia‘s strategic trigger fingers itchy. The potential protection space-based defenses might offer
the United States is swamped therefore by their potential cost: a failure of or false signal from a component of
the Russian early warning system could lead to a disastrous reaction and accidental nuclear war. There is no
conceivable missile defense, space-based or not, that would offer protection in the event that the Russian
nuclear arsenal was launched at the United States. Nor are the Russians or other countries likely to stand still
and watch the United States construct space-based defenses. These states are likely to respond by developing
advanced anti-satellite weapon systems.[1] These weapons, in turn, would endanger U.S. early warning
systems, impair valuable U.S. weapons intelligence efforts, and increase the jitteriness of U.S. officials.

Space arms races only result from development of interceptors
Kenneth S. Blazejewski is in private practice in New York City, focusing primarily on international corporate and financial
transactions. He received his master‘s degree in public affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University and his JD
degree from the New York University School of Law, Spring 08, [―Space Weaponization and US-China Relations,‖ Streategic
Studies Quarterly, 33, www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2008/Spring/blazejewski.pdf] E. Liu

On this account, China‘s primary concern with US space weaponiza- tion is its contribution to a US multilayered missile defense
shield. In- deed, China‘s campaign for PAROS negotiation at the CD seems to inten- sify after each new development in
United States BMD plans. 20 Although China could respond to a BMD shield with effective countermeasures,
21 future technological developments may permit the BMD system to vitiate China‘s nuclear deterrent. 22 In the case of a
conflict over Taiwan, for example, a US space-based BMD system could prove very valuable to the United States.
According to this view, if the United States decides to advance with such a BMD program, China will respond so as to
main- tain its nuclear deterrence. It will modernize its ICBM fleet (a program it has already initiated), develop
further countermeasures to circumvent the BMD shield, and develop the means to launch multiple ASAT attacks.
Ultimately, an arms race could ensue. This, however, would not be China‘s chosen outcome. Its development of space weapons
is merely a counter- strategy to what it views as likely US space weaponization. 23 China would much prefer that the United
States negotiate a PAROS agreement not to build the BMD shield. 24




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                               DDW 2011
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                                            Impact – Ground Attacks
Weaponization incentives attacks on ground platforms
Don L. Wilkerson, space operations officer for the U.S. Army in Carlisle, PA, 3-15-08, [―SPACE POWER THEORY:
CONTROLLING THE MEDIUM WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE,‖ US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300] E. Liu
The most vulnerable segment of any space system is the ground node or ground stations that control the on-orbit assets or
receive the data downlinks from the satellites. Since ground stations are typically considered ―soft‖ targets and many
locations can be easily identified through good intelligence, they are probably the most susceptible to attack from
conventional weapons. Equally vulnerable would be the launch facilities used to place satellites into orbit.
Therefore, substantial investments to place weapons in space would be counter-intuitive if ground stations are more susceptible to
attack and can be easily neutralized. Perhaps discretionary funding should be allocated to hardening critical space nodes,
ground nodes and communication links making them less susceptible to intentional electronic jamming, blinding,
spoofing and conventional strikes. The author contends that these passive and active defense measures help make on-
orbit and ground space systems more resistant to attack and are more economically feasible than placing weapons in space.




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                                           **GMD CP




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                    DDW 2011
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                                                                1NC
Text: The United States federal government should develop and deploy layered, ground-based
ballistic missile interceptors.

Ground based missile defense solves rogue states
Congresional Budget Office, 7-04, [―Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,‖ CBO,
www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5679&type=1] E. Liu

      For this study, CBO dzeveloped five alternative systems— three surface-based and two space-based—to compare the
      potential effectiveness and cost of different approaches to boost-phase intercept by kinetic-energy interceptors. Each system
      has the following capabilities: ■ The ability to counter a representative liquid-fuel ICBM from North Korea or Iran.
      Although neither country is known to possess ICBM-class ballistic missiles today, both are developing long-range missiles
      based on liquid-fuel technology. North Korea has tested (widi only partial success) the Taep'o-dong 1, a missile diought to
      have a range of 5,000 km. Iran is believed to be working on extended-range versions of its Sha-hab-series ballistic missiles
      (although they appear to remain short of intercontinental range). In addition, both North Korea and Iran have expressed
      their inten¬tion to develop space-launch systems. Such systems would be suitable for use as ICBMs. xvi
      ALTERNATIVES FOR BOOST-PHASE MISSILE DEFENSE ■ Coverage of all possible ICBM launch locations in
      North Korea and Iran. The ability to cover all locations in a country means that a BPI system could not be easily
      circumvented by mobile ICBM launchers, A system able to fully cover Iran and North Korea would be highly capable
      against most other potential threat countries employing similar ICBM technology. Iran poses a particular challenge for a
      surface-based BPI system because it is die 16th largest country by area. (Many of die larger countries are considered
      unlikely to prove a threat to die United States.) North Korea poses a particular challenge for a space-based system because
      its high latitude necessitates a large constella¬tion of interceptors, A space-based system with orbits capable of covering
      North Korea could cover about 75 percent of die worlds countries and about 90 percent of diose that might now be
      considered potential threats. The first step in boost-phase intercept is detecting die launch of a threat missile. CBO's
      alternative systems are assumed to all use die same set of sensors to detect launches—a sensor architecture based on die one
      that DoD is planning to deploy to support missile defense and other requirements. For BPI, the important sensors are the
      system of space-based infrared satellites (called SBIRS-High) now being developed, CBO assumed that such space-based
      sensors could allow for BPI commit times on the order of 60 seconds (on the basis of the APS study's assessment of the
      potential performance of no-tional satellite sensors employing current technology). Sensors such as surface or airborne
      radar could be effec-tive against small countries like North Korea. However, because of horizon limitations, an ICBM
      launched from the interior of a large country such as Iran might not be visible to surface or airborne sensors for more than
      two minutes—resulting in too long a commit time for BPI. Because the sensor architecture is common to all of the
      alternatives, it is not explicitly included in the compari¬son below. Nonetheless, the analysis assumes that SBIRS-High or a
      system with similar capability would be fielded in time to support these illustrative BPI systems.\




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                                           AT: Perm do Both
Can’t do both – Developing missile defense in space is perceived as weaponization, causing
Russia and China to develop ASATs and accidental nuclear war to break out, means developing
ground missile defense alone is enough.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                          DDW 2011
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                                                     Solves Rogue States
Space NMD is overkill – Smaller systems resolve missile risks
Charles V. Peña, a senior fellow at the Independent Institute, a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, a
former senior fellow with the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, an adviser to the Straus Military
Reform Project and Edward L. Hudgins is former director of regulatory studies at the Cato Institute, 3-18-02, [―Should the US
weaponize space?‖, Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, No. 427, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa427.pdf] E. Liu

      United States space policy and capa- bilities—as they have been described in the Space Commission report and discussed
      by some in the military—are, by their very nature, global. As such, they only serve to foster a glob- al, space-based NMD
      system. In other words, the only way to defend the panoply of satel - lites orbiting the earth is to have a constella- tion of
      space-based weapons to provide ―space superiority.‖ And those space-based weapons will have an inherent capability to
      shoot at bal - listic missiles (whether they threaten the satel - lites or not). Thus, a military requirement to protect satellites
      (even in the absence of a true anti-satellite or ASAT threat) may be a way to pursue development and deployment of a
      global NMD in a potentially less visible and publicly debated way. Previous Cato Institute reports have argued that a
      national missile defense system should be a truly national defense to protect the United States homeland and not a global
      defense to provide worldwide protection. 65 The reasons that NMD should be limited to protecting the United States
      include the fol- lowing: •The technology for a limited land- based system is the most mature and is currently in its early
      stages of opera- tional testing. •U.S. allies are wealthy enough to build their own missile defenses. 11 A vibrant com-
      mercial space industry will sup- port and enhance U.S. military capabilities far better than let- ting military requirements
      dominate space policy. •Any defense expenditure must be com- mensurate with the threat, and the lim- ited ballistic missile
      threat does not jus- tify the large expenditures required for a global, layered defense system. • If thicker and wider missile
      defenses cause U.S. policymakers to feel more secure against missile attacks, they may be more tempted to engage in
      reckless overseas military adventures, which would actually reduce U.S. security.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                    DDW 2011
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                                                  Solves Major Powers
Either ground based solves better or large states will take out MD capabilities
Richard Lawrence Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, New York. For
many years he was an adjunct professor of physics at Columbia University and, from 1952, a scientist at the IBM Watson Laboratory
at Columbia University,[2] retiring from IBM in 1993.[3] He has also been an Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell
University. Garwin received the National Medal of Science, the nation's highest honor for the fields of science and engineering,
award year 2002. the author of the actual design used in the first hydrogen bomb (code-named Mike) in 1952, 5-14-03, [―Advancing
Human       Security:             The       Role       of       Technology      and      Politics,‖      Pugwash     Congerence,
http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/events/documents/2003/2003-07-22-conf.statement.pdf] E. Liu

      We turn now to space weapons (and their competition) for missile defense. For boost-phase intercept— BPI-- space-based
      kinetic-energy (hit-to-kill) interceptors are in competition with surface-based interceptors (on land or sea, or even on
      aircraft). The non-space options excel against a small state such as North Korea, largely surrounded by water. For BPI,
      space-based interceptors must be given acceleration and divert capabilities very similar to those required for surface-based
      interceptors, if they are not to pass harmlessly by the quarry missiles. For missile launches from a small area, space-based
      interceptors have their required number multiplied by the number of simultaneous launches, and also by the "absentee
      ratio" because most of the SBI will be on the other side of the Earth and unable to join the fray for a clustered launch.
      However capable the surface-based interceptors would be against North Korea, Iraq, or even against launches from Iran,
      unless based within the target country they are ineffective against ICBMs launched from China or Russia, because the
      interior of those countries is so far from the borders. 05/23/03 Castellon (Garwin) 05/14/2003 5 Yet China and Russia are
      highly capable powers, and it would be much easier for them to destroy space- based interceptors as the constellation is
      gradually built than it would be for the US to use the SBIs to counter ballistic missile launch. Some observers are skeptical
      that Russia or China (or France, for that matter) would destroy SBIs in peacetime, but when the question is posed what the
      US would do if another state deployed a vast number of SBIs, the response of many of my colleagues is that we would
      destroy them—―shoot them down‖.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                       DDW 2011
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                                                 Ground Based is Better
SBI is expensive and much worse than ground based interceptors
Bruce M. DeBlois et al 4 is Director of Systems Integration at BAE SYSTEMS, Reston, Virginia. He was formerly Adjunct Senior
Fellow for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Lawrence Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the
Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, New York. For many years he was an adjunct professor of physics at
Columbia University and, from 1952, a scientist at the IBM Watson Laboratory at Columbia University,[2] retiring from IBM in
1993.[3] He has also been an Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University. Garwin received the National Medal of
Science, the nation's highest honor for the fields of science and engineering, award year 2002. the author of the actual design used in
the first hydrogen bomb (code-named Mike) in 1952, R. Scott Kemp is a Fulbright Fellow to the European Union and research staff
at the Pro- gram on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Kemp was previously Research Associate for Science and
National Security Studies at CFR and Jeremy C. Marwell is a Furman Scholar at the New York University School of Law. He was
formerly Research Associate for Science and Technology Studies at CFR, Fall 04, [―Space Weapons Crossing the U.S. Rubicon,‖
International     Security,     Volume        29,     Number       2,    Fall    2004,      pp.    50-84,      The      MIT      Press,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v029/29.2deblois.html] E.Liu

      Space-based interceptors were analyzed in depth by the APS Study Group, whose members included long-time engineering
      experts on rockets and de- fenses. The APS group reªned existing techniques for bringing the rocket- propelled interceptor‘s
      kinetic-kill vehicle into collision with the booster while it is still ªring, such that its calculations represent an optimistic
      picture of the system‘s capability. Nonetheless, the group found that mass constraints (driven by the cost of putting material
      in orbit) undermined any inherent ad- vantages the space-based interceptors might have enjoyed in terms of global reach
      and exo-atmospheric maneuverability. In sum, the APS study estimates the United States would need some 10,000 tons of
      material in orbit to deal with the simultaneous launch of ªve ICBMs from a compact area, and that with only one or
      sometimes two interceptors per ICBM launch. At $22 million per ton of mass launched into LEO, this would amount to
      some $220 billion for launch costs alone. For boost-phase intercept, the APS analysis demonstrates that small inter- ceptors
      (of mass 1,300 kilograms) sometimes proposed for sea-based boost- phase intercept (in the case of North Korea) would not
      be effective. The study does not preclude, however, the effectiveness of ground- and sea-based high- speed interceptors of
      some 14-ton launch weight. 78 Ten ground-based intercep- tors could provide the same capability as some 8,000 space-
      based interceptors to counter a clustered launch of ªve ICBMs. The main point of the APS analy- sis in comparing SBI to
      ground-based interceptors is that presence in orbit pro- vides no utility unless the KKV of the SBI is given similar
      ―reachout‖ and ―divert‖ capability to that needed for a ground-based interceptor.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                       DDW 2011
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                                                 Ground Based Cheaper
Ground based defense is always cheaper – Longer lifetime and doesn’t require launch or
replacement
Congresional Budget Office, 7-04, [―Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,‖ CBO,
www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5679&type=1] E. Liu

      All of the alternative BPI systems described above are able to provide full coverage against liquid-fuel ICBMs from Iran
      and North Korea, but they do not have identical ca¬pabilities. Each design has inherent advantages and disad¬vantages in
      such matters as cost, potential area of cover¬age, capability against solid-fuel ICBMs, dependence on access to foreign
      bases, vulnerability to being attacked or to exhausting their supply of interceptors, and strategic responsiveness. Not
      surprisingly, the greatest differences exist between the space-based systems and the surface-based ones. Costs Developing
      and fielding die surface-based BPI system in Option 1 and tlien operating it for 20 years would cost a total of $16 billion to
      $24 billion (in 2004 dollars), CBO estimates. The system in Option 2 would cost $18 billion to $28 billion, and the one in
      Option 3 would cost $25 billion to $37 billion (see Summary Table 2). Those ranges reflect the possibility of cost growth
      comparable to what similar defense programs have experienced in the past. The cost estimates for the three surface-based
      systems as-sume procurement of equipment for 10 BPI launch sites. Each site would include six interceptors plus a set of
      com-munications and battle management equipment. Using two interceptor shots per engagement, each launch site could
      engage diree targets with that allotment of inter-ceptors. For those options, 10 sites' worth of equipment would be enough to
      defend against liquid-fuel ICBMs fired from Iran and North Korea and also provide some equipment for use against other
      countries of concern. Ad-ditionally, the estimate for each surface-based system in-cludes costs to purchase, operate, and
      maintain three cargo ships on which a BPI site could be located to pro-vide sea-based capability (such as against North
      Korea). Of the space-based systems, the one in Option 5 would cost $27 billion to $40 billion (similar to the high-perfor-
      mance surface-based system in Option 3). The lower-speed SBI system in Option 4 would cost more—$56 bil¬lion to $78
      billion—because of higher costs per intercep¬tor and higher launch costs to put more mass into orbit. The space-based
      options are more expensive than die sur¬face-based options because they need more interceptors to cover Iran and North
      Korea at all times and because they require paying for launch services. The high opera¬tions costs for tliose options reflect
      the need to periodi¬cally buy and launch replacement SBIs. CBO assumes that each interceptor in orbit would have a life
      span of seven years—a typical length for satellites in low-Earth orbit—compared with at least 20 years for a surface-based
      interceptor, The costs of die various BPI systems would be lower if planners accepted less capability. For example, five
      surface sites could provide coverage just of Iran and North Korea (with nodiing left over for testing or odier coverage). The
      cost of that capability over 20 years could be as low as $14 billion to $21 billion for Option 1, $16 billion to $26 billion for
      Option 2, and $22 billion to $35 billion for Option 3, CBO estimates. Similarly, if die space-based systems used a single
      shot against each ICBM, die cost of Option 4 could drop to $36 billion to $51 billion and the cost of Option 5 could decline
      to $20 billion to $31 billion. Although those less-capable systems would probably be considered insufficient as a stand-
      alone de¬fense, tliey might be adequate as complements to other layers of a multilayer ballistic missile defense system.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                        DDW 2011
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                                            Space Defense Causes ASATs
Space based missile defense encourages new ASATs
Charles V. Peña, a senior fellow at the Independent Institute, a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, a
former senior fellow with the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, an adviser to the Straus Military
Reform Project and Edward L. Hudgins is former director of regulatory studies at the Cato Institute, 3-18-02, [―Should the US
weaponize space?‖, Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, No. 427, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa427.pdf] E. Liu

      Yet building a global NMD system may actually be counterproductive. Such a system would be able to shoot down not
      only ballistic missiles but also ASATs as well as orbiting satellites and spacecraft. Nations that feel that the United States is
      trying to hold their satel - lites at risk or prevent them from launching satellites will have incentives (that would be
      nonexistant in the absence of such a threat) to develop ASATs, regardless of the technological hurdles, and will be more
      likely to expend the necessary resources to acquire such a capabili - ty. Those ASATs could put the whole constel - lation
      of U.S. military and civilian satellites at risk. With the greatest dependence of any nation on space assets (both civilian and
      mili - tary), U.S. security could ultimately be reduced if hostile nations are spurred to develop and deploy ASATs (which
      they currently do not have) in response to U.S. deployment of space- based NMD.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                                               DDW 2011
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                                                              Space Defense Fails
Missile defense can’t defend against major powers
Congresional Budget Office, 7-04, [―Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,‖ CBO,
www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5679&type=1] E. Liu

      The greater performance inherent in Options 2 and 3 would give them greater capability against ICBMs with shorter burn times. Either alternative, using a
      site in die Sea of Japan, could counter a solid-fuel ICBM with a diree-minute burn time launched from North Korea even if commit times exceeded 60
      seconds. For full coverage of Iran, the number of sites needed under Option 3 would increase from two to four (for a 60-second commit time), and the
      number of sites needed under Option 2 would rise from two to seven. Those additional sites would not require buying more than die 10 mission sets
                                                                                                                             of space-based
      included in each option, but they would leave fewer sites available to tify die value of the additional coverage. Proponents
      interceptors argue that die identity of future threats is uncertain and that coverage of the ocean is a valuable hedge
      against ICBMs launched from ships or submarines. In principle, a space-based system is also ca-pable of covering
      very large countries—such as China or Russia—tbat are too big to be covered by surface inter-ceptors located around their borders. However,
      die con-stellations in Options 4 and 5 would not cover high enough latitudes to defend against missiles
      launched from those countries.

Missile defense can be avoided by creating a hole or shooting two missiles
Nancy Gallagher, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) and a
Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy. She co-directs the Advanced Methods of
Cooperative Security Program and John D. Steinbruner, Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at the
University of Maryland and Director of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 4-08,
[―RECONSIDERING THE RULES OF SPACE PROJECT,‖ American Academy of Arts and Sciences, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA482054&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf] E. Liu

      U.S. military satellites are somewhat better able to avoid or withstand these types of attacks than commercial or civilian
      satellites are, so if deliberate interference with satellites becomes more common, the softer targets are more likely to suffer.
      The combination of satellite vulnerability and the high absentee ratio in LEO poses particular problems for space-based
      missile defense, because an adversary could create a hole in the constellation by destroying a few inter- ceptors (or inducing
      them to fire in self-defense or at a decoy missile), then launching through the hole the next time it passed over a launch site.
      Satellite absenteeism also exacerbates the cost-effectiveness problem with missile defense, because designing a space-based
      interceptor system that could stop two missiles launched simultaneously from the same location would require twice as
      many satellites as a system designed to intercept only a single launch. Satellite vulnerability and absenteeism would also
      affect an offen- sive application of the interceptor system—that is, preventing other countries from launching objectionable
      satellites. But they would pose less acute prob- lems because a missed intercept would result in a satellite in orbit that might
      be disabled or destroyed by other means before it could fulfill its threatening mission. Still, the physics of space make total
      space control essentially impos- sible; the physics also favor offense over defense in highly destabilizing ways. These same
      physical principles place practical limits on improvements in U.S. space-based intelligence capabilities. As best as can be
      determined from the public record, the NRO currently operates up to three spy satellites in each of three categories: the
      Keyhole series of optical satellites, the Lacrosse/Onyx series of radar satellites, and theMisty series of stealth satellites.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                DDW 2011
                                                              1


                                           **Solvency




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                     DDW 2011
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                                                    Solvency Frontline
1. BMD has empirically failed and even successful tests are unrealistic
Graham Spinardi is at the Institute for the Study of Science, Technology and Innovation, University of Edinburgh, 12-08,
[―Ballistic missile defence and the politics of testing: the case of the US ground-based midcourse defence,‖ Science and Public
Policy, 35(10), December 2008, pages 703–715, http://www.stis.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/30601/SpinardiS-and-
PPbmd.pdf] E. Liu

      Such a demonstration of feasibility was seen to hinge on the performance of flight-tests. Earlier test programmes had been
      seen as demonstrating that it was possible to ‗hit a bullet with a bullet‘, to use the usual analogy, but two main issues
      remained a con- cern. For one thing, the combined success rate for HOE and ERIS was two out of six, and a system with
      such a one-in-three chance of hitting the target would be unacceptable for a deployed defence. The other issue, however,
      is more fundamental to disputes over performance claims for BMD. Hitting a reentry vehicle in a flight-test is an
      impressive achievement, but the critical issue is whether the conditions of such tests are sufficiently realistic. That is to
      say, confidence in the system hinges on judgements of similarity between the flight-tests and ‗real-life‘ use (MacKenzie,
      1989). Typically, in a flight-test the nature of the target, any accompanying decoys or other countermeasures, and their
      time and direction of attack are all known to the defence. Moreover, to date, most tests have used decoys that are
      relatively easy to distinguish from the target re- entry vehicle or no decoys at all (Gronlund et al., 2004). As Paul
      Kaminski, Undersecretary of De- fense for Acquisition and Technology from 1994 to 1997, put it: ‗We can make a bullet
      hit a bullet. We can demonstrate that under ideal conditions. The next step is to move from hitting, not occasionally, but
      to hit routinely under stressful operational condi- tions‘ (quoted in Weiner, 1997). NMD flight-testing was carried with
      interceptors based on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, and using radars and other sensors based Politics of
      testing US ballistic missile defence system there. The target objects, typically a reentry vehicle and some decoys, were
      carried by missiles launched from the Vandenberg Air Base in California, about 7500 km away (Gronlund et al., 2004).
      These target reentry vehicles carried either a global positioning satellite (GPS) receiver and transmitter or a C-band
      beacon (for use with a C-band radar on Hawaii) or both because no suitable radar could track the early stages of flight
      unassisted. Interceptor launch was initiated and guided by information from these sources, but the final homing of the kill
      vehicle (known as the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV)) was autonomous. As it approaches the target cluster (the
      reentry vehicle, remnants of the missile, and any decoys and countermeasures), the EKV compares the IR signatures of the
      objects it can see and uses discrimination algorithms to choose its target. The first two integrated flight tests (IFTs 1A and
      2) were ‗fly-by‘ tests aimed at demonstrating the performance of the system, and particularly the competing kill vehicle
      designs of Boeing and Ray- theon, but with no attempt to intercept the target re- entry vehicle. Carried out in June 1997 and
      January 1998, respectively, these tests collected data as the kill vehicle viewed the dummy warhead and its
      accompanying decoys, which comprised both a number of different sized balloons and conical, re- entry vehicle-shaped,
      decoys (Coyle, 2000). Although not intended to achieve intercepts these fly-by tests were to be significant for future test
      plans, leading to a major controversy over the capa- bility of the kill vehicle to discriminate between de- coys and actual
      reentry vehicles, and whether the tests were a realistic test of such a capability. At the heart of this controversy was the
      decision by the Ballistic Missile Defense Office to reduce the num- ber and complexity of decoys used in subsequent
      flight-tests. Critics argue that this decision stemmed from the realization that the kill vehicle‘s discrimination algo-
      rithms could not distinguish between realistic decoys and the actual reentry vehicle (Postol, 2000). Cer- tainly, whatever
      the reason, decoys that have been used in subsequent flight-tests have had markedly different signatures from the target
      reentry vehicle. This was confirmed by Philip Coyle, the Pentagon‘s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, in
      Congressional testimony in September 2000: ‗Signa- ture simulations show that since the large balloon and deployment
      bus have IR signatures very dissimi- lar to the medium reentry vehicle (MRV), the EKV can easily discriminate the MRV
      from these objects‘ (Coyle, 2000).

2. Space boost-phase interceptors are easily beaten by countermeasures and shorter boosts
Graham Spinardi is at the Institute for the Study of Science, Technology and Innovation, University of Edinburgh,1-10,
[―Technological Controversy and US Ballistic Missile Defence: Star Warriors versus the Huntsville Mafia,‖ Defense Studies,
tp://www.stis.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/30600/SpinardiBMDTechControversyWP.pdf] E. Liu

       The practicality of space-based systems, on the other hand, hinges on the cost of putting them into orbit, but cost
      estimates depend on the weight of the interceptors and number required, and this calculation in turn is based on
      assumptions about the duration of enemy missiles‘ boost phase and the speed of the interceptors. This calculus is
      further complicated by the potential countermeasures that could be used by enemies seeking to overcome a boost phase


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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                        DDW 2011
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      defence. Thus, the claim that boost phase interception eliminates the problem of midcourse discrimination can be
      countered by the argument that opponents could deploy missiles with such short boost phases as to make interception
      practically impossible. Even with a boost phase lasting four minutes (typical for liquid-fueled ICBMs compared to three
      minutes for solid-fueled ones), the time left for interception is very short once detection, tracking and decision-making
      are taken into account. 129 In addition, the APS study noted other countermeasures that could defeat boost-phase
      defences -- whether terrestrially or space based – ‗such as maneuvering and deployment of thrusted decoys during
      upper stage boost, and even multiple upper stages (all of which were employed in one form or another as early as 40 years
      ago.)‘ 130

3. SBIs are vulnerable – Enemies could pick off during deployment
Bruce M. DeBlois is Director of Systems Integration at BAE SYSTEMS, Reston, Virginia. He was formerly Adjunct Senior Fellow
for Science and Technology at the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Lawrence Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus at the Thomas
J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, New York. For many years he was an adjunct professor of physics at Columbia
University and, from 1952, a scientist at the IBM Watson Laboratory at Columbia University,[2] retiring from IBM in 1993.[3] He has
also been an Andrew D. White Professor-at-Large at Cornell University. Garwin received the National Medal of Science, the nation's
highest honor for the fields of science and engineering, award year 2002. the author of the actual design used in the first hydrogen
bomb (code-named Mike) in 1952, R. Scott Kemp is a Fulbright Fellow to the European Union and research staff at the Pro- gram
on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Kemp was previously Research Associate for Science and National Security
Studies at CFR and Jeremy C. Marwell is a Furman Scholar at the New York University School of Law. He was formerly
Research Associate for Science and Technology Studies at CFR, Fall 04, [―Space Weapons Crossing the U.S. Rubicon,‖ International
Security,       Volume        29,       Number        2,     Fall      2004,      pp.       50-84,        The       MIT        Press,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ins/summary/v029/29.2deblois.html] E.Liu

      It is well established, however, that it would be trivial to destroy the SBIs one by one as the constellation is being built. In
      contrast to attacks on large, very costly LEO satellites, 1-ton SBI satellites would best be attacked at leisure with a small,
      low-performance ground-based KKV interceptor, aided by ground-based laser or radar at the planned intercept site. 79 This
      intercept is feasible now, but the question is one of incentive and resolve: which nation or combination of nations would
      have sufªcient interest to object to and destroy U.S. SBIs, which would be in orbit in violation of no existing law? At the
      very least, existing international law would require the state responsible for the de- struction of SBIs to repay the United
      States the cost of the SBI and its launch. 80 in sum: ballistic missile defense. Space-based weapons for defense of the
      United States against long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear war- heads would be ineffective in the midcourse
      phase, if the nuclear warheads in antisimulation balloons were accompanied by many indistinguishable balloon decoys.
      Space-based lasers and space-based interceptors are attractive con- cepts for boost-phase intercept of long-burn-duration
      liquid-fueled ICBMs, but entail large costs to offset a few ICBMs that might be launched simultaneously from a small area.
      The SBL provides a billion-dollar target for a small space mine, while the SBI is vulnerable to space mines or, more
      speciªcally, to de- struction by low-performance ground-based KKVs as the constellation is being deployed.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                        DDW 2011
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                                            XTN #1– BMD Doesn’t Work
Extend number 1 – Success rate of BMD is about a third, and the tests are extremely unrealistic –
All of the factors of the missile are known beforehand, and decoys are not used, that’s Spinardi
08.

Without successful tests, BMD programs stagnate
Graham Spinardi is at the Institute for the Study of Science, Technology and Innovation, University of Edinburgh, 12-08,
[―Ballistic missile defence and the politics of testing: the case of the US ground-based midcourse defence,‖ Science and Public
Policy, 35(10), December 2008, pages 703–715, http://www.stis.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/30601/SpinardiS-and-
PPbmd.pdf] E. Liu

      This lack of spiral development is, of course, closely tied to what has happened with flight-testing. A par- ticular
      problem with the Bush strategy for BMD has been that its ‗capability-based‘ deployment, predi- cated on the
      promise of continuous improvement through spiral development, coincided with a period of four years without a
      successful flight-test intercept. The GMD deployment thus went ahead without the system being validated by flight-tests.
      The 2005 Defense Authorization Act had ‗directed DOD to conduct an operationally realistic test of the system by
      October 1, 2005‘ (GAO, 2005: 18), but this did not happen. According to MDA Director Kadish the urgency of immediate
      deployment had required the normal procurement approach of ‗fly-before-you- buy‘ to be replaced by one of ‗fly-as-we-
      buy‘ (Wall, 2004: 30). In fact, as it turned out, in practice it was rather an approach of ‗buy-before-you-fly‘! However,
      this lack of flight-testing was not the biggest irony of the Bush deployment decision. Paradoxically, deployment also may
      have under- mined the role of flight-testing in improving the performance of GMD technology. Flight-test fail- ures not
      only meant a long period without a success- ful intercept, but they also stymied the planned progression to more realistic
      test scenarios. Instead of facilitating ‗learning by doing‘ the decision to deploy has compromised the flight-test
      programme, one of the key tools for advancing knowledge about the technology‘s performance. This undermining of
      flight-testing has come about because of the role that these tests also play as ‗public experiments‘ (Collins, 1988). By
      deploying the GMD system the Bush administration made flight-testing more sensitive politically. The techni- cal
      challenges remained the same, but the societal challenges increased considerably. The more that the GMD system was
      portrayed as a deployed, opera- tional system, the less tolerant the public and Con- gress would be of test failures. Flight-
      test failures now became much more significant because each failure adds to the perception that the deployed sys- tem is
      ineffective, even though BMD development has been costing the US taxpayer around US$10 billion a year.

Testing is undemanding and useless – The focus is on successful tests to boost popularity
Graham Spinardi is at the Institute for the Study of Science, Technology and Innovation, University of Edinburgh, 12-08,
[―Ballistic missile defence and the politics of testing: the case of the US ground-based midcourse defence,‖ Science and Public
Policy, 35(10), December 2008, pages 703–715, http://www.stis.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/30601/SpinardiS-and-
PPbmd.pdf] E. Liu

      Fear of failure has led MDA to focus its efforts on ensuring flight-tests are successful (i.e. that they hit the target) rather
      than necessarily useful (i.e. that they might fail to hit the target, but nevertheless provide useful feedback that could lead to
      improve- ments). For political reasons the overriding concern has been that flight-tests should succeed, not that they
      provide new data points. In most regards recent GMD flight-tests have remained confined to a nar- row range of the
      potential operational conditions or have even become less demanding. A significant example of this can be seen in the
      way that MDA has removed any decoys or counter- measures from recent tests. None of the GMD inter- cept tests since
      2002 have included any decoys or countermeasures (Coyle, 2008: 16; Samson, 2008). According to testimony from
      former Pentagon Test Director Coyle: ‗From a target discrimination point of view, during the past five years the flight
      inter- cept tests have been simpler and less realistic than the tests in the first five years‘ (Coyle, 2008: 16). This goes
      against the logic of ‗spiral develop- ment‘ in which the currently deployed system would be improved through feedback
      from progressively operationally relevant testing. That should mean testing in a wider range of realistic conditions, but
      this has not happened. For example, to date there has been no testing of the GMD system at night (Coyle, 2008: 17), but it
      can hardly be guaranteed that an enemy would overlook the age-old tactic of attack- ing under cover of dark. Given that the
      success of interception depends on the kill vehicle‘s ability to discriminate infrared signatures, the absence of sunlight
      heating of the reentry vehicles could be sig- nificant. Nor have there been intercept tests against tumbling reentry vehicles
      or against realistic decoys (objects that provide IR signatures that can be diffi- cult to distinguish from real warheads)


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      although both these were originally planned to occur in 2001–2002 (Coyle, 2008: 17). There has been one significant
      broadening of the flight-test envelope with the new intercept geometry used in the tests carried out in September 2006 and
      September 2007. Nevertheless, the assessment by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in March 2008 of missile defense
      progress, noted that ‗tests of the GMD element have not include target suite dynamic features and intercept geometries
      represen- tative of the operational environment in which GMD will perform its mission‘ (GAO, 2008: 27). For example,
      all intercept tests to date have been against targets carried on minimum energy (the most effi- cient) trajectory missiles.
      Although it is well-known that both depressed and lofted trajectories can pose special problems for defences, they have
      not been incorporated into the flight-tests.




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                                           XTN #2 – Countermeasures
1NC number 3 – Our evidence is pretty great on addressing how even space based boost phase
interceptors fail – Enemies can dramatically reduce the boost phase to make intercept impossible
and multiple upper stages or specialized decoys can all tank effectiveness, that’s Spinaldi 08.

Countermeasures and a shorter boost phase can tank defense
David K. Barton is vice president of ANRO Engineering Consultants. An IEEE Fellow, he served as chairman of the Radar Systems
Panel of the IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Society. He is the author of Radar Technology Encyclopedia, et al., Roger
Falcone University of California, Berkeley Daniel Kleppner, Co-Chair Massachusetts Institute of Technology Frederick K. Lamb, Co-
Chair University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Ming K. Lau Sandia National Laboratories David Montague LDM Associates,
Menlo Park, CA David E. Mosher, Staff Director RAND, Washington, DC William Priedhorsky Los Alamos National Laboratory
Maury Tigner Cornell University David R. Vaughan RAND, Santa Monica, CA             Harvey L. Lynch Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center Ken Cole, Staff Assistant American Physical Society David Moncton Argonne National Laboratory, 7-03, [―Report of the
American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense Scientific and Technical
Issues,‖ American Physical Society, http://www.americanphysicalsociety.com/units/fps/newsletters/2004/january/reviews.pdf] E. Liu

      Countermeasures. While boost-phase intercept would not be susceptible to some of the countermeasures to midcourse
      intercept that have been proposed, there is no reason to think it would not face any countermeasures. Effective
      countermeasures to boost-phase intercept by interceptor rockets could include launching several ICBMs at nearly the same
      time or deploying rocket-propelled decoys and jammers. Furthermore, ICBMs could be programmed to fly evasive
      maneuvers that might overwhelm the agility and guidance and control capabilities of the interceptor or exhaust its
      propellant. Shortening the boost phase would also be an effective countermeasure: it would be practically impossible for
      any in-terceptor rocket to reach an ICBM with a boost phase of 2 minutes or less, even if it were launched from a very
      small country. Countermeasures against the Airborne Laser could include applying ablative coatings or rotating the ICBM
      to reduce the amount of heat the missile absorbs, launching multiple missiles to overwhelm the Airborne Laser's
      capabilities, or attacking the aircraft carrying the laser.




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                                       XTN #3 – BMD Will be Taken Out
1NC number 4 – Even if space weaponization is inevitable, that only takes out solvency – ASATs
could easily take out missile defense as its being deployed – The high cost of the system makes it
an easy decision for others, that’s Deblois et al 4.

China won’t develop aggressive ASATs now, but missile defense justifies it
Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 7-1-03, [―CAPABILITIES OF POTENTIAL
ADVERSARIES,‖ FAS Report, http://www.fas.org/resource/10072004164453.pdf] E. Liu

       From the Chinese perspective, any anti-ballistic missile (ABM) weapons are also ASAT weapons, thus China hopes a ban
      on space weaponization (including ASATs) would ban any ABM weapons and halt the U.S. missile defense program. If the
      United States deploys a multi-layer missile defense system with a space weapons component, it is believed that it would be
      politically acceptable for China to pursue ASATs as an effective countermeasure.

Missile defenses excite Chinese asymmetrical response
Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, 7-1-03, [―CAPABILITIES OF POTENTIAL
ADVERSARIES,‖ FAS Report, http://www.fas.org/resource/10072004164453.pdf] E. Liu

      It is believed that an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) system must start intercepting ICBM as early as the boost
      phase, for which space weapons could be used, such as the Space Based Laser (SBL) and Brilliant Pebbles (BP) missile de-
      fense concepts. A layered missile defense system would include space based sen- sors, such as early warning satellites
      (DSP/SBIRS-high) and a space-based missile tracking system (SBIRS-low). The SBIRS-high as planned would consist of
      5 or 6 new early warning satellites located in high orbit and designed to detect the hot plume of the missile during its boost
      phase using infrared sensors. The SBIRS- low system would have approximately 24 satellites located in low Earth orbit.
      These satellites would be equipped with both wide field-of-view infrared sensors designed to detect targets during boost
      phase and narrow field-of-view infrared and visible light sensors designed to track targets during midcourse. SBIRS-low is
      designed to help with target discrimination by adding different types of sensors to the National Missile Defense system.
      Appendices | 117 Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that China could resort to asymmetric methods to counter these
      critical and vulnerable space-based components in low earth orbit such as the space-based tracking satellites (e.g., SBIR-
      low) and the weapon carrier vehicle satellites. The asymmetric approach "countering an adver- sary's strengths by focusing
      on its weaknesses," could be a feasible military strategy in a conflict with the United States in the future. In fact, since the
      Gulf War, some military experts in China have written articles to advocate that China should re- spond "asymmetrically" to
      American superiority by damaging U.S. satellites in a future war, given the huge advantage U.S. enjoys in conventional and
      nuclear weapons, and its reliance on satellites for military operations and pursuit of space dominance. 6




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                                                 AT: Perception Solves
The director of the Missile Defense Association proves successful tests are key to perception
Graham Spinardi is at the Institute for the Study of Science, Technology and Innovation, University of Edinburgh, 12-08,
[―Ballistic missile defence and the politics of testing: the case of the US ground-based midcourse defence,‖ Science and Public
Policy, 35(10), December 2008, pages 703–715, http://www.stis.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/30601/SpinardiS-and-
PPbmd.pdf] E. Liu

      The consecutive failures of flight-tests IFT 10, 13C and 14 led MDA Director Lt. General Henry A ‗Trey‘ Obering (who
      had taken over from Kadish in July 2004) to instigate an independent review team (IRT) in February 2005. 11 The main
      recommenda- tion of the IRT report, submitted at the end of March, was that the GMD programme should enter a new
      phase that they called ‗The Performance and Reliability Verification Phase‘. In particular, the IRT recommended that
      ‗mission assurance becomes the highest priority objective‘, and stressed the impor- tance of successful tests in sending ‗a
      strong mes- sage to adversaries of the US, who might be dissuaded by the effectiveness of the system from investing
      further in ballistic missiles and/or be de- terred from attacking the US, our deployed forces, our allies, and friends‘ (IRT,
      2005: 4, 7). In other words, it was important to make sure the tests were successful because this determined public
      perception of the capability of the system. Although each of the three test failures had spe- cific explanations, the IRT
      concluded that there was a general problem with the GMD programme. In particular, the demanding schedule for
      deployment had meant increased risk of failures, and the IRT recommended that from then on the test programme should
      be ‗event-driven rather than schedule-driven‘ (IRT, 2005: 11). Rather than a mindset of having to ‗prove why should not
      fly‘, the flight readiness process should be orientated proactively to one of ‗prove why should fly‘ (IRT, 2005: 14).
      Problems should not be addressed narrowly and fixed in isola- tion, but rather should be subject to comprehensive
      reviews.




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                                                                      AT: Lasers
Energy, technology, and orbiting make lasers fail – Can’t even destroy 20 ICBMs under best
coniditions
Brian C. Ruhm, United States Air Force, program manager of the Air Force Distributed Common Ground System Increment 10.2
Program at the Air Force Electronic Systems Center , was deployed to Kabul as a member of the former Combined Forces Command
Office of Security Cooperation from June to November 2005, 4-03, [―FINDING THE MIDDLE GROUND: THE U.S. AIR FORCE,
SPACE WEAPONIZATION, AND ARMS CONTROL,‖ Air Command and Staff College Air University,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/03-1394.pdf] E. Liu

      With the exception of ground based kinetic energy systems for missile defense or LEO ASAT, most of the capabilities depicted above
      require quantum leaps in technology before they become operationally viable. Even if the requisite technologies were
      available now, there are solid reasons to question the military utility of some of these systems. Space-based directed energy weapons, for
      instance, would be limited by fuel consumption rates, and would thus be susceptible to adversary strategies aimed at overwhelming
      their defensive capability. Because of the periodic nature of orbiting systems, gaps inevitably occur in weapon system
      coverage that detract from system effectiveness. 28 For example, based on a constellation with five times as many satellites as planned and
      allowing for capabilities well beyond current technology, Barry Watt concludes that an SBL-like system would destroy fewer than
      20 ICBMs salvoed against the US from Korea. 29 Watt allows that these numbers fluctuate according to specific assumptions, but the larger point he
      emphasizes is that ―opportunities for the attacker to maximize the chances of overwhelming SBL defenses are frequent and, because the
      SBL satellites move in accordance 19with orbital mechanics, predictable. Like any static defense, an SBL constellation can be saturated in space and
      time, and a determined opponent can be expected to evolve the weapons and tactics to do so.‖ 30




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                                           **Heg




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                                                         Heg Frontline
1. Space weapons not inevitable – vulnerable assets don’t necessarily invite attack
Karl P. Mueller, Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; B.A. in political science, University of Chicago, senior political scientist at
the RAND Corporation, 3/27/2002, ―Is the Weaponization of Space Inevitable?,‖ International Studies Association Annual
Convention)
     Far and away the best argument that space weaponization is inevitable, and the only such argument that can plausibly stand
     on its own, is that the military utility of space weapons for the United States and/or its enemies will soon be so great that
     the imperative of protecting national security will make space weaponization impossible for rational statesmen to resist.
     Exactly what these weapons would do, and how, varies from one weaponization vision to another, but the standard
     expectation is that space weapons would eventually defend friendly satellites against enemy attack, attack enemy space
     weapons and other satellites that perform important military functions, shoot down long-range ballistic missiles, and
     conduct attacks against enemy air and surface forces and other terrestrial targets.[33] Some weaponization advocates
     anticipate that space weapons will ultimately supplant many, or even most, types of terrestrial military forces; others have
     more modest expectations, but all predict that space weapons will be the best, and in some cases the only, systems available
     to fulfill at least some key military roles. The core of this inevitability argument is that even (or especially) if the
     United States chooses not to build space weapons, other countries will certainly do so, in large part because of the great and
     still growing degree to which U.S. military operations depend upon what has traditionally been known as ―space force
     enhancement‖: the use of satellites to provide a vast array of services including communications, reconnaissance,
     navigation, and missile launch warning, without which American military power would be crippled. This parallels the
     argument that the importance of satellites to the U.S. economy will make them an irresistible target, except that military
     satellites are far more indispensable, and successful attacks against a relatively small number of them could have a
     considerable military impact, for example by concealing preparations for an invasion or by disrupting U.S. operations at a
     critical juncture.[34] Rivals of the United States might also find space-to-earth weapons to be a very attractive way to
     counter U.S. advantages in military power projection. These are all reasonable arguments, but to conclude from them that
     space weaponization is inevitable, rather than merely possible or even likely, is unwarranted, for several reasons. There is
     no question that space systems are a key center of gravity (or perhaps several) for U.S. military capabilities. An enemy that
     attacked them might be able to impair U.S. military operations very seriously, and this ranks high among threats that
     concern U.S. strategists. It need not follow from this that the enemies of the United States will do so, or invest in the
     weapons required to do so, however. The U.S. armed forces possess many important vulnerabilities that adversaries have
     often, even consistently, opted not to attack in past conflicts. To cite but one widely-discussed example, during Operation
     Allied Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did not attempt to mount special forces attacks against key NATO airbases in Italy
     or to use manportable missiles to shoot down aircraft operating from them during take-off or landing, although such an
     action could have profoundly disrupted the Alliance‘s bombing campaign.[35] Moreover, it is quite possible that if a
     potential enemy did want to develop the ability to attack U.S. space systems, it would choose to do so in ways—such as
     investing in ground-based ASAT lasers or computer network attack capabilities—that would not involve weaponizing
     space, and against which the logical defensive countermeasures would not involve placing U.S. weapons in orbit either.
     For military as well as commercial satellites, ―bodyguard‖ weapons in space would offer protection only from certain sorts
     of attacks, while the terrestrial links in satellite systems would remain inviting targets. Again it is the transition to larger
     networks of smaller satellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability, perhaps together with supplementing satellite
     platforms for some military functions with new types of terrestrial systems, such as high endurance unmanned aerial
     vehicles (UAVs),[36] and improving terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATs and satellite launch and
     control facilities. Conversely, if the United States decides that it must have the ability to deny an enemy the use of its
     satellites, it is quite possible that the most attractive means for doing this will prove to involve non-space weapons and, to
     an even greater extent, tools that are not weapons in the conventional sense at all. Space-to-earth weapons are likely to
     prove to be less attractive than ASATs for the United States, which already possesses considerable ability to project
     military force around the world on short notice. Because orbital weapons offer only limited advantages over their terrestrial
     counterparts under most circumstances,[37] it is not difficult to imagine the U.S. Government deciding not to deploy them,
     and instead choosing to invest in terrestrial systems for rapidly attacking distant and well-protected targets, such as
     conventionally armed ICBMs and hypersonic stand-off missiles. For their part, potential enemies of the United States may
     see space weapons as one of the few ways in which they could threaten to mount a substantial non-nuclear military attack
     against targets in the U.S. homeland, and yet still not opt to build them, since effective STEW will not be inexpensive, and
     as years of experience have shown, states at war with the United States have usually been inclined to pursue victory by
     means other than directly attacking North America. Boost-phase long-range ballistic missile defense against large enemy
     states is the single existing military mission for which space-based weapons present the only viable option. However, in


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      spite of current U.S. enthusiasm for BMD, this is a mission in which the United States can afford not to invest for a variety
      or reasons[38] (and if it isn‘t, to say that space weaponization is inevitable because we are determined to build space
      weapons would be an intolerably circular argument). Rivals of the United States seem unlikely to build space-based BMD
      systems to protect themselves from missile attack either by the United States or regional adversaries in light of the
      alternatives.

2. Missile defense causes asymmetric responses and a collapse of international credibility – That
collapses soft and hard power
Trevor Brown, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 09. Air & Space Power
Journal, ―Soft Power and Space Weaponization,‖ http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)

      The United States has plans to weaponize space and is already deploying missile-defense platforms.1 Official, published
      papers outline long-term visions for space weapons, including direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) missiles, ground-based
      lasers that target satellites in low Earth orbit, and hypervelocity rod bundles that strike from space.2 According to federal
      budget documents, the Pentagon has asked Congress for considerable resources to test weapons in space, marking the
      biggest step toward creating a space battlefield since the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Cold War.3 Although two
      co-orbital escort vehicles—the XSS-11 experimental microsatellite and the Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for
      Evaluating Local Space—are intended to monitor the space environment and inspect friendly satellites, they possess the
      technical ability to disrupt other nations‘ military reconnaissance and communications satellites.4 These developments have
      caused considerable apprehension in Moscow, Beijing, and other capitals across the world, resulting in a security dilemma.
      Russia and China believe that they must respond to this strategic challenge by taking measures to dissuade the United
      States from pursuing space weapons and missile defenses. Their response will likely include developing more advanced
      ASAT weapons, building more intercontinental ballistic missiles, extending the life of existing ballistic missiles, adopting
      countermeasures against missile defenses, developing other asymmetric capabilities for the medium of space, and
      reconsidering commitments on arms control.5 The military options for Russia and China are not very appealing since
      neither can compete directly with the United States in space on an equal financial, military, or technical footing.
      Consequently, their first and best choice is the diplomatic route through the United Nations (UN) by presenting resolutions
      and treaties in hopes of countering US space-weaponization efforts with international law. Although such attempts have
      thus far failed to halt US plans, they have managed to build an international consensus against the United States. Indeed, on
      5 December 2007, a vote on a UN resolution calling for measures to stop an arms race in space passed by a count of 178 to
      one against the United States, with Israel abstaining.6 The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it
      seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have
      vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased
      geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the
      legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite
      any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce).8 The United States should not take its soft power lightly since decreases
      in that attribute over the past decade have led to increases in global influence for strategic competitors, particularly Russia
      and China. The ramifications have included a gradual political, economic, and social realignment, otherwise known as
      ―multipolarism‖ and translated as waning US power and influence. ―Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral
      popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. . . . When the United States becomes so unpopular
      that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries‘ domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to
      make helpful concessions. . . . And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing
      U.S. leverage in international affairs.‖9 Due to US losses of soft power, the international community now views with
      suspicion any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in space, making it far
      more difficult politically for the Air Force to make plans to offer such protection.

3. Offensive capabilities aren’t necessary for space power – Ground capabilities exercise it
sufficiently now
Don L. Wilkerson, space operations officer for the U.S. Army in Carlisle, PA, 3-15-08, [―SPACE POWER THEORY:
CONTROLLING THE MEDIUM WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE,‖ US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300] E. Liu

       Space power as a theory illustrates the importance of strategic space systems and demonstrates that space is the ―ultimate
      high ground‖ in which policy makers and commanders will need to formulate actions to seize and control in support of


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      strategic objectives. Theoretically, on-orbit offensive space capabilities would be used to find, fix, track, and destroy targets
      in space, air, on land and at sea. Again, if this capability existed, the employment of space weapons would be more of a
      combat multiplier in support of the other geographical mediums rather than providing unilateral control of all environments
      from space. Gray contends that space power ―adds the greatest value for lethality in combat in the twentieth century.‖ 22
      However, since most of the United States‘ current offensive space power capabilities are ground-based and augmented with
      superior conventional as well as other non-kinetic weapons and forces, one could argue that we currently control the space
      medium without the cost, proliferation and hazards associated with placing weapon systems in orbit. Gray believes that the
      strategic interest in terms of space power theory ―lies in the consequences of its application for deterrence and the conduct
      of war as a whole.‖ 2310 The concept of space control put forth by Gray compares the control of the space medium as
      similar to conducting blockades and ‗choke points‘ like Mahan‘s maritime strategy for sea power. Space has similar choke
      points such as specific launch sites attempting to launch offensive space weapons or satellites that are susceptible to attack
      or that can be held at risk. 24 Again, these choke points or space blockades can be affected using existing capabilities
      without the need for placing weapons in space. The naval theories of Sir Julian Corbett are probably more fitting when
      considering a space power theory based on the control of space. Corbett emphasized the ―conditional nature‖ of sea control.
      He believed that the conditional nature could be positive and defined as one‘s ability to travel the seas freely. Corbett also
      believed that the conditional nature could be negative or the ability to deny this freedom to the enemy. It could either be
      local or global, permanent or temporary. This theory is very similar and applicable to the strategy of space control. 25 No
      matter how integral and essential space operations will be during combat operations, it is doubtful that today‘s wars and
      those in the immediate future will be decided in space. Therefore, Gray‘s prospect of space control is less likely to be
      contested under that Mahanian concept of ―battle fleets‖ clashing in space whether manned or unmanned. 26

4. Missile defense causes China to increase their arsenal, overwhelming defenses
Paul H.B. Godwin , Professor of International Affairs at the National War College, Washington, DC, 1-17-02, [―Potential Chinese
 Responses         to       US        Ballistic     Missile        Defense,‖      Stimpson/CNA        NMD-China           Project,
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/93682/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/7204C519-6290-475B-8C44-
2A9286DCE170/en/Report43.pdf] E. Liu

      Beijing would almost certainly conclude that the multi-layered defense system sought by the United States requires a more robust response
      than China‘s current minimum deterrence stance provides, even if transformed by the small but modern mode. In anticipation of boost and mid-course
      defenses, the number of mobile ICBMs and/or SLBMs deployed would be increased. The requirement for a credible deterrent in the face of
      more sophisticated defenses would also provide an additional incentive to mount multiple warheads allowing the employment of various
      penetration aids. This force structure can be classified as assured minimum deterrence. Although the impetus to increase both missiles and warheads is
      evident, it is uncertain what number of mobile and/or SLBMs together with their MRV/MIRV warheads Beijing‘s strategists would accept as providing
      assured deterrence. An assessment undertaken by Robert Manning, Ron Montaperto and Brad Roberts suggest that China would want to be confident that
      roughly 20 warheads could penetrate any defenses the United States prepared. 8 Li Bin argues that the number of surviving warheads must be greater
      than the number of interceptors used in a terminal defense mode. If there are 100 interceptors and two interceptors are directed at each retaliatory
      warhead, then more than 50 warheads must survive a US first strike. 9Both assessments agree their numbers are notional, but also that some significant
      increase in the number ICBMs and the ability of their warheads to penetrate missile defenses is probable. That is, the numbers may
      change but the argument for increasing the number of missiles and warheads remains the same. Because these assessments are based on a thin terminal
      defense mode, an American capability to also engage missiles in the boost and mid-course and stages of their path serves as an incentive to
      deploy an even greater number of missiles.




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                                    XTN #1 – Weaponization not Inevitable
Extend 1NC number 1 – Space weaponization is not inevitable because empirically vulnerable
assets have been left alone, and even if an enemy wished to attack, they would use ground-assets,
which we can also respond with, that’s Mueller 02.

Weaponizaion is inevitable as long as we tie issues of security to justify it
Charles V. Peña, a senior fellow at the Independent Institute, a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, a
former senior fellow with the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, an adviser to the Straus Military
Reform Project and Edward L. Hudgins is former director of regulatory studies at the Cato Institute, 3-18-02, [―Should the US
weaponize space?‖, Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, No. 427, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa427.pdf] E. Liu

      The concern here is that—much as missile defense advocates have used sea-based mis- sile defense as an attempt to open
      the door to a larger, more expensive global missile defense 66 —space defense policy will be used as a way justify and
      achieve a global—as opposed to national—missile defense. Indeed, if space policy is implemented as out- lined in the
      Space Commission report, a global missile defense may be inevitable. And if there are any doubts about the inextricable
      relationship between space poli- cy and NMD under Rumsfeld, consider the following statement by Senator Smith: With
      the completion of the Rumsfeld national missile defense and space commissions, followed by the choice of Rumsfeld to
      serve as the first Secretary of Defense for the 21st cen- tury, we were already batting three- for-three. . . . Now, if Rumsfeld
      is able to weave space and missile defense into our national defense posture in a way that makes them absolutely essential,
      which I‘m convinced he is determined to do, then the potential is there for a historic grand slam. 67

Weaponization only becomes inevitable if we develop weapons
Baohui Zhang, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Paciic Studies at Lingnan University,
Hong Kong, 11, [―The Security Dilemma in the U.S.-China Military Space Relationship,‖ Asian Survey, Vol. 51, Number 2,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/AS.2011.51.2.311] E. Liu
      Using space weapons to attack ballistic targets is a major goal of space weapon development. he U.S. believes that others‘
      ballistic missiles pose signiicant threats to its security. To be immune from this threat, the U.S. is putting major eforts into
      ballistic missile defense, with space-based weapons being one of the important intercepting platforms. 27 In October 2008,
      the U.S. Congress approved $5 million for an independent study of possible space-based missile defense. his move gravely
      alarmed the Chinese military, which believed that the deployment of space-based missile defense could become inevitable.
      In fact, some PLA experts have claimed that ―Star Wars has come back.‖28

That means there is no pressing need to weaponize space, and that only voting neg is reversible –
If weapons are good, we can develop them later, but we can never erase international animosity.




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                                        XTN #2 – Weapons Collapse Heg
1NC number 2 – space weapons incite opposition from Russia and China – In addition to
developing ASATs that trigger an arms race, they’ll also seek to create an international coalition
against the US – That collapses soft power because foreign leaders are less likely to make
concessions, restricting US hard power and ability to protect its assets, that’s Brown 09.

Space missile defense causes aggressive posturing, arms races, and a collapse of US hegemony
Dana J. Johnson, Senior Analyst at the Northrop Grumman Corporation's Analysis Center, where she is responsible for assessing
space- and missile-defense-related policies and trends, political Scientist with the RAND Corporation for nearly 15 years, et al., Sean
J.A. Edwards, Michael Miller, 02, [―Space Weapons Earth Wars,‖ RAND Corporation, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA403411&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf] E. Liu

      Opponents. A potential adversary could choose any of a number of responses to U.S. acquisition of space weapons,
      depending on his assessment of the weapon and the means available to him. He might attempt to deter its use, if he can
      formulate or acquire a credible de¬terrent. If he already has a credible nuclear deterrent, he might seek to link use of the
      U.S. space weapons to his nuclear deterrent. For example, if he became aware or suspected that a U.S. kinetic-energy space
      weapon was threatening silo-based ICBMs that were a sub¬stantial part of his deterrent force, he could announce a launch-
      on-warning or launch-under-attack policy tied to the status of the space weapons. The opponent might choose to attack the
      U.S. space weapons pre-emptively with physical means, depending on his perception of the vulnerability of the weapon and
      its threat to his interests. He might choose to avoid providing the weapon useful targets if it has opera¬tional limitations
      that leave him useful alternative force structures (e.g., cruise missiles instead of ballistic missiles). He might choose to
      harden some targets if he can develop adequate confidence in his understanding of the weapon's limitations (e.g., burying
      targets vul¬nerable to kinetic-energy weapons deeper than he believes they can penetrate, adding insulation against lasers
      to his missiles). He could attempt to saturate defensive space weapons with multiple targets, real and decoy. Given a U.S.
      precedent of one kind of space weapon, an opponent might choose to follow suit, but possibly with another kind, one
      bet¬ter suited to his perception of U.S. vulnerabilities and to his own technology and doctrine. For example, a small
      quantity of U.S. "silver bullet" space weapon carriers able to deliver a small number of precision or brilliant weapons over a
      broad footprint might en-gender a response of large numbers of lower-technology bulk weapon carriers delivering large
      numbers of less-brilliant but still-effective submunitions (such as those described in Appendix D) against U.S. interests
      (possibly as instruments of terror if not of con¬ventional military utility). A U.S. space-based laser for missile de¬fense
      might legitimize a variety of antisatellite weapons targeted against all U.S. space capabilities. Although U.S. space
      capabilities that provide military advantage are already legitimate targets in a conflict, an opponent might still threaten an
      antisatellite response as a reason not to deploy the space-based laser. Alternatively, an opponent might judge the utility of
      the weapons to be not worth their cost and cede the high ground of space, instead adopting the moral high ground and a
      legal strategy to try to use the U.S. decision to fragment support from its allies and to arouse world opinion against U.S.
      "hegemony." Allies. Depending on what it saw at risk from the introduction of weapons into space, an ally might be
      susceptible to a U.S. oppo-nent's attempt to use a U.S. acquisition decision against the alliance relationship. Among other
      things, an ally might believe that destruc¬tive weapons in space would jeopardize its own intelligence space interests,
      regardless of whether those interests are potential targets or innocent bystanders. Commercial space interests might also
      ap¬pear to be at increased risk from possible orbital debris resulting from conflict in a region of space important to the ally.
      How Might the United States Acquire Space Weapons? 83 If the United States involved its allies adequately in the
      decision and implementation of the acquisition, allies could conceivably play some substantial role in the acquisition,
      support, operation, or use of the weapons. In the absence of that involvement, they may well have reason to feel that the
      acquisition of a significant capability would threaten their vital interests. At the very least, allies that are not ade¬quately
      involved in the acquisition would find themselves increas¬ingly relegated to second-tier status, increasing the likelihood
      and degree of disproportionate roles in alliance operations. There has been evidence of concern about this already in the
      1999 NATO op¬erations in Kosovo and Serbia (Drozdiak, 1999).




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                                          XTN #3 – Ground Based Solves
Extend 1NC number 3 – Ground based conventional deterrent allows us to target potential
ASAT platforms and control sea lines of commerce without the arms races and risk associated
with weaponization, that’s Wilkerson 08.

Ground based OCS can efficiently and cheaply prevent offensive challengers
Don L. Wilkerson, space operations officer for the U.S. Army in Carlisle, PA, 3-15-08, [―SPACE POWER THEORY:
CONTROLLING THE MEDIUM WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE,‖ US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300] E. Liu

      A more definitive alternative for OCS would be the destruction of satellite communication ground stations or an ASAT
      threat on the launch pad. There are a considerable number of conventional weapons raging from long-range artillery,
      strategic bombers, ICBMs, cruise missiles, navy sea-based ballistic missile systems or even special operations forces that
      can be used as offensive space control capabilities to destroy enemy targets that make-up the critical components of an
      adversary‘s space network. When intelligence provides the prerequisite I&W that a potential enemy ASAT20 threat exists,
      U.S. military services under the control of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) or the appropriate Geographical
      Combatant Command (GCC) could initiate time sensitive planning options to conduct a conventional strike against the
      threat. The simple fact is that enemy launch sites, satellite control stations and potential mobile ground space weapon
      systems remain vulnerable to a myriad of current and enhanced conventional weapons. These existing ―means‖ in the U.S.
      military arsenal remain more cost effective in lieu of developing and fielding space-based weapons. Current conventional
      weapons in support of space control are sufficient and essential to integrating space power theory into the mainstream of the
      joint military community. The recent military intercept of an inoperable National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellite by
      a U.S. Navy AEGIS cruiser warship is a great example of employing a conventional weapon platform to control the space
      medium at the LEO altitude. The SM-3 missile system was originally designed to track and destroy short and medium
      range inbound ballistic missiles in their terminal phase of flight. 45 General James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman to the
      Joint Chiefs of Staff and former USSTRATCOM Commander, acknowledged that the AEGIS platform and SM-3 missile
      system required only minor software modifications in order to engage the malfunctioning satellite at approximately 153
      miles in space. 46

No need to raise the bar to space weapons – That only causes destabilizing and costly arms races
Don L. Wilkerson, space operations officer for the U.S. Army in Carlisle, PA, 3-15-08, [―SPACE POWER THEORY:
CONTROLLING THE MEDIUM WITHOUT WEAPONS IN SPACE,‖ US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA482300] E. Liu

      Conversely, the other side of the argument to not deploy weapons in space is probably more compelling. The proliferation
      of space-based weapons will allow potential adversaries to place U.S. space assets at risk without the long-term equivalent
      investment in technology and hardware, and potentially without placing similar space systems in orbit. If the U.S.
      withdraws from the Outer Space Treaty and begins pursuing weapons in space to justify the defense of vital national space
      systems, other countries will undoubtedly pursue these weapons as well. Once other space-faring nations deploy weapons
      in space, not only will on-orbit assets be in danger, but also terrestrial targets within the U.S., such as cities, conceivably
      may be held at risk from attack from space. The proliferation of space weapons could become tomorrow‘s ―nuclear arms
      control‖ issue that would be a costly venture for all involved. Countries would begin to12 channel resources to develop the
      technology and systems to place weapons in space in order to demonstrate their power, modernity and their desire to
      compete with the world‘s most powerful countries. However, current U.S. ground-based space weapon systems and
      conventional warfighting systems already provide the necessary offensive capabilities and deterrence to support a space
      power theory without deploying weapons into space.

Specifically, any ASAT attack by China would be easily detectable and countered




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Geoffrey Forden, Research associate at MIT specializing in Russian and Chinese space systems,
2008. Wired, “How China Loses the Coming War,”
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-chin/
      But Chinacould not launch the massive attack required to have anything like a significant effect on US ability to utilize
      space without months of careful planning and pre-positioning of special, ASAT carrying missiles around the country. It would
      also have to utilize its satellite launch facilities to attack any US assets in deep space: the GPS navigation satellites and communications satellites in
      geostationary orbit. Most importantly, it would have to time the attack so as to hit as many US satellites as simultaneously as possible. And, despite all
      that movement, Beijing would somehow have to keep the whole thing secret. Failure to do so would undoubtedly result in
      the US attacking the large, fixed facilities China needs to wage this kind of war before the full blow had been struck. Even
      if the United States failed to do so, China would undoubtedly plan for that contingency. Based on the orbits of US military
      satellites determined by the worldwide network of amateur observers, there appears to be a large number of low Earth orbit military satellites over China
      several times each week. To hit them, China would have to preposition its ASAT-tipped missiles and their mobile launchers in
      remote areas of China, one position for each satellite. (If reports of low reliabilities for these missiles are correct, two or more missiles might
      be assigned to each satellite.) Furthermore, these positions are really only suitable for a particular day. If China‘s political and
      military planners have any uncertainty at all about which day to launch their space war, they would need to pre-position
      additional launchers around the country. Thus, attacking nine low Earth orbit satellites could require as many as 36 mobile
      launchers—enough for two interceptors fired at each satellite with a contingency day if plans change—moved to remote
      areas of China; areas determined more by the satellite orbits than China‘s network of road. (As will be discussed below,
      nine is about the maximum they could reasonably expect to hit on the first day of the space war.) At the same time that
      China would be trying to covertly move its mobile missile launchers around the country, it would also have to assemble a
      fleet of large rockets — ones normally used for launching satellites. The more large rockets China uses for this task, the
      more deep-space satellites it can destroy. At present, however, China only has the facilities for assembling and launching a
      total for four such rockets nearly simultaneously. Two would have to be assembled out in the open where they could be
      observed by US spy satellites and two could be assembled inside a vertical assembly building during the 18 days it takes to
      stack and fuel the Long March rocket‘s stages while preparing to launch. [See right.] Even the two assembled indoors
      would need to arrive by train and eventually would have to be moved, one after the other, to the launch pad. Each of these
      rockets, usually reserved for launching satellites into geostationary orbits, could carry three to four interceptors and their
      special orbital maneuver motors to attack either US navigation satellites, at about 12,000 miles altitude, or communications
      satellites at about 22,000 miles.




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                                                  XTN #4 – China Turn
Extend 1NC number 6 – China’s desire to have a credible missile deterrent means they’ll
respond to missile defense by developing enough missiles to get atleast 20 through – Missile
defense incentivizes horizontal proliferation, that’s Godwin 02.

That turns their deterrence arguments – If we win that China can compete with the US, that
means they’ll inevitably be able to overwhelm defenses or feel confident enough to where a total
attack makes sense

Chinese missile proliferation increases probability for war – Neighbor skepticism and
miscalculation
Paul H.B. Godwin , Professor of International Affairs at the National War College, Washington, DC, 1-17-02, [―Potential Chinese
 Responses         to       US        Ballistic     Missile        Defense,‖      Stimpson/CNA        NMD-China           Project,
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/93682/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/7204C519-6290-475B-8C44-
2A9286DCE170/en/Report43.pdf] E. Liu

      If implemented with an appropriate force structure, a doctrine of limited deterrence could provide China greater confidence
      in its nuclear deterrent. Nonetheless, Beijing has to consider several liabilities inherent in the doctrine. First, the major
      build-up of weapons required to implement a limited deterrence doctrine would do more than alarm the United States. It is
      doubtful Asian states would view such a build- up as solely a response to US BMD. It is more likely that such an increase
      would be viewed as indicating a major change in China‘s defense policy to a more aggressive stance, suggesting Beijing‘s
      intent to supplant the United States and militarily dominate the region. It would certainly be difficult for Beijing to argue
      as in the past that its nuclear forces were strictly defensive. Second, Chinese analyses of limited deterrence requirements
      have recognized the complexity and cost of the technologies required to implement the strategy. 11 China does not have
      the space-based reconnaissance and early warning systems required to determine in near real-time the size and origin of an
      attack. Thus, it would be difficult to determine what kind and level of response would be required. Chinese analysts are
      aware of these and numerous other deficiencies constraining the implementation of a limited deterrence doctrine. It is
      distinctly possible that China‘s research centers are conducting R&D programs to overcome these difficulties, but their
      cost and complexity indicate that it will be some years before they are resolved. Third, China‘s commitment to the
      Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) does not allow Beijing to test any new warheads that may well be required.
      Beijing could withdraw from the CTBT, but withdrawal would be seen in Asia and the United States yet another indication
      that China had shifted to a more aggressive nuclear posture.

That’s especially bad in this case – China war doesn’t go nuclear now
Dr. Wade L. Huntley, visiting fellow at the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. His
publications on a variety of Asian and global security issues include articles in The Nonproliferation Review,
Asian Survey, International Studies Quarterly, and Millennium: Journal of International Affairs. Dr. Huntley,
formerly Director of the Peace and Security Program at the Nautilus Institute, Summer 02, [―Missile Defense: More May Be Better—
for China,‖ The Nonprolfieration Review, cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/92hunt.pdf] E. Liu

      China currently possesses a small arsenal of interconti- nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying nuclear
      weapons to targets in the continental United States. Chinese strategic modernization program includes devel- opment of
      mobile, solid-fueled ICBMs to improve sur- vivability, and estimate that ―by 2015, the total number of Chinese strategic
      warheads will rise several-fold.‖ How- ever, ―Beijing‘s future ICBM force deployed primarily against the United
      States…will remain considerably smaller and less capable than the strategic missile forces of Rus- sia and the United
      States.‖32 The United States would retain its massive retaliatory deterrent. Even in the event of direct U.S.-Chinese
      military conflict, the prospects of China launching nuclear missiles against the United States would remain slim.
      Accordingly, U.S. government reports do not portray Chinese missile and nuclear forces as an imminent threat to the
      United States. 33 However, U.S. intelligence analysts do perceive Chi- nese ICBMs as a latent and growing threat,
      observing that ―Chinese strategic nuclear doctrine calls for a survivable long-range missile force that can hold a significant
      por- tion of the U.S. population at risk in a retaliatory strike.‖34 In this manner, Chinese nuclear capabilities already pose to
      U.S. analysts a politically meaningful coercive instru- ment—however remote the prospect, U.S. war planners must still


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      reckon with the possible use by China of nuclear weapons directly against the United States.




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                                           **Rogue States




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                                                             Rogue States Frontline
1. A huge number of Space Based Interceptors are needed to cover rogue states – This cites an
article their solvency evidence mentions
Ivan Oelrich, Vice President for Strategic Security Programs at the Federation of American Scientists. He received his BS from
the University of Chicago and a PhD from Princeton University, both in chemistry. He had a pre-doctoral fellowship at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and later conducted research and taught in the Physics Department of the Technical
University of Munich in Germany. He has held senior research staff positions at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a research
center supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University; the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment; and the Advanced Systems and Concepts
Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the US Department of Defense. He is an Adjunct Professor in the Security
Studies Program at Georgetown University and Steve Fetter, assistant director at-large at the Office of Science and Technology
Policy in the Executive Office of the President. He focuses on the scientific and technical aspects of energy, climate change, and
security policy issues. Fetter is on leave from the Maryland School of Public Policy, where he has been a professor since 1988, serving
as dean from 2005 to 2009. His research and policy interests include nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, nuclear energy and
releases of radiation, and climate change and carbon-free energy supply, 9-24-04, [―Not So Fast: Comments on ―Estimates of
Performance and Cost for Boost Phase Intercept‖‖, Marshall Institute‘s Washington Roundtable on Science and Public Policy,
http://wwwfas.bluebox-placeholder.com/programs/ssp/man/wpnsinspacefolder/notsofast.pdf] E. Liu
      Finally, the paper points out that the system does not need uniform satellite coverage over the Earth but can concentrate the coverage over a small area,
      reducing the total number of interceptors. Specifically, if we focus only on North Korea, a constellation with peak concentration at that latitude will be
      much smaller than one covering a larger area. This is true, but at several points the paper uses approximations or assumptions that overestimate the
      effect.     Figure 10 in the Canavan paper shows that SBIs in a constellation inclined at 42.5 degrees (the northern latitude of North Korea) will
      spend 11% of their orbital period within a latitude ―band‖ 3.3 degrees wide, with 42.5 degrees as its northern edge. (We cannot reproduce the
      author‘s numbers from the paper alone but it appears that he uses the 3.3 degree band as covering North Korea. Figure 10 shows the fraction of SBI from
      constellations inclined at 43 and 30 degrees ―in 3.3-degree bands, which are roughly the width needed to cover trajectories of missiles from North Korea.‖
      [p.25] North Korea runs from 38 to 42.5 degrees, or 4.5 degrees, not 3.3. This is important because later Canavan seems to reduce the mass of the
      interceptor based on its being able to just barely cover a 3.3 degree band from edge to edge.) Note this concentration effect is feasible only
      against missiles launched from a small country like North Korea. Iran is much larger , running between 25 and 40 degrees latitude
      and a constellation that covered Iran would clearly be much larger than one covering North Korea. The APS effort started out
      considering only land-based boost-phase interceptors and later added analysis of space-based systems. The APS study team was well aware of the
      concentration effect, noting that ―For any given orbit, satellite coverage will be concentrated at the same latitude as the inclination of the orbit, leaving the
      equatorial region underpopulated, as discussed in [80]. (The inclination of an orbit is the angle that 4 it makes with the equator.) Although that
      concentration would be beneficial if the defense needs only to intercept missiles from a very narrow latitude band, such as from North Korea, it makes
      complete coverage over a wide range of latitudes more difficult to achieve.‖ [APS p. 108] The APS study team also noticed that complete coverage at
      the equator gave fairly constant double coverage at the latitude of North Korea. [David Mosher, personal communication.] Comparing APS Fig 6.3 [p.
      109] and Canavan‘s Fig 11 [p. 26] shows that Canavan calculates substantially fewer interceptors even without concentration, but half of this reduction
      is due to seeking only single coverage, that is, only one interceptor is within range at any moment. That is, the system described in the paper is effective
      against a single North Korean missile. An obvious countermeasure would be to build a second missile that could be launched at the same time. The APS
      study does not concentrate over the latitude of North Korea and calculates a constellation ―sufficient to cover any point in space and time in the region
      between approximately 30 and 45 degrees North latitude with an average of two interceptors and a minimum of one.‖ [APS p. 110]


2. Iran perceives MD as offensive – Will respond agressively
Martin Senn is a lecturer in security studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, Winter
08, [―The Arms-Dynamic Pacemaker: Ballistic-Missile Defense in the Middle East,‖ Middle East Policy Council,
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arms-dynamic-pacemaker-ballistic-missile-defense-middle-east?print]       E.
Liu
      It is commonly known that a military capability is not a threat per se. The threatening quality of a certain capability depends on assumptions about
      associated intentions. For decades, assumptions of Iran‘s ruling elite regarding U.S. intentions have derived from the image of an imperialist force that
      ―seeks to dominate the Middle East and, together with its local allies, control the region strategically and loot its resources.‖21 Ultimately, however, the
      United States is seen as pursuing the goal of overthrowing the theocratic regime one way or the other.22 In recent years, this perception has been
      strengthened by a number of policies (e.g., funding for oppositional groups and extra-territorial broadcasts in Farsi) and rhetoric (e.g., ―axis of evil,‖ ―real
      men go to Tehran,‖ ―all options are on the table‖ and the like). As a consequence, Tehran undoubtedly perceives missile defense as anything but
      purely defensive. It is, rather, seen as a shield that will allow the United States and Israel to use force against Iran with greater freedom,
      whether to attack the ruling elite or to destroy Iran‘s nuclear program. In other words, the deployment of missile defenses by the United States and its
      allies is most likely regarded as ultimately serving an offensive purpose. The prospect of increased BMD capabilities is particularly troubling for
      Tehran, because the ability to credibly threaten U.S. allies and assets with ballistic missiles is a central pillar of its deterrence posture. The
      role of Iran‘s ballistic missiles is the consequence of the lessons Tehran learned as a victim of missile attacks during the Iran-Iraq War, as an attentive
      observer of the military and political virtue of ballistic missiles during the 1991 Gulf War, and as a user of asymmetric warfare (AW) tactics during the
      ―Tanker War.‖23 However, Iran‘s reliance on missiles as a means of AW is not a matter of pure choice, but rather of necessity, due to the war-depleted
      and sanction-stricken state of its conventional armed forces. The resulting obsolescence of Iran‘s military technology, which is predominantly of Western


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      origin, has been aggravated by comparatively low levels of funding.24 As illustrated in Table 1, Iran‘s military expenditures were considerably smaller
      than Saudi Arabia‘s and not much more than the defense expenditures of small Kuwait and the UAE during the 1990s. In the realm of arms imports, a
      recent report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) notes that Iran ―accounted for only 5 percent of transfers to the Middle East
      for the period 2004-2008 and was the 27th-largest recipient of major conventional weapons worldwide.‖25 While Saudi Arabia ranks twenty-sixth
      worldwide, the UAE has turned into the prime arms importer in the region (with a share of 34 percent) and the third-largest arms importer globally.26
      Given the poor state of its conventional forces and its experience with asymmetrical and missile warfare, Tehran‘s reliance on ballistic
      missiles as a central means of deterrence is hardly surprising.27 The importance of missile-based deterrence has also been underlined by a number of
      measures that have been intended to strengthen the material and psychological dimension of the deterrent‘s credibility. Tehran has begun to increase the
      resilience of its missile force by constructing hardened silos. Uzi Rubin noted in 2006 that ―hardened fixed sites were preferred by both superpowers as the
      chief (and in the case of the United States, the exclusive) basing


3 Deterrence checks EMP attack
Scott Stewart and Nate Hughes, Stratfor Analysts, 9/9/10, ―Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,‖
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100908_gauging_threat_electromagnetic_pulse_emp_attack
      However, there are significant deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons in a HEMP attack against the United States, and
      nuclear weapons have not been used in an attack anywhere since 1945. Despite some theorizing that a HEMP attack might
      be somehow less destructive and therefore less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response, such an attack against
      the United States would inherently and necessarily represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and the idea that the
      United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United States continues to maintain the most credible and
      survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any actor contemplating a HEMP attack would have to assume not that they
      might experience some limited reprisal but that the U.S. reprisal would be full, swift and devastating.

4 Technical barriers prevent an Iranian EMP
Scott Stewart and Nate Hughes, Stratfor Analysts, 9/9/10, ―Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,‖
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100908_gauging_threat_electromagnetic_pulse_emp_attack
      One scenario that has been widely put forth is that the EMP threat emanates not from a global or regional power like Russia
      or China but from a rogue state or a transnational terrorist group that does not possess ICBMs but will use subterfuge to
      accomplish its mission without leaving any fingerprints. In this scenario, the rogue state or terrorist group loads a nuclear
      warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship or tanker and then launches the missile from just off the coast in order to
      get the warhead into position over the target for a HEMP strike. This scenario would involve either a short-range ballistic
      missile to achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range (but not intercontinental) ballistic missile to reach the
      necessary position over the Eastern or Western seaboard or the Midwest to achieve a key coastline or continental strike.
      When we consider this scenario, we must first acknowledge that it faces the same obstacles as any other nuclear weapon
      employed in a terrorist attack. It is unlikely that a terrorist group like al Qaeda or Hezbollah can develop its own nuclear
      weapons program. It is also highly unlikely that a nation that has devoted significant effort and treasure to develop a nuclear
      weapon would entrust such a weapon to an outside organization. Any use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously
      investigated and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified and would pay a heavy price for such an attack
      (there has been a large investment in the last decade in nuclear forensics). Lastly, as noted above, a nuclear weapon is seen
      as a deterrent by countries such as North Korea or Iran, which seek such weapons to protect themselves from invasion, not
      to use them offensively. While a group like al Qaeda would likely use a nuclear device if it could obtain one, we doubt that
      other groups such as Hezbollah would. Hezbollah has a known base of operations in Lebanon that could be hit in a
      counterstrike and would therefore be less willing to risk an attack that could be traced back to it. Also, such a scenario
      would require not a crude nuclear device but a sophisticated nuclear warhead capable of being mated with a ballistic
      missile. There are considerable technical barriers that separate a crude nuclear device from a sophisticated nuclear warhead.
      The engineering expertise required to construct such a warhead is far greater than that required to construct a crude device.
      A warhead must be far more compact than a primitive device. It must also have a trigger mechanism and electronics and
      physics packages capable of withstanding the force of an ICBM launch, the journey into the cold vacuum of space and the
      heat and force of re-entering the atmosphere — and still function as designed. Designing a functional warhead takes
      considerable advances in several fields of science, including physics, electronics, engineering, metallurgy and explosives
      technology, and overseeing it all must be a high-end quality assurance capability. Because of this, it is our estimation that it
      would be far simpler for a terrorist group looking to conduct a nuclear attack to do so using a crude device than it would be
      using a sophisticated warhead — although we assess the risk of any non-state actor obtaining a nuclear capability of any
      kind, crude or sophisticated, as extraordinarily unlikely. But even if a terrorist organization were somehow able to obtain a
      functional warhead and compatible fissile core, the challenges of mating the warhead to a missile it was not designed for
      and then getting it to launch and detonate properly would be far more daunting than it would appear at first glance.
      Additionally, the process of fueling a liquid-fueled ballistic missile at sea and then launching it from a ship using an


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      improvised launcher would also be very challenging. (North Korea, Iran and Pakistan all rely heavily on Scud technology,
      which uses volatile, corrosive and toxic fuels.)




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                                    XTN #1 – Doesn’t Solve Rogue States
Extend 1NC number 1 – They can’t solve for Iran because its size means that we would need a
massive constellation to cover it that’s just cost unfeasible, that’s Orelich and Fetter 04.

Their Dolman evidence is not enough – It’s specific to conflict in space and deterring others from
entering into a space weapons race, not what is needed to shoot down missiles from rogue states
Prefer our evidence – Orelich is a Vice President for Strategic Security Programs at the
Federation of American Scientists and Fetter is an assistant director at the Office of Science and
Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President – That means they have experience in
the field that specifically studies the INTERSECTION between security and technological issues,
making them the best to analyze the usefulness of missile defense.




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                                            XTN #2 – Doesn’t Solve Iran
1NC number 2 – Iran’s conventional foces are weak causing it to rely disproportionately on
missiles – Trying to develop missile defense only causes them to reaffirm and expand their
arsenal, increasing the risk of war, that’s Senn 08.

No dissuasion – Psychological benefit
Martin Senn is a lecturer in security studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, Winter
08, [―The Arms-Dynamic Pacemaker: Ballistic-Missile Defense in the Middle East,‖ Middle East Policy Council,
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arms-dynamic-pacemaker-ballistic-missile-defense-middle-east?print
] E. Liu

      Unlike the comparatively short history of the above-mentioned efforts to bolster the material basis of its credibility,
      psychological ―boosters‖ have been a long-term feature of Iran‘s missile deterrent. The psychological dimension combines
      ―an outstanding degree of transparency,‖31 which at times borders on exhibitionism, with aggressive rhetoric. Iran‘s
      missile tests are carefully staged and usually broadcast on TV. The faked picture of a missile test, which was unmasked in
      July 2008,32 indicates that Tehran places great value on its image as a capable missile power. Moreover, missile tests are
      frequently accompanied by rhetoric that is intended to emphasize the increasing technological maturity of Iran‘s missile
      arsenal and the leadership‘s strong determination to retaliate in case of attack. In March 2008, for example, the commander
      of Iran‘s Revolutionary Guard announced that ―Iran has missiles with a range of 2,000 km (1,250 miles), and based on that
      all Israeli land, including that regime‘s nuclear facilities, are [sic] in the range of [Iran‘s] missile capabilities.‖33 In
      addition to the strategic challenge posed by missile-defense deployments in the region, ideological and popular pressures
      will be further factors thwarting the dissuasive effect of BMD. Iran‘s missile program has been cultivated as a widely
      visible sign of the country‘s technological craftsmanship and great-power status and therefore fulfills an important function
      beyond the military dimension. Given Iran‘s historical great-power aspirations, it is unlikely that it will reevaluate the
      utility of its missile program. Furthermore, the assumption that it can be dissuaded disregards the fact that defiance and
      self-reliance in the face of external threats are deeply engrained in Iran‘s strategic culture. A critic of the action-reaction
      argument in this article might raise the point that Iran could rely on its current missile arsenal to overcome defense systems
      and would therefore not see itself as being forced to react. A historical example, however, reveals that this point is wishful
      thinking. In their article on U.S. reactions to Russian missile defense around Moscow, Kristensen, McKinzie and Norris
      refer to recently declassified documents showing that ―[d]espite disagreements and doubts, U.S. nuclear planners gave high
      priority to targeting the Moscow and Tallinn systems, worrying that even a limited ABM capability could diminish a strike
      against Soviet ICBM silos.‖34 In addition to targeting the Soviet systems with approximately 10 percent of its ICBM
      arsenal (about 100 Minuteman missiles), Washington also intensified research into, and eventual deployment of,
      penetration aids and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).35 Unlike the United States, however,
      which directed its planning and modernization efforts against two systems with largely unknown performance capabilities,
      Iran confronts systems that are considered to be the most successful parts of the U.S. missile-defense program.

Iran could develop various techniques to overwhelm missile defense including horizontal
proliferation
Martin Senn is a lecturer in security studies in the Department of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, Winter
08, [―The Arms-Dynamic Pacemaker: Ballistic-Missile Defense in the Middle East,‖ Middle East Policy Council,
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/arms-dynamic-pacemaker-ballistic-missile-defense-middle-east?print
] E. Liu

      On the asymmetrical side, Tehran could resort to at least four types of measures to overcome or avoid BMD. The first
      measure is a quantitative extension of Iran‘s ballistic- missile arsenal that would ensure the saturation of MD systems. A
      December 2008 article in Jane‘s indicates that this prospect is not farfetched, as Iran is reported to have extended its
      Shahab-3 arsenal from 30 to over 100 missiles in a year‘s time.39 Even if the deployment of BMD in the Middle East does
      not lead to a further increase in the production and deployment rate, it will certainly not induce Iran to curb the steady
      expansion of its arsenal. Second, Tehran could draw on qualitative improvements to maintain its missile deterrent.
      Provided that Iran does not receive significant foreign assistance, MIRV technology will likely remain beyond its reach.
      Tehran could, though, deploy less sophisticated but equally effective BMD countermeasures. The form and availability of


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      BMD countermeasures was analyzed in a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), which, among other
      measures, mentions submunitions with biological or chemical agents as a very effective way of overcoming missile-defense
      systems.40 Submunitions provide BMD systems with too many targets to intercept, allow an attacker to cover a wide area
      and thus compensate for the inaccuracy of less sophisticated ballistic missiles. Hence, submunitions with chemical agents
      ideally suit Iran‘s needs. As far as the availability of submunitions technology is concerned, the report notes that the
      required information is freely available and that ―[t]he level of technology required to develop submunitions is simpler than
      that required to build long-range ballistic missiles.‖41 The alleged test of a submunitions warhead on a Shahab-3 missile in
      November 200642 indicates that Iran may already be exploring the use of submunitions on ballistic missiles. As far as
      Iran‘s chemical-weapons capability is concerned, experts deem it likely that Tehran still retains a certain ability to produce
      and weaponize chemical agents.43 Third, Tehran could seek to counter the defensive edge by extending its arsenal of
      cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Compared to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles offer a number of
      advantages.44 Due to their small size and similarity to other (non-)military vehicles, they are easier to conceal than ballistic
      missiles and therefore less vulnerable to enemy strikes. Moreover, cruise missiles are not as cost-intensive as BM, allow
      greater accuracy, are ideally suited to disperse chemical and biological agents and, most important, pose a considerable
      challenge to missile-defense systems. This is due to their ―inherently low visual, infrared and radar signatures‖45 and their
      ability to fly at low altitudes, enabling them to remain below the horizon of ground-based radars. As Dennis Gormley notes
      for Patriot, which is also designed to intercept cruise missiles, ―The earth‘s curvature means that the Patriot‘s ground-based
      radar, in trying to detect a cruise missile flying at a 50-metre altitude, might first see it only when it has closed to some 35
      km or less [emphasis in original].‖46 The advantages of cruise missiles and their ability to overcome missile-defense
      systems was vividly demonstrated by the performance of PAC-3 systems during Operation Iraqi Freedom. While the
      systems successfully intercepted nine Iraqi ballistic missiles, they proved ineffective against four out of five Iraqi cruise
      missiles.47 Iran already possesses Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) such as the Chinese HY-2 (referred to as
      Seersucker) and is also engaged in the acquisition of more sophisticated Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM). In addition
      to purchasing cruise missile systems from foreign sources, as was the case with the KH-55 LACM (3,000 km range) it
      obtained from Ukraine in 2001, Iran is also reported to be exploring the technically challenging conversion of ASCM into
      LACM,48 as well as the indigenous (further) development of an allegedly stealthy ASCM labeled Kosar. Iran‘s cruise-
      missile program is expanding, and Gormley already identifies missile-defense capabilities in the region as a decisive
      motivator.49 As far as the possible operational posture of Iran‘s arsenal of cruise missiles is concerned, Iran could choose
      to equip them with chemical agents or to follow the pattern of joint use with ballistic missiles. By neutralizing the radar
      systems of BMD systems, cruise missiles would increase the likelihood that ballistic missiles reach their targets.50 The
      same function could be fulfilled by UAV, which Iran has successfully built, deployed and even proliferated (to Hezbollah).
      In February 2009, Iran‘s deputy minister of defense claimed that Iran possesses a new type of UAV with a range of 1,000
      km.51




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                                                    XTN #3 – No EMP
1NC number 3 – Credible nuclear deterrent makes an EMP attack completely unlikely – Also,
there is simply no reason Iran would try to preempt the US if they couldn’t take out all of our
forces, because the response would be swift and devastating, that’s Stewart and Hughes 10.

Discount their evidence - it’s just a right-wing ploy to increase support for missile defense
Michael Crowley, senior editor at The New Republic, 6/3/09, ―The Newt Bomb How a pulp-fiction fantasy became a GOP
weapons craze,‖ The New Republic, http://www.tnr.com/article/the-newt-bomb
    People have fretted about an EMP blast since the cold war. But now, discredited by the Iraq war, Gingrich and a cadre of
    conservative hawks are resurrecting the chilling vision and applying it to a new world of rogue states and terrorist groups.
    The attention-grabbing narrative of the pulse threat offers them a fresh argument for some familiar hobbyhorses--namely a
    multibillion-dollar national missile-defense system and even preemptive military strikes against charter members of the
    Axis of Evil. Or maybe it's just that Republicans, now consigned to the wilderness, are simply letting their imaginations run
    wild. Newt is hardly the first politician to be captivated by a pseudo-realistic potboiler. Bill Clinton grilled his aides about
    bioterrorism defenses after reading Richard Preston's horrifying account of a genetically engineered virus, The Cobra
    Event. Michael Crichton's paranoid vision of evil climate-change activists, State of Fear, won him a meeting with George
    W. Bush. Forstchen himself has said that One Second After was designed to have such an effect. "I wrote the book to
    convey a warning and bring it before the public eye," Forstchen recently wrote in response to a critic on the liberal blog
    ThinkProgress. His book's success has done more for the issue than years of striving by a hapless band of Washington
    conservatives. The godfather of the modern EMP alarmism movement is Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett of
    Maryland. "This is just too horrific to be true," Bartlett explains, "so many people want to dismiss it." Bartlett, an 82-year-
    old retired engineer and Maryland Republican, has worried about an EMP attack since he encountered the concept over a
    decade ago in--yup--a potboiler novel. "I called my friend Tom Clancy," Bartlett says, to ask about Clancy's reference to
    the threat in one of his books. Clancy referred Bartlett to a physicist at America's high-tech Lawrence Livermore National
    Laboratory named Lowell Wood. Wood happened to be in Washington "and so, within an hour, he was in my office, "
    Bartlett explains. Wood, who has warned that an EMP attack could amount to "a giant continental time machine," sending
    America back to a pre-industrial state, explained that cold war strategists considered a Soviet EMP assault a likely first step
    in a larger attack on the West. But, since then, he said, the United States had done little to protect its infrastructure against
    such an event. "This is something that the military had been ignoring!" Bartlett says. Bartlett set out to change that. In
    2001, the Maryland congressman, who is known for a set of quirky passions that include a fixation on "peak oil" theory,
    which predicts a catastrophic exhaustion of global petroleum supplies, won congressional approval of a commission to
    study the EMP threat. Some of its members were not exactly mainstream national security experts. Its chairman was
    William Graham, a former Reagan White House science adviser and enthusiast for the "Star Wars" missile-defense system.
    Another commission member was Lowell Wood, who, as the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has noted, was the Reagan-
    era champion of a plan to cripple the Soviet nuclear arsenal by means of a giant x-ray laser platform with which he
    reportedly once sought to ignite part of the earth's atmosphere. Predictably, the EMP commission found that the United
    States faced a serious threat--not just from the intercontinental missiles of major powers like Russia and China, but also
    from terrorists and rogue states. The EMP panel went further, concluding that a single Hiroshima-sized bomb could
    realistically shut down America's critical infrastructure. But the panel's report didn't exactly rock Washington. "The report
    unfortunately was released on the same day that the 9/11 Commission released their report," sighs Clay Wilson, a believer
    and former analyst with the Congressional Research Service, "so all the news people were down the hall." Awakening the
    public would have to wait for another day. The EMP commission actually had a point. There is a scientific basis for fears
    about widespread electric outages, and there is evidence that other countries, possibly including Iran, have studied the
    technique. "EMP is real," agrees Joe Cirincione, a nuclear weapons expert who now runs a pro-disarmament think tank, the
    Ploughshares Fund. But, as Cirincione notes, few analysts take the threat very seriously. The odds that Iran or North Korea
    would prefer a technologically untested Rube Goldberg scheme to merely nuking us seem slim. And any terrorist group
    able to execute such a plan was probably capable enough to get us one way or another anyhow. Those realities argue
    overwhelmingly for prudent but unsexy infrastructure protections, not preemptive attacks or advanced technology. "It's
    horror theater," says Cirincione, "trying to scare Americans into doing something which a rational analysis would stop them
    from doing." Charles Ferguson, a nuclear engineer at the Council on Foreign Relations, agrees. "[T]here are some important
    things we can be doing that won't cost much, but that can serve as a vital backup," he says. For instance, Ferguson has
    advised the New York City Fire Department to keep some backup communications equipment and extra ignition switches
    for its trucks in electromagnetic pulse-resistant steel cages. The hawkish right, however, has much bigger things in mind.
    Although Bartlett himself seems to lack a sub-rosa strategic agenda, he has found common cause among national-security


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      conservatives, about whom the same can't be said. Take, for instance, the spin of Frank Gaffney, perhaps the right's main
      missile-defense zealot: "[T]he United States must now make a redoubled effort to deploy effective, comprehensive defenses
      against ballistic missiles that might be used for EMP and other attacks," Gaffney wrote in a 2006 National Review article.
      Republican Senator Jon Kyl, a key missile-defense champion on Capitol Hill, has held hearings and published a
      Washington Post op-ed on the EMP threat. The like-minded Wall Street Journal opinion pages have repeatedly flogged the
      EMP commission's findings. "The only solution to this [EMP] problem," Brian T. Kennedy of the Claremont Institute wrote
      in an op-ed in the pages last November, "is a robust, multilayered missile-defense system." President Obama, however, is
      far less open to such suggestions than his predecessor, leading some on the right to desperate measures, like reviving the
      EMP anxiety. More broadly, archconservatives like Gingrich and Dick Cheney have gotten used to invoking low-
      probability worst-case scenarios to justify their views on everything from preemptive military action to torture. So why not
      resort to outright science fiction?

An EMP attack would cause no long term damage and neither North Korea nor Iran has EMP
capabilities
Robert Farley, Ph.D. from the University of Washington Department of Political Science, 10/16/ 09, Institute for Policy Studies,
―The EMP Threat: Lots of Hype, Little Traction‖, http://www.rightweb.irc-
online.org/articles/display/the_emp_threat_lots_of_hype_little_traction
     Many weapons experts doubt that an EMP attack could cause lasting or irreversible damage. Stephen Younger, former
     senior fellow at Los Alamos National Lab and director at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, argues that while an EMP
     might create problems in the short term, it is unlikely to cause long-term devastation. Similarly, observers have questioned
     the capacity of North Korea or Iran, much less a terrorist organization, to develop a warhead sophisticated enough to cause
     widespread EMP damage. Nick Schwellenbach, a former researcher at Project on Government Oversight, suggests that the
     idea of a small, EMP-optimized warhead is absurd: "You have a lot of points of failure in order to get to a warhead that is
     EMP optimized. … [Y]ou need specialized machine tools, you need capital, but to create a weapon that creates the
     secondary effect that you're talking about, that's something even we can't do right now.‖ [9] At this point, neither Iran nor
     North Korea possess a missile capable of delivering an EMP attack against the United States. However, Graham, as well as
     Peter Pry, the president of EMPACT America and former senior staffer with the EMP Commission, have argued in
     Congressional testimony that Iran could launch a medium-range ballistic missile from an offshore barge or freighter, thus
     giving the Islamic Republic first-strike capability. Moreover, EMP awareness advocates have argued that if terrorists
     acquired a ballistic missile and a nuclear warhead, they could conduct the same kind of offshore attack.




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                                                    XTN #4 – No EMP
1NC number 4 is that there is no chance of an EMP attack because the tech is too far away –
Considerable technological barriers add to the fact missiles are only intended for defensive uses,
and even fueling and launching would be difficult, that’s Stewart and Hughes 10.

Technical barriers prevent an Iranian EMP
Scott Stewart and Nate Hughes, Stratfor Analysts, 9/9/10, ―Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,‖
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100908_gauging_threat_electromagnetic_pulse_emp_attack
      One scenario that has been widely put forth is that the EMP threat emanates not from a global or regional power like Russia
      or China but from a rogue state or a transnational terrorist group that does not possess ICBMs but will use subterfuge to
      accomplish its mission without leaving any fingerprints. In this scenario, the rogue state or terrorist group loads a nuclear
      warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship or tanker and then launches the missile from just off the coast in order to
      get the warhead into position over the target for a HEMP strike. This scenario would involve either a short-range ballistic
      missile to achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range (but not intercontinental) ballistic missile to reach the
      necessary position over the Eastern or Western seaboard or the Midwest to achieve a key coastline or continental strike.
      When we consider this scenario, we must first acknowledge that it faces the same obstacles as any other nuclear weapon
      employed in a terrorist attack. It is unlikely that a terrorist group like al Qaeda or Hezbollah can develop its own nuclear
      weapons program. It is also highly unlikely that a nation that has devoted significant effort and treasure to develop a nuclear
      weapon would entrust such a weapon to an outside organization. Any use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously
      investigated and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified and would pay a heavy price for such an attack
      (there has been a large investment in the last decade in nuclear forensics). Lastly, as noted above, a nuclear weapon is seen
      as a deterrent by countries such as North Korea or Iran, which seek such weapons to protect themselves from invasion, not
      to use them offensively. While a group like al Qaeda would likely use a nuclear device if it could obtain one, we doubt that
      other groups such as Hezbollah would. Hezbollah has a known base of operations in Lebanon that could be hit in a
      counterstrike and would therefore be less willing to risk an attack that could be traced back to it. Also, such a scenario
      would require not a crude nuclear device but a sophisticated nuclear warhead capable of being mated with a ballistic
      missile. There are considerable technical barriers that separate a crude nuclear device from a sophisticated nuclear warhead.
      The engineering expertise required to construct such a warhead is far greater than that required to construct a crude device.
      A warhead must be far more compact than a primitive device. It must also have a trigger mechanism and electronics and
      physics packages capable of withstanding the force of an ICBM launch, the journey into the cold vacuum of space and the
      heat and force of re-entering the atmosphere — and still function as designed. Designing a functional warhead takes
      considerable advances in several fields of science, including physics, electronics, engineering, metallurgy and explosives
      technology, and overseeing it all must be a high-end quality assurance capability. Because of this, it is our estimation that it
      would be far simpler for a terrorist group looking to conduct a nuclear attack to do so using a crude device than it would be
      using a sophisticated warhead — although we assess the risk of any non-state actor obtaining a nuclear capability of any
      kind, crude or sophisticated, as extraordinarily unlikely. But even if a terrorist organization were somehow able to obtain a
      functional warhead and compatible fissile core, the challenges of mating the warhead to a missile it was not designed for
      and then getting it to launch and detonate properly would be far more daunting than it would appear at first glance.
      Additionally, the process of fueling a liquid-fueled ballistic missile at sea and then launching it from a ship using an
      improvised launcher would also be very challenging. (North Korea, Iran and Pakistan all rely heavily on Scud technology,
      which uses volatile, corrosive and toxic fuels.)




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                                           **Links to Das




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                  Launch Based Environment DA Link – 5 to 10 Fold Increase
Deploying enough interceptors increases current launch rates 5 to 10 fold
David K. Barton is vice president of ANRO Engineering Consultants. An IEEE Fellow, he served as chairman of the Radar Systems
Panel of the IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Society. He is the author of Radar Technology Encyclopedia, et al., Roger
Falcone University of California, Berkeley Daniel Kleppner, Co-Chair Massachusetts Institute of Technology Frederick K. Lamb, Co-
Chair University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Ming K. Lau Sandia National Laboratories David Montague LDM Associates,
Menlo Park, CA David E. Mosher, Staff Director RAND, Washington, DC William Priedhorsky Los Alamos National Laboratory
Maury Tigner Cornell University David R. Vaughan RAND, Santa Monica, CA             Harvey L. Lynch Stanford Linear Accelerator
Center Ken Cole, Staff Assistant American Physical Society David Moncton Argonne National Laboratory, 7-03, [―Report of the
American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense Scientific and Technical
Issues,‖ American Physical Society, http://www.americanphysicalsociety.com/units/fps/newsletters/2004/january/reviews.pdf] E. Liu

      3. If interceptor rockets were based in space, their coverage would not be constrained by geography, but they would
      confront the same time constraints and engagement uncertainties as terrestrial-based interceptors. Consequently, their kill
      vehicles (the final homing stage of the interceptors) would have to be similar in size to those of terrestrial-based
      interceptors. With the technology we judge could become available within the next 15 years, defending against a single
      ICBM would require a thousand or more interceptors for a system having the lowest possible mass and providing realistic
      decision time. Deploying such a system would require at least a five- to tenfold increase over current U.S. space-launch
      rates.




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                                            Spending Link – 44 Billion
Their figures are biased – Minimal missile defense still costs 44 billion
Theresa Hitchens is the director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. She had served as director of the Center
for Defense Information. She has been editor of Defense News, Intern with Senator John Glenn and the Nato Parliamentary Assembly
in Brussels, and director of research at BASIC. Besides her duties as CDI director, Ms Hitchens leads CDI‘s Space Security Project.
The author of Future Security In Space: Charting a Cooperative Course (2004), she serves on the editorial board of The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, and is a member of Women in International Security and the International Institute for Strategic Studies and
Victoria Samson, Washington Office Director for Secure World Foundation and has more than twelve years of experience in
military space issues, consults on war-gaming scenarios for the Missile Defense Agency's Directorate of Intelligence, served as a
Senior Analyst for the Center for Defense Information (CDI), Summer/Fall 04, [―Space Based Interceptors Still Not a Good Idea,‖
CDI, www.cdi.org/news/space-security/space-based-interceptors.pdf] E. Liu

      However, there are critical questions about the size and weight of the constel-lation that would be required to provide a
      meaningful defense. MDA officials and supporters of space-based interceptors at the U.S. national laboratories argue that
      only 300 to 600 interceptors would be required at a cost of $50 billion.1 Some of Reagan's original Star Warriors, such as
      former Ambassador Henry (Hank) Cooper, have even argued that a Brilliant Pebbles-like program could be revived and
      deployed for as little as $10 billion.19 These calculations are widely disputed by independent scientists. A study by the
      non-partisan American Physical Society, for example, determined that in order for an SBI system to be capable of
      inter¬cepting a single solid-fueled ICBM launched from North Korea or Iran during its boost phase, "at least I,6oo
      interceptors would be required for a sys¬tem having the lowest-possible on-orbit mass and providing an optimistically short
      time to construct a firing solu¬tion... Such a system would have a mass in orbit of at least 2,000 tonnes (metric tons)."20
      Considering that current launch costs for Low-Earth Orbit pay-loads hover at $22,000 per kilogram, fielding even this
      minimal space-based KE-BPI capability would cost $44 billion in launch costs alone.21 The APS study, basing its estimate
      on those of the U.S. national intelligence community, assumed that "countries of concern" could obtain solid-fuel missile
      technolo¬gies in ten to fifteen years.2




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                                           Spending Link – 27-78 Billion
Space missile defense requires 27 to 78 billion – Launches and replacement
Congresional Budget Office, 7-04, [―Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense,‖ CBO,
www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5679&type=1] E. Liu

      All of the alternative BPI systems described above are able to provide full coverage against liquid-fuel ICBMs from Iran
      and North Korea, but they do not have identical ca¬pabilities. Each design has inherent advantages and disad¬vantages in
      such matters as cost, potential area of cover¬age, capability against solid-fuel ICBMs, dependence on access to foreign
      bases, vulnerability to being attacked or to exhausting their supply of interceptors, and strategic responsiveness. Not
      surprisingly, the greatest differences exist between the space-based systems and the surface-based ones. Costs Developing
      and fielding die surface-based BPI system in Option 1 and tlien operating it for 20 years would cost a total of $16 billion to
      $24 billion (in 2004 dollars), CBO estimates. The system in Option 2 would cost $18 billion to $28 billion, and the one in
      Option 3 would cost $25 billion to $37 billion (see Summary Table 2). Those ranges reflect the possibility of cost growth
      comparable to what similar defense programs have experienced in the past. The cost estimates for the three surface-based
      systems as-sume procurement of equipment for 10 BPI launch sites. Each site would include six interceptors plus a set of
      com-munications and battle management equipment. Using two interceptor shots per engagement, each launch site could
      engage diree targets with that allotment of inter-ceptors. For those options, 10 sites' worth of equipment would be enough to
      defend against liquid-fuel ICBMs fired from Iran and North Korea and also provide some equipment for use against other
      countries of concern. Ad-ditionally, the estimate for each surface-based system in-cludes costs to purchase, operate, and
      maintain three cargo ships on which a BPI site could be located to pro-vide sea-based capability (such as against North
      Korea). Of the space-based systems, the one in Option 5 would cost $27 billion to $40 billion (similar to the high-perfor-
      mance surface-based system in Option 3). The lower-speed SBI system in Option 4 would cost more—$56 bil¬lion to $78
      billion—because of higher costs per intercep¬tor and higher launch costs to put more mass into orbit. The space-based
      options are more expensive than die sur¬face-based options because they need more interceptors to cover Iran and North
      Korea at all times and because they require paying for launch services. The high opera¬tions costs for tliose options reflect
      die need to periodi¬cally buy and launch replacement SBIs. CBO assumes that each interceptor in orbit would have a life
      span of seven years—a typical length for satellites in low-Earth orbit—compared with at least 20 years for a surface-based
      interceptor, The costs of die various BPI systems would be lower if planners accepted less capability. For example, five
      surface sites could provide coverage just of Iran and North Korea (with nodiing left over for testing or odier coverage). The
      cost of that capability over 20 years could be as low as $14 billion to $21 billion for Option 1, $16 billion to $26 billion for
      Option 2, and $22 billion to $35 billion for Option 3, CBO estimates. Similarly, if die space-based systems used a single
      shot against each ICBM, die cost of Option 4 could drop to $36 billion to $51 billion and the cost of Option 5 could decline
      to $20 billion to $31 billion. Although those less-capable systems would probably be considered insufficient as a stand-
      alone de¬fense, tliey might be adequate as complements to other layers of a multilayer ballistic missile defense system.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                     DDW 2011
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                                                         Plan Popular
Missile defense is bipartisan – The alternative is too weak
James Clay Moltz, Associate Professor on the National Security Affairs faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School. He taught
previously in the Monterey Institute's Graduate School of International Policy Studies and held various positions at the institute's
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) including CNS deputy director and founding editor of The Nonproliferation Review, 4-02,
[―Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control,‖ Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1031] E. Liu

      With the increasing importance of space to the U.S. military and the U.S. economy, however, as well as the growing
      number of states that are capable of launching weapons into space, Pentagon planners have again begun to look at space as
      a possible environment of confrontation. This renewed interest in space coincides with the current push for missiles
      defenses, which may require certain space components. Recent policy is being driven in part by policies enacted by hard-
      line conservatives in the Congress during the late 1990s (the Defend America Act of 1996 and the National Missile Defense
      Act of 1999), as well as the issuance of three major reports (two of them by Republican-controlled congressional
      committees). The first, the Rumsfeld Commission report in July 1998 on missile proliferation, supported conservative
      congressional claims about the severity of the rogue state missile threat and was bolstered by North Korea‘s test of the
      Taepo-Dong 1 one month later. The second, the Air Force‘s ―Vision 2020‖ report, outlined Air Force expectations about
      the opening of a new theater of military operations and discussed an assumed future challenge to U.S. military space
      security. The third, the Rumsfeld Commission report of January 2001 on the management of U.S. space assets, spoke of
      serious vulnerabilities to U.S. military and commercial space systems and the likely need to deploy space weapons to
      counter this presumed threat. Despite criticism of these reports from the arms control community for their exaggeration of
      foreign capabilities and their assumption of hostile intentions among other states, there are two undeniable truths in these
      documents: one, there is currently no means of stopping a ballistic missile traveling through space; and two, the United
      States lacks effective military means of protecting itself against a number of feasible threats to U.S. space-based assets,
      including co-orbital weapons and direct-ascent ASAT weapons. Current treaties (after the June 2002 expiration of the ABM
      Treaty) allow unlimited testing of conventional weapons and lasers in space, the stationing of such systems in space, and
      the use of space for the interception of ballistic missiles or satellites by a variety of ground-, sea-, air-, and space-based
      systems. Thus, as capabilities to deploy these systems increase, either weapons will be needed or treaties will need to be
      expanded and strengthened. To date, the Bush administration has been effective in pushing the weapons option as the best
      means of overcoming these threats, even to the point of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. Meanwhile, arms control
      supporters have failed to communicate an effective alternative strategy to the Congress and the American people. Most
      importantly, they have failed to open a dialogue with moderate Republicans to consider possible ―mixed‖ strategies that
      might involve some weapons options but also strengthened treaties. Fortunately, time is still on the side of a deal. Current
      funding requests from the administration show continued interest in two weapons for national missile defense that would be
      space based: the Space-Based Laser and a kinetic kill interceptor similar to the original Brilliant Pebbles concept. Both
      systems would be deployed in low-Earth orbit. Pentagon officials at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) indicate that
      deployment of these technologies is at least a decade off. However, testing of the Army‘s Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite
      (KEASAT) interceptor may begin much sooner. In addition, a considerable number of other missile defense technologies—
      the ground-based interceptor, the Theater High Altitude Area Defense system, and some of the sea-based interceptors—
      attack their targets and destroy them in low-Earth orbital space. These systems play a central role in the theater missile
      defense programs that have gained considerable bipartisan support in Congress. Some of these systems have been
      extensively tested and have developed some limited missile interception capabilities. Work on them will be accelerated and
      ramped up to faster missiles and more complex tests after June 2002.




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66efedb7-eace-44bc-b262-17a4bd40b8a3.doc                                                                                     DDW 2011
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                                                      Plan Unpopular
Missile defense unpopular – cost
Laura Grego, staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 6-2-11 (http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/6105337195/space-based-
missile-defense-still-a-bad-idea

      While $8 million is small money in this context, as Rep. Sanchez rebutted, space-based interceptors are big money. This
      has been established repeatedly in studies by, for example, the American Physics Society and the Congressional Budget
      Office, both in 2004, which show that hundreds to thousands of orbiting interceptors would be needed to provide global
      coverage against one or two ballistic missiles. For the foreseeable future, each of these hundreds to thousands of orbiting
      interceptors would require a mass of many hundreds of kilograms, larger than an Iridium communications satellite at
      launch. A deployed system would be enormously expensive and challenge the U.S. launch capability. It is unlikely to ever
      be deployed, and in today‘s constrained budgetary environment, it is exceedingly unlikely to even be considered seriously.

Missile defense unpopular – weaponization
Dinerman, ‘10 – Taylor, journalist and writer on space and military matters (11/23. Hudson New York. http://www.hudson-
ny.org/1668/us-navy-china-theater-of-war

The program, though, is controversial: as its foes point out, it would involve the "weaponization of space." In response, it should be
pointed out that space is already a theater of war: satellites are constantly being attacked by jamming and by being "painted" with
lasers. Additionally, the Chinese Anti Satellite(ASAT) weapon test that occurred in January 2007 is often considered to have Missile
Defense applications as well as ASAT ones. Arms Control advocates have long tried to prevent the US from deploying anti ballistic
missile weapons. They have been particularly ferocious in their opposition to space-based missile defense systems. They seem to
believe that the US must negotiate agreements or treaties that either maintain the balance of nuclear terror or replace it with some sort
of universal disarmament.




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