TCA Statutes by alicejenny

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									                                  TCA Statutes
                      Criminal Law: Davies’ Fall 2003

39-13-202. First degree murder.
(a) First degree murder is:
        (1) A premeditated and intentional killing of another;
        (2) [FELONY MURDER RULE] A killing of another committed in the
        perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, arson, rape,
        robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child
        neglect or aircraft piracy; or
                Notes:
               Proximate causes theory - liability attaches "for any death
               proximately resulting from the unlawful activity-notwithstanding
               the fact that the killing was by one resisting the crime."
               Agency theory - "the doctrine of felony murder does not extend to a
               killing, although growing out of the commission of the felony, if
               directly attributable to the act of one other than the defendant or
               those associated with him in the unlawful enterprise." (TN follows
               the agency theory)
        (3) A killing of another committed as the result of the unlawful throwing, placing
        or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(b) No culpable mental state is required for conviction under subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3)
except the intent to commit the enumerated offenses or acts in such subdivisions.
(c) A person convicted of first degree murder shall be punished by:
        (1) Death;
        (2) Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or
        (3) Imprisonment for life.
(d) As used in subdivision (a)(1) "premeditation" is an act done after the exercise of
reflection and judgment. "Premeditation" means that the intent to kill must have been
formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the
mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at
the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to
determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to
be capable of premeditation.

39-13-210. Second degree murder.
(a) Second degree murder is:
       (1) A knowing killing of another; or
       (2) A killing of another which results from the unlawful distribution of any
       Schedule I or Schedule II drug when such drug is the proximate cause of the death
       of the user.
           b. Second degree murder is a Class A felony.




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39-13-211. Voluntary manslaughter.
(a) Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional or knowing killing of another in a state of
passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act
in an irrational manner.
(b) Voluntary manslaughter is a Class C felony.
       Requirements of the Rule of Provocation
       1. adequate provocation {a term of art having special meaning} (words alone
       are not enough)
             a. discovering one's spouse in the act of sex with another
             b. mutual combat
             c. assault and battery
             d. Injury to one of the defendant's relatives or a 3rd party
       2. heat of passion
       3. must have been a sudden heat of passion
       4. casual connection b/w the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act

       TCA ANNOTATIONS
       Passion
           Suppressed anger is a common accompaniment to passion so that
             where defendant unexpectedly met the debaucher of his wife whom he
             killed without warning, the fact that defendant displayed no particular
             emotion until this time would not justify conviction of second degree
             murder rather than voluntary manslaughter. Whitsett v. State, 201
             Tenn. 317, 299 S.W.2d 2 (1957).
           Where defendant is laboring under an adequately aroused passion so
             great as to obscure his reason, the killing will be reduced to
             manslaughter provided the passion has not had time to cool. Whitsett
             v. State, 201 Tenn. 317, 299 S.W.2d 2 (1957).
           The distinguishing feature of manslaughter from murder was the lack
             of malice and in its stead passion which was an emotional state which
             included fear, terror, excitement or nervousness. Capps v. State, 478
             S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972), overruled on other grounds,
             State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn. 1992).

       Provocation.
           An assault, too slight of itself to be sufficient provocation to reduce a
             killing to voluntary manslaughter, may become sufficient when
             accompanied by offensive language; but to do so, the accompanying
             assault must be imminent and actual. Freddo v. State, 127 Tenn.
             376, 155 S.W. 170, 44 L.R.A. (n.s) 659 (1912).
           Circumstances which produce such excitement and passion as
             would obscure the reason of an ordinary man and induce him to
             strike a fatal blow will reduce the homicide to manslaughter. Toler v.
             State, 152 Tenn. 1, 260 S.W. 134 (1923).



39-13-212. Criminally negligent homicide.
(a) Criminally negligent conduct which results in death constitutes criminally negligent
homicide.
(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a Class E felony.



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39-13-215. Reckless homicide.
(a) Reckless homicide is a reckless killing of another.
(b) Reckless homicide is a Class D felony.

39-13-213. Vehicular homicide.
(a) Vehicular homicide is the reckless killing of another by the operation of an
automobile, airplane, motorboat or other motor vehicle:
        (1) As the proximate result of conduct creating a substantial risk of death
        or serious bodily injury to a person; or
        (2) As the proximate result of the driver's intoxication as set forth in § 55-
        10-401. For the purposes of this section, "intoxication" includes alcohol
        intoxication as defined by § 55-10-408, drug intoxication, or both.
(b) Vehicular homicide is a Class C felony, unless it is the proximate result of
driver intoxication as set forth in subdivision (a)(2), in which case it is a Class B
felony.
(c) The court shall prohibit a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide from driving
a vehicle in this state for a period of time not less than three (3) years nor more
than ten (10) years.

(5) "Deadly weapon" means:
(A) A firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of
inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or
(B) Anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death
or serious bodily injury;

(12) "Force" means
compulsion by the use of physical power or violence and shall be broadly construed
to accomplish the purposes of this title

(34) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves:
(A) A substantial risk of death;
(B) Protracted unconsciousness;
(C) Extreme physical pain;
(D) Protracted or obvious disfigurement; or
(E) Protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ
or mental faculty


39-11-302. Definitions of culpable mental state.
(a) "Intentional" refers to a person who acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the
conduct or to a result of the conduct when it is the person's conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(b) "Knowing" refers to a person who acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or to
circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the
conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result
of the person's conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result.
(c) "Reckless" refers to a person who acts recklessly with respect to circumstances
surrounding the conduct or the result of the conduct when the person is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances


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exist or the result will occur [THIS MEANS IF IT'S A HOMICIDE CRIME THE
RESULT SPOKEN OF HERE IS THE RESULT OF DEATH!!!!!]. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the accused person's standpoint.
(d) "Criminal negligence" refers to a person who acts with criminal negligence with
respect to the circumstances surrounding that person's conduct or the result of that
conduct when the person ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the accused person's standpoint.


39-11-611. Self-defense.
(a) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another person
when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the force is immediately
necessary to protect against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force.
The person must have a reasonable belief that there is an imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury. The danger creating the belief of imminent death
or serious bodily injury must be real, or honestly believed to be real at the time,
and must be founded upon reasonable grounds. There is no duty to retreat
before a person threatens or uses force.
(b) Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury
within the person's own residence is presumed to have held a reasonable fear
of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury to self, family or a member
of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of
the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and
forcibly entered the residence, and the person using the force knew or had reason to
believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred.
(c) The threat or use of force against another is not justified if the person
consented to the exact force used or attempted by the other individual.
(d) The threat or use of force against another is not justified if the person
provoked the other individual's use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless:
        (1) The person abandons the encounter or clearly communicates to the
        other the intent to do so; and
        (2) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force
        against the person.
(e) The threat or use of force against another is not justified to resist a halt at a
roadblock, arrest, search, or stop and frisk that the person knows is being made by
a law enforcement officer, unless:
        (1) The law enforcement officer uses or attempts to use greater force than
        necessary to make the arrest, search, stop and frisk, or halt; and
        (2) The person reasonably believes that the force is immediately necessary to
        protect against the law enforcement officer's use or attempted use of greater
        force than necessary.

39-13-216. Assisted suicide.
(a) A person commits the offense of assisted suicide who:
       (1) Intentionally provides another person with the means by which such
       person directly and intentionally brings about such person's own death; or


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         (2) Intentionally participates in a physical act by which another person
         directly and intentionally brings about such person's own death; and
         (3) Provides the means or participates in the physical act with:
                 (A) Actual knowledge that the other person intends to bring
                 about such person's own death; and
                 (B) The clear intent that the other person bring about such
                 person's own death.
(b) It is not an offense under this section to:
         (1) Withhold or withdraw medical care as defined by § 32-11-103;
         (2) Prescribe, dispense, or administer medications or perform medical
         procedures calculated or intended to relieve another person's pain or
         discomfort (but not calculated or intended to cause death), even if the
         medications or medical procedures may hasten or increase the risk of death;
         or
         (3) Fail to prevent another from bringing about that person's own death.
(c) This section shall not in any way affect, impair, impede, or otherwise limit or
render invalid the rights, privileges, and policies set forth in the Tennessee Right to
Natural Death Act, compiled in title 32, chapter 11; the provisions for the durable
power of attorney for health care, compiled in title 34, chapter 6, part 2; or the Do-
Not-Resuscitate (DNR) regulations of the Tennessee board for licensing health care
facilities issued pursuant to §§ 68-11-201 - 68-11-204.
(d) A cause of action for injunctive relief may be maintained against any person who
is reasonably believed to be about to violate or who is in the course of violating
subsection (a) by any person who is:
         (1) The spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the person who would bring about
         such person's own death;
         (2) Entitled to inherit from the person who would bring about such person's
         own death;
         (3) A health care provider or former health care provider of the person who
         would bring about such person's own death; or
         (4) A public official with appropriate jurisdiction to prosecute or enforce the
         laws of this state.
(e) A cause of action for civil damages against any person who violates or attempts
to violate subsection (a) may be maintained by any person given standing by
subsection (d) for compensatory damages and exemplary damages, whether or not
the plaintiff consented to or had prior knowledge of the violation or attempt. Any
compensatory damages awarded shall be paid as provided by law, but exemplary
damages shall be paid over to the department of revenue for deposit in the criminal
injuries compensation fund.
(f) Reasonable attorney's fees shall be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff in a civil
action brought pursuant to this section. If judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant and the court finds that the plaintiff's suit was frivolous or brought in bad
faith, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to the defendant.
(g) Assisted suicide is a Class D felony.

ASSAULTIVE OFFENSES
39-13-101. Assault.
(a) A person commits assault who:
       (1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
       (2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent
       bodily injury; or




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       (3) Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a
       reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or
       provocative.
(b) Assault is a Class A misdemeanor unless the offense is committed under
subdivision (a)(3), in which event assault is a Class B misdemeanor.

(2) "Bodily injury" includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement; physical
pain or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ,
or mental faculty;

39-13-102. Aggravated assault.
(a) A person commits aggravated assault who:
        (1) Intentionally or knowingly commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-
        101 and:
                (A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; or
                (B) Uses or displays a deadly weapon; or
(2) Recklessly commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101(a)(1), and:
        (A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; or
        (B) Uses or displays a deadly weapon.
(b) A person commits aggravated assault who, being the parent or custodian of a
child or the custodian of an adult, intentionally or knowingly fails or refuses to
protect such child or adult from an aggravated assault as defined in subdivision
(a)(1) or aggravated child abuse as defined in § 39-15-402.
(c) A person commits aggravated assault who, after having been enjoined or
restrained by an order, diversion or probation agreement of a court of competent
jurisdiction from in any way causing or attempting to cause bodily injury or in any
way committing or attempting to commit an assault against an individual or
individuals, intentionally or knowingly attempts to cause or causes bodily injury or
commits or attempts to commit an assault against such individual or individuals.
(d) Aggravated assault under subdivision (a)(1) or subsection (b) or (c) is a Class C
felony. Aggravated assault under subdivision (a)(2) is a Class D felony. The court
shall consider as an enhancement factor at the time of sentencing that the victim
of the aggravated assault was a law enforcement officer, firefighter, correctional
officer, youth services officer, probation and parole officer, or a state registered
security officer/guard performing an official duty or an employee of the department
of correction or the department of children's services; provided, that such officer or
employee was performing an official duty. The court shall consider as an
enhancement factor at the time of sentencing that the victim of the aggravated
assault was an emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician,
or paramedic, whether compensated or acting as a volunteer; provided that such
technician or worker was performing an official duty.

39-13-103. Reckless endangerment.
(a) A person commits an offense who recklessly engages in conduct which places
or may place another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(b) Reckless endangerment is a Class A misdemeanor; however, reckless
endangerment committed with a deadly weapon is a Class E felony.


39-15-401. Child abuse and neglect.
(a) Any person who knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under
eighteen (18) years of age in such a manner as to inflict injury or neglects such a child


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so as to adversely affect the child's health and welfare commits a Class A
misdemeanor; provided, that if the abused or neglected child is six (6) years of age or
less, the penalty is a Class D felony.
(b) (1) Any juvenile court having reasonable cause to believe that a person is guilty of
violating this section shall have the person brought before the court either by summons or
warrant. No arrest warrant or summons shall be issued by any person authorized to issue
such a warrant or summons nor shall criminal charges be instituted against a child's
parent, guardian or custodian for a violation of subsection (a) based upon the allegation
that unreasonable corporal punishment was administered to such child unless the affidavit
of complaint also contains a copy of the report prepared by the law enforcement official
who investigated the allegation or independent medical verification of injury to the child.
        (2) (A) If the person pleads not guilty, the juvenile judge shall have the power of a
        judge of the court of general sessions to bind the person over to the grand jury as
        in cases of misdemeanors under the criminal laws of this state. Upon being bound
        over to the grand jury, the person may be prosecuted on an indictment filed by the
        district attorney general and a prosecutor need not be named on the indictment.
                 (B) On a plea of not guilty, the juvenile court judge shall have the power
                 to proceed to hear a case on its merits without the intervention of a jury if
                 the person requests a hearing in juvenile court and expressly waives, in
                 writing, indictment, presentment, grand jury investigation and jury trial.
                 (C) If the person enters a plea of guilty, the juvenile court judge shall
                 sentence the person under this section.
(c) Except as expressly herein provided, the provisions of this section shall not be
construed as repealing any provision of any other statute, but shall be supplementary
thereto and cumulative thereof.
(d) A violation of this section may be a lesser included offense of any kind of homicide,
statutory assault, or sexual offense if the victim is a child and the evidence supports a
charge under this section. In any case in which conduct violating this section also
constitutes assault, the conduct may be prosecuted under this section or under § 39-13-
101.

39-15-402. Aggravated child abuse and neglect.
(a) A person commits the offense of aggravated child abuse or aggravated child neglect
who commits the offense of child abuse or neglect as defined in § 39-15-401 and:
        (1) The act of abuse or neglect results in serious bodily injury to the child; or
        (2) A deadly weapon is used to accomplish the act of abuse.
(b) A violation of this section is a Class B felony; provided, that, if the abused or
neglected child is six (6) years of age or less, the penalty is a Class A felony.
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to mean a child is neglected, abused, or
abused or neglected in an aggravated manner for the sole reason the child is being
provided treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets
or practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited
practitioner thereof in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.




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ROBBERY
39-13-401. Robbery.
(a) Robbery is the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of
another by violence or putting the person in fear.
(b) Robbery is a Class C felony.

39-14-103. Theft of property.
A person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of
property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property
without the owner's effective consent.


39-13-402. Aggravated robbery.
(a) Aggravated robbery is robbery as defined in § 39-13-401:
      (1) Accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used
      or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly
      weapon; or
      (2) Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury.
(b) Aggravated robbery is a Class B felony.


39-13-403. Especially aggravated robbery.
(a) Especially aggravated robbery is robbery as defined in § 39-13-401:
      (1) Accomplished with a deadly weapon; and
      (2) Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury.
(b) Especially aggravated robbery is a Class A felony.

39-13-404. Carjacking.
(a) "Carjacking" is the intentional or knowing taking of a motor vehicle from the
possession of another by use of:
      (1) A deadly weapon; or
      (2) Force or intimidation.
(b) Carjacking is a Class B felony.



FALSE IMPRISONMENT OFFENSES
39-13-302. False imprisonment.
(a) A person commits the offense of false imprisonment who knowingly removes
or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other's
liberty.
(b) False imprisonment is a Class A misdemeanor.

39-13-303. Kidnapping.
(a) Kidnapping is false imprisonment as defined in § 39-13-302:
       (1) Under circumstances exposing the other person to substantial risk of
       bodily injury; or
       (2) Where the confinement of another is in a condition of involuntary
       servitude.
(b) Kidnapping is a Class C felony.




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39-13-304. Aggravated kidnapping.
(a) Aggravated kidnapping is false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-302,
committed:
       (1) To facilitate the commission of any felony or flight thereafter;
       (2) To interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
       function;
       (3) With the intent to inflict serious bodily injury on or to terrorize the
       victim or another;
       (4) Where the victim suffers bodily injury; or
       (5) While the defendant is in possession of a deadly weapon or threatens
       the use of a deadly weapon.
(b) (1) Aggravated kidnapping is a Class B felony.
       (2) If the offender voluntarily releases the victim alive or voluntarily
       provides information leading to the victim's safe release, such actions shall be
       considered by the court as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing.

39-13-305. Especially aggravated kidnapping.
(a) Especially aggravated kidnapping is false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-
302:
       (1) Accomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used
       or fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly
       weapon;
       (2) Where the victim was under the age of thirteen (13) at the time of
       the removal or confinement;
       (3) Committed to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or
       hostage; or
       (4) Where the victim suffers serious bodily injury.
(b) (1) Especially aggravated kidnapping is a Class A felony.
       (2) If the offender voluntarily releases the victim alive or voluntarily
       provides information leading to the victim's safe release, such actions shall be
       considered by the court as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing.

INCOHATE OFFENSES
39-12-101. Criminal attempt.
(a) A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability
otherwise required for the offense:
        (1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute
        an offense if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person
        believes them to be;
        (2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense,
        and believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the
        person's part; or
        (3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that
        would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the
        conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a
        substantial step toward the commission of the offense.
(b) Conduct does not constitute a substantial step under subdivision (a)(3) unless
the person's entire course of action is corroborative of the intent to commit the
offense.
(c) It is no defense to prosecution for criminal attempt that the offense attempted
was actually committed.




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39-12-102. Solicitation - Defenses disallowed.
(a) Whoever, by means of oral, written or electronic communication, directly or
through another, intentionally commands, requests or hires another to commit
a criminal offense, or attempts to command, request or hire another to commit
a criminal offense, with the intent that the criminal offense be committed, is guilty
of the offense of solicitation.
(b) It is no defense that the solicitation was unsuccessful and the offense
solicited was not committed. It is no defense that the person solicited could not
be guilty of the offense solicited, due to insanity, minority, or other lack of criminal
responsibility or incapacity. It is no defense that the person solicited was unaware
of the criminal nature of the conduct solicited. It is no defense that the person
solicited is unable to commit the offense solicited because of the lack of capacity,
status, or characteristic needed to commit the offense solicited, so long as the
person soliciting or the person solicited believes that either or both have such
capacity, status, or characteristic.

39-12-103. Criminal conspiracy.
(a) The offense of conspiracy is committed if two (2) or more people, each having
the culpable mental state required for the offense which is the object of the
conspiracy and each acting for the purpose of promoting or facilitating commission of
an offense, agree that one (1) or more of them will engage in conduct which
constitutes such offense.
(b) [DISREGARD SUBSECTION B FOR PURPOSES OF OUR CLASS]
(c) If a person conspires to commit a number of offenses, the person is guilty of
only one (1) conspiracy so long as such multiple offenses are the object of the
same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.
(d) No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense unless an overt
act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done
by the person or by another with whom the person conspired.
(e) (1) Conspiracy is a continuing course of conduct which terminates when
the objectives of the conspiracy are completed or the agreement that they be
completed is abandoned by the person and by those with whom the person
conspired. The objectives of the conspiracy include, but are not limited to, escape
from the crime, distribution of the proceeds of the crime, and measures, other than
silence, for concealing the crime or obstructing justice in relation to it.
        (2) Abandonment of a conspiracy is presumed if neither the person nor
        anyone with whom the person conspired does any overt act in pursuance of
        the conspiracy during the applicable period of limitation.
        (3) If an individual abandons the agreement, the conspiracy is terminated
        as to that person only if and when the person advises those with whom
        the person conspired of the abandonment, or the person informs law
        enforcement authorities of the existence of the conspiracy and of the
        person's participation therein.
(f) It is no defense that the offense which was the object of the conspiracy was not
committed.
(g) Nothing in this provision is intended to modify the evidentiary rules allowing
statements of co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy.

       Pinkerton Rule: Each member of a conspiracy is liable for those crimes
       committed by all other members that were:
                1. A reasonably foreseeable result of the conspiracy; and
                2. Committed in furtherance of the conspiracy




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39-12-104. Renunciation defense.
It is an affirmative defense to a charge of criminal attempt, solicitation or
conspiracy that the person, after committing the criminal attempt, solicitation or
conspiracy, prevented the successful commission of the offense attempted,
solicited or conspired, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary
renunciation of the person's criminal purpose.

39-12-105. Incapacity, irresponsibility or immunity of party to attempt,
solicitation or conspiracy - Defenses.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), it is immaterial to the liability of a
person who solicits another to commit an offense that:
       (1) The person or the one whom the person solicits does not occupy a
       particular position or have a particular characteristic which is an element of
       such offense, if the person believes that one of them does; or
       (2) The one whom the person solicits is not legally responsible or has an
       immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commission of the offense.
(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), it is immaterial to the liability of a
person who conspires with another to commit an offense that the one with whom the
person conspires is not legally responsible or, after the formation of the conspiracy,
has been given immunity to prosecution or conviction for the commission of the
offense.
(c) It is a defense to a charge of attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit an
offense that if the criminal object were achieved, the person would not be guilty of
an offense under the law defining the offense or as an accomplice under § 39-11-
402.
(d) It is a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the person or the one with whom
the person conspires does not occupy a particular position or have a particular
characteristic which is an element of such offense, if the person believes one of them
does.

39-12-106. Multiple convictions.
(a) A person may not be convicted of more than one (1) of the offenses of
criminal attempt, solicitation or conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or
to culminate in the commission of the same offense.
(b) A person may not be convicted of criminal attempt or solicitation and the
offense which was the object of the attempt or solicitation.
(c) A person may be convicted of conspiracy and the offense which was the
object of the conspiracy.

39-12-107. Grading attempt, solicitation and conspiracy.
(a) Criminal attempt is an offense one (1) classification lower than the most
serious crime attempted, unless the offense attempted was a Class C misdemeanor,
in which case the attempt would not be an offense.
(b) Solicitation is an offense two (2) classifications lower than the most serious
offense solicited, unless the offense solicited was a Class B or C misdemeanor, in
which case the solicitation would not be an offense.
(c) Except as provided in § 39-17-417(i) and (j)[THESE TWO SUBSECTIONS MAKE
CERTAIN CONSPIRACIES OF DRUG OFFENSES THE SAME LEVEL OF THE OFFENSE;
JUST MY GUESS, BUT THEY PROBABLY WON'T BE ON THE FINAL], conspiracy is an
offense one (1) classification lower than the most serious offense that is the
object of the conspiracy, unless the offense conspired was a Class C misdemeanor,
in which case the conspiracy would not be an offense.




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CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
2 provisions that have to be read together: 39-11-401 + 402
      Party = means you are criminally liable for an offense

39-11-401. Parties to offenses.
(a) A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is
committed by the person's own conduct, by the conduct of another for which the
person is criminally responsible, or by both.
(b) Each party to an offense may be charged with commission of the offense.


39-11-402. Criminal responsibility for conduct of another.
A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of
another if:
(1) Acting with the culpability required for the offense, the person causes or aids
an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the
definition of the offense;
(2) Acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to
benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids,
or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense; or
(3) Having a duty imposed by law or voluntarily undertaken to prevent
commission of the offense and acting with intent to benefit in the proceeds or results
of the offense, or to promote or assist its commission, the person fails to make a
reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.


39-11-403. Criminal responsibility for facilitation of felony.
(a) A person is criminally responsible for the facilitation of a felony if, knowing that
another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required for
criminal responsibility under § 39-11-402(2), the person knowingly furnishes
substantial assistance in the commission of the felony.
(b) The facilitation of the commission of a felony is an offense of the class next
below the felony facilitated by the person so charged.


39-11-407. Defenses excluded.
In a prosecution in which a person's criminal responsibility is based upon the
conduct of another, the person may be convicted on proof of commission of the
offense and that the person was a party to or facilitated its commission, and it is no
defense that:
       (1) The other belongs to a class of persons who by definition of the offense is
       legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity; or
       (2) The person for whose conduct the defendant is criminally responsible has
       been acquitted, has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of
       a different offense or different type or class of offense, or is immune from
       prosecution.




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39-11-411. Accessory after the fact.
(a) A person is an accessory after the fact who, after the commission of a
felony, with knowledge or reasonable ground to believe that the offender has
committed the felony, and with the intent to hinder the arrest, trial, conviction or
punishment of the offender:
       (1) Harbors or conceals the offender;
       (2) Provides or aids in providing the offender with any means of avoiding
       arrest, trial, conviction or punishment; or
       (3) Warns the offender of impending apprehension or discovery.
(b) This section shall have no application to an attorney providing legal services as
required or authorized by law.
(c) Accessory after the fact is a Class E felony.



DEFENSES
39-11-201. Burden of proof.
(a) No person may be convicted of an offense unless each of the following is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt:
        (1) The conduct, circumstances surrounding the conduct, or a result of the
        conduct described in the definition of the offense;
        (2) The culpable mental state required;
        (3) The negation of any defense to an offense defined in this title if admissible
        evidence is introduced supporting the defense; and
        (4) The offense was committed prior to the return of the formal charge.
(b) In the absence of the proof required by subsection (a), the innocence of the
person is presumed. (THIS IS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE)
(c) A person charged with an offense has no burden to prove innocence.
(d) Evidence produced at trial, whether presented on direct or cross-examination of
state or defense witnesses, may be utilized by either party.
(e) No person may be convicted of an offense unless venue is proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.
(f) If the issue is raised in defense, no person shall be convicted of an offense unless
jurisdiction and the commission of the offense within the time period specified in title
40, chapter 2 are proven by a preponderance of the evidence.


39-11-203. Defense.
(a) A defense to prosecution for an offense in this title is so labeled by the phrase:
"It is a defense to prosecution under . . . that . . ."
(b) The state is not required to negate the existence of a defense in the charge
alleging commission of the offense.
(c) The issue of the existence of a defense is not submitted to the jury unless it is
fairly raised by the proof.
(d) If the issue of the existence of a defense is submitted to the jury, the court shall
instruct the jury that any reasonable doubt on the issue requires the defendant to be
acquitted.
(e) (1) A ground of defense, other than one (1) negating an element of the offense
or an affirmative defense, that is not plainly labeled in accordance with this part has
the procedural and evidentiary consequences of a defense.
         (2) Defenses available under common law are hereby abolished.




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39-11-502. Ignorance or mistake of fact.
(a) Except in prosecutions for violations of §§ 39-13-504(a)(4) [note: that's Agg.
Sexual Battery of a Child; we probably won't have to know that] and 39-13-522
[note: and that's rape of a child], ignorance or mistake of fact is a defense to
prosecution if such ignorance or mistake negates the culpable mental state of
the charged offense.
(b) Although a person's ignorance or mistake of fact may constitute a defense to the
offense charged, the person may be convicted of the offense for which the person
would be guilty if the fact were as the person believed.


39-11-503. Intoxication.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), intoxication itself is not a defense to
prosecution for an offense. However, intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary,
is admissible in evidence if it is relevant to negate a culpable mental state.
(b) If recklessness establishes an element of an offense and the person is
unaware of a risk because of voluntary intoxication, the person's
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
(c) Intoxication itself does not constitute a mental disease or defect within the
meaning of § 39-11-501. However, involuntary intoxication is a defense to
prosecution if, as a result of the involuntary intoxication, the person lacked
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the person's conduct or
to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law allegedly violated.
(d) The following definitions apply in this part, unless the context clearly requires
otherwise:
        (1) "Intoxication" means disturbance of mental or physical capacity
        resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body;
        (2) "Involuntary intoxication" means intoxication that is not voluntary; and
        (3) "Voluntary intoxication" means intoxication caused by a substance that
        the person knowingly introduced into the person's body, the tendency of
        which to cause intoxication was known or ought to have been known.


39-11-504. Duress.
(a) Duress is a defense to prosecution where the person or a third person is
threatened with harm which is present, imminent, impending and of such a
nature to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if
the act is not done. The threatened harm must be continuous throughout the time
the act is being committed, and must be one from which the person cannot
withdraw in safety. Further, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm
must clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm
sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct.
(b) This defense is unavailable to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly becomes involved in a situation in which it was probable that the person
would be subjected to compulsion.

39-11-505. Entrapment.
It is a defense to prosecution that law enforcement officials, acting either directly or
through an agent, induced or persuaded an otherwise unwilling person to commit an
unlawful act when the person was not predisposed to do so. If a defendant intends
to rely on the defense of entrapment, the defendant shall give to the district attorney
general a notice comparable to that required for an insanity defense under Rule 12.2
of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.


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THERE IS NO PRACTICAL DIFFERENCE IN TN LAW B/W THE EFFECT OF A DEFENSE
AND THE EFFECT OF A JUSTIFICATION

JUSTIFICATIONS
39-11-601. Justification a defense.
It is a defense to prosecution that the conduct of the person is justified under this
part.

39-11-602. Justification definitions.
As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Custody" means under arrest by a law enforcement officer, or under restraint by
an officer, employee or agent of government pursuant to an order of a court;
(2) "Deadly force" means force that is intended or known by the defendant to
cause or, in the manner of its use or intended use, is capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury; and
(3) "Escape" means unauthorized departure from custody or failure to return to
custody following temporary leave for a specific purpose of limited period, but does
not include a violation of conditions of probation or parole.

39-11-609. Necessity.
Except as provided in §§ 39-11-611 - 39-11-621, conduct is justified if:
(1) The person reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to
avoid imminent harm; and
(2) The desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according
to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the
law proscribing the conduct.

39-11-610. Public duty.
(a) Except as qualified by subsections (b) and (c), conduct is justified if the person
reasonably believes the conduct is required or authorized by law, by the
judgment or order of a competent court or other tribunal, or in the execution of legal
process.
(b) The succeeding sections of this part control when force is threatened or used
against a person to protect persons (§§ 39-11-611 - 39-11-613), to protect property
(§§ 39-11-614 - 39-11-616), or for law enforcement (§ 39-11-620).
(c) The justification afforded by this section is available if:
       (1) The person reasonably believes the court or tribunal has jurisdiction or the
       process is lawful, even though the court or tribunal lacks jurisdiction or the
       process is unlawful; or
       (2) The person reasonably believes the conduct is required or authorized to
       assist a public servant in the performance of the public servant's official duty,
       even though the public servant exceeds the public servant's lawful authority.

39-11-611. Self-Defense [see above]

39-11-612. Defense of third person.
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another to protect a third
person if:
(1) Under the circumstances as the person reasonably believes them to be, the
person would be justified under § 39-11-611 in threatening or using force to




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protect against the use or attempted use of unlawful force reasonably believed to be
threatening the third person sought to be protected; and
(2) The person reasonably believes that the intervention is immediately
necessary to protect the third person.

39-11-613. Protection of life or health.
A person is justified in threatening or using force, but not deadly force, against
another when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the force is
immediately necessary to prevent the other from committing suicide or from
the self-infliction of serious bodily injury.

39-11-614. Protection of property.
(a) A person in lawful possession of real or personal property is justified in
threatening or using force against another when and to the degree it is reasonably
believed the force is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's
trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property.
(b) A person who has been unlawfully dispossessed of real or personal property is
justified in threatening or using force against the other when and to the degree it is
reasonably believed the force is immediately necessary to reenter the land or recover
the property if the person threatens or uses the force immediately or in fresh
pursuit after the dispossession; and:
        (1) The person reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when
        the other dispossessed the person; and
        (2) The other accomplished the dispossession by threatening or using
        force against the person.
(c) A person is not justified in using deadly force to prevent or terminate the
other's trespass on real estate or unlawful interference with personal property.

39-11-615. Protection of third person's property.
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another to protect real or
personal property of a third person if, under the circumstances as the person
reasonably believes them to be, the person would be justified under § 39-11-
614 in threatening or using force to protect the person's own real or personal
property.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
39-11-204. Affirmative defense.
(a) An affirmative defense in this title is so labeled by the phrase: "It is an
affirmative defense to prosecution under . . . ., which must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, that . . .," or words of similar import.
(b) The state is not required to negate the existence of an affirmative
defense in the charge alleging commission of the offense.
(c) (1) If a person intends to rely upon an affirmative defense, the person shall, no
later than ten (10) days before trial, notify the district attorney general in writing of
the intention, or at such time as the court may direct naming the affirmative
defense(s) to be asserted, and file a copy of the notice with the clerk.
        (2) Except as provided herein, if there is a failure to comply with the
        provisions of this subsection, the affirmative defense may not be raised;
        provided, that this shall not limit the right of the person to testify on the
        person's own behalf.




                                            16
        (3) The court may, for cause shown, allow late filing of the notice or grant
        additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make other orders as may
        be appropriate.
        (4) Evidence of an intention to raise an affirmative defense, which is later
        withdrawn, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the
        person who gave the notice of the intention.
        (5) The provisions of this subsection shall only apply in courts of record.
(d) The issue of the existence of an affirmative defense may not be submitted to the
jury unless it is fairly raised by the proof and notice has been provided according to
subsection (c).
(e) If the issue of the existence of an affirmative defense is submitted to the jury,
the court shall instruct the jury that the affirmative defense must be established
by a preponderance of the evidence.


39-11-501. Insanity.
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the commission
of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of such
defendant's acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and
convincing evidence.
(b) As used in this section, "mental disease or defect" does not include any
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
(c) No expert witness may testify as to whether the defendant was or was not
insane as set forth in subsection (a). Such ultimate issue is a matter for the trier of
fact alone.




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