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The Cold War Questions of the Day


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									  The Cold War
Questions of the Day
  Daniel W. Blackmon
     IB HL History
  Coral Gables Sr. High
        Question of the Day
 "Itis evident that the conflict after
  1947 between the United States and the
  Soviet Union was not simply a clash of
  ideologies but a struggle of competing
  interests . . . .
        Question of the Day
 the forces bringing the two countries
  into collision as world powers would
  have operated in much the same way if
  the Bolshevik revolution had never
 How far do you agree with this claim?
  (1985) (HL/SL)
              Key Terms
 ―not simply a clash of ideologies but a
  struggle of competing interests . . . . ―
 ―How far do you agree . . . ―
 Thisis a good question in that it may
 easily and convincingly be argued both
 pro and con.
 ―Although  some kind of clash of
 competing interests between the United
 States and the Soviet Union was
 inevitable, the nature and length of that
 conflict was determined more by
 ideological considerations than by any
 other factor.‖
 As American historian John Spanier
 has pointed out, a bipolar world is
 inherently an unstable world.
 Furthermore, Louis Halle has asserted
 that the dramatically different
 historical experiences of the two
 nations has conditioned how each
 responded to the post-War world.
 However,  George Kennan‘s argument
 in the Long Telegram, that the policies
 of the Soviet Union were profoundly
 determined by its particular ideological
 Weltanschauung, has been affirmed by
 the verdict of history.
 When the ideological party-state of the
 Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War
 came to an end. It is Soviet
 Bolshevism which has passed into the
 ―dustbin of history.‖
            Outline of Ideas
 Spanier and bipolarity
 Halle and differing experiences
 Kennan and the Long Telegram
            John Spanier
 ―Inthe state system [of conducting
 foreign policy], each member . . .
 Tends to feel a high degree of
 insecurity. In the absence of a world
 government that could govern and
 safeguard it, each state knows that it
 can depend on no one but itself for its
 own preservation and safety.
 ―Selfprotection is the only protection
 in an essentially anarchical system;
 understandably, states tend to regard
 one another as potential adversaries,
 menaces to one another‘s territorial
 integrity and political independence.
 Inshort, the very nature of the state
 system breeds feelings of insecurity,
 distrust, suspicion, and fear. . . . ― (1)
           John Spanier
 ―Enhancing   one‘s power relative to
 that of a possible foe becomes a
 principal means of reducing one‘s own
 insecurity. . . . Power politics stems
 from each state‘s continuous concern
 for its security.‖ (1)
 ―.. . It is easy to understand why in
  these circumstances states pursue a
  balance of power policy. A balance or
  equilibrium would make victory in a
  war less probable for an opponent and
  certainly very costly in comparison
  with any possible gains.
 ―Logically, therefore, a balance is
  presumed to be that distribution of
  power most likely to deter attack.‖ (2)
 ―The fundamental assumption
  underlying the state system is that its
  members cannot be trusted with power
  since they will be tempted to abuse it.‖
            John Spanier
 ―The  strategy of any nation in the state
 system is—or should be—to oppose
 any state that seeks predominance
 since this would constitute a threat to
 its security and independence.‖ (4)
A  bipolar world is inherently unstable
 because even small shifts in relative
 power are perceived as very
            Louis Halle
 LouisHalle, in his classic The Cold
 War as History, regarded Russian
 history as primary and communism as
 incidental. (12)
            John Spanier
 Russia  has no clear cut geographical
  boundaries, and has historically been
  open to repeated invasion
 Eisenstein‘s great film, Alexander
  Nevsky, celebrates a historical victory
  over the Teutonic Knights. Its
  pertinence to the threat posed by Adolf
  Hitler is not coincidence.
 Russia survived only by a brutal
 militaristic rule that subordinated
 everything to survival itself.
 Ivan the Terrible enserfed the peasants to
  provide the labor necessary, and broke the
  power of the nobles for the same reason.
 Michael Romanov began a dynasty
  that fought Swedes, Poles, and Turks
 Peter the Great defeated the Swedes
  and began to force a turn toward the
  increasingly technological West.
            John Spanier
 Russia become and remained a
  closed society, xenophobic, and
  aggressively expansionist in self-
  defense (Halle 12-19)
 (do unto others before they do it
  unto you)
 The  US experience has been
  conditioned by a struggle with nature,
  not with Man.
 The Atlantic and Pacific Ocean make
  us virtually invulnerable to invasion,
  and provided a security denied
  European nations
 For the US, peace was normal, war
 George  Washington had expressed our
 orientation in his Farewell Address:
 “The great rule of conduct for us, in
 regard to foreign Nations, is, in
 extending our commercial relations, to
 have with them as little Political
 connection as possible.”
            John Spanier
 James Monroe with the Monroe
 Doctrine had emphasized this
 separation: “The political system of the
 European powers is essentially
 different . . . from that of America.”
 Following the end of the war, the US
 refused to ratify the Treaty of
 Versailles, join the League of Nations,
 and turned its back on Woodrow
 Wilson‘s dream of a universalist,
 democratic world government that
 would preserve peace. The isolationist
 impulse was far too strong.
 The  nation‘s slogan became “Back to
  Normalcy,” which meant making
  money and ignoring the outside world
 Most Revisionist historians are
  strongly influenced by isolationism;
  involvement in the world at large is
  immoral, demeaning, and distracts us
  from reforming ourselves.
            John Spanier
 Neither US political leaders (Woodrow
 Wilson or Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
 for instance) nor the American public
 were comfortable with power politics.
             Louis Halle
 Like Spanier, Halle sees two nations
  whose experiences were so different
  that misunderstandings and conflicts
  were inevitable.
 The question is, would they have
  consituted the Cold War as we
  experienced it?
     Stalin‘s Foreign Policy
 Molotov, in Berlin in November 1940,
 responded to Ribbentrop‘s overtures]
 with "a long monologue in which he
 repeated the well-known Soviet
 aspirations in Finland, Southern
 Bukovina and the Dardanelles
         Molotov in Berlin
Molotov wanted German troops out of
 Finland, and Japan to renounce her
 concession rights to coal and iron in
 North Sakhalin. He further proposed
 that the Soviet Union should issue a
 guarantee to Bulgaria, similar to that
 given by Germany to Rumania,
         Molotov in Berlin
with the additional right to set up bases
 capable of controlling movement
 through the Turkish Straits. . . .
 [Later that night] Molotov revealed
 his secondary spheres of interest,
 which included Greece, Yugo-Slavia,
 Hungary and Poland and the control
 of the Baltic Sea." (Seaton 13)
 (emphasis added)
  Stalin‘s Foreign Policy Goals
 December  1941, Stalin asked Anthony
 Eden to recognize Soviet territorial
 gains which resulted from the Nazi-
 Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.
 (McCauley Origins 37-8)
  Stalin‘s Foreign Policy Goals
 Stalin‘screation of an empire in
 Eastern and Central Europe thus
 represents long-term foreign policy
 goals, and may be seen as part of
 traditional Russian expansionism
 rather than Communist universalism.
           Stalin and Katyn
 Stalin arrested some 14,000 Polish
  officers when he occupied eastern
  Poland in 1939
 At least 4,000 of them were executed
  in the Katyn Forest and buried in a
  mass grave
          Stalin and Katyn
 The  Germans discovered the bodies in
  1943 and brought in the Red Cross to
  prove Soviet atrocities
 )Stalin claimed the Germans did it
          Stalin and Katyn
The London Polish government-in-exile
  accused Stalin of the crime.
Stalin used this as a pretext to establish
  his puppet Lublin Government as
  the ―government‖ of Poland on July 2,
The issue for Stalin was really Soviet
  control of a post war Poland.
          Stalin and Katyn
 Any  government in Poland which
  represented the wishes of the Polish
  people would be adamantly anti-
  Soviet. Stalin could not permit this.
 He murdered the officers in order to
  decapitate the ruling class in Poland
  and nip any organized resistance in the
         Stalin and Katyn
 When  the Polish Home Army rose
 in revolt (August 1, 1944) as the Red
 Army approached Warsaw, Stalin
 halted his offensive and sat idly while
 the Germans systematically massacred
 the defenders.
             Stalin and Katyn
(   )Stalin also blocked all efforts by the
    US and Britain to airlift supplies to the
    hard-pressed Poles.
(   )The Germans were killing the anti-
    Soviet leadership for him.
            Stalin and Katyn

   )In 1945, leaders in the Polish Home
    Army went to Moscow to discuss
    broadening the Provisional
    Government and were arrested.
           Stalin and Katyn
 Brutal and cynical as these actions
  were, might Stalin have done them had
  he not been a Communist?
 The answer is, ―Yes.‖
 Stalin and Czechoslovakia 1943
 Edouard     Beneš was pro-Soviet (the
  Munich Pact somehow led many
  Czechs to be less than enthusiastic
  about the West)
 December 1943, he signed a treaty
  with Stalin that guaranteed a coalition
  government with the portfolios of
  interior, defense, agriculture, and
  propaganda and education (McCauley
        Stalin and Hungary
 As the Red Army liberated Hungary, a
  coalition government led by the rural
  Smallholders‘ Party was formed.
 Using “salami tactics,” in the phrase
  of Matyas Rakosi, the communists
  destroyed the coalition to take over.
 This amounts to a unilateral solution
          Stalin and Katyn
 The  Soviets first allowed a coalition
  National Democratic Front
 By February 1945, Romanian
  communist violence led to the collapse
  of that government.
         Stalin and Katyn
)Andrei  Vyshinski gave King
 Michael 2 hours to name a new Prime
 Minister--Dr. Petru Groza, a Fellow
This amounts to a unilateral solution
        Stalin and Bulgaria
 Thepopulation was generally pro-
 Soviet anyway, and the Fatherland
 Party government was soon in
 communist hands as the Red Army
    The Churchill-Stalin ―Deal‖
 Churchill proposes in 10/44 “spheres of
  influence‖ in the southeastern Europe
 Romania       USSR 90%        Britain 10%
 Bulgaria      USSR 75%        Britain 25
 Hungary       USSR 50%        Britain 50%
 Yugoslavia    USSR 50%        Britain 50%
 Greece        USSR 10%        Britain 90%
   The Churchill-Stalin ―Deal‖
 Allof this may be interpreted in terms
 of traditional power politics rather than
            Yalta: Europe
 USSR   receives part of eastern Poland
 Poland compensated by moving
  western border to the Oder.
 USSR would receive largest share of
  the reparations from Germany
            Yalta: Europe
Germany to be divided into US, British,
 French, and Soviet zones of occupation
Berlin to be jointly governed by the Four
―Democratic interim governments‖ were
 to hold ―free elections‖ in the liberated
            Yalta: Asia
 USSR  would receive Sakhalin island
 and the Kurile Islands, plus rights in
 Manchuria (including the naval base at
 Port Arthur and the operation of the
 Manchurian Railroad): in other words,
 a return to the status quo ante 1905
 (before the Russo-Japanese War)
             Yalta: Asia
 Outer   Mongolia becomes a Soviet
 Stalin promised to declare war on
  Japan between 60 and 90 days after
  Germany‘s surrender.
 Stalin kept this promise to the day.
 Almost  all of these provisions may be
  seen as power politics.
 Only the ―free elections‖ and the
  “Declaration on Liberated
  Europe‖ are ideological
            Enter Truman
 Truman,   however, took promises of
  free elections very seriously.
 He was also being advised by men who
  had negotiated with the Soviets during
  the war, and who had become
  increasingly disillusioned.
 Here, I believe, ideology is crucial
 Truman Meets Molotov 4/23/45
 Truman    told Molotov that the Soviets
  would from henceforth have to keep
  their agreements [specifically, on the
  subject of free elections in Poland],
  that relations could no longer be on the
  basis of ‗one way street.‟
 It should be noted that the US did not
  abandon negotiations
Truman Meets Molotov 4/23/45
 Molotov  replied „I have never been
 talked to like this in my life.‟ Truman
 replied „Carry out your agreements
 and you won‟t get talked to like that.‟”
 (McCauley Origins 61)
Potsdam: Stalin‘s Shopping List
 Stalin‘s   shopping list
  – Decide on German reparations
  – Liquidate the London Polish government
  – Internationalization of the Ruhr
  – Soviet trusteeship over Libya
  – Rupture diplomatic relations with Spain
Potsdam: Stalin‘s Shopping List
  Replace the Montreaux Convention on
  the Straits with Russian control
 Return to the Soviet Union of land lost to
  Soviet Georgia and Soviet Armenia in
Potsdam: Stalin‘s Shopping List
 While the first 3 can be tied to
  legitimate defense interests, the last
  four are fundamentally aggressive.
 These may have been bargaining
  chips, but Stalin does not drop them
          Potsdam Agreements
 Truman recognizes the Lublin government
  in Poland, bowing to Stalin‘s fait accompli.
 Truman refused to acknowledge the
  governments of Bulgaria and Romania, with
  James Byrnes citing violations of the
  Declaration on Liberated Europe.
    – this position was later softened and we accepted
      the governments in Romania, Bulgaria,
      Hungary, and Finland.
        Potsdam Agreements
The US accepts changes to the Polish-German
  border placing it on the Oder-Neisse Line
  (shifted westwards)
 )Byrnes offers Stalin not only reparations
  from his zone of Germany, but 25% of the
  Western zone as well.
 Korea was to be occupied by the Soviets
  north of the 39th parallel, and by the US
  south of that line.
     Stalin Pushes the Envelop
 Stalin,1945, to Miloslav Djilas “This
  war is not as in the past; whoever
  occupies a territory also imposes on it
  his own social system. Everyone
  imposes his own system as far as his
  army has power to do so. It cannot be
  otherwise.” (Qtd. In Dunbabin 61)
         The Soviet System
Restrictions of personal freedom
Trade treaties that restricted or
 prohibited trade with the West
     Stalin Pushes the Envelop
 Stalin‘s pressure outside of Eastern
  Europe is a very important element in
  the Cold War
 Stalin had a clear security interest in
  controlling east Europe.
 A de facto sphere of influence was
  accepted by the US
    Stalin Pushes the Envelop
 )Pressure beyond that region could not
  be described as defensive in nature,
  only offensive, or at least, reasonably
  interpreted as offensive.
 The Truman Doctrine is provoked on
  the periphery.
       demanded a revision of the 1936
 Stalin
 Montreaux Convention, on control of
 the Black Sea Straits, changes in the
 Bulgarian frontier, annexation of Kars
 and Ardahan.
These were supported by fierce
 propaganda pressure.
“ „The Soviets have gone mad, they
  dream of world domination. They are
  crossing you and Britain at many
  points: Bornholm, Trieste, Albania,
  Greece, Turkey, Iran. Where they find
  a weak point they exploit it.‘ Prime
  Minister Saracoglu told us in July 1945
  (qtd in Dunbabin 64)
 Pressure on Turkey is in line with
 Russian foreign policy since the days
 of Peter the Great: to break out into
 the Aegean Sea.
 In 1941, the British and the Soviets
  jointly occupied Iran
 In 1943, the US reached an agreement
  that all forces would be evacuated
  within 6 months of the end of the war.
         ( )
Late in 1945, the Soviets had not left.
They created and supported a communist
 Tudeh Party, massed troops, and
 created a Kurdish and an Azerbaijani
 The Iranian Prime Minister Quavam
  agreed to a joint oil company with the
  Soviets, an Azerbaijani republic, and
  Kurdish and Azeri participation in his
 Tudeh growth led to strikes in the
  southern oil fields,

 Quavam   dismissed the Tudeh
  ministers, suppressed the autonomous
  republics, and appealed to the US.
 The joint oil company was rejected.
            Other Areas
 Stalindemanded trusteeship over
  Libya as well as bases
 Demand for military bases in these
  Greek islands
 Cession of Bear Island and bases on
 Bases on Bornholm Island (Dunbabin
   Churchill: The Iron Curtain
 SirWinston Churchill spoke at Fulton
  Missouri on March 5, 1946
 Four days earlier Moscow had
  announced that it would stay in Iran
  regardless of any agreements.
       The Iron Curtain Speech
 ―A shadow has fallen upon the scenes
 so lately lighted by the Allied victory.
 Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and
 its Communist international
 organization intends to do in the
 immediate future, or what are the
 limits, if any, to their expansive and
 proselytizing tendencies. . . .
     The Iron Curtain Speech
 From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in
 the Adriatic, an iron curtain has
 descended across the Continent.
 Behind that line lie all the capitals of
 the ancient states of Central and
 Eastern Europe.
    The Iron Curtain Speech
 Warsaw,   Berlin, Prague, Vienna,
 Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and
 Sofia, all these famous cities and the
 populations around them lie in what I
 must call the Soviet sphere,
        The Iron Curtain Speech
 and all are subject in one form or
 another, not only to Soviet influence
 but to a very high and, in many cases,
 increasing measure of control from
 Moscow . . . .
    The Iron Curtain Speech
 Whatever   conclusions may be drawn
 from these facts--and facts they are--
 this is certainly not the Liberated
 Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it
 one which contains the essentials of
 permanent peace. . . . .
    The Iron Curtain Speech
 From what I have seen of our Russian
 friends and Allies during the war, I am
 convinced that there is nothing they
 admire so much as strength, and there
 is nothing for which they have less
 respect than for weakness, especially
 military weakness.‖ (Churchill ―Iron
 Curtain‖ 1-4)
    The Iron Curtain Speech
 The speech specifically mentioned
 Poland, Berlin, Iran, Turkey, the
 expulsion of millions of Germans from
 eastern territory, and the establishment
 of Communist satellite governments
     The Iron Curtain Speech
 Churchill‘s speech is ambiguous as to
  whether the causes of conflict are
  primarily ideological or spring from
  power politics.
 However, he does refer specifically to
  ―the Liberated Europe we fought to
  build up. ―
  George Kennan and the Long
 George  Kennan placed ideology
  squarely at the heart of the conflict.
 His point of view was that of a scholar
  and diplomat who had had deep
  experience in negotiations with the
  Soviet leadership.
        The Long Telegram
 He  had become convinced that it was
  simply not possible to negotiate with
  the Soviets in good faith.
 This interpretation does not require one
  to argue that power politics played no
  role whatever, or that there would not
  have been any conflicts with ideology.
        The Long Telegram
 Kennan‘s  view, it seems to me, simply
  argues that these conflicts could have
  been ameliorated to a large degree if
  ideology had not been present.
 One might compare conflict between
  Great Britain and Imperial Russia from
  1815 to 1907
       The Long Telegram
I believe that the most telling argument
 in favor of Kennan‘s view is that the
 Cold War does not end until
 Communism in Russia collapses—as
 Kennan predicted.
         The Long Telegram
 This  document remained classified
  until 1947, when Kennan repeated
  much of the argument in “The
  Sources of Soviet Conduct” by
  Mister X, published in Foreign Affairs
  July 1947
 The telegram was distributed
  throughout the government, and helped
  provide an intellectual framework for
  future policy.
         The Long Telegram
 ―For ideology, . . . taught them [the
 leaders in the Kremlin] that the outside
 world was hostile and that it was their
 duty eventually to overthrow the
 political forces beyond their borders. . .
          The Long Telegram
 [A]llinternal opposition forces in
 Russia have consistently been
 portrayed as the agents of foreign
 forces of reaction antagonistic to
 Soviet power. . . .Today the major part
 of the structure of Soviet power is
 committed to the perfection of the
 dictatorship and to the maintenance of
 the concept of Russia as in a state of
 siege. . .
        The Long Telegram
 [T]here can never be on Moscow‘s side
 any sincere assumption of a
 community of aims between the Soviet
 Union and powers which are regarded
 as capitalism. . . . But we should not be
 misled by tactical maneuvers. . . .
        The Long Telegram
 The Soviet concept of power, which
 permits no focal points of organization
 outside the Party itself, requires that
 the Party leadership remain in theory
 the sole repository of truth. For if
 truth were to be found elsewhere, there
 would be justification for its expression
 in organized activity.
            The Long Telegram
 [[[t]he leadership is at liberty to put
  forward for tactical purposes any
  particular thesis which it finds useful to
  the cause at any particular moment . . .
  . [T]his means that the truth is not
  constant but is actually created, for all
  intents and purposes, by the Soviet
  leaders themselves. . . .
        The Long Telegram
 But we have seen that the Kremlin is
 under no ideological compulsion to
 accomplish its purposes in a hurry. . . .
 Its political action is a fluid stream
 which moves constantly, wherever it is
 permitted to move, toward a given
        The Long Telegram
 Its main concern is to make sure that it
  has filled every nook and cranny
  available to it in the basin of world
  power. But if it finds unassailable
  barriers in its path, it accepts these
  philosophically and accommodates
  itself to them.
        The Long Telegram
 Themain thing is that there should
 always be pressure, increasing
 constant pressure, toward the desired
          The Long Telegram
 Thereis no trace of any feeling in
 Soviet psychology that that goal must
 be reached at any given time.. . . .. .
       The Long Telegram
 Inthese circumstances it is clear that
 the main element of any United State
 policy toward the Soviet Union must be
 that of a long term, patient, but firm
 and vigilant containment of Russian
 expansive tendencies. [emphasis
 added] . . . .
        The Long Telegram
 Itis clear that the United States cannot
  expect in the foreseeable future to
  enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet
  regime. It must continue to regard the
  Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner,
  in the political arena.
         The Long Telegram
 Itmust continue to expect that Soviet
  policies will reflect no abstract love of
  peace and stability, no real faith in the
  possibility of a permanent happy
  coexistence of the Socialist and
  capitalist worlds,
        The Long Telegram
 butrather a cautious, persistent
 pressure toward the disruption and
 weakening of all rival influence and
 rival power.‖ (Kennan ―Sources of
 Soviet Conduct‖ 107-128)
        The Truman Doctrine
 The situation in Greece
   – A bitter civil war erupted between the
     official, right wing government and
     Communist guerrillas
   – The Communists were supported by Tito
 Greece had traditionally been a concern of
  the British (to safeguard the Suez Canal,
  and Britain had long denied the Eastern
  Med to Russia)
       The Truman Doctrine
 February  1947, British Foreign
  Minister Ernest Bevin recognized
  that Britain could not sustain the cost.
 Dean Acheson argued that a British
  pullout threatened the fall of the entire
  region to the Soviets unless the US
 Early version of the domino theory
      The Truman Doctrine
 Truman asked for $ 400,000,000 for
 Turkey and Greece
       The Truman Doctrine
 “Ibelieve it must be the policy of the
 United States to support free peoples
 who are resisting attempted
 subjugation by armed minorities or by
 outside pressures. I believe that we
 must assist free peoples to work out
 their own destinies in their own way.
       The Truman Doctrine
 “Ibelieve that our help should be
 primarily through economic and
 financial aid which is essential to
 economic stability and orderly political
       The Truman Doctrine
 While power politics might have led
  the US to fill the power vacuum left by
  Great Britain, note that the request was
  phrased in ideological terms.
 Without that appeal to the threat of
  Communism and the value of
  democracy, the appropriation could not
  have passed Congress!!!!
       The Truman Doctrine
 By itself, however, the Truman
  Doctrine was negative—attempting to
  block the spread of Communism.
 A proactive policy was needed to
  ensure that instability would not lead to
          The Marshall Plan
 George Catlett Marshall left the Moscow
  Conference in 1947 deeply concerned by
  the lack of progress on Germany.
 ― ‗All the way back to Washington . . . [he]
  talked of the importance of finding some
  initiative to prevent the complete
  breakdown of Western Europe.‘ ― (qtd. In
  Dunbabin 90)
         The Marshall Plan
 The  Marshall plan was proposed by
  General of the Army (now Secretary of
  State) George Catlett Marshall at a
  speech at Harvard
 He did not consult with his staff before
  the speech
        The Marshall Plan
 Marshall said that the US would assist
 “the revival of a working economy in
 the world so as to permit the
 emergence of political and social
 conditions in which free institutions
 can exist.”
            The Marshall Plan
 BritishForeign Minister Ernest Bevin
 and French Foreign Minister Bidault
 called a conference in Paris in 1947, to
 which they invited the Soviet Union
 and the Eastern European states.
         The Marshall Plan
 Molotov   walked out, which was a huge
 Poland and Czechoslovakia planned to
 This is a threat to the Soviets, since
  their participation would inevitably
  orient their economies toward the West
           The Marshall Plan
 Stalin makes a second blunder by
  ordering Western Communist parties to
  sabotage the Plan
 Zhdanov and Malenkov summoned
  the leaders of the Italian and French
  parties to Moscow for instructions.
  (Dunbabin 90-95)
         The Marshall Plan
 Demanding     that the national
  Communist parties toe Moscow‘s line
  requires them to act against the best
  interests of their own nation.
 This tends to alienate the local
         The Marshall Plan
 Itcertainly delegitimizes the
 Since Communists had been very
  prominent in the Resistance, they had
  emerged from the war in a strong
  political position.
        The Marshall Plan
             the policies of the
 Coordinating
 national Communist parties to that of
 Moscow‘s is unthinkable without the
 common Marxist ideology.
  European Recovery Plan
 The   US provided about $17,000,000 in
 How that money was spent was
  determined largely by the Europeans
  themselves, in negotiation with the US
 Much of that money was spent in the
         The Marshall Plan
All European nations were invited,
 including Eastern block nations..
The Marshall Plan was an enormous
 success, with most nations achieving
 higher production figures in 1952 than
        The Marshall Plan
 The Soviets eventually create
  COMECON as a competing program.
 Without the power of the US economy,
  COMECON is notably ineffective.
         The Marshall Plan
 The  Marshall Plan is one of the crucial
  turning points in the evolution of the
  Cold War.
 It meant that the economy of Europe
  would be divided into two separate
  spheres, instead of a single unit.
         The Marshall Plan
 Such an economic division would act
  to make the political division
 NATO and the Warsaw Pact are built
  along lines already delineated by the
  Marshall Plan
   Creation of the Cominform
 Creation of the Cominform 1947 under
 the direction of Andrei Zhdanov
   Creation of the Cominform
This event formally signaled the
 beginning of a new and often brutal
 Soviet policy: the consolidation of the
 Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern
   Creation of the Cominform
This new policy entailed the
 transformation of five countries into
 Soviet satellites under the control of
 Communist regimes cloned from the
 regime in Moscow.‖ (Zubok and
 Pleshakov 111)
   Creation of the Cominform
Zhdanov, who lacked formal higher
 education, became the chief ideologist
 of the Party under Stalin. He
 possessed ―blind loyalty, spineless
 obedience, and meticulous adherence
 to ideological dogma.‖ (112)
    Creation of the Cominform
Zubok and Pleshakov note that ideology
 had a dual function in the Soviet state
 to suppress tensions within the society
     by imposing ―monolithic unity‖
 to serve within ―the framework of the
     revolutionary-imperial paradigm . . .
     [as] one more dimension of political
     and physical control.‖ 113)
    Creation of the Cominform
Western writers such as Hannah Arendt, Carl
  Friedrichs, and George Kennan had begun
  describing the Soviet Union as a
  “totalitarian state” and drawing
  comparisons with the Nazi totalitarian state.
Stalin required an ideological legitimation for
  his control over the satellites.
   Creation of the Cominform
 Creation of the Cominform represents
 Stalin‟s belief that the West--
 particularly the Marshall Plan--
 threatened his security zone and that
 he could hold that security zone only
 through draconian measures.
 The Marshall Plan defines for me the
 difference between Soviet and US
 Some   critics have argued that the US,
  like the USSR, created a European
  empire for itself.
 I would contest the use of the word
  ―empire‖ in the case of the US, but let
  us examine the proposition.
 US ―imperial‖ policies led eventually
 to the creation of a vibrant and
 prosperous Western Europe capable of
 challenging the US in the world market
 The current European Union has the
 financial and human resources to
 become a center equal or superior to
 the US
 Nations  fell under US hegemony
  because they wanted to; they asked to
  be included.
 Relations between the US and its
  Euroepan allies involved considerable
 Washington   only wishes it could
  dictate policy.
 Indeed, no US leader, steeped as he
  was in a democratic political system,
  could conceive of leadership that was
  not consultative.
 By  contrast, the Soviet empire pursued
  policies that impoverished its members
 The Soviets began exploitive policies
  early, dismantling factories not only
  from defeated Germany but other
  satellites and carrying them off as the
  spoils of war.
 Soviet hegemony was imposed by
  force—the Red Army was always
 When the Soviet Union was no longer
  able or willing to maintain its empire
  by force, that empire quickly
       The German Problem
 Zones   of Occupation
  – Soviet Zone
  – British Zone
  – US Zone
  – French Zone
   theory, the four zones would be
 In
 governed as one unit by the Allied
 Control Commission.
       Issues of Reparations
 Soviet reparations were to be the sum
 of all industrial plant in the Soviet zone
 plus 25% of that in the Western zone
       The German Problem
The  US insisted that Germany retain
 enough industry to maintain a standard
 of living equal to the rest of Europe
The US also insisted reparations be
 delayed until the Germans could
 support themselves
  this would avoid the errors of Versailles
       The German Problem
The  Soviets quickly demolished the
 industry in their zone and also cut off
 food shipments to the West
  This food was to be in return for
   60% of the total industrial plant
   taken from the West
      The German Problem
Germany    was supposed to be governed
 as a single economic unit, but the issue
 of reparations broke cooperation down
 by July 1946
       The German Problem
The US then suspended all payments to
 Germany until the Soviets
 administered Germany according to
 their agreements (Spanier 42-43)
At about this point, Sec. Of State James
 McGregor Byrnes gave up hope of
 successfully negotiating with Molotov
            Bizonia 1947
 Embryonic  state formed of US and
 British zones.
  – French later join.
  – Germans are given greater role in self-
           Bizonia 1947
Bizonia  is actually formed before the
 Marshall Plan proposed
Currency reform was instituted by US
 military when the Soviets walk out of
 negotiations for a single currency in
   The Berlin Blockade: 1948
 The possibility of a revived Germany
 under US auspices threatened two
 Soviet goals
  – Withdrawal of US forces and
    neutralization of Western Europe
  – creation of a subservient Germany in
    partnership with the USSR
     The Berlin Blockade: 1948
A blockade of Berlin, which was 100
 miles inside the Soviet zone, would
 hold the entire population hostage.
    The Berlin Blockade: 1948
 In June 1948, Stalin cut off electricity and
  overland communications to Berlin.
 Stalin did not believe Truman would fight a
  war over Berlin
 He believed that if the US backed off of
  Berlin, then the confidence of all Europeans
  in US promises would be irretrievably
             Berlin Airlift
 He  assumed that Stalin was not ready
  to fight for Berlin either.
 Truman chose to supply 2,500,000
  people entirely by air
  – previous attempts to supply armies by air
    in World War II—such as at Stalingrad--
    had ended in failure.
              Berlin Airlift
Berlin required 4,000 tons daily
The US and British reached 13,000 tons daily
 Planes landed 24 hours a day in 3 minute
 intervals in all weather
Berliners were not only eating better at the
 end of the blockade than at the beginning,
 they were eating better than Berliners in the
             Berlin Airlift
The blockade lasted 324 days before
  Stalin called it off.
The Blockade is a disaster for Stalin
In elections in the West sector, Berliners
  overwhelmingly endorsed their
             Berlin Airlift
The aftermath is a much stronger
  perception that protection against the
  Soviet Union was needed.
In other words, Stalin had blundered
 The  contrast between the US and the
  USSR could not have been starker.
 Stalin held 2,000,000 people hostage,
  threatening them with starvation
  – Not surprising considering his starvation
    of millions of Ukrainians
 TheUS fed 2,000,000 of its former
 Thedivided city of Berlin became a
 symbol for the difference between the
 two systems: capitalism and
 West  Berlin rose vibrantly from the
  ashes of defeat, a showcase for the
  German Wirtschaftswunder.
 East Berlin remained poor, drab, and
  haphazardly rebuilt.
           East Germany
 The Soviets establish their eastern zone
 as the German Democratic Republic
 (or the ―so-called DDR‖) in 1949
   Formation of NATO: 1949
 North   Atlantic Treaty
  Organization (NATO) 1949
 Goal is to defend Western Europe
  against the Red Army
 An attack against one member of
  the alliance is an attack against all
 Collective Security, and avoid the
  errors of appeasement!!!
  Original members were

United States     Belgium
Great Britain     Luxemburg
Canada,           Italy
France            Norway
the Netherlands   Iceland
 USSR  creates the German Democratic
  Republic in 1949
 The Federal Republic of Germany
  added to NATO in 1954
        The Warsaw Pact 1955
 Albania          Hungary
 Bulgaria         Poland
 Czechoslovakia   Romania
 The              USSR
   Outbreak of the Korean War
 The  Soviets invaded Korea following
  their declaration of war on Japan in
 The US occupied the southern portions
 Following the Marshall Plan,
  negotiations for a single government
  broke down and excluded observers
  from the west.
The Soviets establish Kim Il-Sung in a
 Communist government.
US supported a government under the
 leadership of Syngman Rhee, an
 authoritarian nationalist.
   Outbreak of the Korean War
 Kim  was determined to unify Korea,
  and proposed forceful unification to
 Stalin and Mao both agreed to the
 They thought victory could be
  achieved before US intervention.
   Outbreak of the Korean War
Truman equated the invasion of Korea
 with the Japanese invasion of
 Manchuria (1931), with the Italian
 invasion of Ethiopia (1935-6), and
 Austria (1938)
        The United Nations
Truman chose to work through the UN
The Soviets were boycotted the UN over
 the issue of seating the People‘s
 Republic of China.
    Power Politics vs Ideology
 Kim   Il Sung should be seen as both a
  nationalist and a communist.
 It should be borne in mind when
  evaluating him that he created the most
  repressive communist state in the
    Power Politics vs Ideology
 But  Kim could not possibly have
  attacked South Korea without the
  consent of both the Soviet Union and
  of the People‘s Republic of China
 That means both Stalin‘s and Mao‘s
   Power Politics vs Ideology
 Without  the ideological bond between
 them, it is difficult for me to imagine
 why either would consent to such a
 risky adventure.
    Power Politics vs Ideology
 For Mao especially, the risks were
 The US had made no commitment to
  defend Taiwan, and most probably
  would not have done so in the face of
  an invasion by the PRC
    Power Politics vs Ideology
 The  evidence seems to be that Kim
  cleverly played the two men off against
  each other.
 However, it also appears that much of
  his appeal was framed in terms of a
  common ideology.
       Power Politics vs Ideology
 It cannot be doubted that the US
  interpreted the Korean War as
  evidence of a conspiracy, master-
  minded from Moscow, to spread
  Communism around the world.
 Under the circumstances, that
  conclusion was not unreasonable, even
  if it was simplistic.
 Consequences of the Korean
 Cost
  – 900,000 Chinese casualties
  – 1.5 million North Korean casualties
  – 1.3 South Korean (most civilian)
  – 34,000 US dead (Dunbabin 108-115)
 Consequences of the Korean
 Strategic Implications
 A limited war
 Stalin made China buy its military
  supplies from the USSR, which helped
  plant the seeds of future division
  between China and the USSR
 South Korea is firmly within the US
  defensive perimeter
 Consequences of the Korean
Taiwan enters the US defensive
The US signs a unilateral peace treaty
  with Japan, tying Japan firmly to our
Steps move forward to rearm Germany
Following NSC - 68, the US rearms in
             NSC - 68

 March  1950
 .Recommendation of rapid US military
  buildup and acquisition of non-nuclear
             NSC - 68
 .Conventional   build up was needed to
  avoid having no choice but nuclear war
  or inaction in case of pressure at any
  point around the world.
 .NSC-68 had no immediate effect. But
  the Korean War seemed to validate it.
   Stalin Blundered Again
Stalin‘s decision to allow Kim to invade
  the South seems a terrible mistake.
     Topics for Consideration
How was East/West rivalry illustrated
  and affected by:
    (A) the division of Germany
    (B) the founding of NATO
    (C) the Korean War? (1987). (HL)
       Topics for Consideration
 Inwhat ways could Stalin be held
 responsible for the origin and
 development of the Cold War? (1995)
    Topics for Consideration
 How did fear contribute to the origin
 and development of the Cold War?
 [1997] [HL]
     Topics for Consideration
 Assess the significance for the
  development of the Cold War between
  1945 and 1950 of three of the
 a. The Yalta Conference, 1945
 b. The Iron Curtain Speech, 1946
 c. The Truman Doctrine and the
  Marshall Plan, 1947
       Topics for Consideration
 d. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from
  the Soviet block, 1948
 e. The Berlin Blockade and Airlift,
 f. The formation of NATO, 1949
  [Specimen] [1998]

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