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					                       IN THE SUPREME COURT

ERIC HOGGATT                                                 2003-CA-01142

v.

YOUTH COURT OF ADAMS COUNTY



                           Amended Brief for the Appellant



                                   Statement of Issues


       1.May Mississippi, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses

of the Fourteenth Amendment, deny fit non-resident parents, appellate review of a record

of sufficient completeness to permit proper appellate consideration of their claim raised

in Hoggatts‟ Petition for Disclosure here on appeal and argued on the record, that

Mississippi lacked state subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial or any subsequent

custody determination stripping them of custody of their minor child (also then a New

York resident)?



       2. Does a Mississippi Youth Court‟s assertion of jurisdiction over a New York

family to issue multiple custody decrees stripping fit parents of custody of their minor

child, and awarding the minor to the custody of a Louisiana relative, violate a

requirement or standard of fairness which a court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction

over child custody matters of a nonresident family must meet in order to avoid a violation

of the parents‟ right to due process of law?
       3. After asserting it has jurisdiction to make multiple custody determinations over

a non-resident child of fit non-resident parents, can Appellee Mississippi youth court

sidestep a challenge to it‟s subject matter jurisdiction contained in Hoggatts‟ Petition for

Disclosure by filing, the day before the Petition is to be heard, a surprise Motion to

Vacate Durable Legal Custody without notice to Parents, then “rule” on Parents‟ Petition

the day before hearing it, and then declare the issue of subject matter jurisdiction moot,

by reason of its surprise motion, because it has “terminated jurisdiction”?



       4.Did the trial court err when it ruled as inadmissible evidence of bias and interest

of witness Manfred Eidt, Guardian ad Litem, specifically that disclosure of youth court

records was also sought for purposes of investigation and prosecution of civil rights

violations by Judge John Hudson and the Youth Court of Adams County (R 101); ruled

inadmissible evidence of criminal activity of the witness, Wilton Hoggatt, custodian;

ruled inadmissible evidence that statements of MDHS social worker Ashley Junkin were

at variance with prior findings of the Mississippi court; and ruled inadmissible legally

audiotaped prior statements submitted as evidence to attack the credibility of a witness,

and for the purpose of impeachment of testimony of the minor, the guardian ad litem, and

of witness Isaiah Hoggatt?



       5. May a Youth Court judge, consistent with the Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing confidentiality requirements as

to youth court
records, deny an appellant his right to designate the content of the record for appeal as

provided by M.R.A.P. 10 (b) (1), and then the Youth Court Judge designate the record

himself, omitting even CASA and Mississippi Department of Human Services/Division

of Youth Services records that were, per the court, “documents, reports, and

…investigations which are to be considered by this court, at this hearing”, the hearing

from which the order here appealed emanated?



       6. Is Appellee Mississippi Youth Court governed by the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction Act (hereinafter UCCJA)?



       7. Can a Mississippi Court deny fit parents a hearing on the merits of their

Petition for Disclosure brought under Miss. Code Ann. 43 – 21 – 261 (G), which outlined

detailed compelling circumstances affecting the health and safety of a child, and which

stated why disclosure was necessary to protect not only W.N.H., but also his cousin, a

sexual assault victim, and the minor‟s little sister (CP 23,24, 29 – 31, 35) by filing, the

day before the Petition for Disclosure was to be heard, a surprise Motion to Vacate

Durable Legal Custody without notice to Parents, then “ruling” on Parents‟ Petition the

day before hearing it (CP 4), and then declaring when the Hoggatts arrived March 6,

2003 for the hearing set on Disclosure “…the only issue before the court is whether it is

going to continue jurisdiction in this case. That‟s the only issue” (CP 22) by reason of its

“surprise” motion?
       8. Does Miss. Code Ann. § 43 – 21 – 261, as applied or per se, unconstitutionally

infringe on Hoggatts' fundamental right to rear their children?



       9. Does the Appellee Court‟s order forbidding the appellant “having the record”

for inspection of the transcribed court record for appeal, and its requirement that non-

resident Parents and any attorney for them may view the appellate record only in the

offices of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, presumably without opportunity to certify to

the correctness of the record, or to propose corrections to the record, as required by

M.R.A.P. 10 (5), violate Hoggatts‟ right of due process of law and equal protection under

the law (R 204)?



                              Statement of the Case



          August 20, 2000, Appellants Eric and Victoria Hoggatt, natural parents of

W.N.H., contacted Natchez Police Department for assistance, as relatives in Virginia,

Louisiana, and Texas, including paternal grandfather, Wilton Hoggatt, were acting in

concert to supply W.N.H., 16 years old, with a hotel room and were threatening to pick

him up to run away from their custody. Hoggatts, at that time New York residents since

1997, had been in Natchez, Mississippi less than one day. Having interned as a youth

court counselor in the 3rd Chancery District (CP 43), Victoria Hoggatt knew that assisting

a child to leave the custody of his parents, buying him an airplane ticket, and telling the

minor that his parents would probably call the police, and that he “should run”, was by

statutory definition (Miss. Code Ann. § 97 – 5 – 39), Contributing to Delinquency of a
Child, (CP 6, 19 – 20). Natchez Police Department contacted Judge John Hudson who

said parents must file a petition against N. for “ungovernable behavior” to invoke

protection of State of Mississippi, which Hoggatts proceeded to do. (CP 3, 6, 9, 13, 58).

They also tried to file criminal charges against relatives, but Natchez, Mississippi city

prosecutor said, “Jurisdictional nightmare”(CP 35).

         September 7, 2000 the Mississippi youth court found W.N.H. “Ungovernable”

and awarded temporary custody of W.N.H. “until further order of this court” to paternal

grandparents in Louisiana, which order stated that the grandparents should enroll the

minor in school in Louisiana. By dispositional Order dated September 25, 2000, file

stamped December 5, 2000, but not signed by clerk, the Mississippi court ordered

continued custody with paternal grandparents “until further order of this court”.

Dispositional Review Order dated October 28, 2001, file stamped December 28, 2001,

but not signed by receiving clerk, granted durable custody to Wilton Hoggatt. Hoggatts

were refused inspection and copies of the custody orders (CP 7, R 81 – 91), and were

never contacted about “family therapy”, which the purported September 25, 2000 order

mandated, which they had no idea was court ordered, and upon which return of the child

was purportedly conditioned (CP 3 and 5; R 26, 93,179 – 180). After Mississippi court

refused the Hoggatts a copy of all custody and review orders when Victoria Hoggatt

traveled to Natchez, Mississippi on or about October 30, 2001 (CP 81 – 88), Judge

Hudson told Victoria Hoggatt in a legally recorded phone conversation December 28,

2001, that she had a right to come and inspect all youth court records (CP 9,14; R 4).

       January 14, 2003, Victoria Hoggatt, licensed to practice law in the State of

Mississippi since 1978, came to the Circuit Clerks‟ office and was given the youth court
file. Judge John Hudson came to the Circuit Clerk‟s office and instructed the Circuit

Clerk to not allow her to inspect anything in the youth court file (CP 13-14). Guardian ad

Litem similarly instructed the MDHS worker (R 33). Judge Hudson stated that Victoria

Hoggatt must file a Petition stating why inspection of the youth court record was “in the

best interest of the child”.

        January 16, 2003, Mississippi Assistant Attorney General Alice Wise stated that

the Hoggatts did, in fact, have a statutory right to “inspect, upon request”, the youth court

record, (CP 14,15) and when Adams County Circuit Clerk M.L. Vines still denied

inspection, and refused to give copies of custody decrees pursuant to a written request,

Victoria Hoggatt spoke with the District Attorney‟s office about seeking relief under

Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97 – 11 – 17 and 97 – 11 – 37. Mr. Clarence Powell of the state

office of the Mississippi Department of Human Services advised sending the Petition

requested by Judge Hudson to MDHS attorneys in the Attorney General‟s office, so they

could advise the youth court counselor and MDHS workers, if the judge was telling them

to deny access (CP 47).

        Hoggatts filed a Petition for Inspection of Records and Release of Records

January 31, 2003, asserting that (1) the County Court of Adams County did not then, nor

ever had state subject matter jurisdiction to alter custody of the non-resident child,

W.N.H., (CP 21-23) (2) that the Mississippi County Court could not transfer a New York

child to Louisiana without following the Interstate Compact for the Placement of

Children, (CP 40), (3) that Victoria Hoggatt had a right of inspection as both parent and

attorney, to prepare for whatever hearing may be at hand, as the „custodian‟ was 84,

hospitalized, and seriously ill, (4) that fit parents have a statutory right to receive custody
decrees upon request pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 93 – 23 – 33 (5); that Due Process

of Law and Equal Protection gave parents a constitutional right to care for their child,

absent a showing of harm, and that they could not review file to see if the Interstate

Compact on the Placement of Children was followed as to their child, or what sort of

counseling he was receiving, (6) that Miss Code Ann. § 11 – 49 – 7, speaking to an

attorney‟s right to inspect papers, provides,” Every attorney…, practicing in any court in

this state, shall be allowed, at all reasonable times, to inspect the papers and records

relating to any suit in such court in which he may be concerned as attorney or counsel,

and (7) that parents had a right of disclosure pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 43 – 21 –

261 (G) because compelling circumstances affecting the safety of a child, the best interest

of the child, and public safety (the safety of the Eric Hoggatt family, the safety of

W.N.H., of W.N.H. ‟s cousin, a sexual assault victim, and the safety of Sascha Hoggatt)

then existed.

       Hoggatts attempted to attach to the Petition for Disclosure audiotaped

conversations of Wilton Hoggatt, the durable custodian and of his daughter, Tessa

Hoggatt Albritton, discussing Wilton Hoggatt‟s activities with the fugitive Andrew

Allbritton and with the FBI, and of Craig Johnson, brother of Victoria Hoggatt who had

initially bought the minor‟s hotel room in 2000, exhibiting drunken behavior and

religious animosity (CP 45; R 78, 79).

       After MDHS worker and Guardian ad Litem listened to said audiotapes (CP 45 –

46; R 34,78 – 79), the Guardian ad Litem joined with court appointed attorney for the

minor, and filed the day before the hearing, a Motion to Terminate Durable Legal

Custody, without notice to Parents/Hoggatts. Upon appearing March 6, 2003 for the
hearing set for Hoggatts‟ Petition for Inspection of Records and Release of Records,

Victoria Hoggatt was met outside the courtroom door by the Guardian ad Litem, Manfred

Eidt, told that a Motion to Vacate Durable Custody had been filed, and that the Judge had

ruled on Petition for Disclosure, that she could now inspect youth court records, but that

if she entered the courtroom to ask the Judge what was going on, that she would be

forever barred from viewing years of CASA and MDHS records. (R 2 – 11)

       The Mississippi court declared at the March 6, 2003 hearing that had been set to

hear the Petition for Disclosure that all proof put on in support of the parents Petition for

Disclosure must relate to time subsequent to appointment of durable custodian, since the

court appointed attorney for the child and the court appointed guardian ad litem had filed

their surprise Motion to Terminate Durable Legal Custody (R 2 – the 212, the entire

proceedings!).

       Practically all evidence proffered by the Hoggatts was held inadmissible, although

the Mississippi judge, as well as the youth court prosecutor and the court appointed

attorney for the child, knew that evidence in youth court proceedings may be informal

and narrative in form, that Rule 1103 (b) (3) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence

expressly declares that Mississippi Rules of Evidence are not in force at youth court

hearings, and that youth court proceedings are held only to applicable Constitutional

standards, per Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-203(4). The Mississippi trial judge also knew

that Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-203(9) provides that all parties to a youth court cause shall

have the right at any hearing in which an investigation, record or report is admitted in

evidence: (a) to subpoena, confront and examine the person who prepared or furnished

data for the report; and (b) to introduce evidence controverting the contents of the report.
       Practically the entire body of evidence proffered by Appellants at the March 6,

2003 and April 1, 2003 hearings was objected to and sustained, as it had been in the

September 2000 hearings (R 16 lines17-26).

       At the March 6, 2003 hearing, if the youth court prosecutor or court appointed

attorney for W.N.H. did not think to object, the Judge stated, “That‟s objectionable”. If

they still didn‟t get the hint, the Judge objected for them, explained that the objection was

based on the attorney‟s previously overruled objection, and then sustained his own

objection, so that all the prosecutor and court appointed attorney had to do was say,

“Thank you”. See certified court record page 28, lines 1 through 22.

       Evidence of bias and interest, and evidence of prior inconsistent statements by

Guardian ad Litem (R 101), Wilton Hoggatt (R 124 – 140), Isaiah Hoggatt (R 161 – 174),

and the minor W.N.H. (R 103 – 114), to show that they were then committing perjury

was excluded. Allegations in the Petition for Disclosure were substantiated by sworn

affidavits executed by the mother of sexual assault victim, adult brother of the minor, and

the minor‟s aunt in Virginia. (CP 107 – 109).

       The Adams County (Mississippi ) Court/Youth Court Division issued an Order

Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Motion for Disclosure and Granting the Motion

to Terminate the Durable Legal Custody and to Cease Jurisdiction on May 1, 2003.

Hoggatts appealed, and designated the entire youth record as necessary for appeal.

Appellee Mississippi youth court objected to the Designation of Record, by a Motion

Objecting to the Designation of Record By Appellandt [sic] and to Designate Record.

       The motion was not signed by the receiving Clerk upon filing, (file stamped that it

had been filed June 10, 2003 but listed on the Docket as filed by the prosecutor on the
day of the hearing, July 10, 2003, when the prosecutor could not attend the hearing set on

her own motion, because she was out of town (R 188). The Mississippi court, by its own

order, upon its own motion, “designated” the record itself, excluding all CASA and

MDHS reports that it declared were, per the court, “documents, reports, and

…investigations which are to be considered by this court, at this hearing” (R 5, 190).

       Hoggatts filed a Notice of Appeal July 18, 2003, to appeal the July 10, 2003 order

styled Order Designating Record, by which the trial judge purported to eliminate the

Appellants‟ Designation of the Record, and substitute his own. The Circuit Clerk did not

file the Notice of Appeal of the Order Designating Record dated July 10, 2003 with the

Mississippi Supreme Court for over one year, until on or about September 1, 2004.See

revised docket, last entry. The Circuit Clerk did not file and list on the docket even the

Mississippi County Court’s Order Designating Record dated July 10, 2003 until on or

about September 1, 2004.See revised docket.

       What about file stamp as to when it was filed? Video says 11th jan, docket says?,

document says?

       The revised docket also lists for the first time subpoena requests to the April 1,

2003 hearing and the July 10, 2003 hearing, both of which Judge John Hudson told the

clerk not to issue, (See )in violation of Miss. Code Ann. ?

The revised docket also lists for the first time a document styled ?list any others

       Eric and Victoria Hoggatt, natural fit, non-resident parents of the non-resident

child, W.N.H. petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for a Writ of Special Assistance

for supplementation of the record and other extraordinary relief, which Petition was
deniedi. Hoggatts filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents, which was

likewise denied.

                   Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented



       August 2000, Grandparents on both sides were enraged at W.N.H.‟s parents, Eric

and Victoria Hoggatt. Maternal grandfather, Warren Johnson, of Virginia, had boasted to

family members that he would “pluck those boys from Vik, one by one”, because Eric

and Victoria Hoggatt had limited association of the children to times when he was not

under the influence of alcohol and/or illegally obtained percodan, percocet and codeine

(CP 18, 26; R 119, lines 10 – 13).

       Paternal grandfather, Wilton Hoggatt of Louisiana was furious because Eric and

Victoria Hoggatt had discouraged Wilton Hoggatt‟s aiding and abetting Andrew J.

Allbritton. Allbritton is the uncle of Eric Hoggatt, the brother of his late mother, Mamae

Hoggatt.

       Allbritton was still, at the time of filing of the Petition for Disclosure, and at its

hearing March 6, 2003, wanted for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution for Aggravated

Incest with an 8 year old child committed in 1996, and 3rd offense DWI (CP 21, 28, 96,

97, R 77). The Eric Hoggatt family had left the home of Wilton Hoggatt, where they had

been visiting from New York, because the animosity of Wilton Hoggatt was so great, and

went to spend the night in Natchez, Mississippi. Both parents (Eric and Victoria Hoggatt)

had offered to serve as state and federal witnesses against Wilton Hoggatt as to his

assistance to his brother-in-law Andrew J. Allbritton, prior to any hearing in the

Mississippi youth court. (R 80). The parents, Eric and Victoria Hoggatt, at first contact,
apprised all Mississippi court officers that extended family members were in the youth

court of Adams County testifying because of great animosity about the Allbritton affair

(R 80).

          All Mississippi court officers were also apprised of prior criminal activity

committed against the family in New York, by Craig and Warren Johnson and Wilton

and Isaiah Hoggatt, including breaking and entering, grand larceny, obscene and

threatening phone calls, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor (CP 12, 13, 33 –

36, 75 – 81). W.N.H. told his mom that the grandfathers had decided upon their plan of

attack at the youth court hearing, viz., “We‟re going to use your religion against you, and

you know you can‟t defend yourself against that.” (CP37). Hoggatts are Jehovah‟s

Witnesses. (R 34, lines 10 – 11)

          Lack of fitness of the parents was never alleged by the trial court, the Mississippi

Department of Human Services, the Court Appointed Special Advocate, or the court

appointed counsel for the minor. Quite the reverse, from the beginning of the contact with

the Eric Hoggatt family with the Mississippi youth court, until the end, only the religion

of Eric and Victoria Hoggatt was at issue. As to fitness of the parents,

[Quoting Judge John Hudson, the Mississippi trial court judge from
September 2000], One thing he was certain of, was that he saw three young
men with “everything going for them”, and “that it was obvious that until each
child reached 16 years of age, that things went very well.” (CP12)

[Judge John Hudson, the Mississippi trial court judge, findings of the court, April 1,

2003] More importantly, however, in this case is the Court does see in evidence that

has been elicited here today, that the child, NH, has obviously done well in school in

Louisiana, being on the honor roll, living a, as far as we can tell from the evidence

that‘s actually been elicited here today, living a fruitful life while he was there, and
now a freshman in college. As I said one other time, that is not something that

occurs in two years. I fully recognize that. That is something that occurs as a

lifetime of achievement. The goal orientation of these young men, uh, and I assume

of - - of the young lady who will be coming along later, is well defined. And that is -

- that is a tribute to everyone who‘s had anything to do with their upbringing,

including mother, father, and grandfather in this particular situation. (R 186 lines 4

– 16)

         At the September 2000 youth court hearings, with no allegation by the

Mississippi court officers, nor by MDHS officials, of any unfitness of the Hoggatts or

harm to the child, the Mississippi court purported to strip Eric and Victoria Hoggatt of the

custody of W.N.H., their minor son, after his sophomore year of high school. Custody

was awarded paternal grandparents in Louisiana “until further order of the court”, with no

provision for visitation with his “loving and caring” (CP Exhibit, Volume 1) parents. The

temporary custody order of September 7, 2000 ordered that the paternal grandparents

enroll W.N.H. in school in Louisiana.

        The Mississippi court did not file a disposition order on the September hearings

until December 5, 2000 (CP 3) and refused the “nurturing” (CP 90) parents the right to

inspect or have a copy of any such order, which the parents only found out purported to

outline provisions for reunification of the family after being allowed its examination in

2003 (CP 50). The order which purported to order MDHS and CASA supervised „family

counseling‟ has no signature of the filing clerk on the file stamp. Neither does the

adjudicatory order, dated September 7, 2000, (CP 2) purportedly filed December 5, 2000.

Neither does the Dispositional Review Order (CP 4) dated October 29, 2001, „filed‟
December 28, 2001, coincidentally the same date that Judge John Hudson told Victoria

Hoggatt that she had a right by statute to come to Natchez, Mississippi and inspect all of

the youth court records. (CP 9; R page 4, lines 12 through 18).

       The “positive and modest” (CP 63) Hoggatts requested access to and copies of the

orders in the cause repeatedly. (CP 13; R 90, lines 6 – 11). MDHS social worker Ashley

Junkin and Manfred Eidt, CASA guardian ad litem, purported to be charged in the

dispositional order with arranging family therapy, never contacted the “gentle and caring”

(CP 62) parents in New York at all about “therapy”. (R 2, 92, 93).

       Manfred Eidt, CASA guardian ad litem, told Victoria Hoggatt that W.N.H. was

never even assigned a youth court counselor from the Youth Court of Adams County.

(CP 23). The Mississippi court did not hold timely 6 month review as mandated by

statute and by the purported order itself, (See Docket), nor did they give Hoggatts notice

of the review when (and if) it was held, so that they might attend. (R 26)

       Both Judge Hudson and Guardian ad litem were apprised in November of 2001,

after the sexual assault victim attempted suicide, that Louisiana „custodian‟ Wilton

Hoggatt had stated to FBI agent Nathan Songer, that he had „gone to court to get custody

of Hoggatts‟ children‟, because they were „unfit parents‟, and that Eric and Victoria

Hoggatt were only making up false accusations to get back at him, and that the FBI

would not use Hoggatts‟ testimony to subpoena bank records of „custodian‟ Wilton

Hoggatt and of Daphne Woods, of Monroe, Lousiana, who sent payments from Wilton

Hoggatt to the fugitive, because the „custody‟ proceedings would “cloud” Eric and

Victoria Hoggatt‟s testimony. Victoria Hoggatt repeatedly asked both the Guardian ad

litem and Judge Hudson to either release court records to the FBI agent, or contact him,
to let him know the true nature of the proceedings in the Mississippi Court, to aid in the

apprehension of the fugitive (CP 13, 27, 28, 35 – 6; R 75 – 79, 86).

       The part of the youth court record that the Mississippi Court denied to Hoggatts in

the order here appealed, and which the Mississippi court seeks to deny Appellants for

appellate review, and to keep “confidential” from law enforcement agencies and for

purposes of civil action, contains voluminous evidence of religious bias, evident not only

by witnesses, “Mainstream religions consider them a cult”(CP 37), “Should be

institutionalized” (CP 38), but also by Judge Hudson and court officers. The Judge

exhibited egregious religious bias inside and outside the courtroom, “I am a United

Methodist, and if Isaiah had done half the things you said in there, he would have been

thrown out of Millsaps a long time ago”. (CP 24, 25) Judge Hudson told the mother,

Victoria Hoggatt, that whether or not Wilton Hoggatt was then aiding and abetting a child

molester was “none of her business.” (CP 25, 26). Judge Hudson refused to let the parents

speak at the Dispositional Hearing, and limited cross- examination of witnesses to two

questions each, (CP 38) in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-203(9).

       Under supervision of the Mississippi court, and the dear old grandfathers, W.N.H.

himself began exhibiting the influence of those persons that Eric and Victoria Hoggatt

had tried to protect their son from (CP 31), viz., violent religious bigotry, resulting in

W.N.H. assaulting his brother Ethan, saying he had “F…ed over Grandma”, by not

joining in a prayer at her funeral, (CP 36, R 93, R 109 – 111), public drunkenness

resulting in arrest (CP 40, R 93, lines 24 – 26; R 100 at line 27 through R 101, line 7),

and remorseless destruction of property, to the tune of $2300. (CP 29, 30, 36, 40, 83 –

84; R 24-27).
        Judge John Hudson and officers of the Mississippi court knew that Victoria

Hoggatt sought inspection of youth court records to gather evidence to submit to the

United States Department of Justice, (CP 30) and that the Youth Court of Adams County

would be included in that presentation. (CP 37; R 101) The transcripts of the March 6,

2003, April 1, 2003, and July 10, 2003 proceedings show a “Legally Blonde” catfight,

Hoggatts desperately attempting to get proof on the record, and three seasoned attorneys

of the Appellee youth court acting in concert to try to extricate themselves from ever

having to answer for the actions of the Mississippi court, by seeking to “terminate

jurisdiction” after the Petition for Disclosure was filed, and to deny any knowledge of the

court appointed custodian‟s involvement in harboring the fugitive, who was still wanted

for Aggravated Incest at the time of the filing of the Petition for Disclosure, and at the

time of the filing of the surprise motion to terminate the court‟s „jurisdiction‟.

       Judge Hudson said, “ I don‘t know if such a thing exists”, referring to “the

Aggravated Incest charge on Mr. Allbritton”. (R 137, lines 19 – 23), even though all

his officers, CASA guardian ad litem, Manfred Eidt, Mississippi Department of Human

Services social workers, Ginger Johnson and Ashley Junkin, and youth court counselor

Eileen Anderson were apprised of the fact that Wilton Hoggatt was then aiding and

abetting the fugitive, prior to any hearing held in his court in September of 2000(CP 41;

R 80, line 12 through R 81, line 5); even though court officers, including CASA guardian

ad litem, Manfred Eidt, and MDHS social worker, Ashley Junkin had listened to

recordings of „custodian‟ Wilton Hoggatt discussing his involvement with and assistance

to the fugitive, and Craig Johnson‟s comments on Eric and Victoria Hoggatt‟s assistance

to the FBI, as well as legally audiotaped conversation of Wilton Hoggatt‟s daughter,
Tessa Albritton Hoggatt discussing Wilton Hoggatts‟ assistance to the fugitive, after

those recordings were submitted to the Mississippi Court on January 24, 2003; even

though Judge Hudson‟s secretary said that the said audiotapes, then in the possession of

the court, could be submitted as evidence March 6, 2003 „so the opposing attorney’s

would have opportunity to consider I’t [the tapes]; even though court pleadings contain

FBI posters of Allbritton charged with Aggravated Incest (CP 96-98); even though the

mother of the sexual assault victim, Marisa Allbritton, filed a sworn affidavit to the

Petition for Disclosure that the “matters, facts, and things set forth about Andrew

Allbritton Jr in the above and forgoing Petition [for Disclosure] are true and correct as

therein stated” (CP 108); even though witness testimony of Wilton Hoggatt‟s

involvement with the fugitive is contained on the court record for the hearings held in

September of 2000 (CP), March 6, 2003 (CP), and April 1, 2003. (R147, line 22 through

R 150, line 6); and even though Judge John Hudson vehemently told attorney and mother

Victoria Hoggatt ―It is none of your businesss!‖ [if Wilton Hoggatt was assisting the

fugitive], outside the courtroom in the old juvenile justice building, on September 25,

2000, immediately after the Mississippi judge presumed to award custody of Hoggatts‟

minor child to Wilton Hoggatt in Louisiana “until further notice”. (CP 25)

       Court appointed attorney for child, Philip LeTard queried, “Why do we spend

this time cross examining Mr. [Wilton] Hoggatt and make him a villain? (R 131,

lines 14 – 16) There‘s no proof of it, he‘s not been convicted of anything and it‘s an

improper question.” (R 136, lines 22 – 23)

       Question to Manfred Eidt, on cross by Mrs. Hoggatt,
Mrs. Hoggatt: Manfred, did I warn you over a year ago that – that Judge Hudson

had invited me to sue him for a civil rights violation and that to not –

Philip LeTard: Objection to the form of the question. It‘s not relevant.

Q. – ―harm yourself.‖

Mr. LeTard: It‘s not – it‘s not relevant.

The Court: Sustained, and I suggest that you be careful in your comments, Mrs.

Hoggatt. (R 101, lines 13 – 21).



                               Summary of Argument



   The Mississippi court‟s following of the injunction provided in the UCCJA would

have prevented the arbitrary actions of the Mississippi court that resulted in its serving as

the handmaiden of Warren Johnson to carry out his threat to “pluck those children from

Vic one by one” and of Wilton Hoggatt to obstruct justice, whose criminal actions were

then contributing to the serious injury of a child, the sexual assault victim. The actions of

the Mississippi youth court are proven to have endangered the heath, safety, and morals

of W.N.H. Allegations contained in the Petition for Disclosure were substantiated by

sworn affidavits executed by N.‟s aunt, adult brother, and by the mother of the sexual

assault victim, and supported by many exhibits. As such, such allegations are not only

part of the record, but must be presumed true on their face. Common Cause of Mississippi

v. Smith, 548 So.2d 412, 415 (Miss.1989)

       The Mississippi court never had jurisdiction to alter custody of W.N.H. Its

purported assertion of jurisdiction to issue an initial and any subsequent custody order
violated Hoggatts‟ right to Due Process and Equal Protection of the Laws, as does

allowing the Appellee court to designate the record for the parents‟ appeal.

       Mississippi may not deny Hoggatts‟ a sufficient record for appeal, nor deny them

the right to examine the record for proposed corrections, nor limit Hoggatts‟ ability to

access the record to submit evidence to law enforcement officials, and for civil

prosecution of the Mississippi court.

       Appellants respectfully submit that most serious violence committed against

women and children is by family members. From the very founding of America, “The

very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the

protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch

137, 163 (1803). Parents were seeking protection to which they were legally entitled

against extended family members that boasted of their intent to “pluck the children” from

their parents “one by one”, who were then in the process by criminal means with

“pluckee” three, and who have subsequently stated on the court record that it would not

benefit the minor to have any relationship with his own parent. “[T] he right of every

individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury” is, indeed,

what separates liberty from tyranny.



                                        Argument



       1. When "an interest far more precious than any property right", Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 -759 (1982), is at stake, Mississippi may not block the

Hoggatts' access to an appeal afforded others, see Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 -
196 (1971). Just as M. L. B. v. S. L. J., individually and as next friend of the minor

children, S. L. 519 US 102 (1996) held that Mississippi may not block an indigent

parent‟s access to an appeal afforded others, so Mississippi may not deny the Hoggatts

appellate review of the evidence on which the trial court found it had and retained subject

matter jurisdiction to strip Parents of legal custody of W.N.H., because youth court

records might subject the minor to “embarrassment” (R 187, line 20). “Although the

Federal Constitution guarantees no right to appellate review, …once a State affords that

right, Griffin held, the State may not "bolt the door to equal justice," id., at 24

(Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).

        The Order of Appellee Court (CP 36) placing the child miles from home, with no

provision for visitation (CP 1, 3), at the home of paternal grandparents who manifest

great animosity toward the mother (CP 35, 50, R 126-140, Example: Question to paternal

grandfather, Wilton Hoggatt, court appointed Custodian …―Do you think N. would

benefit from having counseling that would enable him to have a normal family

relationship with his mom and dad like he once had?‖

        A.    Repeat that again?

        Q.    Do you think it would benefit NH to have counseling that would help

        him

              establish or re-establish a normal, familial relationship with his

        mother?

        A.    No.

        Q.    Why not?
       A.      I don‘t have to give a reason‖(CP 135, lines 7 – 17), and where family

members were assaulted if they visited (CP 36, R 93, R 109 – 111), de facto terminated

parental rights of Eric and Victoria Hoggatt, especially in light of the fact that all court

records reveal that the only efforts of the youth court were to continue the separation of

the child from his natural parents.



 “Services were not provided to the family in a timely manner.‖

Where? [Finding contained in Dispositional Review Order], which was a gross

understatement, as no services were provided to the family.

―vii. The method of achieving the goal/plan [established prior to hearing and
appointment of durable custodian in October 2001] to establish a permanent home
for the child(ren) is Placement with maternal grandfather [but it was paternal], work
toward durable custody. [emphasis added] (CP 5).

       Provisions for purported “reunification” of the family mandated in the purported

original disposition court order (CP 3) were not acted upon in any way by those named to

arrange and supervise “therapy”. Mississippi Department of Human Services social

worker Ashley Junkin on direct examination by Victoria Hoggatt:

       Q. Did you ever make any contact with the parents, ever?‖

       A. I can‘t honestly say it. I feel I probably talked with y‘all about hearings

but --,‖

       (R 26, lines 18 – 21).

       ―[A]fter that second – it was an adjudication hearing [September 25, 2000] –I

       never heard – I never saw y‘all again and I –― (R 26, lines 16 – 17).

           Q: Since - - from the period of time, January 11th to March 7th that I was in

       town and contacted you repeatedly, did you ever give me anything?
         A. What was the dates?

         Q: From January 11th of this year until March 7th.

         A: I haven‘t spoken with you [‗you‘ is Victoria Hoggatt] since, um since I

         faxed those, which I think it was in December of 2001, I haven‘t had any

         contact with you or N. [the minor, emphasis added]. (R 179, lines 12-20)

         Q. And to your knowledge, N. never received any hearing about the taking of

         the car or the –

         A. I heard those in the court hearings but, no, I have not spoken with you. (R

         179, lines 24-27)

         Q. ―[T]o your knowledge, did N. ever receive any counseling at all about the

public

             drunkenness?‖

         A. ―Not to my knowledge.‖ (R 179, line 28 through R 180, line 1)



         Q. ―Manfred, Did N. ever receive any counseling about assaulting his

brother?‖

         A. ―Not to my knowledge.‖ (R 92, lines 5 – 7)

         The Court: ―The question was did he ever get any - - does he - -do you know

         whether he ever got any – any --, uh, counseling.‖

         A. [Manfred Eidt, CASA Guardian ad Litem]: ―Uh, I‘m not aware that he

         got any counseling‖. (R 93, line 15 – 18).
       The M. L. B. Court “was unanimously of the view that "the interest of parents in

their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite

class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," Santosky, 455 U.S., at

774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and that "[f]ew consequences of judicial action are so

grave as the severance of natural family ties," id., at 787. Pp. 12-15. “[The]Court has

consistently set apart from the mine run of civil cases those involving state controls or

intrusions on family relationships. In that domain, to guard against undue official

intrusion, the Court has examined closely and contextually the importance of the

governmental interest advanced in defense of the intrusion.” Id., …“ we hold that

Mississippi may not withhold from M. L. B. "a record of „sufficient completeness' to

permit proper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims." Mayer, 404 U.S., at 198 .

       Although M.L.B held that the State must provide an indigent parent appealing a

decision to terminate parental rights with an appellate record, the Mississippi Legislature

has seen fit to mandate that all indigent youth court appellants have a statutory right to

what?check statute pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-651 (1) be sure make sure the

statute is in statutes and rules in the back, and to add to where it‟s cited in brief..

       In these cases, “due process and equal protection principles converge.”Bearden v.
       Georgia, 461 U.s. 660, 665,76. d. 2nd 221, 103 S. Ct 2064. A “precise rationale”
       has not been composed, Ross, 417 U.S. at 665, because cases of this order “cannot
       be resolved to resort of easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis,” Bearden, 461 U.S.
       at 666. Nevertheless, “most decisions in this area”, the Court has recognized, “rest
       on an equal protection framework, “ 461 U.S. at 665, as M.L.B.‟s plea heavily
       does, for due process does not independently require that the State provide a right
       to appeal. Placing this case within the framework of the Court‟s past decisions in
       this area, the Court inspects the character and intensity of the individual interest at
       stake, on the one hand, and the State‟s justification for its exaction, on the other.
       See 461 U.S. at 666-667.” M.L.B., id at519 U.S.102,103; 117 S. Ct. 555, 556.
In a case such as the extant one, where happily married, non-indigent fit parents were

stripped of custody of the minor child, due process and equal protection of the laws

would require that Mississippi may not withhold from the Parents a record of sufficient

completeness to permit proper [appellate] consideration of their claim that the Mississippi

Court never had subject matter jurisdiction to issue an initial or any subsequent custody

decree. The Mississippi Supreme Court cannot examine “closely and contextually the

importance of the governmental interest advanced in defense of the intrusion”, without a

record of sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of the Parents‟ claims.

As in M. L. B., supra., the Mississippi court's order in this case simply recites statutory

language; it describes no evidence, and otherwise details no reasons for its finding that

custody of N. should be removed from the custody of his natural Parents.

       Quite the reverse, this record contains numerous glowing reports by friends of the

family, teachers, school counselors, a minister, (CP 86 – 89 and Exhibit 1) and

professional colleagues (CP 59 – 63), as well as assertions by N.‟s elder brother that “My

brothers Isaiah and Micah have bought into my Grandfather Johnson‟s drunken

philosophy that they can do or say anything they please, talk their way out of it, have no

responsibility for it, and always manage to point the finger back at you if you have the

audacity to mention anything about what they‟ve done. It doesn‟t matter that their actions

have caused a great deal of pain to the person involved; it‟s always the other person‟s

fault. N. has evidently bought into the same line of thinking and conduct. If we really

wanted to help N., the thing to do would be to help him learn to take responsibility for his

actions, just like the rest of us are expected to.” (CP 83 – 84), and N.‟s aunt Shari
Johnson, “ The Johnson‟s [maternal grandparents] have been completely and consistently

divisive and undermining in terms of the boys‟ respect for their parents.” (CP 74).

       Even the trial judge stated, on the record he seeks to exclude, that, “One thing he

was certain of, was that he saw three young men with “everything going for them”, and

“that it was obvious that until each child reached 16 years of age, that things went very

well.” (CP 12)

       The record reveals ample evidence of Hoggatts‟ seeking to protect N. from the

influence of N.‟s grandfather ―under the influence of alcohol, or rude, hostile, and

belligerent, usually a combination of all of the above, creating an atmosphere of extreme

discomfort for everyone” (CP 92), who along with N.‟s uncle, Craig Johnson,

“condoned and encouraged underage drinking” (CP 75).

       The September 2000 trial court records excluded by Appellee Mississippi trial

court judge‟s “Order Designating the Record” contained voluminous evidence of the

determined and premeditated (“Warren Johnson said….he would do everything he could

to „pluck those children from Vic‟ one by one” CP 75) destructive effect of grandparents

upon Hoggatts' children, including N.‟s elder brother Isaiah Hoggatt, who was then on

probation for public nudity, arson, vandalism, and alcohol violations (CP 64 – 71), and

about whom Millsaps College stated, “The members of the Judicial Council are very

concerned about Isaiah‟s destructive behaviors”. (CP 68)

       The Mississippi trial court is seeking to exclude most of the court record because

it clearly shows that Manfred Eidt, CASA guardian ad litem; Ashley Junkin and Eileen

Anderson of the Mississippi Department of Human Services, each had copies of the

records from Millsaps College concerning Isaiah Hoggatt‟s dishonesty and Social and
Disciplinary probation at the time of the initial contact with the Adams County youth

court, and they all had been fully apprised of the addiction problems in the maternal

extended family. The trial judge himself was sent copies of the Millsaps letters. (CP 25,

26)

         It is noteworthy that Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-651 (1) affords appellate review of

youth court orders and decrees to indigents by mandating that youth court record

transcripts be made available to indigent appellants. Such provision reflects Mississippi‟s

recognition that rights that youth court orders may affect merit heightened protection, and

that Mississippi acknowledges the importance of all youth court appellants having access

to appellate review of youth court decisions. As M.L.B. held, “Only a transcript can

reveal the sufficiency, or insufficiency, of the evidence to support that stern judgment.”

M. L. B. v. S. L. J., individually and as next friend of the minor children, S. L. 519 US 102

(1996)

         Transferring custody of a child 1000 miles away to persons that do not believe the

child should have a relationship with his parents, with no allegation of harm to the child

or unfitness of parents, is certainly a “stern judgment.” Hoggatts cannot be denied

appellate review “ to defend against the State's destruction of … family bonds, and to

resist the brand associated with” a public perception of a parental unfitness adjudication

that naturally devolves from court ordered removal of custody of one‟s child. “Like a

defendant resisting criminal conviction”, the Hoggatts should be spared “from the State's

devastatingly adverse action.”

      M. L. B. v. S. L. J., individually and as next friend of the minor children,

S. L.and who else children? 519 US 102 (1996) criteria are applicable in the
extant case, as the cumulative effect of orders of the Mississippi court placing

the child over 1000 miles from home, with no provision for visitation (CP 1

and 3), where the „custodian‟ exhibited extreme animosity against the child‟s

mother, and where the child‟s adult brother was assaulted when visiting in

Louisiana (R 104, line 9 through R 109, line 17), was both in fact and de facto

Termination of Parental Rights. The Mississippi Court manifested its intention

of “[P]ermanent destruction of all legal recognition of the parental

relationship” M.L.B., at 519 U.S. 102, 105 throughout all stages of the

proceedings.

       “Wilton Hoggatt [at the September 25, 2000 dispositional hearing]
       could not bring himself initially to say that he would refrain from
       speaking disparagingly of Parents, or to say that he would refrain from
       doing anything that would cause the minor to disrespect his parents, or
       to say that he would support the reunification of the family.

       [Paternal grandmother] Mamae Hoggatt‟s stage whisper of “Say yes,
       Wilton, say yes! Say yes, Wilton, say yes!” was for the purpose of
       encouraging him to respond in the affirmative….Wilton Hoggatt could
       not bring himself to respond at all to Judge Hudson‟s attempt to elicit
       a “yes”, that Wilton Hoggatt would support the reunification of the
       family of Eric and Victoria Hoggatt, quite possibly because he was in
       the youth court of Adams County for the express design of separating
       the minor child, W.N.H., from the physical custody and natural
       familial affections of his parents, and from the love, supervision,
       oversight, training, custody, care, and nurture of Petitioners, his God
       given natural parents, in order to present the minor to law enforcement
       officials to damage the credibility of federal witnesses, to obstruct
       justice, and to escape prosecution for criminal acts that he was then,
       and is now continuing to commit, involving children of Petitioners.
       Petitioners would assert that they are most seriously displeased.” (CP
       50)


[Wilton Hoggatt, Louisiana resident, who Mississippi court appointed

“custodian”]
W.E. Hoggatt – Cross by Mrs. [Victoria] Hoggatt

(R 129, line 22 though page 130, line 26Ethan type)



My relationship is, uh, its not hate….it‘s just better I didn‘t have a

relationship with her [W.N.H.‟s, mother, Victoria Hoggatt].

THE COURT: I understand. [Emphasis added] (R 129, line 22 though page

130, line 26Ethan type)

.

W.E. Hoggatt –Cross by Mrs. Hoggatt

Mrs. Hoggatt: Q. Did you recently scream at me and …say I was stone damn crazy,
and

shit, you didn‘t want to hear that, and what, was I working for the FBI; do you
recall that

conversation?

Mr. LeTard: I object to the---

A. No, not in those words, no.

Q. How do you remember it?

Mr. LeTard: I object –

A. I don‘t remember the –

The Court: Hold on a minute –


[W.E. Hoggatt]: Exact words. It wasn‘t what you put it there. (R 127, line

23 – R 128, line 4)
   The actions of the Mississippi court did in fact forever terminate Hoggatt's

parental rights to their minor child, declaring him „independent‟? The Court

may take judicial notice of the fact that parents in Mississippi have certain

rights as to supervision of their children until age 21, such as approving of any

marriage the minor may enter; without removal of the disability of minority, a

minor cannot contract to sell real property.

     The Mississippi trial court may not abrogate such rights without due

process of law. It is unclear if Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part the

Motion for Disclosure and Granting the Motion to Terminate the Durable

Legal Custody and to Cease Jurisdiction constitutes a circuitous Termination

of Parental Rights, a removal of disability of minority, or a shadetree

emancipation of the minor, to-wit:



[Philip LeTard, court appointed counsel for minor] examining „custodian‟,

Wilton Hoggatt,

Q: …We want him to be on his own; do you think that would be a good

idea for him?

A: Absolutely.

Q. Do you feel like he‘s mature enough to, uh, be on his own?

A. Right.            (R 126, lines 1 – 6)
[Philip LeTard, court appointed counsel for minor] Q: ―If the court were to

take the durable legal custody from the grandfather, do you believe it

would be advisable to return the custody to N.‘s parents?

[Guardian ad Litem, Manfred Eidt] A: No, I don‘t. (R 77, lines 17 – 20)



[Guardian ad Litem, Manfred Eidt]: [I]t would be better if he could be declared an

independent. (R 74, lines 15 – 16)


       Additionally, jurisdiction is a legal question, and logically, the Mississippi

Supreme Court cannot conduct the de novo review afforded legal questions (Harrison

County v. City of Gulfport, 557 So. 2d 780, 784 (Miss. 1990) and apply the appropriate

standard of review without a record of „sufficient completeness' to permit proper

consideration of Hoggatts‟ claim that the Mississippi youth court had no basis for

assertion of initial and subsequent subject matter jurisdiction to issue a custody decree in

this cause.

       Subject matter jurisdiction turns on the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint.

Reynolds v. Mississippi Wood, Inc., 481 Southern 2nd, 292, 296 (Miss. 1985). Omitting

the original youth court complaint/petition and all transcripts of adjudicatory and

dispositional hearings from the appellate record makes de novo review a bit tough.

       2. The difficulty for the family of appearing in a Mississippi court more than 1000

miles away, the fact that Mississippi had no reasonable interest in deciding the custody of

N., and the ineffectiveness of the relief to be obtained in Louisiana, (Admitted by the

Mississippi Court at CP 185, ―The ability of this court to act in Louisiana on eighteen

and above has been tested many times and it is - - impotent to deal with 18 year olds
in the State of Louisiana. Uh, the orders are not - - are not, uh, and understandably

so, are not orders which Louisiana courts will act on… We have lots of experience

with …trying to enforce our orders on a seventeen year old that is an adult in the

state of Louisiana. It just doesn‘t happen, and we understand those realities‖) were

all factors that demonstrate that Mississippi lacked such minimum contacts with the

Hoggatt family that the exercise of jurisdiction over the family to alter custody of its

child offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, especially in view of

the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause‟s substantive component that "provides

heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights

and liberty interests," Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 7,02, 720 including parents'

fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their

children, see, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651, Pp. 5-8.

      The record shows that the Mississippi court was clearly an inconvenient

and inappropriate forum for deciding custody of W.N.H., placing too great

and

unreasonable a burden upon parents to comport with due process and equal

protection of the laws.

          [Victoria Hoggatt] would be acting as Adjunct Instructor for
         Tyler Junior College, Tyler, Texas, teaching the American
         Government course required by Texas statute that requires all
         students in Institutions of Higher Learning in Texas to take a
         course that teaches the United States Constitution, like she did last
         semester, if she were not having to stay in the vicinity of Natchez,
         Mississippi, seeking to preserve her own Constitutional Rights and
         those of her family. (CP 19)

         Eric and Victoria Hoggatt of Patterson, New York, had remained in or
         around Natchez, Mississippi for over one month living in hotel rooms with
         Ethan and Sascha Hoggatt, two of their other children, from August 20, 2000
       until sometime after September 28, 2000 until disposition of the cause was
       held. The family was over 1,000 miles from home. (CP 36)

[Victoria Hoggatt:] “I‘ve spent approximately eight thousand dollars here in Natchez

trying to get access to youth court records‖. (R174, line 21-22).

       Justice Clarence Thomas‟ concurring opinion in Troxel agreed that

       I think this is Souter. Here, the state of Washington lacks even a legitimate

governmental interest -? To say nothing of a compelling one – in second guessing a fit

parent‟s decision regarding visitation with third parties.




       3. No. The Court cannot “terminate jurisdiction” it never had. If the Mississippi

       Court

lacked jurisdiction to issue an initial or any subsequent custody decree, all such custody

decrees are void ab initio. An inspection of the record of the case must affirmatively

show that subject-matter jurisdiction to alter custody of this non-resident child had been

lawfully conferred upon the Mississippi court. If any of the purported orders transferring

custody of W.N.H., a non- resident from his fit non- resident parents (Residency of the

Eric Hoggatt family, including W.N.H., at CP 57 and 58), to the custody of an 83 year

old Louisiana relative did not strictly comply with the mandatory requirements of the

UCCJA, then the Mississippi court acted without jurisdiction to issue a custody decree.

Custody of the minor was never legally changed. At no time that the Mississippi Court

purported to assert subject matter jurisdiction (Issue of subject matter jurisdiction raised

and argued at CP 22 – 3, 44, 2 – 10, 22; R 22, lines 12 – 17, R 195, line 1 through R196,

line 10) over the family and the custody of their minor child did the Court meet the
requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, as neither custodian, child,

nor fit parents resided in Mississippi, nor had any significant connection with

Mississippi, at any point in the entire Mississippi proceedings. (CP 22).

       There is no statute of limitations to challenge the orders of any court which has

acted without subject-matter jurisdiction, as the orders are a legal nullity and are void ab

initio. The void orders can be challenged, as they are, as one court stated, nothing more

than a blank piece of paper. “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived and may be

asserted at any stage of the proceeding or even collaterally." Hunt v. Hunt, 629 So. 2d

548, 551 (Miss. 1992)

        Additionally, failure to serve the Hoggatts with copies of the Motion to Vacate

Durable Legal Custody (dated March 4, 2003, filed ? March 5, 2003 [no signature of

Court Clerk, CP 110]) in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-201 (3) denied Parents

Due Process and Equal Protection of the laws. Constitutional guarantees of due process

of law and equal protection would be meaningless without right for adequate preparation

of legal counsel. To deny that right until the opposing side attempts to circumvent

inspection by filing a „surprise‟ motion without notice, and a „surprise‟ hearing is held on

a motion that was never served on the Hoggatts, denies the Hoggatts due process of law

and equal protection of the laws. Right to “inspect” years of MDHS and CASA social

services documents, granted as Parents or their attorney walk towards the courtroom for a

hearing on another matter, for several minutes under great duress, stating that their right

of inspection will end as soon as they walk into the courtroom, is no right of inspection at

all, nor is it “reasonable notice” required by Miss. Code Ann. § 93-23-7.
(Judge Hudson: “OK. I‘llI to inspect those documents. I will give you an opportunity

to inspect them before we proceed further at R 5, lines 10 – 11)…The court is

granting your request to inspect those documents, reports, and – what was the other

thing that was said – and investigations which are to be considered at this court as

this hearing (R 5 lines 3 – 6) ….. the problem with it is if you don‘t inspect them now

and I rule on the motion, then the right of inspection ceases with the ruling on the

motion, cause nothing‘s pending before this court. Clear reading of the statute.” (R

5, lines 12 – 15)

        Showing what a ruse the whole endeavor was, is the fact that, interestingly

enough, Order Setting the Hearing on the Motion to Vacate Durable Legal Custody was

filed March 7, 2003, the day after the hearing on both Parents Petition for Disclosure and

the Motion to Vacate Durable Legal Custody (See Initial page of Certified Court Record,

docket entries prepared by the Clerk of the trial court), and yet the Mississippi Court later

found concerning subject matter jurisdiction: “Well, if—if the issue wasn‘t moot, it

would not be too late: but the issue is now moot because the court no longer has

jurisdiction in this case”. (CP 195, lines 1-12, and CP 196, lines 1-10) Whew! Just in

time!

        4. Yes. Rule 607 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence states that “the credibility

of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him”. One can

scarcely imagine a stronger basis for bias and interest in the case, than a youth court

officer knowing that disclosure of youth court records might result in loss of licensure for

failure to abide by the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (CP 40), [which

the Appellee judge ruled inapplicable], criminal prosecution, and civil lawsuit connected
with someone wanted for Aggravated Incest (R 37, 101). Rule 616 of the Mississippi

Rules of Evidence permits any party to submit evidence of bias, prejudice, or interest to

attack the credibility of a witness.

    Inconsistent statements by W.N.H. (R 103 – 114) and Isaiah Hoggatt (R 161, line 26

– 174, line 10) in the record were adequate foundation for impeachment, as was

conflicting testimony between court appointed attorney Philip LeTard (R 175, line 1 –

177), Isaiah Hoggatt, and statements on the record by Appellee Judge Hudson, regarding

how extended relatives got extensive and sensitive youth court records from the

Mississippi court.

    Bias of Wilton Hoggatt, custodian, being questioned about his relationship with the

fugitive should have certainly been admissible (R 124-140), especially since court

officers had listened to audiotapes of both him and his daughter, Tessa Hoggatt Albritton,

discussing his involvement with the fugitive, prior to the hearing. Eric Hoggatt‟s

declaration of what he was told by his father, Wilton Hoggatt, of paying money to A. J.

Allbritton, Jr. for years after Allbritton‟s flight to avoid prosecution (CP13; R 147, lines

4-8, R 147, line 13 through 148, line 17). should have been admissible as an “admission

against interest” exception to hearsay.

      Perjury was committed on the April 1, 2003 certified court record by Wilton

Hoggatt denying involvement with the fugitive. See certified court record Page 127, Line

7 through Page 140, Line 19, cf. Eric Hoggatt‟s testimony (R 147, lines 4-8, R 147, line

13 through 148, line 17) and affidavit of Marisa Allbritton, mother of sexual assault

victim (CP 108). April 1, 2003, Wilton Hoggatt was in Wisner, Louisiana and was

present by telephone in the Natchez, Mississippi court hearing, sworn under oath.
    Appellee conspired to pretend in the March 6, 2003, April 1, 2003, and July 10, 2003

hearings to know nothing of the criminal activity documented in the youth court files of

the youth court counselor, in the files of the Mississippi Department of Human Services,

and in pleadings contained in the youth court files, that was perpetrated by the person to

whom the Mississippi court awarded custody of W.N.H., over the strong objection of his

fit parents, and to their astonishment, and in violation of the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction Act, the Juvenile Jurisdiction Act, and the Interstate Compact on the

Placement of Children, other laws, and in violation of the United States Constitution.

    Appellee Judge, Clerk and Officers of the Youth Court Division of the County Court

of Adams County Mississippi have acted in concert to attempt to exclude from the

appellate record evidence that would show that the Mississippi Court not only permitted

outrageous religious bias from the time of Appellant‟s first contact with Appellee

Mississippi court, but that the County Court and its officers themselves manifested such

palpable bigotry in the September 2000 hearings and subsequent thereto, and that the

Appellee court further encouraged the minor when he later also exhibited egregious

behavior (assault and battery committed upon a family member) motivated by extreme

bigotry, when minor was purportedly a “ward of the State of Mississippi”. (See certified

court record, Page 92 Line 5 through Page 100, Line 20).

     The Mississippi court conspired to exclude from hearings March 6, 2003 and April

1, 2003 evidence of Appellee‟s facilitating and tacit approval of the minor‟s actions,

evidence of which is contained in youth certified court records in letters from an older

adult brother of the minor (CP 83-84), and on the court reporter‟s official record of the

October 29, 2001 hearing. (R 92, line 4 through R 93, line 29).
         A recording of the telephone conversation with W.N.H. was proffered but not

accepted, for impeachment of the witness, and to show bias, credibility, and interest of

the witness, and also to show that the minor was then committing perjury. ( See certified

court record 103, line 27 through page 111, line 7). Court appointed counsel for the

minor, Philip LeTard said, “We‟ll acknowledge that”, as to content of recording of the

minor, to avoid its inclusion in the record. Court and prosecutor agreed. See certified

court record 110, line 7 through page 111, line 3.

Vividly illustrating the fact that Appellee is not denying parents, Appellants, access to

records, “in the best interest of the child”, on some date after January 31, 2003 [date of

filing], in violation of the youth court confidentiality provisions punishable per Miss.

Code Ann. § 43-21-267, officers of the Mississippi youth court conveyed youth court

pleadings to Isaiah Hoggatt, age 22, of Wisner, Louisiana, who was the coordinator for

the extended family members in Texas, Louisiana, and Virginia (CP 20-21, 33-35)

concerted criminal action, i.e., Kidnapping and Contributing To the Delinquency of a

Child, on the night of August 19 and 20, 2000 resulted in Appellants‟ only reason for

contact with Appellee Mississippi Court. (See certified court record Page 174 Line 16

through Page 177, Line 29. See also R 164 Line 3 through Page 166 Line 15).

     Isaiah Hoggatt, who the court on its own motion designated a hostile witness, was

greatly angered by what he read about himself in the court pleadings filed January 31,

2003 by Appellants, and stated to his mother, Appellant Victoria Hoggatt, all sorts of

ugly things, including that he „hoped to watch‘ her get ‗electroshock treatment‘. See

certified court record Page 167 Line 19 through Line 23.
    To further illustrate the fact that Appellee is not denying parents, Appellants, access

to records, “in the best interest of the child”, on some date after January 31, 2003

Appellee conveyed youth court pleadings to Craig Johnson of Danville, Virginia. Craig

Johnson repeatedly called Appellant Victoria Hoggatt in Texas, and threatened her prior

to the April 1, 2003 youth court hearing, saying, “I‘m going to rack your ass”. (See

certified court record Page 164, Line 3 through Page166, Line 15 See also certified court

record Page 174, Line 16 through Page 177, Line 29). This was the same Craig Johnson

that Appellee Mississippi Court knew had threatened his wife, Shari Johnson, for

appearing as a witness before Mississippi Court officers in September of 2000. (See CP

75, statement 12, threats to Shari Johnson for coming to Natchez to testify). Prior to

conveying extensive youth court pleadings that Appellee claims are so super sensitive to

Craig Johnson in Virginia, Appellee Court had also listened to a telephone conversation

of Craig Johnson cursing uncontrollably and stating he “was the meanest son of a bitch

there ever was”, and using the F- word incessantly, provided to the guardian ad litem by

Victoria Hoggatt, and proffered as an exhibit to the Petition for Disclosure, (See R 79,

lines 3 through 9, wherein CASA Guardian ad Litem, Manfred Eidt, states that he had

listened to the tape; MDHS worker Ashley Junkin, at page 34, lines 18 through 21, states

she had listened to the tape.)

As to why court appointed counsel for the minor, Philip LeTard would provide privileged

and extensive youth court pleadings to parties that were known to be violent, having been

arrested for production of a controlled substance, assault on a police officer and resisting

arrest in Virginia and Texas, and possession of controlled substance, and whose son at

about the same age as the minor then was, spent four months in detention for assault with
a deadly weapon (CP 24) while on hallucinogenics, and experienced multiple arrests for

resisting arrest, and multiple arrests for Driving under the influence and possession of

marijuana, is anyone‟s best guess. Philip LeTard fraudulently stated to Appellants/Parents

outside the courtroom April 1, 2003 that he did not give the records to Isaiah Hoggatt. (R

62, lines 24-25)

      In the courtroom, when [court appointed counsel for the minor] Mr. LeTard was

asked how Craig Johnson got the extensive and sensitive youth court pleadings, he denied

that he had told the parents he didn‟t give Isaiah Hoggatt the pleadings, stating, (R 62,

line 26 through R 63, line 2 ), “No that‘s not correct. ―What I said was that no

records left this courthouse under anybody‘s authority. That‘s what I said. So, for

the record, let me correct you, Mrs. Hoggatt. You asked me how your brother would

get access to records outside this courtroom, and I said that nobody, certainly not

me, and nobody that I‘m aware of, took any records out of this courthouse.”

      At page 62 of the certified court record, line 15 through page 63, line 29, an

interesting discussion ensued wherein the judge and court officers tried to help. The

Judge decided to intervene in Mr. LeTard‟s behalf, lines 3 though 21, suggesting that

perhaps Craig Johnson had gotten them from someone Appellants may have disclosed

them to. When that didn‟t work, the Judge flatly declared, “He didn‘t get it from this

building” and “Well, but I mean, it‘s – we don‘t have control over something that

has been published by third parties”. Prosecutor Brown-Toussaint tried to assist, by

changing the subject, at line 28, “I – I – I think we‘re getting off track here”.
     Court appointed Attorney for the child, Philip LeTard stated on the court record, “So

at no time did I give them an –uh, and I am sorry that the petition went out of this

office.” (CP 175, line 22-24).

       That Mr. LeTard was the source of the youth court pleadings disclosed was

corroborated by Mr. LeTard‟s statement in the certified court record at Page 175, line 16,

“In fact, I asked for one copy back”, which presupposes that more than one copy of

youth court records were delivered. Mr. LeTard stated he did give him the youth court

record at Page 175, line 27, The pe…the petition that I give him, the long petition,

was not filed. [Though it had been, See first entry on court docket, and the Appellee

judge‟s use of the same petition at the trial court hearings].

    That Mr. LeTard was the source of the youth court pleadings disclosed was further

corroborated by testimony by Isaiah Hoggatt at page 164 of the certified court record,

line 3 through R 166 line 7,

Isaiah Hoggatt - Direct by Mrs. Hoggatt (Adverse)

Q:…to your knowledge, does Craig Johnson have a copy of the

petition that was filed?

A: He does.

Q: How did he get it?



IH: I spoke with Mr. LeTard about it earlier. Uh, when were here the last time, uh,

we were reading it and it was pretty funny, so I said Grandma and Grandpa

[Warren and Dorothy Johnson of Virginia] have got to see this; (further
corroboration, as well as gross inconsistency of testimony, is found at R 164, line 9,

through R 166 line 7).



       5. No provision in Youth Court Act requires a showing that for the Mississippi

Supreme Court to review the appellate record, Appellants must prove that the review

would serve the best interest of the child, public policy or the functioning of the youth

court. The construction urged is absurd. Allowing the trial court judge to designate the

record for appeal is effectively putting the fox in charge of the henhouse, thereby placing

actions of a youth court beyond any substantive appellate review.

       The Appellee Mississippi Court even omitted from its purported “Order

Designating Record” (CP 120) all CASA and MDHS reports that were, per the court,

“documents, reports, and …investigations which are to be considered by this court, at

this hearing” (CP 5, 190). Given the broad right of appellate review granted even all

indigent youth court appellants at Miss. Code Ann. § 43 – 21 – 651 (1), such action of the

Appellee Court denies the Hoggatts Due Process and Equal Protection of the laws,

especially given M.R.A.P 10 (f)‟s Limit on Authority to Add to or Subtract From the

Record, which directs that “Nothing in this rule shall be construed as empowering the

parties or any court [emphasis added] to add to or subtract from the record except insofar

as may be necessary to convey a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired

in the trial court with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.”

         6. Miss. Code Ann. § 93 – 23 – 5, Jurisdiction, states “A court of this state

which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child

custody determination by initial or modification decree if:….”, and then outlines
reasonable requirements for basis for an assertion of jurisdiction. While Appellants

acknowledge that custody determinations are one disposition available to youth courts in

Mississippi, and that thus a youth court is “ a court of this state which is competent to

decide child custody matters”, no exceptions are made for Chancery Court, Youth Court,

or County Court by the UCCJA, as to requirements of some reasonable connection with

the state of Mississippi which must be met before a court has jurisdiction to make an

initial child custody determination in a particular case. Any other reading would allow

youth courts, only, of all Mississippi state courts unlimited discretion to make arbitrary,

illogical, and harmful custody determinations such as the extant one, where the Court

purported to assert jurisdiction to award a non-resident child of fit, non-resident natural

parents to a grossly unfit non-resident aged relative, only because he wanted to, or

because he was a “United Methodist”.

       In Curtis v. Curtis, 574 So. 2d 24, the Chancery Court's decree was in part

predicated on the Protection From Domestic Abuse Act, invoked by non-custodial parent

purportedly to protect his children. Citing Walters v. Walters, 519 So.2nd 427, 428 (Miss.

1988), the Mississippi Supreme Court held, "… the UCCJA provides the exclusive state

law source for determining state court subject matter jurisdiction." Id., at 29. The extant

case was not one of parental kidnapping, as in Curtis, but of extended family members‟

attempt to kidnap. (CP 58)

       “Though not pressed, the UCCJA provides a final basis upon which this Court

might assume jurisdiction and modify custody.” Id. “ The Chancery Courts have no

power under the PDA that are inconsistent with the jurisdictional injunction of the

UCCJA.” Id. It may thus be inferred that the youth courts also have no have no power
under the Youth Court Act that are inconsistent with the jurisdictional injunction of the

UCCJA.

       In Curtis, above, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated, “the children had at most

been in Mississippi for one or two days. As a matter of law, we hold that this is not “a

significant connection” within Section 93 – 23 – 5 (1) (b). We find this reading

reinforced by Section 93 – 23 – 5 (2) n9 which provides that, with exceptions not here

relevant, physical presence in this state of the child, or of the child and one of the

contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a

child… custody determination.” 574 So. 2nd 24, 29

"Emergencies by definition do not last and to say that the Chancery Court had temporary

subject matter jurisdiction in no way precludes plenary inquiry in to the Chancery Court's

permanent subject matter jurisdiction of the court." Id, at 27.The Mississippi Supreme

Court held that the Mississippi trial court had erred when it continued to assert subject

matter jurisdiction after the „emergency‟ had passed.

       In Curtis, the Chancellor was faced with an emergency petition by a non-custodial

father, and was only able to hear one side of the story. Mom was in Utah, and the

complaint stated a case of substantial neglect and abuse of the children. There the

Chancellor felt justified to act in an emergency to protect children against possible harm.

       Unlike Curtis, no party to the proceeding claimed residency in the State of

Mississippi. Unlike Curtis, both parents were right there, for approximately one month,

for court officials to interview. (Cf. CP 1, 3, and 58). To the contrary, Appellants /

Parents had only contacted Mississippi authorities to protect themselves and the child
from criminal acts then being committed against their family, which posed an imminent

danger to the health, welfare, and morals of the minor.

      Unlike Curtis, where the Court found the Chancellor‟s assumption of emergency

jurisdiction appropriate as the father was accusing his ex-wife of abuse, the instant record

contains evidence from the minor‟s school counselor and close family friends, some of

whom had known W.N.H. and his Parents the minor‟s entire life. “I have known them

for the last seventeen years, and found them to be loving and caring people…children

seemed to have been well adjusted socially and intellectually….received many academic

honors, … morally, emotionally sound…..well spoken of in our community as well as

respected” (School counselor, at CP Exhibits, Volume 1);

       In a letter to MDHS worker Ashley Junkin, and contained in the court file, Brenda

Smith stated “ …I would like to provide you with additional information regarding the

environment in which N.H. and his siblings have been reared. Through many years of

friendship with the Hoggatt family, I have observed first-hand the warm, loving, and

nurturing atmosphere Eric and Vickie Hoggatt have provided for their children. ….Eric

and Vickie worked hard to provide a beautiful home for their children. Not only was

their house and property physically beautiful, the true beauty stemmed from their warm

family life. The only times my visits to the Hoggatt home felt strained or uncomfortable

where when Mr. Johnson, Vickie‟s father, was visiting. On each occasion that our visits

coincided, Mr. Johnson would be either the influence of alcohol or rude, hostile, and

belligerent, usually a combination of all of the above, creating an atmosphere of extreme

discomfort for everyone…I can unequivocally state that I have observed Eric and

Vickie‟s conduct for twenty years and I have never met any two parents who have shown
more love and concern for the welfare of their children… They have always strived to

give their very best to their children and to instill in them a sense of responsibility and

respect…The conduct of N. and two of his older brothers are engaged in is certainly not

something that was taught to them by their parents… Irregardless of their current

conduct, these children were taught, by their parents, to have respect for authority,

respect for other people and the property of others, and to be honest, hardworking

individuals…. Not only am I appalled by the actions of N. and his brothers, I am deeply

saddened as well, for if anyone deserves love and respect from their children, it would be

these parents, who have not only loved their children, but have loved being

parents….Until recently, N. and his two brothers‟ behavior mirrored their good

upbringing. (CP Exhibits, Volume 1, Exhibit 1, also at 92 – 93)

       The record even contains testimony by adverse witness attesting to benefit of the

minor‟s having a relationship with his parents. Isaiah Hoggatt, who the Mississippi Court

itself designated a hostile, adverse witness, stated in response to the question, “Would N.

benefit, Isaiah, from knowing what a normal family relationship is?”, “N. had that

experience for a long time.‖ (CP 162) ―Would you like N. to have a relationship with

his parents?”, Isaiah Hoggatt responded, “Under the right circumstances, I think it

would be the best thing.” (R 162, lines 14 – 17).

       In Curtis, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the Chancery “Court erred

when it continued to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over this matter after it should

reasonably become apparent that there was no clear and present danger to the children,

stating, “We further hold that the Court erred when it ordered custody permanently
changed from Lauralee to Gregory, the error being one of jurisdiction and not on the

merits of the controversy.” Curtis, 574 So. 2nd 24, 29.

       The record contains much evidence of character of the parents, but no assertion by

the court or its officers that the Parents‟ conduct had ever presented a threat of harm to

W.N.H.

" [T]he law's traditional presumption has been "that natural bonds of affection lead

parents to act in the best interests of their children," Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602

(1979); and "[s]imply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or

because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that decision

from the parents to some agency or officer of the state," id., at 603.

       If the Mississippi Court did not have jurisdiction this year, it does not have it the

next. Again Curtis provides a useful analogy. There the minor children remained in

Mississippi by virtue of the Chancery Court's custody and protective order. The

Mississippi Supreme Court stated, “Without hesitation we hold that such court ordered

involuntary residence does not generate so much as a tick of the UCCJA's six consecutive

months clock.” [Italics added]. Id., at 28.

       The Court further stated, “This case presents a classic case of the …judicial

behavior the statutes were designed to and do proscribe…In doing this almost three years

after the fact, we have no illusion that we are able to put Humpty Dumpty back together

again. We hope from this fall all may know of our seriousness of purpose that the law‟s

injunction be respected.” Id, 24.

       Additionally, the facts recounted in the petition demonstrate the sort of

machinations that Appellee Court pulled, such as not making a dispositional
determination until New York residents had stayed in the vicinity of Natchez, Mississippi

area for over one month, from August 19, 2000 to September 25, 2000, while their child

W.N.H. was placed in temporary custody of the grandparents and acclimated to the

climate of hatred, bigotry, pride, and resentment of Wilton and Mae Hoggatt, and ordered

by the Appellee Court to enroll in school in Louisiana. Appellee Court then did not file

[if it was in fact filed then, as no Circuit Clerk or deputy circuit clerk initialed the

filestamp] an order on that hearing until December 5, 2000, and has most recently

demonstrated its position that parents or their attorney don‟t have a right to even know if

the order has been filed, or to have a copy of it.

        In Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co., Inc., 653 So.2d 250, 250-251 (Miss. 1994) the

Court held that several verdict forms signed by the trial court were not "final judgments"

triggering the 30-day time for appeal. The Court further stated that "[e] ven assuming

arguendo that the forms could be construed to be final judgments, [appellant] was never

notified of their existence, and her right to due process would protect her from losing her

right to appeal since she was not aware of the jury verdict forms and was not notified of

their existence."

        7. Mississippi Court could not “terminate jurisdiction” it never had. The surprise

motion was a very transparent attempt by the Mississippi court to avoid a hearing on the

merits of the request for disclosure pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 43 – 21 – 261 (G).

Petition outlined detailed compelling circumstances affecting the health and safety of a

child, and stated why disclosure was necessary to protect not only W.N.H. , but also his

cousin, the sexual assault victim. The Petition stated why disclosure was essential in

order to promote investigation that would lead to apprehension of Andrew Allbritton, Jr.
wanted for Aggravated Incest, and that disclosure of records was requested as also

necessary for prosecution of extended family members who have been committing

criminal acts against the Eric Hoggatt family and against the minor, W.N.H., (CP 41)

from before the beginning of this cause, and were yet utilizing the Mississippi youth

court proceedings to obstruct justice. Another “a child” to be protected is Sascha Hoggatt.

(CP 29-30).

       8. Yes, the Mississippi Court‟s assertion that confidentiality statutes of the youth

court act prohibit fit Parents or any attorney for them from even inspecting the custody

orders that altered custody of their child with no finding of unfitness, or any Department

of Youth Services plan for reunification of the family, because after the hearing that

generated the order, “nothing is pending”, unless they can prove to the youth court that

such inspection would be “in the best interest of the child”, not only is patently

ridiculous, but also places an Constitutionally prohibited burden on fit parents, who are

presumed to act in the child‟s best interest. A family denied inspection of social services

records for years, and orders that outlined plans for reunification of the family, can

scarcely comply.

         Parents‟ fundamental right to the custody of his child, absent a showing of

unfitness or harm, trumps a state best interest governmental intrusion, thus a parent‟s

right to have any custody decree that altered custody of his child, pursuant to Miss. Code

Ann. § 93 – 23 – 33 is not abrogated by “confidentiality” due child. Miss. Code Ann. §

43 – 21 – 261 also conflicts with Miss. Code Ann. § 11 – 49 – 7, which provides,” Every

attorney or counselor at law, practicing in any court in this state, shall be allowed, at all

reasonable times, to inspect the papers and records relating to any suit in such court in
which he may be concerned as attorney or counsel, without being compelled to take

copies thereof ” as well as the youth court provision found at Miss. Code Ann. §

        The order that appointed durable custodian was a dispositional review order,

necessarily part of a continuum, once Mississippi asserted a right to intrude upon the

Hoggatts‟ fundamental right in the care and custody of W.N.H. . `[T]he requirement of

harm is the sole protection that parents have against pervasive state interference in the

parenting process.' " In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d, at 19-20, 969 P. 2d, at 30 (quoting Hawk

v. Hawk, 855 S. W. 2d 573, 580 (Tenn. 1993). For that reason, "[s]hort of preventing

harm to the child," the court considered the best interests of the child to be "insufficient

to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental rights."

In re Smith, supra, at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30.

        Troxel et vir v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) held, “…Our cases have

consistently followed that course”; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982)

(discussing “[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and

management of their child”); Glucksberg, supra, at 720 (“In a long line of cases, we have

held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the „liberty‟

specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t]…to direct the

education and upbringing of one‟s children” (citing Meyer and Peirce). In light of this

extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions

concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” “Accordingly, so long as a

parent adequately cares for his or her children, (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no

reason for the State to interject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of

that parent‟s children.”

          The Mississippi Court‟s construction of Miss. Code Ann. § 43 – 21 – 261 also

conflicts with actual practice. The Justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court may take

judicial notice that any Mississippi attorney of record is routinely mailed the appellate

youth court record upon request to prepare mandatory record excerpts, and that Victoria

Hoggatt could check out the file in Jackson, if it is not already checked out, as a member

of the bar in good standing.

          9. Yes. Having the record “ [F]or fourteen (14) days …for examination…and

proposed corrections”, Rule10(5) Miss.R.A.P., is a right of due process afforded all other

youth court Appellants, and its protection may not be denied Hoggatts. In cases such as

the extant one, where many irregularities are patently obvious in the clerk‟s filing and

removal of documents, (See emphatic statement of trial judge that social services intake

report records are not contained in the Circuit Clerk‟s office (R 192, Line 25-25 and R

193, line 6-11), cf. Docket entry September 15, 2000 entry of “intake report” filed),

where statements made under oath by the youth court prosecutor, the Guardian ad litem,

and Mississippi Department of Human Services/Division of Youth Services worker are

patently inconsistent with the findings of the Court,

          Compare statements above(cite)

          all reasonable efforts made to maintain child in his own home, MDHS did all they

should,
       , and when the integrity of the actual court reporters‟ transcript is in controversy,

inspection of the transcribed court record is an essential component of due process.

       The fact that Mississippi lawyers representing non-resident youth court appellants

that live within the state of Mississippi are mailed the entire appellate record upon request

from the Clerk of the Mississippi Supreme Court to prepare record excerpts, but that a

non-resident member of the Mississippi Bar must travel a thousand miles to check out the

file, or per the order of the order of the Mississippi youth court, must prepare same in the

offices of the Mississippi Supreme Court, “in camera” no less find(CP , denies both

non-resident appellants and any non-resident Mississippi Bar member attorney equal

protection of the laws, and may constitute an unconstitutional infringement upon

interstate commerce.



                                     Conclusion



     Wherefore, premises considered, Appellants respectfully pray for the following

relief: (1) That upon a finding that the Mississippi Court never had state subject matter

jurisdiction to alter custody of W.N.H. to a Louisiana relative with no showing of

unfitness of the parents, that all orders and decrees in the cause be found void ab initio,

(2) that all youth court records as defined by Miss. Code Ann. § 43 – 21 – 251, including,

but not limited to, all records prepared by MDHS workers Ashley Junkin or Ginger

Johnson, by CASA Guardian ad Litem Manfred Eidt, by Eileen Anderson, youth court

counselor, and all documents and notes in the Circuit Clerk‟s youth court file in this

cause, together with all court reporter‟s stenographic notes and audiotape recordings in
the cause from September 7, 2000 until July 10, 2003, be delivered to the Hoggatts to be

their sole property, (3) that pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11 – 53 – 23, 11 – 53 – 55,

and 11 – 55 – 5, Appellee Mississippi youth court, and attorneys John Hudson, Philip

LeTard, Vivian Brown-Toussaint as individuals, be assessed costs and attorney‟s fees in

the amount of $165,000 for interposing claims and defenses in this cause without

substantial justification for literally years for delay and harassment, by improper conduct,

in bad faith and for improper purpose, and that (4) pursuant to Pursuant to M.R.A. P.

Rules 2 (b) and 46 (d) that the Mississippi Supreme Court take appropriate disciplinary

action against Judge Hudson and youth court attorneys Vivian Brown-Toussaint and

Philip LeTard, for conduct unbecoming members of the bar, viz., for failure to comply

with appellate rules as to determination of the content of the record for appeal, and for

filing a frivolous Motion Objecting to Appellandt‟s [sic] Designation of Record and to

Designate Record, for disclosing youth court records in violation of statute, and for

refusing to hold a hearing as required by statute on the Proposed Corrections to the

Record. (See Docket)

    Appellants further pray that the Court may impose such sanctions as may be

appropriate. including (5) issuance of a public reprimand, on Judge John Hudson as an

attorney who directed both the prosecutor and the Circuit Clerk to not comply with

M.R.A.P. Rule 10, and who told M.L. Vines that Victoria Hoggatt had lied to him and

misrepresented who she was, that he (Judge Hudson) never told Victoria Hoggatt that she

had a right of inspection; (6) upon M. L. Vines, trial court clerk, for failure to deliver

copies of custody decrees upon request, after having been so advised by the Attorney

General‟s office, and for failure to place Appellants‟ Proposed Corrections to the Record
on the Clerk‟s List of Papers, though it had been filed (See, Appellants‟ Proposed

Corrections to the Record; for threatening the sexual assault victim, her mother, and

attorney Victoria Hoggatt, that he was “going to call the sheriff to have you removed”,

and for accusing publicly an officer of the court of “Misrepresenting who you are” and

that she had “lied” to him, and for failure to send a copy of Notice of Appeal of the Order

Designating Record, that Hoggatts filed July 18, 2003.

      Further, Hoggatts respectfully request (7) a finding that all records prepared by

MDHS workers Ashley Junkin or Ginger Johnson, by CASA Guardian ad Litem Manfred

Eidt, by Eileen Anderson, youth court counselor, and all documents and notes in the

Circuit Clerk‟s youth court file in this cause in the Adams County Youth Court are

expressly exempt from protection under Miss. Code Ann. § 43 – 21 – 261, and also that

they may not be accessed as public records, nor be considered in the public domain (8)

and that the style of this cause may be Hoggatt v. Adams County Youth Court.

       The young sexual assault victim, before she attempted suicide six years after the

assault, told Victoria Hoggatt, “if only this [the years of pain and anguish of knowing that

not only her grandfather may return to hurt her, as he promised to if she told what he had

done to her, but more importantly, the assistance of her great-aunts and of her great uncle,

Wilton Hoggatt, as well as law enforcement personnel charged with bringing the fugitive

to justice (CP 38)] could help someone else”.

       There is more than one way to rape a child, and that child‟s parents. Parents Eric

and Victoria Hoggatt respectfully assert that Judge John Hudson, essentially told the

parents of W.N.H. the same thing that A. J. Allbritton told the eight year old child, “If

you tell, you‟re gonna pay”.
       It is the prayer of Appellants that the situation be a teaching tool for family and

youth court judges and social services workers, to be wary that persons with an agenda

can hurt young people and their families terribly, that prejudice lives in the heart of all of

us, and that we all must carefully abide by the protections that keep citizens from

infringing upon the rights and sacred duties of their fellow citizens.

       The inestimable honor and sacred trust of having and holding children, and trying

to teach them to work, to love, to rejoice, to contribute, and when to be quiet, is perhaps

the most glorious privilege afforded man. It is our prayer that the State of Mississippi

will contribute to the strengthening of those rights in a world increasingly hostile to the

family structure. As a „Bluebird‟, when she was eight, Victoria Hoggatt began an

embroidery sampler about “Home”. One line was “Bless these walls, so firm and stout,

keeping want and trouble out.”

       The Mississippi Supreme Court has an opportunity to contribute to the

strengthening and preservation of the family, by upholding Constitutional guarantees of

due process of law and equal protection as those rights swim in the murky waters of

secret proceedings, to assist parents to keep „want and trouble out‟, including the trouble

of unwarranted governmental intrusion into the home, the ruthless deprivation of civil

liberties effected under color of law, and the age old, but perhaps never before better

exemplified, double trouble of the In-Laws from Hell.



               Respectfully submitted, this the __________________ of September,

               2004.
                                         ____________________________________

                                                          Victoria Johnson Hoggatt
                                                          Mississippi State Bar # 2497




        i
           Hoggatts Petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court a for a Writ of Emergency
Assistance and Other Collateral Relief asking for supplementation of the record, outlining
egregious criminal violations committed by the youth court to obstruct justice, committed at the
time of filing and subsequent to Hoggatts‟ Petition for Disclosure, filed January 31, 2003,
including (1) Judge Hudson‟s instructing the Circuit Clerk‟s office not to issue Hoggatts'
summons to approximately 25 witnesses to the April 1, 2003 hearing; (2) Office of the Circuit
Clerk and Judge Hudson directing summoned witnesses not to appear at the April 1, 2003 and
July 10, 2003 hearings; (3) Judge Hudson‟s secretary calling the Hoggatts in Texas to state that
he had told the Circuit Clerk to issue summons to July 10, 2003 hearing, and a video of the
Adams County Circuit Clerk‟s office stating that Judge Hudson had directed them not to issue the
same summons; (4) Circuit Clerk‟s office stating that youth court prosecutor Vivian Toussaint
and Judge Hudson had directed at the last minute, when process would be impossible to be
achieved on out of town critical witnesses, charging the Appellants‟/Hoggatts approximately
$450 before the court would issue summons to approximately 25 witnesses to the April 1, 2003
hearing, when all court officers knew that statute prohibits charging for youth court summons; (5)
Prosecutor Vivian Brown-Toussaint fraudulently writing Victoria Hoggatt that she had filed an
***Amended Motion***Objecting to Appellant‟s Designation of Record and to Designate
Record, and for the conveying to Hoggatts a copy of the purported “Amended Motion” Objecting
to Appellant‟s Designation of Record and to Designate Record, that designated some CASA and
Mississippi Department of Human Services records as necessary for appeal; (6) Court appointed
attorney for the child transferring over 100 pages of youth court records to extended family
members who had had originally bought the hotel room for the minor in August of 2000 at the
Days Inn and orchestrated his running away, who read them and threatened Victoria Hoggatt,
“I‟m going to rack your ass” and another, that he hoped “to watch you get electroshock
treatment” (think A Beautiful Mind); (7) a video of Melody Bradley, Deputy Adams County
Circuit Clerk, running from the Circuit Clerk‟s office to the Juvenile Justice building, after which
Natchez police officer, Carl Houston jerked the camera off of Victoria Hoggatt‟s neck outside of
a public building. Mississippi Department of Human Services and youth court workers are
filmed calling the Natchez, Mississippi Police Department, stating “They need to come get the
camera. They need to take it away from her”, as Victoria Hoggatt was documenting why Manfred
Eidt, Guardian ad Litem, did not attend the July 10, 2003 hearing after speaking with Judge John
Hudson, who had asked Eidt if he had received a summons the day before the hearing; (8) the
Adams County Circuit Clerk not filing the Hoggatts‟ Proposed Corrections to the Record, (or
filing, then un- filing them ), and; (9) the trial judge, John Hudson refusing to set a hearing (or
setting and then un-setting ) on the Proposed Corrections to the Record, ad nauseum.
      Hoggatts provided 29 document exhibits, 3 video exhibits, and 42 audiotaped
telephone and in person conversations as evidence to the Mississippi Supreme Court of
all the criminal and civilly actionable activities set forth in their Petition for Disclosure,
and committed subsequent thereto, including audiotapes of the trial judge, the sex
offender, the FBI agent, and the oral presentation prepared for the United States
Department of Justice, Eastern District of Texas, by both parents of the sexual assault
victim, as well as the recordings of „custodian‟ Wilton Hoggatt and his daughter Tessa
Hoggatt Albritton, both talking about Wilton Hoggatt‟s involvement with the fugitive,
that Mississippi court officers had listened to, prior to filing their surprise Motion to
Terminate Durable Legal Custody.
         Hoggatts contended that the Mississippi youth court sought to omit from the
appellate record social services records, interim dispositional hearing order, and transcript
of hearings in September of 2000 and October 2001 to keep youth court records
“confidential”, so as to shield itself from richly deserved civil and criminal prosecution.
Hoggatts further asserted that the Mississippi youth court was seeking to obtain, by
criminal means such as crafting a record by interference with service of process, an
appellate affirmation that the Mississippi youth court had rightfully denied Hoggatts
access to youth court records, as an attempt to obtain protection in actions that may be
brought against it, via the defense of res judicata.
         Petition for Writ was denied by Mississippi Supreme Court without opinion.*

   *Many custody matters have related or relevant collateral civil or criminal proceedings
necessarily included in the statement of the case in custody matters, even of proceedings
in other states. Mention of the Petition for Writ of Special Assistance is properly
included in this brief, not to prove the assertions contained therein, but to give any court
that may review this appellate record an accurate history of all proceedings in the cause.
Information was provided in a footnote, as Appellants anticipate a motion to strike from
the record. It can be deleted, and we can all pretend it never happened.

               Mrs. Hoggatt:           ….I was told that you had said do not issue my
                                       summons.

               Mr. LeTard:             Objection, your Honor, to the hearsay.

               Mrs. Toussaint:                 Objection.

               The Court:              Sustain the objection. And that’s not true.
                                       [Emphasis added] …

               Mrs. Hoggatt:           Why were they not issued?

               The Court:              I sustained the objection.


(Certified Court Record, Page 204, lines 22-29, Judge Hudson fraudulently declaring that
he had not told the Adams County, Mississippi Circuit Clerk to not issue the Hoggatts‟
summons)
2000-2004 Copyright Bay Israel Chitrikar Keller Iglesias

				
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