Docstoc
EXCLUSIVE OFFER FOR DOCSTOC USERS
Try the all-new QuickBooks Online for FREE.  No credit card required.

Sep Uncompanion.pdf

Document Sample
Sep Uncompanion.pdf Powered By Docstoc
					Special Warfare
     The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School




PB 80–02–3                          September 2002                            Vol. 15, No. 3
From the Commandant
September 2002                                   Special Warfare                                       Vol. 15, No. 3


            While all U.S. operations in Afghanistan
         during Operation Enduring Freedom have
         been characterized by the skill and dedica-
         tion of United States military personnel,
         the contributions of U.S. special-operations
         forces have been particularly valuable. To
         ensure that the contributions of the Army
         special-operations forces involved do not go
         unsung, the Army Special Operations
         Command has undertaken a project that
         will record the activities of ARSOF units.
         The USASOC historian’s office has inter-
         viewed soldiers from a variety of ARSOF
         units and is recording the results of the
         research in a book scheduled to be pub-
         lished later this year.                            ARSOF have been able to perform their
            In this issue of Special Warfare, we are for-   missions in Afghanistan quickly and effec-
         tunate to be able to present abbreviated ver-      tively. It is difficult to read the accounts of
         sions of many of the articles that will be         their activities without feeling a sense of
         included in that book. While our selections do     admiration and pride.
         not encompass all the articles that will be           At the Special Warfare Center and
         included in the book, our intent has been to       School, we have another reason to be proud
         present vignettes that represent the wide          of the operations that ARSOF have per-
         range of ARSOF missions.                           formed in Afghanistan. The efficiency and
            In many of the vignettes, the participants      professionalism that have characterized
         are identified by pseudonyms. The pseudo-          ARSOF soldiers’ actions there are a result
         nyms are used for security reasons, but they       of the training programs that we have
         may have another, unintended effect: By            helped develop and administer over the
         obscuring the identity of the individuals, the     past several years. Moreover, the bravery,
         pseudonyms allow the reader to realize that        flexibility and self-reliance demonstrated
         the activities were those of a team, any of        by ARSOF soldiers validates our assess-
         whose members would have been capable of           ment-and-selection procedures. In the end,
         performing the same actions.                       ARSOF activities in Afghanistan have
            The number of vignettes is evidence of the      shown the world what we have known for
         wide range of ARSOF missions and the num-          some time — that we are training some of
         ber of units that have participated in             the finest soldiers in the world.
         Afghanistan to date. Those missions include
         precision flying at night, disaster relief, psy-
         chological operations, direct action, uncon-
         ventional warfare, coalition operations, coun-
         terinsurgency, and the provision of supplies
         and communications under extremely diffi-             Major General William G. Boykin
         cult conditions.
            Despite challenges from weather and ter-
         rain, from cultural and language barriers,
         and from a sensitive political situation,
PB 80–02–3
                                                                                                       Contents
September 2002                                                          Special Warfare                                Vol. 15, No. 3


     Commander & Commandant
    Major General William G. Boykin
                                                                      Features
                 Editor                                           3   ‘Find Those Responsible’: The Beginnings of Operation
           Jerry D. Steelman                                          Enduring Freedom
           Associate Editor                                           by Dr. Richard L. Kiper
          Sylvia W. McCarley                                      6   Into the Dark: The 3/75th Ranger Regiment
               Graphics & Design                                      by Dr. Richard L. Kiper
                Bruce S. Barfield
                                                                  8   ‘We Don’t Fail’: The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion
               Automation Clerk
                                                                      by Dr. Richard L. Kiper
                Gloria H. Sawyer
                                                                 10   Meeting the ‘G-Chief’: ODA 595
                                                                      by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

                                                                 13   ‘We Support to the Utmost’: The 528th Special Operations
                                                                      Support Battalion
                      VE R
                             IT
                                  AS
                                            LI B
                                                   ER
                                                        TAS
                                                                      by Dr. Richard L. Kiper
                                       ET


   Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the   16   Uprising at Qala-i Jangi: The Staff of the 3/5th SF Group
United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission            by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp
is to promote the professional development of special-
operations forces by providing a forum for the examination
of established doctrine and new ideas.
                                                                 19   ‘Of Vital Importance’: The 4th PSYOP Group
   Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do             by Dr. Richard L. Kiper
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This
publication does not supersede any information presented
in other official Army publications.                             22   ‘Have Tools, Will Travel’: Company D, 109th Aviation Battalion
   Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and
should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,
                                                                      by James A. Schroder
USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN
239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special          24   The Campaign in Transition: From Conventional
Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.
   Published works may be reprinted, except where                     to Unconventional War
copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare              by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp
and the authors.
   Official distribution is limited to active and reserve
special-operations units. Individuals desiring private           27   Change of Mission: ODA 394
subscriptions should forward their requests to:
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
                                                                      by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special
Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web             30   Caves and Graves: The 19th SF Group
(https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).
                                                                      by Dr. Richard L. Kiper
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
                                                                 32   To Educate and to Motivate: The 345th PSYOP Company
Eric K. Shinseki
                                                                      by Dr. Richard L. Kiper
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff                                                   34   Armed Convoy to Kabul: The 3/20th SF Group
Official:                                                             by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

                                                                 36   Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and PSYOP Teams in
Joel B. Hudson                                                        Afghanistan
Administrative Assistant to the                                       by Dr. C.H. Briscoe
Secretary of the Army
                              0219002
Headquarters, Department of the Army                                                (Contents continued next page)
Contents                                                              PB 80–02–3

September 2002          Special Warfare                                 Vol. 15, No. 3


                 39   Ambush at 80 Knots: Company B, 3/160th SOAR
                      by James A. Schroder

                 42   An Army for Afghanistan: The 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group,
                      and the Afghan Army
                      by Dr. Richard L. Kiper
                 44   ‘Deminimus Activities’ at the Bagram Clinic: CA Team A-41
                      by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp

                 46   Forty-Five Seconds on a Hot LZ: The 2/160th SOAR
                      by James A. Schroder

                 50   Observations: ARSOF in Afghanistan
                      by James A. Schroder
                 53   Vigilant Warrior 2002: War Game Demonstrates ARSOF’s
                      Value to the Objective Force
                      by Major General William G. Boykin

                 56   As I Saw It: The Eyewitness Report of a Soldier Who Fought
                      During World War II and Survived
                      by Colonel Vernon E. Greene, U.S. Army (ret.)




                      Departments
                 62   Foreign SOF
                 63   Enlisted Career Notes
                 64   Officer Career Notes
                 66   Update
                 68   Book Reviews
‘Find Those Responsible’: The Beginnings
of Operation Enduring Freedom
by Dr. Richard L. Kiper




                                                 tions there. Two-thirds of the country is

T
       aliban, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden —
       as the rays of the early morning sun      covered by mountains that rise to almost
       reflected from the twin towers of the     17,000 feet. Only 15 percent of the land can
World Trade Center Sept. 11, 2001, few           support agriculture. Three major lan-
Americans had ever heard those names.            guages and 30 minor languages, religious
Within hours, however, few Americans             divisions between the majority Sunni Mus-
would not have heard them.                       lims and the minority Shi’a Muslims, trib-
   Not since Dec. 7, 1941, had the United        al cultures, oppression, illiteracy, famine,
States been attacked directly by a foreign       drought, and the lack of infrastructure
power. Within 24 hours, intelligence reports     have severely hampered military and
linked Islamic extremist Osama bin Laden         diplomatic attempts to destroy the al-
to the attacks, and congressmen and mili-        Qaeda terrorists and to remove the Taliban
tary officials were calling for retaliation.     from power.5 Of no small import are the
President George W. Bush characterized the       millions of undocumented land mines that
attacks as “acts of mass murder” and             are strewn about the country.
pledged “to find those responsible and bring        “We will rally the world,” declared Presi-
them to justice.”1 While Secretary of State      dent Bush, and Secretary of State Powell
Colin Powell mounted a diplomatic offen-         immediately launched a diplomatic offen-
sive to garner support for action by the U.S.,   sive to rally support from both the United
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld pre-        Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty
pared an order to mobilize reservists and        Organization, or NATO. “We’re building a
members of the National Guard. Deputy            strong coalition to go after these perpetra-
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz warned       tors,” Powell told reporters. Within days,
that the military was “entering into a cam-      the U.S. had received pledges of support
paign against terrorism.”2                       from Russia, China, NATO and the Euro-
   On Sept. 15, the U.S. Senate adopted a        pean Union.6 Such coalition support would
resolution that authorized “the use of           prove invaluable.
United States armed forces against those            Any doubt as to the legality of military
responsible for the recent attacks launched      action against the terrorists and their sup-
against the United States.”3 Bin Laden           porters was laid to rest when the U.S. Con-
quickly became the focus of an unprece-          gress passed a joint resolution authorizing
dented manhunt, and Afghanistan was the          the president “to use all necessary and
prime area of attention.4                        appropriate force against those … [who]
   Afghanistan’s geography and demogra-          aided the terrorist attacks.”7 To establish a
phy are significant challenges to opera-         secure footing for further coalition support,

September 2002                                                                                   3
    Secretary Powell invoked Article 51 of the            told the American people in a nationally
    U.N. Charter, which guarantees “the inher-            televised address Oct. 8. The previous
    ent right of individual or collective self-           night, U.S.-led airstrikes had struck tar-
    defense if an armed attack occurs against a           gets near Kabul and Kandahar.13 However,
    Member of the United Nations.”8 Calmly,               it was clear that if the U.S. was going to
    systematically, and methodically the U.S.             wage an effective campaign in the remote-
    was dotting the “i’s” and crossing the “t’s.”         ness of Afghanistan, the use of bases in the
       In a warning issued at the Pentagon                region would be critical. The efforts of the
    Sept. 17, President Bush stated that he               Secretary of State had paid off when the
    wanted bin Laden brought to justice “dead             Uzbeks allowed coalition forces to be based
    or alive.”9 It was no idle threat. Two days           at Karshi Kanabad, which would become
    earlier, during a meeting at Camp David,              known as K2. On Oct. 7, airplanes carrying
    Bush and his national-security team had               logistics and communications personnel
    reviewed the options for responding to the            and equipment from both the 528th Sup-
    terrorist attacks.                                    port Battalion and the 112th Signal Bat-
       During the meeting, Director of Central            talion began arriving at K2. Also in the
    Intelligence George Tenet offered a plan for          process of deploying were elements from
    using the Northern Alliance opposition to             the 160th Special Operations Aviation Reg-
    the Taliban. Under his plan, U.S. ground              iment, the 4th Psychological Operations
    forces would link up with the Northern                Group, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion and
    Alliance fighters in order to attack terror-          the 5th SF Group.14
    ist supporters in and around cities in                   Critical to the conduct of any military
    northern Afghanistan. According to the                operation is the establishment of a logistics
    president, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld              base and a communications network.
    “understood the utility of having the CIA             While the 528th and the 112th valiantly
    involved,” and “quickly grasped” the plan             labored to convert a primitive airfield into
    “to mate up our assets with the Northern              a usable facility, the 160th SOAR and the
    Alliance troops.” Chairman of the Joint               5th SF Group began planning for future
    Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton then pre-               combat missions. State Department
    sented three military options. In his third           spokesman Richard Boucher admitted that
    option, he recommended attacks by cruise              representatives were in contact “with the
    missiles and manned bombers, with the                 whole gamut of Afghan factions, including
    addition of placing “boots on the ground” —           the Northern Alliance.” Secretary Rums-
    the insertion of Army Special Forces.10               feld stated on “Meet the Press” that the
       When President Bush told “everybody who            U.S. was attempting to find ways of assist-
    wears the uniform to get ready,” on Sept. 15,         ing antiterrorist forces.15
    Washington Post reporters already were specu-            Civil Affairs units began planning for
    lating that SF was “certain to be at the center       the distribution of blankets and food to dis-
    of the action.”11 Little did the reporters know       placed persons that would take place once
    that while the National Guard and the Army            the tactical situation had been stabilized.
    Reserve were activating their soldiers, and           In the meantime, however, on Oct. 7, U.S.
    while military installations were tightening          Air Force C-17s began air-dropping
    their security measures, the U.S. Central Com-        humanitarian-aid rations. Two days later
    mand, or USCENTCOM, was quietly summon-               Air Force EC-130 “Commando Solo” air-
    ing planners from the U.S. Army Special Oper-         craft began broadcasting radio messages to
    ations Command to investigate various means           emphasize the international nature of the
    of retaliating against the terrorists. As the fight   mission to free the Afghan people from the
    against terrorism began, Rumsfeld did                 oppressive rule of the non-Islamic Taliban.
    acknowledge, “a lot of the effort … will be spe-      Other messages were directed at the Tal-
    cial operations.”Army Secretary Thomas White          iban: “You are condemned. Resistance is
    seconded that acknowledgement.12                      futile. Surrender now.” Those scripts were
       “On my orders, the United States mili-             prepared by the Product Development
    tary has begun strikes,” President Bush               Company of the 4th PSYOP Group.16

4                                                                                     Special Warfare
  On the night of Oct. 19, Rangers from the              Nod,” Washington Times, 27 September 2001, 17;
75th Ranger Regiment parachuted from                     Charter of the United Nations, www1.umn.edu/
                                                         humanrts/instree/chapter 7.html.
MC-130s into Afghanistan. That same                        9 Dan Balz, “Bush Warns of Casualties of War,”
night, detachments from the 5th SF Group                 Washington Post, 18 September 2001, 1. This warning
landed by MH-47E helicopters flown by the                was issued on 17 September.
160th SOAR. The articles in this issue of                 10 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, “At Camp David,

Special Warfare tell the stories of some of              Advise and Consent,” Washington Post, 15 September
                                                         2001, A01.
the Army’s special-operations forces that                 11 Elaine Sciolino, “Bush Tells the Military to ‘Get
were engaged in the operation to find those              Ready’; Broader Spy Powers Gaining Support,” New
responsible for the terrorist attacks on the             York Times, 16 September 2001, 1; Dana Priest, “Spe-
U.S. that September morning — Operation                  cial Forces May Play Key Role,” Washington Post, 15
Enduring Freedom.                                        September 2001, 5.
                                                          12 Michael R. Gordon, Eric Schmitt, and Thom

                                                         Shanker, “Scarcity of Afghan Targets Leads U.S. to
                                                         Revise Strategy,” New York Times, 19 September
   Dr. Richard L. Kiper earned his Ph.D. in              2001; Rowan Scarborough, “Pentagon Prepares Vari-
history at the University of Kansas. He pre-             ety of Responses,” Washington Times, 21 September
viously served as an officer in Special                  2001, 1.
                                                          13 Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. And Britain Strike
Forces, airborne, and infantry units state-              Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps;
side and overseas. He also served on the                 Bush Warns ‘Taliban Will Pay A Price,’” New York
Army Staff, and he was an instructor at                  Times, 8 October 2001, 1; Peter Baker, “Kabul and
West Point and at Fort Leavenworth. He                   Kandahar Hit in Attacks Through Night,” Washington
earned his Combat Infantryman Badge                      Post, 8 October 2001, 1.
                                                          14 C.J. Chivers, “2nd Wave of Troops Arrives in Uzbek-
and Purple Heart in Vietnam, where he                    istan,” New York Times, 8 October 2001; U.S. Army
served in the 5th Special Forces Group and               Special Operations Command Crisis Response Cell
as an infantry-company commander. His                    briefing, 092000Z Oct 2001.
first book, Maj. Gen. John Alexander                     15Rowan Scarborough, “Northern Alliance Gets Help

McClernand: Politician in Uniform, won                   From U.S.,” Washington Times, 28 September 2001, 1;
                                                         Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, “Bush
the Pratt Award for best nonfiction Civil                Approves Covert Aid for Taliban Forces,” New York
War book in 1999.                                        Times, 1 October 2001, 1.
                                                          16 U.S. Army Center for Military History, “Afghan War
   Notes:                                                Chronology,” 25 April 2002; Andrea Stone, “USA’s Air-
 1 Rowan Scarborough, “Military Officers Seek Swift,     borne Message: Taliban, ‘You Are Condemned,’” USA
Deadly Response,” Washington Times, 12 September         Today, 17 October 2001, 10; Major Larry Paulson
2001, 1; Dan Eggen and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Intelli-       (pseudonym), 4th POG, interview by author, 3 April
gence Points to Bin Laden Network,” Washington           2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations
Post, 12 September 2001, 1; eMedilMillWorks, Inc.,       Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
“President Bush’s Remarks,” Washington Post, 12
September 2001, 2.
 2 Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Asks

Call-Up of Reserves, As Many As 50,000,” New York
Times, 14 September 2001; Rowan Scarborough, “U.S.
Plans War on Terrorists, Not Infrastructure,” Wash-
ington Times, 14 September 2001, 13.
 3 David Von Drehle, “Senate Approves Use of Forces;

Military Patrols Cities and Ports,” Washington Post,
15 September 2001, 1.
 4 Dan Eggen and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Intelligence

Points to Bin Laden Network,” Washington Post, 12
September 2001, 1.
 5 Afghanistan Online, www.afghan-web.org; Country

Watch – Afghanistan, www.countrywatch.com.
 6 “A New World Order,” Christian Science Monitor,

14 September 2001, 1; President Bush’s address to the
nation, 12 September 2001.
 7 Associated Press, “Text of Joint Resolution,” Wash-

ington Post, 15 September 2001, 4.
 8 Nicholas Kralev, “U.S. Can Strike Without U.N.




September 2002                                                                                                     5
                 Into the Dark: The 3/75th Ranger Regiment
                 by Dr. Richard L. Kiper




                                                                   targets on Objective Iron. They could not

                 O
                         n Oct. 19, 2001, Ranger Task Force
                         3/75(-), with a regimental command-       identify Objective Copper from the air. AC-
                         and-control element, conducted the        130s also fired on buildings and towers with-
                 first Ranger combat parachute assault since       in the walls of Objective Cobalt.
                 Operation Just Cause in Panama. Four MC-            Company A(-), with a sniper team, had
                 130s dropped 199 Rangers from 800 feet            the mission of securing Objectives Tin and
                 above ground level under zero illumination        Iron to prevent enemy interdiction of
                 to seize a remote desert landing strip, or        Objective Cobalt and the landing strip.
                 DLS; to destroy Taliban forces; to gather         Specialist Martin Pasquez realized how
                 intelligence; to provide a casualty transload     low the airplane was flying when the doors
                 site; to establish a forward aerial               of the MC-130 were opened and dust blew
                 refuel/rearm point, or FARP, for rotary-wing      into the plane. As they were floating down,
                                                                   Sergeant First Class Ron Searcey and the
En route to the drop, Rangers on each chalk                        men of his platoon were able to orient
                                                                   themselves by the light of Objective Tin,
recited the Ranger Creed. Subsequent actions                       which was burning as a result of the bomb
                                                                   strike. Because both fixed- and rotary-wing
proved that they indeed exemplified the                            aircraft would be landing, the Rangers had
creed: ‘Readily will I display the intestinal for-                 to bag all of their parachutes before mov-
                                                                   ing off the landing strip. The Rangers were
titude required to fight on to the Ranger objec-                   prepared for resistance, but only one
                                                                   enemy soldier appeared. He was killed by
tive and complete the mission.’                                    several soldiers from Company C. Because
                                                                   they had performed numerous rehearsals,
                 aircraft; and to assess the capabilities of the   the Rangers were able to assemble, clear
                 airstrip for future operations.1                  Objective Iron, and establish the pre-
                    Objective Rhino, located southwest of Kan-     planned blocking positions quickly.2
                 dahar, consisted of four separate objectives:       The mission of the two platoons from Com-
                 Tin, Iron, Copper and Cobalt. B-1 bombers         pany C was to clear Objective Cobalt — the
                 dropped 2,000-pound bombs that were guid-         walled compound on the objective.Although the
                 ed by the global positioning system on Objec-     AC-130 had directed fire against the com-
                 tive Tin, followed by fire support from AC-       pound, damage was minimal. Concrete walls
                 130s. Initial reports indicated that 11 enemy     and roofs reinforced with rebar had absorbed
                 soldiers had been killed and nine had been        the blasts, or the shells had simply penetrated
                 seen running away. The aircrew identified no      the ceilings, leaving only a hole. The same was

6                                                                                               Special Warfare
true in the case of the towers. As Rangers          controllers smoothly directed them to the
moved toward Objective Cobalt, a loudspeaker        awaiting refuelers. Finally, each Ranger per-
team from the 9th Psychological Operations          formed superbly.
Battalion broadcast tapes in three languages to        En route to the drop, Rangers on each
encourage enemy soldiers to surrender. The          chalk recited the Ranger Creed. Subsequent
Americans did not know that the compound            actions proved that they indeed exemplified
was empty. Pre-assault fire had breached the        the creed: “Readily will I display the intesti-
wall, giving the Rangers an entry point into the    nal fortitude required to fight on to the
area. The Rangers moved quickly to the specif-      Ranger objective and complete the mis-
ic target buildings and the towers that were to     sion.”5 In addition to accomplishing their
be cleared. Clearing the buildings proved to be     assigned mission, the Rangers proved that
a more difficult and time-consuming process         American military forces could strike swift-
than had been anticipated: Many of the locked       ly, silently, with deadly force, at night.
steel doors could be opened only by multiple        Ranger fortitude, technology and training
shotgun blasts or demolition charges.3              combined to demonstrate to the Taliban and
   Fourteen minutes after Company C(-) had          to al-Qaeda that there are no safe havens.
begun to clear the compound, an MC-130 car-            On Nov. 25, 2001, U.S. Marines occupied
rying medical personnel arrived, and doctors        the site of the Ranger assault and desig-
began to treat two soldiers who had been            nated their new facility Camp Rhino.6
injured during the jump. Six minutes later, a
flight of helicopters that were participating
in another operation arrived to be rearmed              Notes:
                                                     1  “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions on
and refueled. While they were being serviced,
                                                    OBJ Rhino, Southern Afghanistan on 19 October 2001”
orbiting AC-130s destroyed enemy vehicles           (Masirah Island, Oman: 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger
and personnel that were moving toward the           Regiment, 25 October 2001), 1; “The 75th Ranger Reg-
area. Meanwhile, members of a U.S. Air Force        iment: Combat Operations in Southern Afghanistan in
special-tactics squadron were surveying the         Support of Operation Enduring Freedom,” briefing pre-
DLS to determine its ability to accommodate         pared by the 75th Ranger Regiment, n.d.
                                                      2 1st Lieutenant Kenneth Brown (pseudonym), Spe-
larger aircraft.                                    cialist Martin Pasquez (pseudonym), Sergeant First
   Upon completion of the rearming and              Class Ron Searcey (pseudonym) and Sergeant Thomas
refueling operations, the helicopters depart-       Evans (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th
ed and the Rangers who had been clearing            Ranger Regiment, interview by author, 28 March 2002,
Cobalt began to collapse toward the MC-             Fort Benning, Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special
                                                    Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
130s that had been refueling the heli-                3 Staff Sergeant James Turner (pseudonym), Compa-
copters. The last MC-130 departed five              ny B, 9th Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations
hours and 24 minutes after the airborne             Group, interview by author, 3 April 2002, Fort Bragg,
assault had begun.4                                 N.C.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations
   “Rangers Lead the Way,” and the 75th             Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Sergeant First
                                                    Class Ron Searcey (pseudonym), Captain Stanley
Rangers led the way in accomplishing every          Davis (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion, 75th
objective assigned. Several factors con-            Ranger Regiment, interview by author, 28 March 2002,
tributed to the success of the Rangers. Accu-       Fort Benning, Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special
rate intelligence allowed them to conduct           Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
                                                      4 “Combat Operations Summary of Ranger Actions on
detailed rehearsals. The interior construction
                                                    OBJ Rhino, Southern Afghanistan on 19 October 2001,” 1.
of the buildings on Objective Cobalt, howev-          5 Captain Sam Crevald (pseudonym), Headquarters
er, caused the clearing operation to take           Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment,
longer than had been anticipated. Firepower         interview by author, 28 March 2002, Fort Benning,
provided by on-station AC-130s prevented            Ga.; tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations
enemy forces from interfering with the oper-        Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.; Ranger Creed,
                                                    www.benning.army.mil/rtb/ranger/rgrcreed.htm.
ation. The actions of the departure airfield          6 Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Grabs Airstrip Near
control party — ensuring that fixed-wing air-       Kandahar, Gains Fixed Base Inside Afghanistan,”
craft taxied and parked where there would           Washington Times, 27 November 2001, 1.
be no possibility of collision — were critical to
overall success. As the helicopters arrived,

September 2002                                                                                                7
    ‘We Don’t Fail’: The 112th Special
    Operations Signal Battalion
    by Dr. Richard L. Kiper




                                                     pany A arrived in theater, and there was

    O
           n Sept. 21, 2001, 10 days after the
           terrorist attacks on the United           little knowledge available about which
           States, Company A, 112th Special          other units might be coming or when.
    Operations Signal Battalion, received a U.S.        In addition, the available real estate was
    Central Command deployment order to pro-         littered with trash and discarded Russian
    vide communications support to the Joint         equipment, and the soil was contaminated
    Special Operations Task Force, or JSOTF,         with petroleum, oil and lubricants. As units
    that was being established in Karshi Kan-        began to move into the base, some difficul-
    abad, Uzbekistan, in support of Operation        ties developed among the communicators
    Enduring Freedom.1 On Oct. 4, 37 soldiers        from different headquarters and the allo-
    deployed to the theater; they arrived there      cators of real estate. For example, systems
    Oct. 6 and reported to the J6.2                  that would be used to process top-secret
       The 112th is capable of deploying rapidly     information were supposed to be located
    to establish the long-haul links that allow      near a secure compartmented information
    deployed special-operations forces, or SOF, to   facility, or SCIF. When units arrived, how-
    communicate with headquarters in Europe          ever, the SCIF had not been established.
    and in the United States, and with               When it was established later on, some
    embassies in neighboring countries.              units had to move their equipment and
    Although the mission in Karshi Kanabad           interrupt their communications.
    would be a combat mission, it was typical of        Company A arrived in theater with one
    the missions that the 112th had practiced
    many times on exercises in the U.S. and
    abroad. Those exercises had led Company A
    to develop standard communications deploy-
    ment packages in order to minimize last-
    minute predeployment planning.
       Upon its arrival in Karshi Kanabad,
    Company A faced the initial difficulty of
    determining where to set up its operations.
    This was a critical decision, because it is a
    guiding principle of communications that
    once communications have been estab-
                                                                                              U.S. Army photo
    lished, the communications equipment
    should not be moved. There were only             The 112th Signal Battalion operates at Karshi Kanabad
    about 100 people on the ground when Com-         in Uzbekistan.


8                                                                                     Special Warfare
super-high-frequency satellite hub, a tacti-    was being established there. 2nd Lieu-
cal telephone switch, a data-services team,     tenant Tom Washington, a former enlisted
one SCAMPI node capable of providing            SF soldier, and his platoon immediately
secure and nonsecure networking, data           appropriated space in a field near the
services and secure telephones, equipment       perimeter and went to work. Within 48
for secure video teleconferencing, and three    hours, Washington’s company had complet-
Special     Operations      Communication       ed the links between the JSOTF and the
Assemblage, or SOCA, teams capable of           higher headquarters, as Company A had
providing tactical satellite communica-         done. In Washington’s words, that accom-
tions. The 112th was also equipped with         plishment was possible only because
about 200 personal computers.                   “Incredible guys are running these sys-
   Within 48 hours, the company had             tems.” The next month, soldiers from the
installed communications to support the         first platoon established communications
Joint Special Operations Air Component,         in Kabul between the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF
which had already been established. Minor       Group, and the JSOTF. The platoon also
technical problems and real-estate alloca-      deployed three SOCA teams to support for-
tion difficulties that required some equip-     ward-operations bases in Khowst, Kanda-
ment to be moved resulted in the SCAMPI         har and Shkin.5
not being re-established for about four days.      Operation Enduring Freedom validated
Normally, some of those problems would          the concept that a rapidly deployable sig-
have been resolved in a predeployment           nal battalion that is dedicated to support-
commo exercise. Under the conditions, how-      ing SOF is essential to the accomplishment
ever, it was not possible for Company A to      of special-operations missions. Soldiers of
troubleshoot problems beforehand.3              the 112th have developed the attitude of
   Once the JSOTF commander arrived, he         the customers they serve. First Sergeant
assigned the 112th the mission of being         Martin Masterson of Company A summed
fully capable by Oct. 13 to support future      up that attitude: “We don’t fail; we just
missions. Captain Steve Marks, who had          don’t fail.”6
commanded the company during operations
Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard, took it as
a challenge that the company would not be           Notes:
                                                 1  United States Central Command Deployment
the weak link in the execution of future mis-
                                                Order, 19 September 2002.
sions. The unit met the challenge, and it was     2 Briefing, Company A, 112th Special Operations
able to establish a secure video teleconfer-    Signal Battalion, January 2002, U.S. Army Special
encing link from the theater back to the U.S.   Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.
                                                  3 Captain Steve Marks (pseudonym), Company A,
Eventually, the unit was executing 10-14
                                                112th Signal Battalion, interview by author, 19 March
video conferences daily.4 These conferences
                                                2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Spe-
enabled commanders to provide real-time         cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
reports and to receive immediate guidance         4 First Sergeant Martin Masterson (pseudonym),

on future operations. The company also          Company A, 112th Signal Battalion, interview by
arranged for two SOCA teams to deploy to        author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape record-
embassies and for one SOCA team to pro-         ing, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive,
                                                Fort Bragg, N.C.
vide communications between a Special             5 2nd Lieutenant Tom Washington (pseudonym), 2nd
Forces detachment at Mazar-e Sharif and         Platoon, Company B, 112th Signal Battalion, inter-
its headquarters.                               view by author, 6 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan,
   After approximately 100 days, a conven-      tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Com-
                                                mand archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
tional Army signal battalion replaced Com-        6 Masterson interview.
pany A at Karshi Kanabad, but that did
not end the 112th’s involvement in the war
against terrorism. In March 2002, the sec-
ond platoon of the 112th’s Company B
deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, to pro-
vide communications to the JSOTF that

September 2002                                                                                           9
     Meeting the ‘G-Chief’: ODA 595
     by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp




                                                       Special Forces A-detachment 595 had

     A
            s the sun rose Oct. 19, 2001, in the
            Dari-a-Souf valley in northern             arrived only a few hours earlier, flown in
            Afghanistan, Captain Mike Nash wait-       during the night by the crew of an MH-47E
     ed to meet his new Afghan ally.1 General          Chinook helicopter from the 160th Special
     Abdul Rashid Dostum was the commander of          Operations Aviation Regiment. Relying on
     the largest armed faction of the Northern         their multi-mode radar, the pilots had
     Alliance. An ethnic Uzbek and former Soviet       brought the SF soldiers over mountains
     tank officer, Dostum had been fighting the Tal-   higher than the Rockies and had flown
     iban in the canyons of the “Valley of the River   them through a nighttime dust storm that
     of Caves” for years. He had been described to     forced back two MH-60 escorts. To reach
     Nash in intelligence reports as a “ruthless       the detachment’s objective, the Chinook
     warlord,” who would likely be unreceptive to      had to conduct an aerial refueling while
     Americans and might even attempt to kill him      flying at 110 knots only 300 feet above the
     at their first meeting.                           ground, in the moonless dark.
        Nash and the 11 other men of U.S. Army            From the time of their arrival until 5 a.m.,




     Special Forces soldiers
     from A-detachment 595
     ride into battle with
     Afghan warriors.
                                                                                           U.S. Army photo


10                                                                                  Special Warfare
Nash, his executive officer and his team         discern that Dostum’s 2,000 troops were
sergeant received a complete intelligence        horse-mounted cavalrymen, and in the
update. The ominous personality profile of       crash planning sessions, no one noted that
Dostum that Nash had received in Uzbek-          Nash had grown up as a cowboy.
istan was recast during the update. Dostum          As Dostum’s entourage moved up a rocky
was now described as a smart, pragmatic          trail, Nash took measure of the SF team’s
fighter who was eager for the American sol-      mounts. They were “tough little mountain
diers to join him.                               ponies,” he noted, “like American mustangs
   At 9 a.m., an advance security party of       from out West.” He thought the saddles were
30 Afghan horsemen, armed with AK-47             too small for American soldiers. The stirrups
assault rifles, PK machine guns and rock-        were also short and nonadjustable, forcing
et-propelled grenades, rode into the Ameri-      the team members to ride with their knees
can base camp. Dostum soon followed, also        uncomfortably bent. The real problem, he
on horseback, guarded by 20 more heavily         thought, would occur if anyone were to fall
armed riders.
   Dostum, Nash and two other men, one of
them a translator, sat on carpets on the hill-   Approximately six-foot-two and weighing
side. They drank a cup of hot “shai” (Afghan
tea) and made their initial plans.2 Nash         around 230 pounds, Dostum was decidedly
sized up the Afghan general — much bigger        the man in charge. Deep-voiced, with close-
than the average Afghan, he thought.
Approximately six-foot-two and around 230        cropped gray hair and a short beard, Dostum
pounds, Dostum was decidedly the man in
charge. Deep-voiced, with close-cropped          looked Nash in the eye as he spoke. He shook
gray hair and a short beard, Dostum looked       hands frequently, in a confident, friendly way.
Nash in the eye as he spoke. He shook
hands frequently, in a confident, friendly
way. Dostum said that he had enough hors-        from his horse on the narrow mountain
es to take six Americans with him to his         trails. Nash called out the first of several ad
headquarters several hours’ ride to the          hoc “horse SOPs” (standard operating proce-
west, and he announced that he would be          dures): “Keep your feet light in the stirrups,”
leaving in 15 minutes. Mules would bring         he ordered. Should anyone be thrown by a
their rucksacks later, he assured the Ameri-     runaway mount with his foot caught in a
cans. Nash and his executive officer quickly     stirrup, he added, the nearest man must
chose the men for his “split team.” He left      shoot the horse dead. “You’ll be killed if
his warrant officer and the other half of his    you’re dragged on this rocky ground,” he
detachment behind to establish a base camp       warned his team.
and to organize the force’s logistics with          Two days later, on Oct. 21, Dostum led
Dostum’s supply officer.                         Nash and his team from his mountain
   It was a coincidence that the captain cho-    headquarters camp to the front lines,
sen to ride with Dostum was the best horse-      where Nash proposed to begin aerial bom-
man in the 5th SF Group. The lean, sandy-        bardment of the Taliban forces. Oddly,
haired Nash was raised in north central          Nash noticed, Dostum seemed exceedingly
Kansas on his parents’ cattle ranch, and he      protective of him and his fellow Americans.
competed in collegiate rodeo in calf-roping      Besides surrounding them with his person-
while earning a degree in biology at Kansas      al bodyguards, Dostum would not allow the
State. Detachment 595 had initially been         Americans to approach closer than eight
sent to Uzbekistan on a different assign-        kilometers from the Taliban front lines.
ment, which had subsequently been can-              Nash’s team used its global-positioning-
celled. As a result, the team was left with-     satellite receiver to establish its position,
out a mission until it was selected to sup-      and then through the brownish haze, team
port General Dostum’s anti-Taliban force.        members plotted the azimuth and direc-
Intelligence staffs had not had the time to      tion to a far-off enemy bunker. A lone B-52

September 2002                                                                                     11
     Special Forces soldiers
     from A-detachment 595
     direct airstrikes in north-
     ern Afghanistan.




                                                                                              U.S. Army photo

     bomber turned 20-minute-long racetracks         Nash and his men were at the forward
     in the sky 20,000 feet overhead, dropping a     edge of the assault, riding with the attack
     single bomb on each pass.                       force and guiding precision bomb strikes
       The first bomb turned out to be the one       that would drive the Taliban from the
     that landed closest to the target. Subse-       Dari-a-Souf valley for the first time in five
     quent adjustments moved the strike of the       years.
     bombs a kilometer or more farther away,
     and in a different direction each time.
     Nash even saw Taliban troops gather               Dr. Kalev I. Sepp earned his Ph.D. in his-
     around to inspect one of the bomb craters       tory at Harvard University. He previously
     with impunity. Disappointed with the            served as an officer in Special Forces,
     results, Nash released the B-52 after its       Ranger, airborne, armored cavalry and
     sixth pass. Dostum, however, was buoyant.       artillery units stateside and overseas, and
     The translator explained, “You made an          he was an instructor at West Point. He
     aircraft appear and drop bombs. General         earned his Combat Infantryman Badge as
     Dostum is very happy.”                          a brigade adviser during the Salvadoran
       With each bomb that fell, rapport             civil war.
     improved between Dostum and his com-
     manders and the U.S. SF soldiers. Never-           Notes:
                                                      1 This article is based on an interview with Captain
     theless, to improve the effectiveness of fur-
                                                     Mike Nash (pseudonym), Company C, 3rd Battalion,
     ther bombing, Nash insisted to Dostum           5th SF Group, Fort Campbell, Ky., by the author, 26
     that he and his men be allowed to move          March 2002. Dari-a-Souf is pronounced “DAH-ree-ah
     closer to the front. Dostum objected. He        SOOF.”
                                                      2 Shai is pronounced “shy.”
     told Nash that he was certain that if any
     American were to be killed, the U.S. gov-
     ernment would withdraw all Americans
     from Afghanistan.
       Eventually, through discussions at com-
     manders’ meetings and through the per-
     sonal example of Americans under fire,
     Nash convinced the general that he did not
     need to fear an American withdrawal.
     When Dostum began his “big push” Nov. 5,

12                                                                                    Special Warfare
‘We Support to the Utmost’: The 528th
Special Operations Support Battalion
by Dr. Richard L. Kiper




                                                          from numerous exercises with special-

M
         ilitary theorist Baron Antoine
         Henri de Jomini defined logistics                operations forces enabled commanders and
         as “the art of moving armies.”1                  section leaders to begin planning for a
Since its reactivation in 1987, the 528th                 deployment of an unspecified period of
Special Operations Support Battalion has                  time.2
become expert in the art of providing logis-                 The 528th conducted initial coordination
tics support to special-operations soldiers               with United States Special Operations
who are deployed on exercises and mis-                    Command to familiarize the command
sions worldwide.                                          with the 528th’s capabilities. The 528th
   In October 2001, elements of Company                   also coordinated with the 5th Special
A, the 528th’s forward-support company,                   Forces Group to reconfirm the SF group’s
again deployed to support special-opera-                  support requirements. Again, OPSEC pre-
tions soldiers. On this occasion, however,                vented the 528th from being informed that
the soldiers were not on an exercise, but                 it would be supporting a bare-base opera-
were instead fighting the war on terrorism.               tion and from coordinating directly with
Because of considerations of operations                   the 10th Mountain Division, which would
security, or OPSEC, the 528th did not                     provide base security.
receive complete information about where                     The 528th’s mission would be to estab-
it would deploy or exactly what its mission               lish a ration point and a warehouse for
would be. However, the unit’s experience                  repair parts, to provide office supplies and
                                                          clothing for deployed special-operations
                                                          forces, and to establish a fuel point. Short-
                                                          ly before departure, the 528th’s leaders
                                                          were informed they would deploy to Karshi
                                                          Kanabad, Uzbekistan, and that there
                                                          would be no conventional support units to
                                                          assist the 528th once it was in country.3
                                                          The unit also received attachments to per-
                                                          form mortuary, medical and veterinary ser-
                                                          vices. Both the company staff and the bat-
                                                          talion staff had to constantly adjust the
                                                          deployment package, which was based not
                                        U.S. Army photo   on the anticipated requirements, but on
Members of the 528th Special Operations Support Bat-      the number of aircraft that would be avail-
talion assemble racks at Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan.      able to deploy the force.

September 2002                                                                                            13
                     Upon its arrival in theater, the unit         arrived daily by airlift.
                  immediately coordinated with the advance            The 528th’s reputation as a “can do” unit
                  party from the 160th Special Operations          quickly spread throughout the camp. Soon,
                  Aviation Regiment, or SOAR, and an Air           units that had deployed with little or no
                  Force colonel from the Joint Special Opera-      meals ready-to-eat, water, sleeping bags or
                  tions Task Force-North for the allocation of     winter clothing learned that the 528th
                  the unit’s real estate. Previous exercises had   would not turn away soldiers who needed
                  revealed the capabilities of the Air Force       support. Although the mission of the 528th
                  base-support package, and that knowledge         is to support special-operations units, the
                  enabled the 528th to tailor its support          battalion became, in essence, an area-sup-
                  accordingly. Previous exercises had also pro-    port unit. The only item that the unit tend-
                  duced close cooperation with other services’     ed to hoard was toilet paper, which was in
                  support forces, such as between Army and         very short supply. Leaders also had not
                  Air Force cooks. Staff Sergeant Manual Par-      anticipated the tremendous need for office
                  sons, a 528th food-service specialist, took      supplies, initial stocks of which soon ran
                  the responsibility for running the dining        low. The necessity of stocking deployment
                                                                   containers with more of those items is a
                                                                   lesson learned.
The 528th’s reputation as a ‘can do’ unit quickly                     Although some sections of the 528th had
                                                                   established relations with other SOF units
spread throughout the camp. Soon, units that had                   during exercises, not all of them had. For
deployed with little or no meals ready-to-eat, water,              example, the warehouse section had never
                                                                   met the S4 sections of either the 160th
sleeping bags or winter clothing learned that the                  SOAR or the 5th SF Group. This lack of
                                                                   familiarity could have been detrimental
528th would not turn away soldiers who needed                      except for the message that the 528th
support. Although the mission of the 528th is to                   made clear: It was supporting soldiers who
                                                                   were conducting dangerous operations.
support special-operations units, the battalion                    Staff Sergeant Celeste Holmes, the ware-
                                                                   house supervisor who would soon depart
became, in essence, an area-support unit.                          for Officer Candidate School, understood
                                                                   how critical the mission was. “We won’t
                  facility as a 24-hour operation.4 Soldiers       turn away a shooter,” she said.5
                  encountered such unforeseen difficulties as         Essential to the success of the support
                  contaminated soil, trash dumps, remnants         mission was the professionalism of the
                  of Soviet equipment, and an occasional           junior NCOs. Those soldiers, several of
                  cobra emerging from the latrines — that is,      whom had 8-10 years of experience in the
                  after latrines were constructed.                 battalion, were accustomed to deploying
                    A combat-arms soldier’s most valuable          and directing a team to support special-
                  tools are his weapon and his ammunition.         operations units. They were proficient in
                  528th soldiers quickly learned that their        taking the initiative, in thinking on their
                  most valuable tools were lumber and a            feet, and in taking responsibility for their
                  forklift. Fortunately, Company A had             actions. It was the NCOs who determined
                  deployed with plywood and other lumber           what was needed, and their decisions
                  that could be turned into floors and             allowed the unit to operate for two weeks
                  latrines. The forklift operator became one       in theater without resupply. They under-
                  of the most sought-after soldiers on the         stood how important their mission was at
                  entire installation. Forklift operators          the national level.
                  moved mountains of abandoned equipment              “We had little or no guidance, but lots of
                  and trash to make room to develop Camp           experience,” commented 1st Lieutenant
                  Stronghold Freedom. They moved the con-          Michael Bridgewater.6 OPSEC, country
                  tainers that became the warehouse, and           clearances, speed and the lack of environ-
                  they moved the pallets of equipment that         mental information forced the 528th to rely

14                                                                                             Special Warfare
on the experience it had gained from previ-              author, 4 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording,
ous exercises. Having the ability to antici-             U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort
                                                         Bragg, N.C.
pate requirements enabled the unit to
deploy with the items needed to assist in
the establishment of the base camp, to con-
struct facilities, and to provide logistics
support to units based at the camp.
  In early December 2001, most of the
528th’s Company A redeployed to Fort
Bragg. Its mission in Afghanistan was
assumed by the 507th Corps Support Com-
mand. Operation Enduring Freedom vali-
dated the operational concept that had led
to the activation of the battalion — a unit
capable of deploying quickly, operating
independently and supporting effectively
the Army’s special-operations forces.
  There is no greater compliment than one
given by one’s peers. The true measure of
how well the 528th Special Operations
Support Battalion accomplished its mis-
sion was best captured by Staff Sergeant
Timothy Matthews from the 3rd Battalion,
4th Psychological Operations Group: “The
528th is a class act.”7


   Notes:
 1 Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Novato,
Calif.: Presidio Press, 1992), 69.
 2 Captain Samuel Sims (pseudonym), Headquarters

and Main Support Company, 528th Special Operations
Support Battalion, interview by author, 6 March 2002,
Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U. S. Army Special
Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
 3 “After Action Review for Operation Enduring Free-

dom” (Fort Bragg, N.C.: Alpha Forward Support Com-
pany, 528th Support Battalion, 13 March 2002), 1.
 4 Staff Sergeant Manuel Parsons (pseudonym),

Headquarters and Main Support Company, 528th
Special Operations Support Battalion, interview by
author, 19 March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape record-
ing, U.S. Army Special Operations Command archive,
Fort Bragg, N.C.
 5 Staff Sergeant Celeste Holmes (pseudonym), Head-

quarters and Main Support Company, 528th Special
Operations Support Battalion, interview by author, 19
March 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S.
Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort
Bragg, N.C.
 6 1st Lieutenant Michael Bridgewater (pseudonym),

Company A, 528th Special Operations Support Bat-
talion, interview by author, 6 March 2002, Fort Bragg,
N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations
Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
 7 Staff Sergeant Timothy Matthews (pseudonym),

Headquarters and Service Company, 3rd Battalion,
4th Psychological Operations Group, interview by


September 2002                                                                                                     15
                              Uprising at Qala-i Jangi: The Staff of the 3/5th
                              SF Group
                              by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp




                                                                                           Operating Base, or FOB, 53.1 FOB 53,

                              W
                                        hen 300 soldiers of the al-Qaeda
                                        surrendered near the city of                       which was based in Mazar-e Sharif’s five-
                                        Mazar-e Sharif Nov. 24, 2001, nei-                 story Turkish School, was coordinating the
                              ther the chiefs of the Northern Alliance nor                 consolidation of the newly-liberated city.
                              their American advisers anticipated an                       The FOB commander was away, monitor-
                              uprising that would become one of the                        ing the Northern Alliance’s encirclement of
                              major battles of the war in Afghanistan.                     Konduz, a full day’s drive to the east.
                                                                                             Late on the afternoon of Nov. 24, trucks
                                                                                           carrying the 300 al-Qaeda prisoners arrived
                                                                                           at the 18th-century fortress of Qala-i Jangi,
                                                                                           10 kilometers west of Mazar, where the pris-
                                                                                           oners were interned under the guard of
                                                                                           about 100 troops of the Northern Alliance.
                                                                                             Built of adobe-style mud bricks, Qala-i
                                                                                           Jangi dominated the local landscape. More
                                                                                           than 300 meters in diameter, Qala-i Jangi
                                                                                           was of the style known as Vaubanian —
                                                                                           built with moats, ramparts, scarps and
                                                                                           counterscarps and parapets. Its walls, 10
                                                                                           meters high and 15 meters thick, were
                                                                                           topped with hundreds of firing ports. Dur-
                                                                                           ing the 20th century, the fortress had
                                                                                           served the Royal Afghan Army, the Soviet
                                                                                           Red Army, the Northern Alliance and the
                                                                                           Taliban. General Abdul Rashid Dostum
                                                                                           had reclaimed it as his military headquar-
                                                                                           ters only two weeks before, and U.S. Army
                                                                         U.S. Army photo   SF teams had briefly stayed inside the
U.S. Special Forces soldiers survey the damage to the Qala-i Jangi fortress                fortress before moving to the cleaner and
                                                                                           more spacious Turkish School, which was
                                The mass surrender seemed to be more                       deserted except for its caretaker and a few
                              good news for the two dozen United States                    instructors.
                              Special Forces soldiers from the 3rd Bat-                      That night, the FOB received a report of
                              talion, 5th SF Group, who staffed Forward                    trouble with the prisoners at Qala-i Jangi:
                                                                                           An al-Qaeda prisoner had killed two

16                                                                                                                     Special Warfare
                                                                                                             U.S. Army photo

guards and himself with a concealed hand        an armory in the southern compound, and         A view of the breach in
grenade. The next morning, the FOB              they were now as well-armed as the              the north wall of the
received news of another suicide-by-            Alliance forces who were trying to contain      Qala-i Jangi fortress. The
grenade that had killed three prisoners.        them inside the fortress. From the ram-         breach was created by an
                                                                                                errant U.S. Air Force
   At 1:45 p.m. Nov. 25, Joint Special Oper-    parts of the fort, the British squad poured
                                                                                                bomb on Nov. 26, 2001.
ations Task Force-North, located at Karshi      machine-gun fire into the south compound.
Kanabad, Uzbekistan, radioed FOB 53             The Americans directed aerial bombing
that the prisoners at Qala-i Jangi had          against the prisoners’ positions, while only
killed two Americans. The next report from      150 meters away, Northern Alliance troops
JSOTF-North was that one American had           struggled to contain the al-Qaeda. As dark-
been wounded and that another was               ness gathered, the rescue force withdrew to
trapped inside the fortress. Neither report     the Turkish School to plan the next day’s
was wholly correct.                             operations. Throughout the night, they
   As quickly as possible, the FOB opera-       heard gunfire and explosions coming from
tions officer formed an ad hoc rescue force.    the fortress.
A squad of British troops with a U.S. Navy        On Nov. 26, the rescue force, reinforced
attachment that had been operating in the       by a platoon of infantrymen from the 10th
Mazar-e Sharif area formed the rescue           Mountain Division and by additional SF
force’s assault element. Two U.S. Air Force     soldiers, returned to the fortress to contin-
intelligence officers, an Afghan interpreter,   ue the aerial bombardment that would
the SF battalion’s surgeon, and two SF          support ground assaults by the Northern
NCOs joined the rescue force to serve as        Alliance. The force was almost wiped out
medics, radiomen and translators.               when an errant 2,000-pound bomb pulver-
   The rescue force arrived at the main gate    ized a section of the massive fortress wall.
of Qala-i Jangi to the sounds of steady gun-    Eight American and British troops were
fire and explosions. Hiding inside the          wounded, and several Afghans were killed.
fortress headquarters in the north wall,        That night, two AC-130 Spectre gunships
the first American radioed that the prison-     orbited over Qala-i Jangi, raking the south-
ers had exploded a bomb, overpowered            ern compound with fire from 40- and 105-
their guards and seized control of the          mm cannon. Their last rounds detonated a
southern half of the fortress. He added that    hidden munitions dump, shaking the
he had last seen the second American in         entire fortress and hurling artillery shells
hand-to-hand combat with a swarm of al-         over the walls, while burning rockets shot
Qaeda prisoners, and that he did not            in all directions. From nearly 20 kilometers
believe that the captured American was          away, FOB members on the roof of the
still alive. The first American later escaped   Turkish School watched the ammo dump
over the fortress’s north wall.                 blaze fiercely all night.
   The al-Qaeda prisoners had ransacked           On the third day of the uprising, Alliance

September 2002                                                                                                          17
                           troops fought their way into the southern           from within. The al-Qaeda had not antici-
                           compound with the support of fire from              pated that the prisoners would be interned
                           tanks. Room-to-room fighting precluded              outside the city, or that the Alliance sol-
                           the use of airstrikes. The next morning,            diers, supported by American and British
                           pockets of al-Qaeda were still holding out,         forces and airstrikes, would be able to con-
                           but a squad of Alliance soldiers found the          tain and then defeat the uprising at Qala-i
                           second American’s body and delivered him            Jangi.
                           to the Anglo-American rescue force in the
                           northern compound. The body was trans-
                           ported to the Mazar-e Sharif airfield that             Notes:
                                                                                1 This article is based on interviews with members of
                           evening, for a flight to Uzbekistan.
                                                                               Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group, Fort
                             As the rotors of the MH-47 helicopter             Campbell, Ky., by the author, 22-23 March 2002.
                                                                                2 The American John Walker Lindh was in this

                                                                               group of recaptured prisoners, but he did not identify
                                                                               himself until a day later, when he was interned at
                                                                               Shebergan Prison, west of Mazar-e Sharif.




                                                             U.S. Army photo
Dead al-Qaeda and Tal-     turned, the U.S. and British soldiers held a
iban fighters litter the   brief service and rendered military honors
ground as Afghan sol-
                           to their fallen comrade. An SF sergeant
diers and members of
                           major produced an American flag that he
the 5th SF Group gather
inside the fortress of     had carried in Iraq during the Gulf War
Qala-i Jangi after four    and had brought to Afghanistan. Unable to
days of fighting.          drape it over the body because of the rotor
                           wash, he handed the folded flag to the two
                           officers who would escort the body on its
                           journey home, so that they could present it
                           to the American’s family.
                              The next day, Nov. 29, the last pocket of
                           al-Qaeda resistance in Qala-i Jangi surren-
                           dered. The 86 holdouts were the only sur-
                           vivors of the 300 who had entered the
                           fortress six days before.2 Intelligence
                           reports later revealed that the mass sur-
                           render had been a deception to get the al-
                           Qaeda troops inside Mazar-e Sharif, so
                           that they could retake the district capital

18                                                                                                              Special Warfare
‘Of Vital Importance’: The 4th PSYOP Group
by Dr. Richard L. Kiper




                                                pines in support of OEF-Philippines and

I
    n 1961, Secretary of the Army Frank
    Pace wrote: “The psychological warfare      the Country Team. Tactical PSYOP forces
    program is of vital importance to           also supported TF 1-187 during Operation
national security and defense.”1 Shortly        Anaconda in the Shah-i Khot region.
after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,       All PSYOP plans and programs required
that importance became evident as the 4th       policy-level approval from both the Assis-
Psychological Operations Group, or 4th          tant Secretary of Defense for Special Opera-
POG, began planning for anticipated psy-        tions and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD-
chological operations, or PSYOP, in             SO/LIC, and the Under Secretary of Defense
Afghanistan. The mission would be to pro-       for Policy, or USD-P. Once the overarching
vide operational and tactical level PSYOP       plans and programs were approved, a proto-
that would undermine the terrorists and         type of each individual PSYOP product was
separate them from their support systems.       sent to the commander in chief of USCENT-
  Although teams from the 4th POG are           COM for approval. The product was then
constantly deployed in the United States        submitted to ASD-SO/LIC for policy review.
Central Command, or USCENTCOM,                  Once it was approved, it was released for
region, there were no PSYOP teams               dissemination.2
focused on Afghanistan at the time of the          If the product was a digital radio pro-
terrorist attacks. But within weeks,            gram or a video program, it was sent into
PSYOP teams were ready to deploy into           theater by satellite for local broadcast.
the specific area of operations in support of   Once printed products received final
Operation Enduring Freedom, or OEF.             approval, they could be printed at Fort
  The 8th PSYOP Battalion established a         Bragg or they could be transmitted digital-
Joint Psychological Operations Task Force,      ly to a forward-deployed print facility for
or JPOTF, for all PSYOP within the area of      production. So far, approximately 135 sol-
operations. Different elements of the 4th       diers — print personnel, staff augmentees
POG, as well as mobilized Army                  and a tactical PSYOP company — have
Reservists, provided tactical PSYOP forces      been mobilized from the Army Reserve to
to augment special-operations forces, or        assist in support of OEF.
SOF, and conventional forces. These                Critical to PSYOP planning is target-
PSYOP elements deployed not only to             audience analysis, which is provided by
Afghanistan, but also to other forward          civilian analysts in the regionally oriented
areas. PSYOP elements deployed to Guan-         strategic-studies detachments of the 4th
tanamo Bay, Cuba, to support the debrief-       POG’s Research and Analysis Division.
ing of captured terrorists and to the Philip-   These cultural experts, most of whom hold

September 2002                                                                                 19
               Ph.D.s, use the extensive research            leaflets informed the people which chan-
               resources and contacts at their disposal to   nels to tune to for U.S. PSYOP-produced
               develop themes and to identify potentially    programs.3 Initially, Commando Solo was
               effective target audiences. For example,      able to broadcast only 10 hours a day, but
               hard-core al-Qaeda or Taliban members         once Special Operations Media Systems
               might not be affected by a PSYOP cam-         Broadcast, or SOMS-B, radio stations were
               paign, whereas villagers who have suffered    established in Afghanistan, programs
               at the hands of the repressive regime         could be broadcast 24 hours a day.
               would be viable targets. Included in the         Ensuring an adequate supply of native
               supporting PSYOP plan developed by the        linguists has been a challenging problem.
               JPOTF were a number of themes, among          Because of the huge volume of work, the
               them ones that sought to encourage sup-       4th POG had to augment its Pashto and
               port for the Partnership of Nations forces;   Dari speakers by hiring contract linguists
               undermine Taliban/al-Qaeda; emphasize         who could translate proposed leaflets and
               the inevitability of Taliban/al-Qaeda         radio programs and could serve as radio
               defeat; rally support for the Afghan Inter-   announcers. The Army has the only com-
               im Authority; promote the capture of          prehensive military PSYOP capability and
               Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda lead-      thus must perform the lion’s share of the
               ers by offering rewards; and strengthen       work in executing a PSYOP plan. Air Force
               Afghan-U.S. friendship. Once the plan and     capabilities are limited, but they include
                                                             an important broadcast platform (Com-
                                                             mando Solo aircraft) and the means of
Intelligence sources reported that the                       delivering leaflets on target. The Navy has
PSYOP campaign was a key factor in the sur-                  one shipboard system and one land-based
                                                             system, neither of which was available for
render of Konduz. Additional feedback indi-                  Operation Enduring Freedom.4
                                                                The airborne assault on the airstrip
cated that PSYOP leaflets and radio broad-                   southwest of Kandahar by the Rangers
casts were important in leading the Afghan                   was filmed by a combat camera team. Two
                                                             tactical PSYOP loudspeaker teams also
population to withdraw its support from the                  accompanied the Rangers on the jump.
                                                             Immediately following the operation, the
Taliban and especially from al-Qaeda.                        video footage was turned over to PSYOP
                                                             forces in theater, who used their digital
               themes were completed, specific products      video distribution system to send it to the
               were developed. The entire process draws      4th POG headquarters at Fort Bragg. From
               heavily on the knowledge, analytical acu-     Fort Bragg, it was immediately transmit-
               ity, and cultural empathy of Ph.D.-level      ted to Washington, where it was reviewed
               area experts as well as military PSYOP        and then released to the national media.
               specialists.                                  Digital PSYOP technology made it possible
                  Within a few weeks after Sept. 11, two     for the major news networks to show the
               liaison officers deployed with the 5th Spe-   footage shortly after it had been recorded.5
               cial Forces Group; they were soon followed       Measuring the overall effectiveness of a
               by tactical PSYOP forces, a deployable        PSYOP campaign presents a challenge
               print center, and a satellite downlink for    because it is difficult to precisely ascertain
               radio programs. In a matter of a few          the relationship between a leaflet or a
               months, more than 75 million leaflets were    radio program and the actions taken by an
               dropped from B-52s and C-130s, more than      individual or a group. Some effect mea-
               3,000 hours of radio programs were broad-     surements are based on anecdotal evi-
               cast by Commando Solo, and more than          dence. For example, Afghans reported that
               7,500 hand-held radios were distributed by    they enjoyed the radio programs because
               air drop and by tactical PSYOP teams          they broadcast music, and it was the first
               operating with SF A-detachments. Certain      time the Afghans had been permitted to

20                                                                                       Special Warfare
hear music in six years. The broadcast                  1951, Record Group 319, National Archives.
                                                          2 Dr. Darren Curtis, Strategic Studies Detachment,
music was selected by POG area experts;
                                                        4th POG, interview by author, 15 April 2002, Fort
changes in the music programming were                   Bragg, N.C., transcript, U.S. Army Special Operations
made based on feedback provided by the                  Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
PSYOP teams accompanying the SF A-                        3 Keith B. Richburg and William Branigin, “U.S.

detachments. Intelligence sources report-               Bombs Aid Rebels in North; Propaganda Campaign
ed that the PSYOP campaign was a key                    Intensifies,” Washington Post, 8 November 2001, 13.
                                                          4 Andrea Stone, “Soldiers Deploy on Mental Terrain,”
factor in the surrender of Konduz. Addi-                USA Today, 3 October 2001, 7.
tional feedback indicated that PSYOP                      5 Staff Sergeant James Turner (pseudonym), Com-
leaflets and radio broadcasts were impor-               pany B, 9th Battalion, 4th POG, interview by author,
tant in leading the Afghan population to                3 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S.
withdraw its support from the Taliban and               Army Special Operations Command archive, Fort
                                                        Bragg, N.C.
from al-Qaeda.6                                           6 Curtis interview.
  The 4th POG employs personnel from                      7 Major Henry Blackaby (pseudonym), Psychological
the rank of colonel to that of private; their           Development Company, 8th Battalion, 4th POG, inter-
education levels vary from high-school                  view by author, 17 April 2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape
graduate to Ph.D. The PSYOP products in                 recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command
                                                        archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Afghanistan are reviewed by the Office of                 8 Letter, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Psycho-
the Secretary of Defense; they are distrib-             logical Warfare Division, “Operations in Western
uted by U.S. Air Force aircraft; they are               European Campaign,” October 1945, 1, Record Group
received by people living in a country that             319, National Archives.
has for years been dominated by foreign
invaders and oppressive rulers; and they
are scrutinized by the American media.
  Major Henry Blackaby, commander of a
psychological development company, recog-
nizes the seriousness of the PSYOP cam-
paign and the level of scrutiny that it
receives. Leaflets and radio broadcasts are
a critical element in Operation Enduring
Freedom. All of the links in the chain are
important, but according to Blackaby, “The
real heroes are the young troops who devel-
op the products.”7
  Following World War II, General Dwight
Eisenhower stated, “The exact contribution
of psychological warfare toward the final
victory cannot, of course, be measured.” He
added, “However, I am convinced that the
expenditure of men and money in wielding
the spoken and written word was an
important contributing factor in under-
mining the enemy’s will to resist.”8 There is
reason to believe that Eisenhower’s assess-
ment will be equally valid when the final
history of Operation Enduring Freedom is
written.


   Notes:
 1 Department of the Army, Office of the Secretary of
the Army, Subject: Importance of Army-Wide Support
of the Psychological Warfare Programs, 2 February



September 2002                                                                                                   21
                         ‘Have Tools, Will Travel’: Company D, 109th
                         Aviation Battalion
                         by James A. Schroder




                                                                          ducting its monthly drill, Jackson informed

                         T
                                he initial success of the war on ter-
                                rorism depended heavily upon the          the unit’s personnel to be prepared for a
                                availability of assets from Army Spe-     probable activation and to make arrange-
                         cial Operations Aviation, or ARSOA — the         ments for deployment. The call came the
                         organization that could infiltrate special-      following week, and the unit reported to
                         operations forces throughout Afghanistan.        the 160th’s facilities at Fort Campbell, Ky.,
                            Helicopter maintenance was key to that        and at Hunter Army Airfield, Ga., Nov. 12.
                         success, and maintenance requires a large           Company D’s relationship with the 160th
                         amount of resources — especially person-         SOAR was a new one.1 Although the 109th
                         nel. To meet the great demand for aviation       was being activated for the first time in
                                                    assets,     ARSOA     more than 30 years, extensive training had
                                                    sought help from      left the company well-prepared. The unit’s
                                                    the Army National     readiness rating was more than 90 percent
                                                    Guard. Company        for people and equipment, a notable
                                                    D, 109th Aviation,    achievement in the National Guard.
                                                    an aviation inter-       To prevent any delay in delivering urgently
                                                    mediate mainte-       needed mechanics, the 160th accepted full
                                                    nance, or AVIM,       responsibility for the administrative require-
                                                    company that is       ments of activating the National Guard unit.
                                                    capable of provid-    The 109th’s post-mobilization training would
                                                    ing maintenance       be performed as time permitted. Major Jack-
                                                    expertise for the     son and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Simp-
                                                    various models of     son,2 the SOAR’s executive officer, worked
                                    U.S. Army photo
                                                    helicopters organic   together to develop a pioneering plan that
Mechanics from Compa-    to the 160th Special Operations Aviation         would capitalize on the experience and the
ny D, 109th Aviation,    Regiment, was uniquely suited to augment         capabilities of Company D, which consisted of
work on helicopters of
                         the 160th’s maintenance resources.               mechanics experienced at working on Chi-
the 160th SOAR at Fort
                            The maintenance company, composed of          nooks, Blackhawks and Kiowas. Although doc-
Campbell, Ky.
                         personnel from Nebraska and Iowa under           trine calls for an AVIM company to remain
                         the direction of Major Martin Jackson, a         separate from its supported unit, the newly
                         former CH-46 pilot in the Marine Corps           established plan divided Company D’s person-
                         and a veteran of the Gulf War, had com-          nel into four contact teams that were assigned
                         pleted a three-week annual-training rota-        to the 160th’s 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions and
                         tion in Germany Sept. 15, 2001. During the       to the regiment’s training company.
                         weekend of Oct. 20, while the unit was con-         Each contact team rapidly assimilated

22                                                                                                    Special Warfare
the fast pace of the 160th’s maintenance
sections. Although they required some
familiarization and training on special-
operations helicopters, the 109th mechanics
brought their talent and years of experience
to the maintenance effort, and they prompt-
ly established credibility. Within a month,
the Company D mechanics were working
long hours, on multiple shifts, side by side
with their Night Stalker contemporaries.
This teamwork enabled the 160th and the
109th to complete helicopter phase mainte-
nance in as few as 28 days, a remarkable
feat. Both the National Guard and SOAR
personnel benefited from the relationship:
The experienced Guard members passed
their knowledge to the younger mechanics,
and the SOAR personnel shared their
knowledge of special-operations aircraft
with the Guard members.                                                                                            U.S. Army photo

  Company D was also integrated into           Success was achieved as a direct result of pio-         Members of Company D,
Green Platoon, the 160th SOAR’s training-      neering ideas, highly competent personnel,              109th Aviation, negotiate
and-selection course. More than 60 soldiers    specialized training and a commitment to                obstacles during training
from Company D completed the course            maintenance. The Guard soldiers demon-                  with the 160th’s Green
                                                                                                       Platoon.
within the first six months of their activa-   strated the same work ethic and dedication
tion. Their accomplishment further             to mission accomplishment that the Night
increased the credibility of the Guard         Stalkers do, and they provided continuity in
members. Green Platoon is a prerequisite       the maintenance sections during the rotation
for deployment overseas, and the gradu-        of 160th personnel overseas. They enthusias-
ates provided a source of mechanics for        tically attended Green Platoon and energeti-
potential overseas deployment. So far,         cally accepted all training. The 160th SOAR
approximately 30 mechanics of the 109th        was able to meet the high demand for its heli-
have deployed overseas to Afghanistan,         copters because of its joint enterprise with
Korea or the Philippines. One soldier from     Company D.
the 109th who had a background in law-
enforcement excelled in the course and was
selected to be an instructor because of his       James A. Schroder earned his MBA at
special background and capabilities.           Murray State University. He previously
  This working association was unique in       served as an NCO and as a warrant officer in
another respect. Company D arrived with        Special Forces, military intelligence and avia-
14 female mechanics, an unfamiliar sight       tion units stateside and overseas, and he com-
for the 160th’s mechanics. Female soldiers     pleted Ranger training and Russian lan-
are precluded by regulation from being         guage training. He earned two Air Medals
assigned to active-duty special-operations     piloting CH-47D Chinook helicopters in the
aviation units as mechanics or as crew         Gulf War, and he piloted MH-47Es for seven
members. The 14 female mechanics in the        years as a member of the 160th Special Oper-
109th had the exclusive opportunity to         ations Aviation Regiment.
serve in a unit that is outside the reach of
their active-duty counterparts.                   Notes:
                                                1 This article is based on an interview with Major
  The mutually beneficial association
                                               Martin Jackson (pseudonym), commander of Compa-
between the 160th SOAR and Company D,          ny D, 109th Aviation Battalion, by the author and Dr.
109th Aviation, greatly contributed to the     Chuck Briscoe, 24 April 2002, at Fort Campbell, Ky.
enormous helicopter maintenance effort.         2 “Edward Simpson” is a pseudonym.



September 2002                                                                                                                23
     The Campaign in Transition:
     From Conventional to Unconventional War
     by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp




                                                        tuns who constitute the majority of the Afghan

     U
              nexpectedly,       the      war     in
              Afghanistan accelerated ahead of          population below Kabul. But events would soon
              the estimated timetable prepared          outstrip these assumptions.
     by the staffs of the United States Central            In both the north and the center of
     Command and its special-operations units.          Afghanistan, the local warlords went on the
        As had been planned, U.S. Army Special          offensive as soon as the first SF troops stepped
     Forces detachments flew into Afghanistan           off their helicopters to join them. Unbe-
     beginning in October 2001. The winter was to       knownst to the Americans, the Northern
     have been a “Valley Forge” experience for the      Alliance was ready to begin conventional-style
     supposedly beleaguered Afghan Northern             maneuver warfare against its Taliban adver-
     Alliance. SF detachments were to spend             saries. With the support of aerial bombing and
     those cold, snowy months in the valleys of the     other aid, including air-dropped arms and
     rugged Hindu Kush, drilling the loose collec-      ammunition, the Northern Alliance took the
     tion of warrior bands into a well-trained and      initiative — sometimes on their own, some-
     well-equipped army. The commander of the           times prompted by their new American advis-
     5th Special Forces Group would employ his          ers.1 Deft U.S. diplomatic maneuvering gar-
     unit as Joint Special Operations Task Force-       nered bases for American and coalition forces
     North to carry out this effort. He hoped that      in Pakistan and in Uzbekistan, and simulta-
     one of the northern towns, maybe two, might        neously isolated the Taliban from their former
     be taken from the enemy before the cold            sources of money and aid.
     forced the traditional winter hiatus from mil-        In rapid succession, city after city fell to the
     itary operations.                                  Northern Alliance. First, the Alliance took
        Around April or May 2002, this new anti-Tal-    Mazar-e Sharif, the second largest city in
     iban army was to begin a spring offensive to       Afghanistan, on Nov. 10. The towns of Bamian
     secure the northern tier of Afghan cities. The     in the center,Taloquan in the north, and Herat
     offensive would also open roads into Pakistan      in the west surrendered within days, and Kon-
     and Uzbekistan. Those roads would facilitate       duz was besieged. Then on Nov. 13, in a single
     the movement of supplies overland and possi-       day, Northern Alliance forces advanced from
     bly facilitate the entrance of U.S. combat divi-   the trenchlines at Bagram into Kabul, which
     sions into Afghanistan. Then, perhaps later        had been hurriedly abandoned by the Taliban.
     that year, a general offensive toward Kabul        The next day, Jalalabad fell. Just before
     could be launched. Operations in the southern      Thanksgiving, the Taliban forces at Konduz
     region around Kandahar were thought to be          capitulated.
     problematic. Strong anti-Taliban leaders had          On Thanksgiving Day, the first major
     not yet been identified among the ethnic Pash-     U.S. conventional ground forces arrived in

24                                                                                      Special Warfare
Afghanistan. Two U.S. Marine battalions           The emerging concern was the possibility of
occupied a dirt airstrip in the desert 80       a major human disaster in Afghanistan,
kilometers from Kandahar, where a               brought on by a shattered infrastructure, a
Ranger task force had conducted a para-         million refugees, and the coming of winter.
chute raid in October. The Marines relocat-     Civil Affairs units and engineer units were
ed three weeks later to the Kandahar air-       hastily deployed into the theater of war to
port, which had been captured Dec. 1 by         begin recovery efforts and disaster-relief oper-
Pashtun forces and U.S. SF troops.              ations. Humanitarian aid of every description,
   In the south, two anti-Taliban Pashtun       promised by the signatories of the December
leaders finally emerged. Aided by SF            2001 Brussels Accord, would have to be airlift-
teams, they marched their forces toward         ed into the country. In addition, the multifari-
Kandahar, the “spiritual capital of the Tal-    ous agencies that needed to oversee the distri-
iban movement.” One of those two men was        bution and application of the aid would have
Hamid Karzai, who was chosen to head the        to accompany it, and they would have to be
Afghan Interim Authority at the Bonn            protected and supported as well.
Conference Dec. 3. He narrowly escaped
being killed by an errant U.S. Air Force
guided bomb two days later, as his forces       It became evident that the campaign was not going
battled the Taliban on the northern             to transition neatly into a post-conflict paradigm of
approach to Kandahar. Gul Agha Sherzai’s
Pashtuns, attacking up the southern route,      peacekeeping forces overseeing nation-building
won the race to Kandahar Dec. 7. Every
major Afghan city and town was now liber-       projects; rather, the campaign was becoming more
ated from Taliban control.                      like a counterinsurgency. The task of creating a
   American and allied Afghan forces
destroyed the entire Taliban government         new, multiethnic Afghan National Army to prose-
and army in Afghanistan in two months.
Some observers had predicted that the           cute this new campaign fell to the soldiers of the
campaign might take two years.2                 3rd SF Group and to French mountain troops.
   The focus of the Afghan war now shifted
to the east, along the Pakistan border. While
thousands of Taliban soldiers simply               On Dec. 24, 2001, the first elements of the
changed allegiance to the victorious side —     Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations
a long-established Afghan tradition — and       Task Force arrived in Kabul. A week before,
thousands more lay dead, other thousands        the International Security Assistance Force,
were retreating to sanctuaries and strong-      or ISAF, had been established under British
holds in eastern Afghanistan and in west-       command, to serve as a peacekeeping force.
ern Pakistan. To cut them off, the coalition    These efforts would be essential in stabiliz-
air forces bombed the caves of Tora Bora.       ing Afghanistan against any Taliban resur-
Meanwhile, the Afghan soldiers — various-       gence, or in preventing a new civil war
ly called the Anti-Taliban Forces, Opposi-      among the Afghan warlords who had been
tion Group Forces, and the Afghan Military      restored to power in their various provinces.
Forces — advanced into the mountains to            The number of U.S. military personnel in
finish off the enemy. This effort had little    Afghanistan continued to grow from the
result. SF teams also established bases         hundred-plus special-operations-forces sol-
around the eastern town of Khowst, and          diers who had fought the initial battle for
various special-operations units conducted      Afghanistan, to nearly 5,000 troops. U.S.
direct-action raids inside Afghanistan in       Army infantry battalions arrived in Febru-
search of fugitive al-Qaeda and Taliban         ary 2002 to replace the Marines. Detach-
leaders. Preparations were made to assist       ments from the National Guard’s 2nd Bat-
Pakistani army units in this hunt on their      talion, 19th SF Group, and the Regular
side of the border, but the operation never     Army’s 3rd SF Group arrived to take over
came to fruition.                               from departing 5th SF Group teams. The

September 2002                                                                                     25
     Chinook helicopter company from the 160th            Afghan national-guard battalions to provide
     Special Operations Aviation Regiment’s 3rd           “internal security” for the new government.
     Battalion arrived to relieve the 2nd Battal-            The initial phase of the war was essentially
     ion’s initial Chinook contingent. The 3rd            conventional in nature, notwithstanding the
     Ranger Battalion, after conducting its sec-          fact that it was fought by Afghan irregulars
     ond parachute raid in November, rotated its          and U.S. special-operations forces. Paradoxi-
     companies in and out of Afghanistan to sup-          cally, once the enemy was beaten in open com-
     port continuing countrywide operations.              bat and had transitioned to guerrilla warfare,
        The 5th SF Group members who were man-            the U.S. Central Command placed convention-
     ning Joint Special Operations Task Force-            al division and corps commanders in overall
     North at Karshi Kanabad, Uzbekistan, pre-            charge of military operations in Afghanistan.
     pared to transfer their missions and remain-            American troop strength in country
     ing forces to JSOTF-South at Kandahar, and           reached 7,000, and the allied troops in the
     to return to the U.S. at the end of February. In     ISAF, manned by 18 nations, numbered near-
     turn, JSOTF-South, constituted from the              ly 5,000. Subsequent large-unit operations by
     headquarters of Naval Special Warfare                U.S., British and Canadian soldiers and spe-
     Group-One, was likewise scheduled to close           cial-reconnaissance units found that Taliban
     down on March 30 and would hand-off its              fighters were re-entering Afghanistan from
     operations to the recently-formed Combined           Pakistan. The “Loya Jirga” — the grand
     Joint Special Operations Task Force-                 national council — was scheduled for June,
     Afghanistan, or CJSOTF-Afghanistan, which            the same month during which the Afghans
     was building a new base camp at Bagram Air-          were to choose their new post-Taliban gov-
     field. Two hundred soldiers from the 3rd SF          ernment. As Afghan infighting grew in scope
     Group, and 100 soldiers from the National            and in intensity, and as intelligence sources
     Guard’s 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group, staffed        reported that the Taliban forces were re-
     the CJSOTF-Afghanistan headquarters.                 grouping, a successful outcome of the Loya
        At the same time, U.S. and coalition military     Jirga was not assured. The campaign to seal
     staffs planned a brigade-size tactical opera-        the military victory with political, social and
     tion to root out Taliban and al-Qaeda sur-           economic stability was a long way from con-
     vivors hiding in the rugged escarpments              clusion. This meant that the work of Army
     around the isolated Shah-i-Khot valley. Code-        special-operations forces in Afghanistan was
     named Operation Anaconda, the sweep was              far from over as well.
     intended to flush its quarry toward ambushes
     and blocking positions that would be set
     around the valley. When the action began, the            Notes:
                                                           1  U.S. Central Command, Transcripts, “Informal Press
     stubborn and effective enemy defense of the
                                                          Opportunity with Rear Admiral Craig Quigley, 30 Octo-
     Shah-i-Khot took the American commanders             ber 2001.” “We’re providing weapons and ammunition
     by surprise. Planned as a two-day operation,         to a variety of opposition groups in a variety of ways.”
     Anaconda extended into two weeks of heavy            (http://www.uscentcom.mil/       news/     transcripts/
     bombing and hard fighting, with significant          20011030.html).
                                                            2 U.S. Central Command, Transcripts, “Gen. Franks
     losses of troops and aircraft.
                                                          Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, 27
        The Afghanistan campaign was taking an            February 2002.” Gen. Tommy Franks, Commander,
     unexpected turn. It became evident that the          USCENTCOM: “Combining the resources and capabil-
     campaign was not going to transition neatly          ities of the Defense Department, Central Intelligence
     into a post-conflict paradigm of peacekeeping        Agency, and other agencies of the Federal government
                                                          has produced results [in Afghanistan] no single entity
     forces overseeing nation-building projects;
                                                          could have achieved.” (http://www.uscentcom.mil/
     rather, the campaign was becoming more like a        news/ transcripts/20020227.htm).
     counterinsurgency. The task of creating a new,
     multiethnic Afghan National Army to prose-
     cute this new campaign fell to the soldiers of the
     3rd SF Group and to French mountain troops.
     In the capital of Kabul, the Germans schooled a
     national police force, and the British trained

26                                                                                           Special Warfare
Change of Mission: ODA 394
by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp




                                                Sergeant Ty McFadden to build on the

T
       he “fog and friction of war” so often
       cited in military theory became a        company’s two-day initial training pro-
       reality for the 12 soldiers of Special   gram.5 The men of Three-Nine-Four re-
Forces Operational Detachment A-394             equipped themselves with sledges and pry
soon after their arrival in Afghanistan.1       bars, and they reconfigured their body
   At the “Rose Garden,” a former Taliban       armor and weapons for combat within the
military training camp near Kandahar, Cap-      confines of the mud-walled structures com-
tain Jed Samuels, the leader of the SF team,    mon to the hinterlands of Afghanistan.
received his first change in mission from his      Then, after almost two weeks of intense
battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel         rehearsals, Three-Nine-Four received a
Terry Sanders.2 “Three-Nine-Four,” which is     warning order to move against a suspected
assigned to Company C, 3rd Battalion, 3rd       target. But the target was not a building —
SF Group, had come to the theater of war        it was several square kilometers of moun-
Feb. 8, 2002, equipped with four ground-        tainous terrain. Samuels’ team was to be
mobility vehicles (armed “Humvee” trucks)       part of a coalition task group of units from
and prepared to conduct mounted special-        New Zealand, Canada, Norway and Den-
reconnaissance and direct-action missions.3     mark that would identify caves for destruc-
   Now, as Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th        tion by aerial bombing. But as the mission
SF Group, was preparing to redeploy to the      start-time approached, Three-Nine-Four
United States, Company C, 3rd Battalion,        and SF A-Detachment 391 were redesig-
3rd SF Group, would instead take over the       nated the quick-reaction force, or QRF, for
departing unit’s mission of sensitive site      the allied forces, and Hensen and his com-
exploitation, or SSE. The Company C com-        pany headquarters would serve as the
mander, Major Mickey Hensen, directed           QRF’s command element.6
Sergeant Major Rudy Madden and Master              Leaving their vehicles behind, the members
Sergeant Gregg Corr to immediately train        of the QRF flew to Bagram Airfield, the aban-
the company in close-quarter battle, or         doned Soviet base north of Kabul. While wait-
CQB — fighting inside buildings.4               ing for orders, the QRF spent the night freez-
   The training in CQB was not refresher        ing on the cement floor of the only available
training. Company C normally trained for        facility — a bombed-out hangar.
mounted desert reconnaissance, its special-        The next morning, Madden asked Com-
ty. The team members had to teach them-         mand Sergeant Major Marc Lorenzo, the
selves to perform the advanced CQB tasks.       senior NCO in the 10th Mountain Division,
Samuels turned to his second-in-command,        if the 10th could feed the SF teams, which
Warrant Officer Max Gorley, and to Master       were still huddled in the hangar on QRF

September 2002                                                                                   27
                standby.7 The SF soldiers were unshaven,       advanced operating base, or AOB, had just
                some with full beards, and they were wear-     been established. Later that night, Three-
                ing an assortment of jackets and pants.        Nine-Four was in the 10th Mountain Divi-
                “Come with me,” Lorenzo said, and he led       sion’s tactical operations center, receiving a
                them to a mess line where he ordered the       grim intelligence update. Five Apache
                servers to give the SF soldiers all they       attack helicopters had been badly shot up,
                could eat for breakfast. Later, after the      and A-detachment 372 had taken casual-
                mission was completed and the QRF stood        ties, including Warrant Officer Stanley L.
                down, Three-Nine-Four was ordered back         Harriman, who had been killed while lead-
                to Kandahar to prepare for a major new         ing an Afghan truck convoy to the battle.
                operation code-named “Anaconda.”               About 25 soldiers from the 10th Mountain
                  The nature of 394’s new mission was spe-     Division had been wounded, and soldiers
                cial reconnaissance, and the team re-fitted    from the 10th were still trapped near their
                and rehearsed to establish clandestine         landing zones in the Shah-i-Khot valley.
                observation posts in enemy-held territory      “Not a good first day,” commented one of
                on two rocky mountaintops. But after two       the SF NCOs. Ominously, the C-130 trans-
                days of preparation, Three-Nine-Four was       port that was flying the team to Bagram
                ordered to stand down to allow Danish and      was also carrying an empty metal coffin for
                German troops to conduct the operation.        Harriman.
                                                                  The unexpectedly intense fighting had
Because the team had left almost all of its                    forced the commitment of the QRFs from
                                                               the 10th Mountain Division, the 101st Air-
equipment behind at Kandahar, it was now                       borne Division and Joint Special Operations
having difficulty gathering the gear it needed                 Task Force-South. At Bagram, every avail-
                                                               able Australian, German and American unit
for the mission. Australian troops operating                   was urgently mustered to create another
                                                               viable reaction force. The team members
from the same base were astounded at the                       now heard troubling rumors about an
team’s lack of extreme-cold-weather clothing;                  American who had fallen out of a helicopter
                                                               into enemy hands, and of one, maybe more,
‘You blokes’ll perish up there,’ they warned.                  Chinook helicopters that had been shot
                                                               down by enemy ground fire. After two days
                The succession of unexecuted missions was      on standby, Samuels’ team was detached
                wearing on the morale of the SF soldiers,      from the ad hoc QRF and told to prepare for
                who were eager to get into the fight. The      a reconnaissance mission.
                biggest action of the war so far was about        Three-Nine-Four was to land at night by
                to begin, and they were being held in          helicopter. The team was to climb to an
                reserve at the Kandahar “Rose Garden.”         observation site that was 10,400 feet above
                   On D-Day of the operation, as the SF sol-   sea level and blanketed by an estimated
                diers listened to the various American and     three feet of snow. From the jagged escarp-
                allied commanders sending orders and infor-    ment, it would overlook two trails on which
                mation over the radio, it became apparent to   Taliban troops were believed to travel.
                them that Anaconda was not going as               Because the team had left almost all of its
                planned. The radio chatter indicated unex-     equipment behind at Kandahar, it was now
                pectedly strong enemy resistance and           having difficulty gathering the gear it need-
                numerous U.S. casualties from the fire of      ed for the mission. Australian troops operat-
                mortars and machine guns.                      ing from the same base were astounded at
                   The team received a terse message: “You     the team’s lack of extreme-cold-weather
                have one hour to pack your rucksacks for a     clothing; “You blokes’ll perish up there,”
                dismounted mission.” Details would be pro-     they warned. Generously, they loaned the
                vided later, they were told. Meanwhile, an     Americans snowshoes, walking poles, and
                aircraft was waiting to fly them back to       snow-camouflage clothing. The team medic,
                Bagram airfield, where Company C’s new         Sergeant First Class Jason “J.D.” Thurman,

28                                                                                         Special Warfare
coaxed the airfield’s Spanish military hospi-    its gear — just in time to get orders from
tal into giving him morphine autoinjectors.      its new commander, Lieutenant Colonel
Staff Sergeant Jake Millett traded boxes of      Carl Hooper of 1st Battalion, 5th SF
rations to the Aussies for spare “double-A”      Group, to whom the team had been
and D-cell batteries.8                           attached.12
  Staff Sergeant Jerry Rawlins was partic-          When the second push of Anaconda
ularly interested in acquiring a Barrett         began, Three-Nine-Four would not be left
M-82A1 .50-caliber sniper rifle.9 Given the      behind. The team was elated to learn that
vast open spaces in Afghanistan, many tar-       it was going into combat. The objective
gets would be visible beyond the 800-meter       would be the rocky massif west of the
range of the team’s Remington M-24 model         Shah-i-Khot valley called the “Whale.” The
7.62 mm rifles. While still in the U.S., Rawl-   men of Three-Nine-Four would guide
ins had requested one of the Barrett “fifty-     bands of Afghan mercenary troops to fight
cals” from the joint operational stocks at the   religious fanatics on some of the most inac-
Lexington Bluegrass Arsenal, but he was          cessible terrain on Earth, at altitudes that
told that the entire inventory had already       would leave them gasping for air as they
been requisitioned. However, by trading his      climbed into the battle over rocks and
extra 7.62 mm match-grade cartridges to a        snow. The “fog and friction of war” that had
10th Mountain Division reconnaissance pla-       held the team out of combat now drew it in.
toon, Rawlins gained an introduction to the      This time, for the first time since arriving
chief of the division’s explosives-ordnance-     in Afghanistan a month ago, Three-Nine-
disposal unit — who had a Barrett to spare.      Four’s mission would not be changed.
Rawlins signed for the rifle and carried it
into the Anaconda battle.10
  By midnight, the team members were                 Notes:
ready, and they settled down for some much-
                                                  1  This article is based on interviews with the mem-
                                                 bers of Operational Detachment A-394, Company C,
needed rest before their insertion into enemy    3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, Bagram Airfield,
territory. Just a few hours later, McFadden      Afghanistan, by the author, 10 May 2002.
received some news: An estimated 200               2 “Jed Samuels” and “Terry Sanders” are pseudonyms.
                                                   3 Because of space constraints on transport aircraft,
enemy soldiers had been spotted moving
                                                 the team’s vehicles arrived four days after the team
around Three-Nine-Four’s intended landing
                                                 had landed. The detachment personnel traveled on
zone. The team’s recon mission was can-          two different aircraft, as well.
celled, and the area was bombed instead.           4 “Mickey Hensen,” “Rudy Madden” and “Gregg Corr”

  Anaconda was about to begin an                 are pseudonyms.
                                                   5 “Max Gorley” and “Ty McFadden” are pseudonyms.
unplanned second phase, to try to accom-
                                                   6 There were not enough helicopters to lift the entire
plish the operation’s original mission of
                                                 force as originally organized, so the SSE force was
destroying Taliban and al-Qaeda units that       reduced.
had escaped to mountain hideouts. ODA              7 “Marc Lorenzo” is a pseudonym.

Three-Nine-Four would now join a seasoned          8 “Jason Thurman” and “Jake Millett” are pseudonyms.
                                                   9 J”erry Rawlins” is a pseudonym.
team from the 5th SF Group, A-detachment
                                                  10 Rawlins never fired his Barrett during the Anacon-
594, and travel in a convoy of pickup trucks
                                                 da battle. Because the al-Qaeda fighters often con-
and sport-utility vehicles lent by the 10th      cealed their weapons beneath their robe-like coats,
Mountain Division, to Gardez, a four-and-        Rawlins was unable to identify any of the distant fig-
one-half hour drive away.11                      ures he spotted as “definitely enemy.”
                                                  11 Several senior members of the 3rd SF Group later
  Just before sunset, the teams arrived at
their new base, a mud-walled compound            remarked on the excellent support that they received
                                                 from the 10th Mountain Division, in contrast to their
crowded with more than 100 coalition sol-        experience with the same division in Haiti in 1995.
diers. Samuels took stock of his team. He         12 “Carl Hooper” is a pseudonym.

determined that before the team could
attempt any operation, it would need the
equipment that had been left behind in
Bagram and Kandahar. Within a few
days, Three-Nine-Four had recovered all

September 2002                                                                                              29
                          Caves and Graves: The 19th SF Group
                          by Dr. Richard L. Kiper




                                                                            Department of Defense in support of

                          A
                                 ny doubt as to whether Army
                                 National Guard Special Forces              national objectives.
                                 groups can meet the standards of              After having undergone a period of
                          the active-component groups has been dis-         preparation at Fort Campbell, Ky., during
                          pelled by SF A-detachment 923, from the           which it was placed under the command of
                          19th Special Forces Group, headquartered          the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, Detach-
                          in Utah. Despite limited training time,           ment 923 arrived in Karshi Kanabad,
                                                                            Uzbekistan, in early March 2002. There, it
                                                                            was assigned the mission of operating as a
                                                                            quick-reaction force in Pakistan to inter-
                                                                            dict members of the Taliban who were flee-
                                                                            ing Afghanistan — a mission that the
                                                                            detachment never executed.
                                                                               On April 25, the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF
                                                                            Group, ordered the team to Bagram, where
                                                                            the 3rd SF Group assigned it the mission of
                                                                            supporting cave searches in the Tora Bora
                                                                            region. The team then came under the tac-
                                                                            tical control of Task Force Rakkasan, from
                                                                            the 101st Airborne Division. Specifically,
                                                                            the team was to reconnoiter potential heli-
                                                                            copter landing zones, or HLZs, determine
                                                                            the level of enemy activity, and observe
                                                                            possible cave sites.1
                                                                               On April 27, Captain Kerry Barnes
                                                          U.S. Army photo   found himself moving Detachment 923 to
Members of A-detach-      these National Guardsmen unhesitatingly           Jalalabad, which is a long way from the
ment 923 talk with        exchanged their mufti for desert camou-           drug store where Barnes plies his trade as
Afghanis near Alefkhel,
                          flage when they were called to duty in            a pharmacist. In Jalalabad, the detach-
Afghanistan.
                          December 2001. During the two years prior         ment met another SF team, A-detachment
                          to that, the members of the 19th SF Group         966, and the Afghan soldiers that A-966
                          had participated in exercises in Thailand,        was advising. Because A-966 had already
                          Korea, Tonga and the Maldives in prepara-         established rapport with the Afghans,
                          tion for any special-operations mission           Barnes incorporated six of its members
                          that might be assigned to them by the             and 50 Afghans into his operation. On

30                                                                                                     Special Warfare
April 30, the force began to move to its
objective by truck.
   Although the distance to the objective
was about 50 kilometers, vehicles could
traverse only the first 30 kilometers, to
Tangi Qolleh. The Afghan commander dis-
patched a reconnaissance element to Ale-
fkhel, while the SF detachments contract-
ed for 16 mules to move equipment from
Tangi Qolleh. The force left Tangi Qolleh at
7 a.m. on May 1 and arrived in Alefkhel at
11 a.m. The terrain was so steep that the                                                      U.S. Army photo

mules could go no farther, so the teams         Alefkhel villagers receive humanitarian aid.
contracted for porters from the village.
   After an hour and a half, the teams had         In exchange for villagers’ permission to
covered only 300 meters (straight-line dis-     excavate the graves, the SF detachments
tance). The distance from Alefkhel to the       coordinated with U.S. Civil Affairs person-
proposed observation site was only 2,500        nel and arranged for more than 12,000
meters, but the elevation increased 1,500       pounds of humanitarian-assistance supplies
meters. After a climb of three and one half     to be distributed to the villagers. On May 7,
hours, the teams reached the site. From         CH-47 helicopters brought in the aid, and
there, they could observe two ridges, and       the village elders began to distribute it.
there appeared to be two caves on each             By truck, by mule, and by foot, this Nation-
ridge. The teams soon located three poten-      al Guard SF A-detachment accomplished its
tial HLZs, but the HLZs would require the       assigned mission — searching for caves and
use of demolitions to make them usable.         locating landing zones. In addition, the team
On May 2, two SF engineers arrived with         located grave sites that contained 25 bodies,
the demolitions. The next morning, they         and it arranged for humanitarian assistance
began clearing the landing zones.               to be distributed to a village that had an esti-
   Team members observed the caves, and         mated 2,000 inhabitants.
then, together with the Afghans, they moved        Superior training, flexibility and dedica-
to the sites. Two caves had been sealed by      tion are the hallmarks of the SF soldier. SF
bombs; the third was only an illusion of a      A-detachment 923 proved that those quali-
cave, caused by the shadows of overhanging      ties are as prevalent among National
rocks. The fourth suspected cave was a fight-   Guard soldiers as they are among their
ing position with overhead cover. Nearby        active-duty counterparts.
were several bunkers that appeared not to
have been occupied recently.2
   Villagers from Alefkhel reported that           Notes:
about 25 Arab bodies had been buried in a
                                                 1 Master Sergeant Andy Stewart (pseudonym), Com-
                                                pany B, 1st Battalion, 19th SF Group, interview by
mound in the village. SF team members           author, 10 May 2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape
also located two graves on one of the           recording, U.S. Army Special Operations Command
ridges. On May 4, American and Canadian         archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
                                                 2 Captain Kerry Barnes (pseudonym), Company, 1st
conventional forces, accompanied by
                                                Battalion, 19th SF Group, interview by author, 10 May
reporters and forensic experts, arrived. The
                                                2002, Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army
media immediately began to film the grave       Special Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
mound, but they did not film the excava-         3 Ryan Chilcote, “Hunt for bin Laden’s remains,”

tion that was being conducted by the foren-     www.cnn.com, 7 May 2002; Peter Baker, “Mass Grave Is
sic personnel. In all, 25 bodies were found     Discovered at Tora Bora,” Washington Post, 8 May 2002,
at the sites. After the forensic experts took   16; Carlotta Gall, “Allies Exhume 23 Bodies Thought to
                                                Be al-Qaeda Fighters, Washington Post, 8 May 2002.
DNA samples, they reburied the bodies.
The story appeared on CNN and was
reported in major newspapers.3

September 2002                                                                                                   31
                To Educate And To Motivate: The 345th
                PSYOP Company
                by Dr. Richard L. Kiper




                                                                  the 345th PSYOP Company, from Dallas,

                F
                      ollowing Operation Desert Storm in
                      1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf            Texas. After being alerted in early Decem-
                      declared, “Psychological operations         ber 2001, the 345th, commanded by Major
                are going to be absolutely a critical, critical   Ralph Marshall, reported to Fort Bragg
                part of any campaign that [the United             Jan. 7, 2002. As an airborne company with
                States] must get involved in.”1                   a focus on the U.S. Central Command’s
                  Now, more than 10 years later, another          area of operations, the 345th was the logi-
                operation, Operation Enduring Freedom,            cal choice for activation.
                has reaffirmed not only the value of psy-            The active-component 9th PSYOP Bat-
                chological operations, or PSYOP, but also         talion conducted a one-month validation
                the value of and the necessity of using           program for the 345th that included sub-
                                                                  jects such as marksmanship, troop-leading
The teams also developed themes relating to                       procedures, battle drills and drafting oper-
                                                                  ations orders. The validation program con-
the provision of humanitarian assistance and                      firmed that the 345th was prepared for its
                                                                  wartime mission.2
to the value of education. The low level of                          In early March, the company learned
education among the Afghan people was a                           that it would deploy to Afghanistan to sup-
                                                                  port the 3rd Special Forces Group.
hindrance to the PSYOP campaign. Because                          Although the Texans had never worked
                                                                  with SF teams, Staff Sergeant Max Carson
the low literacy rate restricted the effective-                   and his tactical PSYOP team, or TPT, had
ness of written products, leaflets had to                         trained with SF units at the Joint Readi-
                                                                  ness Training Center during Carson’s 10
depict the PSYOP themes clearly and simply.                       years in the company.
                                                                     The 345th’s early coordination with the
                reserve-component PSYOP forces to aug-            3rd SF Group and the SF group’s detailed
                ment active forces.                               planning during the preparation of the
                   Because there are only six active-compo-       PSYOP annex to the operations order
                nent PSYOP battalions, the U.S. has found         ensured that the two units would be able to
                it necessary to activate reserve-component        integrate their operations effectively. The
                PSYOP units during Operation Enduring             3rd Group sent an advance party to
                Freedom to ensure that commanders have            Afghanistan to make plans for the deploy-
                access to the full spectrum of PSYOP oper-        ment. Recognizing the importance of
                ations. The first unit to be activated was        PSYOP, the 3rd included Captain Timothy

32                                                                                           Special Warfare
Issacson from the 345th to serve as a                 cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
                                                        3 Staff Sergeant Max Carson (pseudonym), 345th
PSYOP planner with the advance party.3
                                                      PSYOP Company, interview by the author, 16 April
Later, when the National Guard’s 19th SF              2002, Fort Bragg, N.C., tape recording, U.S. Army Spe-
Group arrived in Afghanistan to augment               cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
the 3rd Group, the 345th continued its                  4 Major Paul Fletcher (pseudonym), 345th PSYOP

close coordination with the 19th Group as             Company, interview by the author, 9 May 2002,
well.                                                 Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Spe-
                                                      cial Operations Command archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
   It is critical to the success of Operation
Enduring Freedom that all U.S. forces
stress the themes of the legitimacy of the
existing Afghan government, the surrender
of antigovernment forces, and the impor-
tance of education. During the first two
weeks that the 345th was in country, TPTs
deployed countrywide to emphasize that
the U.S. force was not an occupying force,
and to assess the effectiveness of the
themes of Afghan unity and the capability
of the Afghanistan National Army.
   The teams also developed themes per-
taining to the provision of humanitarian
assistance and to the value of education.
The low level of education among the
Afghan people was a hindrance to the
PSYOP campaign. Because the low literacy
rate restricted the effectiveness of written
products, leaflets had to depict the PSYOP
themes clearly and simply.
   Reserve-component TPTs patrolling with
National Guard SF detachments provided
the 345th with the feedback that was
essential for determining the effectiveness
of PSYOP themes. Using immediate feed-
back from forces in theater, the 345th’s
Product Development Detachment (also
located in theater) was able to develop con-
cepts and recommend products to the Joint
PSYOP Task Force.4
   The integration of the 345th PSYOP
Company with both the active-component
3rd SF Group and the National Guard’s
19th SF Group is testimony to the vital
role that reserve-component special-opera-
tions forces can play in supporting the war
on terrorism.


   Notes:
 1 Field Manual 3-05.30, Psychological Operations
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June
2000), 1-2.
 2 Major Ralph Marshall (pseudonym), 345th PSYOP

Company, interview by the author, 10 May 2002,
Bagram, Afghanistan, tape recording, U.S. Army Spe-


September 2002                                                                                                 33
                Armed Convoy to Kabul: The 3/20th SF Group
                by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp




                                                                assigned to the named task force. Faced

                W
                          hen the National Guardsmen of
                          the 3rd Battalion, 20th Special       with these circumstances, Colonel Mark
                          Forces Group, arrived at Bagram       Phelan, the 3rd SF Group’s commander,
                Airfield, Afghanistan, they proved that         created his own augmentee pool from an
                they were ready for anything — even for         arriving unit that had been assigned to his
                the disbandment of their unit.1                 command — the headquarters and support
                  The headquarters of the Regular Army’s        personnel of the 3rd Battalion, 20th SF
                3rd SF Group had been designated the            Group.
                Combined Joint Special Operations Task             The 3/20th’s commander, Lieutenant
                Force, or CJSOTF, for Afghanistan. The          Colonel Jack Sykes, had earned his nick-
                CJSOTF was to receive 120 Army                  name “Hurricane” because of his energy
                                                                and because of the driving pace of training
“When General Tommy Franks visited the                          in his Florida-based unit.2 Without a unit
                                                                to lead, Sykes threw himself into his new
Special Forces units here,” recalled the exec-                  job: J5 plans officer in the 3rd SF Group’s
                                                                joint operations center.
utive officer of the West Virginia National                        Sykes’ soldiers also found themselves in
Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, “he                       new jobs: They filled out staff sections so
                                                                that the command post could operate
said, ‘I’ve seen the 3rd Group and the 19th                     around the clock, they built fortifications
                                                                and guard posts, and they renovated the
Group, and I can’t tell them apart.’ ” The XO                   bombed-out Russian buildings scattered
joked that both the 3rd Group and the 19th                      about the base. The imposing command
                                                                sergeant-major of the 3rd SF Group strode
Group had been offended by the remark.                          through the staff tents and motor bays of
                                                                the camp, assigning soldiers to the neces-
                Reservists who had been called to active        sary tasks.
                duty specifically to fill out the task-force       One ad hoc collection of the 3/20th’s SF
                staff.                                          soldiers was responsible for managing the
                  However, the CJSOTF received none of          armed convoys that the CJSOTF dis-
                the Army Reserve soldiers, because the          patched across Afghanistan. Late in the
                Special Operations Command of the               morning of May 7, 2002, those 3/20th sol-
                United States Central Command in Doha,          diers prepared to accompany three officials
                Qatar, kept the augmentees there, even          from Bagram to the Kabul Military Acade-
                though doctrine called for the soldiers to be   my, some 40 kilometers away.

34                                                                                         Special Warfare
   Sergeant First Class Sandy Marcello          group of dust-covered soldiers, they had
was the NCO in charge of the task-force         been light-heartedly cautioned against
convoys.3 Marcello, the owner of an auto        saying so out loud. “When General Tommy
body shop in Tennessee, had served on           Franks visited the Special Forces units
active duty as an SF weapons sergeant and       here,” recalled the executive officer of the
as an SF engineer sergeant. He had              West Virginia National Guard’s 2nd Bat-
deployed on a series of operations to Pak-      talion, 19th SF Group, “he said, ‘I’ve seen
istan in the 1980s during the Soviet occu-      the 3rd Group and the 19th Group, and I
pation of Afghanistan. Recalled to active       can’t tell them apart.’ ” The XO joked that
duty for Operation Enduring Freedom,            both the 3rd Group and the 19th Group
Marcello returned to a territory that he        had been offended by the remark. That
understood well. He called the crew and         morning, as the soldiers drove down the
the passengers of the two-vehicle convoy        road to Kabul, through minefields and past
together, and in quick, well-rehearsed          burned-out tank hulls, there was no sign of
phrases, he described the mission, the          offense taken by either party. The Guards-
route, the timetable, the checkpoints, the      men said they were simply glad to be in
communications and the emergency proce-         Afghanistan, “to finally have our turn at
dures that would be followed if the convoy      bat” — whatever the mission.
encountered mines or ambushes.
   The two armed “Humvee” trucks had
been inspected and were ready to roll. Staff        Notes:
                                                 1  This article is based on interviews with members of
Sergeant Darryl Albright drove the lead
                                                Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 20th SF Group, and
vehicle. In civilian life, Albright worked as   with members of the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, at
a nurse; in the 3/20th, he served as an SF      Bagram Airfield and in Kabul, Afghanistan, by the
medic. Sergeant Aaron Lawless was also          author, 7-8 May 2002.
                                                  2 “Jack Sykes” is a pseudonym.
an SF medic; his duties complemented his
                                                  3 “Sandy Marcello,” “Darryl Albright,” “Aaron Law-
pre-war career as a physician’s assistant
                                                less,” “Albert Cassidy,” “Jules Burgette,” “Jamie Bar-
and as a nurse. Lawless held a carbine          ber” and “Timothy Nixon” are pseudonyms.
across his lap. On the roof of the vehicle,
Specialist Albert “Wes” Cassidy, a police-
man from Hollywood, Fla., manned the M-
2 .50-caliber machine gun. In the 3/20th,
Cassidy was a parachute rigger, but he had
once been a rifleman in a mechanized-
infantry unit, where he mastered the work-
ings of the heavy machine gun.
   The trailing vehicle was armed with a
MK-19 40 mm grenade launcher, manned
by Sergeant Jules Burgette, who in civilian
life was a college student in Florida. At the
right-side rear door, Sergeant Jamie Bar-
ber kept an M-240 machine gun at the
ready. Once his tour of duty in Afghanistan
ended, Barber intended to return to his job
as a hotel manager. The only Regular Army
SF soldier in the convoy was Sergeant
First Class Timothy Nixon, a medic from
the 3rd SF Group’s Support Company, who
drove the second vehicle.
   Although the passengers might have
been tempted to make the observation that
there was no distinguishing the National
Guardsmen from the Army regular in the

September 2002                                                                                            35
                              Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells
                              and PSYOP Teams in Afghanistan
                              by Dr. C.H. Briscoe




                                                                                              tract requirements for projects, for arrang-

                              W
                                        hile deployed to Afghanistan, two
                                        coalition humanitarian liaison                        ing the delivery of food and clothing, and
                                        cells, or CHLCs from the 489th                        for overseeing work in progress.
                              Civil Affairs Battalion, U.S. Army Reserve,                        In Afghanistan, the CHLCs focus on basic
                              Knoxville, Tenn., performed similar tasks                       necessities and seek to create positive
                              but worked for different commands and                           impressions for future generations. Their
                              coordinated with quite different populaces.                     mission continues to be tough and demand-
                                                                                              ing; it requires consummate professional-
                                                                                              ism and a positive “can do” attitude in the
                                                                                              face of daily frustrations.
                                                                                                 Getting troops on the ground to take the
                                                                                              hand-off from the 96th Civil Affairs Battal-
                                                                                              ion and to sustain the momentum of the
                                                                                              humanitarian effort launched by the 96th
                                                                                              was critical. Members of the 489th CA Bat-
                                                                                              talion’s CHLC 6, which was assigned to
                                                                                              support the 101st Airborne Division’s Task
                                                                                              Force Rakkasan, lived out of their ruck-
                                                                                              sacks for a month at Kandahar Airfield,
                                                                                              Afghanistan.
                                                                                                 Initial meetings with the Afghan region-
                                                                                              al commander who was responsible for the
                                                                                              outer-perimeter security of Kandahar Air-
                                                                                              field facilitated the hiring of local inter-
                                                                                              preters and the leasing of two pick-up
                                                                     Photo by Kevin P. Bell   trucks that would be used to transport
A member of the 489th Civil Affairs Battalion (left) talks with workers who are recon-        members of CHLC 6 to outlying Alliance
structing a warehouse in Konduz.                                                              camps and villages. With the CHLC’s two
                                Working in conjunction with local elders                      Iridium telephones, Major Gregory Jerni-
                              and government officials, the four- to six-                     gan and Staff Sergeant Eric Nolan, both
                              man CHLCs (commonly referred to as “chi-                        civilian law-enforcement officers, estab-
                              clets”) are responsible for assessing                           lished communications, and CHLC 6 was
                              humanitarian needs (water, food, shelter,                       “in business” in less than a week.
                              clothing, and education), for establishing                         Using common civilian transport, and
                              priorities based on need, for preparing con-                    wearing civilian clothes and beards, the

36                                                                                                                       Special Warfare
                                                                            Because Afghanistan has
                                                                            been plagued with
                                                                            drought for seven years,
                                                                            many of the CHLC proj-
                                                                            ects involved drilling
                                                                            wells.




                                                          U.S. Army photo

CHLC minimized the “footprint,” or obvi-        Afghan children. The stateside response
ous presence of their military connection.      was tremendous, and the actions of the
But the impact of their presence was sig-       families and the family-support groups
nificant. Within two weeks, 42 village          built strong bridges for the future.
elders had gathered at Kandahar Airfield.          Despite limited communications in out-
Some had walked as far as 30 miles to           lying areas, “word of mouth” quickly spread
meet Jernigan and to listen to his propos-      the news that a small village that had
als. Since Afghanistan had been plagued by      needed internal water for more than 10
drought for seven years, all of Jernigan’s      years had a new well. Engineers from the
proposals — ranging from well-digging to        489th CA Battalion had provided the nec-
irrigation projects — involved water.           essary technical supervision and the expe-
   For the first time, village leaders were     rience to ensure that drilling went to the
being invited to share in the prioritization    bottom of the aquifers — the critical ele-
of solutions. They were also seeing some        ment of reliable water sourcing.
response to requests for assistance —              Meanwhile, in Kandahar, some 40 miles
which was a radical change. In the past,        from the former Soviet airfield, the soldiers
the further the villages were from Kanda-       of CHLC 2 performed “hands on” missions
har, the less prosperous they were: Dis-        in a different way. CHLC 2 was an integral
tance reduced interest.                         part of an ARSOF team built around an SF
   While refining, validating, and updating     detachment from the National Guard’s 19th
the contract process, CHLC 6 used ARSOF         SF Group. ARSOF integration had been
and TF Rakkasan helicopters to begin dis-       prompted by rocket attacks, the deaths in
tributing wheat, rice, dates, beans, and        Kandahar of an SF medic and three mem-
blankets to the 51 villages and towns           bers of an explosive-ordnance-disposal
around the airfield. Having visited most of     team, and the wounding of an SF lieutenant
the villages and having talked with the         who had been on patrol in the Kandahar
elders, CHLC 6 and Detachment 910, Com-         market area.
pany A, 9th Psychological Operations Bat-          Major Harry Singletary, Major Gregory
talion, wanted to repay the hospitality of      Mulligan and Captain Terry Rounds (not all
the villages. As a way of reciprocating, they   from CHLC 2) emphasized that combat tac-
established links with relatives in Palm        tical skills became primary when CHLC 2
Beach, Fla., and Knoxville, Tenn., and with     was told to help defend the ARSOF team’s
family-support groups at Fort Campbell          compound at night, and when CHLC 2 was
and Fort Bragg, who were willing to donate      dispatched to clear suspected rocket-launch
simple toys and school materials for the        sites in a nearby apartment building. How-

September 2002                                                                                         37
                            ever, during the day, the CHLC’s Civil                      As Civil Affairs projects, such as the
                            Affairs missions (medical, food distribution,            rebuilding of Mirawyse hospital by the 96th
                            and education) took priority.                            CA Battalion, were completed, the psycho-
                              CHLC 2’s medical and education team,                   logical-operations team — Detachment 1-2
                            Specialists John Harriman and Arthur Wal-                of the 345th PSYOP Company, from Dallas,
                            ton, dressed in civilian clothes to conceal              Texas — publicized the successes.
                            their rank. They concentrated on significant                However, when the 19th SF Group liai-
                            projects that would help residents and that              son team at Kandahar Airfield discovered
                            would counter Iranian-sponsored anti-Amer-               that Detachment 1-2 had a squad auto-
                                                                                     matic weapon, or SAW, and an M-203 with
                                                                                     basic loads of ammunition, the detachment
                                                                                     was “reassigned and transported” to the
                                                                                     SFOB in Kandahar. Within 48 hours,
                                                                                     Detachment 1-2 had become part of an SF-
                                                                                     Afghan vehicle-mounted task force that
                                                                                     was en route to Nowzad to capture a noted
                                                                                     Taliban leader. Because almost everyone in
                                                                                     the village was illiterate, the assistant
                                                                                     team leader, Sergeant Tim Elton, brought
                                                                                     along several loudspeakers. The team
                                                                                     sergeant, Staff Sergeant Charles Milton, a
                                                                                     veteran of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, was
                                                                                     carrying the M-203. Milton, Elton and the
                                                                                     SAW gunner, Specialist Joshua Danner,
                                                                                     along with 12 other Americans, were
                                                                                     crammed into four pickup trucks. Two-
                                                                                     hundred-fifty Afghani soldiers were stuffed
                                                         Photo by William A. Jones   aboard 10 other trucks for the 18-hour
CHLC 6 arranged for fam-                                                             cross-country trek. “It was a ‘Rat Patrol’
ily-support groups in the   ican propaganda. One dual-purpose project                but twice as hairy. It wasn’t a convoy — it
United States to donate     was the air conditioning of the building that            was more like a herd racing across the high
school supplies to chil-    housed the popular Afghan radio station.                 desert at night,” remembered Milton.
dren in Afghanistan.           The radio-station project would expand                   When the task force arrived, the entire
                            communications to a population that has a                village was pitch black: the village had no
                            75-percent illiteracy rate. Because the anti-            electricity and no generator. Night visitors
                            quated Croatian radio equipment used by                  usually meant trouble. Thus, an explana-
                            the Iranians tended to overheat after two                tion was necessary to ease tension among
                            hours, air-conditioning the Afghan station               the villagers about the “unexpected” intru-
                            would allow the Afghans to dominate the                  sion. That’s when Elton’s loudspeakers
                            local airways.                                           were brought into play. Although the Tal-
                               Harriman also learned that employing                  iban leader was not in the village, Detach-
                            locals, whom he said could “talk to the peo-             ment 1-2 demonstrated combat skills that
                            ple and connect with them,” as radio                     made it a true force multiplier. Thus, true
                            announcers was preferable to using U.S.-                 ARSOF integration was achieved in the
                            schooled Afghans. Employing locals also                  heart of Afghanistan.
                            improved the station’s credibility and
                            expanded its listening audience. Both Har-                  Editor’s note: All the names given in this arti-
                            riman and Walton admitted that their                     cle for U.S. military personnel are pseudonyms.
                            toughest task was convincing nongovern-
                            mental organizations to shift from simple
                            emergency actions to more complicated                      Dr. C.H. Briscoe is the command histori-
                            developmental projects that would yield                  an for the U.S. Army Special Operations
                            long-term benefits.                                      Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.

38                                                                                                                   Special Warfare
Ambush at 80 Knots: Company B,
3/160th SOAR
by James A. Schroder




                                                mixed within the flight. Unfortunately, day-

O
       ne particular aviation mission during
       Operation Enduring Freedom proved        light came quickly: A daylight mission
       that all the aviators within the 160th   increases the risk, both to aircraft and to
Special Operations Aviation Regiment are        personnel.
trained to the same high level of competence.      The formation received continual intelli-
   After executing an operation on the          gence updates from an observation plat-
Takur Ghar Mountain on March 4, 2002, in
which several helicopters from units of the
160th were either damaged or destroyed by
enemy fire, the 160th temporarily com-
bined some of the assets of Company A of
the 2nd Battalion with those of Company B
of the 3rd Battalion.
   On March 16, members of the composite
unit were alerted that the next day they
would fly their helicopters, loaded with
Navy SEALs, to intercept a convoy of al-
Qaeda forces and either capture or destroy
the enemy.
   The operation would require MH-47D
helicopters from Company B and MH-47Es
from Company A. Chief Warrant Officer
Gary Black,1 the MH-47E flight leader, had
previously served with Company B. Black
had overall responsibility for the mission.                                                                 U.S. Army photo

He assembled all the helicopter crews and       form that routinely surveyed the battle-       An MH-47D Chinook and
briefed them on the mission, diagramming        field.2 As the flight raced to intercept the   assault force wait for the
                                                convoy, the SEALs aboard the MH-47Ds           order to launch a mission
the procedure on butcher-block paper. Once
                                                                                               in Afghanistan.
he was confident that the participants fully    asked for permission to remove the win-
understood their tasks and all contingen-       dows on the Chinooks. Removing the win-
cies, Black told the group to get some rest.    dows would allow the soldiers to fire on the
   Early on March 17, after attending a         convoy in case one of the Chinook’s M-134
quick update briefing, the elements of the      miniguns failed or jammed. The pilots
combined flight departed, with an MH-47E        agreed, and the crewmembers and the
in the lead and the remaining Chinooks          assault element jettisoned the windows on

September 2002                                                                                                         39
                           each helicopter en route to their objective.         M-249s followed them.
                              The enemy convoy of three trucks was                 As Chief Warrant Officer Mark Reagan4
                           traveling down a wadi, a dry steam bed that          landed his helicopter, the right-side mini-
                           functions as a road, and a fourth truck              gun jammed after a 15-second burst. Staff
                           trailed about two miles behind in the same           Sergeant Charles Martin,5 the flight medic
                           stream bed. The pilots had expected to be            and a former squad-automatic-weapon gun-
                           able to see the vehicles far enough out to           ner in the 75th Ranger Regiment, immedi-
                           plan an approach for the assault. However,           ately began using his M-4. Firing in semi-
                           30-foot granite cliffs prevented the aviators        automatic mode to conserve ammunition, he
                           from seeing the convoy until they were               shot the nearest enemy soldier; then he and
                           almost on top of it.                                 Sergeant Walker, the right door gunner, who
                                                                                was also firing an M-4, killed a second foe.
                                                                                   As the crewmembers and SEALs shot
                                                                                through the window holes, the pilots quick-
                                                                                ly repositioned the helicopter to a new spot
                                                                                just over the crest of a small hill. The new
                                                                                position masked the helicopter and gave the
                                                                                assault force a superb position, overlooking
                                                                                the convoy, from which they could engage
                                                                                the surviving al-Qaeda forces.
                                                                                   Meanwhile, Elkenback and his crew spot-
                                                                                ted the fourth truck in the stream bed to the
                                                                                north. They rapidly closed on the vehicle
                                                                                and stopped it by executing a 180-degree
                                                                                decelerating turn with the helicopter’s left
                                                                                minigun trained on the truck. There was no
                                                                                place to land. As the helicopter hovered, a
                                                                                woman exited the truck and held up a child;
                                                              U.S. Army photo
                                                                                five other people in the vehicle simply
An MH-47D conducts an
                              Black, executing a gut-wrenching 90-              stared at the Chinook. The crew maintained
in-flight refueling over
Afghanistan.
                           degree right turn with a rapid deceleration,         excellent fire discipline. After the ground
                           landed his helicopter approximately 20 feet          force performed a quick assessment of the
                           in front of the lead vehicle and forced the          situation, the team leader instructed the
                           convoy to stop. The rules of engagement              crew to abort, and Elkenback returned to
                           stated that if the occupants pointed                 the main convoy.
                           weapons at the helicopters, the gunners                 The ground-force commander ordered
                           could shoot the enemy. The al-Qaeda sol-             two Chinooks to return to the fourth truck
                           diers aimed their weapons at the heli-               to perform an extensive search. This time,
                           copters as they exited their trucks. The left        one Chinook hovered ahead of the vehicle
                           minigun on the lead Chinook immediately              as the second helicopter landed nearby and
                           fired on the first vehicle.                          unloaded the ground force. The passengers
                              Black’s maneuver forced Chief Warrant             exited the vehicle, sat on the ground and
                           Officer Charles Elkenback,3 flying the sec-          waited for the team to complete its search
                           ond helicopter, to bank hard to the left in          of the vehicle. Meanwhile, the two heli-
                           order to avoid a collision. As Elkenback’s           copters had departed, but they would
                           helicopter banked, the right cabin-door              return after the search and take the team
                           minigun, the ramp gunner and the SEALs               back to the main convoy.
                           aboard fired on the convoy. The other Chi-              By now, however, the helicopters were
                           nooks moved into position to engage their            running low on fuel, so the ground com-
                           respective vehicles. The enemy scrambled             mander released them so that they could
                           out of their trucks, shot at the helicopters         refuel from a MC-130P tanker that was
                           and attempted to run to a nearby ravine. A           flying nearby. After refueling, the heli-
                           storm of gunfire from miniguns, M-4s and             copters returned to exfiltrate the ground

40                                                                                                          Special Warfare
force. The operation yielded 16 enemy sol-
diers dead and two taken prisoner, along
with the destruction of enemy vehicles
and weapons. Despite moderate enemy
fire, the helicopters suffered only minor
battle damage.
   The mission was a success, and the inte-
grated aviation assets worked well togeth-
er. The aviators of both companies had
demonstrated their professionalism and
competence in battle, and the SEALs con-
gratulated the Night Stalkers on a job
well-done.


    Notes:
 1  “Gary Black” is a pseudonym.
  2 Bill Gertz, “U.S. Attacks Afghan Convoy,” The

Washington Times, 19 March 2002, 6.
  3 This article is based on an interview with Chief

Warrant Officer Charles Elkenback (pseudonym),
Company B, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment, by the author, 8 May 2002, Kan-
dahar, Afghanistan.
  4 “Mark Reagan” is a pseudonym.
  5 Interview with Staff Sergeant Charles Martin

(pseudonym), Company B, 3rd Battalion, 160th Spe-
cial Operations Aviation Regiment, by author, 8 May
2002, Kandahar, Afghanistan.




September 2002                                         41
                            An Army For Afghanistan: The 1st Battalion,
                            3rd SF Group, and the Afghan Army
                            by Dr. Richard L. Kiper




                                                                                 nation forces in order to enhance the

                            Y
                                    ears of civil war have left
                                    Afghanistan without a national               nation’s security. General Tommy Franks,
                                    army. Tribes and ethnic groups led           commander of the United States Central
                            by warlords were able to defeat the Soviets          Command, emphasized the importance of
                            and, with American assistance, they drove            SF’s training mission in Afghanistan: “The
                            out the Taliban. Subsequently, those tribes          national army of Afghanistan is going to be
                            and ethnic groups became the dominant                an essential element of [Afghanistan’s]
                            military forces within the country.                  long-term security,” he declared.2
                               The Afghanistan Interim Authority, or                The Kabul Military Academy was a Rus-
                            AIA, as well as members of the antiterrorist         sian training site during the Soviet occupa-
                            coalition, recognize that the security of            tion of Afghanistan. Bombing by U.S. B-52s
                                                           Afghanistan     can   and small-arms fire during the fighting in
                                                           only be ensured by    Kabul demolished or heavily damaged
                                                           a well-trained army   many of the academy’s buildings. In addi-
                                                           composed of all       tion to the destruction, arriving SF soldiers
                                                           members of Afghan     found rooms piled several feet high with
                                                           society. In May,      human feces. To make the facilities usable
                                                           President George      as classrooms and as barracks for the
                                                           Bush, in a conver-    Afghan officer and enlisted recruits, Ameri-
                                                           sation with interim   can engineers performed extensive recon-
                                                           Afghan leader Ha-     struction. Their efforts include decontami-
                                                           mid Karzai, pledged   nation, wiring for electricity, and extensive
                                                           $2 million to help    structural repairs.
                                    Photo by Kevin P. Bell
                                                           equip an army for        The 1st Battalion was given 10 months
Soldiers from the 3rd SF    Afghanistan.1 To that end, soldiers from the         in which to train nine 600-man infantry
Group issue new uni-        1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group,             battalions and six 300-man border-guard
forms and equipment to
                            have begun training the first recruits for an        battalions. At the end of that time, the
recruits for the National
                            ethnically-diverse Afghan national army.             Afghan military cadre trained by the SF
Afghan Army.
                               Providing that type of training is a typi-        soldiers would begin training additional
                            cal SF mission — SF soldiers frequently              forces. The objective, according to the com-
                            assist other countries in training their mil-        mander of the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant
                            itary forces to prevent or defeat subversion         Colonel Keith McDaniels, is to build “a
                            or insurgency. Cross-cultural communica-             credible, capable force.”3
                            tions skills and regional expertise enable              Recruits for the Afghan army are select-
                            SF soldiers to organize and train host-              ed by provincial officials, and then they are

42                                                                                                           Special Warfare
sent to Kabul for training. Travel to Kabul        the trainers emphasize the importance of
is extremely difficult, and although trans-        learning to recognize leaders by their
portation is the responsibility of the gov-        appearance and their position. Critical to
ernment, American and coalition forces             the success of both the Afghan army and the
have periodically had to assist with the           nation is that the recruits understand their
movement         of    Afghan       forces.   In   individual and unit relationships to higher
Afghanistan, birth certificates are nonexis-       headquarters and to the government of
tent, so verifying a soldier’s age is almost       Afghanistan.4
impossible. Afghanistan has no national              The Afghanistan
identification method, such as a card, so          training mission is
the SF soldiers must ensure that only              only one of the
those recruits who have passed the initial         missions that SF is
screening are allowed to begin training.           trained to perform.
   Each Afghan recruit is supposed to bring        Previous training
an AK-47 and four magazines of ammuni-             missions have pre-
tion when he reports for training, but not         pared the SF sol-
all of them do. The AIA is responsible for         diers to occupy a
providing equipment for the recruits, but          bare-base facility
its supply process is slow. The SF trainers        and to train a
have adapted to the situation by using             native      military                                                 U.S. Army photo

their personal equipment to teach basic            force.5 No other force in the U.S. military              An SF soldier from the
tasks such as camouflage.                          has the capability or the flexibility needed             1st Battalion, 3rd SF
                                                                                                            Group, works with
   The trainers teach basic soldier skills —       to perform such a highly political mission
                                                                                                            recruits for the National
marching, marksmanship, map-reading,               with such global implications. One SF
                                                                                                            Afghan Army during their
first aid, physical fitness and small-unit tac-    trainer summed up the importance of the                  first week of training.
tics. Training then progresses to the study of     mission as follows: “That we are here dur-
mortars and communications. There is no            ing this time is key to stabilizing
NCO tradition in Afghanistan, so enlisted          Afghanistan for long-term growth and
recruits who are identified as having lead-        development.”6
ership potential receive additional leader-
ship training in an attempt to create an
NCO corps. After undergoing two weeks of               Notes:
                                                    1  “U.S. to Help Equip Afghan Army,” Washington
training, officer recruits begin receiving
                                                   Post, 3 May 2002, 5.
leadership training, and they are then               2 Laurie Goering, “Kabul Sees Army as Key to
incorporated into leadership positions with-       Peace,” Chicago Tribune, 22 May 2002.
in their battalions. Compounding training            3 J.S. Newton, “New Ranks Emerge From Dust,”

difficulties is the fact that the recruits speak   Fayetteville Observer, 2 June 2002, 1A. “McDaniels” is
                                                   a pseudonym.
either Dari, Pashtu or Farsi; most are illit-        4 Major Henry Deaver (pseudonym) and Chief Warrant
erate; most have little concept of teamwork;       Officer 4 David Carson (pseudonym), 1st Battalion, 3rd
and the recruits come from tribes that have        SF Group, interview by author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 7
been fighting one another for decades.             May 2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Operations
   Few recruits have any knowledge of              Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
                                                     5 Captain John Montgomery (pseudonym) and Master
Afghanistan’s origins or of its government.
                                                   Sergeant Charles Dunleavy (pseudonym), 1st Battalion,
Tactical Psychological Operations teams            3rd SF Group, interview by author, Kabul, Afghanistan,
assist the SF soldiers by teaching classes on      7 May 2002, tape recording, U.S. Army Special Opera-
the history of Afghanistan; Afghanistan’s          tions Command Archive, Fort Bragg, N.C.
                                                     6 Carson interview.
geography and the make-up of its various
tribes; the Afghan government; and the
Afghan election system. All instruction
emphasizes national unity, the identity of
the leaders of the AIA, and the legitimacy of
the new government. Because many of the
AIA leaders are unknown to the recruits,

September 2002                                                                                                                     43
     ‘Deminimus Activities’ at the Bagram
     Clinic: CA Team A-41
     by Dr. Kalev I. Sepp




                                                     around the town of Bagram to determine

     I
         t was a newsworthy story from
         Afghanistan, said CBS “Sixty Minutes        where U.S. resources could be applied.
         Two” producer Shawn Efran.1 With the        Sergeant First Class Roger McDonald, the
     military defeat of the main force of Taliban    team sergeant who never quite lost his
     and al-Qaeda units, the difficult task of       Queens accent, served as “front man” for the
     helping Afghans rebuild their country fell      team. He made travel plans; arranged meet-
     to small groups of United States special-       ing agendas with the local political and mil-
     operations soldiers like Civil Affairs Team     itary leadership; and prepared the security
     A-41. They were professional soldiers of        plan for the gatherings. The team’s expert
     the first order, but they wore beards and       on civil infrastructure, Sergeant First Class
     dressed in local garb in order to gain better   Lyle Canberra, surveyed and assessed
     access to the people they wanted to help.       water and sewage systems, aqueducts,
     Their job was “nation-building,” which          wells, power grids, roads and bridges. He
     stood in sharp contrast to the destructive      also organized demining operations, as he
     morality of the al-Qaeda.                       had done on other former battlefields.
        As characters in a news story, the four      Sergeant First Class Bart Schuyler was A-
     men of A-41 were “good copy.” Major Silas       41’s medical specialist, and like McDonald
     Greene led the team with energy and excel-      and Canberra, he was a veteran of Special
     lent judgment. To Efran, Greene’s urbane,       Forces. He had practiced his skills on the
     articulate style belied his background as a     edges of civilization on all the continents of
     tank officer who had successfully complet-      the world.
     ed airborne and Ranger training. His effec-        The team was trained in foreign lan-
     tiveness at leading his team was derived in     guages, but not in any of the languages of
     large part from his previous assignments        Central Asia. A-41 was oriented for
     in the U.S. Army’s 96th Civil Affairs Bat-      employment in the European Command
     talion, a special-operations unit based at      area: Greene spoke French; McDonald, Pol-
     Fort Bragg, N.C. Greene had become an           ish; Schuyler, German and Spanish; and
     expert horseman while pursuing a bache-         Canberra, Spanish and Portuguese. The
     lor’s degree in animal science at the Uni-      scale of the crisis in Afghanistan required
     versity of Massachusetts at Amherst, and        as many Civil Affairs teams as could be
     he had just received a master’s degree in       deployed. In any case, given the variety of
     defense analysis at the Naval Postgradu-        Pashtu, Dari and Urdu dialects endemic to
     ate School. His thesis, coincidentally, was     the various ethnicities of Afghanistan,
     “Islamic Fundamentalism in Central Asia.”       local translators were the best choice for
        The team moved constantly in and             local communications.

44                                                                               Special Warfare
   The “Sixty Minutes Two” producer            van whose back seats had been removed.
brought his cameraman and his sound            Schuyler knew he could participate in
man to meet A-41 in mid-January 2002.          “deminimus activities” in this situation —
Their correspondent, Scott Pelley, would fly   that is, on Greene’s orders, Schuyler could
in after the crew completed the back-          use U.S. resources to alleviate the immedi-
ground research and prepared the story. As     ate suffering of non-U.S. personnel. After
they would have done with any new team         allowing Doctor Atta to take the lead in the
members, McDonald and Canberra gave            treatment, Schuyler began coordinating a
the crew rudimentary weapons training          follow-up visit with a U.S. Army surgeon at
and put them through security drills, for      the Italian-run hospital in Kabul. He also
their self-defense. Schuyler taught them       made arrangements for skin grafting and
basic first-aid procedures for gunshot         physical therapy. Schuyler himself checked
wounds and related trauma. The camera-         on the boy later and was pleased to learn
man had once served in the 82nd Airborne       that there was no secondary infection. The
Division, and he cooperated happily; the       boy’s hand was saved.
sound man, a freelancer like the camera-
man, fit in just as well.
   When Pelley joined A-41 and the “Sixty
                                               A-41 responded in an almost automatic fash-
Minutes Two” crew a week later, Greene         ion. McDonald and Canberra took up security
simply followed his normal, crowded sched-
ule. That day, A-41 was scheduled to re-       positions to hold back the gathering crowd.
visit the emergency clinic in the city of
Bagram. It was one of 23 clinics that, along
                                               Greene found himself helping to push-start
with a hospital, were supported by an Ital-    the clinic’s worn-out ambulance. … Schuyler
ian private volunteer organization. Howev-
er, Doctor Mohammed Atta, the clinic’s doc-    began coordinating a follow-up visit with a
tor, had not been paid in eight months. He
had remained in his hometown through
                                               U.S. Army surgeon … in Kabul.
both the Soviet and Taliban occupations,
even when Bagram became the center of             The incident in the Bagram clinic was over
fighting. He was now living hand-to-mouth      in less than 20 minutes, and all of it was
in a nearby bunker and was planning to         caught on tape by the “Sixty Minutes Two”
start a garden on its roof.                    team. Scott Pelley featured the incident in
   Minutes after A-41 and Pelley’s crew        his story on A-41, which was aired nation-
arrived at 11 a.m., a mob of local children    wide under the lead-in title, “Mission Impos-
rushed in carrying a badly injured 16-year-    sible.” For Greene, McDonald, Schuyler and
old boy, whom Doctor Atta recognized. The      Canberra, who made one of the 10 Civil
boy had reached down to pick up a              Affairs “alpha” teams operating across the
grenade, and it had detonated in his right     country, the incident represented just anoth-
hand. His little finger and part of his ring   er morning of another day of trying to give
finger and thumb were gone, and the dor-       Afghanistan “a good start” toward making
sal portion of his hand was “de-gloved” to     itself a nation that would not become a sanc-
the wrist — that is, the skin was peeled       tuary for terrorists again.
back. The boy also had a grenade fragment
projecting from his cheek, but most of the
blood on his face had come from his hand.        Notes:
                                                1This article is based on interviews with three mem-
   While the “Sixty Minutes Two” crew was
                                               bers of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Fort Bragg,
recording the event, A-41 responded in an      N.C., conducted by the author 5 April 2002. Silas
almost automatic fashion. McDonald and         Greene, Roger McDonald, Lyle Canberra and Bart
Canberra took up security positions to hold    Schuyler are pseudonyms.
back the gathering crowd. Greene found
himself helping to push-start the clinic’s
worn-out ambulance, a battered old mini-

September 2002                                                                                         45
               Forty-Five Seconds on a Hot LZ:
               The 2/160th SOAR
               by James A. Schroder




                                                                  trate two special-operations teams into two

               F
                      or two months early in 2002, the spe-
                      cial-operations-aviation warriors of        separate LZs, one in the northern area of
                      the 2nd Battalion, 160th Special            Objective Remington and the other in the
               Operations Aviation Regiment, conducted            southern area. Razor 03 would fly to the
               numerous missions from Bagram air base.            northern LZ with Razor 04, drop off Razor
                 By March 3, 2002, they had inserted many         04 and then proceed to the southern LZ.
               coalition and United States teams into the         Razor 04 planned to land at the northern
               Shah-e-Kot valley in Afghanistan in support        LZ, drop off his team, and then proceed
               of Operation Anaconda. The Night Stalkers          north at a slow airspeed in order to allow
               had completed the infiltrations under the          Razor 03 to link up. Once they had
               cover of darkness using MH-47E Chinooks.           rejoined, the two Chinooks would return to
               The flights had been routine, with little enemy    Bagram air base and end the mission.1
               contact. The helicopter landing zones, or LZs,        Razor 03 and Razor 04 departed the air
               had been at altitudes ranging from 8,000 feet      base on the night of March 3 to fly to an off-
                                                                  set location. The flight arrived at the pickup
                                                                  zone, or PZ, without incident, loaded two
The delay caused a problem for the ground                         special-operations teams, and departed on
                                                                  time. Intelligence indicated that the flight
force: There wouldn’t be enough time for                          routes and the LZs were relatively secure,
the ground force to move to its observation                       but an AC-130 gunship was to check the LZs
                                                                  and confirm that the area was clear.
position, or OP, under the cover of dark-                            When the flight of Chinooks was six min-
                                                                  utes from the objective, the AC-130 was divert-
ness. The team leader requested permis-                           ed because of its proximity to an incoming
sion to go directly to the OP.                                    B-52 airstrike. The AC-130 therefore failed to
                                                                  establish “eyes on the objective.” Chief War-
                                                                  rant Officer 3 Alfred Mann,2 the flight leader,
               to 11,500 feet mean sea level, or MSL. The LZs     and Captain Timothy Dickerson,3 the air-mis-
               offered limited space to land, and the margin      sion commander, or AMC, decided to return to
               for error was slim. The altitude of the LZs        the PZ, which was only a 15-minute flight
               challenged aircraft performance and pilot          from the objective, and to wait for the bombing
               skill; single-engine flight was never an option.   operation to end. At the PZ, the flight crews
                  The mission planned for the night of            reduced the helicopter engines’ speed to
               March 3 was uncomplicated: Two Chi-                ground idle in order to conserve fuel.
               nooks, Razor 03 and Razor 04, would infil-            Next, an air assault by the 101st Air-

46                                                                                             Special Warfare
borne Division onto Objective Remington          one o’clock position. The machine gun was
further delayed the mission. The helicopter      not an unusual sight, because the mountains
crews shut down the engines to conserve          of Afghanistan are littered with abandoned
fuel. The delay caused a problem for the         military hardware. Next, they spotted a don-
ground force: There wouldn’t be enough           key tied to a tree at the three o’clock position.
time for the ground force to move to its         Upon landing, Mann informed the team
observation position, or OP, under the           leader that they were not alone.
cover of darkness. The team leader                  As the team stood near the ramp hinge,
requested permission to go directly to the       poised to exit the helicopter, Sergeant Jer-
OP. Mann calculated the performance fig-         ald Curtis,4 saw a man duck behind a
ures and stated that the team leader could       berm at the nine o’clock position. Mann
get in, but there was no guarantee that the      relayed that information to the team
LZ would be suitable for landing. The team       leader, who stated that his team was tak-
leader replied that he saw the imagery and       ing the hill. Sergeant Derick Mackenzie,5
that there were places to land.                  the right ramp crewmember, held the
   The air-assault mission ended, and the        team up as the information was relayed.
flight began the engine start-up procedures.
Unfortunately, the right engine on Razor 03
exceeded its limits on start-up. Mann decided
that it would be foolish to take an aircraft
with a questionable engine to 10,000 feet
MSL. He immediately shut down the heli-
copter. Dickerson contacted the rear and
requested a replacement aircraft. Coinciden-
tally, two Chinooks were in the forward arm-
ing and refueling point, or FARP. Dickerson
coordinated with the operations center for
the two Chinooks in the FARP to become
replacement helicopters. Once the replace-
ment Chinooks arrived at the PZ, the pilots
in Razor 03 and Razor 04 decided to use the
replacements, because now both of the origi-
nal aircraft were low on fuel. Mann informed
the team leader that in the best-case sce-
nario, he could get the team to the LZ by 2:45                                                                   U.S. Army photo

a.m. The delay would allow the team only one     Just as Mackenzie dropped his arm to                Razor 03’s battle-dam-
hour of movement under the cover of dark-        release the team, an enemy soldier stood            aged aircraft at the
ness. The team leader again requested per-       and launched a rocket-propelled grenade,            forced-landing site. The
mission to go directly to the OP.                or RPG, at the left side of the helicopter.         aircraft was later recov-
   At 2:30 a.m., the flight departed en route    The RPG hit Razor 3, knocking out all of            ered and is being
directly to the OP and executed the mission      the electrical power. The exploding round           returned to service.
exactly as planned. The first AC-130 gunship     wounded Curtis’ right leg. The flaming
reached its fuel limit and handed its mission    projectile passed through the aircraft and
over to a second AC-130, which cleared the       knocked out the transfer rectifiers, which
new LZ and departed for another tasking          eliminated all of the multifunctional dis-
approximately six minutes prior to Razor         plays; the Advance Flight Control System,
03’s arrival at the LZ. During the approach,     or AFCS; radios; all of the aircraft’s mis-
the crew members thought that the LZ             sion equipment; and the M-134 miniguns.
appeared to be suitable for landing, although    Smoke filled the cabin and obscured the
they noticed footprints in the snow that was     vision of those in the back.
common at those high altitudes. Coming clos-        Small-arms fire caused the No. 1
er, they noticed an unmanned DSHK                hydraulic system to fail. The RPG had also
machine gun (in pretty good shape) at the        knocked out the intercrew communication

September 2002                                                                                                              47
When Razor 03’s controls
locked up, the aircraft was
10 feet above the ground.
Although      the     crew
expected it to roll over,
the aircraft remained
upright.




                                                                                                                    U.S. Army photo

                              system between the front door gunners             inch-square back-up altitude indicator, which
                              and the pilots. The team stayed on the air-       was the only flight instrument that remained
                              craft, and the team leader yelled, “Get us        operative, Tucker called out airspeed, altitude
                              out of here!” Mackenzie, the only crew            and direction. Mackenzie confirmed that both
                              member who could communicate, yelled to           engines were running. He informed Mann
                              Mann over the intercom system, “Fire in           that a man had fallen out at the LZ and that
                              the cabin rear ready! Pick it up, pick it up!     they had to go back. Then he focused his atten-
                              Go, go, go!” and fired an M-60 machine gun        tion on Parcelli, who was dangling beneath the
                              mounted in the aft right cabin window.            helicopter, and pulled him in as the aircraft
                              Mann took the controls from Chief Warrant         took more small-arms fire.
                              Officer 3 George Tucker6 and quickly                 Mann and his crew immediately decided
                              departed without the use of the AFCS.             to go back, fully aware that the miniguns
                                 The oil-soaked ramp, which had been            were inoperative and that they had only the
                              rendered inoperative when small-arms fire         M-60 and their individual weapons. Mann
                              damaged the helicopter’s utility hy-              banked the helicopter to the right and felt
                              draulics, was stuck in the down position.         vibration in the flight controls. As Macken-
                              As the helicopter lurched off the ground,         zie looked forward, a red haze, caused by
                              Petty Officer First Class Neil Roberts, slip-     hydraulic fluid spraying from a severed line,
                              ping on the greasy floor, fell and rolled         enveloped the ramp area. Soon it became
                              toward the open ramp. Sergeant Paul Par-          apparent that the hydraulic system was
                              celli,7 the ramp gunner, rushed toward the        failing — a condition that could render the
                              tumbling SEAL and caught him. Macken-             Chinook unflyable. Mackenzie read the
                              zie, reacting to movement, rushed after           maintenance panel and confirmed that the
                              both of them. Mackenzie and Parcelli tem-         hydraulic pressure for all three systems was
                              porarily held Roberts, but they could not         zero. Aware of the gravity of the situation,
                              maintain their hold during takeoff. As the        he opened a can of hydraulic fluid, one of
                              helicopter shuddered, Roberts and Parcelli        four that he routinely kept near the pump,
                              fell out of the helicopter. Parcelli, tethered    and poured it into the hydraulic-fill module.
                              by a safety harness, remained with the            He quickly hand pumped the life-saving liq-
                              Chinook, but Roberts fell to the ground           uid into the system. This procedure tem-
                              from about five feet. When the helicopter         porarily restored cyclic control, but the
                              cleared the ridge line, Parcelli dangled          cyclic controls continued to lock up even as
                              3,000 feet above the ground.                      Mackenzie added more fluid.
                                 Using his flashlight to illuminate the four-      Mann determined that he couldn’t make it


48                                                                                                           Special Warfare
back to the LZ and that he would have to
land immediately in order to save the lives of
those aboard. He identified a potential land-
ing zone and put the helicopter in a landing
attitude. The cyclic controls locked up when
the helicopter was 10 feet above the ground.
Mann pressed the pedals to turn the nose,
and he lowered the thrust. The aircraft hit
the ground with the nose 15 degrees high
and the right side 10 degrees high. The crew,
expecting the helicopter to roll over, conduct-
ed an emergency shutdown, secured all sen-
sitive items and executed the emergency-
action plan. The team leader exited the heli-
copter and established communications to
effect recovery. Soon, Razor 04 arrived at the
crash site, recovered all the personnel before
the closing enemy could reach their location,
and returned to the PZ.
   “Leave no man behind” has become an unof-
ficial motto of special-operations forces. Despite
severe damage to their helicopter, Mann and
his crew valiantly attempted to rescue Roberts.
Only when Mann could not maneuver the
unstable helicopter because of the loss of
hydraulic power, a lack of electrical power, and
inoperative miniguns, did he decide to abandon
the rescue attempt. Through his exceptional
flying skills and complete coordination with
Tucker, Mackenzie and the rest of the crew,
Mann landed the aircraft without further casu-
alties. This mission is a testimony to the skill
and courage of special-operations aviators in
the face of overwhelming odds. “Night Stalkers
don’t quit!”


   Notes:
 1 This article is based on an interview with Chief War-
rant Officer 3 Alfred Mann (pseudonym), HHC, 2nd Bat-
talion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, by
the author, 25 March 2002, Fort Campbell, Ky.
 2 “Alfred Mann” is a pseudonym.
 3 “Timothy Dickerson” is a pseudonym.
 4 “Jerald Curtis” is a pseudonym.
 5 Interview with Sergeant Derick Mackenzie (pseu-

donym), Company A, 2nd Battalion, 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment, by the author, 9 July
2002, Fort Campbell, Ky.
 6 “George Tucker” is a pseudonym.
 7 “Paul Parcelli” is a pseudonym.




September 2002                                             49
     Observations: ARSOF in Afghanistan
     by James A. Schroder




                                                    barriers — all of which the soldiers

     T
           he success and the speed of execu-
           tion of the war on terrorism, Opera-     encountered in Afghanistan.
           tion Enduring Freedom, or OEF,              SF training encourages ingenuity, auton-
     were a result of years of strategic invest-    omy and adaptability because, by design,
     ment in personnel, training and equipment      the 12-man SF detachments infiltrate many
     of United States Army special-operations       miles into enemy territory or into semi-per-
     forces, which consist of Special Forces;       missive environments, having only each
     Rangers; Civil Affairs; Psychological Oper-    other to rely on. All three SF attributes were
     ations; the special-operations support         brilliantly demonstrated as SF soldiers
     units — the 112th Signal Battalion and the     called in close air support from remote loca-
     528th Support Battalion; and the 160th         tions, conducted direct actions against the
     Special Operations Aviation Regiment.          Taliban hierarchy, and performed foreign
        The accomplishments of OEF were pos-        internal defense — creating a national army
     sible because of the expertise, commit-        from disparate local Afghan forces.
     ment, ingenuity, adaptability and warrior         The Rangers illustrated their lethality
     ethos of these dedicated soldiers — a direct   as an exceptionally competent Army strike
     result of their personnel-selection process-   force. Their seizure of the airfield south of
     es and their specialized training. The tech-   Kandahar was an example of flawless exe-
     nological advances of the past few years       cution: They fought as they had trained —
     contributed to the victories, but individual   with speed and ferocity. They took no casu-
     soldiers made the difference.                  alties, and they confiscated valuable intel-
        Special Forces verified their invaluable    ligence information.
     capacity during OEF, fighting alongside           At Takur Ghar mountain, in a firefight
     Afghani soldiers against Taliban and al-       reminiscent of the one in Mogadishu, the
     Qaeda forces in the austere, mountainous       Rangers attacked an enemy force
     terrain of Afghanistan. Numerous mem-          entrenched atop a 10,000-foot high moun-
     bers of SF detachments attributed their        tain, neutralized it, and then kept other hos-
     success during OEF to the realistic final      tile forces at bay for more than 15 hours
     phase of the SF Qualification Course, exer-    until all friendly forces could be extracted at
     cise Robin Sage. During the exercise, the      night. The valiant effort cost the lives of
     SF students learn to address a myriad of       three Rangers, and many more were wound-
     problems associated with working with          ed, but no man was left behind.
     “guerrilla forces,” ranging from logistical,      Civil Affairs units deployed to
     administrative, financial and operational      Afghanistan with a mission to assist the
     issues to cultural conflicts and language      Afghan people, who were suffering from

50                                                                               Special Warfare
years of restrictive and negligent Taliban         The tactical importance of PSYOP was
rule. Because the CA teams are combat            also beneficial. The 910th Tactical PSYOP
forces, they were able to operate in danger-     Detachment educated and warned vil-
ous and hostile areas that were unreach-         lagers during tactical operations around
able by nongovernment organizations.             their villages. The 910th’s soldiers also
After conducting an assessment of basic          proved that they were a combat multiplier
survival needs — water, food and shelter —       that could fight alongside infantry forces.
the CA teams began providing humanitar-            Teams from the 112th Signal Battalion
ian aid to the needy people.                     provided rapid and continuous connectivity,
   The teams also conducted many construc-       across a broad spectrum of communications,
tion-project estimates for water wells, hospi-   between deployed commands and the state-
tals, schools and road repairs. Unfortunate-     side combatant commander, as well as
ly, the funding for these projects was not       between intratheater commands. OEF cre-
readily available: The nations that had          ated an enormous demand for bandwidth to
promised the necessary financial aid were        accommodate all the secure and nonsecure
slow in delivering the funds. The delay cre-
ated resentment among the local governors        The accomplishments of the war were possi-
or chieftains who had believed that if they
cooperated fully with the CA teams, the con-     ble because of the expertise, commitment,
struction projects would begin immediately
and endear them to their native populace.
                                                 ingenuity, adaptability and warrior ethos of
   The CA teams also operated as combat          these dedicated soldiers — a direct result of
forces when necessary. One CA team,
Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cell 2,           their personnel-selection processes and spe-
responded as a quick-reaction force during
a crucial mission to recover an explosive-
                                                 cialized training. The technological advances
ordnance-disposal team whose members             of the past few years contributed to the victo-
were killed while attempting to destroy an
enemy ammunition cache. The CA team              ries, but individuals made the difference.
performed its military duties with profi-
ciency, in an extremely dangerous situa-         data — including voice, data and video —
tion, on very short notice, and while adjust-    that was essential to mission completion.
ing its plan en route to the objective.          Small ARSOF signal teams deployed to
   Psychological Operations units con-           remote locations, overcame harsh environ-
tributed to the strategic and tactical objec-    ments and technical and tactical difficulties,
tives of the war. PSYOP teams demon-             and never failed to deliver communications.
strated their ability to produce and deliver     The signal teams reacted promptly to the
leaflets that were culturally sensitive and      many urgent demands imposed upon them,
targeted to specific themes that met the         for each request was of great importance to
combatant commander’s objectives. The            the requesting customer.
strategic importance of the leaflets was            The units of the 528th Support Battalion
immense. The Afghan people needed to             contributed to OEF in various ways. Com-
know why American and coalition forces           pany A provided the SOF-specific expertise
were in their country. The PSYOP leaflet         necessary for equipping and supplying
campaign provided that knowledge, but            demanding customers. At Task Force Dag-
the effectiveness of the leaflet campaign        ger, the 528th’s support soldiers estab-
was difficult to measure because most of         lished a warehouse system and assisted
the Afghan people could not read. The            Air Force personnel in correcting an
leaflets presented simple messages about         accountability problem so that they could
mine awareness, explained the source of          better control the off-loading of personnel
the humanitarian rations that fell from the      and equipment from aircraft. The 528th
sky, and stressed that the Americans were        soldiers also established accountability for
friendly and not an occupying force.             every item transferred or issued to non-

September 2002                                                                                    51
     Army SOF personnel.                               never dropped a mission because of a main-
        By doctrine, the 528th acts as a medium        tenance problem, and its operational rate
     between special-operations supply chan-           was in the high 90s. Whether they were
     nels and conventional supply channels.            treating troops who had been injured in bat-
     Unfortunately, the transition from SOF            tle or who had been rescued from aircraft
     support to conventional support suffered          crashes, or whether they were caring for
     because of a limited availability of SOF          civilians who had been injured by subver-
     personnel, and Task Force Dagger immedi-          sives, the 160th’s flight medics, all gradu-
     ately felt the impact as it battled the           ates of the Special Operations Combat Med-
     inflexibility of conventional supply sys-         ical Course, demonstrated their life-saving
     tems. The maintenance-support team from           skills.
     the 528th’s Company B distinguished itself           When National Guard and Army
     by maintaining the decrepit civilian vehi-        Reserve SOF soldiers mobilized to aug-
     cles used by SF soldiers. The mechanics           ment active-duty forces, they left behind
     kept the vehicles operational by making           their civilian jobs and families, well aware
     “controlled substitutions” from comparable        that their deployments would last at least
     nonworking vehicles. Many times, especial-        a year. The deployments caused financial,
     ly when they were repairing all-terrain           family and personal stress, but the recalled
     vehicles in remote locations, the mechanics       SOF soldiers enthusiastically embraced
     could rely on nothing except their tools and      their assigned responsibilities. They expe-
     their ingenuity.                                  rienced the same combat situations as the
        The Night Stalkers of the 160th Special        active-duty soldiers, and they executed
     Operations Aviation Regiment used their           their duties to the same standards expect-
     vast collection of organic assets — multi-        ed of all SOF personnel.
     million-dollar flight simulators, state-of-the-      While the learning curve may have been
     art helicopters, advanced mission-planning        steeper for the RC soldiers, who had previ-
     programs, and outstanding training — to           ously practiced their soldiering tasks only
     execute nearly impossible missions in             on a monthly basis, National Guardsmen
     Afghanistan to the promised standard: time        and Reservists play a critical role in the
     on target plus or minus 30 seconds. Com-          implementation of “rotational warfare.”
     bating some of the harshest environmental         Rotational warfare depends upon a compe-
     conditions in the world, the Night Stalkers       tent, well-trained reserve force that can
     doggedly completed many arduous and haz-          replace the limited number of active-duty
     ardous aviation missions in support of OEF.       SOF personnel in combat after a specified
        The “Don’t Quit” attitude of the Night         amount of time, usually 3-6 months. The
     Stalkers played a crucial role early in the       reserve-component forces also contributed
     campaign, when the 160th’s aviators com-          to stateside successes by helping maintain
     pleted numerous challenging infiltrations of      helicopters for the 160th SOAR, by aug-
     personnel from SF units and from other gov-       menting the cadre and staff at SF school-
     ernment agencies. The MH-47E proved to be         houses, and by producing high-quality
     the most capable helicopter in Afghanistan.       PSYOP products.
     Its terrain-following technology enabled it to       While the phenomenal success of OEF is
     fly in zero visibility, several hundred feet      not due to the efforts of any one SOF unit, the
     above the ground, for long durations. The         valuable contributions of every individual
     powerful MH-47D/E Chinook provided the            soldier in each component of the well-trained
     primary means of transportation across soar-      and dedicated ARSOF community are to be
     ing mountaintops and remote desert loca-          commended. Without the efforts of ARSOF
     tions. The MH-60 DAP provided armed               soldiers, the war on terrorism could not have
     escort for the Chinooks in Afghanistan, a         progressed so rapidly and so effectively.
     salient source of armed protection.
        For months, the mechanics and crew
     members worked long, grueling hours to
     keep the machines in the air. The 160th

52                                                                                  Special Warfare
Vigilant Warrior 2002: War Game Demonstrates
ARSOF’s Value to the Objective Force
by Major General William G. Boykin




                                                that range from strategic to tactical.

T
      he 2002 Army Transformation war
      game, Vigilant Warrior, demonstrat-          In the future, the U.S. will maintain a
      ed the value that United States           strong interest in achieving its objectives
Army special-operations forces, or ARSOF,       through, with and by indigenous or surro-
will offer to the Army Transformation’s         gate forces. ARSOF are the combat multi-
Objective Force.                                plier. When the U.S. commits forces to any
  This year’s Vigilant Warrior, which con-      of the full range of ARSOF missions, the
cluded April 26, focused on assessing both      nation’s demands and expectations run
the design of the Objective Force and its       high. Because of the demands and the chal-
capabilities for global and full-spectrum       lenges of the missions, ARSOF must con-
war-fighting. Set in the year 2020, the war     tinue to invest the majority of their time
game was based on a global situation that       and resources in training adaptive, mature
included a major regional contingency and       and intelligent soldiers. Leader develop-
several smaller-scale contingencies. Joint      ment and specialized training remain key
forces participated in the exercise, and a      to maintaining a quality force that will be
series of joint task forces provided com-       capable of meeting the demands of future
mand, control, communications, comput-          war-fighting.
ers, intelligence, surveillance and recon-         A mission that continues to be critical to
naissance, or C4ISR. The U.S. Special Oper-     the achievement of U.S. objectives is
ations Command provided augmentation            nation- and army-building. When it is in
to the joint special-operations task forces.    the U.S. national interest to help develop
  ARSOF participated in all scenarios of        the military capabilities of foreign nations
this year’s war game. The war game proved       or of indigenous groups, ARSOF will serve
to be an excellent means of evaluating con-     as a key enabler by developing the con-
cepts of the future and identifying issues      cepts and by executing the programs relat-
that require further development. During        ed to foreign internal defense. Special
the evaluation of each of the scenarios, one    Forces works with foreign militaries and
common lesson emerged: ARSOF are a key          indigenous groups to develop focused war-
component of the Objective Force. It is more    fighting capabilities. Beginning at the indi-
important now than ever before that             vidual level and working through battalion
ARSOF be better integrated into both joint      operations, SF soldiers can assist a host-
and Army war-fighting doctrine. ARSOF           nation’s soldiers in developing and refining
represent a multifunctional battlefield oper-   a full range of military capabilities.
ating system, a maneuver element, and an           ARSOF are capable of building other
operational enabler for achieving objectives    nations’ armies because they have mas-

September 2002                                                                                  53
               tered basic and advanced warrior skills         trine for the other members of the coali-
               and are able to teach those skills in a for-    tion. In many cases, the members of the
               eign environment. While language skills         CST will later work with the same forces
               and cultural awareness are important,           they have trained. That fact mandates that
               ARSOF’s ability to effectively teach war-       new U.S. Army C4ISR systems be fielded to
               rior skills is paramount. Unless SF soldiers    ARSOF so that the coalition commanders
               are expert war-fighters, they cannot be         can integrate maneuvers into the common
               effective in training others in the funda-      operational picture that U.S. commanders
               mentals of war-fighting. Basic marksman-        will use in providing command and control
               ship, patrolling, raids, ambushes, move-        to the coalition partners during tactical
               ments to contact, and offensive and defen-      operations.
               sive operations remain critical common             Promoting security cooperation with
               denominators for all armed forces. Fur-         allies and friends will continue to be a task
               thermore, much of the training in foreign       for the U.S. Army as part of its campaign
               environments must focus on operations in        strategy. Occasionally, the U.S. Army will
               urban terrain. The Special Forces               “create” favorable balances of power by
                                                               assisting friendly nations’ efforts in inter-
                                                               nal defense and development, or IDAD. It
During the evaluation of each of the scenar-                   is reasonable to believe that most U.S. cam-
ios, one common lesson emerged: ARSOF are                      paigns will continue to require IDAD dur-
                                                               ing some phase of the campaign, if not
a key component of the Objective Force. …                      throughout the campaign. As a means of
                                                               reducing the potential for hostilities in
ARSOF represent a multifunctional battlefield                  areas in which U.S. forces are conducting
operating system, a maneuver element, and                      operations, security-cooperation efforts
                                                               could be performed in other areas nearby
an operational enabler for achieving objec-                    in order to divert the war-fighting forces
                                                               and logistics of hostile groups.
tives that range from strategic to tactical.                      While IDAD is a multiagency responsi-
                                                               bility, ARSOF remain an invaluable com-
               Advanced Urban Combat Course, or                bat multiplier. Conventional forces may be
               SFAUCC, enhances the survival skills of         employed to establish a secure environ-
               SF teams and serves as a mission-               ment within which a nation can rebuild
               enhancer. SFAUCC will continue to               unimpeded. Soldiers in Special Forces;
               progress and to integrate new technologies,     Civil Affairs, or CA; and Psychological
               and in the future, SF soldiers will integrate   Operations, or PSYOP, integrate their
               SFAUCC into the training they provide to        operations with the operations of other ele-
               foreign armies.                                 ments of the U.S. government, of foreign
                  ARSOF must not only stay abreast of          governments, of nongovernment organiza-
               conventional war-fighting doctrine, they        tions and private volunteer organizations,
               must become experts in Army, SOF and            and of host-nation national systems. CA
               joint doctrine. As ARSOF move toward the        works through the indigenous leadership
               Objective Force, new doctrine emerges, and      to assess or re-establish government infra-
               ARSOF continue to rapidly integrate new         structures and civil infrastructures.
               doctrine, tactics and techniques, as well as    PSYOP elements play a critical role in the
               new technologies, into the training pro-        information campaign to influence the
               grams of all ARSOF war-fighting units. In       behavior of designated target audiences at
               the future, few operations will be unilater-    the tactical, operational and strategic lev-
               al U.S. actions, and coalition operations       els. Through a variety of mediums, PSYOP
               will be pre-eminent. When called into           units also inform the public and indige-
               action as a coalition support team, or CST,     nous populations of U.S. objectives in an
               with foreign forces, ARSOF must be adept        effort to gain popular support and to pro-
               at interpreting the principles of U.S. doc-     vide public-service information.

54                                                                                         Special Warfare
   On the future global battlefield, ARSOF
will offer Army and joint-force command-
ers a multispectrum, specialized force
capable of performing full-spectrum uncon-
ventional operations. ARSOF can help
commanders achieve national objectives
with a unity of effort and an economy of
force. They can wage unconventional war-
fare, or UW, to shape the operational envi-
ronment and, occasionally, to create a situ-
ation that will compel adversaries to divert
their forces and to shift their focus from
the primary area of operations. As
required, ARSOF may execute a UW cam-
paign as the main effort, and then employ
their integrated assets to provide security-
cooperation programs once combat opera-
tions have been completed.


  Major General William G. Boykin is com-
mander of the JFK Special Warfare Center
and School.




September 2002                                 55
  As I Saw It: The Eyewitness Report of a Soldier Who
        Fought During World War II and Survived
                               by Colonel Vernon E. Greene, U.S. Army (ret.)




                                         would even earn $3 for a three-                        and that he was admired and

W
           hen I was born in West
           Virginia May 11, 1923,        round fight. I seemed to be locked                     respected. I decided that I wanted
           World War I was still a       in for life.                                           to become a soldier and move away
vivid memory to most Americans,            An uncle whom I never had a                          from the coal dust and the daily
and war clouds had already begun         chance to meet helped shape my                         risk of losing life or limb.
to darken the skies over Asia and        course. He was a Georgia boy, my                          As the Japanese, German and
Europe.                                  father’s brother, Reney, whose neat,                   Italian governments became more
   I was the middle of nine children —   handsome World War I soldier’s                         vocal and as their military capabil-
three boys and six girls. When my        picture hung in our front room. I                      ities became more visible, the
father died in 1938, I did as my         never knew what rank Uncle                             United States was becoming con-
older brother had done: I dropped        Reney held, but from those who                         cerned about a possible worldwide
out of school to work in the coal        knew him, I learned that he set an                     conflict. The U.S. Army welcomed
mines to supplement the family           outstanding example for others                         volunteers and paid privates $21 a
income. The daily wage was just                                                                 month. Too young to enlist without
short of $5. Although we were                                                                   an adult signature, I asked my old-
required to report to work Monday                                                               est sister to sign the necessary
through Friday, we were paid only                                                               papers, and on Oct. 18, 1939, I was
if we were needed. Otherwise, we                                                                en route from Bluefield, W.Va., to
returned home without pay. Those                                                                Fort Thomas, Ky. Upon arrival at
who were fortunate worked three                                                                 Fort Thomas, I was physically and
days a week.                                                                                    mentally tested and then sent, still
   One evening the younger of my                                                                in my civilian clothes, directly to
two brothers and I were trying to                                                               what would be my home for the
sneak into a boxing arena. When                                                                 next three years, Company M, 10th
an official came to the door and                                                                Infantry Regiment, 5th Infantry
asked if anyone wanted to box, my                                                               Division.
brother volunteered me. We got in                                                                  I was not to become familiar with
free, but I lost the fight. I fought a                                                          the terms “basic training,” “boot
few more times before I entered the                                                             camp,” and “advanced training”
Army. I got three dollars if I lost,                                                            until I returned from Iceland in
and five dollars if I won. I usually                                                            1943. In the 10th Regiment, a sol-
picked up three dollars. At the age                                                             dier learned by on-the-job training.
of 16, I was going to work not                                                                  It was a difficult environment for a
                                                                 Photo courtesy Vernon Greene
knowing whether I was going to           Vernon Greene on the day he entered the Army, Oct.     tenderfoot. I lived with my peers,
earn a wage each day or whether I        18, 1939, at the age of 16.                            my leaders, my superiors and my

56                                                                                                                 Special Warfare
evaluators. There was little room for     cient in the ring, the decision was    NCOs. In a few words, he stated
me to err without being critiqued.        easy for me, especially after a pro-   that he would stop sending people
Punishment was readily available          fessional fighter knocked me out in    to the guardhouse, that the work
through extra guard duty, kitchen         my last fight.                         would be done, and that if we could
police, policing for match sticks and       In the fall of 1941 we took a        not get our soldiers to perform, we
cigarette butts, marking targets on       motor trip from Michigan to the        could turn in our stripes, and he
the rifle range, oral and written rep-    harbor in New York City. The Army      would find someone who could.
rimands, and reduction in rank by         did not want anyone to know that       Discipline improved.
local authority.                          we were on our way to Iceland to          German military air and sea
   Early in my 10th Infantry days,        augment the British forces who         power in the North Atlantic region
a corporal assembled about 30 of us       had been rushed there after the        had increased considerably after
new soldiers from different units         Germans took Norway. Later, we         the German invasion of Poland in
for basic close-order drill. He           learned that some of the British       September 1939 and of France in
showed us a black pen and said,           soldiers were veterans of Dunkirk.     1940. Prior to the U.S. entry into
“This is a yellow pen.” He then           They seemed twice our age, and         the war, German reconnaissance
walked up to each soldier and             they became valuable instructors       aircraft would fly over our firing
asked him the color of the pen.           and friends. During our stay in Ice-   ranges, but we were not permitted
Each soldier, including me,               land, we called our regiment the       to fire on them. One morning in
responded, “Yellow, Corporal.” He                                                December 1941, as the first
said, “That’s great. We understand                                               sergeant was about to dismiss us
each other.”
                                          I soon learned that being              from the 4 a.m. reveille formation,
   Late in 1939, we moved to Fort         both a good squad                      he said, “Oh, yes! The Japanese
McClellan, Ala., to join other units of                                          bombed Pearl Harbor. Dismissed!”
the 5th Infantry Division and to          leader and a good boxer                After that, we saw more enemy
spend a cold winter living in tents.                                             aircraft and submarines, and
At Fort McClellan we learned to
                                          required more time than                many allied ships were sunk en
function as a team during squad,          there was in a day.                    route to us and to our European
platoon, and larger-unit field exer-                                             allies. Caring for the shipwreck
cises. In the spring of 1940, the 5th     Because I loved soldier-               survivors     (mostly     Merchant
Infantry Division moved to Fort                                                  Marines) became an additional
Benning, Ga., for field maneuvers —
                                          ing, and because I was                 mission for us.
the largest peacetime field maneu-        not very proficient in the                On Oct. 24, 1942, I was promoted
vers in U.S. history — conducted in                                              to sergeant and appointed section
Louisiana and Texas.                      ring, the decision was                 leader of two machine-gun squads.
   In the fall of 1940 we moved into                                             Shortly thereafter, I appeared
new wooden barracks at Fort
                                          easy for me.                           before a board for Officer Candi-
Custer, Mich. — our first perma-                                                 date School and was selected for
nent shelters in more than a year.        10th Labor Regiment. We worked         the Infantry Officers’ School at
Our training there concentrated on        12 hours a day, seven days a week,     Fort Benning, Ga. Although I
individual proficiency and small-         primarily unloading ships and          attended OCS there, I did not grad-
unit tactics. By that time I had          building fortifications and roads.     uate, and I was assigned to Compa-
been promoted to corporal, and I          We also manned defensive posi-         ny M, 311th Infantry Regiment,
was the leader of a machine-gun           tions and patrolled the beaches.       78th (Lightning) Infantry Division,
squad. My promotion brought my            With our work schedule, the sum-       located at Camp Butner, N.C. The
monthly pay up to $42, from which         mer days and winter nights             division had been activated Aug.
I sent my mother an allotment. We         seemed even longer than they           15, 1942, from a reserve unit. Most
enjoyed our stay at Fort Custer. I        were. It was rumored that prison-      of the cadre were from the 29th
fought a few bouts, but I soon            ers in the guardhouse worked only      Infantry Regiment. They were
learned that being both a good            eight hours per day, five days a       much older than I, and they knew
squad leader and a good boxer             week. Perhaps the appeal of the        each other. I did not know any of
required more time than there was         guardhouse workday caused disci-       them. For the first time in my mil-
in a day. Because I loved soldiering,     pline to get out of hand. Our first    itary career, I was a replacement,
and because I was not very profi-         sergeant called a meeting of the       an unknown quantity.

September 2002                                                                                                   57
   I was assigned to be a section       the death, bravery, fear, sorrow and                  the division staff assembled the
leader to two machine-gun squads,       suffering of those operations would                   regimental commanders to discuss
the same position I had held in Ice-    require volumes, and I will leave                     the new offensive and to receive
land. Following three weeks of          the details to more gifted writers.                   the field orders. The 311th Infantry
maneuvers in South Carolina in            On Dec. 11, the 78th Division,                      Regiment was assigned the task of
November 1943, the division             now attached to V Corps and the                       seizing Kesternich and Huppen-
returned to Camp Butner to pre-         U.S. First Army, received the mis-                    broich. The 311th’s 2nd Battalion
pare for departure to the Second        sion to seize the town of Schmidt                     pried Kesternich away from the
Army maneuvers in Tennessee in          and to capture the Schwamme-                          Germans during a two-day battle.
January 1944. The month prior to        nauel Dam. However, the execution                     For this action, the 2nd Battalion
our departure, I was promoted to        of the mission was postponed                          was awarded the Presidential Unit
first sergeant, at age 20. For the      because of an increase in enemy air                   Citation. Staff Sergeant Jonah E.
next 2 1/2 months, we slogged our       and ground activities, including                      Kelley of the 2nd Battalion was
way through mud, through                the infiltration of enemy para-                       posthumously awarded the Medal
streams, and over mountains. We                                                               of Honor, the only one awarded to a
were being hardened for combat.                                                               member of the 78th Division dur-
On April 1, the division rolled into                                                          ing World War II.
a new station at Camp Pickett, Va.                                                               The 3rd Battalion (my battal-
   After undergoing many personnel                                                            ion), dressed in white camouflage
changes directed by Washington,                                                               suits, advanced over open, snow-
the division began field exercises at                                                         covered terrain, then crossed a cav-
the battalion, regimental, and com-                                                           ern-like ravine to reach Huppen-
bat team levels. By September,                                                                broich. The fierceness of the strug-
there was no doubt that the division                                                          gle is evidenced by the casualty list
was going overseas, and by Sept. 26,                                                          for the battle. The battlefield was
we were sailing for England. The                                                              liberally covered with dead sol-
78th Infantry Division spent                                                                  diers. More than a year later, while
approximately four weeks in                                                                   I was stationed at Camp Robinson,
Bournemouth, England, but by the                                                              Ark., I was surprised to receive the
end of November, it had moved to                                                              Silver Star for my minor role at
Tongres, Belgium. In December, the                                                            Huppenbroich.
78th moved into Germany, first to                                                                The way was now clear for fur-
the Rotgen area and then to the out-                                                          ther      action     against     the
skirts of Lammersdorf.                                                                        Schwammenauel          Dam      and
                                                               Photo courtesy Vernon Greene
   The 311th Regiment was intro-        Corporal Vernon Greene (top) with members of his      Schmidt. Still a first sergeant, I
duced to combat Dec. 9, 1944, when      machine-gun squad in Iceland, 1941.                   was assigned to be a platoon leader
the regiment took over 7,000 yards                                                            (a lieutenant’s position), in charge
of the line in the Hurtgen Forest,      troopers dropping into our zone.                      of four machine-gun squads. The
one of the bloodiest battlegrounds      The increased activity was part of                    3rd Battalion and other division
of the war. By Dec. 23, the snow-       the German counteroffensive into                      units received orders to move
lined foxholes of our defensive posi-   the Ardennes. The 78th was                            toward Schmidt, which was located
tion covered 12,000 yards. Our          instructed to halt its drive and to                   2 1/2 miles west of the Roer River.
positions were on the northern          take the defensive. The division’s                    Other divisions thrown against
shoulder of the Ardennes salient,       sector, north of the enemy thrust,                    Schmidt had been driven back with
the “Bulge.” With Germans on            had to be held, so the 78th’s sol-                    heavy losses.
three sides of us, we stayed there      diers dug into the snow and pre-                         The plan called for us to ride
until Jan. 30, 1945. During 130         pared coordinated defensive posi-                     into Schmidt on tanks. We had dif-
days of continuous combat, the          tions throughout the sector.                          ficulty finding the tanks and load-
311th fought in the Hurtgen For-           By mid-January, the German                         ing onto them because of incoming
est, on the Siegfried Line, in          offensive into the Ardennes had                       artillery fire and a lack of commu-
Nideggen, along the Roer River, on      been smashed, and the 78th pre-                       nication with the tank crews.
the Cologne plain, in Remagen, and      pared to resume the offensive. On                     When we were about 200 yards
in the Ruhr Pocket. To tell fully of    Jan. 28, during a heavy snowfall,                     from Schmidt, the lead tank was

58                                                                                                                Special Warfare
knocked out by an anti-tank gun          lar opposite the second-lieutenant    Roman town with a population of
located near the edge of town. The       bar. That gesture concluded my        about 5,000. As a place from which
other tanks turned and started           commissioning, and I went back to     we could launch an attack across
toward the rear. My battalion com-       the war.                              the Rhine, Remagen offered many
mander ordered us off the tanks.           When I returned to the 311th,       difficulties, but it had a double-
We assembled our platoons,               Schmidt and the Schwammenauel         track railroad bridge, just over
moved rapidly across the open            dam had been secured, and the         1,000 feet long, that had been built
fields and dispersed toward the          311th had crossed the Roer River      at the end of World War I.
town. Bullets from machine guns          at Zerkall and Nideggen. I was          The 311th was placed under the
zinged overhead while the enemy          pleased to be back home. It was a     command of Brigadier General
gunners adjusted their range. For-       bit awkward for my friends to call    William M. Hoge, commander of
tunately, most of the enemy              me “sir” instead of Sergeant          the 9th Armored Division, for the
artillery was targeted on our            Greene. I wondered what they          expansion of the Remagen bridge-
assembly areas, now vacant. With         called me behind my back.             head. Hoge informed the 311th’s
adjacent units, we reached the             Although none of us knew it, we     commander, Colonel Chester Will-
center of town by nightfall. After                                             ingham, that he wanted one battal-
dark, tank crews on foot led their                                             ion of the regiment to move east
tanks forward in low gear to our
                                         I was surprised when the              astride the main highway in the
new defensive positions.                 general took the crossed              HovelHimberg area, and the rest of
   The 311th was instructed to                                                 the regiment to move north, in a
assemble in Schmidt as the divi-         rifles from the collar of a           column of battalions, along the east
sion reserve. While we were there,                                             bank of the Rhine River to Honnef.
I received mysterious orders: 1.
                                         lieutenant colonel and                  Early on March 8, the 311th
Take a driver, a jeep with a full        placed them on my collar              rushed in to the bridge at Remagen
tank of gas, and a five-gallon can of                                          to cross the Rhine and to expand
gas; 2. Go to the regimental head-       opposite the second-                  the bridgehead. Riding in trucks,
quarters, take a bath, get a clean                                             the regiment rolled through the
uniform and report to the adjutant.
                                         lieutenant bar. That ges-             rubble of crumbled rock, aban-
I did as I was told. When I reported     ture concluded my com-                doned equipment and mangled
to the adjutant, I was formally dis-                                           bodies that littered Remagen. The
charged from the Army of the U.S.        missioning, and I went                1st Battalion, in the lead, moved
and told to report to the 78th Divi-                                           across the bridge and toward the
sion headquarters. There I was
                                         back to the war.                      front line, which was about 1,000
given a hot meal and a bed and                                                 yards from the bridge. Because of
instructed to eat breakfast early        were about to end the slow, tough     an increase in combat activity, the
and be ready to meet the division        fighting of the previous months       2nd and 3rd battalions had to dis-
commander, Major General Edwin           and begin the race to the Rhine       mount from their trucks west of
P. Parker Jr., at 8 a.m. the next day.   River. None of us could have          the Rhine and follow on foot, bring-
   The next morning I was seated         guessed that within a month, we       ing only their personal weapons.
in a room filled with officers when      would be on the east bank of the      The heavier, crew-served weapons
General Parker entered. All pres-        Rhine. Along a route of attack that   (machine guns, etc.) that would
ent snapped to attention. I was          was thickly wooded and hilly, the     have provided needed firepower
introduced to the general, an out-       regiment slugged its way forward      would follow later, on vehicles.
standing soldier, who swore me           against elements of the proud 3rd     Enemy bomber- and fighter-air-
into the Army of the U.S. as a sec-      Parachute Division and other Ger-     craft activity, added to the Ger-
ond lieutenant and placed a gold         man units. Town after town fell       man’s effective field artillery,
bar on my collar after the adjutant      rapidly. Late in the afternoon of     encouraged us to move rapidly. The
read that I was commissioned “for        March 7, after a day of hard fight-   311th was the first complete U.S.
the duration of the war plus six         ing, troops of the U.S. 9th Armored   infantry regiment to cross the
months.” I was surprised when the        Division reached the west bank of     Rhine.
general took the crossed rifles          the Rhine at the town of Remagen,       By 3:30 p.m. on March 8, the
from the collar of a lieutenant          midway between Cologne and            311th, fighting to expand the cru-
colonel and placed them on my col-       Koblenz. Remagen was an old           cial bridgehead, had closed on

September 2002                                                                                                  59
                                                                                  wired the necessary explosives for
                                                                                  its detonation. They made several
                                                                                  unsuccessful attempts to detonate
                                                                                  the explosives. On March 15, the
                                                                                  Germans sent bombers against the
                                                                                  bridge, and swimmers armed with
                                                                                  explosives. They also used a large
                                                                                  railroad gun and V2 rockets to
                                                                                  attack the bridge. On March 17,
                                                                                  the bridge at Remagen collapsed.
                                                                                  The Allied armies had drawn up
                                                                                  along the entire length of the
                                                                                  Rhine’s west bank to attack in con-
                                                                                  junction with the largest air
                                                                                  assault of World War II, which
                 The 10th SF Group Coin                                           occurred March 24.
                                                                                     In late March, as the 78th Divi-
        In July 1969, while commander of the 10th Special Forces Group,           sion was defending the First
     Vernon Greene designed a coin intended to give the soldiers of the           Army’s northern flank along the
     10th SF Group a sense of pride in their unit. According to the 50th-         Sieg River, the 311th Regiment
     anniversary annual published by the 10th SF Group in 2002, “A tra-           was relieved of duty for a five-day
     dition was thus begun, calling for each Group member, past and pres-         period of rest, recuperation, and
     ent, to carry his coin at all times.”                                        training. Following those wonder-
        On the front of the coin, beneath the unit’s official designation, is a   ful days, we were ordered to occupy
     replica of the Trojan-horse crest worn by members of the 10th SF Group       newly acquired territory along the
     on their berets during the 1950s, when the beret was still unofficial. The   Sieg River. The regiment remained
     reverse side of the coin features a scroll with the Special Forces motto,    in this position while other ele-
     “De Oppresso Liber.” Beneath the scroll is an image of a beret carrying      ments of the First Army conducted
     the SF crest. Below the beret is a large scroll that has space for engrav-   a pincers movement to encircle the
     ing the owner’s name. Below that is another scroll with the words, “The      Ruhr Valley, Germany’s richest
     Best,” which according to the annual, “signifies the goal of the Group and   industrial district. Later, attack
     all its members — pre-eminence in all endeavors.”                            orders placed the 78th Division in
        The original die for the coin was produced by the Robbins Manu-           an offensive movement that was to
     facturing Company of Attleboro, Mass., which the annual says has             culminate with the capture of Wup-
     minted all the coins to date. The 10th SF Group retains exclusive            pertal (estimated population:
     rights to the use of the coin.                                               270,000). This maneuver played an
                                                                                  important role in the elimination of
                                                                                  the area called “The Ruhr Pocket,”
Erpel. By nightfall, the 311th was         a 60-hour accounting reported that     from which about 300,000 prison-
joined by two armored infantry             578 German soldiers were brought       ers were taken by our forces.
battalions of the 9th Armored Divi-        to our prisoner-of-war cages.             As a subordinate unit, the 311th
sion; one battalion of the 47th              On March 10, Army engineers          advanced about seven miles per
Infantry, 9th Infantry Division; a         began constructing a pontoon           day for eight days. Wide attacking
troop of the 89th Cavalry Recon-           bridge and a treadway bridge that      zones, rugged terrain, and piece-
naissance Squadron; one company            were needed to replace the dam-        meal resistance of the enemy dic-
of the 656th Tank Destroyer Bat-           aged railway bridge at Remagen.        tated the nature of the action in
talion; and the 1st Battalion, 310th       The Remagen bridgehead, 10 miles       the pocket. The climax of the regi-
Infantry, 78th Infantry Division. In       deep and 30 miles long, posed a        ment’s drive came with the capture
all, the U.S. force amounted to no         serious threat to the heart of Ger-    of Wuppertal on April 16, which
more than a few thousand men and           many. The Germans had planned          proved to be our last day of combat.
a handful of armor. While the total        to blow up the bridge rather than      The Ruhr Pocket was not exactly a
cost to the Germans was unknown,           let it be captured, and they had       picnic, as the regiment suffered 37
                                                                                  men killed and 218 wounded. On

60                                                                                                   Special Warfare
the credit side of the ledger, we cap-   bled because he appeared to be fin-     and our accomplishments of years
tured 266 towns, overran 149             ishing a four-year tour overseas,       past. I wish every American citizen
square miles of territory, took more     and I was pleased because he was        could make a trip of that sort; it
than 15,000 prisoners, and cap-          still “vertical and mobile.”            might give them a better idea of
tured large quantities of materiel         When we arrived in New York,          where we have been and who we
and equipment.                           Red Cross ladies greeted us with        are.
   In addition to performing many        smiles, coffee and doughnuts.              It is a pleasure now to reflect on
small, time-consuming tasks, the         Everywhere, we were greeted with        these significant years of my
311th Regiment also assisted in          unhesitating handshakes or pats on      youth. With time, the recollections
securing First Army communica-           the back. What a contrast that wel-     of ice-covered foxholes, the rip of
tion and supply lines against any        come was to the silent treatment we     burp guns, and the screams of the
guerrilla-warfare activities that        received upon our return from           wounded have dimmed, but the
the enemy might instigate. These         Korea. An even greater contrast         friendships formed during the com-
tasks continued after the uncondi-       was the reception we received when      mon danger of war remain forever
tional surrender of Germany on                                                   bright. My old companions, my cur-
May 7 at Rheims, France.                                                         rent pillar of friends and my won-
   Another task was tending to the       With time, the recollec-                derful family form my cornerstone.
thousands of displaced persons the                                               To all these, I dedicate these
Germans had brought from con-
                                         tions of ice-covered fox-               remembrances.
quered countries to be used as           holes, the rip of burp
slave labor. We assisted in feeding,
clothing and housing these people        guns, and the screams                      Colonel Vernon E.
until they could be returned to                                                  Greene’s 34 years in
their homes. However, some of
                                         of the wounded have                     the U.S. Army in-
these individuals attempted to loot      dimmed, but the friend-                 clude service during
German houses and farms. We                                                      World War II, the
attempted to maintain law and            ships formed during the                 Korean War and the
order in the communities through-                                                Vietnam War. Colonel
out our assigned areas.
                                         common danger of war                    Greene enlisted in 1939 at the age
   During this period, the ground        remain forever bright.                  of 16, became a first sergeant at the
forces in Europe provided a source                                               age of 20 and received a battlefield
of manpower for the expected inva-                                               commission while serving in
sion of Japan. The 78th Division         we returned from Vietnam: U.S. cit-     Europe during World War II. His
was sent to Berlin as part of the        izens carrying protest posters and      duty assignments include service
occupation force. Earlier, I had let     calling us murderers. Maybe those       both at NATO headquarters and at
it be known that I wished to             later reception groups were not suf-    SHAPE headquarters. While in
remain in the Army after the war. I      ficiently aware of our governmental     Special Forces, he served as an SF
was placed in the 70th Infantry          structure to know that their duly-      staff officer in the Military Assist-
Division, a unit that was deploying      elected civilian officials had placed   ance Command, Vietnam; served at
to the Far East. We were moved to        the soldiers in harm’s way. Why spit    the Special Warfare Center as a
France to await ship transporta-         on the uniform?                         division chief and as an instructor
tion through the Suez Canal. The            In May 2000, I had the privilege     in the SF School; served as a mem-
victory over Japan came while I          of visiting the area in Europe over     ber of the 7th SF Group; and served
was in France. I had accumulated         which we had fought 55 years ear-       as commander of the 10th SF
enough credit points to return to        lier. We visited battlesites as well    Group (1968 to 1970). Colonel
the U.S. early, and my port of           as two cemeteries, one in Belgium       Greene attended the Army War Col-
embarkation was changed to a port        and the other in Holland, where         lege and the National War College.
in the Normandy area. As I board-        thousands of American soldiers are      Following his retirement from the
ed the ship, I was humbled and           buried. In Belgium, Holland and         Army in 1974, he taught at both the
pleased to recognize a soldier who       Germany, people ranging from            high-school and community-college
had been in Company M, 10th              mayors to school children were          level for several years.
Infantry, when we were sent to Ice-      eager to tell us how much they
land in the fall of 1941. I was hum-     appreciate our friendship today

September 2002                                                                                                     61
Foreign SOF
                                                 Special Warfare


    Moscow reports Israelis            According to Russian reports,former Russian servicemen who have settled in Israel are
recruiting Russian veterans            being recruited by the Israeli military. Former marine and airborne soldiers, as well as
                                       others who have served in Chechnya and in other Russian conflict areas, are said to be
                                       especially sought. While the recruiting action incorporates the skills of former soldiers
                                       into the Israeli forces, it also lowers the unemployment rate among Russian émigrés.

        Mexico’s Yucatan state         While the Mexican Attorney General’s Office has undertaken a “weapons for provisions”
     to create armed auxiliary         trade-in program in Yucatan state to reduce drug and other criminal violence, Mexican
                                       military authorities in the 32nd Military Zone are creating an armed auxiliary .Under the
                                       military’s plan, armed contingents will be drawn from the local populations in eastern
                                       rural areas of Yucatan to assist the army when necessary   .The auxiliary will be required
                                       to provide assistance during natural disasters and to provide back-up in combating drug
                                       traffickers and other criminals. The auxiliary will comprise 21 10-man squads. After
                                       receiving basic weapons training and self-defense training, the members of the auxiliary
                                       will be armed with “short-range” weapons (presumably shotguns).The program is anal-
                                       ogous to other efforts in Central and South America that deal with organized criminal
                                       and insurgent activities in areas where the military or police presence is limited.

     Tri-Border area may have          In the wake of the Sept.11,2001,terrorist attacks on the U.S.,a number of regions have
             links to terrorism        received scrutiny as potential vectors of international terrorism. One of those regions
                                       is the “Tri-Border”area of Argentina,Paraguay and Brazil,where frontiers of the three
                                       countries come together. Like many frontier regions, the Tri-Border area has become
                                       known for its smuggling ventures and other assorted criminal enterprises.The largest
                                       Arab community in Latin America is centered in the area,and some of the Arab inhab-
                                       itants are said to be strongly anti-U.S.and anti-Israel in their views.Because of the sub-
                                       stantial Islamic population in the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este and in the sur-
                                       rounding area, and because of enduring reports of terrorist training camps, rest areas,
                                       and terrorist-associated alien and materiel smuggling, the area has also been consid-
                                       ered a potential jump-off point for international terrorist activity.Recent developments
                                       have fueled further interest.For example,the importing of 30,000 ski masks to Ciudad
                                       del Este by a Lebanese importer who had connections to the area raised many ques-
                                       tions and suggested a terrorist nexus. So, too, did the Brazilian arrest of Egyptian
                                       Mohammed Ali Abul-Mahdi Ibrahim Soliman, an alleged member of the extremist
                                       group Gamaa Islamiya,which has cells in Brazil and in Ciudad del Este,and ties to al-
                                       Qaeda. Growing foreign interest regarding terrorist links to the Tri-Border area has
                                       sometimes provoked strong adverse reaction both from the respective national gov-
                                       ernments and from media commentators. For example, statements made by senior
                                       U.S. government representatives in May about the existence of terrorists in the Tri-
                                       Border area sparked irritation and denials from regional commentators.Nevertheless,
                                       the area is likely to remain an object of interest for international-security specialists.




  Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies
Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

62                                                                                                           Special Warfare
                          Enlisted Career Notes
                                       Special Warfare


    PSYOP gains additional     The Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations Proponency
    drill-sergeant positions   Office has negotiated the expansion of the role of the PSYOP specialist in
                               the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s drill-sergeant program.
                               Beginning in mid-2003, the PSYOP MOS (37F) will gain four authoriza-
                               tions for E6 drill sergeants at Fort Benning, Ga. The positions will support
                               one-station unit training in Fort Benning’s Infantry Training Brigade.
                               Selection for the positions will be highly competitive. A drill-sergeant
                               assignment will provide outstanding opportunities for a soldier to enhance
                               his individual leadership skills. Because it may also carry a great deal of
                               weight with senior enlisted promotion boards, the assignment may also
                               enhance the soldier’s opportunities for career progression. The SF/PSYOP
                               Enlisted Branch at PERSCOM will begin selecting soldiers for the male-
                               only positions in October 2002, based on the following criteria (in order of
                               precedence):
                                • At least 18 months of successful tactical leadership experience in the
                                  9th PSYOP Battalion and a combat-arms-secondary MOS.
                                • At least 18 months of successful tactical leadership experience in the
                                  9th PSYOP Battalion.
                                • At least 18 months of successful leadership experience in PSYOP and a
                                  combat-arms-secondary MOS.
                               The selection criteria emphasize the importance of successful tactical lead-
                               ership experience. Soldiers who are interested in the drill-sergeant posi-
                               tions or who are interested in obtaining more information should contact
                               SFC Neil Dziemian in the PERSCOM SF/PSYOP Enlisted Branch at DSN
                               221-8901 or commercial (703) 325-8901; or send e-mail to: Neil.Dziemi-
                               an@hoffman.army.mil. Soldiers may also contact Sergeant Major Eric
                               Scheib, SWCS SOPO, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or
                               send e-mail to: scheibe@soc.mil.




September 2002                                                                                          63
Officer Career Notes
                                           Special Warfare


      Major promotion board       The 2002 reserve-component major promotion board considered 106 offi-
       selects 65 CA officers     cers in the Civil Affairs Branch and selected 65. The selection rate for the
                                  CA branch continues to be higher than the average rate for the Army
                                  Reserve. The following table summarizes the CA Branch’s results:
                                                                       Considered      Selected     % Selected
                                    USAR (previously considered)           1990          288            14
                                    CA (previously considered)               16            6            38
                                    USAR (first consideration)             4533         1745            38
                                    CA (first consideration)                 90           59            66
                                    USAR (total)                           6523         2033            31
                                    CA (total)                              106           65            61
                                  For additional information, telephone Major Charles R. Munguia at DSN 239-
                                  6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or send e-mail to: munguich@soc.mil.


  FA 39 LTC promotion rate        The FY 2002 lieutenant-colonel promotion board was the first promotion board to
 dips below Army’s average        be held under Officer Personnel Management System III.The board considered 68
                                  officers who were members of FA 39 and selected 19. The board selected one offi-
                                  cer above the zone, 15 officers in the promotion zone and three officers below the
                                  zone. The FA-39 promotion-zone selection rate of 71.4 percent was slightly below
                                  the Army’s promotion-zone rate of 77.3 percent, but the FA 39 below-the-zone
                                  selection rate of 11.5 percent was double the Army’s rate.


     FY 2004 LTC command          The FY 2004 lieutenant-colonel command board will convene Oct. 1, 2002. The
board will fill FA 39 positions   following commands will be available to FA 39 officers: 1st PSYOP Battalion, 4th
                                  PSYOP Group (FA 39B); 3rd PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group (FA 39B);
                                  ARFOR, JTF-B (FA 39A); 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (FA
                                  39A); 96th CA Battalion (FA 39C). The Department of the Army has approved
                                  the addition of the 4th PSYOP Group’s PACOM battalion (FA 39B) to the list of
                                  commands that will be available to FA 39 officers during the FY 2004 board.


     FA 39 officers may apply     FA 39 officers may request that both their military and civilian experience be
       for constructive credit    considered as a basis for granting constructive credit toward completion of the
                                  Regional Studies Course. To be considered for constructive credit, applicants
                                  must submit a memorandum that addresses the following qualifications:
                                  • Political-military analytical proficiency. The officer must have experi-
                                     ence that demonstrates a proficiency in international studies and in
                                     political-military analysis related to the use of special operations.
                                  • Regional expertise. The officer must have experience that demonstrates perform-
                                     ance of a comprehensive, detailed area analysis of a region of concentration.
                                  • Cultural expertise. The officer must have experience that demonstrates possession
                                     of the skills necessary for successful communication across cultural boundaries.
                                  • Comparative political studies. The officer must have experience that


64                                                                                                 Special Warfare
                                    demonstrates an understanding of major modern political ideologies.
                                  • Economics. The officer must have experience that demonstrates an understand-
                                    ing of the basic theories of national and international economic phenomena.
                                  When requesting the substitution of college or graduate-level courses for
                                  experience, applicants must furnish course descriptions. Requests must be
                                  submitted to the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, Attn: Jeanne
                                  Goldmann. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann at DSN
                                  239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406; or send e-mail to: goldmanj@soc.mil.


 SWCS, USASOC, DA pursue          The JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations Propo-
 SF warrant-officer initiatives   nency Office, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the Depart-
                                  ment of the Army are pursuing several initiatives to assist in the recruit-
                                  ing and retention of Special Forces warrant officers.
                                  Short-term
                                   • NCOs who become SF warrant officers will be able to retain their spe-
                                     cial-duty assignment pay as a part of “save pay.” This action is expected
                                     to be approved shortly and should become effective in October 2002.
                                   • SOPO has requested that DA allow SF sergeants first class who become SF war-
                                     rant officers to be promoted to CWO 2 when they complete the SF Warrant Offi-
                                     cer Basic Course. This initiative, if approved, is anticipated to last only two years.
                                  Long-term
                                   • SOPO has requested a warrant-officer accession bonus for NCOs who
                                     become SF warrant officers. The proposal is being considered by DA and
                                     is expected to be approved for implementation in FY 2004.
                                   • SOPO has requested a critical-skills retention bonus for CWO 3s and CWO 4s in
                                     MOS 180A.
                                   • SOPO has requested that designated SF warrant officers below the
                                     rank of CWO 5 be allowed to serve 24 years of warrant-officer service.
                                     The Warrant Officer Management Act requires warrant officers below
                                     the grade of CWO 5 to retire when they reach 24 years of warrant-offi-
                                     cer service or 30 years of active federal service, whichever comes first.
                                   • SOPO has requested that the Army adjust the pay scales for warrant officers so
                                     that an NCO who becomes a warrant officer will not have to rely on “save pay.”

 PERSCOM points of contact           SF Branch chief                      LTC Dave Maxwell
                                                                          DSN 221-3173
                                     LTC assignments                      MAJ (P) Jack Jensen
                                                                          DSN 221-3169
                                     MAJ assignments                      MAJ Ken Hunt
                                                                          DSN 221-5739
                                     CPT assignments                      CPT Steve Johnson
                                                                          DSN 221-3175
                                     Accessions                           CPT Joe Lopez
                                                                          DSN 221-3178
                                     Field-grade technician               Ms. Sandra Bryant
                                                                          DSN 221-7915
                                     Accessions/CPT technician            Ms. Pam Redman
                                                                          DSN 221-2452




September 2002                                                                                                          65
Update
                                                        Special Warfare


Kensinger takes command                                                                              Runners-up were Specialist
of USASOC                                                                                          Aaron J. Laurich, Company C, 1st
                                                                                                   Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment,
   Lieutenant General Philip R.                                                                    Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.; and
Kensinger Jr. took command of the                                                                  Staff Sergeant Thomas N. White,
U.S. Army Special Operations                                                                       Headquarters and Headquarters
Command from Lieutenant Gener-                                                                     Company, U.S. Army Special Oper-
al Doug Brown in a ceremony at                                                                     ations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C.
Fort Bragg Aug. 29.
   Kensinger was formerly the Army                                                                 SWCS videotapes available
assistant deputy chief of staff for                                                                through DoD Web site
operations. His special-operations
assignments include commander,                                                                        Two videotape products pro-
Special Operations Command-Cen-                                                                    duced at the JFK Special Warfare
tral; deputy commanding general                                                                    Center and School are now avail-
                                            The emblem of the Army Special Operations Battle Lab   able to requestors through a
and chief of staff, USASOC; com-
mander, 3rd SF Group; commander,            Trojan horse head denotes cunning                      Department of Defense Web site.
1st Battalion, 5th SF Group; execu-         and stealth, and the scales symbolize                     The mountaineering video series,
tive officer, 3rd Battalion, 7th SF         analysis and assessment. The check-                    produced at the request of the 10th
Group; commander, SF Battalion              ered field in perspective symbolizes                   Special Forces Group, consists of six
Task Force, Joint Task Force 11, in         strategy and simulation directed                       videotapes: “Basic Mountaineering”
Honduras; and detachment com-               toward a future horizon. The torch                     (production identification number, or
mander in the 7th SF Group.                 reflects learning and guidance; the                    PIN, 710962);“Level 2 Mountaineering
   Kensinger is a 1970 graduate of          shield represents national defense;                    Techniques Part 1” (PIN 710963);
the U.S. Military Academy. He               and the wreath represents honor and                    “Level 2 Mountaineering Techniques
earned a master’s degree from               high achievement.                                      Part 2” (PIN 710963);“Mountaineering
Louisiana State University in 1980.                                                                Rescue” (PIN 710964); “Backpacking
   Brown is slated to become the deputy     USASOC announces                                       with Mules and Llamas” (PIN
commander of the U.S. Special Opera-        Soldier, NCO of Year                                   710965); and “Medical and Weather
tions Command, MacDill AFB, Fla.                                                                   Considerations in a Mountain Envi-
                                               The U.S. Army Special Opera-                        ronment” (PIN 710966).
                                            tions Command announced the
Emblem represents                                                                                     The second videotape, “Army Oil
                                            winners of the Soldier and NCO of                      Analysis Program” (PIN 711439),
ARSOBL’s missions                           the Year competition July 25.                          was produced for all Army units
   The Special Warfare Center and              The USASOC Soldier of the Year                      and Army laboratories.
School’s Army Special Operations            is Specialist Joshua C. Simmons, a                        To order copies of these training
Battle Lab, or ARSOBL, now has              radio and communications security                      products, visit the following Web
its own emblem.                             repairer with Company A, Support                       site: http://dodimagery.afis.osd.mil.
   The emblem was created by the            Battalion, 1st Special Warfare                         Click on “Central DoD Production
Army Institute of Heraldry. The five        Training Group, JFK Special War-                       Database DAVIS/DITIS,” then
lightning bolts represent the following:    fare Center and School.                                search for videos by subject, title or
Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psycholog-      The USASOC NCO of the Year is                       PIN. The database will allow
ical Operations, Special Operations         Staff Sergeant Peter N. Johnson, an                    requestors to locate most special-
Aviation and Rangers; sea, air, land,       Army Reserve psychological-opera-                      operations training subjects. The
space and information; or concept           tions specialist assigned to Headquar-                 videotapes are free to requestors
development, war gaming, simulation,        ters Support Company, 17th Psycho-                     within DoD. Because of their con-
experimentation and analysis. The           logical Operations Battalion, Joliet, Ill.

66                                                                                                                     Special Warfare
tent, some video products may             State University in 1985.                   ucts can be difficult. Correlating a
have limited distribution and will          His previous assignments include          significant behavioral response
not be available to all requestors.       division telecommunications officer,        with a specific PSYOP activity is
   The mountaineering and oil-analy-      platoon leader and executive officer,       another difficult but necessary
sis tapes were produced by SWCS’s         123rd Signal Battalion, 3rd Infantry        step. A third critical step is deter-
Audiovisual Branch, Directorate Man-      Division, Wuerzburg, Germany; and           mining whether the PSYOP objec-
agement Office, Directorate of Train-     assistant division signal officer, signal   tive has been met.
ing and Doctrine. For additional infor-   battalion operations officer and secre-        The MOE model recommends a
mation, telephone Diana Wells, DMO        tary of the general staff, 25th Infantry    systematic approach that would
AV Branch, at DSN 239-2472 or com-        Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.       consider tasks at the “micro” and
mercial (910)432-2472.                      Bell, who had commanded the               “macro” levels, from the analysis,
                                          112th since June 29, 2000, will             planning and development process-
96th CA Battalion soldiers                attend the Air War College,                 es through the execution of pro-
receive awards for OEF                    Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. —              grams. The model examines the
   Forty-nine soldiers from the 96th      Barbara Ashley, USASOC PAO                  PSYOP objectives, themes, collec-
Civil Affairs Battalion received                                                      tive and individual tasks, and
                                          Efforts to measure PSYOP                    product introduction. It also exam-
awards Aug. 26 for their efforts dur-
ing Operation Enduring Freedom.           effectiveness continue                      ines behavioral responses in order
   Awards included the Bronze Star           The Special Warfare Center and           to determine the level of success.
Medal, the Army Commendation              School’s Psychological Operations           Specifically, it examines task exe-
Medal with “V” device, the Combat         Training and Doctrine Division is           cution during the planning, prepar-
Infantryman Badge, the Combat             encouraging all sectors of the              ing, distributing and disseminating
Medical Badge, the Navy and               PSYOP community to help                     phases of a PSYOP campaign.
Marine Corps Achievement Medal            improve the success of PSYOP by                Members of the PSYOP communi-
and the Army Achievement Medal.           offering recommendations for                ty may derive worthwhile informa-
   The soldiers had been deployed to      refining the recently proposed              tion regarding the effectiveness of
either Afghanistan or the Philip-         PSYOP measures-of-effectiveness,            past and present PSYOP programs
pines, assisting those nations with       or MOE, model.                              from the following documents:
the task of eliminating terrorism and        The MOE model offers a means of           • Situation reports from strategic,
rebuilding infrastructure. The sol-       evaluating PSYOP effectiveness by              operational and tactical mis-
diers also provided food and techni-      examining PSYOP task execution and             sions and exercises.
cal assistance to local populations.      target-audience behavioral responses         • After-action reviews.
   “We went there as a group. … All       (Special Warfare, June 2002, 67). The        • Reports of PSYOP or IO working
that we do … is a team concept,           PSYOP Training and Doctrine Divi-              groups.
and I am just one of the members          sion is working to refine the proposed       • Evaluations       performed     by
of a team,” said Sergeant First           MOE model in order to produce a valid          PSYOP assessment teams.
Class Byron R. Shrader, a medic           methodology that can assess the accu-        • Campaign plans and programs.
assigned to the 96th, who received        racy, persuasiveness and productivity        • Notes or logs.
both the Army Commendation                of PSYOP products.                           • Intelligence      requests     for
Medal with “V” device and the                U.S. military PSYOP specialists             PSYOP-relevant information.
Combat Medical Badge.                     target the emotions, motives and             • Survey research proposals and
                                          reasoning of foreign governments,              designs.
112th SOSB receives new                   organizations, groups and individ-             The MOE project will be a long-
commander                                 uals to effect attitudinal and              term endeavor, and the PSYOP
                                          behavioral changes consistent with          Training and Doctrine Division will
  Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Gal-                                                    provide periodic updates. To submit
lagher took command of the 112th          U.S. policy objectives. They analyze
                                          numerous factors while trying to            recommendations or to obtain more
Special Operations Signal Battal-                                                     information, telephone Lynn Gilfus,
ion from Lieutenant Colonel               develop effective PSYOP programs.
                                          But, given the unpredictability of          project officer, at DSN 236-1318 or
Robert T. Bell Jr. in a ceremony at                                                   commercial (910) 396-1318; or e-mail
Fort Bragg July 3.                        human behavior and the cultural,
                                          historical, social and environmen-          gilfusl@soc.mil.
  Gallagher, a native of Pittsburg,
Kan., received his commission             tal factors that can affect a partic-
through the Reserve Officer Train-        ular target audience, measuring
ing Corps program at Pittsburg            the effectiveness of PSYOP prod-


September 2002                                                                                                          67
Book Reviews
                                                  Special Warfare


The Last Battle: The Mayaguez                                                      were shot down. In Wetterhahn’s
Incident and the End of the                                                        account, they seem to care only about
Vietnam War. By Ralph Wetter-                                                      the public-relations potential of pro-
hahn. New York: Carroll & Graf                                                     viding the American people with an
Publishers, 2001. ISBN: 0-7867-                                                    apparent victory. The Marines appear
0858-1. 400 pages. $27.                                                            to be led by officers who only want to
                                                                                   kill and who care little for their men.
   Ralph Wetterhahn’s The Last                                                     Conversely, the Cambodians appear
Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and                                                  to be the ones who were attacked. The
the End of the Vietnam War tells                                                   Cambodian motive for seizing the
the story of the seizure of the                                                    ship is not covered, and the book con-
United States merchant vessel                                                      tains very little of the murderous his-
Mayaquez by the Khmer Rouge in                                                     tory of the Cambodian regime of Pol
1975. The operation to rescue the                                                  Pot. As a historical analysis, the book
vessel and its crew was this                                                       displays clear bias.
reviewer’s first combat mission: I                                                    Wetterhahn also fails to verify some
was a second lieutenant flying one                                                 of his information. The most glaring
of the HH-53 rescue helicopters.                                                   example is that he accepts as true the
   In The Last Battle, Wetterhahn                                                  Khmer assertion that 72 men held off
presents two stories. The first is an                                              the U.S. Marines, airstrikes and heli-
account of his visit to the island of    leaders of the forces of the Marines,     copters. But in A Very Short War, an
Koh Tang during the late 1990s, as a     Navy and Air Force. He also tells         earlier book about the Mayaguez inci-
member of JTF Full Accounting.           the stories of the fighters them-         dent, Dr. John F. Guilmartin confirmed
Cambodians and Americans fought          selves — the captains, sergeants          that Khmer casualties were 50 killed
at Koh Tang May 15, 1975, over the       and lance corporals — and explains        in action and more than 70 wounded.
Mayaquez and its crew, which the         the chaos of battle, the shooting-        Wetterhahn seems to have put his
Cambodians had seized. Wetterhahn        down of helicopters and even the          story of the battle together in order to
tells how he and others searched for     workings of tactical communica-           provide context to the search for the
the remains of the Americans left on     tions in each aircraft. Wetterhahn        missing Marines. In doing so, he put
that battlefield and in the wreckage     also includes the experiences of a        his story together hastily and
of the helicopters that had crashed      member of the Mayaguez crew and           researched it poorly.
and sank offshore.                       the memories of one of the Khmer             It is sad that the story of the search
   Wetterhahn’s first-person narra-      company commanders, whom he               for and the recovery of the Marines —
tive of the search and of the discov-    interviewed during the 1990s.             Joseph Hargrove, Gary Hall and
ery of the remains of three Marines         Wetterhahn manages to sustain an       Danny Marshall — is overshadowed
who were missing in action estab-        interesting narrative. He keeps the       by the errors in the story of the
lishes his credibility. Then, from       reader informed regarding the point       Mayaguez incident and in the author’s
telling the tale of researchers dig-     of view and the time of the action, and   “blame America” analysis. In making
ging for bones and relics, Wetter-       he provides some good observations        the search and recovery a small part of
hahn flashes back to the story of        on the chaos of battle. But his analy-    the book, Wetterhahn missed his
the battle itself, which he tells from   sis of the motives of the U.S. leaders,   chance. The Last Battle could have
various points of view.                  whom he appears to despise, is ques-      been a tale about the perseverance to
   His account relates decisions         tionable. Those leaders are shown as      give closure to three men’s lives. That
made at the White House by then-         devoid of concern about the crew of       tale should have been the largest part
President Gerald Ford and his staff,     the merchant ship, the Marines in         of the book. It is one in which Wetter-
as well as decisions made by the         battle, and the helicopter crews who      hahn took part personally, and it is one

68                                                                                                       Special Warfare
that he could easily have gotten right.    eties are pushed in seemingly con-      peace groups. The members of the
As it is, the reader is unsure what to     tradictory directions. Access to        network shared information and
believe, because so little care was        information makes hierarchies less      coordinated their activities, and
taken with so many facts. The bottom       efficient: Component groups may         NGOs “swarmed” on Mexico, both
line of this review is that Wetterhahn     not feel it necessary to participate    physically and electronically.
tries to do too much, tries to analyze     in a state hierarchy of groups that        The fourth section focuses on some
too many characters, and strays from       have different interests. At the        paradigms for thinking about conflict
the facts. Overall, The Last Battle is a   same time, groups and individuals       in the information age. Whoever mas-
good read — spoiled.                       that are geographically dispersed       ters the network form of organization
                                           can form supranational communi-         will realize a major advantage. Mili-
  BG Richard Comer                         ties, based on a common element         tary and government organizations
  U.S. Air Force                           that transcends national borders.       will need to establish network-hierar-
  Hurlburt AFB, Fla.                       These communities are not organ-        chy hybrids. Interagency task forces
                                           ized as hierarchies, but as networks.   are an example of network-hierarchy
In Athena’s Camp: Preparing                   The information revolution           hybrids. A military organization could
For Conflict in the Information            favors networked organizations.         establish a network-hierarchy hybrid
Age. Edited by John Arquilla and           Networked organizations are more        by forming smaller units with a flat-
David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica,              flexible and can act upon informa-      tened chain of command. Advances in
Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1997.            tion faster than hierarchies can.       communication technology may make
ISBN 0-8330-2514-7. 501 pages. $36.           The book uses the Zapatista          it possible for smaller units to com-
                                           revolt of 1994 as an example of a       municate and coordinate rapidly with
   In Athena’s Camp is a collection        networked organization waging a         each other and to attack by swarm;
of essays that discuss ways in             conflict. The Zapatista National        i.e., to converge rapidly and stealthily
which conflict can be waged in the         Liberation Army, or EZLN, in Chia-      from several directions. One general
postindustrial world.                      pas, Mexico, occupied several local     officer could command a multitude of
   In the first section of the book, the   towns and declared war on the Mex-      platoon- or company-sized units from
essays examine the current revolu-         ican government. Besides perform-       different services without the addi-
tion in military affairs, or RMA, and      ing traditional guerrilla operations,   tional battalion or brigade layer of
note that it is mainly information-        the EZLN linked into communica-         command. That sort of approach is
driven. RMAs occur periodically in         tion nodes that had been formed by      not unprecedented in history: The
history, evolving out of a particular      a network of nongovernment organ-       Mongols and the German U-boat
technological or organizational            izations, or NGOs, operating in the     “wolf packs” are examples of geo-
breakthrough that has radical              area. The NGOs included religious       graphically dispersed units swarming
effects on doctrine. In the current        groups, human-rights groups and         at the critical time and place.
RMA, as in previous ones, those who                                                   Although some of its passages will
have the wisdom to see more pro-                                                   be of more interest to philosophers
found meanings of new systems will                                                 than to soldiers, In Athena’s Camp is
be the most successful.                                                            an interesting book. It should be read
   The essays in the second section                                                by anyone in the special-operations
maintain that information systems                                                  community who is interested in infor-
have become so critical to the military                                            mation operations, especially those in
world and the civilian world that                                                  PSYOP, a field that is only beginning
those systems can be both the means                                                to better use technology to form net-
of attack and the target of an attack.                                             work-hierarchy hybrids in order to
An information-warfare attack, made                                                act faster than our competitors.
with the same level of audacity as the
Sept. 11 attack, might be less bloody                                                Major Bill Gormley
but could have the potential to be far                                               304th PSYOP Company
more obtrusive into the ways that our                                                Sacramento, Calif.
society operates.
   The third section of the book dis-
cusses ways in which information
technology is changing society.
Global interconnectivity can bring
profound societal changes, as soci-

September 2002                                                                                                          69
                         Special Warfare




This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army




Department of the Army                                                                              Prstd Std
JFK Special Warfare Center and School                                                              U.S. Postage
ATTN: AOJK – DT – DM                                                                                   PAID
Fort Bragg, NC 28310                                                                             Temple Hills, MD
                                                                                                 Permit No. 4004




                                                                                                          PIN: 080087–000

				
DOCUMENT INFO
Shared By:
Categories:
Tags:
Stats:
views:19
posted:9/15/2011
language:English
pages:72