The Soviet Army Operations and Tactics by dfgh4bnmu

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									                                                                                                FM 100-2-1
                                                                                                Department of the Army

                                                                                   AND TACTICS
  ' ,;       I   '~ .,   •   DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: This publication contains technical or operational information that
'. '     .                   is for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to US Government agencies. Requests
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                                                                                        *FM 100-2-1
Field Manual                                                                   Department of the Army
No. 100-2-1                                                                  Washington, DC, 16 July 1984

Operations and Tactics


   This field manual is part ofFM series 100-2, 1beSovietArmy. The other volumes are
FM 100-2-2, ]be Soviet Army: specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support, and FM
100-2-3, ]be Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment These manuals
cannot stand alone but should be used interchangeably.
  These field manuals serve as the definitive source of unclassified information on
Soviet ground forces and their interaction with other services in combined arms
warfare. These manuals represent the most current unclassified information and they
will be updated periodically. More information would become available in the event of
war or national emergency.
  Users of this publication are encouraged to recommend changes and submit
comments for its improvement. Key comments to the specific page and paragraph in
which the change is recommended. Provide a reason for each comment to insure
understanding and complete evaluation. To send changes or comments, prepare DA
Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it
to Deputy Commander, USA CACDA, ATIN: ATZL-CAT, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
FM 100-2-1

             The cover design is an adaptation of this patch which
             is worn by Soviet motorized rifle troops, whose organiza-
             tion is representative of the Soviet combined arms theme.

                                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1


Quick Reference _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

 CHAPTER TITLE                                                NUMBER          CHAPTER TITLE                             NUMBER
 INTRODUCTION ...........................                               1     ARTILLERY SUPPORT ...................... 9
 SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE .............                                 2     ANTITANK SUPPORT ..................... 10
 COMMAND AND CONTROL ...............                                    3     AIR DEFENSE ............................ 11
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS: FRONT                                                  AIR SUPPORT ............................ 12
 AND ARMy ................................                              4     SMOKE ................................... 13
 OFFENSIVE TACTICS: DIVISION AND                                              ENGINEER SUPPORT ..................... 14
 LOWER ....................................                             5     ELECTRONIC WARFARE .................. 15
 DEFENSE. WITHDRAWAL. AND RELIEF ....                                   6     NUCLEAR. BIOLOGICAL AND
 RECONNAISSANCE .......................                                 7     CHEMICAL WARFARE .................... 16
 FIRE SUPPORT ....... " ...................                             8

                                                                   PAGE                                                      PAGE
  1   INTRODUCTION ........................                             1-1       ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS ...... 3-2
      SOVIET GROUND FORCES ................                             1-1       COMMAND POST ........................ 3-3
      GROUPS OF FORCES .................... ,                           1-1       TACTICAL COMMUNiCATIONS ............ 3-3
        The TVD ...............................                         1-1       DIVISION-LEVEL COMMAND AND
        The Soviet Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..   1-1       CONTROL ............................ 3-4
      STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF                                                    Dual Allegiance ........................ 3-5
      FORCES ............................ ,                             1-1         Division Command Group ............. :. 3-5
                                                                                    Division Command and Staff
  2   SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ........... 2-1                                      Procedures ........................ 3-10
      THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF WAR ........... 2-1                                   REGIMENT-LEVEL COMAND AND
      THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET MILITARY                                            CONTROL. .............................. 3-12
      THOUGHT ................................ 2-1
        Principles of Military Art ................ 2-2                       4   OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS: FRONT
        The Laws of War ....................... 2-2                               AND ARMy .............................         4-1
      THE SOVIET CATEGORIZATION OF                                                TVD OFFENSIVE ..........................       4-1
      COMBAT ACTIONS ....................... 2-5                                  FRONT OFFENSIVE ......................         4-1
      COMBINED ARMS OFFENSIVE WARFARE .. 2-5                                        Offensive Planning .....................     4-1
        The Attack in Depth ..................... 2-6                               Offensive Phasing ......................     4-2
        Nuclear Warfare Implications ............ 2-7                               Rapid Advance .........................      4-4
        Limited Nuclear War Considerations ..... 2-8                                Concentration of Forces .................    4-4
        Nonnuclear Warfare .................... 2-9                                 Attack Echelons ........................     4-5
        Chemical Warfare ...................... 2-9                                 The Front Operational Maneuver Group ..      4-5
      ECHELONS AND FORCE RATIOS ......... 2-10                                      Nonnuclear Front Offensive .............     4-6
        First and Second Echelons ............. 2-10                              ARMY OFFENSIVE ........................        4-6
        Reserve Forces ........................ 2-11                                Echelonment of Forces .......... , .......   4-6
        Force Ratios ........................... 2-11                               Use of Forward Detachments ............      4-7
      NORMS. INITIATIVE. AND FLEXiBILITy .... 2-11                                 The Army OMG ........................         4-9
                                                                                    Other Support Elements .................     4-9
  3   COMMAND AND CONTROl. ............                                 3-1
      THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND                                           5   OFFENSIVE TACTICS: DIVISION
      AUTHORITy ..............................                          3-1       AND LOWER ............................ 5-1
      THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ......                             3-2       TACTICAL FORMATIONS AND
      COMMANDERS ..........................                             3-2       MOVEMENT ..........•.•............. 5-1
FM 100-2-1

                                                                        PAGE                                                      PAGE
       The March ............................. 5-1                                      TARGET DAMAGE CRITERIA ..............      8-1
       Prebattle Formation ..................... 5-8                                    PHASES OF FIRE SUPPORT ...............     8-1
       Attack Formation ...................... 5-11                                     FIRE SUPPORT ZONES ....................    8-2
     ATIACKING A DEFENDING ENEMy ....... 5-13                                           AIR SUPPORT ............................   8-2
       Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5-1 3        FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS ...................    8-3
       Forms of Ma neuver .................... 5-13                                     TRENDS IN FIRE SUPPORT ................    8-3
       Objectives ............................. 5-14
       Planning .............................. 5-14                                 9   ARTILLERY SUPPORT ................... 9-1
       Rei nforcements ........................ 5-1 6                                   ARTILLERY ASSETS ...................... 9-1
       Fire Planning .......................... 5-17                                      Allocation Procedures ................... 9-1
       Division Attack ..........•............. 5-18                                      Organization for Combat ................ 9-1
       Regimental Attack ..................... 5-22                                     COMMAND AND CONTROL ............... 9-3
       Battalion Attack ... ; ................... 5-24                                    Command Relationships ................. 9-4
       Conduct of the Attack .................. 5-27                                      Coordination, and Communications ..... 9-4
       Combined Arms Tactics ................ 5-27                                      FIRE CONTROL AND TARGET
     THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT ............ 5-29                                           INTELLIGENCE ........................... 9-6
       Objectives and Characteristics ......... 5-29                                      Observation Posts ...................... 9-6
       The March Prior to Engagement ........ 5-31                                        Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition .. 9-6
       Initial Phase ........................... 5-34                                   EQUIPMENT .............................. 9-7
       Deployment of Main Force ............. 5-34                                      ARTILLERY AMMUNITION ................. 9-7
       Follow-on Forces ...................... 5-36                                     TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF AN ARTILLERY
     PURSUIT ................................ 5-36                                      BATIALION .............................. 9-8
                                                                                        TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE
 6   DEFENSE, WITHDRAWAL,AND RELIEF .. 6-1                                              ROCKET LAUNCHERS .................... 9-11
     THE ROLE AND NATURE OF THE                                                         METHODS OF FIRE ...................... 9-12
     DEFENSE ................................ 6-1                                         Offensive Fire ......................... 9-12
     CONCEPTS OF THE PREPARED DEFENSE .. 6-1                                              Defensive Fire ......................... 9-15
       Security Echelon ....................... 6-2                                     FIELD ARTILLERY CONDUCT OF FIRE ..... 9-16
       Main Defensive Area ................... 6-2                                      FIRE PLANNING ......................... 9-18
       Fire Sacks .............................. 6-2                                    FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE OFFENSE ....... 9-20
       Minefields and Obstacles ............... 6-2                                     FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE DEFENSE ....... 9-22
       Anti-tank Defense ...................... 6-3                                     FIRING NORMS ......................... 9-22
       Counterattacks ......................... 6-3
     CONCEPTS OF THE HASTY DEFENSE ...... 6-3                                      10   ANTITANK SUPPORT ..................       10-1
       Reverse Slope Defense .................. 6-3                                     ANTITANK WEAPONS SySTEMS .........        10-1
       Support Elements ...................... 6-4                                      ORGANIZATION AND EQUiPMENT ........       10-1
     CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE .............. 6-4                                          TACTICAL EMPLOyMENT ................      10-1
       Defensive Planning ..................... 6-4                                     THE OFFENSE ...........................   10-2
       Division-level Defense .................. 6-5                                    THE DEFENSE ...........................   10-3
       Regimental-level Defense ............... 6-6
       Battalion-level Defense ................. 6-7                               11   AIR DEFENSE .......................... 11-1
     WITHDRAWAL .......................... 6-10                                         CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES ............. 11-1
     RELIEF .................................. 6-11                                     ORGANIZATION AND EQUiPMENT ........ 11-2
                                                                                        MISSIONS .............................. 11-3
 7   RECONNAISSANCE .....................                                 7-1           SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE .............. 11-4
     ELEMENTS USED IN RECONNAISSANCE ...                                  7-1           SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE .............. 11-6
     CONTROL OF RECONNAISSANCE                                                          AIR DEFENSE RECONNAISSANCE ........ 11-8
     ELEMENTS ...............................                             7-2           PROTECTION OF MARCH COLUMNS ..... 11-9
     RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATIONS ......                                  7-2           AIR DEFENSE AMBUSHES AND ROVING
                                                                                        UNITS ................................. 11-10
 8   FIRE SUPPORT .......................... 8-1                                        PROTECTION OF RIVER CROSSINGS .... 11-10
     CONCEPT ................................ 8-1                                       AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN
     FIRE SUPERIORITY ....................... 8-1                                       MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN ............... 11-11
                                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

                                                    PAGE                                                                             PAGE
     AIR SPACE CONTROL. .................. 11-11                SOVIET RADIOELECTRONIC COMBAT
     WEAKNESSES ......................... 11-11                 (REC) ...................................                            15-1
     TRENDS ............................... 11-12               TARGET PRIORITIES .....................                              15-2
                                                                INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS ..........                                 15-2
12   AIR SUPPORT .......................... 12-1                ELECTRONIC INTERCEPT AND DIRECTION
     CONCEPT ............................... 12-1               FINDING ................................                             15-2
     AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE: ................ 12-1                ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES (ECM)                                     15-3
       The Air Operation .............•.......      12-1        USE OF FIREPOWER .....................                               15-4
       Air Support of Ground Forces ..........      12-2        GROUND BASED EW CAPABILITIES ......                                  15-4
     ORGANIZATION A~D EQUIPMENT ........            12-2        AIRBORNE EW CAPABILITIES ............                                15-4
     COMMAND AND CONTROL ..............             12-2        SEABORNE EW CAPABILITIES ............                                15-5
       Aviation Control Element ...............     12-2        ELECTRONIC COUNTER-
       Forward Air Controller .................     12-2        COUNTERMEASURES (ECCM) ............                                  15-5
       Difficulties in Coordination .............   12-3          Organizational ECCM Techniques .......                             15-5
       Night and Weather Conditions ..........      12-3          Individual ECCM Techniques ...........                             15-5
     PLANNING AND PREPARATION ..........            12-3          Antiradar Camouflage ..................                            15-5
     PREPLAN NED AIR SUPPORT                                    SATELLITES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..   15- 6
     MISSIONS .............................         12-4
     AVIATION EMPLOyMENT ................           12-5        CHEMICAL WARFARE ................. 16-1
       Air-Ground Coordination ...............      12-5        NUCLEAR WEAPONS .................... 16-1
       Control Versus Mass ...................      12-6        NUCLEAR OPERATIONS ................. 16-2
       Reconnaissance and Targeting .........       12-6          Planning .............................. 16-2
       Mission Execution .....................      12-6          Targeting ..•.......................... 16-2
     SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE ..............          12-8          Offensive Employment ................. 16-2
     SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE ..............          12-9          Defensive Employment ................. 16-3
     TRENDS ................................        12-9        BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ................. 16-3
                                                                CHEMICAL WEAPONS ................... 16-3
13   SMOKE ................................ 13-1                SOVIET PROTECTION AND WARNING
     TYPES OF SMOKE SCREENS ............. 13-1                  EQUIPMENT ......... : ................ : .. 16-5
     METEOROLOGICAL INFLUENCES ON                               CHEMICAL DEFENSE TROOPS ........... 16-6
     SMOKE ................................. 13-2               NBC TRAINING .......................... 16-6
                                                                  Premilitary Training .................... 16-6
14   ENGINEER SUPPORT ..................            14-1          Unit Training .......................... 16-7
     ORGANiZATION .........................         14-1          Training of Chemical Defense Troops .... 16-8
       Engineer Support in the Offense ........     14-2          Training of Chemical Defense Officers .. 16-8
       Engineer Reconnaissance ..............       14-2        PROTECTIVE MEASURES ................ 16-9
       Movement Support ....................        14-2          NBC Protective Equipment ............. 16-9
       Minefield Breaching ...................      14-2          NBC Reconnaissance .................. 16-9
       Mine Laying ..........................       14-4          Decontamination Procedures .......... 16-11
      Assault River Crossings ................      14-4        COMBAT IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT .... 16-12
     ENGINEER SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE ....           14-4          Actions During the March ............. 16-12
     CAMOUFLAGE AND WATER SUPPLy .....              14-5          The Offense .......................... 16-1 2
                                                                  The Defense ......................... 16-1 2
15   ELECTRONIC WARFARE ............... 15-1                      Recovery Operations .................. 16-13
     SOVIET EW CAPABILITIES ............... 15-1                CONCLUSIONS ......................... 16-14


    This field manual describes the operations and           are capable of employing chemical agents from bat-
tactics of Soviet general purpose ground forces. The         talion level upward.
(."(mtent is based on information in Soviet writings and        The Soviets' basic principle ofland warfare is violent,
other open source literature. Most available informa-        sustained, and deep offensive action. Mechanized and
tion is focused on potential battle in Central Europe.       armored formations, supported by aviation and artil-
"Ibis manual reflects that focus. Though Soviet military     lery, are to seize the initiative at the outset of hostili-
activity extends to other parts of the world, the Soviet     ties, to penetrate the enemy's defenses, and to drive
forces opposite NATO represent a general model for           deeply and decisively into the enemy's rear area.
Soviet forces elsewhere, as well as for forces of Soviet
allies and surrogates.
    The ground forces constitute the largest of the five    GROUPS OF FORCES
Soviet military services. Soviet armies have always been       In peacetime, the major combined arms commands
massive. Today, they are also highly modernized, well       are located in the 16 military districts in the USSR and
equipped. and have great firepower and mobility. Man-       in the 4 groups of forces in Eastern Europe: Group of
power and materiel combined make the present Soviet         Soviet Forces, Germany, Northern Group of Forces in
ground forces a very formidable land army.                  Poland, Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia,
    The main combat power of the ground forces is           and Southern Group of Forces in Hungary. The Soviets
centered in tank and motorized rifle divisions that are     also maintain sizable forces in Mongolia and
dt.-ployed under combined arms commands (armies             Afghanistan. (See map on page 1-2.)
and fronts) and controlled through the Chief of the            In wartime, forces in the groups of forces and mili-
(jeneral Staff. The airborne troops are nominally an        tary districts will be organized into theaters of military
arm of the ground forces but are subordinate opera-         operations (Russian: TVD) and fronts (army groups)
tionally to the General Staff.                              for combat operations. The military districts will con-
    In the years immediately following World War II,        tinue to function as territorial commands, acting as
Stalin maintained massive ground forces to offset the       mobilization and training bases and providing
threat of US nuclear power. As the Sovi~ts developed        logistical and other support services.
their own strategic nuclear capability and forces, their
t.·mphasis shifted away from the ground forces. Under
Khruschev, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the size      The TVD
of the ground forces was reduced, while strategic             Besides being a level of command, a TVD is also a
rocket forces increased in size.                            geographic entity. It consists of a particular territory,
    The Soviets are concerned about the growing threat      such as a continent or sea, where military forces of the
from China and wars in the Middle East and Far East.        USSR and/or its allies operate in wartime. The Soviets
"Ibey are increasingly aware that a war may be fought       consider the major t}pe of wartime operation to be the
without the use of strategic nuclear weapons. For           theater strategic operation. Within each TVD there are
~h.t.'"SC reasons, the Brezhnev regime reemphasized the     one or more strategic axes. A strategic axis consists of a
Importance of the ground forces. Steady and sys-            wide strip of land or sea and the air space above it, lead-
tematic improvements continue. More than 30 divi-           ing the armed forces to the enemy's most important
sions have been added since 1967. Many new weapons          administrative-political and industrial-economic
and equipment of all types have been introduced.            centers. The TVD's most important function will be to
()ffi~er and conscript training has been improved. New      orchestrate and control coordinated theater-wide
tactICS, operational art, and strategy also have been       operations involving fronts, fleets, independent
dt.·vcloped.                                                armies, or flotillas.
    The Soviets believe that any future war could involve
the use of nuclear weapons and that the initial stage of
the war will be decisive. Tactical nuclear weapons          The Soviet Front
~av~ been assigned at all levels from division up. The         The front is the largest field formation in wartime. It
~)\'Je~'i have the largest and most effective array of      is an operational and administrative unit, and its size
chemIcal weapons and equipment in the world. They           and composition can vary widely depending on the
FM 100-2-1

Soviet Military Districts and Groups of Forces _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

      1 - Leningrad                     5   -   Carpathian        9   -   Transcaucasus              1J   - Central Asia
      2 - Baltic                        6   -   Odessa           10   -   Volga                      14   - Siberian
      J - Belorussian                   7   -   Kiev             11   -   Urais                      15   - Transbaykal
      4 - Moscow                        8   -   North Caucasus   12   -   Turkestan                  16   - Far East
      A - Group of Soviet Forces, Germany                        C - Central Group, Czechoslovakia
      B - Northern Group, Poland                                 o - Southern Group, Hungary

mlsslon and situation. Roughly equivalent to a                    missile, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, Signal,
US/NATO army group, afrontcould be composed of                    intelligence, reconnaissance, and rear support units.
three to five armies with organic artillery, missile, air         By altering the mix of motorized rifle and tank divi-
defense, engineer, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance,          sions and artillery and missile support, the army can
and rear service units, plus aviation, air assault, and           operate in either offensive or defensive roles in
special pwpose forces.                                            different geographical areas and under various opera-
                                                                  tional constraints.
The Combined Arms Army. The combined arms
army is an operational and administrative organization;           The Tank Army. Thetankarmyisanoperationaland
it is the basic Soviet field army. A typical combined             administrative unit, and, like the combined arms army,
arms army includes two to four motorized rifle divi-              is a basic component of afront. The size and composi-
sions and one or two tank divisions, plus artillery,              tion of the army will depend on the mission, the situa-
                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

tion, and the area of operations. A typical tank army          Many Soviet divisions are maintained at reduced
includes two to four tank divisions and one or two          strength in peacetime, but they can be brought up to
motorized rifle divisions, plus artillery, missile, air     operational strength quickly by calling up trained
defense, engineer, chemical defense, signal, intelli-       reservists.
gence, reconnaissance, and rear service units. A typical       For over a decade, the Soviets have been modern-
role of a tank army is to exploit penetrations deep into    iZing and upgrading their ground forces. This has
the enemy's rear areas.                                     involved large-scale improvements in mobility, fire
   There are three basic types of maneuver divisions in     power, shock action, command and control, obstacle-
the Soviet ground forces: motorized rifle, tank, and air-   crossing capability, air defense, electronic warfare
borne. (For more detailed information, refer to PM          (EW), and logistic support. New and advanced equip-
100-2-3, The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and          ment has been introduced.
Equipment.)                                                    The Soviets have been paying increased attention to
                                                            the .development of power projection forces that
                                                            would enable them to assert their influence in areas
STRENGTH AND                                                distant from their borders. Naval and air transport
DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES                                        resources can be employed to project regular ground
   The Soviet ground forces have a total strength of        force units as well as naval infantry and airborne units
about i,825,OOO men. There are currently 191                and independent air assault brigades.
maneuver divisions. There are 134 motorized rifle divi-        Soviet power projection capabilities are impressive
sions, 50 tank divisions, and 7 airborne divisions. Of      in the Persian Gulf region. The Soviets have a sub-
these maneuver divisions, 30 are stationed in Eastern       stantial number of divisions in varying states of readi-
Europe (East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and           ness based in Mghanistan and in the Transcauscasus,
Hungary), 80 are stationed in the European portion of       North Caucasus, and Turkestan Military Districts.
the USSR, 29 in the Central Asian portion and               Soviet aircraft based in Afghanistan can reach most
Mghanistan, and 52 in Siberia, the Far East, and            points in the Persian Gulf region and large portions of
Mongolia.                                                   the Arabian Sea. Port facilities in the People's
   There are four basic deployment groupings: against       Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia greatly
NATO, against China, against the Middle East, and a         enhance the operating potential of the Soviet fleet in
strategic reserve. The largest, best-equipped, and most     the Indian· Ocean and Arabian Sea
combat-ready is the group deployed against NATO.



   To the Soviets, war is a manifestation of the class        tary decision-making level. The system deals with all
struggle. It is an expression of the co¢1ict between the      military issues, ranging from national defense policy
"progressive forces of socialism" and the "reactionary        down to platoon tactics. Soviet military officers are
forces of imperialistic capitalism," which they feel will     quite familiar with the entire system of thought and
be ultimately resolved in favor of socialism. The Soviet      routinely express themselves in these terms. They
concept of war represents a continuation ofpolitics. In       think and formulate decisions using these concepts.
Western perceptions, war occurs when politics fail to           Military science is the study and analysis of the
resolve conflicts nonviolently. The Soviets feel that war    diverse psychological and material phenomena rele-
is the least desirable method by which the forces of his-    vant to armed combat for developing practical recom-
tory will move toward complete victory for soc~sm.           mendations for the achievement of victory in war.
   The Soviet political and military theorists compare       Unlike doctrine, military science is characterized by
the socialist and capitalist camps by a concept called       controversy and debate. In military science, there may
the "correlation of forces." This concept compares the       be several points ofview, diverse "scientific" concepts,
relative political, moral, economic, and military            and original hypotheses that are not selected as doc-
strengths of both sides. In the Soviet view, the correla-    trine and therefore are not accepted as official state
tion of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist   views on military issues. Military science encompasses
camp since the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World        virtually all things military.
War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the           Military art is the most important and primary field
correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism.     within military science and is the basis for strategy,
The correlation of forces may be advanced by both            operational art, and tactics. It is the theory and practice
violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by         of conducting armed conflict. The principles ofmili-
violent means, the military component of the correla-        tary art are the basic ideas and the most important
tion is the dominant factor.                                 recommendations for the organization and conduct of
                                                             battles, operations, and warfare.
                                                                The concept of military art and its role in military
THE STRUCTURE OF                                             science are not just empty exercises in the Marxist-
SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT                                      Leninist theory. Many Soviet military officers hold
   Soviet military doctrine is the officially accepted set   advanced degrees in military science and are serious
of concepts that delineate the ways and means to             and intense in their study. They are convinced of the
achieve military objectives in the interest of politics.     superiority of this methodology for preparing the
This doctrine also specifies the structure of the Soviet     Soviet armed forces to achieve success in modem war-
armed forces, allocates industrial resources and out-        fare. The structure of ideas, terminology, and concepts
put, and orients research and development efforts to         associated with this system of thought constitutes the
support armed forces. Military doctrine is the blue-         very vocabulary through which Soviet officers express
print drawn up by the highest Soviet political leaders       their perceptions of military problems and the mea-
that describes in specific detail the shape of the armed     sures they develop to resolve them.
forces and the way they are to be used.                         Military art applies to three separate but interdepen-
   The formulation of Soviet military doctrine is a con-     dent levels of combat activity:
tinuous evolutionary process based on:                         • Strategic - national and theater level.
 • Communist ideology.                                         • Operational - fronts and armies.
 • Soviet foreign policy.                                      • Tactical - division and below.
 • Economic and military strengths of adversaries.              Soviet perspectives on and prescriptions for armed
 • Soviet resources and geography.                           conflict require that tactical success leads to opera-
 • History.                                                  tional success. Similarly, operational gains lead to
 • Science and technology.                                   strategic success.'
   Soviet military doctrine is based on an elaborate,           It is often difficult to separate Soviet tactics from
integrated system of thought. The doctrinal concepts         what the Soviets call "operational art" because the
are precisely defined, and each has its place in a           maneuver divisions that are the subject of tactics are
hierarchy of importance that corresponds to its mili-        the maneuver elements that achieve the" operational"
FM 100-2-1

objectives of armies and fronts. Moreover, the two            • Maintain continuous and reliable command and
concepts are closely interrelated in Soviet military        control.
thinking and planning. A recurring theme in Soviet           • Be determined and decisive in achieving the
military writing is the need for the commander to keep      assigned mission.
the "operational" goal in mind. The overriding objec-         • Maintain complete security of combat operations.
tive of the combined arms offensive is to rapidly tum        • Reconstitute reserves and restore combat effec-
tactical success into operational success by a well-        tiveness as quickly as possible.
orchestrated combination of massive fire, maneuver,            These are general principles that apply to all three
and deep, violent strikes.                                  levels of military art: strategy, operations, and tactics.
   It is important to understand what the Soviets mean      At each of these levels, there are more specific,
by "tactics" and "operations" as well as the various        detailed principles.
words and verbal formulas that they associate with             Soviet military thought subscribes to certain "laws of
each concept. To the Soviet officer, the word               war" at the strategic level, and "principles of opera-
"operation" informs him that the activity in question       tional art and tactics" which apply to the actual
involves at least an army or a front that was probably      conduct of combat.
tailored for the mission. "Tactics" consist of combat
actions at division level and lower. Divisions have a set                    The Laws of War
organizational structure that, except for combat sup-          First Law: The course and outcome of war
port reinforcements, does not vary from mission to             waged with unlimited employment of all means
mission                                                        of conflict depends primarily on the correlation
   Divisions fight battles, whereas armies conduct             of available, strictly military combatants at the
operations. First echelon divisions usually pursue tacti-      beginning of war ...
cal objectives in the enemy's tactical depth, whereas          Second Law: The course and outcome of war
armies-normally using their second echelon divi-               depend on the correlation of the military
sions-must achieve operational objectives in the               potentials of the combatants.
enemy's operational depth.                                     Third Law: (The) course and outcome (of war)
                                                               depend on its political content.
                                                               Fourth Law: The course and outcome of war
PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY ART                                     depend on the correlation of moral-political and
   Soviet military theorists consider the following            psychological capabilities of the peoples and
points to be the general principles of military art. They      armies of the combatants.
do not represent any special revelation of truth or
radical departure from traditional military thought.                                Marshal Sokolovsky
However, by their emphasis on these particular points,                              Military Strategy
Soviet military leaders reveal the character of their
military thinking and predict the basic characteristics        In simpler terms, these laws mean the follOwing:
of future Soviet military operations.                         • First Law: Be prepared. Prepare in peacetime for
   According to the Soviets, their armed forces must:       the next war. Forces-in-being are the decisive factors.
 • Be fully prepared to accomplish the mission              The side with the most and best troops and equipment
regardless of the conditions under which war begins         at the start of war will win the war.
or must be conducted.                                        • Second Law: The side which can best sustain a pro-
 • Achieve surprise whenever possible. Military             tracted war will win the war.
operations must be characterized by decisiveness and         • 1bird Law: The higher the political stakes of a war,
aggressiveness. Forces must strive continuously to          the longer and more violent it will be.
seize and to hold the initiative.                            • Fourth Law: War aims must be seen as just.
 • Make full use of all available military assets and       Modem war cannot be waged without public support.
capabilities to achieve victory.                               Soviet planning and preparation for war reflect a
 • Insure that major formations and units of all ser-       dominant feeling that war is inevitable. This is not to
vices, branches, and arms effect thorough and con-          say that the USSR wants war, but that it is preparing for
tinuous coordination.                                       it continuously.
 • Select the principal enemy objective to be seized           The Soviet state is autocratic, militarized, and cen-
and the best routes for attacking it. Make a decisive       tralized. Its political and economic systems give
concentration of combat power at the correct time.          priority to military requirements. The state allocates
                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

 resources and directs production for preparation and           The most Significant points of this list are:
 maintenance of a war footing.                                 • He who gets to the initial battle with the "most"
    The preparation of a nation for war is                     • The enemy must be confronted with more than
    accomplished along three main lines:                      one situation to deal with.
    • the preparation of the armed forces,                     • One should not be diverted by geographical objec-
    • the preparation of the national economy,                tives, but should concentrate on the destruction of the
    • and the preparation of the population.                  enemy's military forces.
                                                               • Detailed, exacting preparation must precede an
                         Marshal Sokolovsky                   attack.
                         Military Strategy                      • Design actions to preempt the opponent and keep
                                                              him reacting to situations that you control.
     The Soviet Union is prepared to exert itself at great     • Concentrate on the enemy's weak points rather
  expense to achieve its goals. Jt is a nation which          than his strengths.
  through civil war, collectivization, attendant famine,         Contemporary Soviet military theorists hold that
  and purges inflicted more than 20 tnillion deaths on its    nuclear weaponry and other means of modem warfare
  own citizens from the Russian Revolution to the start       have modified the basic principles. By the early 1970's,
  of World War II. It is a nation that endured the loss of    the following principles dominated Soviet operational
  20 million people during World War II. Its tolerance        art and tactics:
  for sacrifice is high.
     As the "laws of war" dominate strategic planning for
  war, so do "principles of operational art and tactics"      Russian Military Principles of the 1970s _ _ __
  govern the conduct ofwarfare within a given theater of
  operations. The popular Western version of these              • Mobility and high rates of combat operations.
  Soviet operational and tactical principles is very brief:     • Concentration of main efforts and creation of
  objective, offensive, surprise, maneuver, and mass. This      superiority in forces and means over the enemy
  list does not fairly characterize the basis on which          at the decisive place and at the decisive time.
  Soviet military leaders plan and conduct operations           • Surprise and security.
, and tactics.                                                  • Combat activeness.
     Just as they add new equipment to their forces             • Preservation of the combat effectiveness of
  without abandoning older equipment, the Soviets have          friendly forces.
  modernized operational and tactical principles                • Conformity of the goal to the actual situation.
  without fully abandoning earlier ones. A good place to        • Coordination.
  begin is with those classical principles that were
  taught by the tsarist general staff.                          Commenting on the above listing, Colonel V. Yeo
                                                              Savkin wrote the following:

Classic Russian Military Principles - - - - - - -               The enumerated principles have become the
                                                                most important although of course, they cannot
   • Extreme exertion of force at the very                      encompass the entire diversity of combat
   beginning of a war.                                          activity. Even now, as there is further develop-
   • Simultaneity of actions.                                   ment of means of warfare and military art, other
   • Economy of forces.                                         principles can be formulated. For example, the
   • Concentration.                                             principle of simultaneous action upon the
   • Chief objective - the enemy's army.                        enemy to the entire depth of his deployment and
   • Surprise.                                                  upon objectives of the deep rear has acquired an
   • Unity of action.                                           increaSingly realistic basis with the adoption of
   • Preparation.                                               nuclear weapons.
   • Energetic pursuit.
   • Security.                                                                       Colonel V. Yeo Savkin
   • Initiative and dominance over the enemy's                                       The Basic Principles of
   will.                                                                             Operational Art and Tactics
   • Strength where the enemy is weak.                                               (Moscow, 1972)

FM 100-2-1

  A melding ofcontemporary writings and those of the       Russian principles, results in the following specific
recent past, plus the influence of significant classical   Soviet principles of operational art and tactics:

Modern Operational and Tactical Principles - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  • The offensive is the basic form of combat                rather than by massing maneuver forces.
   action. Only by a resolute offense conducted at a         • If maneuver forces must be massed, do so
   high tempo and to great depth is total                    rapidly. Disperse them as soon as possible after
   destruction of the enemy achieved.                        the task has been achieved.
  • Combat maneuver units must be mobile and                 • Maneuver first with firepower. Firepower is
   capable of rapid movement.                                maneuver.
  • Fire support, command and control, and                   • Maneuver forces should attack the weakest
   logistics must be as mobile as maneuver units.            points in enemy defenses. If necessary, create
  • Conduct thorough and continuous reconnais-               weak points or holes with nuclear or nonnuclear
   sance. Find the enemy's weak points.                      fires. Bypass enemy strongpoints to strike
  • Perform a thorough estimate of the situation             deeply into his rear.
   and make timely, analytical decisions. Be                 • Avoid frontal attacks. Whenever possible
   realistic. Consider the mission, enemy, your              strike the enemy in the flanks or rear.
  own combat power, terrain. weather and light               • Maintain security of your own flanks and rear.
  conditions, and time.                                      • Maintain sufficient follow-on force to assure
  • Prepare and plan extensively and in detail.              achievement of the mission and to deal with
  • The planning and conduct of an operation                 contingencies.
   must involve the full coordination and coopera-           • Maintain uninterrupted combat support.
  tion of all commanders involved.                           • Maintain effective, continuous command,
  • There must be unity of command, a single                 control, and communications. Loss of
  commander for any operation.                               communications leads to loss of control and
  • Fully orchestrate all available combat mea~s             defeat. Maintain redundant communications at
   in a coordinated, cooperative, combined arms              higher levels. Rely on audio and visual signals
  effort.                                                    and well-rehearsed battle drills at lower levels.
  • Deceive the enemy. Attack from an                        • Staffs at every level must have the equipment
  unexpected direction at an unexpected time.                and skills necessary to collect and analyze
  Use terrain and weather to your advantage.                 information quickly and to develop and dissemi-
  • Strike early with great force. Constantly strive         nate orders rapidly based on the commander's
  to preempt and dominate the enemy.                         decision.
  • Attack the enemy violently and simul-                    • Employ radioelectronic combat to deprive the
  taneously throughout his depth. Carry the battle           enemy of effective command and control of his
  to the enemy rear with swift penetrations by               combat forces.
  maneuver units, fires, aviation, airborne and              • Adhere to the spirit and letter of a plan. If the
  heliborne assaults. and by unconventional                  plan fails, use initiative to accomplish the
  warfare means.                                             mission.
  • Be bold and decisive. Seize and hold the                 • Be prepared to react effectively to a rapidly
  initiative.                                                changing battlefield. Develop procedures to deal
  • Prosecute an operation relentlessly, without             with numerous contingencies.
  pause, under all conditions of visibility or NBC           • Think quickly and be decisive and resourceful
  contam ination.                                            in accomplishing the mission.
  • Keep the enemy under constant pressure and               • Conserve fighting strength through the use of
  off balance. Do not allow him to react effectively.        combat vehicles with collective NBC protection,
  • Fully exploit the effects of nuclear or chemical         dispersal of forces, minimum combat power
  strikes with deep attacks by all available forces.         necessary to accomplish a task, the use of
  • Whenever possible achieve mass by concen-                captured enemy equipment, and effective
  trated, massed nuclear or nonnuclear fires                 logistics.
                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

  These principles are idealistic. They are what the         Offensive actions are divided into three subcate-
Soviets strive to achieve. They show what the Soviets      gories which key on enemy actions and disposition.
would like to do, but not, in all cases, what they maybe   When the enemy is stationary, in a defensive posture,
capable of doing. However, the principles serve as a       the Soviets conduct an attack against a defending
basis from which any examination of Soviet operations      enemy. When both the Soviets and the enemy are on
and tactics must start.                                    the offense and their forces collide, the action that
                                                           occurs is the meeting engagement. When the enemy is
                                                           withdrawing, action performed against him is called
THE SOVIET CATEGORIZATION                                  pursuit.
OF COMBAT ACTIONS                                             Defensive actions are not as clearly delineated.
  An important consideration in understanding Soviet       Though the Soviets recognize a hasty and a prepared
military thought is their categorization of types of       defense, the distinction between them is not absolute.
combat actions. It is important to adhere to their         With time and preparation, a hasty defense becomes a
categorization and terminology to fully understand the     prepared defense. Withdrawal is a topic given very
essence of Soviet operations and tactics. The 1966         little attention in Soviet writings. If not categorically,
Soviet book Taktika (Tactics) was written at a time        then at least in perception, it is probably viewed within
when it was assumed that all major combat activity         the larger context of defense.
would take place under nuclear conditions. The book           Adhering to the Soviet terminology is particularly
described four major categories of combat action:          crucial when examining Soviet offensive actions. Too
offense, meeting engagement, defense, and with-            many US analysts have used US tactical terms such as
drawal. The listing of the meeting engagement as a         "deliberate attack," "hasty attack," or "movement to
separate major category of combat reflects the view        contact" to describe Soviet offensive actions. The use
held at that time that it would be the most prevalent      of these terms results in a distorted image of Soviet
form of combat under nuclear conditions. More recent       actions. Their tactics are not a "mirror image" of US
writings, to include the Soviet Military Encyclopedia,     tactics. To fully understand the Soviet military thOUght
indicate that the meeting engagement is looked upon        process and the options available to the Soviet com-
as one element of the broad category of offense, rather    mander, the Soviet categorization must be adhered to.
than a separate major category. This probably reflects        According to the Soviet categorization, there is no
the contemporary Soviet view that both nuclear and         such thing as a "breakthrough attack" This is another
nonnuclear warfare are possible and that the attack        term used incorrectly and too freely by US analysts. The
against a defending enemy may be just as prevalent as      misuse of this term has resulted in incorrect percep-
the meeting engagement.                                    tions of Soviet tactics. The "steamroller attack" of
   Contemporary Soviet writings describe only two          World War II, with troops and equipment massed
basic, diametrically opposed forms of combat action:       across a narrow frontage to bludgeon their way
offense and defense.                                       through enemy defenses, is no longer the most com-
                                                           mon type of Soviet attack: The Soviet commander
                                                           conducting an attack against a defending enemy has
Categories of Soviet Combat Action _ _ _ _ __              other options.

  OFFENSE                                                  COMBINED ARMS
  • Attack Against a Defending Enemy                       OFFENSIVE WARFARE
    • Attack from the March                                  Although some aspects of the Soviet concept of com-
    • Attack from a Position in Direct Contact             bined arms are similar to the US military practice of
  • Meeting Engagement (enemy is also on                   combined arms and joint (interservice) operations,
  offense)                                                 the Soviet concept has a different meaning than does
  • Pursuit (enemy is withdrawing)                         the US term. For example, within the Soviet Army, units
                                                           of different branches do not normally cross attach
                                                           among themselves to obtain the optimum mix of
   DEFENSE                                                 combat elements for a given mission. Instead, a unit of
  • Hasty Defense                                          one arm will attach its subunits to support or rein-
  • Prepared Defense                                       force units of another arm without receiving attach-
  • Withdrawal                                             ments in return.
FM 100-2-1

   The major difference, however, goes beyond vari-         action by tank, infantry, artillery, and aviation. The
ances in methods of attachment and reinforcement            separate arms and services were required to combine
The concept of combined arms is far more compre-            their efforts under a single control element to imple-
hensive and formalized in Soviet doctrine. It is the        ment a unified plan. As a consequence, the require-
cumulative expression of the principles of military art.    ment for thorough and continuous coordination
Combined arms combat is the primary vehicle for their       among all combat elements throughout the planning
implementation in operations and tactics.                   and execution phases of every operation increased
   Over the past 60 years, the development of the           markedly. Maintenance of reliable and continuous
Soviet combined arms concept has been essentially a         command and control became at once more difficult
doctrinal response to increases in the lethality and        and more critical. The roles of the combined arms
mobility of weapons and armies.                             commander and combined arms staff were expanded
   Their initial combined arms problem arose from the       and refined. The combined arms commander, advised
need to coordinate artillery and infantry during World      by his staffs has the overall responsibility for the plan-
War I and the Russian Civil War. During the 1930s, as       ning and execution of the operation as well as the
the range and speed of weapon systems began to              authority to carry it out
increase, the Soviets developed the theory and practice       To execute the operation in depth successfully, the
of operations in depth. This theory included a number       combined arms force had to maintain a rapid tempo of
of tactical prescriptions: the primacy of offensive         advance. By tempo, the Soviets mean not only speed
operations, swprise, "shock power," and the combina-        but also the flexibility and aggressiveness to create and
tion of several arms and services to attain decisive        develop opportunities and to build advantage upon
operational success to a considerable depth within the      advantage. To accomplish this, the Soviet armed forces
enemy's defense.                                            adopted the practice of echeloning their formations.

                                                             The First Echelon.        Typically, the first (assault)
The Attack in Depth                                          echelon attacked and penetrated the enemy's tactical
   The principle of attacking in depth was the Soviets'      defenses, and the second (exploitation) echelon
response to the increased capability and mobility of         drove through the penetration deep into the enemy's
fire support systems (artillery and aviation) and the        operational rear. Both echelons were controlled by the
appearance of mechanized infantry, tank, and airborne        same combined arms commander. He assigned
forces. Enemy weapons and formations located several        missions to the commanders of the first and second
kilometers from the FEBA became an immediate threat         echelons in support of his overall mission and con-
to forces opposing them and had to be engaged with           trolled the entire force until the operation's ultimate
the same urgency and decisiveness as closer targets.        objective had been accomplished.
On the other hand, Soviet fire support systems could           While the putpose of echeloning has changed little
reach farther, and their tank and infantry formations       over the years, the circumstances under which
had increased in mobility. Soviet military theorists con-   echeloning is applied and the manner in which it is
cluded that the deeper threat and the potential for         applied have varied considerably-depending on the
deeper fire and maneuver by Soviet forces necessitated      relative strength and defensive tactics of the Soviets'
a combined arms effort. They decided that simul-            enemies. During World War II, Soviet commanders
taneous artillery attack and airstrikes through the         usually employed a heavy second echelon ( one third to
entire depth of enemy defenses combined with tank           one half of the entire formation) at the tactical level
and infantry formations to break through his tactical       only when the enemy defensive formations were
defensive and to drive rapidly and forcefully into the      strong and deeply echeloned and the enemy had large
depth of his operational rear would best attain success     reserves. When enemy defenses were thin and the
in combat. The enemy's lines of communication, com-         defender did not possess significant reserves, the
mand and control would then be destroyed or dis-            Soviets often attacked in a single large echelon (main-
rupted and the remainder of the forward edge of his         taining a relatively small combined arms reserve) to
tactical defensive system would begin to fragment and       overwhelm the enemy along his entire front. Use of a
collapse. Disorganized, demoralized, and isolated,          single-echelon formation simplified command and
enemy commanders would be unable to reestablish an          control problems for the Soviet commander and
effective and coordinated defense.                          denied the weaker defender the opportunity to rein-
   The successful execution of this high-speed, deep        force laterally and to deal with the attacking force as it
operation required closely coordinated aggressive           presented itself in several "waves."
                                                                                                            FM 100-2-1

The Second Echelon.          Even when they did not          group. The second echelon was thought capable of
echelon their divisions (tactical echeloning), the           both building up the offensive or exploiting success of
Soviets would form an operational second echelon             the first echelon.
(within armies and fronts). The composition, size, and
specific employment of the second echelon force was           The Operational Maneuver Group. The concept
again determined largely by the enemy's strength,            of the mobile group and its role in combined arms
tactics, and disposition When the enemy was able to           combat received renewed Soviet interest as the basis
establish a strong tactical defensive system of several      for refining their contemporary operational offensive
echelons (reinforced by tactical reserves) and had siz-      methods. The modern version of the mobile group, the
able operational reserves available as well, the attack-     operational maneuver group (OMG), can move
ing Soviet second echelon comprised as much as half of       faster, go deeper, and has better combat and combat
the attacking formation (e.g., two divisions of a four-      service support than its World War II counterpart. The
division army). The missions of this standard second         OMG concept significantly contributes to fulfilling the
echelon included reduction of byPassed enemy forces,         existing requirement for the deep theater offensive
exploitation through the penetration achieved by the         operation in keeping with the evolving nature of
first echelon, or an attack in a new direction, and          modern war.
possible replacement or reinforcement of the first              The concentration of the necessary amount of force
echelon if the first echelon suffered heavy losses.          at the right time and place was critical to the mainte-
                                                             nance of the tempo required for successful execution
The Mobile Group. Whentheenemywasrelatively                  of the deep combined arms operation. During World
understrength and lacked credible operational                War II, the Soviet Army concentrated tremendous
reserves, the army second echelon would take the             force against a narrow sector of the enemy's defenses
form of a mobile group made up of a tank or                  to achieve a rapid breakthrough. For example, in one
mechanized corps (normally one to three divisions            instance, a guards rifle corps was assigned a zone of
reinforced with highly mobile combat and combat ser-         advance of 22 kilometers but concentrated 80 to 90
vice support elements). This group, essentially a large,     percent of its force into a sector less than one third the
mobile, operational raiding force, either replaced or        width of the zone. As a consequence, in a sector 7
supplemented the standard second echelon. The                kilometers wide, the corps massed 27 battalions, 1,087
mobile group differed from the standard second eche-         pieces of towed artillery and mortars, and 156 tanks
lon in that it was expected to drive to deeper objec-        and self-propelled artillery weapons, resulting in a
tives and be able to s).lstain itself longer without major   force advantage of 4 to 1 in infantry, 10 to 1 in artillery,
additional support. It also differed in that while the       and 17 to 1 in tanks.
standard operational-level second echelon usually was
primarily nonmotorized infantry, the mobile group
was composed of tank or motorized infantry forces.           Nuclear Warfare Implications
When the mobile group was the only follow-on                    The advent of nuclear weapons caused Soviet
element, part of its force would usually assist the first    planners to go through a long period of rethinking and
echelon to make the initial penetration. When a              revising their combined arms doctrine. Modem, totally
mobile group and a second echelon were formed to             mechanized armed forces- supported and threatened
conduct an operation in anticipation of heavier              by weapons that can change the face of the battlefield
resistance in the tactical defense zone, the mobile          in a matter of minutes-gave a 'Whole new meaning to
group could be committed before or after the second          the high-speed, combined arms operation in depth.
echelon, depending on the actual level of resistance            Possible nuclear or chemical attacks by the enemy
encountered by first echelon units.                          make concentration inadmissable in its World War II
   The mobile group of the front typically consisted of      sense. At the same time, the availability of friendly
a tank army. The front mobile group's missions were          nuclear strikes and the longer ranges of conventional
similar to the army level group except that the objec:       artillery reduce the requirement for massed artillery
tives were larger and deeper.                                formations. Improved troop mobility permits both the
   In the post World War II era, the Soviets completely      rapid concentration and quick dispersal essential to
motorized all infantry units and increased the number        the survival of tank and motorized rifle formations as
of tanks in divisions. This full mechanization along with    they maneuver on a nuclear-threatened battlefield.
the advent of nuclear weapons resulted in dropping             In this context, the Soviets now stress that the
the different roles of a second echelon and a mobile         "quality" of mass must compensate for the reduced
FM 100-2-1

quantity formerly provided by concentrations of             may include the use of chemical weapons. They further
troops and equipment. This quality takes the form of        believe this nonnuclear phase is most likely to lead to
intense strikes with conventional air, artillery, and       the eventual use of nuclear weapons. Soviet emphasis
weapons of mass destruction.                                on destroying as much of enemy theater nuclear
  The enemy, being under nuclear threat, also must          capability during the nonnuclear phase as possible
disperse his formations making himself more vulner-         using air and rocket attacks, airborne, heliborne, and
able to penetration by an attacking force. But enemy        special purpose forces, and rapid, deep penetrations by
troops are also highly mobile and capable of rapidly        ground forces, might deny a credible enemy nuclear
concentrating to protect a threatened sector. There-        option.
fore, surprise and timing of operations are extremely
critical to complicate enemy targeting and to deny him
the time to use his mobility to reinforce.                   Umited Nuclear War Considerations
                                                               In the past decade, the Soviet political and military
Mobility. In an NBC environment, the need for               leaders have discussed the possibility of a limited
mobility on the battlefield increases dramatically.         nuclear war. They accept that a war could be limited to
Exploitation forces must be prepared to move great          a given theater of military operations (1VD) and
distances while maintaining command and control and         would not necessarily escalate to an intercontinental
combat effectiveness. The ability of Soviet combat          exchange of nuclear strikes.
vehicles using collective NBC protective systems to            Attempting to limit nuclear war to a 1VD would
move through contaminated areas and the increased           place even greater pressure on Soviet forces to achieve
emphasis on the use of airmobile forces in combat           theater objectives quickly to present enemy decision
areas enhance mobility.                                     makers with a fait accompli that would make escala-
   In past wars, the numerical relation of opposing         tion clearly unattractive. In this context, the principles
forces in a particular sector could be changed onlybya      of tempo, decisiveness, and mission take on added
slow process of providing more men and equipment.           importance.
Nuclear and/or chemical weapons can bring a sudden             In a war that is nuclear from its start, nuclear strikes
change of great magnitude to the balance. Their use         would be directed against the strongest sectors of the
can change ratios of forces and means on any axis of        enemy's defenses and throughout his operational
advance and to the entire depth ofthe enemy's disposi-      depth. Divisions, in "nuclear-dispersed" formations,
tions. This constitutes both a threat and an opportunity    would attack through the created gaps led by forward
to the Soviet commander and strongly reinforces the         detachments advancing at top speed into the depth of
Soviet polk"}' to preempt enemy use of nuclear or           the enemy defenses. Their aim would be to seize or to
chemical weapons.                                           neutralize remaining enemy nuclear weapons and
                                                            delivery systems and command, control, and com-
Decisive Force Capability. Since the mid-1960s,             munications fucilities. They would try to split and to
the Soviets have moved toward a doctrine and force          isolate the enemy by attacks from different directions
capability to fight decisively at all levels of conflict,   and across a broad front.
with nuclear weapons or without them. Soviet                   This exploitation force would probably attack in
planning and preparation for both nuclear and non-          two echelons to take full advantage of the speed of
nuclear combat always assume the possibility of enemy       advance that it would expect to achieve. In a nuclear-
use of nuclear weapons. They develop plans and doc-         supported attack, the echelons are essentially an initial
trine under the supposition that dispersion and             exploitation force and a follow-on relief exploitation
mobility must always be maintained. The Soviets plan        force. A rapid tempo of advance is assured by assigning
for enemy nuclear weapons and delivery systems to be        tank elements to the first echelon and by using
detected and destroyed as the first priority by whatever    motorized rifle units with the tanks on the main axis. In
means is most effective and acceptable at the time.         this instance, the BMP is preferred for employment in
Planning, likewise, assumes that whatever the level of      the first echelon, since it was designed primarily for
conflict (nuclear, chemical, or conventional), all types    this type of combat. The BMP is afast, highly maneuver-
of weapons releasable at the time will be employed in       able, infantry fighting vehicle, which would be ideal for
an integrated, complementary way to accomplish the          operations in which nuclear weapons have already
objectives of the war.                                      softened or breached the defense. In a nuclear-
   The Soviets believe a theater war is most likely to      supported attack, tanks are especially effective in the
commence with a phase of nonnuclear combat that             first echelon, since they have maneuverability, fire-
                                                                                                            FM 100-2-1

     power, lower vulnerability to enemy nuclear attacks,       provide more advantageous poSitioning offorces when
     and the capability to achieve penetrations of great        and if the nuclear phase is initiated.
        Even when nuclear weapons are not used from the
     outset, Soviet commanders deploy their troops based        Chemical Warfare
     on the assumption that the enemy may strike with              The Soviets do not perceive clear delineations
     nuclear weapons at any moment. They continuously           between conventional, chemical, and nuclear warfare.
     update their own plans for nuclear employment so           It is possible that chemical weapons would be used
     they will be prepared if they are required to preempt      early in an operation or from its onset.
     such an attack. The Soviets have developed their com-         Chemical attacks would be directed principally
     bined arms concept to fit a nuclear engagement as well     against enemy positions in the forward battle area
     as a nonnuclear phase, which is planned within the         Soviet military writings indicate that non-persistent
     context of a pervasive nuclear-threatened environ-         agents would be used across the front of a Soviet attack,
     ment. Thus, the Soviet command does not have to            while persistent agents would be used to protect their
     make a complex transition from nonnuclear to nuclear       flanks.
     war-fighting modes, since the nonnuclear mode is              Simultaneously with strikes across the front, chemi-
     already adapted to an overall nuclear posture.              cal strikes also could be expected throughout the
        The Soviets would prefer to avoid nuclear warfare.      depth of enemy defenses. These chemical strikes
     They would probably do so as long as their objectives      would be combined with other forms of conventional
     were being achieved and there were no indications          attack to neutralize enemy nuclear capability, com-
     that the enemy was "going nuclear." However, the           mand and control, and aviation. Subsequent chemical
     Soviets would attempt to preempt enemy nuclear use         attacks might be conducted against logistic facilities.
     by a massive, initial, in-depth, theater nuclear strike.      Besides offensive chemical capability, Soviet forces
                                                                are equipped with the best chemical protective and
                                                                decontamination equipment in the world. They know
     Theater Nuclear Targeting Priorities - - - - - -           that their chemical capability greatly exceeds that of
                                                                any other nation. Not to use this capability would
                                                                deprive them of a decisive advantage.
         •   Nuclear delivery means.                               Though they might use chemical weapons, the
         •   Command and control.                               Soviets would strive to keep a theater offensive non-
         •   Deployed troop formations.                         nuclear. They would attempt to achieve the swift, early
         •   Reserves .                                         destruction or neutralization of enemy tactical nuclear
         •   Supplies.                                          capability by rapid, deep penetrations by ground forces
                                                                and strikes throughout the enemy depth with all avail-
                                                                able nonnuclear means.
     They perceive that their decision to go nuclear must be       The vulnerability of densely concentrated forma-
     made early so that sufficient nonnuclear offensive         tions to nuclear weapons caused the Soviets al~rto
     power remains to follow up and to exploit the gains of     their method of achieving mass. The "breakthrough"
     nuclear employment with an immediate, high-speed           concept of World War IT, with its massed troops and
     air and ground offensive.                                  weapons, narrow frontages, and fixed echelons, is
                                                                maladapted to the nuclear-threatened battlefield.
                                                                Though it is still an option when attacking enemyposi-
     Nonnuclear Warfare                                         tions that are well-prepared and arrayed in depth with
        Nonnuclear warfare is distinguished not so much by      substantial reserves, densely-massed formations are a
     major differences in combat deployments as by the          least-preferred option.
     extra missions assigned to artillery, helicopters, and        Under nuclear-threatened conditions, the Soviet
     tactical air. These conventional fire support systems      offensive concept would have the following features:
     must provide additional massive fires to take up the        • Avoid concentrating forces.
     slack in destructive firepower that would otherwise be      • Concentrate fires, but not firing weapons.
     provided by nuclear strikes. Nonnuclear operations          • Attack across broader frontages, on multiple axes.
     are related closely to nuclear operations. Conventional     • Avoid enemy strong points.
     and/or chemical combat can appreciably alter the            • Probe for enemy weak points.
     "correlation of forces" in the Soviets' favor as well as    • Penetrate where possible.
FM 100-2-1

 • Commit fullow-on forces when and where they                   Second echelon forces are likely to be dispersed
can best contribute to success.                               laterally, following behind first echelon forces.
 • Drive rapidly and deeply into the enemy rear to            Dispersal provides both security and flexibility in
destroy nuclear weapons and enemy defenses.                   commitment.
  The desire to keep a theater war nonnuclear has                The distance between echelons is not fixed. It is
been a driving force· behind the vast qualitative and         decided by the commander based on the situation. The
quantitative improvements in Soviet conventional              second echelon is located close enough to the first
ground forces over the past fifteen years.                    echelon to insure timely commitment, but far enough
                                                              back to provide protection and room for maneuver.
                                                              Second echelon forces normally advance in march or
ECHELONS AND FORCE RATIOS                                     prebattle formation.
   A Soviet tactical commander develops his concept              The preferred method of committing second
for an attack much the same as a US commander does.           echelon forces is through gaps or around flanks offirst
The Soviet commander considers the same factors               echelon forces. For example, a second echelon regi-
which we know as MEIT-T (mission, enemy, terrain,             ment normally would pass between first echelon
troops, and time available). He assesses his objectives,      regiments or around the flank of its parent division.
the terrain, enemy forces, and avenues of approach.
Then he assigns forces necessary to insure completion
of the task. One tool that he uses in allocating forces is    Commitment of Forces _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
                                                                                               Second echelon passes

   Forces may be allocated to a first echelon, a second                                        through gaps or at flanks to
echelon, a combined arms reserve, or special reserves.                                         avoid passage of lines and
If enemy defenses are well prepared in depth, the                                              intermingling of forces.
Soviet commander will normally organize his forces
into two echelons, special reserves, and, possibly, a
small combined arms reserve. If the enemy defends
with most of his forces forward, the Soviets normally
will attack in a strong, single echelon, followed by a
combined arms reserve and special reserves. Combat
organization is variable and adaptable to the situation.

First and Second Echelons
   A first echelon is a main attack force. It will contain
the majority of the combat power of the formation or
unit. Missions of first echelon forces are:
 • Penetrate or defeat enemy forward defenses.
 • Continue the attack.
 • Under nuclear conditions, exploit nuclear strikes
on enemy defenses.
   Second echelon forces are assigned missions at the
same time as first echelon forces. Possible missions for
second echelon forces include:
 • Exploit the success of first echelon forces.
 • Conduct a pursuit.
 • Destroy bypassed enemy forces.
 • Replace or reinforce first echelon forces.
   Regardless of a previously assigned mission, second          However, the second echelon could be committed
echelon forces are used to reinforce success, not             on an axis of a first echelon unit. Whenever possible,
failure. The main goal at all levels is to carry the battle   the Soviets will avoid a passage of lines and inter-
swiftly and violently into the enemy rear. The com-           mingling of forces of two echelons, such as would
mander commits second echelon forces in a manner to           happen if the second echelon unit were passed
best achieve this goal.                                       through the first echelon unit.
                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

   Whereas, second echelon forces have assigned                This 3: 1 ratio refers to more than just cumulative
missions, reserve forces do not. This is the key distinc-   numbers of first echelon troops and weapons relative
tion between them. Reserve forces are the Soviet com-       to enemy troops and weapons in a given sector. It is,
mander's asset for flexible development of the battle       instead, a more sophisticated calculation of the total
and for reacting to contingencies.                          force, to include all maneuver units and combat
                                                            support that a commander can bring to bear relative to
                                                            the total force with which the enemy can oppose him.
Reserve Forces                                                 In computing his strength relative to enemy
   Combined arms reserves are made up of tank,              strength, a Soviet commander considers all organic,
motorized rifle, and artillery subunits. When a large       attached, and supporting combat power. When an
single echelon is employed in an attack, a combined         attack begins, his actual strength advantage at the FEBA
arms reserve will be used to exploit success. It will       could be as small as 2: 1. The remainder of his force may
advance in a manner similar to a second echelon, but        not be readily visible to defending enemy units.
will not have a pre-assigned mission. It is committed       Massive artillery and air strikes will pour down on
when and where the Soviet comJ;llander believes it can      defensive positions from remote locations while
best lead to deeper penetration and success.                second echelon or reserve forces approach in march
  A small combined arms reserve, approximately one-         or prebattle formation. Nevertheless, the commander
ninth the size of the parent unit, may be formed when       considers this entire force, which may give him an
two echelons are employed. Such a reserve is used           advantage of 3: 1 or 4: 1 over the defender, when plan-
primarily for security and reaction to enemy                ning and conducting a mission to penetrate enemy
counterattack.                                              forward defenses.
   Special reserves are organized from antitank,               The Soviet norm for dispersion on the nuclear-
engineer, chemical, or other combat support                 threatened battlefield is calculated so that no two
elements. They are used primarily for defense against       equivalent subunits (battalion or smaller) would be
enemy counterattacks, security, and tasks requiring         destroyed by a single tactical nuclear weapon. The dis-
specialty skills.                                           tance between those subunits should be great enough
                                                            that they could not be totally or partially destroyed by a
                                                            single tactical nuclear weapon capable of destroying
Force Ratios                                                an entire subunit of that size. A Soviet commander may
   After World War II, but before the introduction of       depart from these guidelines and temporarily decrease
tactical nuclear weapons and the complete mechaniza-        dispersion to achieve the force ratio necessary for a
tion of Soviet ground forces, Soviet military planners      penetration of enemy defenses. Even if he does
routinely weighted a main attack with ratios of 3-5: 1 in   concentrate forces, he will rarely, if ever, mass his
tanks, 6-8: 1 in artillery, and 4-5: 1 in personnel.        troops and weapons to the densities that were accept-
Contemporary Soviet writings indicate that an aggre-        able before the advent of tactical nuclear weapons.
gate ratio of combat power of approximately 3: 1 is           The concept of echeloning allows the Soviet com-
sufficient in conducting an offensive operation or an       mander to disperse his unit laterally and in depth. At
attack against a defending enemy.                           the same time, he can apply a sizable part of his force
                                                            rapidly when and where he wants to, based on the
                                                            developing battlefield situation.
Desired Attack Force Ratio - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                            NORMS, INITIATIVE, AND FLEXIBILITY
                                                               Soviet military doctrine includes a system of per-
                                                            formance standards, expressed in numeric-al form,
                                                            called "norms." Norms define the ideal performance in
                                                            a multitude of tasks and conditions. They are used to
                                                            determine things such as interval, rates of march,
                                                            frontages, logistics requirements, fire support, and
                                                            training drills.
                                                               Norms provide a mathematical prescription for
                                                            proper action. They are formulated by historical
                                                            analysis, training exercises, requirements, and gaming
FM 100-2-1

 models. Based on norms, a given situation has an               Flexibility in battlefield thought and action increase by
 approved response. The correctness ofa commander's            degree, upward through division, army, and front.
 action or his troops' response is often measured by               Soviet officers today are well-educated and well-
 their adherence to the established norms for that              trained in their military specialties. Most of them are
 situation.                                                    graduates of branch academies where they receive the
    The advantage of this system is that it provides a high    equivalent of a college education plus a thorough
 degree of combat readiness, at least in the initial stages.   grounding in their branch skills. Though their world
 Drills at the subunit level (battalion and lower) are         outlook is biased by a lifetime of political dogma, they
 well-rehearsed. The tactical level commander is aware         are not ignorant nor incapable of profeSSional, purely
 in advance of how well his troops can cope with time          military judgment. It is not likely that they would
 and space factors.                                            rigidly adhere to a plan faced with imminent failure if
    The obvious disadvantage to strict adherence to            an expedient to success were at hand.
 norms is less provision for the unexpected. If a situa-           Flexibility in Soviet operations has been evident
 tion arises for which there is no established normative       since the final years of World War II. Since the mid-
response, a lower-level commander might find himself            1960s, Soviet military writers and theorists have
 in peril.                                                     emphasized:
    The topic of initiative receives much attention in           • The need for rapid concentration and dispersal of
Soviet military writings. When a plan fails, comman-           combat power on the modem battlefield.
ders are strongly urged to use initiative as a cure-all.         • The rejection of the classic "breakthrough"
    The Soviet perception of initiative involves finding a     achieved by massed forces.
correct solution following normative patterns. If the            • The need to attack on multiple axes.
commander adheres to norrlls and is successful, he is            • The lack of a continuous front.
praised. If he violates normative patterns and fuils, he is      • The exploitation of weak points in an enemy
condemned. Success, however, is most important. If a           defense.
commander solves a problem by his own devices, he is             • Swift transfer of combat power from one point to
lauded.                                                        another on the battlefield.
   Soviet operations and tactics are not as thoroughly           • The achievement of SUlprise.
rigid as is perceived by many Western analysts. The              • Speed in the attack.
amount of flexibility exhibited increases with the rank          • Independent action by commanders.
of the commander and the size of force commanded.                • The need to carry the battle deep into the enemy
There is probably little tactical flexibility at subunit       rear.
level (battalion and lower). The first level where any            These concepts are not descriptive of a rigid
real tactical flexibility might be found is at regiment,       offensive doctrine, but of one that is both mobile and
which is the smallest fully combined arms unit.                flexible.



   The Soviet National Military Command Authority                                       Committee of Defense -essentially a war cabinet with
exercises complete control over the military-                                           oversight of the political, diplomatic, and economic
economic planning and activities of the Soviet Union. It                                aspects of the nation at war, as well as general policy
is ~omposed of three major bodies:                                                      matters concerned with the conduct of military
 • The Council of Defense.                                                              operations.
 • The Main Military Council.                                                             The Main Military Council is immediately
 • The General Staff.                                                                   responsible to the Council of Defense for the overall
   The Council of Defense is responsible for planning                                   leadership and status of the Soviet armed forces in
and preparing the country for war. It is chaired by the                                 peacetime. The Minister of Defense heads this council.
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet                                  The Chairman of the Council of Defense is a member,
Union. The council is made up of selected Politburo                                     as are the First Deputy Ministers of Defense. The
members, including the Minister of Defense. This                                        ministers include the Chief of the General Staff and the
council is the USSR's highest military-economic                                         Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. Other
planning agency; it deliberates interrelated issues                                     members might include the commanders of the five
concerning the nation's defenses, economic plans, and                                   military services, the Chief of the Main Political
government branches. These include the mobilization                                     Administration, the Chief of the Rear Services, and the
of industry, transportation, and manpower for war, and                                  Chief of Civil Defense.
the peacetime structure of the armed forces. Its                                          In wartime, the council would be transferred into
deliberation and decrees are translated into law. In                                    the STAVKA (Headquarters of the Supreme High Com-
wartime, this body would be reorganized into the State                                  mand), which would represent the top echelon of

Soviet National Military Command Authority _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

           -        PEACETIME                                                                                                          II!IIlIIIIIIIII       WARTIME

               COUNCIL OF DEFENSE              I!iIiRi I!iIiRi I!iIiRi I!iIiRi (*) 11IIIIIIII I!iIiRi 11IIIIIIII11IIIIIIII        STATE COMMITTEE OF DEFENSE

                      I                                                                                                                                      I
                                                                                                                                  HQ SUPREME HIGH COMMAND
                                       ~1IIIIIIIII1IIIIIIIII1IIIIIIIII1!iIiRi(*)IlIIIIIIlIIIIIIlIIIIIIlIIIII . . . .                      (STAVKA)
                                                                                                                                 SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF

                      I                    I
                                                                  GENERAL STAFF
                      I                                                                                                                                          I
                                                                                                                                                                              !-   ,...
        GROUND FORCES                                                                                                                                    I
        AIR FORCES
        AIRBORNE FORCES                           "NOTE: These controlling bodies transfer to wartime
                                                  organizations indicated. The General Secretary of the
        NAVY                                                                                                                                                         FRONTS
                                                  Communist Party, Chairman for the Coucil of Defense in
                                                  peacetime, becomes the Supreme Commander in Chief of
                                                  Soviet Armed Forces in wartime.                                                                                    FLEETS

FM 100-2-1

Soviet wartime military-control. The General Secretary      one or more airborne divisions, military tram.port
of the Communist Party, as Chairman of the State Com-       aviation, and fleets on maritime axes. These are joint
mittee of Defense, would become the Supreme Com-            operations, conceived by the STAVKA, planned and
mander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces.                 conducted by the General Staff for the Supreme
   The STAVKA will plan and direct strategic opera-         Commander in Chief. The sizing of the /mnts, the
tions on a global scale through theaters of military        allocation of other forces, the assignment of missions,
operations (Russian:lVD), sizing and allocating forces      and the concepts of operations are responsibilities of
to implement its plans. The number of fmnts, their          the General Staff.
composition, missions, and the general plans for the           Given the extent and redundancy of communica-
conduct of TVD operations will be established by the        tions, the mobility of the forces, the anticipated tempo
STAVKA. It also will monitor individualfmnt and fleet       of operations, and the requirements for the highest
actions and supervise coordination between them.            level centralized control, the Soviet General Staff will
   The General Staffis the major link in the centraliza-    probably exercise direct control over the major opera-
tion of the Soviet National Military Command                tional forces, with close supervision over their
Authority. The General Staff is the executive agency for    coordination.
the Main Military Council in peacetime and the
STAVKA in wartime. The Soviet General Staff is
charged with the basic military planning for the Soviet     COMMANDERS
Armed Forces, both in peace and war. The militaryser-          The Soviets recognize that effective command and
vices, the military districts, and the Groups of Forces     control is critical for success in modern combined
outside of the USSR report to the Minister of Defense       arms warfare. Their method of insuring success is to
through the General Staff in peacetime. In wartime,         establish and to maintain a system of tightly centralized
field forces in a TVD (tmnts and fleets) would report       control over the combat and supporting forces at each
to the Supreme Commander in Cl1iefand the STAVKA            level of command.
through the General Staff.                                     The Soviet commander at each level is charged with
                                                            overall responsibility for his forces. Soviet doctrine
                                                            emphasizes that under the fluid conditions of modern
THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS                              warfare, even in the course of carefully planned opera-
   The area ofland and sea (and the air space above) on     tions, the commander must accomplish assigned
which the armed forces prepare for war, deploy mili-        missions on his own initiative without constant
tary forces, and conduct war at the strategic level make    guidance from above. To do this, the commander must
up the theater of military operations, or "TVD." The        be well informed about the general situation and the
theater of military operations usually encompasses a        intentions of the senior commander.
considerable portion of the territory of a continent.          The fmnt commander is responsible for the
The basic types of strategic ground operations are the      conduct of the entire operation in which his front is
offense, defense, and counteroffense. The strategic         involved and for carrying out long-term operational
offensive operation is considered the chief and             and strategic plans. Army commanders receive their
decisive form of strategic operation. Only as a result of   missions from their front commander. Division com-
such an offensive operation is it possible to defeat and    manders, in turn, receive their missions from their
destroy the enemy's field forces within the TVD, to         respective army commanders.
capture vitally important territory, to destroy the
enemy's ability to conduct organized resistance, and to
insure victory.                                             ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS
   A strategic offensive operation can be conducted          All headquarters (fmnt, army, and division) are
over one or more strategic axes or across the entire·       organized in the same basic manner, but differ in size
width of a TVD.1t can be conducted to the entire depth      and complexity. The higher the level, the larger and
of the lVD, or may only be planned to obtain                more complex the staff is.
intermediate stategic areas; one or more subsequent            The staff, supervised by the chief of staff, 'assists the
strategic offensive operations may be required to           commander by planning, monitoring, and controlling
accomplish all of the strategic tasks reqUired for total    operations. The principal functions of a Soviet staffare:
victory in the TVD.                                         operations, intelligence, communications, rocket
   A strategic offensive operation is conducted with        troops and artillery, air defense, engineer support,
several fmnts, (army groups), one or more air armies,       chemical defense, aviation, rear services, armaments
                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

and equipment ( technical matters ), and political           necessary. Radio stations and special vehicles are
support.                                                     located some distance from the actual command
   The political directorate, a department of the            center.
Central Committee of the Communist Party, is                    All headquarters have an administrative element that
responsible for propagating Party policy throughout          provides local security and traffic control. Air defense
the armed forces. Political officers (deputy com-            of these headquarters receives a high priority. Due to
manders for political affairs) are present at all levels     dispersion in a mobile environment, command posts
down to company. They conduct troop indoctrination           will often be responsible for their own local ground
and training, assist the commander in maintaining            defenses.
troop morale, motivation, and discipline, and advise            The seven basic types of command posts are
him on nonoperational matters. The political officer         described as follows:
does not play a formal role in making military deci-          • A main command post is the primary command
sions, but he does exert considerable influence on the       post at division, army, and front. It is augmented by
general policy and political direction of his unit.          forward and alternate command posts.
   Arms and services are staff dements for tank,              • A forward command post is deployed near the
artillery, aviation, air defense, communications, and        first echelon troops to enable the commander to con-
chemical troops. Each is responsible for the technical       trol his unit in combat more effectively, especially in
aspects of its arm. The senior officer of each arm is also   the main sector. It is employed at division level or
an advisor with direct access to the commander.              higher when control is difficult from the main com-
   The logistic staff is responsible for coordinating rear   mand post, or when the main command post is moving
service activities and for liaison between other staff       or has been put out of action.
elements and logistics organizations. Logistic activities     • An alternate command post, with reduced
are managed by chiefs of rear services and chiefs of         staffing, is established to insure continuity of control
technical matters/armaments services through their           should the main command post be put out of action.
supporting staffs.                                            • A rear area command post is established for the
                                                             deputy commander for rear services. From it, he
                                                             organizes and directs the rear service support for his
COMMAND POSTS                                                unit.
    Control is exercised through a series of command          • A command observation post is normally an
,posts. The distance between them is planned so that         armored command vehicle, an APC, or tank. It is the
 only one would be put out of action bya single tactical     only command post formed below regiment level.
 nuclear weapon. The number of command posts and              • Auxiliary command post is set up at front and
 their sizes depend on the level of command. There are       army levels when the situation requires an extra com-
 seven basic types of command posts: forward com-            mand post. It is often used to control an operation on a
 mand post, main command post, alternate command             secondary axis.
 post, rear services control pOint, command/observa-          • Airborne command posts are used at front, army,
 tion post, auxiliary command post, and airborne             and division levels to provide the commander an
 command post.                                               airborne platform from which to control operations.
    The commander decides where the posts will be
 located and how they will move. Front and army com-
 mand posts generally are deployed in depth to facili-       TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS
 tate control of their entire areas of operation.               The Soviets recognize that they cannot effectively
    During lengthy moves, command posts may leapfrog         control the battlefield actions of combined arms
 forward along parallel routes. They are preceded by         formations without good communications. They know
 reconnaissance parties that select the new locations        that the enemy will continually strive to disrupt their
 and act as traffic regulators. While on the move, com-      communications. To counter this threat, the Soviets
 mand posts maintain continuous contact with subordi-        stress considerable redundancy in communications
 nate units, higher headquarters, and flanking units.        modes and equipment.
 Normally, the alternate and main command posts                 The organization of communications to meet
 move by leap-frogging each other, one moving while          immediate tactical requirements is a responsibility of
 the other is set up and controlling operations.             the commander at each tactical level. Unit communi-
    During movement halts, command posts are dis-            cations officers are charged with establishing and
 persed in concealed areas and are camouflaged if            maintaining continuous communications.
. FM 100-2-1

   The following principles are applied in organizing         services have separate nets that are similar and parallel.
tactical communications:                                       • Staff nets are used by the chief of staff for directing
 • Responsibility for command communications is               other staff elements at his level and for keeping
from higher to subordinate headquarters; however, if          subordinate and superior staffs informed of his com-
communications are not established by the higher              mander's intentions. The chief of artillery at front,
headquarters, the subordinate headquarters must               army, and division has his own staff communications
provide them using its own equipment.                         for control of units subordinate to him and to direct
 • Communications with supported units are the                the actions of similar forces at the next lower level; the
responsibility of the headquarters of the supporting          aviation commander or controller at each level may
units.                                                        have similar communications. The chiefs of engineer
 • Lateral communications normally are established            and chemical troops must use the main staff com-
from right to left; but if such communications are not        munications network.
established by the unit on the right, the unit on the left     • Liaison nets are established between ground force
must do so.                                                   units operating in coordinated action, and from sup-
 • Radio is the principal mean" of communications,            porting units to supported units. Each liaison officer
especially when in contact with the enemy. Messen-            provides his own communications equipment to
gers and other liaison services are used for augmenta-        operate with his parent unit.
tion and security.                                             • Coordination nets are established between com-
 • Wire is used extensively in the defense and in the         manders to insure mutual understanding and unity of
preparatory phase of offensive actions.                       purpose and action with adjacent units.
 • Operator discipline is strict, operating procedure          • Warning nets are used to warn subordinate units
is of a high order, and security precautions are to be        of impending air, tank, nuclear, and chemical attack
observed minutely.                                            and to disseminate meteorological information.
 • Command nets are designed to provide communi-               • Air defense nets include air surveillance nets to
cations with subordinate units two levels down, in a          radar sites, air warning nets, and air defense control
"skip echelon" manner. This communications                    nets connecting higher and lower staffs and air defense
structure allows, for example, a division to control a        units.
battalion, or a regiment to control a company, if neces-       • Rear seroices nets are used by rear elements to
sary.                                                        control supply, transport, medical, and other support
   Soviet communications equipment ranges from               services at all levels· from front down to battalion.
simple, easy-to-operate electronic devices to complex,        More reliance is placed on cable and wire for these
vehicle-mounted equipment that requires highly                nets than for the other types.
skilled operators. Radio is the principal means of             • Speda/ putpose nets are established between main
communications except in static situations where             command posts and selected units.
wire can be employed effectively.                               Communications units are assigned at all levels from
   Soviet ground force radios include low power, -fre-       front to battalion to support internal headquarters and
quency modulated (FM) and amplitude modulated                to provide communications with higher, subordinate,
(AM) sets of manpack and vehicle-mounted types,              and adjacent units. At the tactical level, each division
medium power high frequency (HF) radio stations of a         has a signal battalion, each regiment has a signal com-
heavy mobile variety, and multichannel radio-relay           pany, and each battalion has a communications
equipment.                                                   platoon.
   Field telephones are used widely with automatic              A variety of communications means are provided to
switching equipment; switchboards are provided               tactical units for use when radio and wire communica-
down to company level. Teleprinter communications            tions are not appropriate. These include flares, tracer
are provided down to regiment level.                         rounds, signal flags and lights, and loudspeakers.
   Couriers are also used. They are transported by
helicopters and a wide variety of ground vehicles.
   The following types of communication nets are             DIVISION-LEVEL
used:                                                        COMMAND AND CONTROL
 • Com11Ulnd nets are used by the commander pri-               The Soviet division commander exercises command
marily to pass combat orders. Channels generally are         authority over his unit and is responsible for its actions.
direct from a superior to his immediate subordinates,        His deputies are responSible, however, for some of the
but they also permit skipping echelons. The arms and         technical operations of the various branches ofselVice
                                                                                                              FM 100-2-1

represented in the division. This frees him to concen-          be part of one system known as the "military rear." The
trate his energies on planning and fighting the battle.         logistic plans of the division are not independent but
The division commander is the only general officer in a         are part of a centrally directed logistic system. Army
division.. Many division commanders are senior                  and front logistic plans directly affect the division, and
colonels, who are later promoted to major general               assets from these levels augment the division rear.
(one star) rank.                                                   In the Soviet view, proper coordination and trans-
                                                                mission of orders result, for example, in first echelon
                                                                divisions receiving logistic allocations according to
 Dual Allegiance                                                established criteria for first echelon divisions in a given
    Each branch of service, except for tank and                 type of operation. Because logistic planning has started
 motorized rifle, is represented on the division staff by a     at front level, there should be no fundamental conflict
 chief of the branch. Collectively, these officers are          between division requirements and the assets that
 referred to as the chiefs of the arms and services. They       have been allocated to the division. The division com-
 are responsible to the division commander but receive          mander also makes his plans and establishes require-
 additional instructions and guidance from their                ments according to the same criteria. The Soviets
 counterparts at the next higher level.                         recognize that all plans do not operate perfectly and
    The division operates as part of an army which is part      that the situation and special problems affect the
 of a front. The operations of the front are directed by        division's logistic requirements. Since centralized
 an extremely centralized system of command and con-            planning has properly allocated resources from the
 trol. From the front commander's point of view, for            highest levels, the division should be able to resolve
 example, all artillery organic or attached to hisfrontis       any conflicts.
 under his control. The artillery, as a branch of service,         If the system works, the administrative and technical
 has certain capabilities that assist the front com-            burden on the division commander is reduced, and he
 mander in the accomplishment of his mission. He                can concern himself with the tactical conduct of his
 directs the chief of rocket troops and artillery at front      maneuver units. The commander at the highest level
 level to plan and direct the front's artillery fires to sup-   has centralized control over the assets available to him.
port his concept of the operation. The division's               The drawback is the increased need for coordination.
 artillery assets are thus part of the general artillery        When the logistic plan, for example, is not properly
effort. Centralized fire planning at front level insures        coordinated at each level, shortfalls and overages
 that proper allocation of resources is made and that           occur..
weapons engage appropriate targets.                                There are two fundamental areas of division-level
    The division chief of rocket troops and artillery           command and control: the command group and the
 (CRTA) is responsible for integrating his fire plan with       staff. The command group includes the commander
the fire plan from the army CRTA Within the con-                and those officers who work for the commander in a
 straints posed by the army fire plan, the division CRTA        direct command relationship-those who cause the
must satisty the requirements of his division                   unit to execute his orders. The staff includes those
commander-or resolve any conflicts through proper               officers who assist the commander in planning and
coordination. While the possibility for confusion               supervision. Some officers are in both categories.
exists, the Soviets do not view this as an infringement
on command prerogative. On the contrary, it insures
unity of command at the highest levels. The fire plan,          Division Command Group
for example, is viewed as an aid to planning, and not a           A Soviet division commander commands through a
constraint. The division commander learns from the              group of deputy and subordinate commanders. The
army fire plan which targets will be attacked by non-           four maneuver regiment commanders are considered
divisional artillery. He can then decide which targets to       major subordinate commanders. The deputy com-
attack with division artillery.                                 manders are the chief of staff, the deputy commander
   A good example of dual allegiance to the unit com-           for the rear, the deputy commander for technical
mander and a branch chief at the next higher level is           matters, the chief of rocket troops and artillery, and the
the operation of the logistic system. A deputy com-             deputy commander for political affairs.
mander for the rear commands the service support                  The division commander is responsible for the
operations of the division. However, all logistic assets        combat readiness of the division. He is answerable for
in the Soviet Army, from the company to the Chief of            the combat training, political education, and military
the Rear at the Ministry of Defense, are considered to          discipline of his troops; the condition of the division's
FM 100-2-1

equipment; and the logistic and medical support of the      sion commander. He is also under the staff supervision
division. He is responsible for all troop control           of the army deputy for political affairs. The potential
measures during the preparation, organization, and          exists, of course, for the political officer to interfere
conduct of combat.                                          with operations by reporting on the political reliability
   The chiefofstaffis the primary assistant to the com-     of the commander and other officers through political
mander. He is a staff officer and also a deputy com-        channels.
mander. The chief of staff is the only officer authorized      The political officer, who is also secretary of the divi-
to issue orders in the name of the commander. It is his     sion party organization, operates through a division
responsibility to understand not only the commander's       political section which includes the Komsomol (Com-
specific instructions, but his train of thought and         munist Youth Organization) subsection, the propa-
general approach. He insures the execution of the           ganda and agitation subsection, the political
commander's orders during the commander's                   information subsection, and the personnel and
absence. The commander usually is located well for-         welfare subsections. The political officer helps to
ward at a small mobile command post during offensive        promote the authority of the commander, to raise
combat. The main division command post is located           troop morale, and to enhance troop effectiveness. He
some distance to the rear and is under the control of       bears direct responsibility for the organization of
the chief of staff.                                         political work in the division. Elements under his
   The deputy commander for the rear is responsible         control organize and conduct political indoctrina-
for the combat service support of the division and          tion sessions, politically oriented, club-type activities,
commands the logistic assets of the division. He            and lecture on current events and Soviet history.
develops plans and orders, is supported by a rear staff,
and operates a rear area command post. He can be con-
sidered the "installation commander" for the rear area.     Political Officer Responsibilities - - - - - - - _
Small depots which belong to the chiefs of arms and
services and assets controlled by the deputy com-                 Soviet regulations state the political officer
mander for technical matters also are located in the           must accomplish the following:
rear area. The deputy commander for the rear has no            • Participate in planning for combat and political
authority over the officers in charge of these elements        training.
in matters concerning their respective technical               • Organize and conduct political work.
operations. He is responsible, however, for rear area          • Cultivate unreserved dedication to the Soviet
organization and security and assigns locations in the         fatherland, the Communist Party and the Soviet
rear area Additionally, he establishes policies and            government, proletarian internationalism and
plans concerning security and damage control.                  undeviating observance of the military oath,
   The deputy commander for technical matters                  obedience to and respect for superiors, and
controls the division maintenance battalion. He is             absolute adherence to military regulations and
responsible for direct supp~rt maintenance for both            orders.
armored and wheeled vehicles, procurement of repair            • Conduct propaganda among soldiers concern-
parts, and vehicle replacement. He also oversees               ing the successes in the building of
maintenance training throughout the division. During           communism, which includes organizing
combat, he directs the repair and evacuation of                political agitation and propaganda; organizing
disabled equipment, and informs the commander on               and supervising political training for officers;
the status of the division's equipment.                        educating troops to develop hatred for enemies
  The chief of rocket troops and artillery (CRTA)              of the Fatherland; and educating troops to
coordinates and plans the artillery fires of the organic       develop a sense of personal responsibility for
and attached artillery of the division. The division com-      the condition of their equipment.
mander issues orders concerning artillery support to
the CRTA, who has authority to inspect the artillery
units in the division and to hold them accountable for         The regimental commanders command the divi-
their technical proficiency. During the course of the       sion's maneuver units. They are responsible for the
battle, however, he serves primarily as a special staff     combat readiness of their units, as well as their combat
officer, advising the commander on artillery matters.       and political training. They are the instruments
  The deputy commander for political affairs (also          through which the division commander fights the
called the political officer) is subordinate to the divi-   battle.
                                                                                                                              FM 100-2-1

The Division Staff
   The chief of staff controls the staff and coordinates       staff and reports problems to the commander. He is
its work. He is the primary conduit for information            responsible for coordination of all staff work, and is
between the commander and his unit. He reports staff           personally responsible for the coordination oflogistic
findings and acts as the organizer for execution of the        requirements between the chiefs of arms and services
command decision. He monitors progress through the             and the deputy commander for the rear.

The Soviet Division Staff _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                      DIVISION COMMANDER
                                         POLITICAL STAFF                                                            KGB COUNTER-
                                                                                                    I           INTELLIGENCE SECTION
                                                                                                             L -_ _ _----...l

         FOR THE REAR
                                                                   ______ + _
                                                                          I         2
                                                                                                                MILITARY PROSECUTOR

     DEPUTY COMMANDER                      REAR STAFF                                               I
    FOR TECHNICAL MATTERS    1--..- - - - -...- -...                                                I
                                                                                                    L _           MILITARY TRIBUNAL

                                                        CHIEF OF STAFF

                        DIVISION STAFF                                              CHIEFS OF ARMS AND SERVICES

         CHIEF OF                  CHIEF OF 1ST SECTION                 CHIEF OF ROCKET                               CHIEF OF
    TOPOGRAPHIC SECTION                 OPERATIONS                   TROOPS AND ARTILLERY                       AIR DEFENSE TROOPS

          CHIEF OF                                                          CHIEF OF
                                                                                                                      CHIEF OF
          SECTION                                              •.L-____
                                                             • 3         RECONNAISSANCE
                                                                            ~T~RO~O~P~S_____ _ J
                                                                                                                  ENGINEER TROOPS

           CHIEF OF
     ADMINISTRATION AND                                                      CHIEF OF                                 CHIEF OF
       FINANCE SECTION                                                    SIGNAL TROOPS                           CHEMICAL TROOPS

                                                              1. This staff officer has a role similar to that of the deputy commander for
       HEADQUARTERS                                           technical matters except that he is responsible for the technical condition of
       COMMANDANT                         PERSONNEL           armaments and related combat equipment and instruments.
                                                              2. These three sections assist the division commander. but they are not
                                                              subordinate to him.
                                                              3. The chief of the intelligence section is also the chief of the reconnaissance
                                                              4. The chief of the communications section is also chief of signal troops.

FM 100-2-1

Coordinating Staffs.          The eight sections which         gence sections and reconnaissance units. Specific
 make up the group the Soviets call the division staff are      responsibilities of the intelligence officer include-
 under the direct control of the chief of staff. The four        • Collecting and analyzing information on the
 coordinating staff sections belonging to this group are:      enemy, terrain, and weather and its dissemination to
   • first section, operations,                                 the commander and adjacent units.
  • second section, intelligence,                                • Organizing reconnaissance missions, including
  • third section, communications, and                         requests for aerial reconnaissance, in coordination
  • fourth section, personnel.                                 with the first section.
    The most important coordinating staff section is the         • Preparing the observation plan, in coordination
 operations section, headed by the chief of operations.        with the first section
 The chief of operations has responsibilty for training          • Preparing the intelligence portion of the division's
 and formulating operations plans and orders. He moni-         combat order.
 tors the work of all other staff sections, keeps abreast of     • Preparing periodic intelligence reports.
 the situation, and is ready to present information and          • Exploiting documents and materiel.
 recommendations concerning the tactical situation.              • Interrogating prisoners of war.
 He is present when the commander announces his                   The tbird section, or communications section, is
 decision, and he writes combat orders and important           headed by the chief of communications, who is also the
 combat reports. Inspection troops assigned to the first       chief of signal troops. He organizes communications
 section check on the execution of assigned missions           with subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters.
 and adherence of subordinate elements to command              The section must insure that the commander has
 directives. In coordination with the intelligence sec-        continuous and uninterrupted tactical control by plan-
 tion, the chief of die operations section keeps the com-      ning wire, radio, and mobile communications. The
 mander informed on the progress of operations. His            term "mobile communications" includes all means of
 specific duties include-                                      communications other than radio and wire. Specific
  • Collecting information concerning the tactical             responsibilities of the third section include-
 situation of friendly forces to include the division,           • Organizing division radio nets.
 adjacent units, and higher units.                               • Establishing call signs and radio procedures.
  • Preparing and disseminating orders, operational              • Organizing courier and mail· service.
plans and reports, summaries, and situational overlays.          • Operating the division message center.
  • Providing liaison for the exchange of information            • Supervising the supply, issue, and maintenance of
 within division headquarters and with higher, subordi-        signal equipment.
 nate, and adjacent units.                                        The fourth section, or personnel section, is headed
  • Organizing the main command post and insuring              by the chief of personnel. He assigns men; requests
 rear area antitank, antiaircraft, and NBC defense.            replacements; records losses; administers awards and
  • Organizing troop movement and traffic control.             decorations; and collects, records, and disposes of war
  • Coordinating the organization of reconnaissance            booty. The fourth section keeps complete personnel
with the intelligence section.                                 files on company-grade officers, while files on enlisted
  • Controlling the distribution of maps.                      personnel are maintained at regimentalleve1. Files on
    The second section, or intelligence section, is            higher ranking officers are maintained at levels higher
headed by the chief of intelligence, who is also the           than division.
chief of reconnaissance troops. He is part of an intelli-         Coordinating staff responsibility for logistics rests
gence chain of command which originates at front. In           with the chief of staff. It is evident, however, that the
this regard, division-level intelligence efforts fit into an   chief of staff cannot devote a large portion of his time
overall intelligence plan.                                     to detailed logistic coordination and still fulfill his
    The chief of the second section is subordinate to the      other duties. Thus, the Soviets operate to a certain
chief of staff, but can report directly to the division        degree without a logistic staff officer. This fact
commander. In coordination with the operations                 increases the burden on the chiefs of arms and services
section, the intelligence section makes collection             and the deputy commander for the rear. Each chief is
plans and collects and evaluates information                   responsible for consolidating and forwarding logistic
concerning the enemy, weather, and terrain. The                requests for his branch to the deputy commander for
section disseminates necessary evaluated information           the rear.
in a timely manner. During combat, the division intelli-       Special Staffs. The division staff also includes the
gence officer directs the efforts of subordinate intelli-      following four special staff sections:
                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

 • The topographic section gathers and analyzes ter-         naissance troops is also the chief of the intelligence
rain data and maintains supplies of maps, catalogs, and      section. Their duties are described in the previous sec-
map-related equipment.                                       tion on coordinating staff.
 • The cryptographic section encodes and decodes                The relationship between the chief of a given branch
the division's cryptographic communications, desig-          and the unit commander is best explained by the rating
nates the codes to be used in communicating with             system. For example, the division commander signs
subordinate units, and supervises communications             the engineer battalion commander's efficiency report,
security procedures and cryptographic training. This         but the report is written by, or at least greatly influ-
section's activities are integrated into a large effort,     enced by, the chief of engineers. The division com-
coordinated by the chief of the intelligence section.        mander shows the report to the rated officer, usually in
The intelligence officer operates according to               the presence of the chief. When the division com-
guidance from higher levels in this regard.                  mander is displeased with the performance of the
 • The administration and finance section                    engineer battalion,. he is likely to express his dis-
organizes the administration and records necessary for       pleasure to the chief and not to the battalion
providing quarters, food, supplies, 'and pay for division    commander.
personnel. It is responsible for all division financial
planning, accounting, auditing, and pay procedures.          Other Advisory Staffs. Besides the chiefs of arms
The division's finance officer supervises subordinate        and services, the deputy commander for the rear, the
unit finance officers, who are responsible for the           deputy commander for technical matters, and the
distribution of funds.                                       deputy commander for political affairs may be con-
 • The headquarters commandant combines the                  sidered special staff officers.
functions (in US Army terms) of the division                    The deputy commander for the rear advises the
headquarters commandant and the division provost             commander on supply and rear service matters. As
marshal. He is responsible for insuring that the division    noted, he also shoulders part of the coordinating staff
headquarters and command posts, in garrison and in           responsibility for logistics. Through the rear staff, he
the field, are properly sited, organized, supported, and     prepares logistic plans and orders.
protected. He also directs the activities of the Com-           The deputy commander for technical matters also
mandant's Service (somewhat similar to US Military           serves as a special staff officer. He advises the com-
Police), and he operates the division's stockade. He         mander on maintenance and repair procedures and
may also be responsible for handling prisoners of war.       vehicular operational readiness.
                                                                Furthermore, although probably not designated a
Arms and Services. The chiefs of arms and services           division staff officer, the commander of the helicopter
serve as special staff officers and advise the commander     element ( or squadron in selected divisions) acts as the
on matters pertaining to their fields.                       division commander's primary adviser for employment
   The chief of rocket troops and artillery serves as        of the division's organic and attached air assets. When
division fire support coordinator. Acting as the chief       aircraft are used for fire support, the helicopter
artillery advisor in combat, he usually is located at the    element (squadron) commander carefully coordi-
forward command post with the division commander.            nates his plan and its execution with the division
   The chief of air defense troops acts as a special staff   CRTA.
officer for air defense. He advises the commander on
air defense tactics and employment.                          Other Support Sections. Besides the coordinating
   The chief ofengineer troops advises the commander         and special staff, there are several additional sections
on engineer support for all the division's missions. He      which may not be considered as the personal staff of
assigris tasks to engineer units based on the com-           the division commander as they are not subordinate to
mander's concept of the operation.                           him. These include the KGB section, the military
  The chief of chemical troops is responsible for the        prosecutor, and the military tribunal.
division's protection from NBC weapons. He is                   The KGB section, staffed by personnel from the
responsible for the supply and maintenance of NBC            Committee for State Security (KGB), is responsible for
gear and equipment, for organization of NBC recon-           counterintelligence. It works independently of the
naissance, and for all NBC training and work per-            political officer. This section investigates and inter-
formed by division personnel.                                rogates espionage suspects, enforces the political
  The chief of signal troops is also the chief of the        reliability of division personnel, and participates in
communications section. likewise, the chief of recon-        determining key assignments.
FM 100-2-1

   The military prosecutor is in charge of investigating                                In
                                                                operation is upcoming. the division, the commander
and prosecuting criminal activity by division person-           receives his mission from the army commander. This
nel. He is responsible for enforcing both military              order could be delivered by radio, messenger, or at a
regulations and civil laws, including those related to          formal briefing. The division commander studies the
counterintelligence. In close coordination with the             mission, the concept of the operation, and scheduled
KGB special section and the deputy commander for                support by army units. He analyzes the role of his
political affairs, the prosecutor and his staff investigate     division in the overall operation of the army. From this
cases and prosecute them before military tribunals.             analysis, he extracts information that will permit his
The division prosecutor is responsible to the                   staff and subordinate commanders to begin prepara-
prosecutor at army level.                                       tion for combat, and issues this information in the form
   The military tribunal also lies outside the tactical         of a warning order.
chain of command and consists of at least one judge                The chief of staff organizes the staff to present
and one or more officers trained in law. The tribunal           information to the commander concerning the enemy,
presides over trials of military personnel charged with         terrain, troops available, and weather. From this
violating military law and of civilians accused of              information, the commander makes his estimate of the
treason or espionage.                                           situation. If time permits, he makes a personal recon-
                                                                naissance with his subordinate commanders and staff
                                                                officers as required to better evaluate the situation.
Division Command and Staff Procedures                           Given sufficient time, written staff estimates are pre-
   The Soviet division commander must gather                    pared and coordinated for the commander.
information on which to base decisions, convey his                 The operations section prepares several possible
decisions in the form of orders, and supervise the              courses of action for the commander's consideration,
execution of these orders. The commander relies on              and the chief of staff indicates his preference. Based on
his staff to assist him in accomplishing his tasks. As a        the available data and the recommendations from the
result, the Soviets have formalized staffprocedures and         staff, the commander makes a decision. The decision
have established formats for combat documents. It               may be one of the recommended courses of action, a
should be understood that these procedures may be               combination of two or more recommendations, or a
performed completely only when time is not a factor in          new solution.
the decision-making process-for example during
preparations for a major offensive. Once fast-moving            Combat Order. The commander announces his
combat has begun, all procedures will be abbreviated.           decision in the presence of the chief of staff, the chief
   As far as can be determined, the Soviet commander            of the operations section, and, when possible, other
follows procedures familiar to US commanders. He                key personnel such as the coordinating staff, the chiefS
makes an estimate of the Situation, issues a warning            of arms and services, and the deputy and subordinate
order, considers courses of action that have been               commanders. The final decision is issued in the form of
researched and presented by the staff, and fmally               an operation order-in Soviet terminology, a "combat
makes a command decision which is approved by.the               order." When time permits, the combat order contains
army commander. The decision is printed in an                   the following information:
approved, detailed format and disseminated according             • A brief description of the enemy situation.
to a fixed distribution list. In their military writings, the    • The missions of the division and adjacent units.
Soviets emphasize the need to be able to adjust rapidly          • Boundaries separating the division and adjacent
to radical changes in the situation which can occur on          units.
the modern battlefield. This emphasis is more preva-             • Commander's concept of the operation.
lent th~n emphasis on rigid adherence to formal proce-           • Guidance on NBC measures within the division
dures. As a result, the commander's estimate and deci-          zone.
sion may take only a few minutes and may be based on             • Immediate mission, subsequent mission, and
very scanty information. The combat order may be                direction of advance for subordinate units.
nothing more than a sentence transmitted by radio or             • Missions for artillery, antiaircraft, engineer, chemi-
messenger to a regimental commander.                            cal, and other special units.
                                                                 • The time troops must be prepared for action.
Warning Order. The Soviets attempt to maximize                   • Detailed coordinating instructions.
the time available for combat preparations by issuing            • Location of the main command post and its antici-
warning orders to alert subordinate units that an               pated direction of displacement.
                                                                                                                             FM 100-2-1

   Annexes to combat orders are forwarded with the                  and questions passed by radio or messenger. The best
order. If they are incomplete when the order is                     method, according to Soviet thought, is personal
transmitted, they are sent out separately to prevent                contact between the commander or staff member and
delay in transmission of the order. Types of annexes                the subordinate organization's commander.
include coordination requirements, intelligence,
security, signal, artillery, engineer, movement order,              Command Posts. The Soviet division commander
and counterattack plans.                                            also organizes a series of command posts for control
   A separate order for logistics is written by the deputy          purposes. During an attack, the division commander
commander for the rear and his staff. The order                     moves well forward, where he can best influence the
organizes the rear area, routes of movement for rear                action. This forward command post is completely
elements, supply routes, supply points, sequence and                mobile and may move 2 to 5 kilometers behind the line
time of resupply, rear area security, and the location of           of contact. The commander usually will have with him
the rear area command post. The order is approved by                the operations officer and the CRTA. He also may
the division commander. .                                           select other officers.
                                                                       The division's main command post also is mobile,
Supervisory Control.       The issuance of orders does              but is much larger than the forward command post. It
not insure that they will be carried out or even under-             is controlled by the chief of staff and moves 10 to 15
stood. Therefore, the Soviets place a great emphasis on             kilometers behind the line of contact.
supervision after the order is issued. The chief ofstaff is            Additionally, the rear area is expected to move two
responsible to the commander for the overall organiza-              to three times a day and is controlled by a rear area
tion of staff supervision. Each staff section is                    command post. This command post usually will not be
responsible for checking on the execution of the                    more than 30 kilometers from the line of contact.
orders which it prepares and insures that orders have                  On the march and during the attack, the commander
been understood correctly. The chief of staffissues the             controls the action by radio and messengers. In a static
necessary orders, with the division commander's                     situation, or in the defense, wire communications will
approval, to resolve the misunderstandings.                         be installed. Command posts on the ground can be
   Proper supervision may take many forms. Super-                   expected to be well dispersed and camouflaged. Addi-
vision may include personal visits by the commander                 tionally, in a static situation, an alternate command
or appropriate staff representatives, observation from              post probably will be established to assume command
the air and ground observation points, and instructions             if the main command post is destroyed.

Divisional Command Posts _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                            Division commander
                                            moves 2-5 km from
                                            LOC to assure control
                        {6          c1
                              I                                                                                /
                         I                                                                 r-("            /
                      }I                                                                   1-- ...... ./
                     r- (......                                                            IJY/
                        - ......

  LINE OF CONTACT (lOC) 5KM                lOKM               15KM                                                         30KM
FM 100-2-1

Communications. Normal radio nets in the division               The commander is usually a colonel or a lieutenant
include command, staff, coordination, warning, and           colonel. He is most likely to be in his late thirties or
special purpose nets. The command nets link the              early forties and to have had advanced tactical training
division commander with regimental commanders                at one of the higher military academies. He is expected
and major support units such as the artillery, engineer,     to maintain strict control over subordinate com-
and chemical units. Battalion commanders are                 manders; to inspect frequently the various training,
contacted directly when emergency conditions                 administrative, and eqUipment maintenance aspects of
dictate. The chief of rocket troops and artillery estab-     his command in garrison; and to set a high personal
lishes a command net with division artillery units. The      example. In combat, he has considerable prerogatives
staff net provides the chief of staff communications         in the way in which he organizes and executes his
with staff elements of the reconnaissance battalion, the     tactical mission.
motorized rifle regiments, and the tank regiment. The           The chiefOfstaffis usually a lieutenant colonel and a
coordination nets link the main command post with            graduate of one of the higher military academies. He is
the division rear, and division headquarters with            the second-in-command of the regiment and is the
adjacent units. The warning net consists of radio            only officer who may issue written orders in the com-
receivers set on a designated warning frequency              mander's name. The chief of staff is responsible for
throughout the division. This net is used for tactical       mobilization readiness and troop control. He coordi-
alert and warning messages. The special purpose nets         nates the work of the functional staff groups and
employ radiotelegraph and relay equipment to com-            refines and presents to the commander the informa-
municate with units executing special missions and           tion which is required for decision making.
with airborne units behind enemy lines. Division com-           The deputy commander for POlitical affairs most
manders also may establish other nets as required            often is a major or lieutenant colonel. He has a dual
when the necessary equipment is available.                   reporting responsibility-to the regimental com-
   Soviet units usually observe radio silence in, and        mander and to the deputy for political affairs at division
when departing, assembly areas. While moving toward          headquarters. It is the political deputy commander's
the enemy, radio transmissions normally are limited to       responsibility to conduct political activities directed at
various codewords which inform commanders that               insuring full combat readiness, military discipline, and
assigned tasks have been accomplished or that diffi-         high morale. He directs the work of political and
culties have been encountered. Visual signals, such as       Komsomol activists, is responsible for indoctrinating
flags and flares, are used to a great extent during          the troops in the political goals and implications of
movement.                                                    combat actions, and supervises recreational activities.
   When contact with the enemy occurs, normal radio             The deputy commander for technical affairs is
procedures are reinitiated. Call signs identify units, and   normally a major or lieutenant colonel and a graduate
prearranged codewords refer to landmarks. Subordi-           engineer. He is responsible to the commander for the
nate commanders inform the division commander,               serviceability and maintenance of the armored and
usually by codeword, when phase lines are reached,           automotive equipment in the regiment. He is the
when NBC contamination is encountered, when                  direct superior of the technical officers who are found
contact with the enemy occurs, vvhen the enemy is sus-       in each subunit down to company level. During
pected of conducting a withdrawal, and when other            combat he organizes the recovery, repair, or evacua-
important developments occur.                                tion of disabled armored vehicles. Besides his other
                                                             duties, the technical deputy is responsible for the mili-
                                                             tary and specialist training of all technical troops in the
REGIMENT-LEVEL                                               regiment.
COMMAND AND CONTROL                                             The deputy commanderfor rear senJices, normally a
   The regiment headquarters consist of a commander,         major or lieutenant colonel, is responsible for
a chief of staff, his staff group, three functional groups   transport and the supply of regimental subunits both in
each headed by a deputy commander, and chiefs of             garrison and in the field with ammunition, fuel, food,
organic or attached support arms or services.                clothing, and equipment. During combat he com-
   The commander, the chief of staff, and the 9epUty         mands the rear area command post.
commanders for technical affairs, rear services, and           The staff group is subordinate directly to the chief
political affairs form the command group. The com-           of staff and comprises the assistant chiefs of staff for
mander draws a major part of his decision-making             operations, intelligence, communications, and
input from them.                                             personnel. The staff' group also includes a finance
                                                                                                                                      FM 100-2-1

The Soviet Regimental Staff - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                                                                       COMMANDER                                  DIVISIONAL DIRECTION

                   •                                   •
                                                                COMMAND           GROUP

                                                                                              •                   --          :-----.            I

                                                                                                                              p--- ..
                                              DEPUTY COMMANDER                    DEPUTY COMMANDER                   DEPUTY COMMANDER
          CHIEF OF STAFF                             FOR
                                             TECHNICAL AFFAIRS (5)
                                                                                    REAR SERVICES
                                                                                                                      POUTICAL AFFAIRS           I
                   I           STAFF GROUP                                                    I                                                  I
           OF STAFF FOR
          OPERATIONS (1)
                                    .. .-         ASSISTANT CHIEF
                                                    OF STAFF FOR
                                                  INTELLIGENCE (2)
                                                                                 -        CHIEF OF
                                                                                      MOTOR TRANSPORT
                                                                                                                       SPECIAL STAFF

         OF STAFF FOR
                                                 ASSISTANT CHIEF
                                                  OF STAFF FOR
                                                                                        CHIEF OF FUELS
                                                                                        AND LUBRICANTS                        •
                                                                                                                      CHIEFS OF ARMS

         FINANCE OFFICER            .-            CRYPTOGRAPHIC
                                                                                 -         CHIEF OF
                                                                                         FOOD SUPPLY
                                                                                                                      AND SERVICES (6)

                                                                                                                      Reconnaissance Troops
                                                                                                                      Air Defense Troops
                                                                                                                 •    Chemical Troops
                               HEADQUARTERS                                                                      •    Engineer Troops
                              COMMANDANT (4)                                                                     •    Signal Troops
                                                                                                                 •    Maintenance Services
   NOTES:                                                                                                        •    Supply Services
   (l) Also Deputy Chief of Staff                     (6) An ad hoc group which provides advice if required;     •    Medical Services
                                                      represents organic or attached arms and services listed    •    Finance Services
   (2) Commands the reconnaissance company
                                                      above. Officers in this group head. or are members of.
   (3) Commands the signal company                    other staff groups. Their primary task is to command
   (4) Controls work of traffic regulators            the combat support and combat service support
   (5) Also commands the maintenance company          subunits.

officer, a cryptographic officer, and a headquarters                             Additional observation posts are established by
commandant who controls headquarters disposition,                                artillery and air observers.
security, and traffic control (see tasks, next page).                               The main command post consists of several
   The chiefs of organic and attached arms and services                          armored vehicles, including the commander's vehicle.
form an ad hoc group to advise the commander on                                  It is staffed by the chief of staff; the deputy commander
matters within their expertise. These officers are the                           for political affairs; the assistant chiefs of stafffor opera-
commanders of combat support and service support                                 tions, intelligence, and communications; and the com-
units which are organic or attached to the regiment.                             manders of the regimental engineer and chemical
   The headquarters of the regiment operates a main                              defense subunits. The commanders of supporting
command post and a rear area command post (the                                   artillery units, mounted in their own command
command post of the deputy commander for rear                                    vehicles, normally are collocated. The main command
services). The regimental commander's armored                                    post moves in tactical bounds up to 5 km behind the
vehicle may be located forward of the main command                               line of contact. When in position, the command post is
post, functioning as a command observation post.                                 dispersed and camouflaged.
 FM 100-2-1

Tasks of Officers in the Staff Group - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

              POSITION                     RANK                                      RESPONSIBLE FOR

       ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF            Major             Planning operations. liaison and training; serving as the Deputy
       FOR OPERATIONS                                        Ch ief of Staff
       ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF           Captain            Planning reconnaissance missions; collecting. evaluating. and dis-
       FOR INTElLIGENCE                  or Major            seminating tactical intelligence; commanding the regimental recon-
                                                             naissance company.
       ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF           Captain            Establishment and maintenance of communications; supervision of
       FOR COMMUNICATIONS                                    serving of signal equipment; management of the regimental post
                                                             office; command of the regimental signal company.
    ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF               Major             Maintaining statistical records on personnel. equipment and priso-
    FOR PERSONNEL                                            ners of war. Processing replacement leave. and awards and decorations.

    The rear area command post consists of one or two           BATTALION-LEVEL
vehicles. The deputy commander for rear services is             COMMAND AND CONTROL
 aided by the commanders of service support units as               The battalion commander is normally a major
 required. He is responsible for organizing administra-         responsible for-
 tive and logistic support of the regiment from his              • The combat and mobilization readiness of the
command post. This involves the receipt and issue of            battalion.
fuel, ammunition, food, and minor equipment. The                 • The combat and political training, education,
rear area command post also maintains staff control of          military diScipline, political reliability, and morale of
 vehicle and manpower replacements; maintenance,                the battalion's personnel.
repair, and recovery of vehicles; medical services; and          • The condition and security of weapons, combat
personnel services. During combat, the rear area com-           and other equipment, ammunition, fuel, and other
 mand post is expected to operate about 1S km behind            materiel of the battalion.
the line of contact. Ammunition supply for the artillery         • The succes1>ful accomplishment ofthe battalion's
is coordinated by an officer from the artillery battalion,      missions.
who is located in the rear area command post for this              The battalion commander is assisted by a staff that
purpose.                                                        includes chief of staff, deputy commander for technical
    After receiving a mission from the division com-            matters, and deputy commander for political affairs.
mander, the regimental commander, assisted by his                  The chief (~f staff is the commander's "right arm."
staff, makes an estimate of the situation. A warning            He has the authority to give orders to all subordinate
order is sent to subunits. Intelligence on the enemy            elements; and he insures compliance with orders from
and information on friendly units is disseminated. After        the battalion commander and higher commanders.
all factors have been weighed and possible courses of           The chief of staff draws up the combat and training
action have been examined, the commander makes his              plans (based on the regimental plan and the battalion
decision. Frequently, details are marked on a map from          commander's guidance) for the battalion and insures
which the staff formulates written combat orders. If            that they are carried out. He also insures that required
time and the tactical situation allow, commanders will          reports are prepared and dispatched on time to regi-
issue orders at a meeting with subordinate com-                 mental headquarters. He is the principal organizer of
manders. If rapid deployment is necessary, orders are           rear service support for the battalion.
given by radio and then backed up by schematics that               The deputy commanderfor technical affairs super-
are delivered to the subordinate commanders.                    vises the battalion's maintenance service element and
    The regimental commander controls his subunits by           reports directly to the battalion commander or chief
issuing combat instructions over the radio. These frag-         of staff. He is responsible for training of rear services
mentary orders change, supplement, or elaborate on              personnel, and for the technical condition of their
initial combat orders as the tactical situation changes.        equipment.
                                                                                                                                           FM 100-2-1

   The depu~y commander for political affairs                                             The battalion commander directs the combat
organizes and conducts political training. He reports                                   actions of his unit from his command vehicle located
to the battalion commander and to the regimental                                        near his companies.
deputy for political affairs.                                                              In an attack. the commander controls his battalion
   The communications platoon leader acts as the bat-                                   primarily by radio. although he also uses messengers,
talion communications officer. It is his responsibility                                 personal contact. signal flares. signal flags, and other
to train battalion personnel in signal procedures and to                                means. Before contact with the enemy. radio silence is
supervise communications training of the battalion, to                                  observed. except for brief transmissions concerning
include the conduct of classes for radio operators and                                  reconnaissance reports and the crossing of phase lines.
periodic inspections of communications equipment.                                       In the defense. the battalion relics primarily on wire
In combat, the battalion communications officer                                         and telephone communications. hut messengt:rs. sig-
receives instructions from the regimental communica-                                    nal flares. and radios also are used extensivdy. NHC
tions officer. battalion commander and chief of staff.                                  warnings are prmided over a dedicated r.ldio receiver.

.Representative Communications Net in a Motorized Rifle Battalion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

            ATTACHED TANK COMPANY                                                 MOTORIZED RiflE BATTALION elEMENTS

   INDIVIDUAL                                                     !!QUAD
   TANKS                                                          LEADERS

   PLATOON                            123                         PLATOON
   LEADERS                                                        LEADERS

   TANK                          R       R                                                                                                 MORTAR
   COMPANY                      130     123                       COMPANY                                                                  PLATOONS
   COMMANDER                                                      COMMANDERS

            TANK BATTALION
            COMMANO NET



                                                                             REGIMENTAL                                                   SUPPLY
                                                                             COMMANDER                                                    PLATOON
   NOTES                                                                                                                 LEGEND:
  I. Although the company commanders and the battalion commander have RI26s for dismounted control.                   ~               Command Nets
  they would attempt to control their subordinate elements from their BMPs.
                                                                                                                      .... ~. ~....   Fire Support Nets
  2. The battalion chief of staff would control the battalion rear services. The battalion technical officer is
  responsible for the maintenance section
                                                                                                                                      Dismo unted Nets
   3. The antitank platoon in the BTR-equipped motorized rifle battalion would   ~e   part of the fire support net.
                                                                                                                                      Rear Services Nets
   4. The battalion chief of staffs R-311 receiver is used to receive air and NBC warnings.

FM 100-2-1.

A Detailed Example:    Tank Battalion Command and Control - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

      The radio is the most important of several          authorized to transmit on the radio except in an
   means of control available to the Soviet tank          extreme emergency or to request support. This
   unit commander. Soviet military writers insist         communications posture is consistent with his
   that only the speed and flexibility of radio com-      role, which is to lead his platoon in the execution
   munications can adequately meet the demands            of the company mission. He does not have the
   for command and control in modern combined             responsibility to translate his superiors' mission
   arms combat. At the same time, they stress the         into a platoon mission.
   importance of being able to employ other means           The noncommissioned tank commander
   of control to supplement or, if necessary, to          monitors and complies with his superiors' com-
   replace radio communications. The Soviets              mands and follows his platoon leader in the
   train extensively in the use of audio and visual       execution of the company mission. Since he is
   signals, pyrotechnics, and "do-as-I-do" control        not issued a map, he has limited capability to
   procedures with well-rehearsed tactical forma-        relay targets of opportunity to fire support units.
  tions and battle drills.                                  However, a commander of a tank company or
      The battalion is the primary unit for execution     a platoon does have greater latitude when his
  of maneuver. Consistent with that concept, con-        unit is employed as a reconnaissance group or a
  trol of radio communications is centralized at         march security element. or is attached to a
   battalion level. When individualtankcompanies          motorized rifle battalion. For example, the
   operate with their parent battalion, all ofthe bat-   company commander of a tank company that is
  talion's tanks may monitor the battalion VHF           reinforcing a motorized rifle battalion will
  (FM) command net and receive orders from the           operate his own company VHF (FM) net while
  battalion commander. In combat, the battalion          maintaining communications with his parent
   commander attempts to maintain a position             tank battalion using his HF (AM) radio. The rein-
  from which he can observe and direct the               forced motorized rifle battalion commander
  actions of all his companies. Requests for fire        normally will communicate with the reinforcing
  support are almost always coordinated at bat-          tank company on the tank company com-
  talion level. The supporting artillery commander       mander's net.
  (with fire mission computation capability) is             The variant of a reinforced tank battalion radio
  collocated with the tank battalion commander.          net shown at right approximates the portrayal of
     Attached units such as a motorized rifle            radio net structures in Soviet military journals
  company, an artillery subunit (as large as a bat-      and books. Each long vertical rectangle drawn
  talion), an air defense element. and an engineer       with a broken line represents a command
  support element. as well as organic supply,            element or subelement within (or attached to)
  maintenance, and medical sections, all operate         the battalion. Each solid horizontal line repre-
  stations in the battalion VHF (FM) command ~md         sents a single radio net. A sYmbol (diamond,
  coordination net. These organic support                circle, etc.) enclosing a number on a given hori-
  elements normally do not transmit unless               zontal line within the broken lines of a given
  called.                                                command element shows that the command
     Company commanders also have the                    element routinely operates a radio station (of
  authority to transmit on the battalion nets. They      the type represented by the number) in that
  have the. authority to call for supporting fire in     radio net. The identity of the radio net is written
  combat, but such calls for fire normally are           on the horizontal line, and the identity of the
  channeled through the battalion commander.             command element or subelement is indicated at
  While Soviet tactical communications practices         the top of the command column. A symbol
  seem restrictive, they do appear to be adequate        drawn with a broken line (diamond, circle, etc.)
  for the company commander's limited control            that appears within a command element on a
  authority, which normally is confined to fire          radio net line shows that the particular com-
  control of his tanks and the deployment of his         mand element may operate in that net either as
  company in rehearsed battle drills.                    required, or as the alternative to another net. but
     As might be expected, the authority of the          it does not have sufficient radio assets to
  platoon leader is even more restricted. He is not      operate in the net on a continuous basis.
      A Detailed Example: Tank Battalion Command and Control. continued _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                                  RADIO NETS. REINFORCED TANK BATTALION (VARIANT)
               Shown here is a radio net diagram of a tank battalion to which an entire artillery                            supported by an entirE! artillery battalion if it were figt
               battalion is attached for support. A tank battalion normally would be directly                                were operating separately from its parent regiment.

                                                                                                                      I      BATTALION
                                                                                                                           CMD NET (1) (AM)   I                1/- 1 I I
                                                                                                                       I BN CMD AND I                                   oJ: ~
                                                                                                                123      COORD NET 2 FM                        i~i ~
                                                                                                                   ICV I                I                      I
                                                                                                  I              I I
                                                                                                  I         I 123 I
                                                                          x91                     I         I    I I
                                                 I " , I                I    I                              I_~~-.J
                                                                                                  I .......:,... I
                                            I    L<,123 ..... >I        ILL        1ST TC CMD NET L<J2~, ... >J
                                            L ___I ;-:;;··:;r---r---I ---I - - - - - - - - - - - 1 _'l<::·_1
                                                  (, '" " I COR 1            I 1                  I              1
                                                   TKS X9 1 '"          I    1 I                  1 ....         1
                                                               1<" .... 1    1 1                  1( .... ".... 1
                                                                     I ... , I '              I
                                                                     ,< . . .
                                                                        123,,>,      I  I                                                     "
                                                                     I TKSX9 , C.£R I '                                                       I  ...... I
                                                                     , r. >
                                                                              I'"123 I '
                                                                                            ....        >,
                                                                                                                           JRD TC CMD NET
                                                                                                                                              , " "
                                                                                                                                                  <,12:1 ...

                               RiflE PLTS                            ,            1< ,123.....   >,   COR   ,                                 1
                                                                     I            , TKS'                    1                                 I
                                ~                                                                  '8'                                        ,
        CMD NET                                                      I            I
                                                        I....... .I               1                ,I                                         1
                                                        1:1 ST BTRv:'2ND BTRylJRD BTRY'   ,                                             ,

                    1STBTRY 1STBTRY
                                                        ,. CDR .,
                                                        ,: C\
                                                        ': ~
                                                        I· -
                                                                       CDR , CDR ,- - - -'

                                                                    ·1 -
                                                                                  ,   C\ '
                                                                                  I ~ I
                                                                                  1- I
                                                                                                                             ARTY BN
                                                                                                                           CMD NET (FM)
                     FWD OP FIRE POS                    I:          :1            I __ ...1                                                   I
        1ST BTRY      C\          C\                    I: Q        :1 *Each     battery commander                                            I
                   N;.:;E T_....:~ _
       ..;.C_M_D..... .....    .. _ V;:::10===7'___ _ __i:-:....:~
                                °o:::.7                       ..
                                                               0o:::.7--1:: establishes his own command net.                                  L.. _______ J ___ -1
                                                        f. ...... ~                                                                                                                  ,
                                                           ---                                                             TECHNICAL                                                 ,
                                                                                                                             SPT NET                                                 :   <:TIf

       S           Portable FM Radio (R-107/FM)
                                                                                                                             <!9                                   ~
                                                                 Portable radio with power amplifier in a vehicular
                                                                                                                                       A "mm,od "ok ....               .d;., 1'-130 oodR-123)
        /\         Radio Station                                 configuration (R·107/FM)
       ~           (R-104/R-130/AM)

       ~ Radio Re,eiver (R-3l1)                    /""i23l       Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) or Infantry Combat         ~ Tank with mounted radio (R·123) (also may represent a
                                                   ~             Vehicle (ICV) with mounted radio (R-123/FM)                ~ tank· like vehicle such as the ZSU-23-4)
                                                                    The battalion command group is represented          command net (AM). He uses
  n if it were fighting in the first echelon, or if it            by columns 7 through 10. Within the command           equipped R107 VHF (FM) tr
 Irent regiment. as it might in a pursuit.                        group is the battalion commander (column 7)           communicate with the regirr
                                                                  operating from his own tank, which also serves        regimental command net (FM). It
                                                                  as a mobile command observation post (COP);           the chief of staff has primary res
                                                                  the battalion chief of staff (column 8), who          maintaining these battalion static
                                                                  operates the battalion command post from an           regimental nets, thereby leaving
                                                                  armored command vehicfe; the supporting               commander free to use both his
                                                                  artillery battalion commander (column 9), who         radios to control the battalion. Thl
                                                                  operates his batta I ion comma nd observation         will use his R130 radio to opera
                            REGT CMD NET #1 (AM)
                                                                  post from a van or an armored command                 talion HF (AM) command net (CIV
                            REGT CMD NET #2 (FM)
                                                                  vehicle; and the deputy commander for tech-           required. He operates the net c
                                                                 nical affairs (column 10l who directs mainte-         (NCS) of the battalion command,
         I                                                        nance, recovery, and support operations from
         I           I                                                                                                  tion net (CMD NET #2) using the R
                                                                  an armored command vehicle or APC. Not                radio in his CP vehicle. Finally, th'
         I /"""'i2311
         I~I                                                     shown is a second command truck belonging to           maintains the only battalion s
                                                                 the signal section which serves as a backup            higher headquarters NBC and air
                                                                 command post. 'It is equipped with sufficient          using the R311 HF (AM) radio
                                                                  radio assets to duplicate every station main-         retransmits any warning messag
                                                                 tained in the battalion command post.                 talion FM command and coordina
                                                                    The battalion commander (column 7) has two          NET #2).
                                                                  radios in his tank. One is a VHF (FM) radio, the         The attached artillery battaliol
                                                                 R123, which can be pretuned to four preset            (column 9) operates a station in
                                                                 frequencies. Thebattalion commander normally          talion command and coordination
                                                                 will operate the radio on his own FM command          #2) usinU an amplifier-equipped R
                                                                 and coordination net (CMD NET #2). He can             transmits on the net, because (-
                                                                 switch to the regimental command net (FM) as          collocated with the tank battalior
         I                                                       required. If his companies are operating their        He communicates with his own
         I                                                       own command nets, he is capable of communi-           quarters on the artillery regiment
         I                                                       cating directly with any subordinate company's        net usin!J an R130/R1 04 HF (AI\
         I                                                       tanks by turning to that company's net. He nor-           The artillery battalion comma
         I                                                       mally would use the preset capability on the          his own command net using anot

                                                                 R123 radio to reduce the time required to             radio equipped with a power i
                          ARTY REG/GP CMD NET (AM)               change frequencies.                                   shown in the diagram is the batta
                      r                                             The other radio in the battalion commander's       tion net, which is controlled by thl
         I            I                                          tank is an HF (AM) set, the R130 transceiver.         direction center.
(3 :                  :                                          The battalion commander normally will operate             The last element to be cons ide
         I            r              RECOVERY                    this radio on his own battalion HF (AM)               battalion command group is
         I            I DISABLED     AND                         command net (CMD NET # 1), in which only his          commander for technical affairs.
         I            I VEHICLE     REPAIR                       company commanders and chief of staff may             officer in the battalion suppa
 - _...J              I COLLECTION SECTION        RECOVERY
         I            I POINT ~                   VEHICLES       operate. The battalion commander has both             maintains a station in the

         :<:¥l :<€i>
         I            I
                                     58/ <§>
                                                                 command and technical control of this net. The
                                                                 commander willuse his R130 to operate in the
                                                                 regimental command net (AM) as required.
                                                                                                                       command and coordination net (
                                                                                                                       using an R123 vehicular FM radic
                                                                                                                       a second R 123 to control the batt<
                                                                    The battalion chief of staff (column 8) controls   support net. Battalion repair and
                                                                 the battalion command post, which is mounted          ments also monitor this net, and
                          1. Broken symbol indicates operation
R-130 and R-123)          as required.                           in an armored command vehicfe. He normally            and other vehicfes may tune .
                          2. Solid horizontal lines represent
                                                                 has three transceivers and one receiver in his        request .assistance.
                          primary radio nets.                    mobile command post. One is the R 130 HF (AM)            The principal subordinate camn
Iso may represent a                                              transceiver, which he uses to communicate
23-4)                     3. Vertical broken lines show com-                                                           of the reinforced tank battalion
                          mand sub elements.                     with regimental headquarters on the regimental        the left side of the diagram. Eac
 command net (AM). He uses an amplifier-                company commanders (columns 2, 3, and 4)            commander to his firir
 equipped R107 VHF (FM) transceiver to                  has two radios in his tank. He uses his R130 HF     shown here. The degre
 communicate with the regiment on the                   (AM) vehicular radio to operate in the battalion    support coordination ,
 regimental command net (FM). It appears that           AM command net (CMD NET #1). He operates in         combat situation as
 the chief of staff has primary responsibility for      the battalion FM command and coordination net       organization and comb;
 maintaining these battalion stations in the two        (CMD NET #2) on his second radio, the R123.            Below regiment lev
 regimental nets, thereby leaving the battalion         Unlike most other subordinate stations, he has      employ sufficient qua
 commander free to use both his time and his            permission to transmit in the net. Under excep-     equipment to be ope rat
 radios to control the battalion. The chief of staff    tional circumstances, such as when the bat-         platoon to regiment le\i
will use his R130 radio to operate in the bat-          talion is widely dispersed in a pursuit, he may     are transmitted by rae
talion HF (AM) command net (CMD NET #1) as              use the R123 to control his own FM net. in          combat.
 required. He operates the net control station          which case his only radio link with the battalion      Stations are identifiE
(NCS) of the battalion command and coordina-            would be the AM command net (CMD NET #1).           issued in the comn
tion net (CMD NET #2) using the R 123 VHF (FM)          The company net alternative is shown by broken      instructions compilE
radio in his CP vehicle. Finally, the chief of staff    lines within each company command element.          communications platoo
maintains the only battalion station in the             Each tank below company level normally is           communications office
higher headquarters NBC and air warning net.            equipped with one radio, the R123 VHF (FM).         block of frequencies ar
using the R311 HF (AM) radio receiver. He                  The commander of the attached motori~ed          net "item" created nor
retransmits any warning messages on the bat-            rifle company (column 5) has two VHF (FM)           for the duration of an c
talion FM command and coordination net (CMD             radios in his vehicle. He uses his R123 to             Place names are ider
NET #2).                                                communicate with the supported tank battalion       code na mes assigned t
   The attached artillery battalion commander           commander on the FM battalion command and           by the battalion comme
(column 9) operates a station in the tank bat-          coordination net (CMD NET #2). He controls ~his     reconnaissance phase
talion command and coordination net(CMD NET             own company net using the R107 VHF (FM)             This local encoding pi
#2) using an amplifier-equipped R1 07. He rarely        radio in his vehicle.                               mented by an encodE
transmits on the net, because he normally is               Air defense elements and the combat              system. Pyrotechnic ta
collocated with the tank battalion commander.           reconnaissance patrol, normally composed of a       also are generated loca
He communicates with his own higher head-              tank platoon, (columns 1 and 6) operate in the       assign ments may
quarters on the artillery regiment AM command           battalion FM command and coordination net           headquarters.
net using an R130/R104 HF (AM) radio.                  (CMD NET #2).                                           Most information is
   The artillery battalion commander operates              Shown within each company command                the battalion commanc
his own command net using another R1 07 (FM)            element (columns 2,3, and 4) is an artillery bat-   tions platoon leader dl
radio equipped with a power amplifier. Not             tery command observation post. Normally, the         naissance, which norrr
shown in the diagram is the battalion fire direc-      battery commander is collocated with the com-        tion. Atthattime, theba
tion net, which is controlled by the battalion fire    mander of the tank company that he is tasked to      their maps codenames
direction center.                                      support, and communications between the two          and perhaps even a si
   The last element to be considered within the        commanders are accomplished face to face. The        For obvious reasons, tl
battalion command group is the deputy                  battery commander maintains radio                    "the officers' encode
commander for technical affairs. As the senior         communications with his battalion commander          working map."
officer in the battalion support group, he             on the artillery battalion command net (FM)             The Soviets strive t
maintains a station in the battalion FM                using an R1 07 radio. He uses a second R1 07 to      discipline. In the defem
command and coordination net (CMD NET #2)              communicate with his own battery firing              wire whenever possib
using an R123 vehicular FM radio. He also uses         position, and forward observation post (shown        maintain radio silenCE
a second R123 to control the battalion technical       on the diagram for the first battery only) on his    battle, when those aut
support net. Battalion repair and recovery ele-        own battery FM command net.                          do so without restrictio
ments also monitor this net. and disabled tanks            Fire requests generated by the tank company      defending enemy, the
and other vehicles may tune to the net to              normally are coordinated at battalion level.         have begun with the ar1
request assistance.                                    However, Soviet artillery doctrine and organiza-     meeting engagement,
   The principal subordinate command elements          tion do provide a means for direct response to       soon as any element I
of the reinforced tank battalion are shown on          company-level fire requests. These requests          force, other than the
the left side of the diagram. Each of the tank         can be passed through the supporting battery         patrol, makes enemy CI
                                                                                                                FM 100-2-1

 In amplifier-      company commanders (columns 2, 3, and 4)            commander to his firing battery ovelr the nets
Insceiver to        has two radios in his tank. He uses his R130 HF     shown here. The degree of centralization of fire
 ent on the         (AM) vehicular radio to operate in the battalion    support coordination will be dictatHd by the
 appears that       AM command net (CMD NET #1 ). He operates in        combat situation as reflected in the task
lonsibility for     the batta lion FM command and coordination net      organization and combat orders.
ns in the two       (CMD NET #2) on his second radio, the R123.            Below regiment level, the Soviets do not
 the battalion      Unlike most other subordinate stations, he has      employ sufficient quantities of secure-voice
time and his        permission to transmit in the net. Under excep-     equipment to be operationally significant. From
  chief of staff    tional circumstances, such as when the bat-         platoon to regiment level, commands routinely
e in the bat-       talion is widely dispersed in a pursuit, he may     are transmitted by radio in clear text during
D NET #1) as        use the R123 to control his own FM net, in          combat.
Introl station      which case his only radio link with the battalion      Stations are identified by callsigns that are
 nd coordina-       would be the AM command net (CMD NET #1 ).          issued in the communications operating
123VHF(FM)         The company net alternative is shown by broken       instructions compiled by the battalion
  chief of staff    lines within each company command element.          communications platoon leader. The regimental
ation in the        Each tank below company level normally is           communications officer issues the battalion a
warning net,        equipped with one radio, the R123 VHF (FM).         block of frequencies and callsigns. Each radio
 receiver. He          The commander of the attached motori~ed          net "item" created normally remains in effect
!s on the bat-      rifle company (column 5) has two VHF (fM)           for the duration of an operation.
ion net(CMD         radios in his vehicle. He uses his R123 to             Place names are identified on the radio using
                    communicate with the supported tank battalion       code na mes assigned to major terrai n features
  commander         commander on the FM battalion command and           by the battalion commander during the ground
the tank bat-       coordination net (CMD NET #2). He controls"his      reconnaissance phase of a combat operation.
let(CMD NET         own company net using the R107 VHF (FM)             This local encoding process may be supple-
 07. Herarely       radio in his vehicle.                               mented by an encoded map reference grid
~ normally is          Air defense elements and the combat              system. Pyrotechnic tables and brevity codes
 commander.        reconnaissance patrol, normally composed of a        also are generated locally, although some code
higher head-       tank platoon, (columns 1 and 6) operate in the       assignments may come from higher
I.Mcommand         battalion FM command and coordination net            headquarters.
) radio.           (CMD NET #2).                                           Most information is disseminated orally by
der operates           Shown within each company command                the battalion commander and the communica-
er R107 (FM)       element (columns 2,3, and 4) is an artillery bat-    tions platoon leader during the recon-
mplifier. Not      tery command observation post. Normally, the         naissance, which normally precedes an opera-
ion fire direc-    battery commander is collocated with the com-        tion. At that time, the battalion officers record on
 battalion fire    mander of the tank company that he is tasked to      their maps codenames, frequencies, callsigns.
                   support, and communications between the two          and perhaps even a simple radio net diagram.
ad within the      commanders are accomplished face to face. The        For obvious reasons, the Soviets call the map
  the deputy       battery commander maintains radio                    "the officers' encoded map,'" or "encoded
4.s the senior     communications with his battalion commander          working map."
t group, he        on the artillery battalion command net (FM)             The Soviets strive to maintain strict radio
lattalion FM       usi ng an R 107 radio. He uses a second R107 to      discipline. In the defense, they communicate by
:MD NET #2)        communicate with his own battery fifing              wire whenever possible. In the offl3nse, they
 He also uses      position, and forward observation post (shown        maintain radio silence until the outbreak of
lion technical     on the diagram for the first battery only) on his    battle, when those authorized to tra nsmit may
recovery ele-      own battery FM command net.                          do so without restriction. In an attack against a
isabled tanks          Fire requests generated by the tank company      defending enemy, the battle is considered to
) the net to       normally are coordinated at battalion level.         have begl,ln with the artillery preparation. In the
                   However, Soviet artillery doctrine and organiza-     meeting engagement, radio silence is lifted as
and elements       tion do provide a means for direct response to       soon as any element of the Soviet advancing
re shown on        company-level fire requests. These requests          force, other than the combat reconnaissance
1 of the tank      can be passed through the supporting battery         patrol, makes enemy contact.


      The offensive is the only type of combat              against targets in the enemy rear. The brigade may be
      action ... , employment of which attains              deployed as a unit or as subunits. Its mission is to seize,
      the complete route of the enemy and the               disrupt, or destroy nuclear weapons, airfields,
      seizure of important objectives and areas.            command, control and communication (C3) centers,
                                                            logistics facilities, and key terrain such as river crossing
                        A. A. Sidorenko                     sites and road junctions. In this manne'r, it helps shift
                        The Offensive                       the focus of the battle away from the forward edge of
                                                            the battle area (FEBA). If successful, tihe activities of
                                                            the brigade facilitate rapid penetration by first echelon
TVD OFFENSIVE                                               formations through the enemy's forward defensive
 Front and army operations normally take place              zone and directly support the high-speed movement of
 within a theater of military operations (Russian: lVD),    large exploitation forces advclIlcing from the front into
 encompassing a considerable part of the territory of a     the depths of the enemy's defenses.
 continent and comprising a level of command A.lVD
 offensive has a strategic mission to defeat and destroy
 enemy field forces, to capture vital territory, and to     FRONT OFFENSIVE
 bring about the political destruction of the enemy.         The mission of a front offensive is to seize key
   Offensive operations within a lVD could be               political and economic centers and concurrently to
 supported by-                                              destroy enemy military forces defending them.
  • Strategic aviation.                                     A front offensive involves much mor,e than attacks
  • Strategic rocket forces.                                against enemy forward defensive positions. It involves
  • Airborne forces.                                        coordinated, repetitive, intensive strik,es throughout
  • Transport aviation.                                     the entire depth of enemy field forces. These strikes
  • Naval and naval infantry furces.                        are accomplished by an initial, massive, nonnuclear air
   Within the lVD, the operational formations are           operation, heliborne and airborne assault, possibly
fronts and armies. Afront is a wartime formation com-       coordinated with deep attacks by an operational
prised of several armies or separate divisions. Its size    maneuver group, all available unconventional warfare
varies with the mission it is given within the overall      means, surface-to-surface rockets and missiles, elec-
strategic operation. An army is the largest peacetime       tronic warfare, possible chemical warfare, and, if
ground maneuver formation at the operational level. In      deemed necessary, nuclear warfare.
wartime, the composition and size of an army also             The overriding aim in a Soviet front offensive is to
varies dependent upon mission. An army may be either        delay or prevent tbe war from turning nuclear by tbe
tank or combined arms. Its structure provides ade-          swift, early destruction or neutralization of enemy
quate control and ground-based support for the divi-        nuclear weapons by nonnuclear means. High rates of
sions assigned to it during the army's participation in a   advance by attacking ground forces, coupled with
front operation.                                            strikes throughout the rear, are intended to cripple the
   Divisions and smaller organizations are found at the     enemy's ability to respond effectively to the Soviet
tactical level. The division has a fixed organization and   offensive and to resort to tactical nuclear warfare. The
serves as the "building block" and maneuver element         top priority target for Soviet weapons would be enemy
of armies. The motorized rifle and tank divisions are       nuclear delivery systems.
balanced, powerful, and mobile organizations capable
of operations in a nonnuclear as well as a nuclear
environment. At this level, the Soviets emphasize both      Offensive Planning
sustainability and mobility. Organic logistic assets can      In planning an offensive operation for the front,
sustain the division for several days of high-intensity,    consideration is always given to those situations in
high-speed combat and are as mobile as the maneuver         which either side would employ nuclear weapons.
units.                                                      Destruction or neutralization of the ent!my's nuclear·
   The development of air assault brigades has given        capable delivery systems is considered essential. Thus,
the theater commander large, flexible, and well-armed       continuous reconnaissance is planned to target those
formations that he can employ early in the battle           systems with a nuclear capability accumtely. Planning
FM 100-2-1

at front level is essentially the same for both nuclear     are all variable based on missions, enemy defenses, ter-
and nonnuclerue operations in objectives, employment        rain, weather, and time.
of forces, main and supporting attacks, and axes of
advance. The similarities end, however, in planning the
scheme of trumeuver and fire support. Normally,              Offensive Phasing
conventional operations require successive intermedi-           To assist in phasing offensive operations at the
ate operations with a continuous regrouping offorces.       operational level, the Soviets have defined a series of
Frontal aviation is given the mission to engage targets      terms outlining various depths of the enemy defenses
deep in the enc!my rear area while the artillery has the    and the objectives encompassed within those depths.
mission to neutralize the enemy near the FEBA In con-           The initialphase of the operation requires the pene-
~t, nuclear operations keep the number of inter-             tration of the enemy's forward defenses and the
mediate operations to a minimum. Front objectives are       neutralization or destruction of the enemy in the area
attained by employing high speed operations along           defined as the "tactical" This depth includes the
multiple axes of advance, eXploiting the results of the     reserves of the forward enemy divisions. The subse-
nuclear fire phim (see diagram below).                      quent phase calls for the neutralization or destruction
   Planning at front level must support the conduct of      of those enemy units in the area encompassed by the
operations dec!]) in the enemy's rear area. Armies          "immediate operational depth." The enemy cotps
assigned to the:: front-                                    reserves are found in this area. When the situation
 • Attack along one or more axes to split the               permits the introduction of a front's second echelon
defenders into separate or isolated groups. These           armies as exploitation forces, the enemy's strategic
groups are to be destroyed while the offensive is con-      reserves at Anny Group and Theater level are attacked
tinued toward the enemy's rear area.                        The final phase of the offensive is the accomplishment
 • Attack along converging axes to envelop enemy            of the front final objectives: the capture of logistical,
forces. These f,orces are to be destroyed as the offen-     political, and economic centers and the neutralization
sive continues to the depths of the enemy's defenses.       of remaining enemy forces.
   The width of a front offensive zone could extend to         The categories of objective depths which regulate
approximately 350 kilometers. The frontage, organiza-       front offensive operations are identified and illustrated
tion, rate of advance, and concept of the front offensive   on the next page.

Front Planning Objectives _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                               ATTACK ALONG ONE OR MORE AXES TO SPLIT THE DE-
                                                               FENDERS INTO SEPARATE OR ISOLATED GROUPS.
                                                               THESE ARE TO BE DESTROYED IN DETAIL, WITH CON-
                                                               CURRENT FURTHER ATTACKS TOWARD THE ENEMY'S
                                                               REAR DEPTHS.

                                                               ATTACKS ALONG CONVERGING AXES TO ENVELOPE
                                                               SIZABLE ENEMY FORCES. SURROUNDED FORCES ARE
                                                               TO BE DESTROYED AS CONCURRENT ATTACKS CON-
                                                               TINUE TO THE DEPTHS.

                                                                                             FM 100-2-1

Front Offensive Objectives and Depths - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                         . . IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE         I
                                    ..         SUBSE~UENT   OBJECTIVE                    I
   ..                              FINAL OBJECTIVE

                                                     x                               f
                                                     I t-XX-f

                                                     X                  ~XX-O
                                                     X              X                (

                                                     ~xxxi                           0
                                                     X              ~     (
                                                     X              J--XX-O
                                                     X              X     (

                                                     ~xxxi                           0
                                                     X              ~                (
                                                     X                  ~XX-O
                                                     X              X                (

                           O------IL..xxxxx                         i                0

   DEPTH                   DEPTH             DEPTH               DEPTH

FM 100-2-1

Rapid Advance
   The Soviet offensive is characterized by a high rate of   to develop penetrations leading to the enemy rear to
advance. Over a period of several weeks or more, the         topple the enemy defensive structure. They anticipate
Soviets anticipate a rate of advance of approximately        that elements of a front second echelon probably
50 kilometers per day under nuclear or nonnuclear            would not have to combat enemy forces in defensive
conditions. Rate of advance is not expected to be            positions. After the first two to five days of the war, they
uniform. While fighting through enemy defensive posi-        expect prepared positions to have been overrun and
tions, the Soviets expect a rate of several kilometers       combat to be characterized by rapid movement into
per hour or up to 30 kilometers per day. Once a major        the enemy rear interrupted by violent, relatively brief,
penetration has been achieved, the rate would                meeting engagements.
increase considerably.
   When confronting an enemy that has taken up defen-
sive positions, the Soviets attempt to strike weak points    Concentration of Forces
in the defense and to drive to the enemy's rear                A/ront normally conducts a main attack over one or
whenever possible by bypassing his major force               more axes whose proximity to one another depend
concentrations. They attempt to cripple the enemy            upon whether the front is to split or envelop the enemy
quickly by destroying or disrupting his nuclear              in its drive towards its objectives. The direction of a
capability, his command and control facilities, and his      main attack would be decisive in the defeat of the
logistic system before he could effectively react.           enemy and seizure of territory. One or more sup-
   Even if the Soviets are forced to deal with an enemy      porting attacks accompany the main attack. A sup-
that is emplaced in defensive positions across their         porting attack ties down opposing enemy forces to
entire frontage, they still attempt to avoid a costly,       prevent them from reinforcing the sector threatened
time-consuming battle of attrition. They would strive        by the main attack.

Soviet Front Offensive Operation (Variant) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

          ,,                                                                                                (NOT TO SCALE)
      FRONT                       ARMY                 ARMY             DIVISION
      FINAL                       SUBSEQUENT           IMMEDIATE        OBJECTIVES
      OBJECTIVES                  OBJECTIVES           OBJECTIVES
                                                                                                eAA - Combined Arms Army
                                                                                                TA - Tank Army
      600-800 KM                  250-350 KM           100-150 KM       25-30 KM                AAB - Air Assault Brigade
      12-15 DAYS                  6-7 DAYS             3-4 DAYS         FIRST DAY               MRD - Motorized Rifle Division

                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

    Certain sectors of enemy defenses may be desig-          combined arms reserve, or operational maneuver
 nated as breakthrough sectors. These are areas, nor-        group (OMG).
 mally across a main attack axis, that an operational-          Tank armies may be piaced in the first echelon for
 level commander deems necessary, desirable, or likely       attaining greater speed when terrain and other condi-
 for major penetration. Under nuclear conditions,            tions permit this employment. This variant would be
 enemy defenses in a breakthrough sector are                 likely if a massive nuclear strike preceded the ground
 destroyed by tactical nuclear strikes, followed by rapid    offensive or if enemy defenses were not well prepared.
 exploitation by maneuver units. Under nonnuclear,              Most forces of afront are placed in its first echelon.
 but nuclear-threatened conditions, the sector is            The mission of the front's first echelon would be to
 attacked by massed air and artillery fires and numerous     overcome enemy defenses and to attack through the
 attacks on multiple axes by maneuver units.                 immediate operational depth (to enemy corps rear
    The benefit gained by the attacker who uses only         areas).
 conventional weapons on the nuclear-threatened bat-            Front first echelon forces are reinforced by artillery,
 tlefield is that the enemy also mllst avoid concentrating   other combat support, and logistic elements from
 forces. The defender must leave. gaps and/or lightly        front second echelon forces.
 manned sectors between his units. Whenever possible,           The remainder, or follow-on, forces of the front
 the Soviet commander directs his attack against these       could include-
 undefended or lightly defended areas, therebyachiev-         • A second echelon or a combined arms reserve.
 ing a favorable force ratio without massing his own          • An operational maneuver group (OMG).
forces.                                                       • Special reserves.
    The greater range and increased mobility of modem           A front second echelon (or a combined arms
artillery weapons enable Soviet artillerymen to mass         reserve), normally at least one army, has a mission of
fires against a target without concentrating the             exploiting success achieved by first echelon forces by
weapons themselves. This practice reduces their              continuing the main thrust of the offensive to reach
vulnerability to a nuclear strike and makes it more diffi-   deeper objectives. Committed follow-on forces then
cult for the enemy to determine long in advance where        become part of a new first echelon. Then a combined
amain attack might be made. The fires of combat heli-        arms reserve normally is constituted from former first
copters and close air support fixed-wing aircraft also       echelon forces.
are integrated into their overall fire planning. This
again enhances the Soviets' ability to focus a great deal
of firepower without putting maSses of troops at risk to     The Front Operational Maneuver Group
an enemy nuclear strike.                                        Since the late 1970s, important changes in the
    When the Soviets do concentrate forces, they are         operational employment and organization of Soviet
likely to do so in several locations along the FEBA and      ground maneuver formations have been observed. The
in relatively small numbers in anyone sector. By nar-        most Significant operational change has been the
rowing the width of an attack frontage, they achieve         concept of employing a tailored high-speed exploita-
superior force ratios at several points along the FEBA.      tion force at army and probably front level. This force,
In such a situation, they probably attack with most          called the operational maneuver group (OMG), is
forces in the first echelon.                                 tailored for the situation and is designed to move deep
   The Soviet commander is more likely to use multi-         into the enemy rear area and to seize critical objec-
ple, narrow penetrations when he has a clear numeri-         tives, normally before second echelon Soviet forma-
cal advantage over the enemy across his entire frontage      tions are committed to combat. AfrontOMG could be
and when the enemy has positioned the bulk of his            comniitted well before the front immediate objective
defending forces forward. When enemy defenses are            (enemy corps rear) is attained.
echeloned in depth, the Soviets tend to use an attack           The OMG is an updated version of an older concept
force echeloned in depth to maintain the momentum            infused with new technology. It was widely used in the
of the attack after the initial penetration.                 final stages of World War II when the Germans and
                                                             Japanese were unable to present a deeply echeloned
                                                             defense and had no large operational reserves. The
Attack Echelons                                              predecessor of the OMG was the army and front
  As a very general rule, combined arms armies would         "mobile group" of World War II. Mobile groups were
be used in the first echelon of a front. Then tank armies    large operational exploitation forces used to move
would normally appear in its second echelon,                 rapidly and decisively deep into the enemy's rear area
FM 100-2-1

to destroy his command and control and lines of              later time, possibly after completion of the air opera-
communication, to defeat his reserves, to encircle and       tion. It could be of airborne-regiment or possibly
destroy his forces, and to capture or destroy key politi-    division size. linkup may be planned with advancing
cal and economic centers.                                    ground forces, probably an OMG. Possible objectives
   The mission of an OMG is to help the first echelon        include nuclear weapons, command and control
penetrate the enemy defenses, if required, and then to       centers, enemy airfields, major bridges, and logistic
raid deep into the enemy rear as early in the offensive      facilities.
as possible. The OMG is to destroy enemy nuclear                Soviet airborne forces are equipped with BMD
weapons, air defenses, communications, command               airborne assault vehicles. On the ground, in the enemy
and control, to seize airfields or disrupt lines of com-     rear, they fight as motorized infantry. A/ront may also
munication, and to assist advancing main forces by           employ small, foot-mobile, special-purpose airborne
seizing bridgeheads, road junctions, and so forth.           forces to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage in the
   Ajront OMG maybe attached from resources con-             enemy rear.
trolled by the theater of military operations (TVD) or
Supreme High Command. It could be as large as an
army, constituted either before or during an operation.      ARMY OFFENSIVE
   An OMG may not always be formed. Whether one is              An army in the first echelon of ajront offensive nor-
formed depends on a number of factors the most               mally has a mission to attack through enemy defenses
important of which are the planned direction( s) .ofthe      to the immediate operational depth, the enemy corps
main attack; the tactics, strength, and readiness of         rear area. The achievement of an army's mission is the
enemy forces; and the nature of the terrain over which       culmination of successive attacks conducted by its
an attacking force must maneuver. An OMG is most             divisions.
likely to be used when the enemy defense system is             A combined arms army may have two to four
seen to be at a low state of readiness or when enemy         motorized rifle divisions and one or two tank divisions.
defenses are relatively shallow and not supported by         A tank army may have two to four tank divisions and
large reserves.                                              one or two motorized rifle divisions.
                                                               An army offensive normally has a frontage 60 to 100
                                                             kilometers wide. The first echelon of an army normally
Nonnuclear Front Offensive                                   contains most of the army's combat power. Army
   A nonnuclear Soviet front offensive probably would        follow-on forces could include-
 begin with a massive air operation, conducted continu-       • A second echelon or a combined arms reserve.
ously for several days, using massed assets from              • An operational maneuver group.
jrontal, strategic, and naval aviation The two main           • Special reserves.
goals of the air operation are to neutralize enemy
 theater nuclear capability and to gain tactical air
superiority for the remainder of the operation. Targets      Echelonment of Forces
of the air operation are nuclear delivery systems, air-         When an OMG is formed at army level, the bulk of
fields and aircraft, air defense systems, and command        the forces available to the army commander probably
and control facilities.                                      is distributed between the first echelon and the OMG.
   The Soviets are willing to accept great losses in their   This may cause the second echelon or reserve to be
own air assets to achieve their goals. They believe that     smaller in those armies where OMGs are employed.
they could conduct the remainder of the offensive with          If enemy defenses are not well prepared in depth
older, possibly obsolescent, aircraft provided they-suc-     and not backed up by operational-level reserves, the
ceeded in crippling enemy tactical air power.                army probably attacks in a single strong echelon
   Ground attacks by/rontgroundforces are preceded           followed by a combined arms reserve and, possibly, an
by a massive artillery preparation conducted by first        OMG. If the enemy is well prepared in depth and does
echelon armies. If nuclear weapons are used from the         have operational reserves,the armyprobablyattacks in
onset, they are used in a massive, in-depth strike before    two echelons. In other words, if the enemy defense has
the nonnuclear preparation. Whether they are used or         an operational second echelon ( or reserve) the Soviets
not, nuclear strikes always are included in fire             employ an operational second echelon to sustain the
planning.                                                    momentum of the offensive.
   An airborne operation conducted by a front could             First and second echelon forces operate in concert
be launched either at the start of an offensive, or at a     to destroy defending enemy forces before them, up to
                                                                                                                                              FM 100-2-1

Soviet Army Offensive Operation (Variants) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                                                                              :RO     8
                                                                                                                                  ' , ' OMG

                                                                                                                              ...... ,~

           'IT         G)
                                                                                                                                .","      /

                                                                                                                             -;""                     20
                                                                                                                             -                     ECHELON
           (SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC OF MANEUVER ELEMENTS)                                                                         MRO                (RESERVE)

   (NOT TO SCALE)                                                                                       ENEMY                1ST
                                                                                                       TACTICAL           ECHELON
                                                                                                       DEFENSE            DIVISIONS
   (1) Several variants are depicted.
   (2) Combined Arms Army (CAA) depicted consists of 3 motorized rifle divisions (MRD). a tank division (TD). and an independent tank regiment (TR).
   (3) CAA main attack could be on axis 1 or axis 3. Supporting attack on axis 2.
   (4) Frontage: approximately 60 km.
   (5) Depending on CAA missions and/or development of battle. second echelon could be committed to:
      -    maintain momentum on axis 3
       -   secure OMG lines of communication on axis 1
       -   develop opportune success on axis 2
   (6) Flexibility most apparent at operational (Army and front) level.

assigned mission (objective) depths. Second echelon                               The anny's second echelon or combined anns
forces of an army normally are committed after the                             reserve, normally about division size, advances behind
anny's immediate objective is attained. An army OMG,                           anny first echelon forces. It is dispersed laterally on
if employed, could be committed as early as the first                          multiple routes to minimize vulnerability to enemy
day of an operation                                                            detection and attacks. Based on the development of
   One or more divisions in the first echelon probably                         the battle and on his assigned mission, the army com-
attack on a predetermined army main attack axis.                               mander commits his follow-on forces at the most
Other first echelon divisions conduct supporting                               opportune time and place. He does this to' achieve a
attacks. Achievement of a "breakthrough" of enemy                              "breakthrough," deeper exploitation, and dissolution
prepared defensive positions is a probable mission of                          of enemy tactical and immediate-operational defenses.
forces conducting the main attack of an army.
   First echelon regiments of the anny's first echelon
divisions attack from the march at top speed to achieve                        Use of Forward Detachments
deeper penetration of the enemy's main defenses, and                             The offensive is characterized by surprise, speed,
to exploit surprise and enemy disorganization. Second                          and a striving to preempt or forestall the enemy. Some
echelon regiments of the anny's first echelon divisions                        subunits of first echelon forces may attempt to strike
would exploit the best penetrations into the deep                              deep into the enemy forward defensive area before
tactical rear of the enemy.                                                    enemy defenses are fully organized and solidified. Such
FM 100-2-1

missions are likely given to forward detachments of an         anny's offensive zone to penetrate enemy covering
anny's first echelon divisions, fully supported by             forces. Then they drive at top speed in prebattle or
artillery and close air support. It is also possible that an   march formation to seize and hold key terrain within
army could employ a tank-heavy regimental-sized                the main defensive area Battalion-sized helibome
"operational" forward detachment to achieve similar            assaults designed for linkup with the forward detach-
but deeper results in the enemy main defensive area            ments also could be employed The purpose of such
   Division forward detachments, normally reinforced           operationally-planned tactics is to disrupt or preempt
tank battalions, could advance during the night before         enemy defensive structure while opening multiple
the offensive. They attack on multiple axes across the         avenues for swift attacks by larger first echelon forces.

Combined Arms Army Offensive (Variant) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                        (NOT TO SCALE)



   MAIN DEFENSE AREA                                                    DIVISION              DIVISION         DIVISION
   (NOT YET FULLY OCCUPIED                                             FORWARD                 FIRST           SECOND
   NOR ORGANIZED)                                                  DETACHMENTS (TB+)          ECHELON          ECHELON
   LEGEND:                                                             AND ARMY              REGIMENTS        REGIMENTS
   TB - Tank Battalion
                                                                   DETACHMENT (TR+)          ...          y
   TR - Tank Regiment
   MRR - Motorized Rifle Regiment                                                              ARMY FIRST ECHELON

   Strong forward detachments probably would be                situation would complicate or forestall enemy use of
used throughout the operation to continually press the         tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets probably would
advance into the enemy rear on several axes. Numer-            accept heavy losses in deep-penetration forces if they
ous deep penetrations by forward detachments and/or            could cause an early collapse of the enemy's defensive
OMGs early in the operation would result in an                 structure before he could resort to use of nuclear
intermingling of enemy and friendly forces. This               weapons.
                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

The Army OMG
   Army OMGs likely are formed from resources that          purpose. The retative importance of raiding versus
are normally part ofor supporting the army. OMGs may        seizing an objective varies depending upon whether
be established before an operation as part of the initial   the OMG is operating in isolation or as part of an
plan or during an operation to exploit an unforeseen        encirclement operation.
opportunity. At army level, the OMG probably would
be as large as a reinforced division. An OMG could
operate 100 kilometers or more beyond other army              Other Support Elements
forces.                                                          Encirclement of enemy forces is accomplished by
   Command and control of an OMG is conducted bya             blocking routes of withdrawal with forward detach-
combination of radio, an airborne command element,            ments, OMG, pursuit maneuver units, air assault forces,
and air and ground couriers. Sustaining an OMG               or air strikes. Encirclement may be achieved by the
requires highly mobile transport and supply. The              army itself, with the cooperation of a flanking army or
Soviets attempt to maintain a ground line of com-            with the support of front assets. Surrounded enemy
munication as well as resupply- by air.                      forces are destroyed piecemeal while the army con-
   The relationship between the QMG and the second          . tinues to develop the offensive in depth.
echelon in an operation varies depending on the                  An army of a front first echelon receives artillery
concept of operation. If the OMG is operating away           units from the front artillery division. The army com-
from the main axis ofadvance, its activities and those of    mander then allocates artillery to his divisions. He may
the second echelon may not be directly related. If the       retain some artillery at army level to form an army
OMG is operating on the main axis of advance, the            artillery group. Within the army, artillery from second
second echelon may be required to destroy forces             echelon divisions probably is allocated to first echelon
bypassed by the OMG or to secure the OMG's lines of          divisions.
communications.                                                  A first echelon army probably would receive from
   Unlike the second echelon, the OMG acts as a large       front additional engineers and river crossing equip-
operational raiding force. Typically, it is assigned an      ment, air defense weapons, chemical units, and
ultimate objective or objectives (perhaps located on         transportation assets.
the main axis) but is expected to disrupt, capture, or          An army offensive could also include an airborne or
seize other objectives along the way, while attempting       heliborne assault operating in conjunction with an
to avoid a decisive engagement with large enemy              OMG to seize deep objectives. Smaller special-purpose
forces. The OMG could attack targets en route with its       airborne units could be employed to conduct recon-
entire force or more likely with units detached for this     naissance and sabotage.



   The Soviets emphasize swift, efficient movement, or       • Enemy strength and disposition.
transfer, of combat power from one point on the bat-         • DispOSition of friendly forces and missions of
tlefield to another. This is accomplished by rapid          adjacent units.
column movement in march formation and                       • Attachments and supporting units.
successive deployment into prebattle formation and           • Terrain, weather, and light conditions.
attack formation. Commanders insure that their unit          • Possible march routes.
is constantly ready to perform a march, with minimum         • Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
warning and preparation. Units frequently rehearse the      conditions.
march, and its conduct is strictly controlled. They          • Control measures.
practice deployment from march column into                   • Reconnaissance and security.
prebattle and attack formation in standard battle drills.      Based on this estimate, he selects routes, if they have
These formations and drills are designed for a rapid        not been specified by his commander. The following
transition into combat while maintaining maximum            norms apply:
security, speed, and firepower.                              • A division is assigned either a march zone or march
                                                            routes. As many as four routes are possible.
                                                             • A regiment is normally assigned one or two routes.
The March                                                    • A battalion marches on one route.
   A march is an organized troop movement conducted          • Distance between routes should be at least 3
in column formation on roads or cross country. It may       kilometers to reduce vulnerability to nuclear strikes.
be simply an administrative move from one point to             Planning the march is carried out in as much detail
another. In wartime, however, the march often will be       as time and information will permit. IfpoSSible, a route
governed by the possibility of enemy contact. It is         reconnaissance is conducted to determine route
planned and conducted with the expectation of               conditions; to locate contaminated areas, choke
contact.                                                    points, or obstacles; and to determine requirements
   A march may be conducted-                                for engineer or decontamination support.
 • When moving from a rear assembly area to a                  Considering the total length of the march and the
forward assembly area or attack position.                   time available, the commander determines the average
 • When leaving an assembly area to launch an attack        rate of march for the entire march. He then divides the
from the march.                                             march route into segments. Based on the terrain, he
 • When moving forward in anticipation ofa meeting          determines the permissible rate of march over each
engagement.                                                 segment and the time to complete each segment. He
 • During a pursuit.                                        then determines control measures for conduct of the
 • When conducting a passage of lines.                      march and the times associated with each control
   In any march, the challenge facing the commander is      measure.
the proper disposition of combat and support                   Prescribed times for units to pass from assembly
elements within the column, to insure efficient transi-     areas to march column are indicated below.
tion into combat. The column organization, estab-
lished before starting the march, should minimize or
preclude any reorganizing before commitment in              March Column Assembly Times _ _ _ _ _ _ __
   Having received an order to conduct a march, the
Soviet commander issues a warning order to his                           UNIT                    MINUTES
subordinate commanders. He then conducts an                    Motorized rifle company                 5
estimate of the situation to include-                          Motorized rifle battalion           10 to 15
 • Mission of the march.                                       Artillery battalion                 15 to 20
 • Time available.                                             Artillery regiment                 40 to 50
 • Locations of possible or anticipated enemy                  Motorized rifle regiment           60 to 120
contact.                                                       (reinforced)
FM 100-2-1

   A start line or start point is designated for the           • Nature and location of enemy nuclear delivery
 beginnng of the march. It must be fur enough from           systems.
 assembly areas to allow columns to form and reach the         • Movement axes of enemy columns.
 required speed as they pass the start point.                 • Strength and composition of enemy forces.
    Control lines (points) are established to insure          • Deployment lines and routes.
 timely and orderly movement. Their number will be a          • Location of contaminated areas.
 function of the distance to be covered, the terrain,           The advance guard precedes the main force on the
 weather, time of day or night, and state of the roads.      same route and provides movement security and
 Usually they are designated for every 2 to 3 hours of       warning. It normally consists of about one third of the
 movement. Elements of the force must cross these            total combat power of the main force. The advance
 control lines or points at the designated time.             guard of a motorized rifle regiment is normally a
    Halts and rests are specified to preserve the strength   motorized rifle battalion reinforced with tank,
 of personnel and to maintain equipment. Short halts         artillery, antitank, antiaircraft, engineer, and chemical
 are 20 to 30 minutes duration every 2 to 3 hours of         elements. The advance guard of a tank regiment is
 movement. The column formation is not disturbed,            normally a similarly-reinforced tank battalion. In a
 and unit intervals are maintained.                          division marching on mUltiple routes, the lead regi-
   Within units, vehicles pull over to the right side        ment on each route forms its own advance guard.
 of the road with spacings of not less than 10               There is no "divisional advance guard," as such.
 meters between them. Refueling, minor mainte-                  The advance guard, in its turn, will dispatch to its
 nance, and if necessary, partial decontamination            front a forward security element (FSE) consisting of
are accomplished. Long halts are used on marches             about one third of its combat power. A forward
of over 24 hours· duration. They are not normally            security element of a regiment's advance guard will
scheduled at night to allow maximum time for                 normally be a reinforced company. (The FSE is known
night movement. If used, they are 2 to 4 hours               as an "advance party" in some texts.)
duration, usually at the beginning of the second                The FSE is preceded by a combat reconnaissance
half of a day's movement. Units disperse off-                patrol (CRP). The CRP is normally a platoon rein-
road in camouflaged positions. Maintenance,                  forced with engineer and NBC reconnaissance
resupply, and decontamination (if required)                  elements. It reports intelligence information and
are accomplished and troops are fed a hot meal.              makes the initial contact with any enemy forces
   Day rest is scheduled after a night march and night       encountered.
 rest after a day march. Troops are dispersed and con-          Flank and rear security elements for a regiment are
cealed in such manner to fucilitate rapid continuation       normally of platoon size. (More detailed information
of the march. Necessary logistical functions are             on the organization and function of march elements is
accomplished.                                                found under The Meeting Engagement later in this
   March formation normally consists of the following        chapter.)
elements:                                                       March considerations include disperSion, rate of
  • Reconnaissance.                                          march, and march order. Particularly under nuclear
  • Advance guard (or forward security element of a          conditions, march formations must maintain disper-
battalion).                                                  sion both laterally and in depth. A division attains
  • Flank security elements.                                 lateral dispersion by marching in a zone up to 25
  • Main force.                                              kilometers wide on as many as four routes, each
  • Rear security element.                                   separated by 3 to 4 kilometers.
   The focus for march planning is security of the main         The average rate of march is based on the total route
force and creation of conditions for its successful          distance and the time allowed for the march.
commitment into battle.
   The organic reconnaissance battalion precedes its
division on the march. Scout elements of the recon-          Average March Rates for Mixed Columns _ _ __
naissance battalion may operate 50 kilometers forward
of the division. A regiment is preceded by its organic          Day, on roads ............. 20 to 30 KM/HR
reconnaissance company, whose scouts may operate
25 kilometers forward. Reconnaissance forces are               Night. on roads············ 15 to 20 KM/HR
trained to obtain as quickly as possible the following
information about enemy forces:                                Cross Country ............           5 to 15 KM/HR
                                                                                                                     FM 100-2-1

  Di~ipersion in depth is a function of the organization               and the interval between vehicles and between
of the forces on each route and the intervals between                  subunits in each column.
units and vehicles. The commander balances the                            The average movement intervals and vehicle speeds
requirement for dispersion in depth with the require·                  shown in the tables below apply to marches of some
ment for timely commitment of his forces in case                       duration. If enemy contact is made, units may move at
of enemy contact.                                                      maximum speeds. Examples of q.pical march forma-
  The depth of a march formation depends on the                        tions for Soviet motorized rifle and tank forces are
number of march routes, the interval between units,                    shown on the following pages.

Unit Dispersion Intervals _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                           UNIT                                  NORMAL INTERVAL                    VARIATIONS

    Between vehicles in a company                                    25-50 M        Increased at high speeds and when traversing
                                                                                    contaminated or rugged terrain or on icy roads.
                                                                                    May be decreased at night.

   Between companies in a battalion                                  25-50 M        Up to 300 M or more under nuclear conditions.

   Between battalions on the same route                              3-5 KM

   Between regiments on the same route                               5-10 KM        Can vary as contact becomes imminent.

   Between regimental rear services and main force                   3-5 KM

   Between division rear services and main force.                   15-20 KM

   NOTE: Vehicles speeds are determined by road conditions.

Average Speeds of Vehicles _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                               PER (KM/HR)
                                                                               10% SURFACE               MORE THAN 10%
            TYPE OF ROAD                     UNDAMAGED SURFACE                 DESTRUCTION            SURFACE DESTRUCTION
     Concrete. asphalt-concrete                         40-50                      20-35                         10-20

      Gravel and rubble                                  40-45                     20-30                         10-20

     Dirt                                                15-25                     8-15                           5-10
FM 100-2-1

March Formations, Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                        T""'O..-.-- . . . . ,
                                                                     Up to 3 KM                            ,
      .....0                             ~                              ~                      ~~~
               1 -----1

               ...                        FORWARD           I-        5-10 KM ----~1                     ." IBATTALION1
                   Visual and             SECURITY                                                   .",     MAIN
                   Fire Support           ELEM ENT                                   ~- -       -            BODY
                   Range                  Motorized Rifle Company                                            2 x Motorized Rifle Co
                                          Tank Platoon                                                       Tank Company (-J
                                          Artillery Battery                                                  Artillery Bn (-J
                                              au:   ??7??

                                                                                              FLANK SECURITY ELEMENT
                                                                                              Motorized Rifle Company
                                                                                              Tank Platoon
                                                                            PATROL            Artillery Battery
                                                                         T.....o              ~
                                                                     Up to 3 KM
                                         • 100
                                                                        1                                                  PATROL

                                    -I                      1 - - - 5-10 KM ----~1 BATTALION MAIN BODY
                     Within                FORWARD                                            Motorized Rifle Co
                     Visual and            SECURITY                                           Motorized Rifle CO   (-J
                     Fire Support          ELEMENT                                            Tank Company (-J
                     Range                 Motorized Rifle Pit                                Artillery Bn (-J


                                                                                      BATTALION MAIN BODY
                                                                                      2 x Motorized Rifle Co
                                                                                      Tank Company (-J
                                                                                      Artillery Bn (- J
      PATROL   I·                   -I                                 5-10 KM ----~I          =
                                                                                               ~                          PATROL
      0--            Within
                     Visual and
                                          -=<>o-o+t-                     T                    ~                            0--
                                          REAR                       Up to 3 KM
                     Fire Support         SECURITY          PATROL
                     Range                ELEMENT           0--         1                            ~
                                          Motorized Rifle CO (-J                               FLANK SECURITY
                                          Tank Platoon                                         ELEMENT
                                          Artillery Battery                                    Motorized Rifle Platoon

                                                                                                                                                            FM 100-2-1

March Fonnations, Motorized Rifle Regiment _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __


  --0           ~                        · E; -    0              -H+-<>-                  -111 00                  -111 00               ~           :-+ols
                  MR BN(+)               REGT HO                      TANK                   MR                      MR                   REAR              MR
                                         ARTILLERY                    BN(-)                  BN                      BN(-)                SER-              PLT
                                         COMBAT SPT                                                                                       VICES

           1-        2-4           3-        1.0-5.2         3-     1.2-2.2        3-      1.0-3.2      3-      1.5-2.8            3- 3.5-6.4 1-
           2         KM            5           KM            5        KM           5         KM         5         KM               5    KM    3
                                         -              ~

                                                                  -            •
                                                                              30-50 KM
                                                                                                                              •           -     ~




                                        1·3 KM!
                                                       E;-   0-             ;+tH-O-                  111100                   111100            M                 -+otr
                       MR BN(+)                   REGT HO                      TANK                    MR                         MR                REAR           MR
                                                  ARTILLERY                    BN(-)                   BN                         BN(-)             SER-           PLT
                                                  COMBAT SPT                                                                                        VICES
           Up to 25 KM
                                          20-          1.8-5.2         3-     1.2-2.2        3-      1.6-3.2         3-       1.5-2.8         3- 3.5-6.4 1-
                                          30             KM            5        KM           5         KM            5          KM            5    KM    3
   .                                 •
  I.-                                                                         60-100KM                                                                               ~I

  1. Above distances are approximate and only serve to depict minimum and maximum expected distances.
  2. Although basically identical inorganic structure, the regiment marching ahead of a division may include
  a motorized platoon at flank, with the advance guard covering up to 25 kilometers and extending 20 to 30
  kilometers ahead of the main body of the division.

   To assist movement and enforce march control,                                          Use of radios is restricted to minimize risk of radio-
each regiment employs a traffic control platoon and                                     electronic detection, jamming, and enemy attack.
each division employs a traffic control company.                                        Subunits normally march under radio listening silence.
Traffic regulators wear distinctive black uniforms with                                 The Soviets are well drilled in and rely heavily on hand
white belts and, helmets. Before the march, they                                        and arm signals, flags, and light signaling devices.
normally are placed at critical points such as turns,                                   During long halts, wire communications may be used,
intersections, choke points, and control points. Use of                                 Extensive use is also made of motorcycle-mounted
traffic regulators permits less reliance on maps and                                    couriers.
radio communications.
                                                                                                                                                CD     3:

                 '-0                        ,                    ~


                      ~                                           REGIMENTAL            MAIN FORCE
                                          ~                        ADVANCE
                                                                                          OF MR
                                                                                                                                 ~              :II
                  '-0                                        ~ - -1l..- -         --v- . ---""'--                                               3i
                                                     1O~25       ~~
                                                                 REGIMENTAL MAIN FORCE
                                                                                                                        L          ~
                                                     KM                                                           DIVISION HO      TANK
                ~                                                  ADVANCE               OF MR
                                                                                                                      AND          . REGIMENT
                                           ....0                    GUARD               REGIMENT
                                                                                                                COMBAT SUPPORT
                                                              ~-~. -f'L.--V-
                                                                 REGIMENTAL MAIN FORCE
                                                                   ADVANCE                OF MR
                      /                        ~                    GUARD                REGIMENT
                                                             _ _.....                               0                       0'-_ __
                                                                                  U                                 U

              DIVISION                  REGIMENTAL
              PA1ROLS                    PATROLS

                                 I~          25     KM-I~                      60 KM+                          .1

     I..                     50 KM                           ·II....
                                                                  ~~-------'----                     100 KM+                               ~I

     (filOT TO SCALE) (All distances approximate)
                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

   Air defense for the march normally is planned in         Before the march, rear services elements are brought
advance and includes organic and supporting antiair-        forward to replenish supplies, to perform mainte-
craft weapons and aviation. Air defense weapons can         nance, and to evacuate the wounded and sick..
be located in the column or in stationary positions         Refueling and maintenance elements are sent forwanI
occupied in advance. Normally, tbeweapons are distri-       to halt or rest areas. Every attempt is made to replenish
buted throughout the column                                 fuel reserves on the vehicles before combaL
   When enemy aircraft appear, the commander gives             During the march, logistical support is perfonned in
the signal to open fire. Simultaneously the column          areas of halts or rests. Vehicles which break down
speeds up and vehicle spacings are increased to a           between these areas are taken to the right of the road
distance of up to 100 meters between vehicles. If a         and repaired there. Wounded and sick personnd are
large group of aircraft attack, the column may be           given medical aid in place. The seliouslywoundcdare
forced to disperse or seek concealment off the road.        evacuated.
   Engineer support for the march allows the force to          Control of rear services during the marchisdftt-tcd
overcome or bypass those areas which would disrupt          through detailed planning and coordination bctwa:o
the march. Engineer subunits may be formed into-            rear services chiefs, commanders ofrear services uniIs,.
 • A movement support detachment (MSD) which                and the supported commander. A rear command post.
performs route reconnaissance, removes obstacles,           headed by the deputy commander for rear services (at
organizes bypasses, marks the route, and does limited       regimental and division level) is established It IJlOVeS
road repair.                                                at the head of the column of rear services units (on the
 • A mobile obstacle detachment (MOD) which                 main axis if there is more than one column) but will be
provides protection for advancing columns by                situated wherever the Pest control can be maintained.
mechanically laying minefields and creating expedient   I      Under nuclear conditions, units probably will
obstacles on likely enemy approaches.                       encounter contaminated areas. Bypassing zones of
   (The organization and employment of the MSD and          radioactive contamination reduces casualties and
MOD are described in Chapter 14, Engineer Support.)         saves time spent on decontaminating personnel and
  Logistic support of the march can be divided into         materiel but may not always be possible. Some zones
two phases: before the march and during the march.          could be too large to bypass.

March Fonnation. Reinforced Tank Battalion _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __


                                   -+<>- FLANK SECURITY ELEMENT
                             Up to 25 KM
                                           Tank Pit
                                           Mobile Obstacle Detachment (Engr)

 RECON 5-10
                  SECURITY 5-10
                                   1 .to- ~
                                      BN HO    ARTY
                                                                   AA PLT
                                                                                       -itO- •
                                                                                                 REAR     REAR
                                                                                                 SER- 1-3 SECURITY
 PATROL KM        ELEMENT KM                                                                     VICES KM Tank Pit
                                      ~-------                  MAIN BODY                           ~

 Tank Pit         Tank COlo) MR Pit
 NBC Recon        Artillery Btry
                  Movement Support Detachment H
 Engr Recon       (Engr)


FM 100-2-1

   Two methods of crossing contaminated zones are                             Platoon leaders normally ride in the lead vehicle ofa
possible. The first is immediate movement across the                       platoon column. Company and battalion commanders
zone. The other is movement across the zone after                          ride near the front of their march formations.
waiting for a reduction in radiation levels. The crossing                  Regimental commanders normally are located near the
is made on primary routes to insure high speed and                         front of the regimental main force.
control, unless better axes are selected to reduce the                        The march is completed when the last control
distance traveled or to bypass areas of very high                          measure is crossed and the unit enters a new assembly
radiation.                                                                 area, or when it enters prebattle formation or combat.
   Units move across the contaminated area at high
speeds with increased spacings between vehicles,
especially in dusty conditions. Personnel wear protec-                      Prebattle Formation
tive equipment and use the protective systems of                              For the sake of speed, the Soviets prefer to remain in
combat vehicles.                                                           column or march formation whenever possible. They
   When a decision is made to wait for a reduction of                      normally resort to lateral deployment only by
radiation levels, forces disperse and camouflage. After                    necessity, such as when combat is imminent. The next,
radiation levels have fallen, the crossing is made                         successive lateral deployment out of march formation
without significant change in deployment.                                  is into prebattle formation (known incorrectly as
   The Soviets use their best available fire suppression                   "approach march formation" in some Western
means to preclude an enemy attack during their move-                       publications). In prebattle formation, a unit advances
ment across the contaminated area. This fire sup-                          dispersed laterally and in depth. This formation is used
pression mission is an ideal role for self-propelled                       when approaching the battlefield, moving in the
artillery.                                                                 depths of a defending enemy's rear area, and attacking
   Throughout the march, order, speed, and interval                        enemy defenses when preparatory fires have signifi-
are enforced vigorously. The Soviet penchant for                           cantly reduced enemy resistance. Prebattle formation
detailed planning and execution dominates such                             also may be used to rapidly cross nuclear-contami-
activity.                                                                  nated zones and areas that are burning or obstructed

Prebattle Formation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __


         <> • ••
              .+<J                <J           <J

                                                    • •

                                                             ... ..

 1-<> TK PlT
                   TK        MR PlT
                                       <J            <J ....a ..
                                                                . .
                                                                   · ·1·
                                                       co CO.R. • ••• I
                                                                                                     -+n- -+n- -+n-
                                                                                                       MR        MR        MR
       LOR                    lOR                         ••                                CDR        PlT       PlT       PlT
                                               •• •
                                    .. •                  •
        <> ••~                    <J           <J.
                                                                                   DEPLOYMENT FROM COMPANY COLUMN TO
 (NOT TO SCALE)                                                                    COMPANY LINE WITH PLATOONS IN COLUMNS
                                                                                                                   FM 100-2-1

   Prebattle formation minimizes troop vulnerability to         company moves in march column within the forma-
enemy tactical nuclear strikes and conventional                 tion. Deployment into and out of prebattle formation is
artillery and air strikes. It facilitates rapid maneuver as     rehearsed often by set battle drill.
well as quick deployment into attack formation. Units              A company in prebattle formation advances with
in prebattle formation either deploy into attack forma-         platoon columns in one of the formations described in
tion or return to march formation, depending on the             the examples on page 5-10. In prebattle formation a
tactical situation. A unit might remain in this formation       unit does not laterally deploy beyond platoon columns.
for a lengthy period of time. It normally would pass            The intervals between company or platoon columns in
through some form of prebattle formation when                   prebattle formation will be large enough to allow full
moving from the march into full deployment for an               deployment of the subunit into attack formation
attack.                                                         without additional lateral expansion of the entire
   In prebattle formation, a battalion advances with its        formation. Prebattle formation provides a combination
companies deployed on line, deployed in a forward or            of speed, dispersion, fleXibility, and firepower in an
reverse wedge, or echeloned ·left or right. Each                anticipated direction.

Battalion Prebattle Formations _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                               (COMPANIES IN COLUMNS-NOT TO SCALE)

             ~                                                                        I- 500- -.J-tt-mr
             TK CO                                                                        800M        MR COlo)

               TK COlo)     T
                                        BN HQ
                                        TK PLT
                                                                             MR CO         T
                                                                                                             ~   BN HQ
                           500-         MR PLT                                            500-                   MR PLT
                           800M                                                           800M
             ~              1                                                              1          ~
             TK co                                                                                    MR co
                   LINE FORMATION                                               WEDGE FORMATION
              REINFORCED TANK BATIALION                                      MOTORIZED RIFLE BATIALION

                      L    500-   I                                                   '---- 500- ~I
         ~800M""                                                           ~r--800M~
             MR CO
             TK PLT
                                                                              TKCO                    L
                                   ~                                       ~
                                                                                                       BN HQ

                                      BN HQ
                                      MR co
                                                                              TK CO        T
                          800M        TK PLT                                              800M

         ~                 1                                                               1          ~
             MR co                                                                                     TK   co
             TK PLT
              REVERSE WEDGE FORMATION                                        ECHELON LEFT FORMATION
         REINFORCED MOTORIZED RIFLE BATIALION                                     TANK BATIALION
FM 100-2-1

Company Prebattle Formations (Platoons in Column) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __


                                                                          I..   Up to   .. I   T
                                                                          ~     600 M    ~      I                       ¢ ¢
                                                                          o              t 150-
                                                                                         0300 M                            6
                                                                                                                        6 (j
                                                                          2 21                         ~
                                                                                                                        .300 M
                                                                                                              150-300 M
                                                                                                       o;t-        i.


            LINE                                                          REVERSE WEDGE                            ECHELON LEFT

                                                    TANK COMPANY

                                              t      1

                                              ¢300 M
                                                                                                              ¢         ¢
                                              ¢                                                               ¢ ¢
                                   3~~OMI     t                                                                150-¢~

                                                                                                               300 M
                                                                                                               -I   ¢
                                      ¢             ¢                                                                        ¢
                                       I~P to 600 ~I
            LINE                            WEDGE                         REVERSE WEDGE                        ECHELON RIGHT


  LEGEND:          ¢ Tank          () BTR           tJ   Platoon Leader                        Company Commander

      Attack Formation
         Normally, the attack formation is assumed immedi-          formation normally is assumed within about 1000               group off(
      ately before combat. In prebattle formation, platoons,         meters of enemy positions.                                   example, t
      and possibly companies remain in column. Attack                  Platoon leaders normally are located centrally.            ment itl tJ
      formation is assumed when platoons disperse laterally          Company commanders normally are located centrally            talions in
      into line formation. Within their company, however,           and slightly to the rear of lead elements.                    echelon, (
      platoons need not be formed on line but may be also              Attack formation (boyelJOy poryadok) is sometimes          echelon ""
      arrayed in wedge or echelon formations, based on the          referred to as "combat formation" or "battle forma-           tionsonp,
      situation. However, an array of platoons on line is most      tion" in Western publications. It is called attack            in the del
      common. Tanks on line normally precede BTRs or                formation in this manual to distinguish it from the           points t()f\
      BMPs. If troops dismount, they normally follow closely        Russian term b()'yell(~V poryadok lJoysk. which is best       antitank rc
      behind the tanks. BTRs or BMPs normally follow                translated as battle fonnatio11.                              other sUPf
      between 100 to 400 meters behind the tanks. Attack               Battle formation is the organization of a unit or          or operatif

      Company Attack Formation (Platoons on Line) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                            MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY (BTR), WITH ATTACHED TANK PLATOON

                          ,--Up to 400 M-j
                      ¢       ¢    ¢      ¢

                                                                                    ,.100- .,
                 6{J {J6{J {J6{J                                                         200 M

                                  6                                                                    100-
                                                                                                    'ioo M'
            .....~-- Up to 800 M                      •

                      LINE (MOUNTED)                             WEDGE (MOUNTED)                      REVERSE WEDGE (MOUNTED)

                      ¢40- ¢       ¢     ¢                             ¢ ¢                                    ¢    ¢    ¢     ¢
...                  'l'OOM'            Up to 200 MJ ..
              ~               ~                                                                      ~

        1 Cl Cl Cl ~ Cl Cl(l                                                                         {J{J{J                   {J{J{J
                                     '~~~)OO M                                                                                200 M
            t-----up to           800 M      I                                                                     ~

                                                                                                                              200 M

                    LINE (DISMOUNTED)                       WEDGE (DISMOUNTED)                      REVERSE WEDGE (DISMOUNTED)

         (NOT TO SCALE)                LEGEND:   rJ   BTR            6  Platoon leader               6  Company Commander                 ,1
                                                                                                      Fold out for 5-11
                                                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

ssumed immedi-          formation normally is assumed within about 1000             group of forces for offensive or defensive combat. For
nation, platoons,        meters of enemy positions.                                 example, the battle formation of a motorized rifle regi-
 column. Attack            Platoon leaders normally are located centrally.          ment in the attack may be two tank-reinforced bat-
iisperse laterally       Company commanders normally are located centrally          talions in the first echelon and one in the second
apany, however,         and slightly to the rear of lead elements.                  echelon, or it may be three battalions in the first
 but may be also           Attack formation (boyelloy poryadok) is sometimes        echelon with a company held in.reserve (see illustrd-
>os, based on the       referred to as "combat formation" or "battle forma-         tions on page =;-12). 111e battle formation ofa battalion
1S on line is most      tion" in Western publications. It is called attack          in the defense might require two company strong-
recede BTRs or          formation in this manual to distinguish it from the         points forward and one to the rear, and a platoon-sized
lly follow closely      Russian term boyell(~Y p01J'adok l'o)'sk, which is best     antitank reserve. The manner in which artillery and
10rmally follow         translated as battle formation.                             other support elements are deployed for a given hattie
he tanks. Attack           Battle formation is the organization of a unit or        or operation is also part of the hattie t()rmation.

ion Line) ___________________________________________________________________________________________


                      I--Up to 400 M--I                                                                                   I--Up to 400 M--I

         T            ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢                                                                                            ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢
                     2~~OMI~ -I 100-
()       ""t
                     100-200 M
                                        200 M
                                                                                                                T666                      666
        1()6()1              6 (J6()                                                               (J 6() r 6
                                                                                                              Up to
                                                                                                                              50-100 M

                                                          REVERSE WEDGE (MOUNTED)                        ECHElON LEFT (MOUNTED)

                                                         ()()()                    (){J{J
                                                                     ~            _200M

                                                                   6M6 12~~OM
                                                        REVERSE WEDGE (DISMOUNTED)                   ECHELON LEFT (DISMOUNTED)

                                                         6  Company Commander               A      Motorized Rifle Platoon (Dismounted)

                                                          Fold out for 5-11                                                                  5-11
FM 100-2-1

Company Attack Formation (Platoons on Line) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                                       TANK COMPANY
                                                                                                                             Up to 400 M
                                                                                                                           I~                 -I

                                                                     ~T                                         ~T                                 ~
         Up to H                                                     t   Up to 300 M                                  Up to 300 M         t
                                                            ~ UPto400J~
          200 M      Up to

                    100 M
                   Up to 800 M - I
                                                            1--1-            -I
                                                       Up to 200 M
                        LINE                                         WEDGE                                            REVERSE WEDGE

  (NOT TO SCALE)                                                                                                  LEGEND:      <:; Tank             ~TankPla

Tactical Formations of a Motorized Rifle Battalion (BMP) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                                                                                                                                                   • 11 00 ,
                                                                                                                                                     MR   co ,
                               a-- __
                               <:1l - - - - - - ------ --=-:;. ... ~ ........
                               a- - - - -       ...-----           MR PLT     .........          _
                               BMP                                                                    .... _

       800 M
                               a - - .... .........
                                                                                                                      - -

                                                                                           ..-..<:D - - - - - - -;:. - .                              1100 - -
                               a - ---- - - - -        MRPlT                               CO CDR                             _       -              MR CO

                   200 M
                               <:1l-- -.. _ ....
                               a -- - - - -----
                                            - - -_--"::.--~".                          ."",.'
                                                                                                .,., """"   -
                    i          <:1l-- - - - -                                 MR PlT                                                      500-800 M

                                                                                                                                               -411 00 "
  (NOT TO SCALE)                                                                                                                                     MR CO

                         COMPANY ATTACK                                COMPANY PREBATTlE                                                  BATTALION PREBATI
                         FORMATION: LINE                               FORMATION: LINE                                                    FORMATION: LINE
                         (PLATOONS IN LINE)                            (PLATOONS IN COLUMNS)                                              (COMPANIES IN COLI

5-12 Foldin
    Line) _______________________________________________________________________________

                                                            TANK COMPANY
                                                                                                Up to 400 M
                                                                                            I.....          -I
                                    0-4                                               0-4                        0-4                                                       0-4 0-4
                                    t T    Up to 300 M
                                                                                       Up to 300 M         t                                                               t T  Up to 300 M

               Up to 200 M
                                Up to 400     J0-4
                                                                                            10-4                                                        0-4
                                                                                                                                                       Up to 200 M
                                    WEDGE                                             REVERSE WEDGE                                                                ECHElON LEFT

                                                                                      LEGEND:   ¢ Tank            0-4         Tank Platoon                             t    Company Commander

Battalion (BMP) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
                                                                                                                 .. 11 00 ,
                                                                                                                   MR   co ,
-- - -
-- ------=-=--...                             ~
                                                                                                                                                        ~rt ,
                                                                            -'-- -
                   _   __ __                  100
                                               ~        ......

    -   -     -                                MR PlT            "

                                                                             ....... ,
    .... - ....
            ~----::=--~                                              ~- - - - --::::~ - "11 00 - -                                         -       -    -- -           -
.--- -                     -    -   -          MRPlT                  CO CDR                    ........           MR   co                                                      / /  BN HO

- -
    ---- -
    - - - - -
            -- -   -   -
                               -    '::.
                               -- -- -
                                           -  ~
                                              MR PlT
                                                     ... ....
                                                                     ....   ,.-   -                        500-800 M                                    j"l1

                                                                                                                 .. 11 00 '"
                                                                                                                   MR   co

                                        COMPANY PREBATTLE                                                  BATTALION PREBATTlE
                                        FORMATION: LINE                                                    FORMATION: LINE                                                 BATTALION IN
                                        (PLATOONS IN COLUMNS)                                              (COMPANIES IN COLUMNS)                                          MARCH FORMATION
                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

  The attack against a defending enemy is employed             The advantages of an attack from a position in direct
when the enemy is in a defensive position, and the           contact are as follows:
Soviets know his location. It normally follows a plan,        • It allows more thorough study of terrain and
based on intelligence on enemy disposition and the           enemy disposition.
factors of mission, terrain, troops, and time available.      • It permits more refined organization of battle.
  The attack against a defending enemy is the tactic          • It is easier to coordinate fire and maneuver.
which has been incorrectly described as a "break-              The disadvantages of an attack from a position in
through" or "deliberate attack." These terms are incor-      direct contact are as follows:
rect because they do not fully describe all options avail-    • Unit may be already committed.
able to the Soviet commander conducting what he               • Unit is under threat of attack during preparation.
calls attack against a defending enemy.                       • There is less chance of surprise.
                                                              • There is less chance to build up momentum and to
                                                             overcome inertia.
Principles of Attack Doctrine

   • Conduct aggressive reconnaissance.                      Forms of Maneuver
   • Breach enemy defense at weak points or gaps.               The three basic forms of maneuver in the attack are
   Maneuver against enemy flanks and rear.                   the frontal attack, the flank attack, and the
   • Bypass strongpoints.                                    envelopment.
   • Rapidly maneuver forces and fires in decisive              The frontal attack is directed against the enemy's
   direction.                                                frontline forces to penetrate his defenses along single
   • Mass fires.                                             or multiple axes. A unit conducting a frontal attack
   • Give priority to destruction of enemy nuclear           attempts to create openings for subsequent exploita-
   weapon systems.                                           tion. The frontal attack was previously one of the most
   • Strike rapidly and deeply into enemy rear.              frequently employed forms of offensive maneuver. Its
   • Maintain momentum under all conditions.                 success depends on superiority of forces and fire-
   • Employ radioelectronic combat.                          power, the presence of sufficient reserves, and
                                                             thorough planning. The frontal attack, by itself, is the
   The two methods of conducting an attack against a         least preferred form of maneuver. Normally, it is used
defending enemy are to attack from the march and to          in combination with a flank attack or an envelopment.
attack from a position in direct contact.                       The flank attack is conducted to strike enemy
   An attack from the march, the preferred method of         forces in their flank or rear at a relatively shallow
attack, is launched from march formation out of              depth. It normally is initiated through gaps or breaches
assembly areas in the rear. Subunits deploy laterally at     in enemy formations. Forces conducting the flank
designated control lines and assume attack formation         attack and those conducting a simultaneous frontal
within approximately 1,000 meters of enemy defenses.         attack coordinate fire support.
   The Soviets perceive the advantages of the attack
from the march to be as follows: The unit is not
committed before attack. The attack increases chance         Combination of Frontal and Flank Attacks _ _ __
of surprise, allows greater fleXibility, decreases vulner-
ability to enemy artillery, and enhances momentum.
Preparation for combat is performed out of enemy
   Disadvantages of the attack from the march are:
 • Commanders may not be familiar with terrain and
enemy dispositions.
 • It is more difficult to coordinate fire and maneuver
and simultaneous combined arms efforts.
  An attack from a pOsition in direct contact, the less
preferred method, is launched from a pOSition which
may be part of, or immediately behind, a defensive
position. It is most often used when changing over to
                                                                                       FRONTAL ATTACK
the offense from the defense.
FM 100-2-1

  The envelopment is a deeper attack that causes the          are not fixed dimensions, but vary with each situation.
enemy to turn and fight in a new direction. It is                In the initial phase of an attack, when configuration
launched against enemy open flanks or through gaps or         of enemy defenses may be evident, commanders may
breaches. There is no requirement for mutual fire             assign objectives to subordinate commanders to
support with forces conducting a frontal attack.              create, at each level, a minimum 3 to 1 advantage in
                                                              combat power.
                                                                 An idealized, but representative, hierachy of tactical
Envelopment with Frontal Attack _ _ _ _ _ _ __                objectives for an attack in which a 3 to 1 ratio is created
                                                              at all levels is portrayed in the illustration at right.
                                                                 This illustration shows a hierarchy of objectives for a
                                                              division attacking in an army first echelon at the
                                                              beginning of an offensive operation If the division
                                                              attack is successful, it will reach an enemy brigade rear
                                                              area" or, possibly, the enemy division rear area.
                                                                As the offensive continues and enemy resistance
                                                              decreases, objective depths would increase based
                                                              again on the situation. If enemy resistance were light
                                                              (during a later phase of an offensive), a division final
                                                              objective could be as deep a..'i 80 kilometers.

                                                                 Division-level planning and preparation for the
                                                              attack are based on the objectives and missions
                                                              assigned by the army commander. The division com-
   The Soviets seek to exploit massive suppressive fires      mander assesses the situation, outlines his concept and
through the vigorous, sustained, forward movement of          intentions, specifies preliminary actions and missions,
attacking units. Attacking forces attempt to bypass           and directs the preparation of required information
strongpoints and to envelop defensive positions. The          and planning. Warning orders are then passed to
maneuvers used vary with the situation. Units attempt         subordinate and attached units, specifYing where,
to exploit gaps in a defense and to maneuver against its      when, and by what means the attack will be conducted.
flanks and rear. The objective is a strike into the key          Preliminary actions are regulated by a strict time-
points and to the full depth of an enemy defense.             table. The less time available, the more rigidly the work
                                                              is regulated. Concurrent planning and action at all
                                                              levels is emphasized.
Objectives                                                       Soviet attack plans are worked out in great detail.
   Soviet tactical objectives are expressed as dashed         Despite the demands such planning may impose, in
lines on a terrain map, arrayed at various depths, based      favorable circumstances the average reaction times to
on enemy dispositions and terrain. Assignment of an           mounting an attack when already in contact, from
objective to a maneuver unit requires that unit to            receipt of orders or contact report to an H-Hour, are
attack to the limit of the objective line and to destroy or   indicated below.
neutralize enemy troops, weapons, equipment, and
support ~')'Stems.
   The objective lines, all normally assigned by the next     Reaction Times To Mounting An Attack _ _ _ _ __
higher commander, are based on his knowledge of the
enemy and his concept of attack. Divisions and regi-              UNIT          REACTION            PLANNING
ments normally are assigned an immediate objective                                TIME                TIME
and a subsequent objective. Battalions and companies
normally receive an immediate objective and a subse-            Division       2-4 hours             1-3 hours
quent direction of attack. A battalion may sometimes
be assigned a subsequent objective.                             Regiment       1-3 hours             30 minutes to
   At the tactical level, objectives form a progressively                                            2.5 hours
higher and deeper hierarchy. The depths of objectives           Battalion      25-60 minutes         20-45 min
                                                                                                                                  FM 100-2-1

Possible Hierarchy of Tactical Objectives for a
Soviet Division Attack Against a Defending Enemy _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

  ~~h--------~~---xx                                                                                 .1//
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       POSSIBLE                                    DIVISION                                 REGIMENTAL
       DEEPER                                 ><   SUBSEQUENT                               SUBSE~UENT                   BATTALION
                                               I   OBJECTIVE                                OBJECTIVES                   OBJECTIVES
                                                                                            DIVISION                     REGIMENTAL
       OF THE DAY"
                                                                                            IMMEDIATE                    IMMEDIATE
                                                                                            OBJECTIVE                    OBJECTIVES

                                                             OBJECTIVE DEPTHS

                                     ENEMY BAITAlION REAR                      ENEMY BRIGADE REAR                 ENEMY DIVISION REAR

                                      FORWARD DEFENSE OF                      ENEMY BAITAlION REAR
                                      ENEMV BAITAlION

                                 ENEMY FORWARD PLATOON                       DIRECTION FOR
                                 AND COMPANY STRONGPOINTS                    CONTINUATION OF ATTACK

  LEGEND:      -     -     -    Immediate Objectives                  - -
                                                                      - -          =    Subsequent 0 bj ectives

 NOTE: Objectives assigned based on maintaining a minimum 3 to 1 advantage in maneuver forces
 combat power.

FM 100-2-1

    On receipt ofa mission, the division commander and        • Location and organization of enemy artillery and
 his chief of staff immediately assess the assigned          mortars.
 mission, calculate available and required time, and          • Positions critical to the stability of the defense.
 establish what information about the situation they          • Perimeters of strongpoints and defensive areas on
 need, what they already have, and what is lacking.          the FEBA and in the depth of the defense.
Analysis of the assigned mission centers on the role of       • Obstacles.
 the divisions in the attack; where, unless told, its main    • Probable areas of nuclear or chemical strikes.
 effort should be concentrated; what attack formation           In planning an attack from the march and the
 should be used; and what rates of advance are possible      required movements of troops to the line of attack,
 during the attack.                                          critical attention is given to timing. Usually"the next
    The division commander reviews the army's                higher commander specifies the routes, start lines or
 offensive plan, the allocation and procedures for           points, lines of deployment, and the line and time of
employment of nuclear and chemical weapons, and              attack. The length of the routes and distances from a
 the role of the division in the army's scheme. He notes     start line to other control lines are measured and
the axes, objectives, and groupings of flanking              broken down by 5 kilometer segments. Permissible
 division(s ).                                               speeds are determined for different sectors based on
   The basis for his attack planning stems from              the condition of the routes, the time of year and day,
consideration of-                                            the weather, the composition of the columns, and
  • Objective ( s).                                          possible enemy action during movement. Average
  • Enemy dispositions.                                      speeds are calculated, and schedules for troop move-
  • The army's fire plan, particularly the provision for     ments are developed. In calculating troop movements,
nuclear/chemical fires, and the allocation of artillery.     planners reduce the speed of movement from
  • The terrain in the assigned attack zone, the             successive lines of deployment to the line of attack by
weather and light conditions, and time of the attack.        25 to 50 percent from the march speed.
  • Combat effectiveness and supply situation of all            An attack against a defending enemy may be staged
elements of the division.                                    from an assembly area. If an assembly area is occupied,
   The balance of forces directly influences the align-      the stay is limited· to the time necessary to assign
ment of Soviet troops for the attack. The calculation of     missions to subordinate units, to check preparations,
the relative balance of forces is made across the entire     and to organize combat formations. The assembly area
zone of the planned action and to the full depth of the      is located far enough forward for first echelon regi-
assigned mission. When nuclear weapons are                   ments to move to their lines of deployment, normally
employed, the commander assesses the balance of              during the hours of darkness, and to reach their attack
forces after expected nuclear strikes.                       lines during the artillery preparation.
   In calculating the balance of forces, the Soviets            Troops are dispersed in assembly areas with their
attempt to determine the quantity and quality of the         attached reinforcements and are grouped by bat-
opposing forces. Besides a precise count of battalions       talions. Their movement routes, with prescribed
and companies, tanks, artillery, mortars and antitank        control and deployment lines, permit rapid, effective
weapons, this estimate also assesses morale, actual          movement to the attack line. The attack line is desig-
strength in personnel and equipment, and the combat          nated in the combat order. It is planned to be as near as
experience and readiness of each side.                       possible to the forward positions of the enemy defense.
   The assessment of the balance offorces derives from          If a division assembly area is used, it would probably
intelligence estimates that primarily pertain to-            be located about 60 to 75 kilometers from the forward
  • Grouping of forces and the structure of enemy            edge of the battle area (FEBA) and cover an area of 300
defen~s in the attack zone to the depth of the attack        to 600 square kilometers. First echelon regiments
mission.                                                     could occupy assembly areas as close as 20 to 30
  • Presence and location of enemy weapons of mass           kilometers from the FEBA.
destruction and their possible employment.
  • Distribution of strongpoints in the defense and
location of antitank weapons.                                Reinforcements
  • Existence of gaps, breaks, and boundaries in the           A first echelon division may receive the following
defense.                                                     reinforcements from army and front resources:
  • Location of reserves, especially armor, and the           • 2-4 artillery battalions
possible nature of their commitment.                          • 1 engineer company
                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

 •   1 engineer (construction company)                        • Methods of firing in support of the attack.
 •   1 engineer (ponton bridge) company                       • Plans for partial decentralization of artillery con-
 •   1 engineer (amphibian) company                          trol during the accompaniment phase in the enemy
 •   Air defense                                             depths.
 •   Communications support                                   • Plan of support for commitment of second eche-
 •   Signal intelligence resources                           lon forces and reserves.
 •   Medical support                                            The CRTA incorporates the planned fires of the
 •   Chemical defense                                        RAGs and DAGs into a division fire plan. The com-
 •   Motor transport                                         pleted division plan is forwarded to army level for
  The division commander assigns some artillery to           approval and incorporation into the army plan. Adjust-
his first echelon regiments to form regimental artillery     ments in the organization for combat and planned fires
groups (RAG) and retains the rest in a division artillery    are made as the planned attack develops. These
group (DAG). These are temporary groupings which             changes are also forwarded to the army CRTA.
may be modified based on need. (See Chapter 9,                  A possible fire plan outlining the timing for an
Artillery Support).                                          artillery fire preparation is shown below.

 Fire Planning                                               Possible Artillery Fire Plan - - - - - - - - - -
   Fire planning, being highly centralized, integrates
conventional artillery and air strikes as well as missile          TIME                 PHASE OF FIRE
strikes and possible nuclear or chemical fires. The fire                                PREPARATION
plan includes details which specifY the time of assign-
ments, groupings, and displacement of artillery.                H-25           Heavy surprise concentration of
Fragmentary orders provide specifics concerning the                            nuclear strikes or conventional
missions of deSignated artillery units and identifY the                        artillery and air strikes on the
location of observation posts and firing positions.                            entire depth of the defense.
Deadlines for units to be ready to fire are specified.
Artillery units are among the first combat forces to
                                                                H-20          Destruction fire against strong-
                                                                              points, observation points; head-
   Artillery units allocated by higher headquarters join
                                                                              qua rters, a nd artillery. Priority
the designated elements of the attack force in the
                                                                              fires against enemy's forward
assembly area or link up on the march. Artillery desig-
nated to support or reinforce the attack take up firing
positions early enough to be ready to cover the
advance of the division several hours before the attack         H-15          Conventional suppressive fire
                                                                              against enemy forward positions.
is launched. Artillery attached to maneuver regiments
usually moves near the head of the regimental main
forces.                                                         H-5            Heavy, surprise concentrations
   For the attack, fire planning is conducted in the first                     against enemy strongpoints.
echelon regiments and divisions based on the scheme
of maneuver and fire plan of the division and higher            H-Hour        Artillery fires in        support    of
headquarters. The chief of rocket troops and artillery                        the attack begin.
at division level receives instructions from and advises
the division commander on-                                      Fire planning is basically designed to suppress
 • Nuclear fires allotted to the division and plans for      enemy defensive capabilities, including artillery, and to
integrating nuclear, chemical, and conventional fires        cover the deployment and initial assault of the
and available air strikes.                                   attacking maneuver elements. High priority is given to
 • Fires to create passages through obstacles and            neutralizing enemy antitank defenses and to being able
obstructions.                                                to engage possible counteratt~ck forces. Fire planning
 • Priorities of sectors of the enemy defense which          also provides for suppressing enemy strongpoints on
are to be neutralized.                                       the flanks of the attack zones.
 • Starting time, duration, and phases of the fire              Fire planning for the attack is methodical and highly
preparation.                                                 quantitative because of the need to determine
FM 100-2-1

ammunition requirements and to distribute planned              remaining forces are organized into a second echelon,
fires effectively. The availability of artillery and its or-   a combined arms reserve, or special reserves (such as
ganization is measured against the numbers and types           engineer, chemical, or antitank subunits).
of targets and the commander's decision for coordi-               The main difference between a second echelon
nated action in the attack. Targets are allocated to artil-    force and a combined arms reserve is that the former
lery, tanks, aircraft, and nuclear or chemical weapons.        has an assigned mission while the latter does not. A
   The width and depth of the area for which                   combined arms reserve is used to exploit developed or
preparatory fires are planned depends on the strength          developing success or to react to contingendes.
and deployments of the enemy defense. When time                   Within the division's attack zone, a main attack axis
permits, fire planning is based on thorough, detailed          may be deSignated based on terrain, disposition of
reconnaissance and careful study of the attack plan. In        enemy defenses, or the order received from army or
any attack, a 'systematic targeting effort underlies the       higher headquarters. One or two of its first echelon
fire plan at all levels. Accordingly, the commander's          regiments probably would attack along or abreast the
attack order contains specific details such as-                main attack axis. Another first echelon regiment
 • Time of start, direction, and plan of fires.                probably would conduct a supporting attack. (The
 • Locations, times, and methods for clearing                  illustration on page 5-19 depicts a typical Soviet
passages in obstacles (friendly and enemy).                    maneuver plan against a defending enemy.)
 • Procedures for marking and guarding cleared                    A second echelon regiment normally has a mission
passages.                                                      to continue the attack against a deeper objective along
 • Firing procedures for direct firing weapons.                the main attack axis. Normal commitment of a second
 • Coordination with troop units in direct contact.            echelon regiment takes place after the division's
 • Actions if the enemy fires a counter-preparation.           immediate objective has been achieved. However, the
 • Necessary signals.                                          time of commitment depends on the success of first
   The commander also specifies in his attack order            echelon forces and the manner in which the enemy
other actions to be carried out while units move to the        uses his reserves. The second echelon is committed by
attack lines. These include:                                   the commander when and where it can best contri-
 • Emergency procedures and alternate routes in the            bute to overall success. The division commander could
event of enemy use of nuclear or chemical weapons              commit the second echelon on an alternate axis, based
and/ or creation of zones of contamination.                    on his evaluation_ of the developing situation.
 • Organization of air defense measures.                          A regiment designated a combined arms reserve
 • "Safe distance" lines in the event nuclear strikes          would not have an assigned objective at the beginning
are to be employed.                                            of an attack. It would be held in readiness to attafk
 • Procedures for relieving units if they lose their           along the most opportune axis at a time determined by
combat effectiveness due to enemy nuclear strikes.             the division commander.
 • Signal instructions for the attack, calls for fire sup-        Before being committed, second echelon or
port and to cease fires.                                       combined arms reserve subunits advance in march or
                                                               prebattle formation approximately 15 to 30 kilometers
                                                               to the rear of the first echelon. This distance varies
Division Attack                                                with the situation. The commander keeps second
  A division normally conducts an attack as part of its        echelon or reserve forces far enough forward to influ-
parent army offensive. In some circumstances, it may           ence the battle in a timely manner, but far enough to
conduct an attack under control of a corps or front.           the rear to protect them from the bulk of enemy direct
Attacking divisions have missions which contribute to          fire and direct support weapons. Second echelon or
the accomplishment of the army's missions. Achieve-            reserve subunits, before commitment, probably would
ment of a division's mission is the culmination offires        be kept sufficient lateral depth to protect them from
and attacks by its maneuver regiments.                         enemy nuclear or chemical weapons.
  A likely mission for a division attacking in the first          When attacking with three regiments in a single
echelon of its parent army would be to penetrate               echelon, a division zone of attack is normally 15 to 25
enemy rorward defenses, to attack through the enemy            kilometers wide. This width could vary considerably
brigade rear, and to continue the attack to the full           with the situation. Within the zone of attack there
tactical depth-the enemy division rear area.                   probably would be no distinct, continuous division
  A division normally attacks with most of its combat          "attack frontage." Each of the three first echelon regi-
power in a first echelon or a strong single echelon. The       ments attacks on its own axis, with situation-variable
                                                                                                                                                                          .... -

                                                                                                                                                                          :::I I»
                                                                                                                                                                          o ..
                                                                                                                                                                          o I»
                                                                                              KM              -+++<>tnr           REGIMENT          DIVISION
                                                                                                                                                    ZONE OF

                                                                                                                BN+               ZONE OF
                                                                                                                                   ATTACK            ATTACK               :D
                                                                                               j                                                                          <'
                                      ,-~;Jlt!-,..~~. ~;:: 0)---"'--
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                                                                                                                                  REGIMENT                                (')
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                                                                                              KM                BN+                ATTACK                                 I»


                                     111              If!                i   ii               ·1---"'--                           REGIMENT
                                                                                                6             -+++<>tnr            ZONE OF
                                                                                                                BN+                ATTACK

                                                                 1 - 5-15          KM   -II~     ..- - - - -          15-30 KM               .\
                                                            DIVISION                                                  REGIMENTS                     DIVISION
                                                             FIRST                                                      SECOND                      SECOND
                                                            ECHELON                                                   ECHELONS/                    ECHElON/
                                                                                                                       RESERVES                     RESERVE                             'T1
en                                                                                                                                                                                      o
      NOTE: Division second echelons/reserves normally are spaced 15 to 30 kilometers to the. rear of first                                                                             o
.:.   echelon force. Distances between elements of a regiment can vary from 5 to 15 kilometers.                                                                                         N
CO    Regimental attack frontages vary from 3 to 8 kilometers depending on mission.                                                                      (NOT TO SCALE)                 ....
FM 100-2-1

spaces between regiments. Regimental attack                  If enemy defenses are not well prepared and most of
frontages can vary from as little as 3 kilometers to as   the enemy force is deployed forward, a Soviet division
much as 8 kilometers, depending on the regiment's         may attack on multiple axes with no obvious main
mission and battle formation.                             attack. The division array would be similar to that

Typical Attack Formation. Soviet Motorized Rifle Division _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __




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                                                                                                                    FM 100-2-1

just described, with three regiments about equally             kilometers, followed by two second echelon regi-
dispersed in a single echelon. The leading regiments           ments and a small reserve.
attack and probe for weak points in enemy defenses,               Because this type of attack makes their forces
penetrate wherever they can, develop penetrations,             extremely vulnerable to tactical nuclear strikes, it is
and carry the attack as deeply as possible. The division       not likely the Soviets would employ it under nuclear or
commander allows the battle to develop to a stage              nuclear-threatened conditions. Under any conditions,
where he can determine which penetration promises              such an attack requires rapid concentration of forces
the best opportunity to drive into the enemy rear. He          and fires to create the breach and just as rapid a
then commits his combined arms reserve through this            dispersal of forces on the other side of the breach.
penetration.                                                   Though this twe of attack is less likely, it must be con-
   The challenge facing the opposing commander                 sidered a possible option.
under such an attack is to maintain the integrity of his          The Soviet division attack options described are not
main battle area. Otherwise, he may be forced to               all-inclusive, but representative. The organization,
commit his reserve before the direction of the Soviet          concept, and conduct of a Soviet division attack varies
main attack becomes obvious.                                   with the division's mission, and the commander's esti-
  Another Soviet option, less desirable, especially            mate of the situation. The basic concept for an attack is
under nuclear conditions, is the attack with forces            to strike enemy defenses with intensive fires, find or
massed across a narrow frontage. Such an attack might          create a gap, slip through, and drive deep at top speed.
be conducted to create a breach in well-prepared,                 A division attack could include a vertical envelop-
deeply arrayed enemy defenses. A division conducting           ment by a helibome force of up to battalion size. An
the main attack of its parent army could conduct such          organic motorized rifle battalion, stripped of its
an attack to achieve a breakthrough for an offensive           combat vehicles and reinforced with air mobile
operation. A probable array for the division in these          combat support, could conduct such an assault.
circumstances would be two regiments in the first                 The locations of division elements in the attaCk are
echelon massed across a frontage as narrow as 6 to 10          shown below.

Deployment of Division Elements in an Attack _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                    ELEMENT                                                  DEPLOYMENT

   DIVISION FIRST ECHELON                Concentrated to attack on two or three axes each several kril wide.
   DIVISION SECOND ECHELON OR            Moves by bounds 15-30 km behind the first echelon until committed.
   REGIMENTAL ARTILLERY GROUP            1-4 km from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
   DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY GROUP            3-6 km from the FEBA.
   MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER              3-6 km from the FEBA.
   DIVISIONAL ANTITANK RESERVE           .Between first and second echelons on the axis of the main attack or on athreatened
   DIVISION MAIN COMMAND POST            Up to 15 km from the FEBA.
   DIVISION FORWARD CP                   Up to 5 km from the FEBA.
   DIVISION REAR AREA CP                 Up to 30 km from the FEBA and located near the rear service elements.
   REGIMENTAL MAIN CPs                   Up to 5 km from the FEBA.
   LOGISTIC UNITS                        The divisional medical post. together with repair and evacuation elements. moves
                                         behind the first echelon. The rest of the divisional logistic units will be some 5-10 km
                                         behind the second echelon.
FM 100-2-1

   Heliborne assaults could extend out to 50                    sized reserve. A motorized rifle regiment has three
kilometers beyond the FEBA. likely objectives are key           motorized rifle battalions and one tank battalion. The
terrain such as defiles, bridges, or river-crossing sites. A    subunits of the tank battalion normally are assigned to
division may employ a forward detachment, such as a             the three motorized rifle battalions. A tank regiment of
reinforced tank battalion, to link up with a heliborne          a tank division has three tank battalions and possibly a
assault.                                                        motorized rifle company or battalion. Motorized rifle
   The use of forward detachments at the beginning of           suburiits may be assigned to the three tank battalions.
an offensive operation is discussed in Chapter 4. It is            Either regiment normally attacks with two
likely that forward detachments also would be                   reinforced battalions in its first echelon, and one rein-
employed throughout an offensive operation, particu-           forced battalion in a second echelon. A regiment could
larly after penetrating the enemy main defense area.            also attack with three battalions in a single echelon
   A division forward detachment of reinforced                 with a reserve of one or two companies.
battalion size may be dispatched on a swift, indepen-              An antitank reserve of a motorized rifle regiment
dent penetration into the enemy depths to seize and             normally consists of its antitank battery, a tank platoon,
hold a tactical objective until the arrival of main forces.     and an engineer mobile obstacle detachment.
It may also be used for tactical raids. In either case,            A regiment's zone of attack can vary from about 3 to
missions of forward detachments are intended to                 8 kilometers, depending on the attack concept and the
accelerate the advance of main forces and the dissolu-          situation. The most !)Pical attack frontage of a regi-
tion of the enemy defense.                                      ment is 4 to 5 kilometers. The distance between
   TWical objectives for a forward detachment                   echelons can vary from about 5 to 15 kilometers.
include-                                                           Motorized rifle regiments and tank regiments have
 • Road junctions.                                              an organic 122-mm howitzer battalion. When attack-
 • Bridges.                                                    ing in a division first echelon, a regiment normally
 • River crossing sites.                                       receives additional artillery from division. The regi-
 • A mountain pass.                                            mental commander may assign artillery, up to a bat-
 • Air defense weapons.                                        talion, to each of his first echelon battalions. The
 • Rockets and missiles.                                       remainder is formed into a regimental artillery group
 • Command posts.                                              (RAG). A RAG is normally deployed 1 to 4 kilometers
 • Communications centers.                                     from the FEBA (see illustration on the next page).
 • Tactical reserves.                                              A first echelon regiment could also be supported by
 • Withdrawing forces.                                         attack helicopters from front, army, or division
   Advance guards differ from forward detachments in               An attack from the march conducted bya motorized
mission. An advance guard is a march security element          rifle regiment follows this sequence:
which protects and warns the main marching force                 • The air and artillery preparation, which may be up
and engages enemy forces encountered on the march              to 50 minutes duration, is planned and executed to
route. A forward detachment is a deep attack force             end just before maneuver subunits assault enemy
detailed to achieve an independent mission. It is not          forward defenses.
restricted to the route of its main force.                       • The regiment advances out of assembly areas at
                                                               least 20 kilometers to the rear, concurrent with the fire
Regimental Attack                                                • Subunits normally deploy at distances from enemy
  A maneuver regiment is the smallest fully combined           forward defenses of approximately 8 to 12 kilometers
arms ground force element. It is capable of limited            in battalion columns; 4 to 6 kilometers in company
independent action, but normally attacks as part of a          columns, and 1 to 5-4 kilometers in platoon columns.
parent division.                                                  If enemy defenses are not well prepared, the attack
  A regiment attacking in the first echelon ofa division       may be conducted in prebattle formation. Attack
normally will have a mission to penetrate, destroy, or         formation is used against prepared enemy positions. In
neutralize forward strongpoints of defending enemy             general, the Soviets do not deploy laterally except
battalions, to continue the attack to an enemy battalion       when absolutely necessary. They will remain in march
rear area, and to be prepared to continue the attack           or prebattle formation whenever possible, for sake of
into enemy brigade and division rear areas.                    speed. Even after a lateral deployment, subunits may
  A regiment normally is organized for combat into             revert back to march or prebattle formation if enemy
three reinforced battalions and, pOSSibly, a company-          resistance is not as great as anticipated.
                                                                                                                                                                 -4      I»C'S
                                                                                                                                                                 ~       8"g,Sl;
              ) - · -....r-- · --"'-- · --..r- · ----r.....-. • ~ • --r"\...-                                                                                    ii'
                                                                                                                                                                         t: ., .... t'b
                                                                                                                                                                         ....   t'b     I:!l

                                                                                                                                                                         g~~ ~
                                                                                                                                                                         "'n "'
                                                                                                                                                                 I»      O::r~
              ~.          ~TKPLT                               ~                                                                                                 ()      ........ t'b          ~
                                                                                                                                                                 ~       o~..,                 0
                                                                                                                                                                 ~       81»            O'i
                                                           ~MORTAR              -flnf MR PLT (BN RESERVE)                                      _II
                                                                                                                                                                 ~          ~~ ~
                                                                                                                                                                         ~ GO 0. ....

                      ~ ~ 6.
                                                     [>~8TRY                                                                                   -TrlJ1J"
                                                                                                                                                                         f"'t   """,.   ~ ~

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                                                                                                                                                  MRCO           o
                                                                                                                                                                         til ::l' S
                                                AASECTION               g'= G                                                                                    en
                                                                                                                                                                           t'b ....
                                                                                                                                                                         .... =: ~ a

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                                   MR COlo)                                 V                           (_~, SAM                                 MR co                   O'g,a g.
                      ~TKPLT                                             ~                     6.                                                                3:
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              )           -\.                                             -                    REGT                                                              g        ....
                                                                                                                                                                 ~.             ~::l ::r
     ~                                                                                         ~                        3-8 KM                                   N       0.          ....

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                                                                                                                                                                 ~       t'b.           1;;.   t'b
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                                                                                                                                                 TK PLT

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                                                                    =                                                                                                               n
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                                                                                                                                                                                ...·S -
                      -.~                                           ----I"\...-. • ~                                            . -....r--                                      t'bgg.
                                                    3 KM                   -I                                       Distances Approximate                                       .g ~ §
                          .1 :
                                                                                                                                                                                0'';<:: ri
                          1 -:     -   -    -   -   -   -   -    5 KM                                      -I                                                                   f5   =:;:: 0
                             •                                                                10 KM                        $$                               -I                  o.n"""
                                                                                                                                                                                . 0 I»
                                   REGIMENTAL                                                                                      REGIMENTAL                                   '":"\::l~

                                 FIRST ECHELON                                                                                   SECOND ECHELON                                 ~ a§·
                                                                                                                                                                                  o t'b
     1. Atank regiment attacking in two echelons would be of similar configuration, with modifications based
     on differences in combat support elements.
                                                                                                                                                                                i 61g
                                                                                                                                                                                 ~ S'
                                                                                                                                                                                        I» n
~ 2. The extreme limits of a regimental zone of attack are 3-8 kilometers. The most typical attack frontage                                                                        ;,,::       CIl
W of a regiment is 4-5 kilometers.                                                                                                          (NOT TO SCALE)                      .c:;os-
                                                                                                                                                                                 . ~ n                ,
FM 100-2-1

Battalion Attack
   A battalion normally attacks as part of its parent                         attack through strongpoints of defending enemy bat-
regiment. A battalion does not have the organic                               talions and to continue the attack in an assigned direc-
combat support or combat service support required                             tion. Soviet subunits normally do not stop on objec-
for independent action. The exception to this is the                          tives and consolidate them, but continue the attack
employment of a battalion as a forward detachment to                          deeper into the enemy rear.
accomplish a deep, independent mission. In such a                                A motorized rifle battalion has three motorized rifle
circumstance, the battalion would be reinforced to                            companies and nonnally has a tank company attached,
sustain itself for as long as possible.                                       as illustrated below. A tank battalion has three tank
  A battalion attacking in the first echelon of a first                       companies and may have either a motorized rifle
echelon regiment would probably have a mission to                             platoon or company attached.

Attack Formations. Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ __


                                            ---.r'I..- -            ~~ ---r.......                             -   ----v-;=.~         T

                                                                                   C~MR CO [> \;;:::t) BTRY
                                                                                              ~ MORTAR


        \           - :.::v                                                                     t..~E::                  ~ 2'K~ ~'K~

                                      -~- JL -t -~~~'JJ                                     I
                                                                                                           I        I
                                                                                                                           3 KM    (NOT TO SCALE)

  -..JI-            -f"\- _              --y.r-                 --""'-- - -v---

         II                                                                                                             ~~ ~~HELON)
                                             I                                                                 a
                                                                                                                          • 1100
              ~ DIRECT
                                            I                            )                      MRCO
                                                                                                               ~    MORTAR BTRY

              ~SUPPORT                                                                                                                Up to
                        ARTILLERY     -it+-

                              PLANNED UNE \
                            OF DEPLOYMENT \
                           FOR 2D ECHELON
                                                                                      ~ MR CO
                                                                                                       AA SEen.1            =
                                                                                                                        ARTY BN    11 21KM ~PK~

                                        - -\-A-
                                                                     '"' I I                o          1
                                                                                                                   I'"' 3 I
                                                                                                                   2      KM

       OBJECTIVE                          OBJECTIVE

  NOTE: Tank battalion formations are of same general configuration minus mortar battery.                                          (NOT TO SCALE)

                                                                                                                  FM 100-2-1

   A battalion could attack with three reinforced                      probably would have up to a battalion of artillery
companies in a single echelon, plus a small reserve,                   attached to it. This artillery is under the operational
possibly a platoon. A battalion also could attack with                 control of the maneuver battalion commander. It may
two reinforced companies in a first echelon and one                    be used for direct fire.
reinforced company in a second echelon. When two                          A typical tank or motorized rifle company attack
echelons are employed, a normal distance between                       frontage is from 500 to 800 meters. Platoons normally
echelons is 1 to 3 kilometers. A normal frontage for an                attack on a frontage of 100 to 200 meters, with 50 to
attacking battalion is 1 to 2 kilometers, within a zone of             100 meters between vehicles. The frontage of a 4-tank
2 to 3 kilometers.                                                     platoon attached to a motorized rifle company could
   A battalion attacking in a regiment's first echelon                 extend to 400 meters.

Deployment for an Attack from the March _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                           LINE OF                    LINE OF                                 LINE OF
                    LINE OF           DEPLOYMENT INTO             DEPLOYMENT INTO                        DEPLOYMENT INTO
                    ATTACK            PLATOON COLUMNS            COMPANY COLUMNS                        BATTALION COLUMNS
                    (Attack              (Companies in                   (Battalion in                      (Battalion in
 '\:               Formation)         Prebattle Formation)           Prebattle Formation)                 March Formation)
 Jf~--;.r--~-;.r-                                                                           .J"\..-_~

                 ~~S               ~          ITT
           ~~TS ~
                                    MR PLT

                                              ~'l I     ' M R CO
                                                       .... ,

)i ~ I
 )         ATTACK9                                           TK PLT

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'\: ~ I                            ~           r                A~ {,~~,->~)
Jf ~ I                                         I                .•            IE~~ J ~~ ~~                .~':::'r~~:g. I
)i ~ II
                                   ~T I',     I ~';O"
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                                    MR PLJ
                                               r'; /
                                                   /    /
                                                                MR CO
                                                                TK PLT        I                                   I
)_ .3~ _.::.r .__~ _._._. 1

                                                                                                               (NOT TO SCALE)
          Up to 1000 M-J
     ..             1.5 - 4 KM------,
     ,......r - - - - - - - - - - 4 - 6 KM - - - - - - - - - . _ ,

FM 100-2-1

   There would probably be little maneuver evident in          manders are killed, the attack probably would not
platoon and company tactics. These subunits normally           grind to a halt but would be carried forward on its own
attack on line, in unison. However, maneuver probably          momentum. However, elimination of tactical com-
will be evident in the way a battalion commander               manders would diminish coordination of the attack,
moves his companies.                                           especially fire coordination.
   Normally, company and battalion commanders are                 Shown below is a reinforced tank battalion attacking
located centrally and slightly to the rear of lead ele-        from the march against a strongpoint in the depths of
ments in combat vehicles with extra antennas. If com-          the enemy's defense.

Tank Battalion (Reinforced) Attack from the March _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __



                                                                                                     TANK ON (+)
                                                                                                      IN MARCH
                               TK   co   MR   co

                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

 Conduct of the Attack
   Mounted assault speed is approximately 12 kilo-            Mine-clearing is covered by smoke and intensified
meters per hour (200 meters per minute). This speed        fire on enemy defensive positions. Ideally, the Soviets
allows tanks to fire from a brief halt, allowing one       would like to create one lane through an obstacle or
aimed round to be fired from the main gun. There are       minefield per platoon. Normally one tank per tank pla-
indications that the Soviets are striving to increase      toon is equipped with a mine roller. In addition, each
mounted assault speed to 20 kilometers per hour to         tank company has a mine roller/plow. Mobile mine-
reduce vulnerability to antitank weapons. Dismounted       clearing vehicles hurl line charges out to several
assault speed is approximately 6 kilometers per hour.      hundred meters to clear lanes several meters wide.
   Soviets prefer motorized rifle units to assault         Combat vehicles cover each other's passage through
mounted. The factors favoring mounted assault are-         the minefield. If dismounted, riflemen follow in
  • NBC contamination.                                     column behind tanks.
  • Open terrain.                                             The artillery preparation should end just before first
  • Reduced enemy antitank capability.                     echelon elements reach the FEBA. Fires are normally
  • Weak enemy defenses.                                   shifted on command of maneuver commanders within
   If a dismounted attack is planned, a dismount line is   about 200 meters of lead elements, depending upon
designated, within about 400 meters from the FEBA If       weapon caliber. There is no pause between the
possible, dismount is performed with the BMPs or           preparatory fires and the start of fires in support of the
BTRs in defilade to protect riflemen from machine gun      attack While fighting through enemy defenses,
fire and vehicles from antitank fires. Factors favoring    maneuver elements will be preceded by a pattern of
dismounted assault are-                                    intense artillery and mortar fires. Fires like the rolling
 • Strong enemy antitank capability.                       barrages of World War II are unlikely; however, fires on
 • Well-prepared enemy defenses.                           successive concentrations or lines will be provided.
 • Fords or bridges.                                          Fixed-wing air strikes normally are used for targets
 • Obstacles or minefields.                                beyond artillery range. Attack helicopters provide
 • Rough terrain: no high speed avenues of attack          close air support on the FEBA in direct support of
 • Maximum firepower needed.                               ground units.
                                                              Subunits go into the final assault moving at maxi-
                                                           mum possible speed.
Combined Tank and Motorized Rifle Assault _ __

          The most probable array is:                       Combined Arms Tactics
          • Line of tanks                                     The essence of the attack and final assault is
          • Line of dismounted infantry                    combined arms cooperation based on the close and
          • Line of BMPs or BTRs                           uninterrupted interaction of all forces to best exploit
                          or                               their capabilities. Each arm provides strength and
          • Line of tanks                                  protection where another arm is weak or vulnerable.
          • Line of BMPs or BTRs                              The Soviets believe the tank is the major ground
                                                           force weapon. The tank is the keystone of combined
   Dismounted riflemen follow closely behind tanks.        arms cooperation in the attack Concern for the enemy
The BTRs or BMPs normally remain within 100 to 400         antitank threat is the dominating factor in coordinating
meters behind tanks and fire through gaps between          the combined arms effort. For this reason, Soviet tanks
tanks. If the terrain is rugged or heavily wooded,         normally carry more high explosive (HE) rounds than
motorized rifle subunits might lead the assault.           antitank (AT) rounds.
  A first echelon battalion may have a section or             Tank fires are directed by tank company
platoon (two or four) of self-propelled antiaircraft       commanders and platoon leaders. An entire tank
guns (ZSU) attached. The ZSUs follow approximately         company may engage an area target with salvo fire.
400 meters behind attacking manelWer elements, with        Tank platoons engage area or point targets at the direc-
150 to 250 meters between vehicles.                        tion of platoon leaders. Platoon leaders direct fires by
  Minefields are breached by a combination of-             visual signals, radio, and designation with tracer
 • Tanks with mine rollers and plows.                      rounds.
 • line charges.                                              Motorized rifle subunit fires are directed primarily
 • Sappers.                                                against enemy personnel and antitank weapons.
 • Artillery fire.                                         Artillery attached to motorized rifle battalions may
FM 100-2-1

initially be used for indirect fire then revert to direct      If required to repel counterattacks, part of the attack
fire from the immediate rear of assaulting maneuver         force meets the counterattack head on while the main
subunits.                                                   strength of the attacking unit strikes the counterattack
   Consistent with . their principle of doing the           on the flanks and in the rear. Artillery fires are called for
unexpected to surprise the enemy, the Soviets would         immediately. Regimental or division antitank reserves
attack through difficult terrain against lightly defended   move forward to lay down a base of fire and lay hasty
or undefended areas. Attacks by motorized rifle             minefields. If necessary, the attacking force may
subunits along forest trails or ridge lines are likely.     temporarily take up the defense to defeat counter-
  ]be bulk of responsibility for neutralization of          attacks, then resume the attack. The chart below
antitank weapons fallS upon artillery. The massive,         identifies combined arms tactics.
continuous artillery fires in the attack would be
extremely intense. Even if enemy antitank weapons are       Penetration by First Echelon. When a first
not destroyed, the Soviets expect the enemy gunners         echelon regiment's battalions have achieved a major
to be forced to keep their heads down.                      penetration, the area of penetration will be widened
  After penetrating the forward edge of an enemy            for exploitation by second echelon forces or, if still
defense, the Soviets strive to attack further into the      capable, first echelon battalions will continue the
depths of the defensive position. Enemy strongpoints        attack into the enemy depth. Battalions may revert to
that cannot be reduced immediately may be b}passed.         prebattle formation and advance rapidly to deny
   If strongpoints cannot be b}passed, they are             enemy movement of reserves and to prevent the
attacked, preferably from their flanks or rear. Close and   organization of the defense on new positions.
continuing fire support by massed fires is employed.           The Soviets expect a defending enemy to attempt to
Smoke is used, as well as flame weapons, against            rapidly assess the direction and weight ofa main attack
strongpoints.                                               and to allocate available forces to defeat the attack.

Soviet Combined Arms Tactics (Who does what to whom?) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

       ARM                                                     MAJOR TASKS: DEFEAT ENEMY-

       MOTORIZED RiFlE                                         Antitank Weapons
                                                               Infantry Fighting Vehicles

       ATTACK HELICOPTERS                                      Tanks
                                                               Infantry Fighting Vehicles
                                                               Antitank Weapons

       REGIMENTAL AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS                          Attack Helicopters
                                                               Fixed-Wing Aircraft

                                                                                                               FM 100-2-1

Therefore, as the first echelon battalions move to               remain in prebattle or march formation for ease of
deeper objectives, the regimental commander stays                control and speed, unless confronted by a stubborn
particularly alert for enemy counterattacks.                     enemy defense.
  A first echelon regiment which has successfully                   Intensified reconnaissance, artillery and air strikes,
penetrated the enemy forward defenses may establish              and rapid ground attacks are employed to locate and
and secure the gap through which the division follow-            destroy enemy nuclear delivery systems and reserves.
on force will attack. The first echelon regiment also               If enemy defenses are stronger than anticipated and
could be used as a forward detachment to move ahead              cannot be penetrated, second echelon or reserve
of the division to seize important objectives in depth.          forces may be committed earlier. If, however, first
Often such actions take place in coordination with               echelon forces succeed in penetrating enemy forward
heliborne forces. Regiments may send out forward                 defenses and are capable of continuing toward deeper
detachments of battalion strength. An independent                objectives, second echelon or reserve forces may not
tank battalion of a motorized rifle division is likely to be     be committed until much later in the battle.
used as a forward detachment.                                       Assuming the division commander commits his
                                                                 second echelon or reserve on the axis of the most suc-
Commitment of Second Echelon or Reserves.                        cessful penetration and the attack continues success-
The division second echelon or combined arms                     fully, this penetration could be developed further by
reserve is ideally committed upon achievement of the             the parent army's commitment of its follow-on forces.
division's immediate objective. This commitment must             Additional divisions could be committed on a widen-
take place before the momentum of the advance                    ing and ever deepening rapid penetration and exploita-
decreases.                                                       tion This is the fundamental concept behind achieve-
   The commander of a second echelon or combined                 ment of an operational "breakthrough".
arms reserve regiment normally is collocated with the
division commander. This enables him to keep abreast
of the battle as it develops. It also Simplifies the division    THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT
commander's task of amplifying or assigning the
mission of the second echelon or reserve when he                  Objectives and Characteristics
decides to commit it to the battle. The commitment of               The Soviets define the meeting engagement as
the division second echelon or reserve is usually                follows:
marked by an intensification of reconnaissance
activity, artillery fire, air strikes, and the use of smoke to      A clash between opposing. sides when they are
screen the force from enemy observation.                            simultaneously striving to fulfill assigned
   A second echelon· or reserve regiment converges in               missions by means of offensive actions. A
battalion march columns toward the penetration. It                  meeting engagement is characterized by
may remain in battalion columns for the sake of speed               obscurity of the situation and by abrupt changes
if enemy resistance has been minimized. Otherwise,                  in it ... by rapid changes in ... formations.
battalions assume prebattle formation or, if required
by enemy dispoSitions, assume attack formation.                                 Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military ferms
Ideally, the regiment passes through developed pene-
trations to drive swiftly into the enemy rear to seize
deep objectives.                                                    The objectives of the meeting engagement are
   The division commander constitutes a combined                 destruction of the enemy's forces, seizure of key ter-
arms reserve from first echelon forces or uncommitted            rain to insure favorable conditions for future opera-
combat assets as soon as the original follow-on force is         tions, and continuation of the advance.
committed. Surviving pockets of resistance are                      The meeting engagement may occur under widely
attacked by follow-on forces or are destroyed by                 differing ci1cumstances, either offensive or defensive.
concentrated fires of artillery and aviation, including          The circumstances· in turn influence its organization
attack helicopters.                                              and conduct. There are four likely circumstances at the
   Hastily occupied positions in the enemy rear are              beginning of war: when the defender is advancing to
attacked from the march in mounted formations. A                 forward positions; after penetrating enemy forward
dismounted attack may be required due to the                     defenses, in a clash with advancing reserves; during
presence of minefields or a density of antitank                  pursuit; and during counterattack. These circum-
weapons. As a basic rule, exploitation units attempt to          stances are illustrated on the next page.
FM 100-2-1

Circumstances Under Which a Meeting Engagement May Occur _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

  BEGINNING OF A WAR                                           AFTER PENETRATION OF
                                                               ENEMY'S FORWARD DEFENSES

  Could also occur at the outset of any attack when opposing     Would involve the penetrating force meeting the defender's
  forces are not in initial contact, and both assume the         advancing reserve elements.

  DURING PURSUIT                                                DURING COUNTERATTACK

  Meeting engagement likely during counterattack by either       Strong probability that the counterattacking force could be
  side.                                                          met head-on or from the flanks by the enemy.

   Because, in the Soviet view, an offensive generally           The Soviets do not look upon the meeting
develops unevenly over a wide front, meeting engage-           engagement as a purely chance occurrence.
ments are characterized by-
 • Intense combat over a wide front with consider-               One of the most important tendencies in the
able room to maneuver.                                           development of the meeting engagement ... is
 • Extremely limited planning time, resulting in                 the ever greater tendency for early initiation of
heavy reliance on battle drills.                                 the meeting engagement instead of its acci-
 • Continuous effort to seize and maintain the                   dental rising. As a result of ... the depths of
initiative.                                                      action of modern reconnaissance . . . com-
 • Deployment into combat from the march at high                 manders of both sides, more often than not, will
speed.                                                           already have some indication of the strength and
 • Uncertainty due to lack of detailed intelligence.             firepower of the enemy far before the meeting.
 • Sudden changes in the situation                               The decision for the meeting engagement will be
 • Open flanks on each side.                                     taken as a result of real assessment ...
 • Both sides seeking advantageous maneuver room.
 • The rapid approach of the opposing forces.                                   A. I. Radzievskiy
 • An unclear and fluid situation.                                              Tactics in Combat Examples-Regiment

                                                                                                       FM 100-2-1

                                                           Organization of the March
   Soviet commanders are trained to anticipate a              The organization of a march formation anticipating a
meeting engagement, to identify a likely point of          meeting engagement varies with the situation. The
contact, to choose terrain, and to take the initiative.    general organization for a march when enemy contact
They believe that the side which aggressively seizes the   is possible is described in Section I of this chapter. A
initiative with fire and maneuver will win the meeting     more detailed description of such a march formation
engagement.                                                follows, using a reinforced motorized rifle regiment as
   The commander anticipating a meeting engagement         an example. (The BTR-equipped motorized rifle regi-
must consider these factors in his planning and            ment is u~ed as an example because it is the most
decision making:                                           numerous type of maneuver regiment. The description
 • Continuous and thorough reconnaissance from his         also applies to BMP and tank regiments, with substitu-
own reconnaissance means and the correct interpre-         tions or deletions of subunits based on organizational
tation and use of reconnaissance information               differences. See PM 100-2-3.)
furnished from higher levels.                                 A regiment conducting a march usually is preceded
 • The requirement for speed in his troop leading          by its organic reconnaissance company, out to about
procedures-the making and transmitting of                  25 kilometers, and possibly by elements of the division
decisions.                                                 reconnaissance battalion, out to about 50 kilometers.
 • Anticipation of enemy air· and artillery strikes,       These elements attempt to avoid enemy contact and to
nuclear or nonnuclear, and the use of such information     obtain as much information as possible on the enemy.
in gaining fire superiority.                                  The advance guard of a motorized rifle regiment
 • Achievement of the initiative through immediately       usually consists of a motorized rifle battalion rein-
responsive deployment of maneuver forces.                  forced with artillery, tanks, air defense, engineer, and
 • Adequate flank and rear security.                       chemical elements.

Soviet Concept of the Meeting Engagement _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                       -- -

FM 100-2-1

   The advance guard has the tasks of-                     threat comes from the flank, artillery and tanks may be
 • Insuring that the main force moves unhindered.          placed in the middle of the column.
  • Insuring suitable conditions for the commitment
of the main force.                                         Typical Composition
  • Warning the main force of surprise attack.             of Advanced Guard Main Body - - - - - - - -
  • Preventing the penetration of the main force by
enemy reconnaissance.
   The advance guard dispatches a forward security           • Motorized rifle battalion commander, staff,
                                                             artillery commander.
element (FSE), which in its tum dispatches a combat
reconnaissance patrol (CRP).                                 • Signal platoon.
   The combat reconnaissance patrol is a fighting            • Antitank platoon.
patrol consisting of a motorized rifle platoon aug-          • Antiaircraft section.
mented with chemical/radiation and engineer recon-           • Artillery battalion (minus 1 battery with the
naissance personnel. The mission of the patrol is to
provide prompt information on the enemy's strength,          • Tank company (minus 1 platoon with the FSE).
composition, and direction of movement. The patrol           • Two motorized rifle companies.
attempts to penetrate and report on the enemy main           • Rear, including medical post.
body. The patrol also reports information on routes,
the radiological and chemical situation, and the nature      The main force, about two thirds of the combat
of the terrain.                                            power of the regiment, maneuvers to destroy enemy
   The forward security element ( called the "advance      forces that cannot be quickly overcome by the advance
party" in some texts) is normally a motorized rifle        guard. The composition of the main force may vary.
company reinforced with tanks, artillery, mortars,
engineers, and chemical defense. The mission of the
FSE, moving up to 10 kilometers behind the CRP, is to      Typical Composition of Main Force - - - - - -
advance at maximum speed and to engage lead enemy
elements. Through use of its mobility and fire power, it     • Regimental commander, staff, fire support
seizes and holds a position advantageous for subse-          commanders.
quent commitment of the advance guard main body.             • Antitank battery.
   The advance guard main body constitutes the bulk          • Antiaircraft artillery and missile battery
of the combat power of the advance guard.                    (minus elements with advance guard).
   The advance guard main body has the mission of            • Artillery battalion.
either eliminating enemy opposition, permitting              • Tank battalion (minus one company with
continuation of the march, or fixing the enemy force to      advance guard).
permit a flank attack by the main force. Artillery and       • Two motorized rifle battalions.
tanks are habitually placed forward in the column. If a      • Rear.

Elements of March Formation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~-----------

           , . . . . - - - - - - ADVANCE GUARD

 RECON      COMBAT        FORWARD                ADVANCE GUARD                                          REAR
 PATROLS    RECON         SECURITY               MAIN BODY                                              SECURITY
            PATROL        ELEMENT                                            . . FLANK SECURITY

                                                                                                                                    FM 100-2-1

  Elements of the regimental engineer company                                  division, army, or front assets.
(minus elements in the advance guard) are dispersed                               Rear security elements of up to platoon strength
throughout the formation. The signal company and                               normally are positioned up to 3 kilometers from the
chemical defense company (minus) are probably in                               advance guard and the main force. Depending on the
the middle or rear of the formation.                                           enemy threat, flank security elements of up to platoon
  In addition, there may be additional engineer,                               strength are dispatched up to 3 kilometers from the
antiaircraft, artillery, and signal support furnished from                     column.

Typical March Formation of a Reinforced Motorized Rifle Regiment (STR)
In Anticipation of a Meeting Engagement _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                       ~                    <J            <J            <J       <J
                                           MR MR
                                           PLT SOD

                                               COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PATROL
                                                                                                           "    \


                   I' - -                  ---                                                             ./

                                 MR CO
                                                 <J <J ~
                                                           PLT (-)
                                                                                                           <J <J
                                 TK PLT                                                                      PLT (-)

                                                     FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT                                                        I
        ,. -                     -         -                                                                                -
     ,L ....a                                              -III   =        -+K>-
           BTRV         AT PLT         AA                     ARTY             TK CO
                                                                                                - 1100

                                                                                                 MR CO
                                                                                                                • 1100

                                                                                                                MR CO
            HO                       SECTION                   BN
                                                                               (-PLT)                                           SERVICES
                                                              ADVANCE GUARD                                                                     /
 (-            - - -                       -                                                                                               /


                                 -+ AA
                                                                      -'" =
                                                                                               MR BN
                                                                                               TK CO
                                                                                                                        MR BN
                                                                                                                        TK CO

                                                                     MAIN FORCE
FM 100-2-1

Initial Phase
   The initial phase of the meeting engagement is that         At the time of initial contact, the advance guard main
period of combat from the time of enemy encounter by         body is moving in march column 5 to 10 kilometers
the leading element (the combat reconnaissance               behind the FSE. The commander-
patrol) up to the commitment into battle of the main          • Defines the plan for engagement.
force. The initial phase is carried out by the elements of    • Issues orders to the commanders of the CRP and
the advance guard. The subsequent employment of the          FSE.
main force depends on the outcome of the initial              • Moves forward, with the artillery commander, at
phase.                                                       maximum speed to an observation point.
  With current reconnaissance capabilities, the initial       • Issues orders for the deployment of the advance
enemy encounter by the CRP should not be a complete          guard main force.
surprise. Rather, the use of reconnaissance reporting         • Launches the attack.
may permit employment of long-range fires, both
artillery and air, to inflict damage on the enemy and to
delay his advance. A one hour delay could permit the         Buildup of Firepower
further advance of the march column by 25 to 30              (Advanced Guard) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
  The actions of the elements of the advance guard are          Time: +60 minutes
indicated on the following pages. The buildup of major
weapons, based on the typical organization described            Soviet Forces Now Committed:
above, is also shown.                                           31 BTRs
   Upon contact, actions of the CRP are to-                     13 Tanks
 • Report contact to advance guard commander.                   6 Mortars, 120-mm
 • Attempt to penetrate to enemy main force,                    18 Howitzers, 122-mm
bypassing his advance elements.                                 2 Antiaircraft Guns
 • Perform chemical and engineer reconnaissance.                4 ATGMs
 • Collect all information on the enemy that will
expedite the commanders decision.                               As the forward elements of the advance guard
                                                             encounter the enemy, the regimental commander is at
                                                             or near the head of his main force, some 20 to 30 kmto
Buildup of Firepower (CRP) - - - - - - - - -                 the rear of the advance guard. This deliberate spacing
                                                             is calculated to give the commander about 2 hours for
  Time: 0 minutes                                            planning and execution of his battle.

  Soviet Forces Committed: 3 BTRs
                                                             Deployment of Main Force
  Actions of the FSE, moving in column behind the               When the advance guard becomes engaged, the
CRP by up to 10 kilometers, are to-                          main force continues its forward movement. The
 • Advance at maximum speed.                                 deployment of the main force depends on the outcome
 • Engage the enemy with all weapons.                        of advance guard action. Four possible outcomes of
 • Develop the fight                                         advance guard action are shown below:
 • Seize and hold a position until arrival of the             • Attack by FSE and/or advance guard is successful.
advance guard main body.                                      • Advance guard achieves no immediate success.
                                                              • Enemy forces deny further offensive action by
                                                             advance guard.
Buildup of Firepower (FSE) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __                 • Advance guard is unable to hold the enemy.
                                                                Possible outcomes for this advance guard are
  Time: +20 minutes                                          illustrated on the next page.
                                                                When the outcomes of the advance guard action
  Soviet Forces Now Committed:                               require deployment of the main force, the commander
  10 BTRs                                                    decides what form of maneuver to use. There are three
  4 Tanks                                                    basic choices:
  6 Mortars, 120-mm                                           • Envelopment - A deep maneuver, executed
  6 Howitzers, 122-mm                                        through gaps or from an open flank, requiring the
                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

Possible Outcomes of Advance Guard
Action in a Meeting Engagement - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    • Enemy element destroyed.
    • Advance guard resumes march.
    • Main force of regiment does not deploy.

    • Advance guard continues attack.
    • Main force continues march forward and prepares to

   • Advance guard shifts to defense.
   • Main force deploys and attacks.

    • Main force defends on the best available terrain.
    • Advance guard withdraws and joins the defense.
    • Follow-on division forces are committed to attack.
    • Division assumes defense if enemy force is too large to

enemy to tum and fight in a new direction. The double           should provide covered or concealed routes for the
envelopment involves a deep maneuver around both                enveloping force, open ground for deployment, and
flanks.                                                         good fields of fire. The area adjacent to the original
  • Flank attack - A more shallow maneuver, which               route of advance must be 3 to 5 kilometers wide for an
may be executed through gaps or breaches.                       envelopment by a battalion-sized advance guard
 • Frontal attack - A direct maneuver against enemy             Envelopment by a regimental-sized main force
defenses, most often conducted with an envelopment              requires an area 10 to 15 kilometers wide.
or a flank attack                                                 The Soviets consider the major contributing factors
  The envelopment and the flank attack are the                  to a successful envelopment to be-
preferred forms of maneuver. However, in some cases              • Effective real-time intelligence and counterintelli-
the frontal attack is required.                                 gence capability.
  The time available to execute a maneuver may be a              • Effective utilization of terrain.
major factor in the commander's selection of a form of           • Coordination between forces.
maneuver. If an envelopment occurs, space could be               • Appreciation of enemy tactics and capabilities.
the controlling factor. Terrain must be trafficable and          • Capable, ingenious leadership and staff work
FM 100-2-1

Follow-on Forces
   The preceding description of the meeting engage-           of combat. There are many other possibilities as forma-
ment focuses on the actions of a motorized rifle regi-        tions move on a fluid battlefield and encounter one
ment. Unless such a regiment has been assigned an             another. The meeting engagement will not always
independent mission, such as pursuit or acting as a           unfold in the sequence of encounters by recon-
forward detachment, it is marching as part of a division      naissance elements, advance elements, and main
force. Consequently, the development of battle might          bodies. Neither will it always begin with a head-to-
require the commitment of the follow-on elements of           head· meeting; it may arise from direct encounter by
the division. The procedures are substantially the same       main bodies, or from oblique encounters.
as in the example of the lead regiment.                          Whatever the patterns and condition, the Soviet
   Before his lead regiment is fully engaged, the             formula for a successful meeting engagement requires
division commander's forward command post                     smprise, rapid and decisive maneuver, and concen-
normally is near the head of the main division force and      trated preemptive fires against the enemy.
most likely with the next following regiment. He
monitors the action of the lead regiment and, after its
engagement, moves his command group to the best               PURSUIT
~ocation to control subsequent deployments.                    The Soviets define the pursuit as follows:
   The Soviets believe that the disadvantage of a hastily
planned attack is more than offset by the advantage of a        An attack on a withdrawing enemy. undertaken
quick strike against the enemy before he has sufficient         in the course of an operation or battle for the
time for his own preparation. Division follow-on forces         purpose of finally destroying or capturing his
can be fully engaged in less than three hours after the         forces. Destruction of a withdrawing enemy is
lead regiment's main force is engaged.                          achieved by hitting his main body with (fire)
   The employment of division follow-on forces is               strikes. by relentless and energetic parallel or
dictated by the progress of the initial actions of the lead     frontal pursuit. by straddling his withdrawal
regiment and is shown below.                                    route. and by ... attacking his flanks and rear.
  The division's actions in a meeting engagement have
been portrayed as a sequential, front-to-rear unfolding                     Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms

Employment of Division Follow-on Forces - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

   SUCCESSFUL ATTACK                                             LEAD REGIMENT FORCED TO ESTABLISH
   BY THE LEAD REGIMENT                                          HASTY DEFENSE
   • Lead regiment exploits success or resumes                   • Lead regiment holds pending arrival and
   march.                                                        deployment of follow-on forces.
   • Follow-on regiments initiate pursuit or                     • Follow-on forces counterattack and attempt to
   resume march on one or multiple routes.                       envelop enemy. If successful. subsequent
   • Depending on the assigned mission and                       actions are as above.
   degree of success. units could consolidate posi-              • Follow-on forces may be required to augment
   tions and await orders. or resume march in new                defense.
                                                                 LEAD REGIMENT UNABLE TO CONTAIN
   • Lead regiment attacks enemy defenses and.                   • Follow-on forces conduct counterattack. If
   by fixing enemy force. facilitates commitmentof               successful and the enemy withdraws, exploita-
   division follow-on forces.                                    tion or pursuit is initiated; alternatively they may
   • Depending on availability of maneuver space                 consolidate the position, regroup, and later
   and size of enemy force. follow-on regiments                  resume march.
   flank or envelop enemy.                                       • Follow-on forces establish defensive posi-
   • If follow-on forces succeed. exploitation or                tions to or through which the lead regiment
   pursuit are carried out. Alternatively. the posi-             withdraws.
   tion may be consolidated. forces regrouped. and               • Division holds pending commitment of army
   the march resumes.                                            follow-on forces.

                                                                                                           FM 100-2-1

     Pursuit features swift and deep movements offorces           Active reconnaissance, appreciation of enemy
  to strike the enemy's most vulnerable areas. 1bree           tactics, and knowledge of the current tactical situation
  basic requirements for successful pursuit are planning       are essential in obtaining indicators of enemy with-
  and organization, detection ofwithdrawal, and mainte-        drawal. Signs of preparation for withdrawal include-
  nance of high tempo.                                          • Nuclear strikes against first echelon attacking
     By definition, a pursuit occurs when the enemy            formations.
  withdraws. An enemy could be forced to withdraw-              • Intensified movement to the rear, especially
   • As a result of a meeting engagement.                      artillery and reserves.
   • After a penetration of his defensive position.             • Increase in fires in individual sectors of the front.
   • Following a nuclear strike.                                • Conduct of heavy fIfe concentrations in separate
     An enemy may deliberately withdraw-                       areas which apparently are not in accord with the
   • When threatened with encirclement.                        developing situation and at a time when there appears
   • If he is making a redistribution of forces.               to be a general reduction of fires.
   • When he attempts to draw the opposing side into a          • Intensified reconnaissance.
. kill zone.                                                    • Preparations for demolitions and/or destruction
   • When he withdraws for safety before launching a           of facilities, installations, and equipment.
  nuclear strike.                                               • Limited local counterattacks.
     Normally, a regimental commander is the lowest              Once pursuit has been initiated, its success depends
  command level to order initiation ofpursuit. However,       on the maintenance of a high rate of advance with con-
  commanders at all levels are expected to move inde-         tinuous application of force.
  pendently into pursuit when indicators of withdrawal           The forms of pursuit are frontal, parallel, and
  are seen.                                                   combination frontal and parallel. The preferred and
     The scale of a pursuit is governed by the size of the    most effective form is combination frontal and parallel.
  force involved and is categorized as-                          The frontal pursuit is conducted by forces in
   • Tactical pursuit - Conducted by a regiment or a          contact. It is the most likely type of pursuit at the very
  division. In the case of a regiment, pursuit would          beginning of the enemy withdrawal, at night, in diffi-
  probably begin about 10 to 20 Ian in the enemy depths;      cult terrain, when overcoming obstacles, or when off-
  in the case of a division, from 20 to 30 km.                road maneuver is limited. Frontal pursuit applies
   • Operational pursuit - Conducted by army or               constant pressure on the enemy. It limits his freedom
  higher headquarters on a broad front; may extend to a       of maneuver, his ability to take up defensive positions,
  depth of several hundred kilometers.                       .and his ability to disengage. The aim ofa frontal pursuit
     Tentative planning for pursuit is included in the        is to force the enemy to deploy and to accept combat
  initial attack plan. The amount of detail in such           under unfavorable conditions, and to delay the with-
  planning depends on the anticipated actions of the          drawal. Maneuver and flank attacks, though limited, are
  enemy, the battle formation of attacking troops, and        conducted. The frontal pursuit normally is not decisive
  the amount of planning time available.                      since it only pushes the enemy back on his approach-
                                                              ing reserves.
                                                                 In the parallelpursui~ the pursuit force advances on
 Planning Considerations For Pursuit - - - - - -              routes parallel to the withdrawing enemy. High-speed
                                                              parallel pursuit may permit either attack on the
                                                              enemy's flank or cutting his main withdrawal routes.
   • Possible enemy routes of withdrawal.                     Under threat of flank attack, the enemy may be
   • The scheme of maneuver.                                  reqUired to split his force and delay withdrawal while
   • Availability and condition of pursuit routes.            defending against the pursuer's attacks. Unless accom-
   • Forces available.                                        panied by frontal pursuit, this method gives the enemy
   • Critical terrain features (high ground, road             some opportunity to maneuver and counterattack.
   junctions, river crossings, bridges, defiles).                In thecombinationfrontalandparallelpursuit, the
   • The use of forward detachments and heli-                 main pursuit force moves parallel to the withdrawing
   copter assault forces.                                     enemy. A smaller force pursues directly, maintaining
   • Allocation of nuclear weapons and delivery               constant contact with the enemy. The combination
   systems.                                                   form has the advantages of both frontal and parallel
   • Combat support and combat service support               pursuit. It hinders disengagement, leads to flank
   resources.                                                 attacks, and cuts the enemy's withdrawal routes.
FM 100-2-1

FormsofPu~uit        ___________________________________________________________________

  Used at initial enemy
  withdrawal to-
  • Pressure the enemy.
  • Limit maneuverability.
  • Delay withdrawal.
  • Force enemy to deploy.

  High speed pursuit to-
  • Permit flank attack.
  • Cut off withdrawal

  Combines both methods of
  pursuit to maintain high
  rate of advance with con-
  tinual force to hinder dis-
  engagement and cut with-
  drawal routes.

   The .Soviets believe that a timely and correct             taken to insure maintenance of contact. Artillery fire
decision to initiate pursuit is critical to its success. If   and air strikes harass and disrupt the enemy's with-
the enemy is able to begin an undetected withdrawal,          drawal. In the initial phase, tank and motorized rifle
he avoids the constant pressure that disrupts his             pursuit groups attempt to take up routes parallel to the
action. Further, if the enemy can gain a safe distance of     enemy withdrawal route. This helps establish the
withdrawal, the attacking forces are vulnerable to            combination frontal and parallel method of pursuit.
tactical nuclear strikes.                                       Units in contact initiate frontal pursuit immediately
  The enemy will attempt to withdraw at an                    on detection of withdrawal, moving in whatever
advantageous time, usually at night. Timely actions are       formation they have at the moment. As the situation
                                                                                                       FM 100-2-1

 permits, they reform into march or prebattle               reconnaissance reporting, seizure of critical points on
 formation, and then into attack formation when             withdrawal routes, destruction of the enemy's means
 required                                                   of nuclear attack, and link up with tactical airborne or
   The actions of the frontal pursuit force are aimed at    helibome landings.
facilitating the commitment of a parallel pursuit force,       Heliborne or airborne forces may be assigned
which is preferably tank heavy. The parallel force, with    missions similar to those described for forward detach-
 security elements in the lead, also uses march or pre-     ments. Vertical envelopment permits operations much
 battle formations until deployment for the attack is       deeper into enemy territory;
 required                                                     When pursuit is initiated, the parallel pursuit force
   In pursuit the commander attempts to employ the          normally is formed from uncommitted second echelon
 maximum available combat troops. Pursuit is con-           elements. The control of artillery is decentralized to
ducted in a wide zone - up to 30 km for a division. The    maneuver battalions. Batteries and even individual
commander retains the tactical options to converge on      guns move with lead elements to deliver direct fire.
the most important axis or to the effort on a    Artillery elements also are a normal component of
new axis. This flexibility also is required when           forward detachments.
engaging advancing enemy reserves or counterattack            During pursuit, artillery missions include fire on
forces.                                                    columns and concentrations at road junctions, defiles,
   Centralized planning and decentralized execution        bridges, and crossings. They also include repulse of
characterize the pursuit. Preservation of control is a     enemy counterattacks, destruction or delay of enemy
primary concern in such a fast-moving situation. At the    reserves, and destruction of enemy means of nuclear
same time, the Soviets attempt to disrupt the enemy's      attack.
command and control, as an integral part of destruc-          Air support complements other fire support in the
tive pursuit. Continuity of their own control is           destruction and disorganization of the retreating
achieved by-                                               enemy, particularly mobile targets. The situation
  • Designating the direction of advance, routes or        during the course of a pursuit may become obscure.
zones of advance, phase lines, and objectives.             Consequently, air reconnaissance is an import;mt
  • Fixing times for completion of specific missions.      factor in insuring the success of the pursuit.
  • Altering missions as subsequent developments
  • Augmenting normal radio communications with            Air Support During Pursuit - - - - - - - - - -
aerial relays.
  • Using two command groups. The commander will              AIR RECONNAISSANCE IS
be at an observation post behind the leading combat           USED TO DETERMINE-
elements. The second group, headed by the chief of
staff, will be with the main force.                           • The beginning of the withdrawal of rear area
  • Designating the phase lines from which the                forces.
artillery must be prepared to fire by specified times.        • The composition of withdrawing forces and
   As the pursuit is developed, reconnaissance                direction of movement.
elements provide information on the disposition of            • The composition and direction of movement of
retreating enemy formations and on the forward move-          reserve force moving forward.
ment of his reserves. Because of the potential depth of       • The nature of obstacles and intermediate
the operation, aerial reconnaissance may be the               defensive positions.
primary means of identifying significant threats to
pursuit forces. This intelligence is vital at the stage
when a pursuit force faces the risk of becoming over-        The actions of the pursuing force, in conjunction
extended It could be the basis for termination of the      with forward detachments and air-landed forces,
pursuit.                                                   act to create nuclear targets. Priority nuclear targets
   Before or during the course of pursuit, forward         include-
detachments may be designated to move ahead of main         • Approaching reserves.
pursuit forces and to operate independently to out-         • Main groupings of retreating force.
distance withdrawing enemy forces. These detach-            • Enemy concentrations at critical areas (bridges,
ments avoid combat until they reach their assigned         road junctions, deilles).
objective area. Their missions may include concurrent       • Means of nuclear attack.
FM 100-2-1

Soviet Tactical Pursuit (Attack of a Withdrawing Enemy) - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                                                                          - --

                                                                                                                      ..,      --

                                                                                             /                            /
                                                                           \                                          /
                                                                               \         /
                                                                               ~~  v~                ~~
                                                                               ~~?I-                     A.
                                                                                                                              MR BN
                                               TK BN 1-)                           ~     ENEMY FORCE                      • 11100
                                           \ . ~KCo

                                                                                       TKcoi                  \TKCo

                                                       ~-?()                                 \                 \
                                                                                   --            \            0',

                                                                            ---           _\~,
                                                                                          PARALLEL PURSUIT

   Movement support detachments and mobile                            sustaining pursuit is the requirement that, in a large
obstacle detachments provided by engineer troops are                  scale offensive, a tank division with reinforcing trans-
instrumental in sustaining the rate of advance. In the                portation units should be self-sufficient for up to five
initial phase, their missions include operating from                  days.
forward positions to breach obstacles and minefields.                    The pursuit is terminated on order of the next
In the course of the pursuit, their mission is to provide             higher commander. Conditions under which pursuit is
bridging and road repairs and to block withdrawal                     terminated include the following:                      .
routes of bypassed units with mines, demolitions, and                  • The enemy has been destroyed.
obstacles.                                                             • The pursuing force has outdistanced its logistic
  With maximum commitment of forces,                                  support.
requirements for fuel, ammunition, and maintenance                     • The pursuing force has become overextended and
increase. Priority oflogistics is given to units having the           is in danger of being cut off.
greatest success. The depth of pursuit is governed by                  • The advantage no longer belongs to the pursuing
the capability for logistic support. One yardstick for                force.

   Soviets consider the offensive as the only means to     availability of resources do not favor resuming the
achieve decisive victory. However, defensive doctrine      offense in that sector.
has not been totally overlooked. Grounded in the his-         The defense at front and army levels may involve the
tories ofWorld War II and the great defensive battles of   entire formation during the initial stage of hostility
Stalingrad, Moscow, and Kursk, the Soviets have            where an enemy attacks across international borders,
developed a doctrine that is mindful of recent techno-     or in a sector where no offensive action is planned.
logical developments such as ATGMs and nuclear             Usually only part of the formation is on the defense
weapons. Stated reasons for assuming the defense           while the rest takes offensive action.
are-                                                          During World War II, entire theaters were on the
 • To consolidate gains.                                   defense. Extremely dense defenses sometimes were
 • To await additional resources when temporarily          developed, consisting of three or more static defensive
halted by the enemy during the course of an offensive.     belts with the majority of the combat forces deployed
 • To protect the flanks of a formation or a seacoast.     in the first defensive belt.
 • To repulse an enemy counterthrust.                         The development of nuclear weapons required
 • To regroup after severe losses suffered from            modification of this concept and increased the
nuclear weapons.                                           importance of a security echelon and a reserve.
 • To free resources for other units that are on the       Modern defensive doctrine at front and army levels
offensive.                                                 stresses defense in depth; but rather than multiple con-
 • To await logistic support.                              tinuous belts, the defensive area consists of clusters of
                                                           strongpoints. At both front and army levels, the key is
  The Soviets define the defense as follows:               stubborn defense of the forward area by motorized
                                                           rifle forces deployed in depth and decisive counter-
   A type of combat action conducted for the pur-          attacks by highly mobile, tank-heavy forces of a second
   pose of repulsing an attack mounted by superior         echelon and a reserve. The increased fluidity of combat
   enemy forces, causing heavy casualties, retain-         has required an increase in the size of reserves.
   ing important regions of terrain, and creating             The operational reserve and second echelon may
   favorable conditions for going over to a decisive       make up half of the force. While second echelon divi-
   offensive. Defense is based on strikes by nuclear       sions of an army will occupy defensive positions, their
   and all other types of weapons; on extensive            major tasks will be to counterattack and to destroy
   maneuver with firepower, forces, and weapons;           enemy forces penetrating the forward defenses.
   on counterattacks (or counterstrikes) with si-             It is the first echelon divisions that hold the forward
   multaneous stubborn retention of important              edge of the army and front defenses. It is at division
   regions which intercept the enemy direction of          level that we find all the principles of defense
   advance; and also on the extensive use of vari-         employed. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter
   ous obstacles. Defense makes it possible to gain        will examine the defense as conducted by a first
   time and to effect an economy in forces and             echelon division.
   weapons in some sectors, thereby creating con-
   ditions for an offensive in others.
                                                           CONCEPTS OF
                       Soviet Dictionary of                THE PREPARED DEFENSE
                       Basic Military Terms                  In organizing and establishing a prepared defense,
                                                           the Soviet commander considers the same factors
   In most of these cases, the defense is temporary and    addressed by a US commander:
leads to the resumption of the offense.                     • Mission
   The two major forms of the defense are the prepared      • Enemy
defense and the hasty defense (sometimes called             • Terrain
"defense in the course of the offense"). A hasty defense    • Troops
may tum into a prepared defense if conditions and           • Time
FM 100-2-1

                                                            Main Defensive Area
   In analyzing his mission, the commander determines          The main defensive area may appear as bands, belts,
what it is he must accomplish and for how long. The         or layers, but it is simply a defense in depth. The basic
destruction of an amphibious assault along the coast        element of the main defensive area is the company or
will require different measures than will the protec-       platoon strongpoint. This is established on terrain that
tion of an exposed flank.                                   is key to the defense and must be retained at all costs.
   The enemy and his weapon systems influence the           The subunit occupying the strongpoint prepares an all-         ,--
mix of weapons and the type and amount of prepara-          round defense with alternate and supplementary firing
tion required. Whether or not he is in contact makes a      positions for all weapons. Fires are planned to be
great difference to the defender.                           mutually supporting as well as provide for fire sacks.
   The terrain and vegetation also affect the force com-    Vehicles are dug in, and a network of communication
position and deployment. This includes consideration        trenches is constructed linking weapon positions with
of natural features such as high ground and other key       supply, command and control, and fighting positions.
terrain, rivers, and marshes.                               Everything that can be is dug in and given overhead
   The troops available for commitment to the defense       protection. Wire provides the primary means of com-
seriously affect the force dispositions.                    munication. Minefields, obstacles, and barriers are
   Finally, the amount of time available to establish the   emplaced and covered by fire. In addition, the Soviets
defense will temper all these considerations.               rely heavily on the use of maneuver by fire and fire
                                                            sacks to damage or destroy the enemy force.

Requirements for Establishing the Defense - - - -
                                                            Fire Sacks
  • The deployment and employment of a security                Maneuver by fire is the concentration of fires from
  echelon.                                                  many guns from dispersed firing positions. Fire is
  • The location and deployment of forces in a              concentrated on an advancing enemy in a sudden and
  main defensive area.                                      devastating strike or series of strikes. Fire sacks are
  • The location of "fire sacks" (kill zones) and           formed based on key terrain, enemy avenues of
  ambush sites.                                             approach, defensive strongpoints, obstacles and
  • Construction of minefields and obstacles.               barriers, and preplanned fires. (The RUSSian term for
  • The location, composition, and employment of            this defensive deployment translates to "fire sacks" and
  the reserve.                                              is so used herein.) Fire sacks are similar to the US con-
                                                            cept of a kill zone. Obstacles and barriers are planned
                                                            along the edge of the fire sack to contain the enemy
Security Echelon                                            force, and reserves are placed where they can counter-
   The security echelon or zone is that portion of the      attack into the "sack" after the fires are lifted to destroy
battlefield forward of the main defensive area. It is       any remaining enemy.
occupied by a force whose mission is to delay and              Fires are planned to cover all approaches to the posi-
deceive the enemy as to the location and deployment         tion. Finally the entire position is camouflaged. This
of the main defensive forces. The security force            may include the use of dummy positions to draw fire
engages the enemy at the longest possible range and         and to deceive the enemy as to the true location of the
attempts to cause him to deploy prematurely.                defenses.
   The security force's size and composition depend on         Strongpoints are linked with other strongpoints
those factors mentioned earlier. The zone may extend        until a defensive area or belt is formed. This occurs at
to a depth of 30 kilometers at army level and 15            every level, thus multiple belts are formed. Included in
kilometers at division level. It is at least far enough     and between these belts are headquarters, logistic
forward to prevent aimed direct fire from being placed      facilities, reserves, and combat support forces. Each of
on the main defensive area.                                 these elements is responsible for its own security.
   The security force deploys on the best terrain to
effect maximum damage to the attacking enemy.
Obstacles and barriers are used extensively. When           Minefields and Obstacles
faced with encirclement or decisive engagement, the            Minefields are placed forward of the defensive posi-
forces of the security zone attempt to withdraw under       tion to slow the enemy and to force him to concen-
cover of artillery fire and to return to the main defen-    trate. Fires are planned to attack these concentrations
sive area.                                                  and to prevent or delay breaching. Minefields are
                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

designed to break up the enemy's assault and to strip       reserves. Emphasis is placed on their use to defeat tank
away the infantry's supporting armor. They are also         penetrations or flanking maneuvers.
designed to force the enemy into areas where concen-           The reserve is positioned to undertake multiple mis-
trated fires of all weapons may be brought to bear.         sions: blocking, counterattacking, reinforcing. amd
Minefields within the main defensive area are placed to     providing rear area security.
confine the enemy within fire sacks and to make the
employment of the reserves easier.
   Besides preplanned minefields, the Soviets also          Counterattacks
employ hasty antitank minefields laid by engineer              Counterattacks are planned at every level for use if
mobile obstacle detachments, by mechanical mine-            the enemy succeeds in breaching forward defensive
layers, or by helicopter. Hastily laid minefields           positions. Commitment of this force requires the
normally are used with an antitank reserve to counter       authority of the next higher commander. With the
enemy tanks that may have penetrated the depths of          exception of first echelon battalions, whose reserve
the defense.                                                companies may have to conduct a frontal counter-
   Obstacles (including minefields) are used to slow,       attack, this force generally is launched from a flank.
disorganize, and canalize the enemy force. They are         Regimental and higher counterattacks normally are
used alone or with preplanned fire concentrations.          spearheaded by tanks, preceded by an intense air and
The use of natural obstacles is stressed; they include      artillery preparation, and supported by the fires of adja-
lakes, rivers, marshes, escarpments, and densely            cent units. A counterattack normally is conducted
forested areas. Artificial obstacles may include antitank   from the march. While tactical counterattacks usually
ditches, wire entanglements, abatis, and antiheliborne      are planned to restore the defenses, those at opera-
and antiairborne stakes.                                    tional level may be the opening phase of a

Anti- Tank Defense
   Antitank defense is essential to any defense and is of   CONCEPTS OF THE HASTY DEFENSE
great concern to Soviet tacticians. (See Chapter 10,           The writings of Soviet tacticians indicate that the
Antitank Support) The system of antitank (AT)               hasty defense will be more prevalent than the prepared
defense is composed of-                                     defense. They acknowledge that there may be diverse
  • Subunit strongpoints containing well-sited AT           situations in which the hasty defense must be estab-
weapons.                                                    lished. The force making the transition to the defense
  • Tank ambushes set up throughout the defense.            may be in contact with the enemy. If so, a limited attack
  • Antitank reserves placed to respond to enemy tank       could be required to gain defensible terrain. Con-
penetrations.                                               versely, it may be necessary to establish a defense to the
  • Tanks within the second echelon to bolster the          rear and withdraw to it. In any case, the nature of a
first echelon or to counterattack.                          hasty defense does not provide time for detailed
 • Mobile obstacle detachments. (See Chapter 14,            preparation.
Engineer Support.)                                             The same factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops
 • Artillery in the direct fire role, both in forward       available, and time available considered in a prepared
positions and from positions in the depths of the           defense are the primary considerations in establishing
defense.                                                    the hasty defense. They may differ in that-
 • Antitank oblitades covered by fire and comple-            • The mission of hasty defense is more transitory.
menting the maneuver of fires and forces.                    • The enemy situation is clearer, and attack is
 • Maneuver by antitank forces and weapons.                 imminent.
   Antitank guns and ATGMs are concentrated by               • The terrain may be unfavorable for organization of
platoon and battery. They employ multilayered cross-        a defense; it may be better suited for the attacker.
fires, long-range fires, and all-around fires. Coopera-      • Time will be short.
tion between guns and ATGM systems is considered
essential to adequate antitank defense. As with all
facets of combat, the integration of combined arms is       Reverse Slope Defense
considered paramount.                                         Establishing the defense when in contact with the
   Attack helicopters mounting rockets and antitank         enemy poses particular problems, since forces may
missiles are used as mobile, quick-reaction, antitank       have to dig in while under fire and observation of the
FM 100-2-1

 enemy. For this reason, a reverse slope defense is often    priority of support going to units selected to initiate
chosen. Part of the force is left in contact with the        offensive actions.
enemy on the forward slope( s), while the remainder
of the force prepares the position on the reverse
slope( s). The Soviets recognize the following               CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE
advantages of a reverse slope defense:                          At division level, the tactical defense is very
  • It hinders or prevents enemy observation of the          important and can be an integral part of a larger offen-
defensive pOSition.                                          sive operation. A typical Soviet response against a
  • Attacking forces will not be able to receive direct      counterattack is to place a division on the defense to
fire support from following forces.                          halt the attack while other divisions continue the
  • Enemy long-range antitank fires will be degraded.        advance.
  • Attacking enemy forces will be silhouetted on the
crest of the hill.
  • Engineer work can be conducted out of direct fire        Defensive Planning
and observation from the enemy.                                 In the Soviet view, the prepared defense is distin-
   A disadvantage is that the maximum range of all           guished from the hasty defense by the amount of time
weapon systems cannot be exploited. When possible,           and engineer support available for preparation of the
both forward and reverse slope defense are used to           defense. The types tend to merge as a function of time.
take maximum advantage of the terrain.                       The latter stages of a hasty defense may approximate
   When the force going over to the defensive is in          the early stages of a prepared defense. The prepared
contact with the enemy, it is extremely difficult to         defense is more detailed than the hasty defense, so this
establish a security echelon. If established, its depth is   section will deal mainly with it for descriptive
not nearly as great as in the prepared defense. Addi-        purposes.
tionally, long-range fires do not play the part they do in      Two fundamental considerations affect the division
the prepared defense because the opposing forces are,        commander's defensive planning. First, the defense
for the most part, within direct fire range. Deception is    should provide protection against nuclear weapons.
difficult to achieve, since friendly forces may be under     Defense under nuclear conditions demands disper-
direct observation of the enemy. Obstacles are               sion, deception, and field fortifications. The advent of
emplaced but are not as extensive as in the prepared         small-yield nuclear weapons has complicated the
defense.                                                     problem of dispersion. When the minimum yield of a
                                                             warhead was approximately 20 kilotons, disperSion
                                                             was achieved by maintaining intervals between bat-
Support Elements                                             talions. The development of warheads of less than I
   Differences in mission arise from the temporary           kiloton increased the need for dispersion so that now,
nature of a hasty defense. Normally, the primary objec-      according to the Soviets, company and platoon strong-
tive is to deny enemy access to a specific area.             points are the basis of the defense. Increased dis-
However, attrition of the enemy force is essential to        perSion leads to problems in fire support coordination
any defense. In many cases, defensive positions are          and troop control. Furthermore, a defense that is too
chosen to support resumption of offensive action             dispersed does not offer sufficient resistance to accom-
rather than for a prolonged defense.                         plish the defensive missions. As a result, the Soviets
   Combat support remains basically configured for           caution that dispersion must not be accomplished at
continued offensive action. Artillery groupings may be       the price of effective defense.
organized to support the next offensive phase.                  The second fundamental consideration is that the
   Engineer mobile obstacle detachments lay mine-            defense must be organized in sufficient depth to pro-
fields across critical avenues of approach. Maximum          vide effective fire and maneuver. The enemy must be
use is made of armored mine layers, armored engineer         engaged at as great a range as possible and must
vehicles, and dozer blades attached to tanks to prepare      continue to meet an ever-increasing volume of fire as
obstacles and hasty positions. Engineer works are            he nears the defensive positions. Fire support weapons
carried out in a sequence that insures readiness to          must be positioned so that they can shift their fires
repulse an enemy attack.                                     against threatened axes within the defensive position.
   Combat service support also remains configured to         To counterattack enemy penetrations, units deployed
support offensive action. Primary effort is devoted to       in the depth of the defense must be in position to
preparing units for future offensive actions, with           maneuver and concentrate rapidly.
                                                                                                                FM 100-2-1

         A system of fire is constructed to bring all available     come from the division's second echelon. A security
      fires on the enemy as he approaches and to provide for        force of up to battalion size may be deployed in front of
      continuous fire at the forward edge, the flanks, and          each first echelon regiment.
      within the defensive position. In addition, it should            A detailed and coordinated fire plan is developed.
      provide for the rapid concentration of fire against           Weapons are positioned so that the maximum amount
      threatened axes.                                              of fire can be brought to bear directly in front of the
                                                                    FEBA Enemy penetrations are blunted by shifting
                                                                    artillery fire and by conducting counterattacks.
       Division-level Defense                                          The commander controls the defense through a
          When a division is ordered to assume the defense,         series of command posts and command observation
       the commander issues orders based on a map recon-            posts. At division level, there are normally four com-
       naissance and personally clarifies missions on the           mand posts: a main command post, a forward
      ground. He determines key terrain, enemy avenue; of           command post, an alternate command post, and a rear
       approach and probable main attack axis, areas for            area command post.
      possible nuclear and chemical strikes, organization for          The main command post is located in the rear of the
      combat, maneuver reqUirements, organization of                defensive sector and contains the bulk of the staff. The
      strongpoints, probable counterattack axes, and loca-         chief of staff directs its operation.
       tions of command posts and command observation                  The division commander establishes a forward
      posts. Soviet commanders are expected to make maxi-          command post with a small group of selected staff
      mum use of the terrain and to avoid establishing pat-        members. The composition of this group varies but
      terns that would make enemy targeting easier.                usually includes the operations officer and chief of
          A tank or motorized rifle division typically defends a   rocket troops and artillery ( CRTA). This post may be as
      sector 20 to 30 kilometers in width and 15 to 20 kilo-       close as :1 kilometers from the FEBA
      meters in depth. The commander normally organizes                An alternate command post contains representa-
      the main defensive area in two echelons and a reserve.        tives from key staff sections. Displaced from the divi-
      The first echelon's mission is to inflict losses on the       sion main command post, it is ready to take over direc-
      enemy, to force him to concentrate, and to canalize           tion of the division if the main command post is
      him into fire sacks. The second echelon's mission is to      damaged or destroyed.
      stop and destroy enemy penetrations or to reinforce or           The rear area command post is established and con-
      replace troops of the first echelon.                         trolled by the deputy commander for rear services.
         While there is no rigid requirement for the composi-          Besides the command posts, the commander may
      tion of echelons, normally at least two regiments are        establish command observation posts which are con-
      placed in the division's first echelon. In a motorized       trolled from the forward command post. These posts
      rifle diviSion, the first echelon consists of motorized      have radio and wire communications and permit the
      rifle regiments. A tank regiment usually is employed as      commander and his CRTA to better observe different
      a division's main counterattack force.                       sectors of the battlefield.
:c       The division commander issues a combat order
     which contains information about the enemy, the
                                                                       There is no rigid structure for the location of com-
                                                                   mand posts. Command posts are established where the

"     mission, the concept of the operation, the location of
      the FEBA, and the pOSition to be occupied. The order
     further specifies the following details:
                                                                   commander orders them established. He makes use of
                                                                   terrain to camouflage command posts and places them
                                                                   according to his mission concept. The Soviets avoid
        • For first echelon regiments: reinforcements,             establishing command posts on distinguishing terrain
     missions, defense sectors, and axes and areas in which        features.
     main efforts are to be concentrated.                              They anticipate radio communications to be diffi-
        • For second echelon regiments: reinforcements,            cult and often impossible or undesirable in combat and
     miSSions, defense sectors, and axes and deployment            they train accordingly. During training exercises, the
     lines for counterattacks.                                     Soviets regularly practice the use of radio, wire, pyro-
       • The time that positions are to be occupied.               technic (visual signals), sound, and courier
       • Coordination requirements.                                communications. It is standard procedure for them to
         When the defense is established before contact with       employ wire communications in a defensive position
     the enemy, the Soviets establish a security echelon up        or an assembly area. This means of communication-
     to 15 kilometers forward of the main defensive area.          including the prompt restoration of destroyed lines-
     The elements which make up the security echelon               receives heavy emphasis in Soviet tactical exercises.
FM 100-2-1

Defense of a Motorized Rifle Division. Variant


                              MR REGT
                              10-15 KM

                                                                                                                                      DIV MAIN


      --                                                                          v
                                                                                  ..                 •
                                                                                                             V                    V
                                                                  REGIMENTAL         REGIMENTAL

                                                            ..   FIRST ECHELON     SECOND ECHELON        •       DIVISION SECOND ECHELON
                                                                    DIVISION FIRST ECHELON
                                                                                                     •                  AND RESERVE

  Shown above is a simplified diagram of the defense               first echelon, its mission is to prevent penetration of    capability to m.
ofa motorized rifle division. Not all details or weapons           the main defenses by repulsing enemy assaults with         regiment is nor
are shown, but the primary elements found in the                   intense fire and counterattacks by its reserve. When       may vary from ~
division and its regimental echelons are typical.                  given the mission to defend in the division's second          A regimentall
                                                                   echelon, a regiment attempts to defeat any enemy           regiment's seco
                                                                   penetration of the division's first echelon.               size and tank he
                                                                      Regimental !>ubunits normally are dispersed so that a   attacks against c
Regimental-level Defense                                           single lOW-yield nuclear strike can destroy no more           A regimental
  A regiment may be used in the first or second                    than one company. Dispersion is also limited to insure     from the antit;
echelon of the division defenses. As part of a division's          the stability of the defense and to maintain the           motorized rifle
riant ___________________________________________________________________________________________________

                                                                                                          (SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM. NOT All
                                                                                                          DETAilS OR WEAPONS SHOWN.)

                                                                                                           1. Main defensive area is organized into
                                                                                                           two echelons and a reserve:
                                                                                                           . First echelon inflicts enemy losses.
                                                                                                           forcing him to concentrate and canalize
                                                                                                           him into fire sacks .
                                                                                                           . Second echelon's mission is to destroy
                                                                                                           enemy or reinforce/replace first echelon.
                                                                                                           2. In a motorized rifle division a tank regi·
                                                                                                           ment acts as the main counterattack
                                                                                                           3. The security zone is comprised from
                                                                                                           elements of the division's second echelon.

                                                                                      DlV MAIN CP
                                                                                                           4. Detailed and coordinated fire plan is
                                                                                                           developed for fire support.

                                                                         G-KREGT(OI                                        Preplanned artillery

                                                                                                                           Mixed minefield
                                                                                                                           (antipersonnel and
=                                                                                                         \IVVV            Barrier

                                                                                                        =-'::...-:..-!',   Probable enemy avenue
                     REGIMENTAL         REGIMENTAL                                                      =- -=--=--Il'):    of approach                     c.
                    FIRST ECHELON     SECOND ECHELON.I---D-IV-IS-I-O-N-S-EC~O-N-D-E-C-H-EL-O-N---.I                                                        c
                       DIVISION FIRST ECHELON                          AND RESERVE                      NOT TO SCALE

:he defense           first echelon, its mission is to prevent penetration of   capability to mass fires. The defensive frontage for a
:>rweapons            the main defenses by repulsing enemy assaults with        regiment is normally 10 to 15 kilometers. The depth
und in the            intense fire and counterattacks by its reserve. When      may vary from 7 to 10 kilometers.
'Pical.               given the mission to defend in the division's second         A regimental reserve normally is positioned near the
                      echelon, a regiment attempts to defeat any enemy          regiment's second echelon. It is usually of company
                      penetration of the division's first echelon.              size and tank heavy. Its mission is to conduct counter-
                         Regimental subunits normally are dispersed so that a   attacks against an enemy penetration.
                      single lOW-yield nuclear strike can destroy no more          A regimental antitank reserve normally is formed
or second             than one company. Dispersion is also limited to insure    from the antitank missile battery (found only in
a division's          the stability of the defense and to maintain the          motorized rifle regiments), the engineer company,
                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

and either a tank or motorized rifle platoon. The             greater depth is required, it may deploy in two eche-
engineer company probably operates as a mobile                lons, with two companies in its first echelon and one in
obstacle detachment to emplace hasty minefields and           its second echelon. Reserves are located behind the
obstacles. The antitank reserve occupies an assembly          second echelon. The distance between the first and
area generally near the regimental command post.              second echelons can be up to 2 kilometers.
   A regiment in the division first echelon has its              A company occupies a strongpoint 500 to 1000
command post centrally located between its first and          meters in width and up to 500 meters in depth.
second echelons. A regimental command observation             Normally, all three platoons of a company defend in
point may be established in the area of one of the            one echelon. (See diagrams on pages 6-8 and 6-9.)
subordinate battalions. Regimental logistic units and            Artillery, tanks, engineers, and chemical defense
the rear area command post are positioned to the rear         troops attached to a battalion may be allocated to the
of the regimental second echelon. Communications              companies. This allocation depends on the number
are established between the command and observa-              and types of attachments received by the battalion and
tion posts. Wire is the primary mode, supplemented by         the importance of the sectors the companies are
messengers, pyrotechnic Signals, and radio.                   defending. Although artillery may be assigned to the
   The division commander is responsible for security         companies for direct fire support, artillery is usually
forward of the FEBA. The regiment is responsible for         positioned to provide the best fire support for the
local security in front of the defensive positions of its     entire battalion.
first echelon battalions. When time and terrain limit            The battalion commander positions a small reserve
establishment of a security echelon by division, regi-        (normally a platoon) where it can most rapidly and
ments in the first echelon organize combat outposts.         effectively stabilize the defense in the event of an
Each first echelon battalion places a reinforced             enemy penetration. Key terrain and likely enemy
motorized rifle platoon forward, across the main             avenues of attack are factors in determining where the
expected enemy avenue of approach into the battalion         battalion reserve will be positioned. Reaction time for
defensive area. The reconnaissance company of the            a mounted reserve is based on speeds of 20 to 30 kilo-
first echelon regiment perfomls screening and recon-         meters per hour in daytime and 15 to 20 kilometers
naissance activity in front of the combat outposts. Each     per hour at night.
battalion organizes its own observation and listening            The mortar battery of a motorized rifle battalion is
posts.                                                       deployed in accordance with the overall fire plan and is
                                                             positioned to provide close-in fires for the company
Battalion-level Defense                                         The battalion's rear service elements are located in
   After receiving the mission from his regimental com-      covered and concealed positions within the battalion
mander, a battalion commander begins organizing his          area. Rear service elements are responsible for their
assigned sector. The regimental order is as complete as      own security and should change locations frequently
possible. As a minimum, it contains the battalion's          to avoid destruction from enemy air and artillery fire.
mission, trace of the FEBA, and battalion boundaries.            Defensive fires are centrally organized and are
   In a hasty defense, there may be no time for the regi-    planned as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Fires are
mental commander to issue an order with detailed             concentrated on avenues of approach using a series of
supplementary instructions. Consequently, the                designated fire lines. The distance between th-ese lines
motorized rifle battalion commander is allowed more          is 400 to 600 meters on high-speed avenues. The
initiative and flexibility in organizing his defensive       distance is less on less-likely avenues of approach
pOSition in this situation. The battalion initially          because of a probable slower rate of advance. Artillery
consolidates on the terrain it occupies or attempts to       fire is used to separate attacking infantry from their
seize critical terrain favorable for the defense. In con-    tanks approximately 200 to 400 meters from the FEBA.
trast, organization of a prepared defense is centrally       Final protective fires are planned within 100 meters of
planned by the regiment.                                     the FEBA, with concentrations to halt the advance of
   A typical battalion defensive area is 3 to 5 kilometers   enemy forces that have penetrated the defenses.
wide and up to 2 kilometers deep. A battalion usually           Antitank defenses are organized to engage enemy
defends with companies in a single echelon Single            tanks at an effective range up to 3 kilometers forward
echelon deployment permits the greatest concentra-           of the FEBA. Normal distance between tanks and anti-
tion of firepower but it also reduces defense in depth.      tank weapons in defensive positions is about 100
When a battalion defends on a narrow frontage and/or         meters. On open terrain, there may be up to 200
FM 100-2-1

meters between tanks in defensive positions. The ter-                of a typical defense by a reinforced motorized rifle
rain is a dominant factor in positioning tanks and anti-             battalion.
tank weapons. Each tank and antitank weapon has a                       The Soviets constantly emphasize that the defense is
primary and secondary sector of fire as well as primary              a temporary form of combat that makes the transition
and alternate positions.                                             to the offense easier. This transition can be made,
  Barrier plans and the system of fire complement                    however, only when each level of command is able to
each other. Both antitank and antipersonnel minefields               counterattack. The Soviets stress that counterattacks
are laid forward of the FEBA and throughout the depth                should be made when the enemy attack is stalled and
of defensive positions. Antitank obstacles are covered               he is unable to secure the terrain seized and to bring
by direct and indirect fires. Shown below is an example              his reserves forward.

Typical Defense by a Motorized Rifle Battalion (Reinforced) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

   _        -r'\.....-
   NOTE: A battalion usually defends in a single echelon. in an
                                                                     1'0'0,1 Mixed minefield                       Preplanned artillery
   area 3 to 5 kilometers wide and up to 2 kilometers deep. When
                                                                               (antipersonnel and                  concentration
   defending a narrow frontage or if greater depth is required. it
   may deploy in two echelons as above. Distance between                       antitankl
   echelons can be up to 500 meters in depth. Reserves are                                          __     ~~      Probable enemy avenue of
   located behind the second echelon.                                /VVV\     Barrier              ~ ;:   ;;:.>   approach

                                                                                                                                   FM 100-2-1

   Each level of command is prepared to conduct a                          (primarily tank-heavy) second echelon formations,
counterattack. If the enemy's forces and fires over-                       which act as counterattack forces.
whelm the Soviets' first echelon defenses and prevent                         As previously discussed, the Soviets emphasize
them from conducting a counterattack, subunits hold                        dispersion into company-sized strongpoints, while
their position, strike the enemy with all available fires,                 maintaining mutual fire support as a defense against
and create sufficient resistance for a counterattack by                    tactical nuclear weapons. By forming company strong-
forces of the next higher command. As the enemy                            points, adequate maneuver space is created to shift
advances into the depths of the Soviet defense, he                         forces and to counterattack once the enemy's main
advances on positions that have been better prepared;                      attack is determined. The strongpoint is usually
and he encounters progressively larger, more powerful                      centered on the platoon in the second main trench.

A Motorized Rifle Company Strong Point - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _

                                                                                          3RD PLT

                                                  III REF POINT I-
                                                  II BARN                          ~
                                                                            IST PLT

                                          REF POINT 2-
                                          THREE TREES    Y                                                              4TH MR CO

                                                         REF POINT 4-

    LEGEND: (Broken ·symbol denotes ahernate position.)

                                                                Sector of trench with
     <J                APC                                      communications trench
                                                                                                !       Company observation post (on e horizontal
                                                                                                        line denotes a platoon observation posf
      <>               Tank                          IWit$i     Building

  -,>lA , IJ.I U   I   Defense position                         Road                          II!2:!J   Mixed minefield (antipersonnel and antitank)

FM 100-2-1

   The next higher commander authorizes a counter-                 information on the new defensive position. With-
attack to be launched. In most cases, counterattacks               drawals are organized and executed under strict
are initiated from the flanks. Counterattacks are pre-             secrecy and security. The mission is to disengage the
ceded by intense air and artillery fires and the fires of          force. in a timely, organized manner without losing its
adjacent units. The counterattack force attacks from               combat capability. The force executing the withdrawal
the march. Counterattacks at army or division levels               is divided into three groups.
may be the opening phase of a Soviet counteroffensive.                The covering force has the mission to deceive the
                                                                   enemy and to cover the initial withdrawal of the main
                                                                   body. This force normally comes from units along the
WITHDRAWAL                                                         forward edge of the defense. It normally consists of a
   The Soviets view the withdrawal as a combat action              reinforced platoon from each forward-deployed
designed to disengage troops from attack by superior               company.
enemy forces. The experiences of World War II taught                  The rear guard covers movement of the main body
the Soviets the complicated nature of retrograde                   and fights a delaying action if the enemy attempts to
operations under pressure. On the modem battlefield,               maintain contact in the pursuit. It is organized to fight
a withdrawal will bring the full application of the                independently of the main body and covering force.
enemy's combat power to destroy withdrawing units.                 Normally, it is organized as a combined arms force
The Soviets can be expected to resort to deception,                consisting of tank, motorized rifle, artillery, and
movement at night and during periods of reduced                    engineer elements. Maximum use is made of artillery,
visibility, and covert preparations to avoid alerting the          mortar, and long-range ATGM fires through a series of
enemy.                                                             delay positions to prevent enemy interference in the
   The Soviet commander's withdrawal order is                      withdrawal of the main body.
detailed and includes the mission, routes, formation to               The main body breaks contact and attempts to with-
be used, delay positions, control measures, and                    draw without disclosing its intentions to the enemy.

Basic Concept of the Withdrawal _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                           REAR GUARD                                        MAIN FORCE
          COVERING                   INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT                         WITH ORGANIC RECONNAISSANCE.
           FORCE                             POSITIONS                                 FLANK AND REAR SECURITY
                                                     ..,"1 ..,"~•

                   ~             ~&+ -;1,.. -,\,.

                                     .· .·    ·        •7          ,

                   ~             ~&+
                                                      .,"~     .,"~
                                            -,\.,   -04
    < <&+
                                                     •.>17 . .,"~•
                                                    -04    -04
                                                       •7   ·,

                                                    .·. ·.
  ..~ <&+

                                                    .• • .. ·,

                                                      · ••
                                                    -..>1 .·.

    ~ <&+
                                                    -,\      -04

  Deceives enemy and
                                                       •7      ·,

                              Independentlv fights a delaving action to          Conducts deceptive withdrawal under
  covers initial with-        cover movement of main force. Applies              cover of darkness. weather. supporting
  drawal of main body'.       maximum use of fires.                              fires. and ruse tactics.
                                                                                                         FM 100-2-1

Deception may be achieved by withdrawing under the          carefully organized and is executed quickly and
cover of darkness or adverse weather conditions, by         secretly. It attempts to preserve as much of the unit's
using supporting fires to cover noise, or by employing a    combat capability as possible. As a rule, a relief is con-
ruse. A route reconnaissance and a reconnaissance of        ducted at night or during periods of reduced visibility.
the new positions to be occupied are conducted and             Soviet doctrine stresses the temporary nature of the
guides posted to expedite movement. Air strikes and        defense and emphasizes the need for counterattacks as
artillery support are closely coordinated and planned       soon as it is feasible to initiate a renewed offensive. The
to cover the withdrawal.                                    relief operation is a means to achieve this end.
   A regiment conducts a withdrawal in the following          A battalion relief usually is conducted with the
sequence:                                                  regimental commander establishing the relief
  • First echelon battalions deSignate platoons to act     sequence. The two battalion commanders (the one
as covering forces which attempt to portray a nonna!        relieving and the one being relieved) conduct a joint
defensive posture to the enemy.                            reconnaissance of the defensive position. During this
 • The regimental commander designates a rear              reconnaissance, they coordinate routes to and from
guard, normally a reinforced second echelon battalion      the relief areas, traffic regulation posts, locations for
 • On order, the main body (first echelon battalions,      guides to meet the relieving units, and the sequence of
minus covering forces, plus support elements) with-        relief. In addition, the battalion commanders review
draws through the rear guard, in the following order:      the present system of fire and observation as well as
rear services first, then combat support elements, and     obstacles and minefields that have been prepared for
finally the maneuver subunits.                             the position.
 • The main body proceeds, without pause, on multi-           The commander of the battalion which is being
ple routes, all the way back to a new defensive position   relieved specifies to his subordinates the following:
or assembly area.                                            • The sequence of turnover of the defense area
   Once the main body has completely passed through          • Assembly area( s) after the relief.
the rear guard, the covering force breaks contact on         • Camouflage and security measures.
order and withdraws through the rear guard to join the       • Instructions for guides to meet and accompany the
main body. Minimum radio communications or                 arriving relief units.
listening silence is observed.                               • The location of traffic regulation posts.
   The rear guard fights a delaying action, leapfrogging     • The times for commencing and completing the
to successive positions, using to the maximum:             relief.
 • Smoke.                                                    • Actions in the event of an enemy attack during the
 • Mobile obstacle detachments to layminefields and        relief.
to create obstacles across enemy avenues of approach.         The commander of the battalion which is being
 • Artillery fire concentrations.                          relieved exercises overall control until the relief is
 • Ambushes.                                               completed. Should the enemy attack during the relief,
 • Attack helicopters.                                     the relieving battalion, under the command of the out-
 • Fixed-wing air strikes.                                 going battalion commander, attempts to repel the
   If the enemy does not pursue, the rear guard            attack.
assumes march formation and joins the main body as            At the appointed time, the relieving battalion moves
quickly as possible.                                       to the relief area by concealed routes. The relief is
                                                           carried out successively by platoons. The first to be
                                                           relieved are motorized rifle and antitank subunits.
RELIEF                                                     They are followed by mortar, artillery, and tank sub-
  The Soviet term "relief of troops" involves an           units. Tanks may be reassigned and left in place if the
organized transfer of positions, areas, and zones in a     relief is carried out by battalions of the same motorized
combat situation from one unit to another. The units       rifle regiment. Once in position, the relieving subunits
being relieved have usually sustained considerable         establish observation posts and their system of fire.
losses and are on the defense. A relief also may be con-      Relieved commanders transfer their positions,
ducted to enable a fresh unit to occupy the defense        provide information on enemy activities and routines,
positions of the relieved unit in preparation for a        and acquaint relieving commanders with the location
renewed offensive. Because units being relieved are        of obstacles, minefields, and primary directions of fire.
normally in direct contact with the enemy, they are        Established communications are maintained, and wire
subject to enemy fire and ground attacks. The relief is    lines are left in place and passed on to relieving units.

FM 100-2-1

All engineer installations, to include minefields and       The relieving battalion commander checks the loca-
obstacles, are thoroughly checked and verified with      tions and weapon positions of his subunits to insure
respect to boundaries, passages, and degree of           they are prepared for combat. The relieving battalion
readiness.                                               attempts to maintain the same routine and level of
   If the enemy attacks, all available subunits-under    activities that existed before the relief. When the
the command of the commander being relieved - are        relieving commander reports to his superior that the
used to repulse the attack. The reserve of the subunit   relief is completed, the relief is officially terminated.
being relieved may be used to counterattack. It is the   The relieved battalion withdraws to assigned assembly
last element to be withdrawn from the defensive area.    areas and carries out its subsequent assigned mission.

                    CHAPTER 7


   The tactical concepts of Soviet ground forces            offront operations. Visual reconnaissance is a secon-
require timely, accurate, and continuous information        dary mission of all aircraft in the divisional tactical area.
on the enemy, terrain, and weather. Reconnaissance, as      In-flight observations are transmitted to the maneuver
defined by the Soviets, is the collection of information    elements on the tactical air net.
about the location, activity, disposition, composition,        Helicopters flying in the vicinity of the FEBA depend
size, armament, combat readiness, and intentions of         on local air superiority. When air superiority is denied,
the enemy. The Soviets recognize that reconnaissance        helicopters are used to emplace observation posts or
will be met by enemy countermeasures and deception.         reconnaissance patrols rather than perform as air
They employ multiple, overlapping collection means          reconnaissance platforms. All helicopters performing
to insure success of their reconnaissance efforts.          any missions may be expected to pass tactical informa-
                                                            tion to those headquarters and units with whom they
                                                            have radio communications.
Principles of Soviet Reconnaissance - - - - - -                Fromfront to regiment, there are chemical defense
                                                            units which monitor nuclear and chemical contami-
   • Aggressiveness. The decisive actions and ini-          nation. Chemical defense troops from these units
   tiative used by commanders and headquarters             provide direct combat support to the maneuver units
   to obtain necessary information by all means            down to company level. Equipped with radiological-
   available.                                              chemical reconnaissance vehicles, these troops
   • Continuity. The conduct of reconnaissance at          monitor radiation and chemical agents and mark
   all times regardless of the intensity of combat,        contaminated areas. Helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft
   time of day, or weather conditions. Established         also may conduct NBC reconnaissance.
   contact with the enemy must not be broken and               Soviet artillery from front to division has organic
   observation must be continuously maintained.             target acquisition' units which obtain and transmit
   • Timeliness. The gathering and reporting of             meteorological and topographic information. The
   reconnaissance information in sufficienttimeto          division artillery regiment has a target acquisition
   counter enemy actions.                                  battery which gathers information from a topographic
   • Reliability. The degree to which the intelli-         survey platoon, sound/flash ranging platoon, a recon-
   gence information accurately portrays the               naissance platoon, a surveillance radar section, and a
   enemy situation. This involves verifying the            meteorological section.
   intelligence with data from other sources and              Engineer units from front to regimental level may be
   assigning additional reconnaissance missions            used in reconnaissance detachments. Engineer
   to confirm or deny the information.                     specialists normally accompany maneuver unit recon-
   • Accuracy. The accurate determination of               naissance patrols. The Soviets are particularly aware of
   coordinates of important enemy targets such as          the need for engineer intelligence to assist in main-
   missile installations, nuclear capable artillery,       taining a rapid rate of advance. The reconnaissance
   nuclear storage sites, etc.                             resources of the division's combat engineer battalion
                                                           also include mine detection equipment and the means
                                                           for detailed bank and bed survey of water obstacles.
 ELEMENTS USED IN RECONNAISSANCE                              Airborne or airmobile forces may be employed
   The effective ranges of the reconnaissance means at     behind enemy lines to locate enemy headquarters,
front level vary at each level ofcommand. These ranges     communications systems, and nuclear weapons. They
are also dependent on weather and terrain.                 also may be given the mission to attack these targets.
   Aerial reconnaissance by high performance aircraft         Radio intercept and radio direction finding are the
normally is conducted by aviation units at front and       primary electronic means of gathering enemy intelli-
army level. Aviation units conduct visual, photo, and      gence. Radio intercept is the ability to monitor and
electronic intercept and direction-finding reconnais-      understand message content. Radio direction finding
sance missions. Ranges of reconnaissance aircraft vary.    is designed to locate broadcast stations.
Missions of 350 to 400 km usually are flown bypairs of        Medical reconnaissance is conducted to identi1jr
aircraft to support armies or divisions. Long-range        areas potentially dangerous to health, including the
missions in excess of 400 km also are flown in support     presence of biological agents.
FM 100-2-1

   Rear services officers reconnoiter and establish        to determine the strength, composition, and disposi-
,observation posts to facilitate recovery and repair of    tion of enemY' elements. Whenever possible, recon-
 damaged equipment, to identifY sites for forward          naissance subunits bypass enemy groupings and
 supply points, and to determine local sources of          continue the advance along the prescribed route.
 supply.                                                      Engineer reconnaissance detachments and
                                                           chemical defense specialists usually accompany recon-
                                                           naissance patrols at division and regiment. Other
 CONTROL OF                                                specialists accompany reconnaissance patrols as
 RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS                                   needed.
   Soviet divisions and regiments have dedicated
reconnaissance organizations, i.e., a reconnaissance
battalion for the division and a reconnaissance            Typical Reconnaissance Patrol Tasks - - - - - -
company for the regiment. These units gather and
produce intelligence which will assist the accomplish-        • Identify, locate, and report on enemy head-
ment of the division and the regimental mission. At           quarters, nuclear weapon systems, troop loca-
division, reconnaissance elements are controlled by           tions, communication centers, and movement
the chief of reconnaissance and supported by a small          of enemy units.
staff. The division's long-range reconnaissance               • Determine the disposition of enemy defenses,
company can operate up to 100 km forward of the               locate enemy boundaries and artillery positions,
main body; other elements of the battalion operate up         and provide topographical information on
to 50 km forward. Regimental reconnaissance                   approaches to enemy defensive positions.
company elements may operate up to 25 km forward              • Report enemy emplacement of demolitions
and closer once contact is established.                       and the location of minefields.
   During tactical movement, a divisional recon-              • Determine obstacle-crossing sites and provide
naissance battalion usually moves one or more hours           hydrographic information on water obstacles.
ahead of leading elements of the division. The division       • Monitor areas of suspected NBC contami-
normally moves on two or more routes and the recon-           nation.
naissance battalion organization depends on the               • Identify routes for advance, withdrawal, and
division formation. The battalion may form one or two         lateral communications.
reconnaissance groups and several patrols; however,           • Identify key terrain.
this depends on the combat situation and the overall          • Identify possible sites for friendly communica-
mission of the division. Even when the reconnaissance         tion installations.
battalion advances on more than one route, move-
ments of each element are controlled by the battalion
commander. At each successive objective, he estab-         RECONNAISSANCE ORGANIZATIONS
lishes a reconnaissance base from which he directs the        To obtain timely intelligence Soviet commanders
employment of reconnaissance groups and patrols            sometimes organize and dispatch reconnaissance
operating in advance of the base. Radio contact is main-   groups. These groups may be formed by the com-
tained with the division headquarters. The battalion       mander from army through regiment. A reconnais-
commander is expected to be able to implement sup-         sance group is a temporary tactical subunit formed for
plementary reconnaissance missions or· to make             the execution of a specified reconnaissance mission.
changes in the direction or rate of advance. He is also    The composition of such groups, usually reinforced
expected to request additional support from the main       platoons or companies, depends on the situation and
body if his unit becomes too heavily engaged with an       the assigned mission. In an attack, a division could form
enemy unit.                                                a reconnaissance group consisting of a motorized rifle
   Generally, elements of the battalion seek to avoid      company, reinforced with a platoon of tanks and
sustained combat with an enemy force. They cross           engineer and NBC reconnaissance squads. Reconnais-
open areas at high speeds and cross closed and broken      sance groups conduct reconnaissance by observation
terrain by bounds, moving from one vantage point to        as well as by more active methods such as ambushes
another. At the vantage points, they may dismount          and raids. In an extreme case, they may destroy cover-
from the vehicles to get better observation. Upon          ing subunits of a withdrawing enemy. Along with their
contact with an enemy element, reconnaissance              primary reconnaissance mission, they may be assigned
subunits attempt to use feints and flanking maneuvers      missions to destroy enemy means of nuclear attack and
                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

 to seize and hold important terrain features in the        suspected enemy positions to gain information. Their
enemy rear until the arrival of the main attacking force.   mission is to cause the enemy to react and thereby
    A reconnaissance detachment is a temporary              reveal his dispositions, strength, and fire plan. The
tactical subunit of reinforced company or battalion         patrol conducts its reconnaissance byfeints or demon-
strength. The basic subunit (motorized rifle or tank) is    strations employing fire and maneuver against actual
almost always reinforced With elements of the other         or suspected enemy positions. These positions
arm to make it a balanced combat force. Depending on        generally are assigned to the patrol as reconaissance
the mission, specialized reconnaissance elements such       objectives by the controlling headquarters.
as artillery, engineers, or NBC may be assigned or             A reconnaissance in force is employed when
attached. A reconnaissance detachment of battalion          ordinary air and ground reconnaissance activities fail
strength is assigned a zone approximately 7 kilometers       to provide sufficient intelligence on which to base a
wide and 35 kilometers in depth, or it may be assigned      plan of attack· Like the combat reconnaissance patrol,
an axis of advance. A reconnaissance detachment ful-        the reconnaissance in force is intended to force the
fills its mission by observation, by ambush, and by         enemy to expose his defensive system. Its specific
direct attack if necessary.                                 objectives are to fix the true trace of enemy defense
    A separate reconnaissance patrol is a temporary         and to locate troop concentrations and weapons; to
tactical subunit composed of a reinforced squad or a        determine the enemy defensive fire system and the
platoon. It normally is assigned a specific objective       types and locations of fortifications and obstacles; to
and! or route instead of a zone. A squad-sized patrol       locate tactical reserves, boundaries between units, and
may operate away from its parent unit at a distance of8     secondary troop dispositions; to capture prisoners and
kilometers during the day and 3 kilometers at night,        documents; and to seize and hold important objectives
while a platoon-sized patrol may operate at a distance      which permit surveillance of the defensive position
of up to 15 kilometers during the day and up to 5           until the main force attack takes place. The subunit
kilometers at night. A separate reconnaissance patrol       which conducts a reconnaissance in force for a
accomplishes its mission by observation, but may            division is normally a reinforced battalion and for regi-
engage in limited combat if necessary. Limited combat       ment, a reinforced company. Reconnaissance in force
in this case means that the patrol may use reconnais-       is conducted to convince the enemy that an all-out
sance by fire to determine enemy positions when no          attack is under way. The attack is made on a com-
other means are available. The separate reconnais-          paratively wide frontage and is accompanied by feints
sance patrol also is frequently used to capture             and demonstrations by subunits in contact in other
prisoners for intelligence exploitation.                    sectors. An artillery preparation normally precedes the
   Combat reconnaissance patrols in reinforced small        assault.
subunit strength are employed to attack known or



    The Soviet concept of fire support embraces all              In the offense, fire superiority is achieved by fire
 combat support provided to the ground-gaining anns            preparation and normally is maintained during the
 by rocket and artillery troops and aviation using             entire battle. In the defense, fire superiority may be
conventional ammunition. Nuclear fires are excluded            achieved in selected sectors for a given period of
 from this concept. The Soviets consider nuclear               time-for example, in a sector selected for a counter-
 weapons to be so powerful that they cannot be said to         preparation or a counterattack.
 support the combat operations of the ground-gaining
arms. Instead, they constitute a separate and inde-
pendent element of combat power which can accom-               TARGET DAMAGE CRITERIA
plish the missions of destroying major enemy combat              Target damage is the effect offires on a given military
formations, command and control facilities, and                target and results in total, partial, or temporary loss of
logistics centers.                                             the target's combat effectiveness.
   Even though Soviet military doctrine distinguishes
between fire support and nuclear attack, the two are
closely related. First, fire support units must plan and       Categories of Target Damage _ - - - - - - -
deliver nuclear strikes. Second, they must adjust the
fire plan to take into account the effects of nuclear               Destruction. A destroyed target has com-
strikes on the enemy. Finally, nuclear strikes greatly           pletely lost its combat effectiveness. Prepared
affect the tempo of combat activity, which, in tum,              defenses are considered destroyed when they
influences the type of fire support required (mobile             are no longer usable without major reconstruc-
fire support systems, such as combat aircraft, will be           tion. A point target is considered destroyed
more in demand) and the kind of logistics support                whe n there is a 90 percent probabil ity that it has
needed (fu~l and ammunition).                                    suffered serious damage. An area target is con~
   Artillery support is planned and coordinated by the           sidered destroyed when it is highly probable (90
chief of rocket troops and artillery ( CRTA) assigned to         percent) that no less than 50 percent of the
the staff of the supported maneuver element at each              target's subelements or no less than 50 percent
level of command. (At regimental level, the artillery            of the target area has suffered serious damage.
staff officer is called the chief ofartillery. ) The CRTA is        Suppression. A suppressed target has
not the commander of the organic field artillery unit.           suffered sufficient damage to lose its combat
Air support normally is planned by the aviation com-             effectiveness temporarily or to restrict its ability
mander and his staffatfrontand army level and coordi-            to maneuver or effect command and control. An
nated by air representatives at lower levels of com-             area target is considered to be suppressed when
mand (in some cases down to maneuver battalion)                  it is highly probable (90 percent) that no less
who function as forward air controllers.                         than 25 to 30 percent of the target's sub-
                                                                 elements, or 25 to 30 percent of the target's
                                                                 area, has suffered serious damage.
FIRE SUPERIORITY                                                    Harassment. Harassment fire is conducted
   Fire superiority is a firepower advantage over the            sporadically to prevent troop movement in the
enemy in the course of a given battle or operation. Fire         open and to lower the morale of the enemy.
superiority is a unit's ability to execute its own fire mis-
sions successfully while suppressing substantive
counterfire by the enemy. The Soviets believe that fire        PHASES OF FIRE SUPPORT
superiority is relatively assured for the side'that opens         Offensive fire support is divided into four phases: fire
fire first; achieves surprise; renders highly accurate,        support for a force's movement forward, fire prepara-
effective fire; masses fires effectively either through        tion, fires in support of the attack, and fire
maneuver by fire or .maneuver of the fire support              accompaniment.
means. To achieve and maintain fire superiority, a               Fire support for a force's movement forward
Soviet unit maintains continuous fire on the fire sup-         consists of long-range fires designed to protect a force
port means of the enemy, especially his artillery.             moving from an assembly area to the line of departure.
FM 100-2-1

    Fire preparation for the attack or counterattack is      ing in the depth of the enemy's defenses. Fire
 the combat support rendered by rocket forces,               accompaniment includes artillery, rocket, and air
 artillery, and combat aircraft before the attack by         strikes against troops and weapon systems opposing
 maneuver elements. Fires for the preparation are pre-       the attacker's advance as well as against enemy
 planned and may be delivered simultaneously or              reserves deep in the rear. During this phase, previously
 sequentially. In the offense, the preparation immedi-       established fire superiority must be maintained. Fire
 ately precedes an attack It also could be used before       strikes must destroy nuclear delivery systems, enemy
 the introduction of second echelon or reserve forces.       aircraft remaining on the ground, artillery units, com-
 In the defense, it is used before the execution of a        mand and control centers, antitank weapon systems,
 counterattack The preparation is intended to destroy        and enemy troops. Fires must keep the enemy from
 and to suppress enemy weapon systems, command and           using his reserves for counterattacks and must support
 control elements, and troops in the tactical and            the commitment of the attacker'S second echelon
 immediate operational depth of the enemy's defenses.        forces to insure a high rate of speed.
 The Soviets strive to achieve fire superiority early in        Rocket, artillery, and combat aviation units coordi-
 order to deny any real opposition by the enemy.             nate mutually supporting fires with each other and
    Fire preparation consists of artillery and airprepara-   with the supported maneuver unit. The fire
 tion and includes fires from rocket forces, artillery       accompaniment phase begins with the end of the fire
 (including mortars), combat aircraft, and sometimes         support phase and continues until the supported
tanks and other direct fire weapons. Targets for the         maneuver forces have accomplished their missions.
preparation phase are allocated (depending on the               The Soviets consider fire support (artillery and air)
target's type, dimensions, degree of fortification,          the most decisive element in modem combat. They
mobility, and dqJth in the enemy's defenses) to rocket       stress the need to integrate all means of fire support
forces, artillery, or aviation.                              closely and to execute a well-coordinated fire support
   The length and organization of the preparation will       plan throughout the depth of the enemy's defenses.
depend on the nature of the enemy's defenses, the type
and density of fire support means being used for the
preparation, the role of nuclear strikes in the attack       FIRE SUPPORT ZONES
plan, and the nature of the ground attack. It could last        The Soviets distinguish between close and long-
up to 50 minutes or longer or it could be repeated           range fire support zones. The close fire support zone
against well-fortified, deeply echeloned defenses.           extends as far as the range of the attacker's direct fire
    The preparation consists of intense artillery and air    weapons-approximately 3 kilometers into the
strikes against nuclear delivery systems, artillery and      enemy's defenses. Domination ofthe close fire support
mortar batteries, antitank weapons, enemy                    battle is important to ensure the destruction of
strongpoints, and command and control centers.               forward defending troops and their supporting
   Fires in support o/the attack are rendered by rocket .    weapons.
and artillery forces and combat aircraft during the             The depth of the long-range fire support zone has
maneuver unit's assault on enemy defenses. Fire sup-         increased greatly since World" War II because of
port involves the destruction or suppression of enemy        improved mobility of modem weapon systems and
troops and weapon systems forward of friendly attack-        combat fighting vehicles. In the tactical context ( divi-
ing troops. This phase is designed to prevent the            sion and lower), the long-range fire support zone
enemy from restoring fire, command and control, and          extends out to the limit of a division's subsequent (or
observation systems that were disrupted during the           final) objective. Domination of the long-range fire sup-
preparation phase. Fires continue to suppress enemy          port battle is very important today because of critical
troop activity and weapon systems and to maintain fire       targets such as nuclear weapons and delivery systems
superiority, thereby facilitating the forward move-          deep in the enemy's rear area.
ment of assaulting tank and motorized rifle troops.
   The fire in support of the attack phase is planned and
organized at army, division, and sometimes regimental        AIR SUPPORT
level. It starts immediately after the end of the fire         Air support is extremely important for maintaining a
preparation and continues at least until Soviet attack-      high rate of advance. Maneuver units could outrun
ing units have overrun enemy front-line battalions.          their artillery support. Artillery units could outrun
   Fire accompaniment is rendered by rocket, artillery,      their logistic support. In any case, air support is needed
and combat aviation forces to maneuver forces attack-        to cover and support the advance of maneuver units.
                                                                                                           FM 100-2-1

   In the past decade, the Soviets have tried to integrate    replaced with newer models equipped with ATGMs
air support into the total fire support effort. Major field   that have greater standoff range. Newer attack helicop-
exercises feature joint air and ground operations. The        ters can maneuver after missile launch. Assault heli-
quantity and quality of fire support means available to       copter tactics are being more closely aligned with
the commander have been increased in recent years.            ground maneuver unit tactics, while fixed-wing avia-
   Helicopters have become increasingly important in          tion is being reorganized to provide more flexible
execution of both the close and long-range fire sup-          employment.
port battles and have begun noticeably to influence              Third-generation high-performance aircraft with
Soviet thinking about the tactics of ground combat.           improved avionics, ECM-ECCM equipment, and
Combat helicopters provide fire support to tank and           increased combat radius and payload have replaced
motorized rifle units during both the offense and             older models. The Soviet Union has in production or
defense. Helicopters are used also for reconnaissance         development precision-guided munitions (PGM)
and helibome operations, as observation platforms for         similar to those deployed by US forces.
artillery forward observers and as mobile means of               The deployment of a wide array of mobile and semi-
control and communications.                                   mobile air defense missile and gun systems has given
  The establishment of army aviation has given ground         ground formations greater freedom of maneuver,
maneuver formations a vertical dimension. The heli-           while Simultaneously freeing aircraft from air defense
copter now provides combined arms and tank armies             missions for ground support roles.
with a highly maneuverable, versatile platform for
reconnaissance, command and control, and fire sup-
port. General-purpose and attack helicopter units can         TRENDS IN FIRE SUPPORT
move with armies and divisions at the high rates of               Soviet fire support concepts are undergoing
advance they will seek to achieve in conducting com-           considerable modification. The introduction of a
bined arms operations in depth.                                Significant variety of modem equipment in a relatively
                                                              short time has raised command, control, and coordina-
                                                               tion problems. The need to improve interaction
FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS                                            between supporting and supported units is constantly
   Divisional and nondivisional artillery units are being     emphasized, as officers are exhorted to learn the
expanded. Older, towed howitzers are being replaced            tactics and the capabilities of the units which comprise
by self-propelled versions. A I22-mm howitzer bat-             the combined arms team.
talion is being added to the tank regiment of the tank            Present Soviet efforts are directed toward upgrading
and motorized rifle divisions. The addition of large-         employment procedures and personnel proficiency to
caliber, self-propelled howitzers and long-range              maximize the capabilities of new fire support assets.
multiple rocket launchers to the artillery available to       The Sowet aim is to achieve ever greater rates of
army and front commanders greatly enhances their              advance and deeper penetrations into the enemy's
ability to provide area and counterbattery fire support       rear, while minimizing the enemy's capability to
to subordinate divisions as they maneuver at consider-        release destructive power on attacking Soviet forces.
able depth in the enemy's rear.                                  Soviet fire planning and execution are still
   The increasing densities of artillery enable entire        extremely centralized. While this could be an
battalions to fire missions that were previously fired by     advantage in the preparation and during fires in sup-
individual batteries. Improvements in target acquisi-         port of the attack, it could cause considerable difficulty
tion radar allow the Soviets to achieve greater sutprise      in the accompaniment phase.
and shorter, more intense fire preparations. Fire                The command and control system for air support is
missions may be initiated without registration from           even more centralized than that of the artillery. Com-
battalions and batteries. Artillery pieces may be laid        munications are limited between air and ground com-
using shorter, emergency occupation procedures.               manders, especially below division level. This is true
   Soviet artillery battalions are beginning to receive       even in attack helicopter units, where close coordi-
electronic field artillery computers. Automation of           nation with ground units is critical. The Soviets
gunnery computations should help Soviet artillerymen          recognize the limitations of their present command
to reduce their mission times and to deploy their firing      and control system. They are trying to improve com-
batteries with more flexibility.                              munications equipment and coordination to enhance
  The size of helicopter forces has been expanding at a       the ground commander's influence over combat sup-
constant rate. Older combat helicopters are being             port assets.


ARTILLERY ASSETS                                               Organization for Combat
    In the Soviet ground forces, the branch of rocket            The command and organizational structure, 'Which
 troops and artillery is responsible for the following:        insures flexibility in concentrating artillery fire, is
  • Surface-to-surface guided missiles and free flight         established by temporary, mission-oriented groupings.
 rockets of fronts, armies, and divisions.                     Organizing artillery into army, divisional, and regi-
. • Field artillery (multiple rocket launchers, field          mental artillery groups provides maneuver com-
 guns, howitzers, and mortars 120-mm and larger).              manders continuous artillery support with the
  • Antitank artillery (See Chapter 10).                       required degree of centralized control. Artillery
    Motorized rifle units from division to battalion are       groups usually consist of at least two battalions of
 assigned their own organic field artillery element-an         similar or mixed type units, to include field guns,
 artillery regiment to a division, an artillery battalion to   howitzers, and multiple rocket launchers. Command
 a regiment, and a mortar battery to a battalion. The          and control of the group is provided by a designated
 same is true of the tank division except that the tank        commander and staff, usually the commander and staff
 battalion has no organic artillery or mortar unit.            of the artillery regiment or battalion 'Which is the core
 Both the motorized rifle and tank divisions are               of the group.
 assigned their own surface-to-surf.lce missile (SSM)
 battalion.                      .                             Army Artillery Group (AAG). Front artillery
   The combined arms army, and sometimes the tank              assets normally are allocated among committed
 army, has an artillery regiment or brigade with at least      armies, proportionate to the importance of the
two long-range gun battalions and a howitzer bat-              assigned tasks. When an army commander receives
talion. The army usually has an SSM brigade and may            front artillery assets, he decides, based on the concept
also have an MRL regiment.                                     of the operation, what artillery will be suballocated to
   A front would contain an artillery division made up         his first echelon divisions. The division executing the
 of several long-range gun and howitzer regi-                  major army mission gets the most artillery. The remain-
ments/brigades, an MRL brigade, and at least one               ing artillery battalions may be formed into an AAG
 antitank regiment/brigade. It may be supported by a           which will then assume the primary counterbattery
heavy artillery brigade in addition to the artillery divi-     mission for the army.
sion. Afrontwould also have at least one SSM brigade.
 (For more information on fire support organization,           Division Artillery Group (DAG). The division
see PM 100-2-3).                                               commander also allocates artillery, resulting in the
                                                               formation of a DAG and regimental artillery
                                                               groups. The division may organize more than one DAG
Allocation Procedures                                          if necessary due to span of control, number of
   The following are procedures for the alloca-       battalions available, and assigned missions. The DAG
tion of artillery by a higher headquarters to a maneuver       may vary in size from two to four battalions and is
force for the execution of a given operation:                  employed in general support of the division. The DAG
 • Front and army normally allocate artillery bat-             assists the army with the counterbattery mission or, if
talions in accordance with the importance of the               capable, may petform this mission itself.
missions to be carried out by armies and divisions.
 .• A division ,will allocate some of its organic and           Regimental Artillery Group (RAG). Regimental
attached artillery to leading regiments.                       artillery groups are formed from organic and attached
 • A regiment may attach some artillery to leading             artillery and reinforcing nondivisional artillery bat-
maneuverbattalion~                                             talions assigned to provide support to the first echelon
 • Motorized rifle regiments in a division second              maneuver regimen~ Normally RAGs are composed of
echelon normally retain their organic artillery.               two to four artillery battalions and temporarily are
 • Second echelon divisional artillery may be                  assigned the numerical designation of the supported
temporarily attached to first echelon divisions.               regiment. The RAG destroys targets that binder the
 • Second echelon divisions, regiments, and bat-               advance of the atClcking forces. An example of the
talions are not normally reinforced with additional            formation of artillery groups is illustrated on the
artillery until they are committed.                            following page.
FM 100-2-1

Formation of Artillery Groups (Example) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

              TO OTHER

  I,AAG       I
      4 BNS

          TO OTHER
         1st ECHELON

  4    BNS

          TO OTHER
         1st ECHELON

  1. The artillery division has 20 battalions of field guns. howitzers. and multiple rocket launchers.
  2. In addition to its organic artillery division. the front may be allocated a heavy artillery brigade from the
  Reserve of the Supreme High Command. but these assets are not likely to be suballocated to armies.
  3. A first echelon division may receive artillery battalions from a second echelon division.
  4. Antitank and SSM battalions are not normally included in artillery groups.
  5. The regimental howitzer battalion is part of the RAG.
  6. An artillery battalion or battery assigned to a RAG may be further allocated to a motorized rifle ortank
                                                                                                                           FM 100-2-1

                                                                               COMMAND AND CONTROL
    Artillery groups established fur the defense are                             At regiment and above, an artillery officer who plans
 normally maintained intact until the offense is                              and coordinates artillery fires serves on the staff of
 resumed Groups funned to support the offense are                             maneuver unit commanders. He is called the chief of
 generally dissolved or reorganized when the sup-                             artillery at regiment and the chief rocket troops and
 ported maneuver units enter the exploitation phase of                        artillery (CRTA) at division and above. The artillery
 an operation. DAGs and RAGs are funned or dissolved                          staff officer (chief of artillery or CRTA) is responsible
 in accordance with plans and orders of higher head-                          for controlling the artillery units organic or attached to
 quarters. Through his CRTA, the division commander                           his maneuver unit, although he does not command
 may assign specific artillery units to provide support to                    them. The commander of the organic artillery unit
 designated maneuver units. In a fluid situation, such as                     assigned to the maneuver unit is directly responsible
 in exploitation or pursuit, artillery support will be pro-                   for the performance of his artillery unit.
 vided to lead maneuver units. lbrough the division                              At maneuver battalion level, the commander of an
 command and control net, the division commander                              attached artillery subunit acts as the fire support
 retains the ability to fonn new groups as the situation                      coordinator to the battalion commander.
 may require. When groups are -dissolved, army and                               The division CRTA controls the division artillery
front assets may revert to centralized control to pro-                        regiment (including the MRL battalion), the SSM
 vide long-range reinforcement for divisional and regi-                       battalion, the AT battalion, and the ATGM batteries,
 mental artillery.                                                            mortar batteries, and howitzer battalions of the
    An artillery battalion or battery assigned to a RAG                       subordinate maneuver regiments, though he does not
 could be directed to support a maneuver battalion.                           command any of these units. The CRTA also has the
 The release from centralized control would permit the                        authority to inspect the artillery units in the division
 artillery subunit to carry out missions in support of the                    and to hold them accountable for their technical
 specific maneuver battalion while remaining subordi-                         proficiency.
-nate to the RAG. Motorized rifle battalions also have a                         In combat, the artillery groups fonn the basic
 significant organic capability in the mortar battery. Its                    framework for the control of artillery fires in the divi-
 deployment is coordinated with that of other artillery                       sion. Decisions about the employment of artillery are
 weapons, as authorized by the maneuver battalion                             made on a centralized basis. The division commander,
 commander.                                                                   with recommendations from his CRTA, exercises

The Role of the CRTA in the Motorized Rifle Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                  ----------                I

                 .---_ ..... _----:----------
                                                               MORTAR BATTERIES
                                                               OF THE MOTORIZED
                                                                                                          HOWITZER BATTALIONS
                                                                                                           OF THE MOTORIZED
                                                                                                            RIFLE AND TANK
        RIFLE REGIMENTS                                         RIFLE BATTALIONS

   NOTE: The CRTA coordinates the fires of all the above units through the command battery, though he
   commands none of the units. The mortar batteries must satisfy the requirements of their battalion
   commanders. and the howitzer battalions and ATGM batteries must satisfy the requirements of their
   regimental commanders_

 FM 100-2-1

 control over all organic and allocated artillery within         the tasks of the motorized rifle regiment and its RAG.
 the division. The following procedures are observed:            The senior commander who allocates the artillery unit
  • The division commander specifies the artillery               can change the mission of attached or supporting
organization for combat and the tasks to be carried out          artillery during the course of combat. The period of
by the artillery.                                                attachment normally will cover the time needed to
  • The CRTA conducts and coordinates fire planning.             accomplish a particular tactical mission. Such a period
  • Artillery commanders normally are collocated                 could vary from a matter of hours to several days.
with the commanders of the supported maneuver
  • The DAG commanders report directly to the                    Coordination and Communications
CRTA '                                                             The artillery commander normally is collocated
  • RAG co~ders report directly to the supported                 with the commander of the maneuver unit he is sup-
maneuver regimental commander while retaining                    porting and thereby effects coordination face-to-face.
'cOntact with the CRTA                                           Provision also is made for the artillery commander to
  •. Artillery battery and battalion commanders keep             enter the VHF (FM) command net of the supported
their supported maneuver commanders informed and                 unit. Except when subunits have been detached for
report to their controlling artillery headquarters.              special missions, artillery commanders retain rigid
    The division CRTA coordinates the artillery fires of         control of the deployment of weapons and observation
the division through the command battery, though he              posts to provide continuous artillery support in all
commands none of the units. The mortar batteries                 phases of combat.
must satisfy the requirements of their battalion com-              Radio and wire are the primary means of com-
manders, and the artillery battalions and ATGM bat-              munication, although Soviet artillery units also use
teries must satisfy the requirements of their regimental         messengers as well as visual and sound devices. By
commanders.                                                      regulation, communications are established from
                                                                 senior to subordinate and from supporting unit to
                                                                 supported unit.
Command Relationships
 An attacbed artillery battalion or battery is Under the
 operational control of the maneuver force com-                  Radio Communications of a
 mander. A supporting artillery battalion or battery             Division's Artillery Regiment _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
 remains under the control of its parent artillery
 organization, with its fires delegated to a particular
 maneuver force.                                                     DIVISION COMMANDER
    An artillery battalion attached to a maneuver bat-                  (Monitors Division
 talion takes its orders from the maneuver battalion                      Command Net)
                                                                                                    DIVISION CRTA
 commander. Its batteries can be aSsigned to support                                                  (On CRTA's
 motorized rifle/tank companies, but the battalion still                                             Command Net)
 can be called on to support the maneuver regiment
 and to receive missions from the RAG commander.
    A supporting battalion remains subordinate to the
parent artillery unit or the RAG; but, if it has no regi-
 mental missions, it will fire missions for the motorized
rifle or tank battalion that it is tasked to support. Its bat-
-i:eries, however, cannot be tasked separately to support
subordinate companies of the maneuver unit, even
 though supporting and supported commanders may
be collocated. Thus, a supporting artillery battalion
will carry out missions for the maneuver battalion only
if the RAG commander permits or specifically directs
the action                                                                ARTILLERY                    ARTILLERY
    The fire plan of an attached battalion will reflect the            BATTALION FDCs           BATTALION COMMANDERS
                                                                       (On Regiment's Fire           (On Regim8llt's
specific support of the battalion to which it is attached,
                                                                         Direction Net)              Command Net)
but the fire plan of a supporting battalion will reflect
                                                                                                                                      FM 100-2-1

   Soviet artillery units may send radio traffic over sup-                         (VHF) vehicular radio, which is installed in every
ported unit command nets, artillery command nets,                                  howitzer. At higher levels of command, longer-range
and fire direction nets. Artillery group command nets                              HF (AM) radios such as the R130 are also used for
(e.g., RAG or DAG) have battalion commanders as                                    artillery command communications.
substations. Battalion nets have battery commanders                                   The Soviets use wire communications whenever
and the battalion command observation post as substa-                              subunits remain in one location for any length of
tions. Batteries have their own nets but can switch to                             time-normally in assembly areas of defensive
the battalion fire direction net if required. The bat-                             positions. To provide redundancy, artillery wire nets
talion command observation post has direct radio                                   normally parallel the wire nets of the supported units.
communications with battery firing positions on the                                   Soviet subunits also use pyrotechnics, especially in
fire direction net.                                                                coordinating prearranged artillery fire with the
   Towed artillery units rely primarily on the RI07                                advance of attacking maneuver forces. Signal flags are
(VHF) portable radio for internal radio communica-                                 used to acknowledge fire commands at the gun posi-
tions, whereas self-propelled units use the R123                                   tion, for convoy control, and for signaling between the

Towed Artillery Battalion Radio Nets - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __


                                                                                                               BTRY FIRING POSITION
     ARTY RECON                LOP

                                                                                                                           BTRY FOe
                                                                                               BTRY NET

                                                                                                             DIRECTION           NBC AIR
                                                                                                                NET             WARNING

                                             COMMANO NET                              ARTY REGTIGROUP
                                             OF SUPPORTED                               COMMAND NET
                                             MANEUVER UNIT

  NOTE: In self-propelled battalions equipped with the new artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles
  (ACRV). the R123 vehicular VHF radio is used in place of the Rl 07. Besides replacing Rl 07s shown here.
  the R123 is also found in each self-propelled howitzer. The LOP normally communicates with the BN COP.
  but may also communicate with the BTRY COP.

FM 100-2-1

firing point and the truck park (prime movers and             finding equipment, topographic survey equipment,
ammunition carriers) in a battery firing position              artillery fire direction computer equipment (manual
                                                               and electronic), and communications eqUipment. The
                                                               topographic survey equipment provides constant posi-
FIRE CONTROL                                                   tion data on the vehicle's location Communication
AND TARGET INTELLIGENCE                                        equipment consists of crew intercom, two radio sets,
                                                               two telephones, and two reels of wire. The latter are
Observation Posts                                             used to establish communications with supplemental
   Artillery fire is controlled through a network of          observation posts that are established by the crew of
observation posts. The network of artillery observation       the mobile observation posts, using instruments
posts established in a division zone may include              carried in the vehicle.
command observation, forward observation, mobile                  In the offense, the mobile observation post advances
observation, lateral observation, dummy observation,          closely behind lead motorized rifle or tank subunits,
close-in, and alternate observation posts. The number         conducting reconnaissance and fire missions on the
and type of observation posts depend on the mission.          move or during short halts. During a march, the mobile
During high-speed offensive operations, personnel in          observation post moves as part of an artillery recon-
these posts often operate out of armored command              naissance party in the lead security element of the sup-
and reconnaissance vehicles. The most important               ported motorized rifle or tank unit. In the defense,
types of observation posts are discussed below.               mobile observation posts may form part of the combat
   The command observation post (COP) serves as               outposts in the forward security zone.
both an observation post and command post. The COP               A lateral observation post (LOP) is established in
is located where the artillery commander can observe          addition to the COP or FOP so that the same sector of
his zone or sector of fire, study the target area and         the battlefield can be observed from two of the
terrain, follow the progress of friendly forces, and          observation posts. At battalion level and higher
direct or coordinate artillery fires. In most cases it will   artillery echelons, the LOP is used for .accurately
be collocated with the forward command posts of the           locating targets, reference points, and registration
supported maneuver unit commander.                            points and for adjusting fire. LOPs also are used to
   The COP normally is manned by the artillery                study enemy defenses, dispOSitions, and activity. The
commander, and fire direction, communications, and            LOP also is used for observing high-burst or center-of-
reconnaissance personnel. Although both battalions            impact regi~tions. The controlling observation post
and batteries have fire direction centers (IDCs) at the       is usually the COP, and the LOP is situated on the flank
firing position, fire direction computations normally         in a position that will give good observation of the
are accomplished at the COP and the IDC                       artillery unit's zone of responsibility.
Simultaneously.                                                  A dummy observation post may be used to confuse
    Artillery commanders may establish one or more            the enemy as to the actual position of the COP. After
forward observation posts (FOP) to supplement the             the COP is established and functioning, scout
 COP. At the battery and battalion levels, the FOPs are       observers construct a dummy COP. They use materials
 manned by the headquarters platoon leader, a scout,          found on the battlefield to simulate radio antennas and
 and a radioman. A FOP may be located with the sup-           other equipment. Although field training regulations
ported unit commander or with one of the advance              call for a dummy observation post, it normally is used
 maneuver elements. FOPs are employed especially in           only in static situations.
 the offense, during combat in the depth of the enemy's
defenses. When the COP can no longer cover its zone
of responsibility-or if the commander displaces,              Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition
causing the COP to displace-the FOP assures con-                 Observation posts frequently combine several target
 tinuous close fire support for the maneuver forces.          intelligence capabilities (i.e., flash ranging and visual
    A mobile observation post (MOP) may function              observation). Lone ground observers can be located in
either as a COP or FOP. The Soviets have a number of          trees or buildings. Air observers may use light observa-
artillery command and reconnaissance vehicles                 tion helicopters such as the Mi-2/HOPUTE.
(ACRV) that are used as MOPs. The crew of the MOP               Artillery reconnaissance patrols are used primarily
consists of five men: commander, driver/mechanic,             to locate enemy artillery units, especially those capable
 RTO/gunner, navigator, and rangefinder operator.             of nuclear strikes. The patrols may set up observation
 The vehicle contains day/night observation and range-        posts behind enemy lines to adjust the artillery fire.
                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

They also report on enemy organization and                     to motorized rifle and tank regiments in a conven-
deployment. Intelligence data from other observation          tional, nuclear, or chemical environment. The SP
posts and stations are transmitted to the COP, which          howitzers are equipped with filtration and overpres-
apparently relays them to the firing position.                sure NBC protection systems. Ammunition resupply
   A target acquisition battery is organic to the Soviet      for self-propelled howitzers is likely to be limited as
division artillery regiment. This battery and the divi-       long as they have to depend on wheeled trucks for
sion reconnaissance battalion provide the bulk of the         logistic support.
division's artillery intelligence. The battery subunits          The self-propelled howitzers are complemented by
include the following:                                        a new, tracked, artillery command and reconnaissance
 • Radar section. (This has a mortar- and artillery-          vehicle (ACRV). There are two of these ACRVs in each
locating capability.)                                         battery, one for the battery command observation post
 • Sound ranging platoon.                                     (COP) and one for the battery fire direction center
 • SUlVeillance radar section.                                (FDC). Two ACRVs are also assigned to the battalion
 • Reconnaissance platoon.                                    headquarters. One serves as the battalion COP and one
 • Topographic survey platoon.                                as the battalion FDC. A surveillance variant of the BMP    I
 • Meteorological survey section.                             is also in service with the artillery.
   The sound ranging platoon is capable of operating a           The Soviets use multiple rocket launchers (MRLs)
six-microphone sound ranging base that can locate             to deliver strikes at decisive moments in a battle. The
targets up to a range of 20 kilometers in a zone 6 to 8       MRL is an excellent area coverage weapon. The area
kilometers wide.                                              covered by a salvo and its rapid ripple fire make it an
                                                              excellent delivery system for chemical agents.
                                                                 Each motorized rifle battalion has an organic 120-
EQUIPMENT                                                     mm mortar battery. These indirect fire support
    Soviet field artillery is subdivided into field guns,     weapons are also used to assist the regiment in accom-
 howitzers, mortars, and mUltiple rocket launchers.           plishing its mission. For more information on fire sup-
 Until the mid-1970s, Soviet field artillery was all towed,   port equipment, see FM 100-2-3.
 with the exception of multiple rocket launchers,
 which are mostly truck-mounted. Towed guns are
 lightweight, low-cost, and simple. Their disadvantages       ARTILLERY AMMUNITION
 are lack of cross-country mobility and absence of gun           Conventional shells consist of HE, fragmentation,
 crew protection against nuclear, chemical, or conven-        and HE fragmentation types. The HE shells are used for
 tional counterbattery strikes. The Soviets continue to       destroying fortifications. Fragmentation shells are
 bring self-propelled weapons into their field artillery      intended mainly for attacking personnel and equip-
 inventory.                                                   ment in the open. The HE fragmentation shells are
    Field guns are used by the Soviets for-                   fitted with fuzes for either instantaneous or delayed
  • Killing troops in the open.                               detonation and are the standard projectiles for all
  • Destroying buildings above ground level.                  howitzers and guns. A time-delay fuze is also fitted for
  • Engaging of rapidly moving targets.                       airburst effects.
  • Bombarding of distant targets such as artillery bat-         The impact area of fragments from one HE
 teries, headquarters, and columns moving in the rear         fragmentation shell are-
 areas.                                                        • 122mm: 800 square meters.
  • Destroying tactical nuclear delivery means.                • 152mm: 950 square meters.
   Howitzers are used by the Soviets for hitting indirect        The sizes of craters caused by one HE shell can vary
targets and for destrOying or neutralizing enemy defen-       according to the surface struck, its condition, and also
sive positions. Tank and motorized rifle divisions have       the type of fuze. These are average dimensions for
three howitzer battalions in their artillery regiment.        point detonation fuzes striking flat ground:
Each motorized rifle regiment and some tank regi-              • 122mm: 1.5 meters at widest point and 0.5 meter
ments have one battalion of howitzers. This enables           maximum depth.
the regimental commander to engage targets of oppor-           • 152mm: 1.5 meters at widest point and 1.5 meters
tunity quickly.                                               maximum depth.
   Tracked, self-propelled (SP) howitzers have been              Field artillery pieces ( 152-mm and smaller) have an
introduced in recent years, considerably enhancing            antitank capability, and about 10 percent of their
the Soviet artillery's ability to give continuous support     combat load may be armor-defeating ammunition.
 FM 100-2-1

   Smoke is used to obscure the view from observation         Combat Formation of an Artillery Battalion - - - - - - - - - -
posts and fire positions, especially antitank positions.
Smoke shells are most likely to be used when the wind
is blowing towards or across the enemy position.                                                                                                                                               .t
Smoke is also used for marking enemy pOSitions, and
deceiving the enemy by concealing the size and direc-
tion of an attack. (For more information on the use of
smoke, see Chapter 13, PM 100-2-1).
   lliuminating shells are used widely by the Soviets in        AXIS OF ADVANCE                                                    ,-
night combat to observe enemy movements, to acquire
targets for all arms, and to provide reference points.
The standard illuminating shell lights up an area of up
to 1.5-km radius for 30 seconds. One gun firing two to
three rounds per minute is required to provide
continuous illumination for every 750 to 1,000 meters
of frontage. Other types of ammunition indude-
 • Nuclear.
                                                                                                                                         , ""'"
                                                                                                                                        \ \
                                                                                                                                             \ :f='                   "
                                                                                                                                                A             \           "

                                                                                                                                                          " ," - ,,
 • HE rocket-assisted projectiles.                                                                                                       COP 1ST BTRV                         "            ,
 • Chemical.
 • Incendiary.
 • Canister.
 • Propaganda.
   Planning for ammunition consumption is based on
                                                                                          ,..       -- ,         ....:f=, \                                - , '_J
                                                                                                                                                          7:-, '"
                                                                                                                                                                   ,              '

the unit offire, which is a fixed number of rounds per
                                                                                                                , .....
                                                                                                                              I          TEMPORARY
                                                                                                                                       FIRE POSITION
weapon or weapon system that is used for planning and
accounting purposes. It is not an authorized allowance                    I                         COP 20 BTRV/
                                                                   FORWARD OP                           _ -
or daily expenditure rate. For example, the unit offire
for the 122-mm howitzer is 80 rounds. For each opera-
tion, planning factors for ammunition expenditure are
established in units of fire. Ammunition distribution

and stockage also are measured in units of fire.
                                                                                                                            ......- ......
                                                                                                                           / /-,
                                                                                                                                  I :f= , ' \ .
                                                                                                                                               ........   ,
OF AN ARTILLERY BATTALION                                                                               '--J                          A       '\.
   Battalion firing positions normally are laid out in the                                       I                                ~OP 3D BTRV     \'
form of a large triangle with three batteries dispersed
to each of the three points of the triangle. Normally,                                          I
                                                                                          LATERAL OP
                                                                                                                                    \. r
                                                                                                                                      " t> \ ' ,
batteries in the battalion area emplace 500 to 1500                                            \                                       MTR RIFL BN COP \                          \

meters apart. The triangle will form a forward or
reverse wedge pointed toward or away from the
                                                                                                    \                              (,-"
                                                                                                                                           " ! \   ARTY BN COP                        \,
enemy (see illustration at right).
   The battery firing position is selected by the artillery                                             \                                      \'                         I
battalion commander. Certain factors must be con-                                                           \                      \, \                                   I            I
sidered in the selection of a firing position. Wooded
                                                                                                                '\.,               )           I',J                                   I
areas, foothills, and thickets are the most desirable
areas for concealed gun positions. If a concealed posi-
tion is desired in the vicinity of a heavily populated
area, gun positions are located in orchards or garden
                                                                                                                       '......               ~iilit1f
plots. The entrance to and exit from all gun positions is
concealed as much as possible.
   For an unconcealed or open gun position, sufficient          NOTE: Within the battalion firing position. batteries are normally separated from each other by 500 t
range must be allowed for the battery to accomplish a           1500 meters.

;ervation     Combat Formation of an Artillery Battalion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.ons, and
he use of

ioviets in      AXIS OF ADVANCE                                                              ,-
e points.
rea of up
                                                                                                   \ ,\
 provide                                                                                          \ \
o meters
                                                                                                           \ :f:'             "

                                                                                                                       ,"',-- , ,
                                                                                                           f),. \                 " ,
                                                                                                       COP 1ST BTRV
                                                                                                                      ..... ,                   ,

Jased on
                                          "        -- ,            ...:f:,       \
                                                                                                                     \~I                "

                                                                                                                                                    ,,_ J
                                                               ( is. I
                                                                                     I              TEMPORARY
                                                                                                  FIRE POSITION
lowance                   I                        COP 2D BTRV/
                   FORWARD OP                          _ -
lit of fire                                                                                                                                                                                              PRIMARY
                          \.6.                /,"-                                                                                                                                                        FIRING
iture are                 \ ...... ..., 1                                                                                                                                                                POSITION
tribution                                                                                                                                                                           3D BTRV
                                                                                     ,..- ......
JUt in the                                      I                                        ~OP 3D BTRV                      '\ \
~ormally,                                      I
                                          LATERAL OP
                                                                                             '......                I'>
                                                                                                                    r         \ '\
 to 1500                                                                                          MTR RIFL BN COP \                     \                                 ...-,
ward or
rom the                                        h   \                                         (,-"
                                                                                                           " ! \ \  ARTY BN COP             ,                    ,,      1- t' ,
                                                                                                                                                                          _/        "-
 be con-
                                                           \                                  \
                                                                                                              \ \
                                                                                                                1 \
                                                                                                                                  I         I
                                                                                                                                                                                             "- "-
                                                                                                                                                                                             I ":::"eJ
Wooded                                                                                                                                                          I                            ,-'
desirable                                                      "                             )                  I         \, J              I               I
                                                                                                                                                            I                        ",

                                                                         ,~                                  ~"ilrf                                         /--, ",,,,,,, ALTERNATE
.r garden
                                                                                                                      ,_/                                   \~J....    FIRING POSITION

,ufficient      NOTE: Within ttie battalion firing position. batteries are normally separated from each other by 500 to
)mplish a       1500 meters.
                                                                                                                                FM 100-2-1

direct fire mission at the weapon's maximum effective                           simplifies the computation procedures required for
direct fire range. The fire position also should afford                         battery fire missions because it reduces the need for
cover for the gun crews and their ammunition and                                individual piece corrections. The Soviets continue to
should have interlocking fires with adjacent weapons.                           favor this disposition, despite its obvious vulnerability
Unconcealed firing positions could be found near                                to enemy counterbattery fire and air attacks, because
fences, thickets, and roads, or in ditches.                                     they rely largely on manual computation in their fire
  Within the batteries themselves, gun positions                                direction procedures. The reduced computation and
normally lU"e laid out at right angles to the axis of                           mission time enables batteries to complete missions
advance. The battery is deployed in a straight line with                        and relocate more quicklY, thereby reducing their
equal intervals between guns. This pattern of deploy-                           exposure to enemy fire and compensating somewhat
ment reduces emplacement/ displacement time. It also                            for the vulnerability inherent in the formation.

Artillery Battery Firing Position - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                                   -Up to 200 M-
                                                                                    15-30 M
                                                            WEAPON PIT  ..                   •
                                                          (RPK OR RPG-~ 15-


                              GUN POSITION OP
                                                                               ({                                          TOWING
                                                                Up to
                                                                               ~ (1.                                       VEHICLES

                                                               300 M
                                                                       _ -f-E
                                                                                    0     GUN PIT
                                                                                 ...;;;..' WITH
                                                                                           CREW (

                                                                                                         !MMAND POST
                                                                                                            OF BATTERY
                                                                                                          SENIOR OFFICER

                                                                                                 PLATOON COMMANO POST
                                                                                                                             •• ••
                                                                    20-40 M
                                                                           ~   ~ 0-- AMMO ACCESS
                                                                       -       ~           (immediate ammo)

                                                                _ ~ O-..MO SHELTER

          I......                               400 M - - - - - -......~I ••- - - - 200-500 M ----........,...1

  NOTE: Slit trenches and crew shelters may be dug beside gun pits and command posts. Positions may be
  linked by communication trenches.                                                                                         (NOT TO SCALE)

FM 100-2-1

   Soviet artillery does use formations that vary the                           Main and alternate gun positions are selected for a
interval between guns and disperse the guns in depth                         battery in the offense, but only a main one is used in a
with the aid of electronic field artillery computers. The                    meeting engagement. Main, temporary, alternate, and
Chief of Soviet Rocket Troops and Artillery, Marshal                         dummy sites are used in defense.
Peredel'skiy, indicated in December 1980 that such                              In the offense, minimal work is done on gun
computers were available and being deployed. Even                            pOSitions. When time allows, positions will be
with computers, the Soviets may retain the linear                            developed progressively and camouflage nets may be
formation for the sake of speed and simplicity. They are                     used to conceal gun pits.
trying to reduce the time that a firing battery remains                         Battery firing positions are organized by platoons
in position after the first round is fired to as little as 4                 (two firing platoons of three guns each). Each platoon
minutes. Soviet artillerymen are now required to                             has a platoon headquarters and three gun sections. The
render effective fire from emergency positions                               platoon leader of the first firing platoon is the senior
without firing a registration. Under these conditions,                       firing position officer and performs most of the func-
the linear deployment retains its utility and attractive-                    tions carried out by the battery executive officer in a
ness to Soviet artillery commanders.                                         US Army howitzer battery. (The battery commander is
   Possible variants in battery firing poSition deploy-                      normally at the COP with the supported unit
ment are illustrated' below.                                                 commander. )

Deployment of a Howitzer Battery (Variants) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    I-up to       110 M     -I                      I-          up to   100 M - - - - /
     I                   ~-

    I              /                I

    :/®                             I
    Ie                        @
                                    up to
                                                            \        -=--        ®
         \H                        200   M

                                                                                                  I-up to        110M_I

    @    Senior Battery Officer (Commander of the Firing Position}          @ Platoon Leader of Second Platoon     CD   Base Piece

                                                                                                                                              FM 100-2-1

    Rocket launchers are used to place heavy fire on                                    Some protection from fire and observation may be
 important targets at decisive moments in an engage-                                    gained by siting the battery behind high cover.
 ment. They also may be used for roving gun missions                                       During meeting engagements, the battery may
 and counterbombardment. Rocket launcher batteries                                      deploy in line on one or both sides ofa road. The head-
 move fotward 1 to 5 kilometers from their camou-                                       quarters and ammunition trucks may remain drawn up
 flaged positions to occupy fire areas, usually loaded                                  at the side of the road.
 and accompanied by one or more ammunition trucks                                          Normally bullhorns are used on the battery fire
 per launcher. To evade counterbattery fire, rocket                                     position. A land line is laid when time permits. The bat-
 launchers normally move to either a camouflaged posi-                                  tery COP issues fire control orders by radio or field
.tion or to a new fire area immediately after firing. Since                             telephone. Deployment of a BM-21 rocket launcher
 they move often, rocket launchers are seldom dug in.                                   battery is illustrated below.

Deployment of a BM-21 Rocket Launcher Battery - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                     I          '       \                       I

                 I        I"                \             ,--
                I'              \                                                                           1. After firing. rocket launchers return to camou·

                , 1/',1,' -Eft                                  I
                                                                                                            flaged position or move to a new fire area.
                                                                                                            2. In defense each BM·21 might be emplaced in a

                II/ I',                         15-50 M II --'
                                                                                                            firing position. and land line would be laid.
                                                                                                            3. launchers may be fired remotely from crew
                I     I J\
                , \ \ I' I
                I \V , I
                                                -Cr       ,--
                                                                                                            shelter trenches using 50·meter cable.

     !          \ , I,
                 \ I I 150-
                                                -c:r      I

                                                                            (~    I

                 I    , 300 M

                 " , , I", -c:r
                 J G '                                    I
                                                              _J                  I     1-5 KM
                 , ,," I                                  I
                 I I.' I
                 I ,\' I ,
                           -c:r         I

                    \ \ / I
                     \              I                                             I
                         '-                        1-150-300         M-I

     !       Battery COP                                            6       CP of Battery Senior Officer

                                                                        I   Shelter Trenches                                  Ammunition Trucks
             Multiple Rocket launcher                               f-      for launcher Crews                                (up to 3 per launcher)

  FM 100-2-1

     The following Soviet definitions are furnished as                          another. In the offense, maneuver by fire is used in the
   necessary background:                                                        depth of the enemy's defenses to suppress enemy
     Rapid fire is a method of conducting artillery fire                        strongpoints, to repulse counterattacks, and to cover
  whereby the weapon is fired as quickly as possible                            by fire the attacking unit's tlanks. In the defense,
  while not exceeding its maximum rate of fire and not                          maneuver by fire is used to destroy the enemy as he
  sacrificing accuracy. When the command for rapid fire                         deploys to attack; repulse the attack; support acoun-
  is given, each individual weapons crew begins to fire                         terattack; protect gaps in the defenses, including gaps
  independently when ready.                                                     created by enemy nuclear strikes; seal off enemypene-
     Systematic fire is a method of artillery fire where                        trations; render assistance to neighboring units; and
  every round (salvo) is fired on command at a set                              support a unit that is defending all directions. Wide use
  interval. This method is used for firing on observed                          of maneuver by fire helps compensate the defending
  targets during registration (individual rounds) or                            unit for having fewer weapons and enables the
  when the unit is firing a destruction mission (salvos).                       defending commander to achieve fire superiority at
  Systematic fire is used against unobserved targets in                         the critical time in decisive sectors. Plans for maneuver
  the course of fire assaults * of a given duration, during                     by fire· are normally a part of the defensive fire plan. In
  controlling fire *, and during harassing fire, usually                        such planning, artillery units are assigned several sup-
  alternating with rapid fire. The tempo ofsystematic fire                      plementary sectors offire covering areas along the sup-
  against observed targets depends on the capabilities                          ported unit's flanks and the gaps between units.
  and equipment of the observer, whereas the tempo of                              In conducting fire with direct aiming (often
  fire against an unobserved target is determined by the                        confused with "direct fire"), the gunner of the artillery
  amount of time allotted for the expenditure of a given                        weapon can aim the piece using direct visual contact
  amount of ammunition The tempo of systematic fire is                          with the target. An artillery gunner who can sight
  constant during a fire assault but may be intermittent                        directly on the target will usually engage it with direct
  for harassing fire. Systematic fire may be fired by a                         fire, but because ofthe target's range or characteristics
  single weapon, a firing platoon, or an entire battery. On                     of the weapon, he may engage it with indirect fire. A
  receiving the mission, the firing unit also receives a                        mortar crew, for example, could sight directly on a
  rate of fire and an ammunition expenditure                                    target but would have to engage it with indirect fire.
  requirement.                                                                  The Soviets write at great length about direct aiming
     Counterbattery fire is the use of artillery to accom-                      advantages like the reduction in mission time and a
  plish the suppression and/or destruction of enemy                             drastic reduction in ammunition expenditure. Direct
  artillery batteries located in screened firing pOSitions.                     fire is recommended against targets at relatively short
  (The Soviets no longer officially use this term but state                     ranges (under 1,200 meters). Indirect fire with direct
  that the concept it represents is still valid and neces-                      aiming is considered feasible at ranges out to 3
  sary.) Combat with enemy artillery is one of the Soviet                       kilometers and perhaps farther, depending on the
 Army artillery's most important missions because it                            weapon sighting equipment and visibility.
 .enables Soviet ground forces to achieve fire superiority
  on the battlefield. However, combat. with enemy
  artillery today requires more than counterbattery fire.                       Offensive Fire
  It now requires the destruction of the enemy com-                                The offensive fire assault is characterized by
 mand and control centers as well as his artillery and                          surprise and a high density of fire on the target. Several
  requires the cooperation of the other combat arms and                         batteries or battalions fire against an individual target.
  combat aviation                                                               Fire assaults constitute the major subelements of an
     Maneuver by fire is the shifting of a unit's fire from                     artillery preparation for an attack. All (or at least the
 one target (or group of targets) to another without                            larger part of) the artillery of a division or army carry
  changing firing positions. This is a combined arms con-                       out these assaults Simultaneously on a large group of
 cept in which the artilleryplays a critical role. It is used                   targets. Targets may be destroyed or suppressed by fire
 to mass fires on the most important enemy objectives                           assaults (see Target Da.",age Criteria, Chapter 8). The
 and troop formations to destroy them in a short period                         number of fire assaults is determined by the nature of
 of time or to redistribute fires to destroy several targets                    the target to be destroyed (dug-in, covered, armored,
 simultaneously. Maneuver by fire also may be used to                           etc.), the number of rounds allocated for its sup-
 shift the main combat effort from one direction to                             pression/destruction and the time required for
                                                                                available artillery to expend the rounds allocated. The
*These methods of fire are identified and discussed in subsequent paragraphs.   duration of the fire assault is determined by the tactical
                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

situation and by the maximum rate of fire of the               Afire concentration is conducted simultaneously by
weapons firing the mission. Soviet experience in             several batteries or battalions against a common target.
World War II indicates that a fire assault would not         The fire concentration is used against enemy troop
exceed 15 to 20 minutes. A fire assault of a given           concentrations, strongpoints, artillery batteries,
duration typically begins with rapid fire (2 to 4 rounds     command and control centers, and other targets. The
per minute per weapon) and continues with                    dimensions of the fire concentration target area
systematic fire at a rate that will use the allocated        depend on the fire mission and the firepower of the
ammunition in the time allotted for the mission. When        ~illery subunit firing the mission.
a target must be destroyed in the shortest possible             Batteries and battalions conduct fire concentration
time, the duration of the assault is not fixed and the       with all weapons firing at once on the center of the
mission is conducted at rapid fire until the allocated       target area. Depending on factors such as target
ammunition is expended. A fire assault also is fired at      disposition and whether the target is "observed," all"
the rapid rate of fire when a target is to be destroyed      weapons may fire on the same elevation and deflection
rather than suppressed and when a moving target or a         settings or some units may be assigned different
target deployed in the open is to be suppressed. In the      settings.
time intervals between fire assaults, controlling fire          Massed fire is conducted against an important
(see below) may be used against the target.                  enemy objective by all or most of a given formation's
   Controllingftre is directed at an enemy target in the     artillery to destroy it in the shortest possible period of
intervals between fire assaults on the same target. Con-     time. It consists of one large fire concentration or
trolling fire is intended to deny the enemy the freedom      several large fire concentrations fired simultaneously.
to conduct combat activity or to allow escape before         Before massed fire is conducted, target areas are desig-
the next fire assault. It nonnallyis used when the inter-    nated and each area is assigned a codename. If the
val between fire assaults exceeds 15 minutes. Usually it     dimensions of the target area do not exceed 800 by
is conducted by a single battery firing at a systematic      800 meters, all partidpating artillery groups (regi-
rate of fire, rapid fire, or a combination of the two, and   ments, battalions) will fire simultaneously on the
will expend one tenth to one fifth of the rounds allo-       center of the target area, applying the prindples used
cated for the engagement.                                    for fire concentrations. If the target area is larger than
                                                             800 by 800 meters, it is subdivided into numbered
                                                             targets or target sectors. (Areas have codenames;
Safety Distances for Fire Support - - - - - - -              targets and sectors have numbers.) The targets/target
                                                             sectors are then distributed among the assigned
    The minimum safety distance between                      artillery groups or subunits for destruction or suppres-
  artillery and aircraft fire and friendly troops            sion with fire concentrations. To the extent poSSible,
  varies depending on the weapon caliber, type of            the mission will be fired simultaneously.
  projectile, and the range· from which the                     Successive fire concentrations are used in the attack
  projectiles are being fired.                               when the supported maneuver unit has begun the final
  GUNS AND HOWITZERS:                                        assault on enemy defensive positions. Successive fire
  • Firing without registration over troops                  concentrations are used when the successive sup-
  in the open at                                             pression/destruction of specific targets or target
                                                             groupings (such as strongpoints, weapon systems, and
     • Range less than 10 KM                500 M
                                                             command/control points deployed to the front and on
     • Range greater than 10 KM
                                                             the flanks of attacking troops) is required. Although·
  • Firing without registration over troops
   in armored vehicles or fortifications at
                                                             successive fire concentrations are used primarily to
                                            300 M
                                                             support the offense, it can be used to support counter-
     • Range less than 10 KM
                                            500 M
                                                             attacks in the defense. Successive fire concentrations
     • Range greater than 10 KM
                                                             may be single or double. In conducting a single
  • Firing after registration over
                                                             successive ftre concentration, the artillery unit fires
     • Troops in the open
                                                             initially on the single line of targets closest to the
     • Troops in armored vehicles or
  fortifications                            200 M
                                                             attacking troops and shifts the single fire concen-
                                                             tration to progressively deeper lines or groups of
  MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS: 1000 M                          enemy targets as the supported attacking troops
                                                             advance. A double successive fire concentration
  AIR STRIKES:                              200-700 M        requires the simultaneous fire of two artillery groups.
FM 100-2-1

The first group fires on the line of targets closest to the                    initiated on a signal from the combined anus division
supported attacking troops, while the second group                             commander when the ground assault begins. The
fires on the next line of targets. The first artillery group                   supported maneuver regiment or battalion
then shifts its fires from the first line of concentration                     commander gives a signal to shift fire to each subse-
to the second line, while the second group shifts its                          quent line of concentration . The successive fire
fires from the second line to the third -and so forth. In                      concentration was used widely with the rolling
a double successive fire concentration every line of                           barrage (see below) during World War II and it is still
targets, except the first, is attacked twice.                                  given prominence today.
   The first line of concentration covers the defender's                          The rolling barrage normally is used in the support
forward positions. Subsequent lines of concentration                           phase of the attack. It is a continuous curtain of fire
are 300 to 1,000 meters apart through the depth of the                         which is successively shifted from one phase line to
enemy's defenses. On each successive fire concen-                              another in front of attack troops. Like the successive
tration, concentration sectors are assigned to every                           fire concentration, it may be fired against a single line
battalion or battery firing the mission. The duration of                       or against two lines Simultaneously, and fire is shifted
fire on the intialline of concentration (line of targets )                     in a similar way. The rolling barrage differs from the
is determined by the amount of time required to get                            successive fire concentration in that it is planned
the attacking troops from the line of attack (where                            assuming a uniform distribution of targets throughout
normally they deploy into attack formation, and                                the target area. It then shifts fire between phase lines
preparatory fires become supporting fires) to the                              that are uniformly spaced. (The successive fire
artillery fire troop safety line. The duration of fire on                      concentration focuses on targets that require concen-
subsequent lines of concentration is determined by                             trated fires, and the intervals between lines of concen-
the distance between the lines of concentration and is                         tration are determined by target location.) Fire

Successive Fire Concentrations - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

       Sector LYNX             Sector TIGER              Sector LION            Safety Line            Line of Attack
       (5 min +)               (5 min +)                 (5 min +)             (fire shifted           (Fire support

         \                                                \                    from LION
                                                                               to TIGER)               commences)

    n~\                           "                      .~                    ~               ~-
                                                                                                                    The fire preparation
                                                                                                                    phase must begin
                                                                              I                I
            ;~[1]                  ~                     3Qp
                                                                                                                    before attackers are
                                                                              I                I                    in range of enemy
                                                                                                                    ATGMs; i.e., 3-4 KM
    .~                       .~,
                                                                                      ~                Up to 2 KM

                                                          2~                  I
          \~,[1]                  ~[1]
                                                                              I                I
                                       I                                       l               l
                                        I  0.2-
                :-0.3-1 KM-:-0.3-1 KM -1--04 KM--II...        35 K M - - - - - - - -I
                                                    ·~---+---- -
                I                      I                        I    .                             I                                           I
                I                      ,
                                                                ! - 400-1000 M - :                                                             '
   1. Average target size (200 x 300 meters) would be engaged by up to one artillery battalion.
   2. Targets would have already been engaged by preparatory fire.                                                                   (NOT TO SCALE)

                                                                                                            FM 100-2-1

concentrations may be superimposed on the rolling             defense, standing barrier fire normally is planned well
barrage to insure the destruction of the most                 in advance. It is fired in front of and to the flanks of the
important targets.                                            defensive positions, and is observed from a ground
  In the rolling barrage, concentrations are planned          9bservation point. All the artillery of a formation
on phase lines every 400 to 800 meters, depending on          except rocket artillery is used to fire the standing
the density of targets in the target area. Intermediate       barrier fire. Each battalion or battery is assigned a fire
phase lines are planned for every 100 to 200 meters.          concentration sector on the line of fire concentration.
Artillery units will fire on each phase line for at least 5   The width of each unit's sector is computed based on
minutes at a rate of 4 to 6 rounds per 100 meters per          50 meters of coverage per gun (howitzer) or mortar.
minute and on each intermediate line for 1 or 2               Every standing barrier fire line of concentration is.
minutes at the same rate.                                     assigned a code name.
  A rolling barrage is divided into battalion and battery        The line of concentration for the standing barrier
sectors. Standard sector widths are as shown below.           fire must be no closer than 300 to 500 meters from
                                                              friendly troops for troop safety and so gunners can fire
                                                              antitank weapons in direct fire at enemy tanks and
Sector Width for Rolling Barrage - - - - - - -                APCs as they come through the barrier fires. Standing
                                                              barrier fires begin the moment enemy tanks and infan-
    TYPE                          METERS                      try approach the planned line offire concentration and
     OF                 Per          Per         Per          continue at rapid fire until the infantry is cut off from
   WEAPON              Weapon       Battery    Battalion      the tanks and halt their attack If the infantry goes
   Field guns           20-25         150         450         around. the fire concentration line, the fires will be
                                                              shifted to the new approach.
   Howitzers              35         200       600-650           Standing barrier fire is used with other artillery fire
                                                              and fire from tanks and infantry. For example, if dis-
   The division or regimental commander gives the             mounted infantry should lie down to escape the effects
order to shift from a phase line, but fire is shifted auto-   of the standing barrier fire, a fire concentration would
matically from intermediate lines in accordance with a        be fired to destroy them. Tanks penetrating the
timed firing program. Phase lines are given the names         barriers would be destroyed with direct fire.
of animals of prey (lion, tiger, etc.).                          Rolling barrier fire is placed on several successive
   The depth of a rolling barrage depends on the nature       lines of concentration, each closer to Soviet defending
of the enemy's defenses, the attack plan, and the avail-      troops. Lines of concentration for the rolling barrier
ability of artillery and ammunition. Normally, the            fire are planned for terrain that can be observed from a
rolling barrage is conducted through the depth of the         ground observation point. Distances between lines of
defenses of the enemy's first echelon battalions. The         fire concentration will be 400 to 600 meters and more.
rolling barrage requires a great deal of ammunition and       The final line of concentration closest to friendly
is not, therefore, the most likely method of offensive        troops will be 300 to 400 meters from forward defen-
fire. It may be used, however, to support a penetration       sive positions. Every battalion or battery participating
of well-prepared defensive positions and assault river        in the fire mission will be assigned a sector of frre on
crossings.                                                    each of the lines of fire concentration. The width of
                                                              each sector is based on the assignment of 25 meters of
                                                              coverage for each gun (hOwitzer) or mortar. The
Defensive Fire                                                entire barrier fire concentration area is given a general
   Barrier fire is a continuous curtain of defensive fire     codename, and each individual line of concentration is
across the approach of attacking tanks and infantry. It is    given a number in sequence beginning with the one
used normally in the defense but also may be employed         farthest from the defensive positions. Lines of concen-
in offensive operations against enemy counterattacks.         tration might be coded "Lion-I," "Lion-2," or "Shark-
Barrier fire is used with fire concentrations, massed         1," "Shark-2," etc. The rolling barrier fire begins the
fires, and directly aimed fire from tanks and guns.           moment the lead tanks or APCs approach the initial
Barrier fire is further divided into standing barrier fire,   line of fire concentration. The fire continues on that
fired on one line of concentration, and rolling barrier       line until the bulk of the advancing force has moved
fire on successive lines of concentration.                    out of the zone where rounds are impacting. Then the
   Standing barrierfire is fire placed on a single line of    fire is shifted to the next line of concentration. Fires
concentration to disrupt an enemy attack. In the              continue to be shifted until surviving enemy APCs or
 FM 100-2-1

 tanks have passed through the last zone of fire               25 kilometers per hour, each subunit being headed by
 concentration                                                 its commander. An artillery battalion occupies some
                                                               1.5 to 2.5 kilometers of road space, depending on
                                                              vehicle spacing.
FIELD ARTILLERY CONDUCT OF FIRE                                   The ability of field artillery to keep up with
   Massed artillery, "hub-to-hub" weapons, unsophisti-         maneuver units may be reduced if numerous small
 cated fire direction procedures, and weak logistical          attacks require the artillery to deploy. There also are
support may have been the case during World War II,           problems in moving artillery pieces across water obSta-
 but are not descriptive of Soviet artillery today.            cles. Normally the Soviets use amphibians or ferries for
   There are numerous historical examples in which             towed artillery, or wait for a bridge to be constructed
Soviet artillery massed against German forces,                before the bulk of field artillery crosses. When mfue-
particularly in the latter stages of World War II. The        fields are encountered, artillery often is delayed until
Soviets have studied these battles, observed conflicts        combat engineers have cleared a lane.
since that time (especially the 1973 Arab-Israeli                 These problems have diminished considerably for
conflict), conducted exhaustive weapon effects                units equipped with self-propelled howitzers. First of
studies, and incorporated these findings into                 all, the 122-mm SP howitzer is amphibiOUS. Both the
professional papers.                                           152-mm and 122-inm self-propelled howitzers have
   Soviet. offensive doctrine calls for intense artillery     excellent mobility on the road and cross-country. The
preparations of short duration, if pOSSible, that require      152-mm SP howitzer requires only one fifth of the time
a certain number of rounds by type to be delivered to         required by an equivalent towed battery to move from
achieve destruction. Defensive doctrine calls for             one pOSition to another and be ready to fire.
prolonged, high volumes of artillery fire in depth to             Because of the increased mobility of self-propelled
break up and to destroy the enemy's attack. To achieve        artillery, the Soviets probably move artillery batteries,
surprise and to limit susceptibility to enemy fires,          platoons, and individual guns within an assigned firing
Soviet artillery tries to be short but violent in the         position area to escape enemy counterbattery fire.
offense and more prolonged in the defense. The fires          Within his assigned area, the battery commander
are massive and are concentrated on critical points in        selects a primary position and one or more temporary
the offense or are dispersed throughout the sector            firing positions each 300 to 400 meters away from the
in the defense. This requires not only a numerical            previous position. The battery/platoon fires a mission
superiofity in artillery pieces but also rapid fire, long     of 3 to 4 minutes duration and then moves to an alter-
range, and mobility. Above all, the Soviets stress the.       nate position. This technique might be used during a
importance of thoroughly integrated fire and                  long offensive preparation or in the defense when
maneuver plans.                                               forward. or rearward movement is limited. Such
   While the regimental artillery battalion provides the      frequent and disjointed movement within a firing
flexibility and responsiveness required in a fluid            battery would force fire direction personnel to make
combat situa~ion, numerous longer-range tube                  numerous time-consuming corrections in elevation
artillery and multiple rocket launcher battalions from        and deflection for each firing platoon and possibly for
division, army, and front provide massive reinforcing         each weapon. Therefore, it is probable that this is prac-
fires when required In this way, the Soviets seek to          ticed only in artillery units with electronic fire direc-
achieve the densities of fire that they believe necessary     tion computers. Average reaction times from receipt of
without sacrificing the mobility that artillery units         fire orders to first rounds on the ground ( on
need to survive and to perform their mission on the           preplanned targets) are as indicated below:
modem battlefield.
   In the offensive, an artillery battalion leapfrogs its
batteries forward individually in bounds of some 3 to 4       Reaction Times for First Rounds of Fire _ _ _ __
kilometers. By day, it takes a towed howitzer battery
about 30 minutes to move, from receipt of the move-             Mortar battery •........... 1 to 1.5        minutes
ment order until it is ready to fire the first round in its     Artillery battalion ........... 2 to 3      minutes
new position. At night, the same move requires about            MRL battery .................... 4          minutes
                                                                RAG' ........................... 4          minutes
40 minutes.
   An artillery march column has 25- to 30-meter                DAG ..................•........ 5           minutes
intervals between vehicles and 100 meters between                The standard reaction time for shifting fire is 2
batteries. A column normally moves at a speed of 15 to          minutes.
                                                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

nme Frames for Repositioning of Artillery _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                                      TIME IN MINUTES REQUIRED FOR

                                                               EVACUATION OF
                                                                                                             MOVEMENT           OCCUPATION OF
                                                             FIRE POSITIONS OR
                                                                                                              (PER KM)          FIRE POSITIONS
                                        UNIT                 ASSEMBLY AREAS

                                                           BY DAY               BY NIGHT             BY DAY         BY NIGHT   BY DAY    BY NIGHT

   122-mm HOW 0-30                       BTRY                5-7                     9            3 (2() kph)            3.5   10-12        18

                                          BN                  11                    14                   3               3.5    23          32
   152-mm HOW. 0-1                       BTRY                5-7                     9                   3               3.5   10-15      15-20

                                          BN                  11                    14                   3               3.5    23          32

   152-mm HOW. 020                       BTRY                 10                    13                   3               3.5    12          18

                                          BN                  11                    14                   3               3.5    23          32
   130-mm GUN. M46                       BTRY                 10                    13                   3               3.5    12          18

                                          BN                  11                    14                   3               3.5    23          32
   122-mm MRL BM21                       BTRY                3-5                    6.5                  3               3.5   10-12        18

                                          BN                  7                      9                   3               3.5    23          32
   120-mm MORTAR                         BTRY                5.5                     8                 2.5               3      12          18

   Officially. self·propelled artillery (152·mm SP. 122·l)1m SP) can emplace or displace in 5 minutes; but
   self·propelled batteries may require as little as one fifth of the time required by equivalent towed artillery
   to relocate and be ready to fire.

   Battery firing procedures of SoViet tube artillery                                       In executing his duties as battery commander/for-
differ significantly from those of the US Army. The most                                 ward observer/computer, he is assisted by several
significant difference is probably the location of the                                   individuals assigned to the reconnaissance section and
battery commander. During the conduct of tire, the                                       headquarters platoon. These include the headquarters
Soviet battery commander (a captain or senior lieu-                                      platoon commander, the commander ofthe reconnais-
tentant) is placed in a command observation post                                         sance section, an observer, a range finder, a computer,
several kilometers to the front of the firing battery.                                   and a radio te]ephone operator.
From this observation point, he conducts target                                             Operations in the firing position also have many
observation, assists in the computation of tire missions,                                dissimil:¢.ties when comparing Soviet doctrine with
maintains contact with the ground forces his battery                                     that of the US Army. The Soviet's method of fire
supports, and controls the actions of his firing battery.                                direction, gun supervision, and gun positioning are all
The Soviets place great emphasiS on the experience of                                    different. The only similarity between a US and Soviet
the senior officer and his ability to make the most tacti-                               firing battery is probably that each has six guns,
cally sound decisions about target identification,                                       although the Soviet battery is broken down into two
acquiSition, and engagement.                                                             platoons containing three guns each. The battery FOe
FM 100-2-1

is manned by the battery senior officer (platoon leader      battalion firing pOSition. He will be assisted by fire
of the first firing platoon), assisted by fire direction     direction computer personnel. Depending on the type
computation and communications personnel, and has            of mission, battalion dispersion, and time available,
direct radio communications with the battery COP,            battalion fire direction personnel may compute the
the battalion COP, and the battalion FDC. The battery        gunnery problem for the entire battalion or run check
senior officer relays firing data to the guns.               computations while each battery computes the data
   The command "to battle" is acted on with the same         for its own guns. In. any case, all computers should
sense of urgency in the Soviet firing battery as the         begin computation silultaneously because all battalion
command "fire mission" in the US firing battery, but         stations hear the battalion commander transmit the
the individual steps to bring fire on the target vary        fire mission.
significantly. As stated, the battery commander in the          The order to commence fire comes from the
COP decides what targets of opportunity will be taken        battalion commander. The battalion commander·can
under fire. He also decides how to attack the targets        require each battery commander to adjust fire for his
relayed to him by the maneuver forces he is                  own unit by weapon or by battery salvos. Battery and
supporting.                                                  battalion COPs may be supplemented by forward
   In the Soviet system, there are four individuals          ground or air observation posts. Lone ground
responsible for the preparation of firing data:              observers can be located in trees or in the garrets of
 • The battery commander.                                    buildings. Teams are sometimes located forward in
 • The commander of the headquarters platoon.                armored vehicles. Air observers may use light observa-
 • The computer located in the COP.                          tion helicopters to see deeper into the enemy's area.
 • The computer located in the firing position.              (Air observation is considered essential to the success
   The computer positioned in the firing position is         of counterbattery missions.) Forward and air
usually the first to solve the gunnery problem. The          observers transmit target data" to the COP where
senior officer in the firing battery immediately relays      computation is accomplished.
the data to the gun platoons. The data is then set on the       As electronic computers are introduced into Soviet
six guns in preparation to fire.                             field artillery battalions, the procedures can be
   The battery commander and the computer in the             expected to change to accommodate and exploit the
COP also are required to solve the gunnery problem to        new capability. It is unlikely that there will be more
provide a separate check on the data supplied by the         than one computer available to each battalion, so fire
firing battery computer. If, for some reason, the data       mission computation and fire control are likely to be
from the COP is ready before that of the firing pOSition,    centralized at battalion. Battery fire direction
the battery commander transmits his data directly to         personnel will probably receive from battalion fully
the firing position. If a discrepancy exists between the     computed data that is ready to be passed to the guns.
firing data supplied by the two computers, the battery       They may run check computations manually on a
commander decides which is the more accurate. This           routine or random basis.
system demands that the battery commander be as                 Centralizing electronic computation at battalion
proficient in computing the various gunnery problems         level is consistent with establishing the battalion
as the computers. The Soviets feel that the Independent      (rather than the battery) as the basic firing unit in
computation of each gunnery problem by four                  Soviet artillery. It may be some time before these
different computers significantly reduces the chances        changes in organization, doctrine, and equipment are
for a large etTOr. This technique also insures that a fire   seen in all the field artillery units of the Soviet Army.
direction system is readily available in the event that      However, the forward areas will probably be equipped
either the fire direction capability at the COP or the       first.
firing position is destroyed or suppressed.
   When the battalion controls the conduct of fire,
the observation, computation, and firing are con-            FIRE PLANNING
ducted Similarly to battery level. The battalion com-           The fire planning process includes target
mander, normally a majer, is located at the bat~lion         acquisitiOn, organization for combat, assignment of
COP near the command post of the supported com-              tactical missions, determination of ammunition
mander. Target acquisition and fire direction com-           requirements, and formulation of a detailed fire plan.
putation personnel assist him in acquiring targets,          The fire plan is coordinated and approved at the
computing fire missions, and adjusting fire. Normally        highest level of participating units and includes input
the battalion chief of staff will be in charge of the        from subordinate units.
        Planners are guided by the following principles and          The basis for division artillery fire planning is estab-
     targeting priorities when developing offensive fire          lished by the division commander, his CRTA, and other
     plans:                                                       staff members during the reconnaissance of the area of
                                                                  anticipated action. During such reconnaissance, the
                                                                  organization for combat and means of coordination
      Principles of Fire Planning - - - - - - - -_ _              may be refined. The artillery representative receives
                                                                  information from the maneuver commander that
                                                                  forms the basis for determining the following:
        PLANNING GUIDANCE                                          • Targets to be fired on by artillery.
        • Nuclear fires, chemical strikes, conventional            • Priority of each target.
        fires, and tactical air support are included in a          • Sequence in which targets will be attacked.
        single, coordinated plan.                                  • Time for attack of each target.
        • Fire preparations precede major offensive                  An overriding factor in fire planning is the
        actions, whether or not nuclear weapons are to            availability of nuclear fires. Doctrine emphasizes the
        be used.                                                 planning of nuclear fire with conventional fire support
        • All artillery may be deployed for firing with           in all types of military operations.
        direct aiming at regimental and lower levels.                Extracts from an example fire plan for a I22-mm
        • Fires of tanks and antitank artillery may be            howitzer battalion supporting the attack of a
        used during preparations.                                 motorized rifle battalion are given at the right. The
                                                                 attack is made from positions in contact. TIlis extract
        TARGET PRIORITIES                                        has two major parts: preparatory fires and fires in
        FOR OFFENSIVE FIRES                                      support of the attack. Fires in support of the attack
        • Nuclear-capable artillery and missiles and
                                                                 consist of preplanned, successive fire concentrations
        their control systems.                                   delivered on three lines to a depth of 2.5 kilometers.
        • Command posts, observation posts,                      The first line, WOLF, includes the platoon strongpoints
        communications, and radar stations.                      on the forward edge of the defense, designated as
        • Enemy defensive strongpoints, especially
                                                                 sector 11. When the assaulting forces reach a safety
        ATGM positions.                                          line about 200 meters from line WOLF, fires are lifted
        • Conventional artillery and air defense units.
                                                                 on call to the deeper line, RAT.
        • Reserves and service support units.
                                                                     Besides successive fire concentrations, other on-call
                                                                 fires are preplanned; these consist of fire concen-
                                                                 trations, fire at individual targets, and barrier fires.
        The fires of all artillery units within a division are   Barrier fires are planned where enemy counterattacks
     incorporated into the army or front fire plan. The          are expected. They may coincide with the lines ofsuc-
     artillery unit commander at each level coordinates the      cessive fire concentrations.
     fires under his control. He determines new require-            The firing during the prep;uation phase is based on a
     ments and missions and, with the chief of rocket troops     time schedule shown in the fire plan and supple-
:c   and artillery or chief of artillery (depending on the       mented with radio, telephone, and visual signals. In
n    level), makes suggestions to the combined arms com-         addition, signals are prescribed to call for fire, to cease
     mander concerning adjustments in tactical organiza-         fire, and to shift fire.
     tion as the situation develops.
        The division CRTA submits requests and
     recommendations for the employment of nuclear fires.        Signals for Fire
     The fires of nuclear weapons organic to the division
     and/ or nuclear strikes allocated to the division from                                                  RADIOI
                                                                     ACTION              VISUAL           TELEPHONE
     army level are integrated with air strikes, conventional
     fires, and the overall scheme of maneuver.
        Prearranged signals are used for requesting and             Call for Fire     Green Flares          Hurricane
     shifting nonnuclear fire to successive lines and objec-
     tives. The CRTA indicates exactly where to establish           Cease Fire          Red Flares             Stop
     artillery observation posts, trying to place them
     together with the observation posts of the maneuver
     commanders.                                                    Shift Fire       Three-Star Flare          Storm
                                                                                                                                   FM 100-2-1

Illustrative Fire Plan. 122-mm Howitzer Battalion - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                         ASSAULT: Artillery and mortar bat- • Green fl ares           TGT 60                           TGT 18        TGT 40
                   teries. CPs. radar. platoon strongpoint of i • SNOWSTORM 2121 . 90 rds                              140 rds       80 rds
                   companies in first echelon of defense.         (Radio/telephones) Sector 11                        Sector 11     Sector 11
                                                                                      120 rds                          90 rds        120 rds

      H·27                           PI atoon strongpoints              • Star fl ares                    Sector 16   Sector 16 . Sector 16
       to          within deeper defensive positions;                   • HAIL 3131                        120 rds     165 rds     165 rds
      H·17         destruction of targets by direct fire;                 (Radi o/te Ie phones )           TGT 69
    (10 Min)       controlling fires against artillery and                                                  14 rds
                   mortar batteries.

      H-17         FIRE ASSAULT: Platoon strongpoints                   • Yellow flares                   Sector 11   Sector 11     Sector 11
     to H-5        within companies of first echelon of                 • RAIN 4141                        120 rds     150 rds       150 rds
    (12 Min)       defense.                                               (Radio/telephones)

       H-7         OVERLAPPING FIRE: 1st Battery fires                  • Yellow flares                   Target 60
        to         at artillery and mortar batteries. (Over-            • RAIN 4141                        60 rds
                                                                                                                        TOTAL ROUNDS
       H-1         laps H-Hour transition from preparatory                (Radio/telephones)
                                                                                                                      : PREPARATORY 1584
                   to supporting fires.)

      TIME           METHOD OF FIRE AND TARGETS                                                                                     BATTERY
      H-Hr          SUCCESSIVE FIRE CONCENTRATIONS                                                    Overlapping      45 rds        45 rds
       to                                                       .• Green flares                       Fires. as
      H-5                                      On line 1 WOLF    • HURRICANE 5555                     above
                                                    (Sector 11)    (Radio/telephones)

       ON                      5 minute fires on line 2 RAT             • line 2 RAT                       50 rds      50 rds         50 rds
      CALL                                       (Sector 21)            • Star fl ares
                                                                        • THUNDER 6666

       ON                   5 minute fires on line 3 TIGER             • line 3 TIGER                      32 rds       32 rds        32 rds
      CALL                                       (Sector 16)           • Yellow flares
                                                                       • TYPHOON 7777

                   FIRE CONCENTRATIONS                                  Readiness to open fire on Targets 20. 25. 32. 33. 69. 71
                   Individual targets                                   Targets A and B
                   BARRAGE FIRES

                                                                                                               TOTAL ROUNDS, PLANNED
  NOTE: These fire concentrations and barrage fires are contingency plans and will be used depending on        SUPPORTING 1152
  the progress of the attack.

                                                                                                                                  Foldin 9-19
FM 100-2-1                                                                                                                            -1

   Fire planning for an attack is a deliberate and precise    ready-to deploy into attack formation. The fire prepara-              -
process. Weapons and ammunition, target charac-               tion might consist of several artillery strikes, the first
teristics, and the plan of the maneuver commander are         and last of which normally would be the most power-
considered in terms of the target damage criteria. (See       ful. The final strike concentrates on the enemy's
Target Damage Criteria, Chapter 8). If ammunition is          artillery and mortar batteries, and overlaps the end of
limited, the maneuver commander may have to accept            the fire preparation phase and the start of the fire sup-
a lower level of damage.                                      port phase. Suppression of enemy defenses may take
   In the example fire plan, 1.9 units of fire are            place simultaneously throughout the entire tactical
expended to attack the prepared enemy defense. Thus,          and immediate operational depth of the enemy's
the total expenditure of rounds is expected to be 18          defenses. (Tactical and immediate operational depth
guns x 1.9 units of fire x 80 rounds per unit offire, or      are determined by the enemy's division and corps rear
2,736 rounds.                                                 boundaries, respectively).
   Of the total, 1.1 units of fire are planned for prepara-      The fire preparation phase might last up to 50
tory fires (1,584 rounds) and 0.8 units offire (1,152         minutes. Because of the mobility of potential targets
rounds) for the rest of the day.                              and the threat of enemy counterbattery fire, the Soviets
   If time is available, it is normal to layout on the        are striving to increase the intensity and to reduce the
ground the ammunition planned for use during the              length of the preparation phase-poSSibly to less than
preparation. The ammunition loaded on battery and             15 minutes. They are adding more artillery to the force
battalion (possibly regimental) transport is kept for         structure, and are giving special emphasis to the addi-
later use.                                                    tion of mUltiple rocket launcher units.
                                                                 Artillery support of the attack starts when the
                                                              supported maneuver units begin their assault and con-
FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE OFFENSE                                tinues with their advance through the enemy's defen-
   There are four phases of artillery support for an          sive positions. The artillery fires on the enemy immedi - II ND::.
attack against a defending enemy: fire support for a          ately in front of and on the flanks of attacking Soviet TORY 1
force's movement forward, preparation, support of the         troops, shifting fires in sequential bands progressively
attack, and accompaniment.                                    deeper into the enemy's defensive positions (normally
   Fire support for a force'S movementforward is used         successive fire concentrations or rolling barrage).
to cover a unit's movement to contact with the enemy.         Artillery support tries to keep the fire superiority
It may be used to cover a first echelon's movement            attained during the artillery preparation phase and sup-
from an assembly area to an attack position, or to cover      presses enemy defenses during the attack.
a follow-on force's movement forward before actual               Artillery support fires must coincide with the
commitment to battle.                                         advance of the supported maneuver unit. The length of
   Artillery preparation for an attack is the phase of        time artillery fires on the initial barrage line or line of
artillery fire that precedes the tank and infantry assault    targets is determined by the time required for the sup-
against the enemy. The artillery preparation is to sup-       ported attacking troops to move from the line of attack
press and/or destroy a defending enemy with                   to a safety line. Fires are shifted from line to line on the
organized, thoroughly planned, massed fires so as to          command of the maneuver unit commander.                            CJ
deny him the opportunity to organize resistance.
During the preparation phase, artillery fires are
                                                                 In the artillery accompaniment phase, artillery units
                                                              support maneuver units as they exploit their success in
directed against enemy troops, weapon systems, com-           the rear of the enemy's defenses. The accompaniment
mand and control centers, supporting communication            phase begins at the end of the support phase and con-
systems, and defensive structures.                            tinues until the attacking forces have accomplished
   The duration and organization of the artillery             their mission-this normally would refer to the divi-
preparation is determined by the overall attack plan,         sion mission of the day. During the accompaniment
the nature of the enemy's defenses, the level of destruc-     phase, artillery units displace with the units they sup-
tion required, the number and type of fire preparation        port and fire on newly located targets or targets that
missions allocated to rocket troops and aviation, and         have survived the preparation and support phases.
whether and in what quantity nuclear or chemical              Priority of fires go to the enemy's tactical nuclear
weapons are employed. The length of the preparation           weapons, artillery and mortars, and antitank weapons.
depends on the time required to achieve the planned           Artillery operations in this phase coincide with the
level of destruction. In an attack from the march, the        operations of the supported units and aviation support 32
preparation lasts until first echelon maneuver units are      elements. During the accompaniment phase, artillery ..
9-20                                                                                                                              9
                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

units provide fIres to the maneuver units as they attack        The fIre and maneuver of artillery units during all
enemy defenses from the march, fIght meeting                 phases are planned in the initial fIre plan. The artillery
engagements, force water obstacles, commit the               accompaniment part of the plan is then refIned con-
second echelon or reserve to battle, or repulse an air-      tinuously during the course of the attack. The artillery
borne assault. If the enemy counterattacks, the              accompaniment is conducted in close cooperation
artillery, in conjunction with tanks and motorized rifle     with aviation elements and other forces and systems
troops, fIres on the counterattack force as it advances      (e.g., tactical rockets) executing the fIre accom-
and deploys for the attack. During pursuit, accompany-       paniment phase.
ing artillery fIres on the withdrawing enemy and                The Soviets plan to achieve certain density nonns
destroys or suppresses enemy units left behind to            for artillery, depending on the tactical situation. In the
cover the withdrawal.                                        penetration of well-prepared enemy defenses, for
   In the accompaniment phase, artillery units fIre          example, high numbers of tubes per kilometer of
various types of missions, depending on the tactical         frontage are desirable, even under nuclear-threatened
situation. If the attackers encounter an enemy strong-       conditions. However, modern artillery and meth-
point in the depth of the enemy's defenses, the sup-         ods of fIre control will allow lower densities than
porting artillery attacks the target with a fIre concen-     those which were considered standard during World
tration or massed fIres. For repulsing a counterattack,      War II.
the artillery employs defensive fIre tactics such as            Some average guidelines for desired densities are-
standing barrier fIre or rolling barrier fIre. In sup-        • Attack of a well-prepared defense, in the direction
porting a unit that must overcome an enemy occupy-           of a main attack: 60 to 100 tubes per kilometer of
ing hasty defensive positions, force a water obstacle, or    frontage.
commit its second echelon, the artillery might have to        • Attack on a hasty defense in the direction of a main
conduct a short preparation (4 to 10 minutes)                attack: 60 to 80 tubes per kilometer of frontage.
followed by supporting fIres (successive fIre concen-         • Attack on a supporting axis: 40 tubes per kilometer
trations). The antitank reserve normally is used to          of frontage.
repulse enemy counterattacks, to provide security for           These densities include all calibers of guns,
the flanks of supported units, or to reinforce hasty         howitzers, and mortars. Densities computed in
defensive positions assumed by the attackers in the          number of tubes may increase by 50 to 75 percent
course of the attack.                                        when multiple rocket launchers are included
   In this phase, the supporting artillery must conduct         Based on the fIre plan, artillery is deployed to
wide-ranging maneuvers in depth and across its front,        provide preparatory fIres and the initial fIre support of
using both fIre and movement, and be prepared to             the attack. The fIgure below provides tactical deploy-
reorganize and reorient its fIres (maneuver by fIre) to      ment guidelines for Soviet artillery.
reinforce maneuver units moving on the main direc-              The prime mission of artillery in the meeting
tion of attack. (The main direction of attack might          engagement is to gain and keep fIre superiority over
change during the course of the attack).                     the enemy.

Tactical Deployment Norms - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

                                                                                             MULTIPLE ROCKET
     DISTANCES                      MORTARS                 GUNS &. HOWITZERS                  LAUNCHERS

   Between Weapons                    16-60 M                    20-40 M                            15-50 M

  Between Batteries                                             500-1500 M                       1000-2000 M
                                                              (normally about
                                                                  1000 M)

  From the FEBA                     500-1000 M                3-6 KM (DAG)                           3-6 KM
                                                              1-4 KM (RAG)

FM 100-2-1

   In the meeting engagement, artillery is used-                    The artillery organization for combat in the defense
 • To neutralize enemy fire support means, especially            is similar to that in the offense. Artillery groups are
nuclear-capable means.                                           located so that they can execute their primary mission
 • To impede maneuver and deployment of enemy                   and still be capable of massing fires in support of
forces.                                                         forward defense positions, particularly against armor.
 • To cover the deployment and support the attack of                Fire planning supports the defensive mission of the
friendly forces.                                                force. The defensive plan provides for-
   In anticipation of a meeting engagement, code                  • Destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear
designation for fire requests on particular areas and           and nonnuclear weapons. Counterpreparation and
terrain features are planned in detail; a chart of              counterbattery fires are planned for this purpose.
selected reference points is distributed. Although                • Neutralization of enemy command and control
basic fire planning is carried out by the CRTA, artillery       facilities.
often receives orders and amendments to orders by                 • Neutralization of enemy march columns and troop
radio while on the move. Detailed fire planning is              concentrations.
conducted by units initially engaging the enemy. As the           • Interference with the deployment of the attacking
battle develops, and as additional artillery is deployed,       enemy.                                                    .
the fire plan is refined and enlarged to provide maxi-            • Support of friendly units, to include forces in the
mum fire at critical points. Accompanying artillery is          security zone.
positioned to facilita~e prompt fires for each maneuver           • Neutralization of the enemy in front of the forward
unit as it is committed. Reinforcing artillery displaces        defenses.
at a greater distance to be in the best location to               • Neutralization of enemy units that have penetrated
support the battles with maneuver by fire.                      the defenses through extensive use of on-call fires and
   In a pursuit, long-range artillery, moving forward by        direct fire artillery.
bounds, delivers interdiction fire on crossroads and              • Delivery of fire in support of counterattacks and
communication routes to slow the enemy's retreat and            counteroffensives.
to disrupt the approach of his reserves. The more                 • Covering by fire the gaps and flanks in friendly
mobile artillery units available to the tactical com-           sectors, engineer obstacles, and natural obstructions.
manders (self-propelled weapons, multiple rocket                  • Contamination of terrain and obstacles.
launchers, and mortars) normally are attached to                  • Firing of smoke rounds.
parallel pursuit units. Control of forward artillery is           • Illumination.
decentralized to a great degree to meet the require-               Artillery weapons are deployed in concealed and
ments of a fluid situation. Nuclear strikes may be              dispersed positions to employ flanking, interlocking,
employed on the retreating enemy force. Tactical air            and suppressive fires at very close ranges and with
support is increasingly important during the pursuit,           great intensity. Each battery prepares primary, alter-
when the artillery does not have sufficient time to             nate, and night-firing positions. Selected artillery units
emplace.                                                        will occupy temporary firing positions, located well
                                                                forward, to provide fire support to units in the security
FIELD ARTILLERY IN THE DEFENSE                                      Roving batteries and guns are employed to confuse
   Fires in the defense consist of fire strikes, by all         the enemy as to the deployment and fire plans for
available delivery means, planned against the likely            friendly artillery. The regimental chief of artillery plans
approaches to the defense positions. Close coordina-            in detail the deployment of a roving unit. The plans
tion is stressed between nuclear, chemical, and con-            include positions, missions, method offire and number
ventional artillery and aircraft delivery means. Intelli-       of rounds to be fired from each position, itinerary and
gence efforts concentrate on determining enemy                  duration of the mission. The roving unit may leave
formations and locating their nuclear delivery means.           camouflaged decoys in a position to create the
   As in the offense, "maneuver by fire" in the defense         impression that it is still occupied.
means the shifting of concentrated fires. An essential
part of maneuver by fire is the ability to shift fires as the
enemy maneuvers. It is used to bring a high volume of           FIRING NORMS
fire against the enemy's most important attack group-             Firing norms are established for ammunition
ings, against targets in his rear, and for covering             expenditure, the area coverage expected, the effect of
friendly flanks with fire.                                      the target, and the density of fire over time. When
establishing these norms, Soviet artillery planners                   • Type and caliber of weapon engaging the target.                              targets are
consider several variables which are listed in the tables             • Range to the target.                                                         kilometers,
they publish for use in the field.                                    • Whether the target is under direct observation                               on the asSl
  The norms change as anyone or more of the                          during the artillery attack.                                                    teries that 1
variables change. These variables include-                             A general table of ammunition expenditure norms                               gency) oCCI
 • Type of target (e.g., equipment or personnel,                     to which most subsequent tables refer is given below.                           that the bat
deliberate or hasty defensive positions, hard- or soft-              Time is not considered. These norms might apply to                              they are firi
skinned vehicles, point or area disposition, etc.).                  any of the methods of fire described. Note that the                             than 3 hou:

Ammunition Expenditure Norms _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __


                               TARGET                             REQUIRED                                          CALIBER IN MILLIMETERS                 CALIB

                                                                                                                                        130   152   203    82

          (Missile) launcher                                                                            800   720       540       300   280   200   70
         Battery (platoon) of armored                              Target
    2                                                                                                                             450   360   270   120
         self propelled artillery (mortars)                      suppression
          Battery (platoon) of unarmored self-propelled or         Target
    3     dug-in towed artillery (mortars)                                                              540   480       360       240   220   180   100   400
          Battery (platoon) of towed                               Target
    4     artillery in the open                                                                                                   90    80    60    30    180

    5     SAM battery                                                                                                   200       150   150   100   60
         Signal and radar vans or radar                            Target
    6    control point in the open                                                                                      280       180   180   120   60    350
         Dug-in troops and weapons in prepared               Suppression of 1 hec-
    7    defense strongpoint positions                        tare of target area                                       320       200   200   150   60

         Dug-in troops and weapons, tanks, infantry
                                                             Suppression of 1 hec-
    8    fighting vehicles, and APCs in hastily pre-                                                                    250       150   150   110   45    300
                                                              tare of target area
         pared defensive positions, and assembly areas

         Troops and weapons in assembly                      Suppression of 1 hec-
    9    area in the open                                     tare of target area                                   I   30    i   20    20    15    5      35

         Command post in dug-out                             Suppression of 1 hec-
   10    shelter or other overhead cover                      tare of target area                                       320       200   200   150   60

         Command post in the open                            Suppression of 1 hec-
   11    (or mounted in vehicle)                              tare of target area                       120   100       80        50    50    40    15
         ATGM, anti tank gun or other                              Target
   12    individual target in the open                           suppression                            250   240                 140   140   100   50    240
                                                                         . u " , " u •• _ •••.• A-•.•
                                                                                                                                                                                                   FM 100-2-1

lftillery planners          • Type and caliber of weapon engaging the target.                                                    targets are unobserved and situated at a range of 10
listed in the tables        • Range to the target.                                                                               kilometers or less from the artillery. The table is based
                            • Whether the target is under direct observation                                                     on the assumption that the rounds are fired by bat-
 or more of the            during the artillery attack.                                                                          teries that have made deliberate (as opposed to emer-
clude-                       A general table of ammunition expenditure norms                                                     gency) occupation of their firing pOSitions. This means
nt or personnel,           to which most subsequent tables refer is given below.                                                 that the batteries are laid based on survey data and that
lOS, hard- or soft-        Time is not considered. These norms might apply to                                                    they are firing with meteorological data that is no more
~sition, etc.).            any of the methods of fire described. Note that the                                                   than 3 hours old.

                                          '".•q   ·~I'<_~rr«~'t'~"-""""-'~H;;.o"w"""_   ....",,   ~c"~   "''-   >

                                                                           RIFLED BARREL                                                      MORTARS                                         ARTILLERY
                        REQUIRED                                   CAUBER IN MILLIMETERS                                               CAUBER IN MILLIMETERS                        ::ee:            Z          ee:
                         EFFECT                                                                                                                                                     _ c:c
                                                                                                                                                                                                ..... ,    Wc:c
                                                                                                                                                                                                           t:l _
                                                                                                                                                                                                           ee: .....
                                                                                                                                                                                    W .....
                                           76                85         100             122                         130   152   203   82      120    160    240                     ::5         ct:l
                                                                                                                                                                                                w Z
                                                                                                                                                                                                ::3        """"
                                                                                                                                                                                                           ..... u
                                                                                                                                                             .~   ,,", .'   -',-"

                         Target                              720        540             300                         280   200   70                   140      60
                       destruction                                                                                                                                                  510         360        200

                         Target                                                         450                         360   270   120           450
                       suppression                                                                                                                   220     120                     560        400        240
                                                     . ',.

-prop ell ed or          Target
                       suppression                                                                                  220   180   100   400     240    160     100                    400         320        180

                       suppression        250                220        150                90                       80    60    30    180     90      40     20                      150        120        60

                         Target           250                240                                                    150         60
                       suppression                                      200                                               100                                                                   200        100

                         Target                                                         180                         180   120   60    350     180    80      40                     300
                       suppression                                      280                                                                                                                     240        120

Jared             Suppression of 1 hec- ,
                   tare of target area    480                450        320             200                         200   150   60           200     100     50                     320         240        100
tily pre-         Suppression of 1 hec-
                   tare of target area    400                350        250             150                         150   110   45    300    140     85      45                     240         180        80
embly areas
                  Suppression of 1 hec-
                   tare of target area    50                 45          30               20                        20    15    5     35      10      8       4                      10          8          5

                  Suppression of 1 hec-
                   tare of target area                                                                              200   150   60           200     100                            320         240        100

                  Suppression of 1 hec-
                   tare of target area                                                                              50    40    15            25                                     30          20        15
                       suppression                                                                                  140   100   50    240    140     80      35

FM 100-2-1

Calculation of Fire Coverage - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

    NUMBER OF ROUNDS PER HECTARE.                                                          :E
    A HECTARE IS 10,000 SQUARE METERS,                                   1 HECTARE         CI
                                                                                                        =10,000 M2 =2.47 acres

                                                                            100 M

    POINT TARGET - 90 percent probability that target is no longer combat effective.
    AREA TARGET - High probability (at least 90 percent) that at least 50 percent of the elements comprising the target are no longer
    combat effective and/or that at least 50 percent of the target area has been destroyed (rendered ineffective for combat).

    AREA TARGET - High probability (at least 90 percent) that 25-30 percent of the elements comprising the target grouping are no
    longer combat effective and/or that 25-30 percent of the target area has been destroyed.

  At ranges of 10 kilometers or less, coverage is deter-             Minimum Target Size - - - - - -_ _ _ __
mined using the table on page 9-23. To compute the
ammunition expenditure on unobserved targets                             SUPPRES-
located at distances greater than 10 kilometers, the                     SION BY:                RANGE              RANGE
Soviets use the following formula:
                                                                                                Up to 6 KM         Over 6 KM
                                                                         Battery of
                               10                                        Howitzers { l00Mx150M                  100 M x 200 M
                                                                                      (1.5 hectares)             (2 hectares)

        ==   The number of rounds of ammuni-                            A target smaller than the minimum is attacked
             tion expended per hectare of target                        with the same amount of ammunition required
             area at a given distance beyond                            for the minimum size target.
             10 kilometers.
                                                                       Each weapon is assumed to be able to suppress an
D       ==   The actual distance to be fired,                       area, given in hectares, the size of which depends on
             rounded off to the nearest kilometer.                  the time allotted and the type of target. Examples A and
                                                                    B, Target Area Suppressions (shown at right) illustrate
N1 0    ==   The number of rounds to be fired                       the area coverage of an unobserved platoon strong-
             per hectare of target area per                         point given different mission times. The firing unit is a
             norms established for the same                         122-mm howitzer battalion.
             weapon system at a distance of 10                         In Example A, the range is 10 kilometers; in Example
             kilometers or less.                                    B, 15 kilometers. The Soviets will not always fire 100
                                                                    percent of the suppression norm depending on the
  Based on expenditure norms, the Soviets establish                 importance of the target or because of limitations on
minimum target dimensions for firing batteries. The                 time and/or ammunition. A unit might also fire less
minimum target size (example at right) varies with                  than 100 percent because the target is being engaged
range to target and weapon dispersion factors.                      by more than one artillery unit.
                                                                                                                                   FM 100-2-1

Target Area Suppressions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

  TARGET: Hastily prepared strongpoint position (see target number 8, Ammunition Expenditures
  Norms, page 9-23).
  AMOUNT: 100% of norm = 150 rounds per hectare of target.

                                                                                    TARGET AREA (HECTARES)
  TIME ALLOWED FOR ARTILLERY                                     50%                                 75%                         100%
       STRIKE IN MINUTES                           BATTALION           BATTERY         BATTALION           BATTERY   BATTALION      BATTERY
                       5                               6.0               2.0               4.0              -          3.0              -
                       10                              9.6               3.2               6.4              2.1        4.8              -
                       15                             13.2              4.4                8.8              2.9        6.6              2.2

                       20                             16.2               5.4              10.8              3.6        8.1              2.7

  TARGET: Hastily prepared strongpoint position, (see target number 8, Ammunition Expenditure
  Norms, page 9-23).
  AMOUNT: 100% of norm = 225 rounds per hectare of target.
  (Product of formula Nd        = 100    N 1 0 applied to expenditure norm of 150, or 1.5 x 150 =225.

                                                                                    TARGET AREA (HECTARES)

  TIME ALLOWED FOR ARTILLERY                                    50%                                  75%                         100%
       STRIKE IN MINUTES                           BATTALION           BATTERY         BATTALION           BATTERY   BATTALION      BATTERY

                       5                              4.0                -                 -                -          -                -
                      10                              6.4                -                4.3               -          3.2              -
                      15                              8.8               2.9               5.9               -          4.4              -
                      20                             10.8               3.6               7.3               2.4        5.4              -

  NOTE: A dash in place of a number indicates that the number of hectares covered was less than 2 for a
  battery and less than 3 for a battalion.

FM 100-2-1

   To achieve the optimum coverage in a battalion                frontage of the battalion's target. As a result, each of the
concentration, the following guidelines apply:                   three batteries in the battalion superimposes its fire on
 • Target Unobserved (Corrections not Possible).                 that of the other two.
Range setting: If the target is 100 meters deep or less,          • Target Observed (Fire Adjusted). When the target
all tubes will fire on a single elevation setting. If the        is observed and fire can be adjusted on the target, the
target is deeper than 100 meters, all tubes will be fired        battalion target area normally will be subdivided into
on three different elevation settings with the interval          three roughly equal target groupings. Two batteries
between settings equal to one third of the depth of the          will be assigned target groups side by side across the
target. (See illustration below.)                                target's frontage, and the third battery will attack
Deflection settings: Each battery will fire on a single          targets in the depth of the target area. (See illustration
deflection setting that insures coverage of the entire           at right.)

Distribution of Rounds on an Unobserved Area Target _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

          ..                TARGET DEPTH (d)                ~
              d                             ~I                                          FIRING UNIT - TUBE ARTILLERY BATIALION
                            ~ I.. 3" ---""1"- 3"
                                        d               d
          ..- 3

               •                 •               •
               •                 •               •T
                                                 <III           en

               •                 •               •              t:I

               •                 •               •~             Q

               •                 •               •T             Q


               •                 •               • J-

                      I"d          ~I~'"~·I

               b+-                      b         b--                  •       1st Battery Burst
                 3                                  3                  •       2d Battery Burst
                            RANGE SETIINGS                             <III    3d Battery Burst

                                                                       a Interval between deflection settings of the six guns in anyone battery

                                                                        b      Basic Range Setting

                                                                           d   Depth of Target (greater than 100 meters)

                                                                                                                      FM 100-2-1

Range settings: Each battery will fire on a single            into Soviet artillery manuals as "norms," although such
elevation setting if the depth of the target is 100 meters    a change is now being called for by the Soviet Chief of
or less. If the depth of the target exceeds 100 meters,       Rocket Troops and Artillery.
each battery will fire on three different range settings         The Soviets now are striving to reduce drastically the
so that the interval between lines of concentration is        time required for fire missions. Among the reasons
equal to one-third of the depth of the target.                given, the most important are-
Deflection settings: If the target coverage per weapon         • Target mobility. Targets on today's battlefield are
is 25 meters or less, each battery will fire all tubes on a   normally armored, highly mobile, and can relocate
single deflection setting. If the target coverage (sheaf)     within minutes from the time they come under fire.
per weapon is 25 meters to 50 meters, then the battery         • Increased effectiveness offire. The same ammuni-
will fire on two different deflection settings. Mortar        tion allocation is much more effective against a target
batteries will always fire on a single deflection setting.    when the entire allocation is fired within a short
Target coverage per piece is obtained by dividing the         period of time. This is especially true for the initial fire
target frontage by the number of weapons in the firing        assault of a long fire preparation and for short, intense
battery.                                                      fire preparations.
   Until recently, the time required for mission               • Increased survivability. The Soviets assess that
accomplishment was not a major consideration in               enemy target acquisition capabilities have improved
Soviet artillery planning except as a factor in coordina-     conSiderably, allowing enemy artillery to acquire and
tion with supported maneuver units. Minimum time              fire on Soviet artillery batteries within 4 minutes from
requirements may still not be officially incorporated         the time the first Soviet round is fired.

Battery Target Grouping Assignments for an Observed Target _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                          ARTILLERY BATIALION FIRING UPON
                                   TARGET GROUP
                                     1st Battery                          A PLATOON STRONG POINT (EXAMPLE)

                                                                                                      ARTILLERY BATIALION

                                                        ...              1st BATIERY

                                                                         Defensive position or
                                                              ~          emplacement
                                                                                                      1       Platoon command post

                                                              <>Th       Tank in defensive position   )(Q)-   ATGM emplacement

                                         2d Battery           [Q>m       APe in defensive position    )o@)- Recoilless rifle

       /-                  200 M                        -/      }}:::2   Antitank grenade launcher                (NOT TO SCALE)

FM 100-2-1

   As a result of this perception of the threat, Soviet          The Soviets are introducing qualitative and
artillery planners try to reduce mission times to 4           quantitative changes in field artillery equipment and
minutes. This goal is especially important for the            organizations, and revising their deployment doctrine.
accompaniment phase. However, in a large-scale                The density of artillery fire support assets in combined
attack, the preparation and support phases often will         arms formations has been greatly increased. The
be longer. When the enemy is defending and the                introduction of improved munitions, self-propelled
Soviets have overwhelming fire superiority, they              weapons, electronic fire direction computers, and
perceive their own vulnerability to enemy counterbat-         improved target acquisition assets has enhanced the
tery fire to be greatly reduced.                              mobility and reaction time of artillery fire support.
   When the rounds strike a target over a shorter                Although the Soviets apparently continue to
period of time, the result is an increase in the density of   compute combat power ratios on the density of
fire on the target. In Soviet artillery computations,         artillery weapons, the current emphasis is on density of
density of fire is measured by the number of rounds           fire rather than weapons. The artillery battalion has
striking a hectare of the target area in one minute.          been designated as the basic tactical and fire unit.
Apparently, the Soviets have not yet formally estab-          Missions that previously were fired by a single battery
lished minimum density "norms", but their publica-            now are assigned to two or three battalions. Artillery
tions strongly suggest that 25 to 30 rounds per hectare       units practice conducting fire missions without first
per minute is the minimum acceptable density against          firing registration and by adjusting fires with ground
most types of targets. Densities might even be higher         surveillance, counterbattery radars, and sound-ranging
for a moving target.                                          equipment. Batteries are assigned two or three
   The Soviets consider highly dense artillery fire to be     alternate firing positions within a battalion firing
extremely effective in-                                       position and are expected to reposition after one or
 • Suppressing or destroying enemy defenses-                  two fire missions.
especially ATGM positions.                                       The Soviets consider that these measures will insure
 • Suppressing or destroying moving armored                   their artillery fire superiority by simultaneously
targets-since the effect is so intense and sudden that        contributing to the battlefield survivability of Soviet
the target is unable to escape or take cover.                 artillery and the destruction of the enemy's artillery.
   The Soviets are developing technical, operational,         Achieving the desired mobility and firing norms will
and organizational solutions to the problems of               depend, in part, on the wider fielding of automated
reducing mission times and increasing fire density,           systems for intelligence analysis and firing data
such as those identified below.                               computation.

Solutions for Increasing Fire Effectiveness _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

  • Increasing the rate of fire of newer                        • Firing for effect without registration.
  generations of artillery weapons.                             • Using entire battalions to fire missions that
  ;. Using improved rangefinders to reduce                      previously were fired by individual batteries.
  adjustment time on the target and to eliminate
  the need for registration for many types of                   ORGANIZATIONAL
  missions.                                                     • Using more artillery to accomplish the same
  • Using electronic computers to reduce mission                mission. This is the reason for designating the
  computation time.                                             battalion as the basic firing unit.
                                                                • Providing organic artillery to all maneuver
  OPERATIONAL                                                   regiments. Tank regiments, formerly without
  • Firing accurately from emergency occupied                   organic artillery, now have up to a battalion of
  positions.                                                    122-mm howitzers.


    The Soviets divide antitank weapons into two cate-         mutually supporting antitank weapons sited in depth.
 gories: general and special.                                  During tactical moves, antitank elements are placed
    General weapon systems include missiles, aircraft,         throughout march columns.
 tanks, and artillery. These systems are designed to
 destroy a wide variety of battlefield targets, but may be
 employed successfully against tanks and other                 ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
 armored vehicles. According to the Soviets, any                Since neither front nor army has a fixed organiza-
 artillery-1}pe weapon (over 20 mm) should have an              tional structure, the antitank units at these levels will
 antiarmor capability. All conventional artillery up to         also vary. Normally, the front would have at least one
  152-mm caliber has good direct fire antitank capability       antitank regiment assigned to its artillery division.
 and carries some armor-defeating ammunition. The              Front and army antitank assets can be allocated to first
 122-mm towed and SP howitzers .and the 152-mm SP              echelon divisions, be assigned to the army combined
 howitzer with their 360 degree traverse are particu-          arms reserve, or form the nucleus of an army antitank
 larly effective in this role. Field artillery often is used   reserve.
 for direct fire. Antiaircraft guns could engage ground            The motorized rifle division antitank battalion
 targets if required.                                          normally consists of an ATGM battery and two gun bat-
    special antitank weapon systems consist of antitank        teries. A gun battery has two platoons and afire control
 guided missiles (ATGMs), antitank guns, grenade               section Whenever poSSible, the battalion is reinforced
 launchers, and recoilless guns. These Weapons are             by engineer units who assist in construction ofantitank
 designed specifically to destroy tanks and their crews        obstacles. There are no antitank guns in Soviet tank
 by direct fire. The Soviets consider ATGMs to be very         regiments or at Soviet tank division level. The only
 effective antitank weapons, but limited by minimum            ATGMs are in the tank division's motoriz~ rifle regi-
 ranges, low rate of fire, and visibility requirements.        ment. All motorized rifle regiments have an ATGM
 Soviet antitank forces therefore have been structured         battery.
with a mix of ATGMs and direct fire weapons (guns                  An ATGM battery consists of three platoons. Each
and grenade launchers). The direct fire weapons pro-           platoon has three BRDM-2s mounting six AT-
vide qUick-response fires at medium, short, and point-          3/SAGGER or five AT-5/SPANDREL ATGMs. In addi-
blank ranges, on broken ground, and under favorable            tion, platoon and battery commanders have BRDM-2
visibility conditions.                                         scout cars which mount 14.5-mm machine guns and
   The Soviets state that in a nonnuclear environment,         carry target illumination equipment for night combat.
direct fire from antitank guns, ATGMs, and tanks is the        The 14.5-mm machine guns on the command BRDMs
principal and most reliable means of destroying tanks.         are for engaging enemy infantry and soft-skinned
However, if nuclear weapons are employed, they will            vehicles.
constitute the principal antitank fire support means.              Each BRDM-2 SAGGER launch vehicle carries six
The capabilities of nuclear weapons, combined with             missiles ready for launching and eight in reserve. Each
the variety of delivery systems, allow for the destruc-        SPANDREL launch vehicle carries five ready-to-fire
tion of whole tank units at practically all depths of the      missiles and an estimated ten reserve missiles. Addi-
battlefield.                                                   tional missiles are carried by three trucks.
   The Soviets believe that the high density of armored           The antitank platoon of a BTR-equipped motorized
vehicles and improved techniques for their employ-             rifle battalion consists of three squads. One is
ment on the battlefield demand particularly careful            equipped with two 73-mm recoilless guns SPG-9. The
and complete integration of general and special anti-          other two each have two manpack ATGM consoles
tank weapon sWtems available at every level into the           (AT-3 or AT-4). Each squad is transported in a BTR.
antitank fire support plan. The plan is developed in
detail and coordinated at the highest level. Special
emphasis is placed on careful terrain analysis to              TACTfCAL EMPLOYMENT
identifY high-speed armor approaches and on the                  Antitank units can be employed as a special antitank
organization of surveillance and earlywarning systems.         reserve, as an element of a combined arms reserve, or
Flanks and likely armor approaches are covered by              they may be integrated into a combined arms
FM 100-2-1

formation itself (usually in the defense). The most fre-    observation posts, normally collocated with one of the
quent type of tactical employment is as a special           fire positions. The battery reconnaissance section
antitank reserve.                                           deploys as a forward observation post to give warning
   Regimental, divisional, and sometimes army antitank      of approaching enemy tanks. Antitank minefields may
reserves are formed both in attack and defense. They        be laid by a mobile obstacle detachment 1.5 to 2
may consist of guns and guided missiles and generally       kilometers in front of antitank fire positions on the
will include an engineer mobile obstacle detachment         main tank approaches.
(MOD) to lay hasty minefields. Tanks also may be               An ATGM battery can deploy with distances of 30 to
included if the role of the antitank reserve is to deploy   300 meters between vehicles and up to 1,500 meters
rapidly to meet tank threats. When additional assets        between platoons; however, normal frontages are 500
(flamethrowers,' tanks, combat engineers) are               meters per platoon and 1,500 meters per battery. Bat-
attached to the antitank reserve, these elements            tery and platoon commanders control the fire of the
normally are subordinate to the antitank artillery          launchers from observation points that usually are
commander.                                                  sited slightly to the rear and preferably on high ground.
   Command relationS of antitank units under condi-         In good tank country, platoons are likely to be in line,
tions of attachment or support are comparable to            but in broken country, one or more subunits will be in
those offield artillery units. (See section on Command      depth and platoons may be deployed independently.
and Control, Chapter 9).                                    Within platoons, vehicles may be one-up, two-up, or
   If the antitank unit is designated as an antitank        echeloned to a flank. Whenever possible, ATGMs will
reserve, the unit commander is assigned missions            be sited on high ground, clear of close or wooded
directly by the combined arms commander. If the anti-       country.
tank artillery unit is part of a combined arms reserve,        Normally each launcher is given an 80 degree arc of
the unit commander. is assigned missions by the             fire overlapping with each of its neighbors. Missiles are
commander of the combined arms reserve.                     nearly always launched when the BRDM is stationary,
   Antitank units may deploy in line, in two lines,         preferably behind cover, or in defense, from a prepared
echeloned right or left, or they may form a horseshoe       emplacement. A normal drill is to fire not more than
or circle. These formations may be adopted by               two missiles, then move at least 200 meters to a new
platoons within a battery or by the batteries of a bat-     firing position Missiles also may be fired and con-
talion Siting of the weapons within a platoon or            trolled remotely from a position up to 80 meters away.
battery is guided by the principles of defense in depth     Standard time for setting up in this mode is about 1.5
and mutually supporting fires.                              minutes.
   The most common formation for the antitank
battalion is two lines of batteries. Two batteries are
placed in the first echelon and one in the second. They     THE OFFENSE
are sited to provide mutual support. Battery fire posi-        During an attack, the antitank reserve usually moves
tions are located up to 1,000 meters apart. Alternate       behind advancing first echelon tanks and infantry in
fire positions for the battery in the second line           the most exposed direction of attack, ready to repulse
normally are chosen on the flanks.                          enemy armored counterattacks. The combined arms
   The echelon right (or left) battle formation is          commander or the CRTA chooses successive firing
chosen when it is necessary to cover tank approaches        lines to cover likely tank approaches. Firing pOSitions
from both the front and one of the flanks. The subunits     are selected by the antitank unit commander.
are again sited for mutual support.                            The antitank reserve advances to successive firing
   Weapons sited at the top of a horseshoe formation        lines in coordination with the progress of the attacking
open fire at extreme ranges, inviting enemy tank            force and the orders of the combined arms com-
attacks so that the other guns can open flank fire. If      mander to whom it is attached.
enemy tanks penetrate the kill zone ofa horseshoe,. fire       In preparation for an attack, antitank units are
will be delivered simultaneously by all weapons.            located on the most likely enemy armor approaches or
   Antitank guns usually are sited about 100 meters         may be positioned well forward to participate in the
apart, but occasionally may be up to 300 meters; bat-       artillery preparation phase of the attack. They may be
teries and platoons are usually 300 to 500 meters apart,    called upon to conduct fire with direct aiming against
but may be up to 1,000 meters. Subunits normally are        the enemy's armored vehicles. Antitank guns can·
sited with oVerlapping fields offire. Antitank battalion    conduct indirect observed fire (particularly when
and battery commanders control fire from command            there is insufficient artillery).
                                                                                                              FM 100-2-1

   During the artillery preparation phase, antitank units       detected armor concentrations in assembly areas. Air-
 are responsible for-                                           craft, especially ATGM-equipped attack helicopters,
  • Containing enemy armor.                                     are the most effective weapon for engaging moving
  • Covering the deployment of the attacking units.             armor forces at greater ranges. Minelaying helicopters
  • Engaging armored and antitank targets on the for-           also may be used to lay hasty antitank minefields.
ward edge of the enemy position as part of the                     Indirect artillery and MRL fires are effective in isolat-
preparatory fires.                                              ing tanks from supporting forces and causing tank
   During the support phase of the attack, antitank             crews to secure the hatches. Although indirect
subunits cover the flanks and support the deployment            artillery and MRL fires increase the vulnerability of
of the second echelon and reserve.                              attacking tanks to special antitank weapons (by strip-
   During the accompaniment phase, fire positions are          ping them of their supporting forces), the smoke and
selected in the depth of the enemy positions from               dust of the explosions can simultaneously degrade the
which to defeat armored counterattacks. Having                  effectiveness of direct fire support weapons by impair-
received orders to deploy to one of these positions, the        ing gunner viSibility.
antitank unit commander will lead his weapons                      At the start of a defensive action, the antitank reserve
forward, put out observation posts, and move himself            normally occupies camouflaged positions from which
to a position from which he can direct fire. He will            it can cover the most likely tank approaches. The
establish close cooperation with the maneuver force             Soviets state that each tank, ATGM, or antitank gun
commander and the mobile obstacle detachment.                  firing from a prepared camouflaged defensive position
   In anticipation of a meeting engagement, antitank            can defeat two to three attacking tanks. The com-
subunits march with the advance guard or at the head            mander selects from one to three firing lines to which
of the main force. They must be prepared to deploy             his weapons may deploy on each possible approach.
immediately and to provide fire support. At the                Subunit reconnaissance and engineer preparation of
beginning of a meeting engagement, antitank units will         routes and fire positions follow, if time allows.
deploy in the threatened sector on an assigned firing             An antitank unit maybe integrated into the defensive
line, covering the deployment of the combined anns             first echelon, occupying deSignated positions in either
force.                                                         a battalion defensive area or company strongpoint
                                                               This type of deployment is usually by platoon, with the
                                                               separation between platoons insuring mutually sup-
THE DEFENSE                                                    porting fires. Battle formation depends on the mission
   The antitank fire support plan is developed in              and terrain and must insure the following:
greater detail in the defense than in the offense. The           • Concentration of fire on tanks by direct sighting
Soviets believe that the basic system of fire in the           along armor avenues of approach.
defense is antitank fire. The antitank fire plan is              • Covering by fire of approaches to antitank barriers.
designed to place an enemy armored force under con-              • Close coordination between the weapons of the
tinuous fire from the point of its first detection until it    antitank subunits and the antitank weapons of the
is destroyed in a first echelon kill zone.                     company strongpoint or the battalion defense area.
   ATGMs are given an engagement zone that extends               • All-round defense of each platoon.
out to 3 km from the forward edge. Tanks firing from              As the antitank reserve for a defending combined
defilade positions first engage attacking tanks at 2 to        arms formation, an antitank subunit's tactical deploy-
2.5 km in front of the defensive positions. The engage-        ment is based on mission and terrain and must insure
ment zone for antitank guns extends out to about 1.5           the following:
km. SPG or RPG weapons engage enemy armor at                     • Coordinated and concentrated fires on· armor
ranges less than 1000 meters.                                  approaches.
    In the defense, antitank units have these missions:          • Echelonment of the firing positions in depth.
 • Destroy enemy tanks and APCs forward of the first             • Conduct of flanking fire on enemy tanks.
echelon                                                          • Maneuver of the unit within the area of deploy-
 • Destroy tanks and APCs that have penetrated the             ment and to firing lines.
first defensive echelon.                                          If the defending units are forced to withdraw,
 • Cover gaps in the defense.                                  ATGMs and antitank guns cover the withdrawal of
 • Support the counterattack.                                  forward elements. Antitank units break contact and
   Fixed-wing aviation, surface-to-surface missiles, and      .withdraw to a new firing position when enemy armor
massed artillery fires may be employed against                 has closed to 500 meters.


    The objective of the Soviet tactical air defense        of these weapons, with a suitable mix of
 system is to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air         capabilities to ground force commanders.
 attacks. This can be achieved by forcing enemy aircraft       • Surprise. Soviet writers emphasize the
 to expend their ordnance while still beyond the effec-     principle of swprise. They are aware of not only the
 tive or optimum ranges of their weapons or by destroy-     physical destruction that can be achieved by an
 ing the aircraft when they come within effective range     attack on an unsuspecting enemy, but also ofthe
 of Soviet air defense weapons.                             psychological effects of violent and unexpected
    There are two important concepts in Soviet tactical     fires on aviation crews. The psychological effects
 air defense. First, air defense is considered to be an     often are only temporary, but they can reduce the
 integral element of the combined arms concept.             effectiveness of attacking air crews at critical
 Secondly, air defense of ground forces is achieved by a    moments.
variety of weapons and equipment that together form a         • Mobility and maneuver Of air defense
 system of air defense.                                     weapons. The Soviets' mobile tactical air defense
     Soviet air defense of maneuver units includes          system allows air defense units to maneuver with
 three phases. The first phase includes all actions         tank and motorized rifle forces.
 taken to destroy enemy aircraft while they are still         • Continuous activity by air defense units.
 on the ground at airfields or in marshaling areas.        Comprehensive air defense coverage can be
  Soviet aviation resources and surface-to-surface         guaranteed only if air defense units are constantly
 missiles play the major role in this phase. The            active and provided with adequate logistic support.
 second phase includes all actions taken to destroy           • Aggressive action" initiative, and originality
 enemy aircraft while in flight but still at some dis-     on the part of air defense unit commanders. The
 tance from Soviet ground forces. Soviet aviation           Soviets recognize that air defense unit com-
plays a sizable role in these actions, and medium-         manders must exploit the full capabilities oftheir
range air defense missile units also may have              equipment if they are to carry out their missions
 some role. The third phase entails the destruction         successfully. This demands aggressive action,
of enemy airplanes and helicopters that have               initiative, and originality on their part. The future
penetrated into the air space of Soviet maneuver           battlefield will be a fluid and volatile environment.
 elements. This role primarily belongs to Soviet           Air defense unit commanders must be responsive
tactical air defense forces. Thesethreephases may          to. changes in the tactical situation. For example, if
overlap, and all three maybe conducted simultane-          the supported unit's mission is modified, the air
ously. This chapter discusses only the third phase.        defense unit commander must reevaluate his own
    The mission of the Soviet tactical air defense         unit's deployment in light of the new require-
forces is to protect ground force units and other          ments. The air defense unit commander also must
potential targets from attacks by fixed -wing ground       be aware of changes in the tactics employed by
 attack aircraft and armed helicopters. To accom-          enemy air forces.
plish this mission, it is not necessary for Soviet air        • Coordination of actions between supported
defense units to destroy every attacking enemy             maneuver units and supporting air defen$e units
 aircraft. If the Soviet tactical air defense system       and between air defense units. This principle
can prevent enemy air crews from pressing their            emphasizes the Soviet perception of air defense as
 attacks or can force them to expend their ordnance        a single system composed of its various parts
prematurely, for the most part it will have accom-         rather than a series of separate, distinct actions
plished its mission. Soviet ground forces then are         that bear no relation to each other or the conduct of
 able to continue their missions.                          the ground battle. Air defense is an integral
    The basic principles that have influenced Soviet air   element of the ground battle.
defense developments and apparently form Soviet              • All-round security. The Soviets recognize that air
tactical air defense doctrine are:                         attack can come from any quarter and that it is not
   • Firepower. The Soviets use a variety of air           enough to provide security for only the units close to
defense weapons, both missiles and guns, and a             the forward edge and only in the direction of enemy
force structure that provides a significant number         forces.
FM 100-2-1

   The Soviet inventory of tactical air defense weapons     regiment's air defense assets, and he may sometimes
includes a variety of missiles, guns, and support equip-    control the employment of SA-7 SAMs of the subordi-
ment. There are air defense weapons at nearly every         nate motorized rifle battalions or companies.
level. As with other weapon systems, the Soviets have           Soviet tank and motorized rifle regiments have an
incorporated recent technological developments into         organic air defense battery equipped with the ZSU-23-
newly designed air defense weapons while improving          4 self-propelled antiaircraft gun (SPAAG) and the SA-9
other weapons already in production They have               SAM. The battery consists of a headquarters, a platoon
developed a variety of air defense missiles while con-      of four ZSU-23-4s, a platoon of four SA-9 SAM
tinuing to develop antiaircraft artillery (AAA).            launchers, and support and service elements. The regi-
   A BMP-equipped motorized rifle battalion has an air      mental headquarters has a squad of three SA-7 SAM
defense platoon containing nine SA-7 surface-to-air         gunners.
missile (SAM) launchers. A BTR-equipped motorized               The ZSU-23-4 has a relatively small engag~ent
rifle company has an air defense squad containing           envelope and is considered a limited area or point
three SA-7 launchers. While tank companies are not          defense weapon. Normally it is employed with
known to have SA-7s, most Soviet tanks are equipped         individual SPAAGs located within several hundred
with turret-mounted antiaircraft machine guns. All          meters of one another. When the four guns of a ZSU-
Soviet tactical units receive training in the employ-       23-4 platoon are employed in pairs, the pairs are
ment of massed, small arms weapon fire. This tech-          usually kept within approximately 1,500 meters ofone
nique is practiced routinely to engage low-flying           another. Typical missions for these weapons may
enemy aircraft, usually under the supervision of the        involve two to four ZSU-23-4s protecting a battalion in
company commander when he has been notified that            the regiment's first echelon or on a road march.
enemy aircraft are approaching his position.                    The SA-9 has an engagement envelope significantly
   The SA-7s of the BTR-equipped motorized rifle             larger than that of the ZSU-23-4 and is an area defense
company usually are employed as a squad, with the            weapon It provides the regimental commander with
company commander retaining tight control. SA-7              an organic air defense missile capability that can
gunners are not routinely attached to the platoons of        encompass his entire unit. The SA-9 normally is
the company. In a prepared defense, the battalion com-       deployed between the first and second echelons of a
mander or regimental chief of air defense may control        regiment, a location from which it can protect both
the employment of the company's SA-7s.                       first and second echelon subunits without being
   No air defense unit is organic to BTR-equipped            exposed to direct fire from enemy ground forces.
motorized rifle battalions or tank battalions, although      Probable missions of SA-9 units include protecting the
there may be an SA-7 squad assigned to protect the bat-      regimental command post, the regiment's organic
talion command post or other points designated by the        artillery battalion, and other organic or attached
battalion commander. SA-7 SAM squads can be                  elements in the regiment's sector.
employed in any tactical unit, and also at higher levels.       A number of the new SA-13 SAM systems have been
Armored vehicles of the battalion command group are          deployed in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
equipped with vehicle-mounted antiaircraft machine           since 1980: SA-13 units are replacing SA-9 units. Unlike
guns.                                                        the SA-9, the SA-13 is a tracked vehicle with greater
   The Soviet practice of positioning the command            cross-country mobility.
post in the key sector of the battalion's area in the           Introduction of the SA-6 or the SA-8 SAM into the
defense provides an element of protection. The               divisional air defense regiment significantly improved
primary means of air defense for the maneuver bat-           air defense mobility and firepower. The transporter-
talion, however, is provided by its companies and the        erector-launchers (TEL) of both missiles are highly
air defense elements attached from regimental or divi-      mobile. The SA-6 is mounted on a nonamphibious
sional assets. Usually such attachment is practiced by       tracked vehicle, and the SA-8 is mounted on an
the Soviets and is the rule when the battalion is           amphibious wheeled vehicle.
engaged in independent or semi-independent actions.             Employment of the SA-6 or the SA-8 has a major
   The systemic nature of Soviet tactical air defense       impact on the division's combat capability. The
measJ,Jres can be seen in the maneuver regiment. There       division now has an organic air defense system that
is a chief of air defense in the regiment. His              provides a significant degree of protection to, the
responsibilities include planning and directing air         entire division The range of the SA-6 provides for
defense activities within the regiment. He advises the      greater depth in the division's air defense system,
commander on allocation and deployment of the               especially against aircraft employing standoffweapons.

                                                                                                            FM 100-2-1

While the range of the SA-8 is significantly less than         forward edge of the battie area (FEBA) for first
that of the SA-6, its higher road speed and amphibious         echelon armies. Laterally, this SA-4 coverage overlaps
capabilities make it especially well suited for pursuit or     the envelope of adjacent armies.
exploitation.                                                     The mission of the division's air defense regiment is
   A Soviet army usually has one or two SAM brigades            to protect the maneuver regiments and other units or
equipped with the SA-4 84M. Generally, the missions of         facilities within the division's area of activity. First
army-level air defense units are to augment divisional         echelon maneuver regiments, division headquarters,
air defense capabilities in the forward area and to            and the division's artillery and rocket units have the
engage and destroy aircraft that get past the divisions'       highest priorities for protection The division com-
air defense systems.                                           mander is assisted bya chiefof air defense, afield grade
   The Soviets have developed extensive and effective          officer, who with his staff plans and directs the
radar target detection and fire control systems. Their       . division's air defense. operations.
radars can be assigned to two general categories:                 Air defense regiments equipped with the SA-6 or the
surveillance and fire control. Surveillance includes           SA-B SAM are capable of including all elements of the
early warning, target acquiSition, and height finding          division in their engagement envelopes. Typical
radars. Some fire control radars alS9 have limited target      employment of the regiment's five missile firing bat-
acquisition capability.                                        teries might involve two batteries providing support
   It is important to view Soviet radars as systems rather     directly to the two first echelon maneuver regiments,
than as separate units. Because the majority of target         while the remaining three batteries provide protection
acquisition radars are concentrated above division             for the division headquarters, rocket and artillery units,
level, most target information is accumulated and              and the remainder of the divisiOl].. Units to the rear of
processed at army and front air defense operations             first echelon maneuver regiments are protected by the
centers and passed down to divisions. High level com-          engagement envelopes of the first echelon regiments
manders select the· weapon system that can best                and the missile batteries directly supporting them. The
engage a given target. Target detection and monitoring         ranges of the SA-6 and the SA-B allow them to be
by front, army, and division target acquisition radars         deployed several kilometers behind the line of contact,
provide the necessary data for engagement without              thus reducing their exposure to enemy ground-based
unnecessarily exposing the air defense firing battery          weapons. From these positions, the missile batteri(S
and TEL-mounted (particularly SA-B) radars to detec-           can still engage -targets well forward of the FEBA.
~on by enemy forces and subsequent neutralization by              SA-7 SAMs employed in the rear area provide local
electronic countermeasures or destruction (For more            air defense against enemy aircraft that penetrate the
information on air defense organization and equip-             division's primary air defense network. Control of the
ment, see FM 100-2-3.)                                         SA-7s is probably highly centralized to prevent engage-
                                                               ment of friendly aircraft by mistake.
                                                                  Front through division air defense assets are
MISSIONS                                                       employed to create an area defense. Radars provide an
   Front headquarters plays a major r91e in the control        unbroken detection envelope extending well into
of air defense assets of its subordinate units. The            enemy territory and across the entire zone of opera-
front's own air defense weapons are used for various           tions. Enemy aircraft that manage to get past Soviet
 missions, depending on the situation. Some mayaug-           fighters probably are engaged first by front and army
 ment the air defense weapons of armies of the front.          SA-4 missile units. While gaps may appear in the missile
 Others may provide general, front-wide air defense           engagement envelope, significant effort is devoted to
coverage or fill gaps between armies. In any event,           maintaining continuous coverage.
front air defense assets are used primarily to insure             If enemy aircraft penetrate the air defense systems of
continuous coverage in both detection and engage-             front, army, and divisional air defense regiments, they
ment capabilities. Front air defense weapons usually           will be engaged by the short-range SA-7 and SA-9 SAMs
are located somewhere to the rear of army air defense          and the ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns of the maneuver
weapons to engage aircraft that penetrate forward air          regiments. Tank, motorized rifle, and artillery units in
defenses.                                                      the diyision's first and second echelons and the air
   SA-4 units of Soviet armies provide medium- to high-        defense subunits themselves are expected to be the
altitude air defense and augment the air defense assets        primary targets of enemy air attacks. The ZSU-23-4
of divisions. Their engagement envelope extends from           platoon of the maneuver regiment, directly supple-
 the army's rear to about 45 kilometers beyond the             mented by the regiment's SA-9 SAMs and further
 FM 100-2-1

supplemented by divisional air defense batteries, pro-      battalion commander, and direct communications are
vides the key regimental air defense.                       established. The ZSU-23-4 platoon maintains com-
                                                            munications with the regimental air defense battery. It
                                                            also receives information from the divisional air
 SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE                                     defense target identification and warning network.
   Soviet ground force air defense weapons can fully        This communications system provides for timely
 support fast-moving tank and motorized rifle forces in     receipt of information on the tactical air situation.
dynamic offensive combat. Air defense units of front          The maneuver battalion cominander and°the"ZSU-
and army conduct basically an area defense, engaging        23-4 section or platoon leader work closely to inte-
enemy aircraft at some distance from the supported         grate their weapons into an effective air defense plan.
maneuver divisions and themselves. Divisional air          As the battaIion occupies the assembly areas, air de-
defense regiments conduct primarily an area defense,       fense weapons deploy in accordance with this fire
though there is a significant element of point defense     plan. light discipline is strictly enforced, and radio lis-
in support of the division's maneuver regiments.            tening silence is employed to reduce the likelihood of
Operations by air defense batteries and the SA-7 SAM        detection by enemy signal intelligence units. If the as-
sections are largely of the point type due to the          sembly area is to be occupied for an extended period,
capabilities of their weapons and the units they defend.   such as overnight, the ZSU-23-4s and the weapons and
   Air defense actions are most complex in the             vehicles of the battalion are usually dug in.
maneuver regiment. As the supported unit performs its         The battalion commander provides guidance for the
assigned missions, it continuously changes its location    placement of the ZSU-23-4s and the SA-7 SAMs.
and combat formation. The air defense unit com-            Observation posts and firing positions are selected to
mander must respond to these changes and redeploy          provide comprehensive observation and interlocking
his own weapons to provide continuous and effective        fires on the most likely approach routes for low-flying
protection to the regiment's elements.                     aircraft and armed helicopters. When the entire
   Allocation of air defense units is weighted in favor of platoon is employed, the two pairs of ZSU-23-4s are
maneuver units in areas where the threat is perceived " kept within mutually supporting range. As a rule, one
to be the greatest. For example, a motorized rifle regi-   gun crew is on alert in each of the ZSU-23-4 pairs
ment in the division's first echelon usually receives      except when warning of an air attack is received, at
additional air defense support from one or more bat-       which time both crews go to alert status.
teries of the division's air defense regiment. These bat-     The SA-7 SAM squads of the three motorized rifle
teries need not operate in the maneuver regiment's         companies supplement the coverage provided by the
formation. The range of their radars and missiles allows   ZSU-23-4 section or platoon. The three gunners ofone
them to provide support to the first echelon from loca-    company's SA-7 squad may be placed near the ZSU-23-
tions farther to the rear. lOcating these missile bat-     4 section or platoon. The ZSU subunit leader may be
teries to the rear also decreases the likelihood of their  given some degree of control over these SA-7 gunners
being destroyed by enemy ground fire or aircraft.          in such a situation. The SA-7 squad of another
   A motorized rifle battaIion attacking in a regiment's   motorized rifle company could cover a less likely
first echelon often is supported by ZSU-23-4s of the       avenue of approach. Placement of these SA-7 gunners
regiment's ~tiaircraft artillery platoon. In his combat    is similar to that in an air defense ambush. The three
order, the regimental commander assigns the ZSU            SA-7s of the third motorized rifle company may be
platoon the mission of supporting particular battaIions    retained with the battalion in the assembly area to
for a specified period. This period can begin before a     provide close-in protection. Observatioh posts are
battalion moves into an assembly area, in which case       collocated frequently with SA-7 firing positions.
the air defense element provides protection to the bat-       Besides the ZSU-23-4s and SA-7 SAMs, the battalion
talion during the road march to the assembly area.         emplOys its vehicle-mounted machine guns, ATGMs,
Alternatively, the ZSU-23-4 platoon may join the           and massed small arms for close-in defense. When the
maneuver battalion in the assembly area, though the        battalion is reinforced by a tank company, the anti-
Soviets prefer to have both subunits arrive at the         aircraft machine guns on tanks provide additional air
assembly area at approximately the same time. Failure      defense firepower in the assembly area.
of the air defense subunit °to join the maneuver bat-         To attack the battalion in its assembly area with
talion at the designated time leaves the battalion         conventional ordnance, an enemy aircraft must first
exposed to possible enemy air attack. In either case,      penetrate the engagement envelopes formed by
the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader reports to the maneuver        missile units of front, army, and divisions. The
                                                                                                                FM 100-2-1

attacking aircraft then come within range of the regi-           SA-7 gunners ride in armored personnel carriers or
mental and battalion defense systems. The ZSU-23-4s           the BMP. Employment of a BTR company's SA-7
engage enemy aircraft immediately as they come                gunners in a group, close to the company commander,
within range. SA-7 gunners engage enemy aircraft that         is preferred. It offers greater control and increased
maneuver to avoid ZSU-23-4 fires or pass over the SA-7        probability of a target's destruction. It also reduces the
firing positions. Finally, small anus and vehicle-            possibility of firing on a friendly aircraft.
mounted weapons engage enemy aircraft that pass                  When two maneuver battalions attack on line in the
over the maneuver battalions' positions.                      first echelon of a regiment, each normally is supported
   In an attack, the exact location of tactical air defense   by a ZSU section. While the ZSU-23-4 sections remain
weapons depends on the mission of the supported               within mutually supporting range, they are located far
unit, the attack formation chosen by its commander,           enough apart to reduce the chances of their simul-
and considerations of terrain, fields of fire, and            taneous destruction by conventional weapons. The
observation. If the maneuver unit is attacking on a           two guns of each section usually are located from 150
broad frontage, sections of two ZSU-23-4s are usually         to 250 meters apart to insure adequate freedom offire
deployed in aline formation to provide protection to          for engaging low flying targets (see below).
the dispersed elements of the supported unit. When               The air defense platoon command element usually
attacking on a narrow frontage, the two ZSU-23-4 sec-         follows the ZSU-23-4 sections at a distance of approxi-
tions of the platoon are deployed in column to provide        mately 200 meters. Trucks carrying additional
greater control and increased concentration of                ammunition for the ZSUs follow at a distance of 1. 5 to
platoon fire.                                                 2.5 kilometers to the rear of the firing sections.

Air Defense Support for a Motorized Rifle Battalion Assault _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

                                                                       Not more than
                                                                  I-      400 M         .. I                1<=-01
                                                         Ic=-<ll                                                ~
                                                                                       : a<>
                                                              ~        150-250 M

                                                                          1            : a<>                •••
           •                                             1<=-01
                                                                                       : a<>

                                                              ~                        : a<>
                                                                                               1-200 M-J


                            1 =..;;;.w_I SAM fGrai.1
                            ....         ~A. 7
                                               Section   : a<> ZSU-23-4 AA Gun
                                                               Self-propelled                      <J Command APC
 FM 100-2-1

   Basic employment techniques for air defense               elements. The ZSU-23-4 platoon leader is responsible
weapons in a meeting engagement do not differ signifi-       only for the performance of his own platoon.
 cantly from those for the attack. Two ZSU-23-4s of the         When the platoon leader reports to a maneuver
platoon normally are placed in a regiments' advance          battalion commander, he is informed of the battalion's
guard SA-9 SAMs and any reinforcing elements from            mission and dispOSition and thec::ommander's tactical
 the division's air defense regiment most likely remain      plan. He may receive further instructions from the bat-
with the maneuver regiment's main force. Air                 talion commander, and they may conduct a joint ter-
observers are posted on all vehicles, and SA-7 gunners       rain reconnaissance.
are prepared to engage designated targets in their              The platoon leader identifies likely routes of
sectors of observation and fire.                             approach for enemy aircraft, paying special attention
   An additional concern is the need to protect air          to routes suitable for 10w-tIying aircraft and helicop-
defense weapons, especially ZSU-23-4s with the               ters. Positions for air defense weapons are also recon-
advance guard, from enemy direct fire. The advance           noitered. If the battalion commander has directed that
guard battalion also may be protected by SA-6 or SA-8        air defense ambushes and roving units are to be
SAM batteries operating from the regiment's main             deployed, the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader designates
body.                                                        primary and alternate positions on a map and estab-
   A motorized rifle battalion in a pursuit may be aug-      lishes schedules for their movement These positions
mented by air defense elements from its regiment or          and schedules are then coordinated with the battalion
possibly a battery from the division's air defense regi-     commander.
ment Air defense during pursuit is especially                   Battalion air defense preparations begin at the
important, since the enemy will likely use air power to      company level. Air observation posts are established in
reduce the rate ofadvance and the strength ofpursuing        each company area close to the command observation
Soviet forces.                                               posts, on terrain affording good visibility or along likely
                                                             routes of enemy air approach. Schedules for rotating
                                                             air observers are established, and sectors of observa-
SUPPORT IN THE DEFENSE                                       tion and fire are designated for each post to maintain
   The Soviets believe that the motorized rifle and tank     360-degree observation of the air space surrounding
battalions in a division's defending first echelon regi-     the battalion's defensive area. SA-7 SAM firing positions
ments will be priority targets for attacking enemy           are established in each motorized rifle company's area.
aircraft. Therefore, regimental air defense weapons are      These positions often are collocated with air observa-
deployed well forward, with the ZSU-23-4 platoon             tion posts near the perimeters of the companies' posi-
usually supporting first echelon motorized rifle bat-        tions to extend the engagement envelopes as far as
talions. The SA-9 SAM platoon is probably located in         possible. While tank companies have no organic SA-7
the rear of the first echelon battalions or in the forward   SAMs, they do establish their air observation posts as
area of the second echelon, protecting the regiment's        part of the battalion's air defense warning system.
artillery battalion and command post. If the air threat is      Company commanders determine sectors offire for
great, batteries of the divisional air defense regiment      employment of massed fires of small arms and vehicle-
may be allocated to any of the maneuver regiments.           mounted weapons, including tank-mounted antiair-
Remaining divisional air defense batteries protect the       craft machine guns. ATGMs can be used to engage
division main command post and division artillery and        troop-carrying and armed helicopters. Signals for
rocket units.                                                warning and engagement are coordinated, with
   A ZSU-23-4 platoon leader normally is given a             primary reliance on visual signals and field telephone
mission order by his air defense battery commander to        communications. Finally, personnel camouflage their
provide protection to a specific maneuver battalion or       vehicles, equipment, and positiOns as a passive. air
battalions for a given period of time. During this time,     defense measure.
the ZSU-23-4 platoon leader reports directly to the             As in other combat actions, the ZSU-23-4s may be
maneuver battalion commander. The platoon leader             deployed in pairs (sections), with pairs of guns not
also maintains communications with his battery head-         more than to 1,500 meters apart. Positions for the ZSU-
quarters and the division's target identification and        23-4s are usually well within a battalion's defensive
warning net.                                                 area, which affords them a measure ofprotection from
   The maneuver battalion commander has overall              enemy observation and direct ground fire. This enables
responSibility for the organization and conduct of air       the ZSU-23-4s to provide protection to the entire bat-
defense by his own battalion and any attached                talion Air observation posts are established in the
                                                                                                                               FM 100-2-1

battalion rear area and at the battalion command                         The battalion's air defense capabilities are only part
observation post. The ZSU-23-4 platoon or section                     of an overall air defense system. Preparations in the bat-
command post usually is located near the battalion                    talion are directed primarily against low-flying aircr3ft
command observation post.                                             that have penetrated the overall air defense network
  The fires of the battalion's organic and attached air               and are attacking the battalion. Before aircraft can
defense weapons are combined into an integrated air                   reach the outer limits of the battalion'S air defense
defense fire plan. The division target identification and             network, they must penetrate the SAM engagement
warning network provides information about the                        envelopes of the SA-4 SAMs of,front and army, the SA-6
enemy air situation. (Note the graphic illustration                   or SA-8 SAMs of the diviSion, and the SA-9 SAM platoon
below.)                                                               of the maneuver regiment's air defense battery.

Air Defense of a Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Defensive Posture _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

               Air observation post
               SA·71Grail SAM section (3 launchers) launch position
                                                                      ~       Sector of observation/fire for SA-7 section
                                                                          \   Limits of fire for infantry and tank weapons when employed
     : a<>     ZSU·2H (positioned for 36(}'degree coverage)            ~ against aircraft

 FM 100-2-1

    The Soviets believe that it is better to engage a            Air defense units playa Significant role in defending
 hostile aircraft prematurely and waste some ammuni-          Soviet ground forces against attacks by enemy airborne
 tion than to wait and allow the aircraft to expend its       and airmobile troops. When an enemy airborne opera-
 ordnance from an advantageous position Aircraft are          tion is detected, frontal aviation attempts to intercept
 fired on continuously as long as they remain within          and destroy enemy transport aircraft while they are at
 range.                                                       the marshaling airfields and en route to the drop zones.
   Aircraft posing the greatest threat are engaged on a       Front, army, and division SAM units engage the
priority basis. The preferred engagement technique is         transport aircraft entering their respective air defense
to continue firing at an already engaged target rather        zones. Regimental air defense units near the drop
than to switch from target to target-unless a later-          Zones also engage the transport aircraft. The ZSU-23-4
acquired target seriously threatens the air defense ele-      fires on paratroops and equipment descending to the
ments. Air observers and weapon crews outside the             ground. Vehicle-mounted machine guns and small
attacked sector maintain observation and readiness to         arms fire also are used in this role.
fire to preclude enemy success through simultaneous              Enemy airmobile units are engaged primarily by
air attacks from several directions.                          antiaircraft artillery and SA-7 and SA-9 SAMs. ZSU-23-4
    Company commanders usually direct the firing of           guns are effective in combating airmobile forces flying
their SA-7 SAMs and the employment of massed small            at very low altitudes to avoid radar detection. The
arms fires. A helicopter usually is engaged by the            importance of visual surveillance in the early detection
massed small arms fire of a single platoon; high-per-         of these approaching helicopters is stressed repeatedly
formance aircraft are engaged by all weapons of the           in Soviet writings. Vehicle-mounted machine guns and
company. Between attacks, air defense weapons are             small arms fire also engage helicopters. Additionally,
repositioned to reduce the likelihood of destruction in       antiaircraft artillery attack enemy airborne and air-
subsequent attacks and to deceive the enemy as to the         mobile forces that have landed.
strength and composition of air defense units.
   Second echelon battalions of a motorized rifle regi-
ment are located several kilometers behind the FEBA           AIR DEFENSE RECONNAISSANCE
and usually do not have attached air defense elements.           The Soviet concept of reconnaissance in air defense
They benefit from the efforts ofall air defense elements      includes airspace surveillance and evaluation of the
located to their front.                                       terrain for suitable weapon positions and likely routes
   Second echelon maneuver regiments develop their            of approach for low-flying aircraft-both ground-
air defense plan in coordination with the division's          attack fighters and armed helicopters. Surveillance of
chief of air defense. It is also likely that one or more of   the surrounding air space is continuous to maintain
the division's air defense batteries will be located in       current data on the enemy air situation.
the defensive areas of these second echelon regiments.           Terrain reconnaissance usually is conducted by the
   In all cases, second echelon regiments take both           commander of the supported unit and the commander
active and passive air defense measures. Air observa-         of the supporting air defense element. They conduct a
tion posts are established, SA-7 SAM and massed unit          preliminary map reconnaissance to tentatively identify
fires are planned, and camouflage measures are taken          positions for deployment of air defense weapons in
   One problem identified by Soviet writings on air           defensive areas, along routes of march, or in areas to be
defense of defending maneuver units is that their com-        seized byadvandng Soviet forces. Significant emphasis
manders often forget that air defense is an integral part     is placed on identification of all potential attack routes
of combined arms actions. Such an overSight can result        for low-flying enemy aircraft of all types. Routes of
in a poorly organized system of air defense, uncoordi-        approach suitable for armed helicopters and positions
nated actions by organic and supporting air defense           from which these helicopters might employ ATGMs
elements, and unnecessary losses of personnel and             are of spedal concern. The Soviets consider armed
equipment to enemy air attacks.                               helicopters to be a serious threat to their tank and
   Lesser problems involve maintaining continuous air         motorized rifle forces. Soviet commanders are trained
observation and insuring that first echelon units have        to observe areas masked by trees or folds in the terrain
current and accurate information about the air situa-         that might be used by enemy aircraft using nap-of-the-
tion. A problem less frequently mentioned is the high         earth (NOE) flight techniques to avoid radar
ammunition and missile expenditure rate that must             detection.
result from the policy ofearly, multiple, and prolonged          The Soviets use electronic and electro-optical
engagement of targets.                                        means and visual observation to conduct air
                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

 surveillance. Radar is used for technical surveillance,     gence (EIlNT), radars on the vehicles may not be used
 providing an all-weather detection capability.              unless the requirement for their use outweighs the risk
   Whenever possible, preliminary target data is passed      of detection. Additional radars from the division's air
from higher-level radar units to air defense com-            defense regiment may be used if increased radar
manders and their firing batteries. This reduces the        coverage is desired. Two radars are usually used, and
vulnerability of battery radars and radar-equipped gun       they are set up at critical points along the march route.
carriages and missile launchers to electronic counter-       Usually only one radar moves at a time. If the com-
measures. Ideally, only aircraft that have been posi-        mander decides not to use the additional radars during
tively identified as hostile are engaged.                   the march, one is placed in the advance guard and the
   The Soviets are well aware of developments in elec-      other in the main furce of the unit. Both remain ready
tronic countermeasures and radar-homing ordnance.           for use at any time.
Radar personnel receive extensive training in counter-          SA-7 gunners engage low-flying aircraft under the
measures against enemy aircraft that use jamming            direction of their company commanders. Individual
devices and radar-homing weapons.                           SA-7 gunners are assigned specific sectors of observa-
   The development of technical reconnaissance              tion and fire to preclude several gunnerS engaging one
means has not reduced the importance ofvisual recon-        target while additional targets approach from other
naissance. Soviet comman<1ers are taught that an effec-     directions. Tight control over the SA-7 gunners
tive system of visual surveillance often may provide the    reduces the expenditure of missiles.
first warning of an enemy air attack-especially one            Regimental air defense weapons, particularly the
conducted by attack helicopters using NOE flight tech-      ZSU-23-4 SPAAGs, playa major role in the defense of
niques. This is especially true at the subunit level.       units making tactical marches. While one or two pairs
   Air observers are posted in all units operating close    of ZSU-23-4s may be employed to protect units on the
to enemy forces or in areas where enemy air attack is       march, the use of all four seems to be the rule. ZSU-23-
likely. Visual air surveillance is conducted on a 360-      4s are employed within 1,500 meters of each other to
degree basis, and observers are assigned sectors of air     insure mutual support. Individual self-propelled anti-
space to monitor. According to the Soviets, an aircraft     aircraft guns maintain at least 50 meters between
can be detected at ranges from 2 to 5 kilometers when       themselves and other vehicles to insure an unob-
the observer is assigned a 60- to 90-degree sector of       structed field of fire for engaging low-flying aircraft.
observation and at ranges of 6 to 7 kilometers when         Targets can be engaged by the ZSU-23-4 moving at
assigned a 30-degree sector. Of course, terrain and visi-   slow·speeds or during the short halt which yields more
bility affect these distances. Using binoculars can         accurate fire. Whenever a column stops, even for brief
increase detection ranges to about 12 kilometers. Air-      periods, the ZSU-23-4s pull off to the right side of the
craft flying at high altitudes may be detected at ranges    road with the rest of the column and remain ready for
of up to 50 kilometers when more sophisticated              action.
optical rangefinding equipment is used.                        When the threat of air attack is great, or when the
                                                            commander directs, weapons of the division's air
                                                            defense regiment are employed to protect columns.
PROTECTION OF MARCH COLUMNS                                 The SA-6 and the SA-8 SAMs-especially the SA-8, with
   The Soviets anticipate that their units may be sub-      its high degree of road mobility, amphibious capability,
jected to heavy attacks by bom    ground-attack fighters    and integral radars-are well suited to providing air
and armed helicopters when conducting road                  defense protection for columns. These weapons
marches. Accordingly, marching regiments are pro-           provide large engagement envelopes which could have
tected by their organic air defense weapons and by air      a Significant impact on enemy aircraft using limited-
defense weapons from their division.                        range, standoff weapons. It is highly likely that SAM bat-
  Air attack is considered likely at chokepoints where      teries are used to protect columns, especially those
rapid movement is impeded by terrain or other obsta-        moving up from the rear.
cles. These chokepoints include bridges, mountain              Air defense batteries relocate as necessary to pro-
passes, built-up areas, and similar locations.              vide continuous and effective protection to the sup-
  Air observers are designated on all vehicles, and air     ported unit. Soviet commanders maintain effective
defense elements, including SA-7 gunners, remain            protection by leaving at least one battery in firing posi-
ready to er.gage targets at all times. Vehicle-mounted      tion to cover for the onee s) moving. Air defense
weapons are also employed. To reduce the likelihood         elements attached to a maneuver unit usually move as a
of detection of the column by enemy electronic intelli-     part of that unit.

FM 100-2-1

   Soviet commanders employ special techniques to            attack. They accomplish this tnlSSlOn by creating
increase flexibility and effectiveness in their air          envelopes of protected air space above and around the
defense. Among these are the use of air defense              crossing sites.
ambushes and roving air defense elements. Air defense           SA-7 gunners generally operate with the maneuver
elements used for both these techniques are similar in       companies. As the battalion approaches the near river-
task organization and usually consist of a single antiair-   banks, SA-7 gunners move with the motorized infantry
craft gun, section, or platoon. SA-7 SAM squads also         and are posted at key locations with assigned sectors of
may be used independently, or with other weapons.            observation and fire. During the crossing, the SA-7
   Air defense ambushes and roving units are used to         gunners cross with the companies, ready to engage
cover gaps in air defenses, to provide air defense           enemy aircraft. On reaching the opposite bank, they
coverage on less likely approach routes for enemyair-        are again assigned positions and designated sectors of
craft, and to deceive the enemy as to the disposition of     observation and fire. The SA-7 gunners may also take
other air defense elements. These tactics often are          part in air defense ambushes if terrain or threat
employed when the air defense assets are thought to          considerations so dictate.
be inadequate.                                                  A platoon of four ZSU-23-4s often accompanies a
- ,Air defense ambushes are most frequently                  reinforced motorized rifl<; battalion operating as an
positioned along less likely but possible approach           advance guard of a motorized rifle regiment.
routes for enemy aircraft. They usually consist of one          During the motorized rifle battalion's march to a
or more ZSU-23-4s or SA-7 SAMs. The ZSU-23-4, with           river, the ZSU-23-4 platoon usually moves at the rear of
its inherent mobility and high rate offire, is especially    the forward security element. Normally, the ZSU-23-4
well suited for both ambushes and roving units. When         platoon is employed in two pairs. In some situations,
necessary, radar elements of the divisional air defense      only one pair may be located with the forward security
regiment may support a unit operating from ambush.           element while the other pair is with the advance guard
   Engagement is made only of those targets that             main body.
approach on the designated route or in self-defense.            If the battalion is opposed while approaching the
Air defense units are immediately repositioned after         near bank, the ZSU-23-4s may engage ground targets.
engagement or discovery by the enemy.                        However, their vulnerability to antitank and other
   Employment of roving air defense units is similar to      direct fire weapons makes such employment very
that of ambushes. The primary difference is that while       risky. Air defense commanders seek alternative
an ambushing unit lies in wait for approaching enemy         approach routes to the near bank if the threat ofdirect
aircraft, a roving unit moves to the most likely areas of    fire is Significant. The ZSUs take up firing positiOns on
enemy air attack and occupies a series of predesig-          the near shore, usually 300 to 500 meters from the
nated positions in the supported unit's area. The roving     water's edge, and not more than 1,500 meters apart.
unit occupies these poSitions according to a pre-            From· these pOSitions, they engage aircraft attacking
arranged schedule or on order of the air defense unit        the crossing site and, ifnecessary, support crossing ele-
commander.                         '                         ments with direct fire.
   The Soviets believe that sudden and intense ground           After motorized rifle subunits have crossed, ZSU-23-
fire from an unexpected location or direction can be         4s usually cross the river with the tank company on
highly effective in destroying attacking aircraft. They      ferries or by bridge. While crossing, the ZSU-23-4s
believe that such fire can seriously degrade air crew        remain ready to engage attacking aircraft.
performance and cause them to fire their weapons pre-           On reaching the far shore, they take up firing
maturely or force them to break off their attack. The        positions jointly agreed on by the maneuver unit com-
Soviets also think that ambushes and roving air defense      mander and the ZSU-23-4 platoon commander. Air
units can make the enemy believe that Significant air        defense assets on the far shore at this point in the
defense elements are located in areas where there are        crossing consist of an SA-7 squad and the two ZSU-23-
actually only a few weapons. This can reduce the effec-      4s. These air defense weapons provide an engagement
tiveness of enemy reconnaissance and the likelihood of       envelope above and around elements of the battalion
enemy air attack in the area concerned                       on both sides of the river. As the rest of the battalion
                                                             crosses and the regiment's main body reaches the near
                                                             bank, ZSU-23-4s on the near shore usually are replaced
PROTECTION OF RIVER CROSSINGS                                by other air defense weapons-possibly by the regi-
  Soviet air defense plays a major role in river crossings   ment's SA-9 SAM platoon. Replacement of the ZSU-23-
by protecting the crossing site and forces from air          4s by other regimental or divisional air defense
                                                                                                          FM 100-2-1

weapons allows the ZSU-23-4 platoon to move forward         the division of air space among the various systems. To
and continue supporting elements on the far shore.          accomplish this, they use a combination of
   Major problems identified by Soviet articles             geographical, altitude, and time divisions of the air
discussing air defense of river crossings are how to        space to be defended
insure comprehensive radar and visual observation and         A hypothetical geographic division of the air space
how to deal simultaneously with threats on multiple         might include establishing a boundary parallel to and
axes of approach. Other problems include difficulties       well forward of the FEBA, beyond the maximum range
in maintaining continuous 360-degree fire coverage          of SA-4 SAMs. Frontal aviation engages enemy aircraft
and providing adequate ammunition resupply to firing        forward of this boundary, and ground-based air
elements on the far shore. The ammunition problem is        defense systems engage aircraft to the rear of this
especially critical for the ZSU-23-4s. Commanders are       boundary. There also maybe "safe corridors" through
cautioned often to be sure that ammunition carriers         the engagement envelopes of ground-based systems
are moved to the far shore to guarantee continuity of       for safe passage of Soviet aircraft beyond the line of
fire. The Soviets believe that these problems can be        contact. These corridors may be used in conjunction
overcome and that well-trained, well-led air defense        with time periods in which SAM units refrain from
units can successfully support river crossings.             engaging aircraft unless directly attacked Time
                                                            periods also may be established during which all air-
                                                            craft are fired on or during which no aircraft is fired on.
   Air defense units operating in mountainous terrain       WEAKNESSES
have unique problems. The rugged terrain makes it              The greatest potential weaknesses of the Soviet air
extremely difficult to maintain the unit integrity of       defense system are that command and control could
both maneuver and air defense units. This makes main-       fail under the intense pressures ofcombat; Soviet com-
taining comprehensive air surveillance and air defense      manders might fail to vigorously push their air defense
fire support more difficult and results in a greater        assets forward at the same pace as their maneuver
degree of decentralization than normal. These diffi-        forces; and it maybe difficult to supply air defense units
culties affect fire control and operations of air defense   with sufficient ammunition and repair parts during
batteries, platoons, and even sections. The importance      prolonged, fast-moving offensive operations.
of the SA-7 is greatly increased in mountain operations.       If the air defense "umbrella" is not moved forward
   Because of the restrictive nature of mountainous ter-    when necessary, Soviet tanks and motorized rifle units
rain and the typically limited road networks in such        become exposed to enemy ground attack aircraft and
areas, maneuver units often have to move in several         armed helicopters, and they may suffer major losses.
widely separated columns. Air defense weapons are           The only alternative to taking these losses would be to
placed forward in each column. Radar equipment and          slow the pace of the advance, which would signifi-
ZSU-23-4 SPAAGs, when present, usually move from            cantly reduce chances of success.
high point to high point along routes of advance to            There is also the question of how Soviet air defense
obtain the best radar coverage, observation, and fields     systems, including the personnel manning the
offire. SA-7 SAM squads probably have greater freedom       weapons and equipment, will react when subjected to
to engage than is normally the case. At times, authority    intenSive and repeated attacks by large numbers of
to engage is even delegated to section leaders. Greater     modem aircraft using sophisticated electronic warfare
use is made of air defense ambushes using ZSU-23-4s,        equipment and highly lethal advanced ordnance that
SA-7 SAMs, and the fires of motorized rifle units.          will probably impose a high attrition rate on air
Elements of the division's air defense regiment may         defense units.
directly support one or more of the division's columns.        An underlying theme in Soviet writings is criticism
The employment of highly mobile SA-6 or SA-8 SAMs in        of some maneuver unit commanders for failure to
divisional air defense regiments greatly increases the      recognize fully that air defense is an integral element of
capability to support mountain combat.                      combined arms combat. In tactical exercises,
                                                            maneuver unit commanders often "forget" about the
                                                            air threat and fail to employ their air defense
AIR SPACE CONTROL                                           capabilities effectively.
   The Soviets have a multitude of air defense systems         Other problems frequently mentioned are failure to
in their forces. Soviet commanders are concerned with       organize effective and continuous air surveillance and
FM 100-2-1

failure to supply air defense units with sufficient         duced into service to replace the SA-9, is mounted on a
ammunition and other materiel. In both cases, the           tracked chassis and has good cross-country mobility.
effectiveness of these units is greatly reduced             The more recently fielded weapons systems have
   Air defense command and control relationships are        redundant missile guidance capability, providing an
subject to conflicting pressures for centralization and     enhanced ability to conduct successful engagements
decentralization. Factors favoring centralized control      in a sophisticated countermeasures environment.
include the greater efficiency and effectiveness of cen-       Continuing qualitative improvements are expected.
tralized target detection systems and the increased         An improved man-portable SAM can be expected.
ranges of modern SAMs. Factors favoring decentralized       While the ZSU-23-4 is an exceptionally good weapon,
control include the need for flexibility to support fast-   its limited range, lack ofan amphibious capability, light
paced operations by maneuver units and the many             armor protection for crew members, and reduced
unforeseen contingencies that can arise in local            effectiveness against more modem aircraft make it a
situations.                                                 likely candidate for replacement. Western develop-
   The regimental air defense staff sometimes plays a       ments in remotely-guided standoff weapons will
role in the employment of company air defense               probably influence future Soviet air defense weapon
weapons, and there may be occasions when the divi-          development.
sion air defense staff dictates how maneuver regiments         Overall, the division's air defense capabilities have
employ their air defense batteries. There also may be       progressed from a point defense system to an area
situations in which army or front directs the employ-       defense system. The combination of the SA-6 and SA-8
ment of divisional air defense assets. In general, the      SAMs with the area defense weapons offrontand army
Soviets impose enough centralization to optimize effi-      and the point defense weapons within the division
ciency while allowing sufficient decentralization for       gives Soviet ground forces a comprehensive, over-
effectiveness.                                              lapping, and mobile area air defense system.
   Caution must be exercised when attempting to                With the increasing lethality of air defense weapons
balance the "weaknesses" outlined above against the         and their deployment at lower levels in the force struc-
overall capabilities of the Soviet air defense system.      ture, effective control of the air space becomes more
Most of these weaknesses have been clearly identified       complex. The Soviets stress the need for the various air
by the Soviets themselves, and they are working to cor-     defense forces to adopt common terminology and to
rect them. The most pervasive shortcomings appear to        conduct operations with a single integrated plan under
be with individual commanders rather than with              unified command and control. This emphasis on unity
system failures. It is highly wilikelythat these problems   of effort may be reflected in the apparent reorganiza-
would be so prevalent that they would seriously             tion of air defense elements formerly under PVO
degrade the overall effectiveness of the Soviet air         Strany and PVO of the Ground Forces into a single
defense system in combat.                                   service, the Air Defense Forces (Voyska PVO).
                                                               Soviet ground-based tactical air defense systems
                                                            present a formidable threat to any potential air enemy.
TRENDS                                                      Soviet air defense efforts appear to be nearly "state of
   ]be most evident trends in Soviet tactical air           the art" when viewed as a whole, and they are unsur-
defense developments in recent years have been tbe          passed by any systems currently deployed by other
progressive increase in tbe size Of tbe engagement          nations. Soviet air defense weapons are deployed in
envelope and the lethality of tbe weapons. New              variety and quantities unmatched by any other military
weapons systems are being introduced and modifica-          force. Soviet air defense doctrine is comprehensive in
tions are being made to prt;Viouslyfielded systems. The     threat evaluation and formulated response. It is
SA-8 has been modified to carry six, rather than four,      cohesive in organization and equipment. It responds
ready-to-fire missiles. The SA-13, currently being intro-   effectively to ground forces' support requirements.



   Fixed-wing combat aircraft and attack helicopters       employs initial, massive nonnuclear air strikes
provide air fire support to Soviet ground maneuver         throughout the theater of operations.
formations. Air support assets are an integral element        The increase in the number of Soviet ground attack
of combined arms formations at front, army, and            aircraft in the last decade and the concurrent improve-
division levels. The majority of the aircraft and heli-    ments in their range, armaments, and avionics have
copters were introduced during the past decade and         provided Soviet military strategists with a viable, non-
have significantly increased offensive air support         nuclear offensive option for gaining the operational
capabilities.                                              initiative and creating the conditions of victory in the
   Tactical fixed-wing aircraft support fronts and         period directly after the outbreak of hostilities. The
armies in theaters of military operations (1VOs).          concept of the air operation entails Soviet fixed-wing,
These assets accomplish the missions of air defense        ground attack aircraft from frontal aviation and inter-
cover, air reconnaissance, and ground support. The         mediate-range aircraft from strategic aviation and naval
aircraft also can conduct battlefield and rear area        aviation committed to a series of massive strikes
interdiction                                               against priority theater targets over a period of several
   The support role of helicopters has greatly             days. With a small proportion of available air resources
expanded concurrently with the rapid expansion of          assigned to the neutralization of enemy air defenses
the number of helicopters. Attack helicopters are          and the creation of approach corridors, the majority of
routinely employed in exercises to provide immediate       the aircraft attack enemy nuclear weapon systems,
air support to motorized rifle and tank regiments and      command and control centers, and airfields.
battalions. Helicopters also perfonn a variety of             During the initial hours of the air operation, the
logistic, intelligence, liaison, and communications        commitment of fixed-wing aircraft to priority theater
functions. In addition, helicopter support for             targets precludes their use for direct air support of
ainnobile operations is a common feature of major          ground force operations, and ground force com-
Soviet field exercises.                                    manders rely on combat helicopters to fill this role.
   The flexibility and maneuverability of tactical         Integrated fires of artillery, attack helicopters, and
aviation assets give them a key role in modem combat.      operational and tactical missiles assist in the creation
According to the Soviets, aviation has particular advan-   of corridors through the enemy's forward air defenses.
tages over other combat forces in that it can-             Missile strikes and attacks by air assault, special
  • Conduct independent operations.                        pwpose, and partisan forces are planned against air-
 • Execute rapid, wide maneuvers.                          fields, nuclear delivery and storage sites, and command
  • Combat enemy air, ground, and naval forces.            and control facilities.
 • Execute missions under diverse tactical and                The air operation is simultaneously a concentrated
environmental conditions.                                  effort to establish air superiority and a principal com-
 • Concentrate forces quickly for the execution of         ponent of the overall Soviet effort to achieve total fire
unexpected missions.                                       superiority to deprive the enemy of his nuclear attack
 • Be redirected after launch to a different target.       capabilities. The air operation is distinguished from a
   Tactical aviation assets can provide continuous fire    general offensive in that the strikes are not in direct
support to ground maneuver fonnations. Air fire            support ofa coincidental advance by ground maneuver
support is responsive to rapid changes in the battle-      fonnations.
field situation and can keep pace with mobile ground          Due to its scale, an air operation is probably a 1VO-
formations. Furthennore, aviation assets generally can     planned and directed operation. However, an air
strike targets that are out of range of artillery.         operation on a smaller scale may be conducted in the
                                                           course of a front operation to establish local air
AIR SUPPORT DOCTRINE                                          As the number of priority targets is reduced in the
                                                           course of the operation, ground attack aircraft are
The Air Operation                                          reassigned to the air suppOrt role according to a pre-
  A massive air operation is the Soviet approach to the    arranged plan. Through this plan the ground force
initial stage of a nonnuclear theater offensive. It        commanders regain the use of air support resources.
 FM 100-2-1

 Air Support of Ground Forces
   Besides the air operation at the onset of theater-level     The aviation element in selected motorized ritle and
hostilities, Soviet doctrine calls for air support of        tank divisions has been upgraded to squadron strength.
ground forces in offensive operations. The Soviets           The division aviation element formerly contained six
recognize four !itages of air support within an offensive    to eight light, general-purpose helicopters. Selected
operation: support of movement forward, airprepara-          divisions now have an organic aviation squadron that
tion, air support, and air accompaniment, which cor-         includes up to 12 HIP and HIND ATGM-equipped
respond to the phases of the fire support plan. The          attack helicopters, in addition to the general-purpose
major difference between the phases is their time of         helicopters.
deployment, although there are some differences in
targeting, command, and aircraft used. (See page 12-8,
Support in the Offense.)                                     COMMAND AND CONTROL
                                                               The command and control structure of frontal
                                                             aviation is integrated with that of the ground forces to
ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT                                   insure close and continuous coordination in a com-
   Soviet tactical aviation assets are organized on a        bined arms offensive. At front level, the deputy com-
functional/mission-related basis. The Soviets consider       mander for aviation serves as chief of aviation on the
that homogenous formations of fighters, fighter-             front staff.
bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, etc., increase fire-
power and strike capability, promote firm control and
maneuverability, and enhance the capability to               Aviation Control Element
conduct sustained operations. Tactical aviation assets          At army and division level, an aviation control
consist generally of fighter, fighter-bomber, heli-          element normally is assigned to the staff of the com-
copter, and reconnaissance units, as well as                 mander. At army, this element generally consists of
miscellaneous support units.                                 these personnel: an air controller, an intelligence
   The distribution of these assets among the different      officer, a liaison officer, and communications
levels of command is currently in tIux. The ongoing          personnel. Aviation control elements at division level
aviation reorganization shows an apparent desire to          are similar to, but smaller than, those at army level.
centralize control over most fixed-wing tactical                Aviation control elements advise on the use of air
aircraft and to decentralize control over the attack         assets, transmit air support requests to the aviation
helicopters.                                                 organizations, maintain communications and control
   Frontal aviation organizations are located in 12 of       with aircraft in the battle area, and advise the com-
the 16 military districts within the USSR and with each      mander of air reconnaissance information The avia-
of the Groups of Soviet Forces in the GDR, Poland,           tion control element is separated into two sections.
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The strength and                Each of these sections has a specially-equipped BTR-
composition of the aviation assets of a/ront can vary        60. One section chief is collocated with the com-
considerably. Frontal aviation may include two or            mander, and the other is collocated with the chief of
three air divisions and independent regiments of             staff.
reconnaissance aircraft.
   An air division typically contains either fighter or
fighter-bomber aircraft, usually organized into three        Forward Air Controller
regiments of three squadrons each (see FM 100-2-3).            A forward air controller is assigned to ground force
Divisions are commanded by major generals or                 regiments when fixed-wing aircraft or combat heli-
colonels; regiments by lieutenant colonels or colonels;      copters are assigned for their support. The Soviet
squadrons and tlights by majors and captains,                forward air controller is an air forces officer and
respectively.                                                generally a pilot. His tasks are to advise the regimental
   Concurrently with the rapid expansion of rotary-          commander, to serve as the communications link
wing assets, the Soviets have organized a steadily           between the regiment and the aviation control
increasing number of independent attack helicopter           element at division, and to direct attacking aircraft'to
regiments (see FM 100-2-3). These independent                their targets. He is equipped with a vehicle and the
attack helicopter regiments are apparently a principal       equipment required to maintain communications with
component of what the Soviets refer to as armyavia-          the division and the airfield. The forward air controller
tion, and are probably subordinate to army-level             can ~all up air support at the request of the supported
maneuver force commanders.                                   ground unit commander.
                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

   It is rare to find an air representative in a ground     tion of automated control systems to speed and
force battalion. However, a forward air controller may      simplify collecting, transmitting, and processing
be assigned when air support is provided in a parti-        information at all levels of command and control. More
cularly important· or difficult battalion action.           frequent joint t~tical briefings, technical conferences,
Normally, however, a battalion commander has no             and meetings between lower-level ground force and
direct communications with air support resources.           air commanders also are suggested in Soviet military
   For mutual recognition and target designation,           publications.
radioelectronic means such as radio beacons are used
widely by the forward air controllers. Signal flares,
colored smoke, beacon lights, and cloth panels are          Night and Weather Conditions
used when there is visual contact. When aircraft are           At present, the Soviets are striving to increase the
operating against objectives that cannot be observed        effectiveness of air support in poor weather and at
by ground troops or forward air controllers, target         night. Soviet air operations slow considerably under
designation is carried out mainly using reconnaissance      these conditions because of inadequate aircraft and
information obtained by the aircraft crews themselves.      ground-based equipment and shortcomings in flight
The crews use flares, aircraft maneuvers, and radio-        personnel training. Also, some of the mutual identifi-
electronic means for signaling, for communicating,          cation and target designation systems used during
and for making mutual identification.                       complex weather conditions and for night flying are
                                                            unsophisticated The Soviets are evidently making
                                                            efforts to correct these shortcomings. It is believed
Difficulties in Coordination                                that about 20 percent of the third-generation, fixed-
   Judging from Soviet military writings, the method of     wing aircraft introduced in the 1970s and frontal
coordination between the air and ground forces,             aviation's combat helicopters are equipped with radio-
especially at lower levels, is not always successful. The   electronic and infrared instruments. This equipment
procedures worked out by air and ground force com-          enables pilots to carry out sorties at night and in poor
manders before the launch of combat air missions            weather at low altitudes, and to search for, to detect,
often inhibit flexibility in mutual cooperation and pre-    and to destroy targets. Even when modem, sophisti-
vent changes required by the situation that evolves         cated equipment is used, the Soviets believe that-for
after the missions are underway. Problems also arise        air support of ground troops-it is important to train
because many ground force commanders do not have            pilots to navigate by landmarks, to search for targets
in-depth knowledge of the combat capabilities of avia-      visually, and to determine the distances to targets
tion, and air forces commanders often are unfamiliar        without technical aids.
with the development of the ground battle except in            Effective frontal aviation operations in support of
general terms. Ground force unit commanders some-           advancing troops depend a great deal on prOviding
times hesitate to call for air support unless the support   appropriate airfields. In some regions it is possible to
has been planned beforehand. As one Soviet com-             use certain types of modem aircraft from unpaved
mentator stated recently, "The aviators fight according     airfields. Some captured enemy airfields also could be
to their rules, and the combined arms troops accord-        used. When appropriate airfields are available, third-
ing to theirs." The plans for mutual cooperation            generation aircraft with their increased operational
worked out before the actions are often incomplete          range and load capability enable the Soviets to provide
and account for only the situation when aircraft            air support to ground forces advancing at high speed.
approach the FEBA. Lower-level ground force com-            However, the Soviets have been seeking a !:}pe of air-
manders are not always informed of the fighter-             craft that could operate from small, unpaved airfields
bomber and combat helicopter resources allocated for        and insure reliable air support to their ground forces.
immediate missions. The combined arms commanders            To help fulfill this need, the combat helicopter has
do not always know the location and condition ofavia-       emerged as a weapon system that can provide ade-
tion during the battle, the aviation's readiness to         quate support with the required flexibility.
commit reserves, or the types of air strikes available. A
failure by higher headquarters to supply damage
assessment data to ground commanders causes                 PLANNING AND PREPARATION
unnecessary firing at previously destroyed targets.           Planning and pC(;paration of air support before an
   To resolve the problems of mutual cooperation suc-       offensive begin with the front commander's orders
cessfully, Soviet military experts suggest wider adop-      to his aviation commander( s) and to his army
FM 100-2-1

commanders. The order specifies the air units to be         missiles have to be assigned by the commander in
committed, the ground armies to. be supported, and          charge of the entire operation (usually the front
the time of attack                                          commander or above).
   With this information, the combined arms com-               The Soviets normally maintain strict centralization
mander and his aviation staff reconcile the air assets      in controlling air support resources. The supporting
allocated by the front commander with the air support       aviation will not always be under the operational
requirements of the ground force divisions. A               control of the combined arms commander. Instead, air
maneuver division commander consults his aviation           support resources may be apportioned into regiment-
staff and develops his requirements by detetmining the      flights or aircraft sorties with the required quantity of
targets to be attacked in his sector and estimating his     munitions. These resources are allocated temporarily
immediate missions. Available air support is divided        to the combined arms commander for the destruction
among preplanned, on-call, and immediate-air support        of selected objectives. The combined arms com-
missions. An on-call mission is one in which the target     mander may not know which air force unit or forma-
may be predesignated, but the timing of the strike          tion will accomplish the missions he requested.
remains at the discretion of the ground force com-             Such centralized control allows a rapid reallocation
mander. If combat helicopters are to be used, air sup-      of air support resources to accomplish the most
port is divided specifically between the fixed- and         important missions that suddenly arise during opera-
rotary-wing aircraft, depending on the targets, flight      tions. Air force units that were not originally assigned
distances, and disposition of enemy antiaircraft            for ground support may sometimes take part in
defenses. Mer these determinations are approved and         delivering airstrikes against ground objectives. Decen-
integrated with the frontfire support plan, the aviation    tralized employment of aviation (especially combat
commander issues specific orders to his air divisions       helicopters) will be used when operations are being
and regiments concerning targets, numbers of sorties,       waged on separate and disconnected axes. In that case,
air approach corridors, communications codes, and           aviation assigned for air support will be transferred to
mission timing. The air representatives at army, divi-      the operational control of the combined arms com-
sion, and regiment then confirm, for the respective         mander, for employment according to his needs.
commanders, the air resources allocated to them.
Normally, the frontal aviation commander holds a
percentage of his forces in reserve to meet unforeseen      PREPLANNED AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS
demands of division commanders. Division com-                  As preplanned target assignments are received by air
manders also can withhold a percentage of their allo-       regiments and squadrons, they are studied closely to
cated air assets as reserves.                               determine the best tactical approach. Large-scale maps
   When a regiment has been assigned specific air           and, in some cases, scale models of the terrain and
support, the regimental commander explains his              targets are used to familiarize pilots with their assign-
objectives to the commander of the supporting air unit      ments and to determine the optimum flight path and
and the forward air controller assigned to his regiment.    approach maneuvers.
He also seeks their recommendations.                           Once airborne, the aircraft proceed to a designated
   Both front and army commanders pay particular            checkpoint behind friendly lines where they confirm
attention to coordination of artillery and missile fire     their target assignment with ground control. The
with preplanned and on-call air strikes so that artillery   emphasis placed on strict adherence to predetermined
and missile fire can neutralize or suppress enemyanti-      timing and flight paths indicates the probable use of
aircraft defenses befure the arrival of attack aircraft.    "safe" corridors through friendly antiaircraft defenses.
   Coordinating the delivery of nuclear strikes is an       Aviation control elements and forward air controllers
important function for the ground and air com-              maintairi communications with attack aircraft either
manders and their staffs. The commander ofcombined          directly or through radio relay aircraft.
arms furces decides the employment tactics for                 As the-aircraft approach the target area, forward alt:
nuclear weapons immediately within the ground force         controllers establish communications and make sure
zone of advance to the depth of the range of his tactical   targets are correctly identified by the pilots. When the
missiles. He has to determine the target and the type,      target is in Sight and has been confirmed by the for-
method, and time of delivery of nuclear strikes for his     ward air controller, the flight leader assigns individual
own missiles and for the carrier aircraft operating in      targets and orders the attack Aircraft follow the
the zone of advance. Aviation missions for delivery of      origi!lal flight plan through friendly antiaircraft
nuclear strikes beyond the range of ground force            defenses unless changed by ground control.
                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

   A request for immediate air support is submitted by      separate target sectors. Attack helicopters normally
the ground commander to the next higher head-               are employed after the completion of the artillery
quarters and then forwarded through the chain of            preparation. However, it is possible to use both simul-
command. If a request for air support does not exceed       taneously. In such a situation, the helicopters are
the division commander's allocated assets, he can           assigned entrance and exit corridors parallel to and
order the air strike through his aviation control           between artillery fire concentrations, and under the
element. Otherwise, army or front approval must be          trajectory of artillery rounds.
obtained, depending on the size of support requested.          The Soviets constantly emphasize that familiarity
   As with preplanned support, the aviation control         among the different elements of the combined arms
element at each command level participates directly in      force of each other's tactics and equipment, and
the evaluation of each air support request and in the       relationships of mutual trust and understanding, must
coordination of the strike mission.                         be firmly established in peacetime ifeffective coopera-
   Aircraft designated for immediate missions can be        tion and coordination is to be maintained during
airborne in holding areas or on the ground at airfields.    combat. The peacetime distribution of air assets
Occasionally, an aircraft on armed reconnaissance           among the military districts and groups of forces and
patrol can be diverted to respond to an air support         within the force structure reflects the Soviet desire to
request within its area of operations. The Soviets          establish a peacetime organization that closely
recognize three levels of combat readiness for frontal      correspmlds to the wartime 'structure of combined
aviation aircraft: and crews. Aircraft: in categories one   arms rormations. The aviation command and control
and two respond to ground force requests for immedi-        structure is closely aligned with that of ground
ate air support. Before takeoff, pilots receive a short     maneuver formations to insure effective, continuous,
briefing that designates a checkpoint toward which to       combined arms coordination.
proceed and, possibly, the target location. On reaching        The Soviets prefer to use experienced pilots from
the checkpoint, the pilots contact the air represen-        the supporting aviation unit as forward air controllers.
tative of the ground force units being supported to         They prefer to have qualified helicopter pilots direct
receive target designation or confirmation. Approach,       helicopter strikes and qualified fighter-bomber pilots
attack, and recovery air control procedures remain the      direct fighter-bomber strikes. However, either forward
same as in preplanned air support missions.                 air controller may direct strikes by both types of sup-
                                                            porting aviation so long as adequate air-ground
                                                            communications can be established.
AVIATION EMPLOYMENT                                            The forward air controller provides pilots the target
  The Soviets emphasize that aviation can provide           location (either in grid coordinates or in relation to a
responsive and continuous fire support if its employ-       predetermined reference point), the time to execute
ment is guided by the following principles:                 the strike, and information on the ground situation.
 • The early attainment of air superiority.                 The forward air controller normally does not attempt
 • Coordination and integration with other arms.            to mark the target, but frequently uses pyrotechnics to
 • Employment in mass.                                      mark friendly troop locations. He may give the pilots a
 • Strict, centralized control.                             signal when they should climb and identify their target.
                                                            The pilot has primary responsibility for pinpointing the
                                                            target. However, the forward air controller assesses
Air-Ground Coordination                                     and adjusts the strikes for successive target runs. Com-
   The Soviets consider that the coordinated use of the     munications security between the forward air
airspace over the battlefield and aerial delivery of        controller and aircrews is maintained by the
ordnance close to friendly troops are among the most        transmission of brief coded messages and prearranged
complex problems of modem combat. A considera-              signals.
tion in their emphasis on early attainment of air              Minimum safety distances between friendly troops
superiority is simplification of the airspace manage-       and air strikes during peacetime exercises vary
ment problem To reduce air-ground coordination              between 200 and 700 meters. In actual combat, the
problems as much as possible, attack helicopters,           Soviets likely accept less rigid safety distances.
fixed-wing ground attack aircraft:, and artillery are not      Control and target identification posts are estab-
normally employed simultaneously in the same fire           lished as necessary to exercise command and control
zone. Attacks by fixed-wing aircraft: and artillery me      of helicopters and aircraft in a designated air sector.
sometimes coincide in time, but they are assigned           The posts support the introduction of aviation into an
FM 100-2-1

area of combat operations and also may direct ground         planning air and ground operations. There are four
strikes. The posts also accomplish direct coordination       major categories of targets for air reconnaissance:
bet\yeen ground-attack and fighter aircraft and ground        • Nuclear weapon systems and storage depots.
air defense units. These posts are equipped with radar,       • Active and potential enemy airfields.
communications, and automated equipment and may               • Defensive positions and systems (air defense,
be ground- or air-based.                                     command and control centers, electronic warfare
                                                              • Enemy reserves, supply depots, and approach
 Control Versus Mass                                         routes (particularly key intersections and bridges).
   According to the Soviets, strict centralized control is      Aircraft crews on any mission are expected to
one of the "ecisive conditions for the successful            immediately report observed enemy activity. Primary
conduct of combat operations" by aviation.                   responsibility for air reconnaissance is borne by dedi-
Centralized control and mass are viewed as corollary         cated reconnaissance regiments. These regiments
principles, providing for the fullest exploitation of the    have specially equipped reconnaissance aircraft.
mobility and maneuverability of aviation                     Airborne electronic intelligence collectors also are
   Aviation assets may be dispersed to avoid                 available from aviation assets.
destruction by the enemy's nuclear or rqassive conven-          Perishable target intelligence data is transmitted by
tional fire strikes. However, through centralized            radio from the aircraft to ground command posts.
control they are rapidly reconcentrated to deliver           Greater effort is being made to develop and improve
massive strikes against the enemy's main attack or in        methods for secure transmission of reports from the
support of their own main attack. Centralized control        aircraft to data collection and processing centers. The
also is alleged to enhance the planning and execution        processing of data from an air reconnaissance mission
of surprise strikes on the enemy, to allow the mainte-       takes 2 to 8 hours, although procedures for inter-
nance of a strong air reserve, and to simplify coordina-     preting reconnaissance data are being modernized to
tion among aviation assets performing different              speed up this process.
missions in the same air space (e.g., air defense, ground       In training exercises, the Soviets have shown some
support, reconnaissance).                                    reservations about employing armed reconnaissance
   In a rapidly changing combat situation, centralized       flights on battlefield and rear area interdiction
control expedites the reallocation of aviation assets to     missions ("free hunting" flights) until air superiority is
accomplish important missions that suddenly arise            established. Armed reconnaissance efforts would be
during combat operations, such as destruction of             directed toward disrupting the enemy's resupply
enemy nuclear weapons, aviation, and reserves. At            operations and troop movements through the
times, aviation assets that were not originally assigned     immediate exploitation of reconnaissance data (by a
ground support roles may be tasked to strike ground          flight of a reconnaissance aircraft and two to four
objectives. In contrast, it would seem that decen-           attack aircraft). Targets for interdiction missions are
tralized control of aviation assets, especially attack       nuclear storage areas, enemy airfields, troop reserves,
helicopters, is desired when combat operations are           and command and control centers. Targets may be
conducted on separate, disconnected axes. In such            located up to 480 kilometers behind the front lines.
cases, combined arms commanders control and                  Interdiction of enemy efforts to deploy and concen-
employ allocated aviation assets according to the            trate his forces against a rapid and highly mobile attack-
needs of their maneuver forces.                              ing force is considered particularly effective when the
                                                             enemy lacks in-depth reserves and relies on moving
                                                             forces laterally to blunt offensive operations.
Reconnaissance and Targeting                                    The classification (characteristics and configura-
   The principal method for gathering target intelli-        tion) and location of targets are the bases for planning
gence is air reconnaissance. The front commander's           strikes). Targets are classified as single, multiple, line,
staff prepares an overall reconnaissance plan that           or area. (See examples in the upper chart at right.)
details tasks for tactical aviation assets. Tactical
aviation reconnaissance focuses on the tactical and
operational depths of the enemy, although targets at         Mission Execution
strategic depths also may be assigned.                         Air strikes in direct support of ground maneuver
   Air reconnaissance is conducted to determine the          formations are primarily preplanned, with some on-
enemy's intentions and collect intelligence for              eall. The combined arms commander identifies the

                                                                                                                        FM 100-2-1

targets, times, and desired damage for air strikes. The               technique and ordnance, communication codes, and
aviation commander determines the force, size, ord-                   approach and departure routes.
nance, and attack technique that will accomplish the                     A portion of available air assets is held in readiness to
strike mission.                                                       execute immediate missions against unexpected
   Preplanned strikes are planned in great detail and                 targets. On-call strikes are made against predesignated
integrated with other forms offire support. Large scale               targets, with the timing of strikes left to the discretion
maps and, in some cases, terrain models are used to                   of maneuver force commanders. Aircraft and heli-
familiarize pilots with targets, to plan approach and                 copters designated for on-call missions can be
departure routes, and to develop attack techniques.                   airborne in holding areas or on the ground at forward
Attack variations are developed and practiced to pro-                 airfields.
vide pilots with a ready response to changes in the                      The Soviets recognize three levels of combat readi-
situation.                                                            ness for fighter-bomber aircraft and crews, which are
   The plan for preplanned strikes normally covers the                described in the lower chart below. These categories
first 1 to 2 hours of combat operations, but may cover a              are probably also applicable to other types of ground-
period of up to 24 hours in a static situation. The plan              attack aviation assets. Aircraft in categories one and
specifies the targets, strike force, time, location, attack           two respond to on-call missions.

Classification of Air Strike Targets - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

   CLASSIFICATION                              EXAMPLE                                            ATTACK TECHNIQUE
   SINGLE (OR POINT)        Rocket launcher. tank or armored vehicle.                  Single aircraft using low-level or dive delivery
                            parked aircraft. or helicopter. Radar firing point.        of ordnance. ARM employed against radars.
                            observation point. or bunker.                              Single helicopter using ATGM or rockets.
   MULTIPLE                 Group of 10-20 single targets occupying an                 Attack by a small group (2-8) of aircraft or
                            area of 1-1.5 km.