Approaching Counterterrorism Metrics and Measures.ppt by lovemacromastia

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									Approaching Counter
Terrorism: The Global War on
Terror and the Problem of
Metrics
Michael Stohl
Department of Communication
University of California, Santa Barbara
March 2007
Determining the metrics of success
   Today, we lack metrics to know if we are
   winning or losing the global war on terror.
   Are we capturing, killing or deterring and
   dissuading more terrorists every day than the
   madrassas and the radical clerics are
   recruiting, training and deploying against us?
   Donald Rumsfeld October 16, 2003
NSCT, September 5, 2006
Successes
    We have significantly degraded the al-Qaida
   network. Most of those in the al-Qaida
   network responsible for the September 11
   attacks, including the plot‟s mastermind
   Khalid ShaykhMuhammad, have been
   captured or killed. We also have killed other
   key al-Qaida members, such as Abu Musab
   al-Zarqawi, the group‟s operational
   commander in Iraq who led a campaignof
   terror that took the lives of countless
   American forces and innocent Iraqis
State Department Annual Country
Reports on Terrorism, 2005
April 2006
   In 2005, we saw indications of:
   An increasing AQ emphasis on ideological and
   propaganda activity to help advance its cause. This
   led to cooperation with al-Qaida in Iraq, the
   organization led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and
   with AQ affiliates around the globe, as well as
   with a new generation of Sunni extremists;
   The proliferation of smaller, looser terrorist
   networks that are less capable but also less
   predictable;
An increased capacity for acts of terror by local
terrorists with foreign ties (demonstrated in
the July 7 London bombings);
An increase in suicide bombings. The July 7
London bombing was the first such a ttack in
Europe (three of the four terrorists were
second-generation British citizensof South
Asian descent); we also noted a marked
increase in suicide bombings in Afghanistan;
The growth of strategically significant
networks that support the flow of foreign
terrorists to Iraq.
Starting points
   Terrorism is the purposeful act or the
   threat of the act of violence to create
   fear and/or compliant behavior in a
   victim and/or audience of the act or
   threat.
Counterterrorism
   At home, counterterrorism policy and
   actions must respond to the acts or the
   threats of the act of violence, reduce
   the risk of future acts, reduce fear in
   the audience of the risk of future acts
   and maintain the support and trust of
   the home audience.
Counterterrorism abroad
   Abroad, counterterrorism policy and
   actions must respond to the acts or the
   threats of the act of violence, reduce
   the risk of future acts, reduce fear in
   the audience of the risk of future acts
   and maintain the support and trust of
   that audience.
Success in Counterterrorism
   The Bush Administration Approach
Bush Administration
   Most popular approach
     Body counts, scorecards, events and risks
     Announce the counterterrorism measures
     taken
Security: Attacks
   At home
     Since 9/11 no further attacks on U.S. soil
Body Counts and Scorecards

   2/3rds of the al Qaeda leadership
   has been captured
   3400 arrested
   $200 million in assets frozen
   Bases in Afghanistan destroyed.
NSCT, September 5, 2006
   Most of those in the al-Qaida network
   responsible for the September 11 attacks,
   including the plot’s mastermind Khalid Shaykh
   Muhammad, have been captured or killed. We
   also have killed other key al-Qaida members,
   such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group’s
   operational commander in Iraq who led a
   campaign of terror that took the lives of
   countless American forces and innocent Iraqis.
Disruption and Risk
   liberty.gov disrupted 150 terrorist plots
   around the world and at
   Bush at the National Endowment for
   Democracy October 2005, ten plots disrupted.
   Cole (2006) argues that this number is very
   much in dispute.
National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, September 5, 2006
  to win the War on Terror, we will:
  • Prevent attacks by terrorist networks;
  • Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states
     and terrorist allies who seek to use them;
  • Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue
     states;
  • Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use
     as a base and launching pad for terror; and
  • Lay the foundations and build the institutions and
     structures we need to carry the fight forward
     against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.
  • Advance effective democracies as the long-term
     antidote to the ideology of terrorism;
NSCT, September 5, 2006
Successes
 • There is a broad and growing global consensus that the
   deliberate targeting of innocents is never justified by
   any calling or cause.
 • Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with
   unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement,
   intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.
 • We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help
   prevent future attacks in the Homeland by enhancing
   our counterterrorism architecture through the creation
   of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of
   Director of National Intelligence, and the National
   Counterterrorism Center.
Some alternatives to consider
   We are fighting this war on three
   distinct fronts: the home front, the
   operational front and the strategic-
   political front.
   John Lehman, August 31, 2006
Byman (2003)
  five “genuine measures of success” by which to
  evaluate counterterrorist operations:
     the freedom terrorists have to operate (their
     secure geographic zone),
     a high level of domestic support for
     counterterrorist operations,
     the disruption of the adversary‟s command and
     control structure,
     terrorist recruitment,
     terrorist attacks.
Morag (2005 :319-310)
 seven parameters, three categories
   human life (reduction in civilian casualties among
   both Israelis and Palestinians),
   economic resources (minimization of the
   negative economic impact on Israel),
   Political resources (Israeli social cohesion,
   international and domestic support for the Israeli
   government, and the extent of weakening of
   international and domestic support for the
   Palestinian leadership).
Raphael Perl (2005:11)
   Measuring trends.
   1. Terrorist infrastructure.
     Is their leadership being weakened; is their
     recruitment base,
     network, or target list growing?
   2. Terrorist tactical and strategic goals
   3. Capabilities
     What are the capabilities of a terrorist group to
     inflict serious damage?
     Are they increasing or decreasing?
Peter Probst (2005)
   Statistical analysis as used by the government to
   assess terrorism and counterterrorism efforts remains
   primitive and, too often, dangerously misleading. We
   measure what can easily be quantified rather than
   what is truly meaningful. We strive to capture
   extremely complex phenomena in a simple sound
   bite, reinforced by seemingly compelling but
   simplistic statistical comparisons and then wonder
   why our instant analysis has failed to comport with
   reality, leaving us embarrassed and scratching our
   heads. Numbers, as we use them, provide a false
   sense of objectivity, accuracy and precision, too often
   leaving the decision makers frustrated and angry.
   And, too often, leaving the public with the feeling
   that somehow they have been conned.
How should we approach the
establishment of metrics
   Theoretically and conceptually based
   Tied to the concepts that are most
   meaningful for understanding terrorism
   and counter terrorism
   Understand the purpose of the metrics
How should we approach the
establishment of metrics
   Importance of Validity and Reliability of
   measures

     Construct validity
     Convergent and discriminant validity
     Internal and External Reliability
     Multiple measures
Key considerations
   Security
   The Opponent
   The Counterterrorist Organization
   Audience(s)
   Fear
   Trust

 For each of the concepts we need not only
   define but operationalize and measure over
   time
Body Counts and Scorecards
   Increase or decrease of terrorist attacks
   Increase or decrease of risk of future attacks
   Increase or decrease in terrorists, terrorist
   groups, range of operation, safe havens, state
   support
   Increase or decrease in the capacity of the
   organization (s), and network
   Increase or decrease in supporters,
   sympathizers, acquiescers
   Or a simple scorecard
   http://www.angelfire.com/ultra/terroristscor
   ecard/index.html
Rand/ MIPT Data
International Deaths by Region
Rand/ MIPT Data
Deaths by Region, domestic
International terrorism
2001-2005
    Incidents up in the Middle East and either flat
    or down almost everywhere else
    Deaths up in the Middle East and Europe pretty
    flat everywhere else
Domestic terrorism
2001-2005
    up in the middle east
    up in Russia and Chechnya
    South America :Colombia accounts for 90%
    of the deaths since 2001
    Eastern Europe :Russia and Chechnya
    account for 96% of deaths since 2001
    Africa Uganda accounts for 56% of the
    deaths in Sub Saharan Africa,
    Darfur, Congo, etc. don‟t show up
More or less terrorism?where?
   National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC
   http://www.tkb.org/NCTC/Home.jsp),
   In 2004 there were more than three
   times as many incidents (651/208) and
   three times as many persons killed
   (1907/625) in what they define as
   significant international terrorism than
   in 2003
   Data impossible to assess for 2005
   because of change in reporting
More or less terrorism when?
Interrupted Time Series
Total Terrorist Incidents MIPT 09/12/1997 - 09/10/2001



Region                           Incidents   Injuries   Fatalities
Africa                              212        6638       1560
East & Central Asia                 36          100        83
Eastern Europe                      480        1425        593
Latin America & the Caribbean       636         569        563
Middle East / Persian Gulf         1183        1722        519
North America                       43          16          4
South Asia                          432        3776       1361
Southeast Asia & Oceania            203        1203        215
Western Europe                     1490         460        118
Total                               4715     15,909       5016
 Total Terrorist Incidents MIPT
 09/12/2001 - 09/10/2005


Region                            Incidents   Injuries   Fatalities
Africa                               124         828        711
East & Central Asia                  53          61         56
Eastern Europe                       626        3352       1232
Latin America & the Caribbean        865        1594        818
Middle East / Persian Gulf          4468       16437       7637
North America                        58          49          8
South Asia                          2779        8581       3456
Southeast Asia & Oceania             264        2102        751
Western Europe                      1322        1261        281
Total                              10,559       34,205     14950
do these metrics help us know if:
   There is a greater or lesser chance of a
   terrorist attack today in the United States
   than there was when the baseline point was
   established?
   There is a greater or lesser chance of a
   terrorist attack against American targets
   abroad than there was at the baseline point?
   George Tenet‟s testimony to the Intelligence
   committees in February 2004
     “Even catastrophic attacks on the scale of 9/11 remain
     within Al Qaeda‟s reach.”
Capacity of the Opponent
   Capability
     Size, structure, support, sympathy
     Geographical scope and range
     Tactical and strategic
The Opponent
  Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda,
  but it does not end there. It will not end
  until every terrorist group of global
  reach has been found, stopped and
  defeated.
    George W. Bush September 20, 2001


  The Network of Terror: Implications
    To study terrorist networks we need to know:

1. What is a network?
2. Who is in the network? What are its
   boundaries?
3. What relations are encompassed in the
   network? How are nodes connected?
4. What are the relevant structural properties?
5. What types of ties are there?
6. How are networks embedded within society?
7. What network processes are associated with
   structure?
Stohl and Stohl (2007, forthcoming)
Size and Structure of Al Qaeda
   Estimates of the number of persons who passed
   through the Al Qaeda training camps have ranged as
   high as 25,000-30,000 dispersed to cells in more
   than sixty countries.
   There is no easy way to determine the size of Al-
   Qaeda, the number and scale of its affiliates and
   proxies; or who its donors, active supporters
   and potential sympathizers are. Local
   governments often do not know, deliberately conceal,
   or may at times exaggerate the Al-Qaeda presence in
   their countries.
   Trends? -if we don‟t know the baseline it is difficult
   to determine if Al Qaeda or the Global Network of
   Terror is larger of smaller since a particular point in
   time.
Size and Structure of Al Qaeda
In the aftermath of the Afghanistan war the incentive
to demonstrate success led to more conservative
descriptions of organizational size, connections and
possibilities. For example in June 2002, Johnson, Van
Natta and Miller (2002) of the New York Times reported,
“that senior officials suggest that although sworn
members of Al Qaeda were estimated to number no
more than 200 to 300 men, officials say that at its peak
this broader Qaeda network operated about a dozen
Afghan camps that trained as many as 5000 militants,
who in turn created cells in as many as 60 countries.”
Status of Al Qaeda Jenkins (in Fallows)
    “The Taliban were dispersed, and al-Qaeda’s
 training camps in Afghanistan were dismantled.”
  Al-Qaeda operatives by the thousands have been
 arrested, detained, or killed. So have many members
 of the crucial al-Qaeda leadership circle around bin
 Laden and his chief strategist, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
  it has become harder for the remaining al-Qaeda
 leaders to carry out the organization’s most basic
 functions:
  “Because of increased intelligence efforts by the
 United States and its allies, transactions of any type—
 communications, travel, money transfers—have
 become more dangerous for the jihadists. Training
 and operations have been decentralized, raising the
 risk of fragmentation and loss of unity. Jihadists
 everywhere face the threat of capture or martyrdom.”
Status of Al Qaeda
  Their command structure is gone, their
  Afghan sanctuary is gone, their ability to
  move around and hold meetings is gone,
  their financial and communications
  networks have been hit hard,”
   Seth Stodder, a former official in the
  Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Status of Al Qaeda
   “The al-Qaeda that existed in 2001 simply
   no longer exists.
    In 2001 it was a relatively centralized
   organization, with a planning hub, a
   propaganda hub, a leadership team, all within
   a narrow geographic area. All that is gone,
   because we destroyed it.”
   Where bin Laden‟s central leadership team
   could once wire money around the world
   using normal bank networks, it now must rely
   on couriers with vests full of cash.
   Kilcullen in Fallows
Status of Al Qaeda
The essence of the change is this: because of
al-Qaeda‟s own mistakes, and because of the
things the United States and its allies have
done right, al-Qaeda‟s ability to inflict direct
damage in America or on Americans has been
sharply reduced.
  Fallows, September 2006
How does he know this?
Does the preceding tell us this?
The Counterterror Organization
   Building Support Amongst Diverse
   Audiences
Capacities of the
CounterTerrorist Organization
(and organizational network)
Core membership
Members, geographic dispersion,
deviations and trends
   Support structures, resources,
geographic dispersion, deviations and
trends
   Zone of operations, geographic
dispersion, deviations and trends
Size of counterterrorism coalition
   Nous sommes tous Américains
   Le Monde, September 12, 2001
Size of counterterrorism coalition
 What do these numbers signify?

 The members of NATO and the Rio Pact invoked these treaties’
 mutual defense clauses for the first time. Subsequently, sixteen of
 the 19 NATO members engaged in the Afghan theater. The UN
 Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 requiring
 all UN members to freeze terrorist financing, improve border
 security, clamp down on the recruitment of terrorists, share
 information, and deny terrorists any support or safe haven. In
 September and October of 2001 there was clear international
 community support for the United States and for a collective
 response to the problem of terrorism. A total of 136 countries
 offered a range of military assistance to the United States,
 including over flight and landing rights and accommodations for
 U.S. forces.
Size of counterterrorism coalition
   The initial cooperation led to “an aggressive
   international law enforcement effort [which] had
   resulted in detention of approximately 3,000 terrorists
   and their supporters in more than 100 countries and in
   the freezing of $124 million in assets in some 600 bank
   accounts around the world, including $36 million in the
   United States alone.

   If these numbers decline … what is this evidence for?
Perceptions of Fear and Security
Hoffman, 2006
   The tragic loss of innocent life in any attack
   linked to al Qaeda is calculated by its
   masterminds to rekindle worldwide the same
   profound fears and anxieties that the attacks
   on 9/11 ignited. Al Qaeda‟s stature and
   reception in parts of the world today is a
   product of the extraordinary success achieved
   and attention generated by the attacks that
   day.
Metrics of Counterterrorism

   Thus metrics are needed to evaluate
     if different publics feel more or less secure,
      have a more or less favorable attitude
     towards their governments,
     and have a more or less favorable or
     unfavorable attitude towards the terrorists
     or the countries allied against them and so
     on.
"How much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. government to protect its
citizens from future terrorist attacks: a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or
none at all?"
                                                                                         .
                                   A Fair      Not Very
                   A Great Deal    Amount       Much        None at All     Unsure
                       %             %            %            %              %
   3/9-12/06           17            43           28           10             2
   1/5-8/06            21            48           23            6             2
   10/3-5/05           16            47           30            7             0
   9/6-7/05            19            40           30           10             1
   8/29-31/05          18            54           21            5             2
   9/02                20            56           18            4             2
   7/02                21            53           22            3             1
   6/02                16            54           24            5             1
   1/5-6/02            23            58           16            2             1
   12/7-10/01          17            60           18            4             1
   11/13-14/01         22            52           20            4             2
   10/25-28/01         18            58           20            4             0
   10/8/01             30            55           12            1             2
   9/20-23/01          35            53           10            1             1
Attitude towards government
Perceptions of Fear and Security
Perceptions of Fear and Security
U.S. PRESIDENT / NATIONAL
ELECTION / EXIT POLL 2004
    Defined the most          Voted for Bush    Voted for Kerry
    important issue in the
    election as:
    Iraq (15% of voters)      26                73
    Terrorism (19%voters)     86                14



    Do you feel we are:      Voted for Bush    Voted for Kerry
    Safer From Terrorism     79                20
    (54%)

    Less Safe (41%)          14                85
Measuring the support of publics
in friendly (and unfriendly) states
   Global Audiences and Global Messages
     Multiple message sources
Lessons from the Battle of
Algiers
   As the flier inviting guests to the Pentagon
   screening declared: ''How to win a battle
   against terrorism and lose the war of ideas.
   Children shoot soldiers at point-blank range.
   Women plant bombs in cafes. Soon the entire
   Arab population builds to a mad fervor.
   Sound familiar? The French have a plan. It
   succeeds tactically, but fails strategically. To
   understand why, come to a rare showing of
   this film.'„
   NYTimes September 7, 2003
“Will this operation produce more bad guys
than it takes off the street by the way it is
conducted”
Major General David Patreus*, Commanding
General 101st Airborne Division, Summer
2003
(Quoted in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, Penguin
2006, p. 231)
Currently, Lt. General and Commanding
General American Forces in Iraq
South China Morning Post
March 7,2007
   Trigger-happy West risks fostering
   Taliban or worse
The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims
View Each Other:Europe's Muslims More
Moderate ( Pew released: 06.22.06)
Mickolus, Measures for determining
support for terrorists by governments
 1. permitting safe havens or bases,
 2.  permitting training on local soil.
 3.  general training by the government
 4.  making large monetary contributions
 5.  provisioning arms
 6.  providing nonlethal operational assistance
 7.  providing direct financing and training for specific
     operations.
 8. providing weapons for specific operations.
 9. adding to terrorist demands during an incident.
 10. making payment of insurance/bonuses to terrorists
     after the fact.
The Audience (Public)
Support – Opposition Continuum
   Active support
   Passive support
   Acquiescence
   Passive opposition
   Active opposition

 Goal- move your audience towards active
   opposition to the terrorists, hope to obtain
   acquiescence or passive oppostion
Backlash and Burnout
   Increasing the difficulty of terrorist
   operations within the communities they
   purport to represent
   Increasing the incentives for terrorists
   to disengage and move activities to the
   non-violent/ political realm
Support within the
Muslim Community
(Pew, Summer 06)
Support within the Muslim
Community (Pew, Summer 2006)
Larger Strategic Implictions
   three kinds of American reaction—the war in
   Iraq, the economic consequences of willy-nilly
   spending on security, and the erosion of
   America‟s moral authority—were responsible
   for such strength as al-Qaeda now
   maintained.
   David Kilcullen in Fallows, September 2006
George W. Bush July 11, 2005 FBI
Academy, Quantico, Virginia

   We're fighting the enemy in Iraq and
   Afghanistan and across the world so we
   do not have to face them here at home.
Counterterrorism consequences
   The final destructive response helping al-
   Qaeda has been America‟s estrangement
   from its allies and diminution of its
   traditionally vast “soft power.” “America‟s
   cause is doomed unless it regains the moral
   high ground,”
   Sir Richard Dearlove, the former director of
   Britain‟s secret intelligence agency, MI-6, told
   me
Consequences of the
Counterterrorist Strategy
   The jihadist regime in Iran feels no reservation about flaunting its
   policy to go nuclear, and it unleashed Hezbollah, its client terrorist
   organization, to attack Israel.
   In Somalia a jihadist group has seized control of the government. In
   Pakistan, Islamists are becoming more powerful, and attacks within
   India are increasing.
   Governments in Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Algeria and Jordan are
   under increasing Islamist pressure.
   In the Pacific, North Korea now feels free to rattle its missile sabers,
   firing seven on America's Independence Day.
    China is rapidly building its 600-ship navy to fill the military vacuum
   that we are creating in the Pacific as our fleet shrinks well below critical
   mass. Not one of these states believes that we can undertake any
   credible additional military operations while we are bogged down in
   Iraq.
   John Lehman, August 2006
 Successful Counterterrorism:
 Concepts and Measures Required
1.   Reduce attacks
2.   Reduce the risk of further attack
3.   Reduce fear
4.   Increase the confidence of the audience(s) of the act or
     threat that they will be protected and the recognition that the
     multiple audiences must be considered.
5.   Decrease the support for the violence by the supporters,
     sympathizers and potential supporters of the act or threat.
6.   Decrease acquiescence of the audience(s)
7.   Reduce the recruitment of new terrorists
8.   Increase backlash against the terrorists
9.   Increase burnout of the terrorists
Thank you
National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, September 5, 2006
  to win the War on Terror, we will:
  • Prevent attacks by terrorist networks;
  • Deny weapons of mass destruction to rogue states
     and terrorist allies who seek to use them;
  • Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue
     states;
  • Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use
     as a base and launching pad for terror; and
  • Lay the foundations and build the institutions and
     structures we need to carry the fight forward
     against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.
  • Advance effective democracies as the long-term
     antidote to the ideology of terrorism;
NSCT, September 5, 2006
Successes
 • We have deprived al-Qaida of safehaven in
   Afghanistan and helped a democratic
   government to rise in its place. Once a terrorist
   sanctuary ruled by the repressive Taliban
   regime, Afghanistan is now a full partner in the
   War on Terror.
 • A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is
   aggressively prosecuting the war against the
   terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to
   secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq,
   now a new War on Terror ally in the heart of
   the Middle East.
NSCT, September 5, 2006
Successes
   There is a broad and growing global consensus that the
   deliberate targeting of innocents is never justified by
   any calling or cause.
   Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with
   unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement,
   intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.
   We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help
   prevent future attacks in the Homeland by enhancing
   our counterterrorism architecture through the creation
   of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of
   Director of National Intelligence, and the National
   Counterterrorism Center.
NSCT, September 5, 2006
Successes
 Overall, the United States and our partners have disrupted
 several serious plots since September 11, including al-
 Qaida plots to attack inside the United States.
 Numerous countries that were part of the problem before
 September 11 are now increasingly becoming part of the
 solution – and this transformation has occurred without
 destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions.
  The Administration has worked with Congress to adopt,
 implement, and renew key reforms like the USA
 PATRIOT Act that promote our security while also
 protecting our fundamental liberties.
Requirements for successful
counterterrorism
    Security
   The Opponent
   The Counterterrorist Organization
   Audience(s)
   Fear
   Trust
   And remember that counterterrorism policy
   must be linked to the larger domestic and
   international political strategic situations

								
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