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June 2002
Colombia: Negotiate, But What? INTER-AMERICAN
DIALOGUE
By Joaquín Villalobos
Working Paper
Method or Content? this through a political settlement with the
After three years of negotiations between the armed actors. After three years, this con-
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia cept is implicit, but not explicit, in the
(FARC) and Colombia’s current govern- negotiations. What has been established is
ment, and the January 2002 crisis surround- that the war must end through negotiation.
ing the survival of the peace process, it is This decision, however, has put procedure
quite clear that the core dilemma of this ahead of content. The government has tak-
process has been the content of the negotia- en the initiative, but the FARC has been
tions itself .1 In fact, the January crisis able to skirt issues essential to the conclusion
resulted in an agenda that covered such of the process, such as its own demobiliza-
general topics as the paramilitaries, kidnap- tion. Even if the challenge of reassigning
pings, unemployment, and a truce. It is as if part or all of the guerrillas to the army or
the negotiations were geared more toward police forces were settled, the disarming of
resolving the effects of the war than the war the insurgents and the reunification of
itself. The paramilitaries can be considered Colombian society are the real basis of the
a consequence of guerrilla expansion, kid- whole process. This reality makes it easy
nappings serve to finance both groups, the for the FARC to manipulate the negotia-
truce concept smacks of wanting to begin tions tactically.
from the endpoint, and the unemployment
issue is more of a union demand than a war- In short, in spite of the January crisis, the
related negotiating point. government has been unable to come up
with an offer, the guerrillas have made no
The ultimate goal of the negotiations is to specific demands, the war has expanded,
reunify Colombian society, disarm the and the national and international political
insurgent groups, and restore the govern- scenes have become even more complex.
ment’s monopoly over the use of force—all Dozens of meetings have become mired in
longer procedures than those present in
1
During the events referred to as the January crisis, the many other, more complex, conflicts. In
peace process was suspended after the FARC demand- fact, real and direct negotiations have been
ed guarantees for the demilitarized zone. Talks only
resumed after the government threatened to retake the
avoided, replaced with such extensive con-
demilitarized zone and a last-minute international sultation mechanisms that they contribute
diplomatic effort pressured the FARC to concede. to the artificial contin- (continued on page 3)
This is the second in a series of working papers on Colombia that the Inter-American Dialogue plans
to publish over the coming months to deepen understanding and enrich the debate about such an
important policy question.
he Inter-American Dialogue is pleased to launch a special working paper series on
Foreword T Colombia. We plan to devote sustained and high-quality attention to what is
perhaps the hemisphere’s most urgent challenge, looking especially at ways of
helping the country move toward greater peace and security. The aim is to stimulate a wider
public debate on the complex issues facing key decision makers, actors, and analysts with
regard to the Colombian conflict. We wish to offer both diagnosis and interpretations of the
current situation and key dynamics, as well as ideas for policy prescriptions that can usefully
contribute to resolving the country’s multiple and deep-seated problems.
These papers reflect the Inter-American Dialogue’s continuing concern with the Colombia
question, which remains a high priority for the institution. Specifically, these papers come out
of an initiative undertaken in June 2001 known as the Colombia Working Group, which
included a select and diverse group of analysts and former policy officials from Colombia,
other Latin American countries, Europe, Canada, and the United States. The working group
serves as a core of advisors, a "brain trust" for the Dialogue on the Colombia issue. The
group’s goal is not necessarily to reach agreement and produce consensus documents. Rather,
it is to encourage as much imagination as possible and generate ideas and proposals that can
help shape thought and action on Colombia in constructive ways.
This paper, written in early February 2002 by Joaquín Villalobos—former Salvadoran
guerrilla leader currently at Oxford University—sets out some fresh and original ideas for
moving toward a peaceful settlement of Colombia’s conflict. It seeks to reflect on and assess
the experience with peace talks during the Pastrana administration, and yield relevant lessons,
with an eye toward offering some guidance for the next government in Bogotá. Villalobos’s
analysis and formula for a successful peace strategy in Colombia do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of the Colombia Working Group or the Inter-American Dialogue.
Since the Colombian situation is highly dynamic, with events unfolding with unusual
velocity, it is nearly inevitable that some of what appears in these papers will seem out of
date, overtaken by new developments. Still, we hope that a steady production of thoughtful
interpretations and ideas on the Colombia question will lead to better insights on the
problems and more realistic and effective policy recipes.
We are grateful to the United States Institute of Peace for its support of the February
meeting and the production of this report. We are also pleased to acknowledge the assistance
provided for our broader work on Colombia by the Swedish International Development
Agency and the Ford Foundation.
Michael Shifter
Vice President for Policy
2 Colombia: Negotiate, But What?
(continued from page 1) tions that have also failed to produce
uation of the process, even if they help to concrete results. In short, the actors are
politicize a segment of the FARC. Ambigu- speaking different languages, and both the
ity and a lack of well-defined content have war and the negotiations appear to be
transformed the cease-fire into little more marching aimlessly.
than a humanitarian issue. The aforemen-
tioned has created the image of a slow, Goodwill or Correlation of Forces?
debilitating, and to date unproductive peace It would seem that the government wants
process. The January events led to advances to avoid a war by using negotiations as
of great importance and opened a window strategy, and the FARC wants to win the
of opportunity, but the absence of content war by using negotiations as tactic. The cor-
can close it. relation of forces, the natural basis of any
negotiation, has been substituted by the
Negotiation will always be the best option goodwill of the parties. This error has hid-
to end a conflict, and the Pastrana govern- den fundamental aspects and blocked the
ment’s decision to make peace a top politi-
cal priority was absolutely correct. In
Colombia’s case, however, many point to a
lack of results and complain that the nego-
ability to look at concrete issues, further
reinforcing an agenda more focused on pro-
cedure than content. It is very difficult to
believe that goodwill can be useful in a con-
“ …the
government wants to
avoid a war by using
tiations have only worsened the war. The flict undermined by the social decomposi-
negotiations as strategy,
violent events that took place after the Jan- tion brought about by the drug trade,
uary agreement reinforce this viewpoint. If entrenched political violence, and a history and the FARC wants to
this worsening of the violence could be of failed negotiations. The goodwill of the win the war by using
attributed to an attempt to change the cor- players is important, but is ultimately deter-
relation of forces and win concrete points at mined by the correlation of forces and the negotiations as
the negotiating table, the problem would military and political scenarios that arise
”
tactic.
not be so serious, since it would at least be from this correlation. These realities bring
within the logic of ending the conflict. the players to the table in search of a nego-
tiated solution. To stand on a different
The expansion of the FARC’s military principle risks turning the peace process
activity, however, coupled with a negotiat- into a simple stage for rhetorical confronta-
ing content as general as unemployment tion. The correlation of forces, the nature
and the paramilitaries, do not lead us to of the conflict, and the precision of the
think that force may be turned into results. negotiating content are directly related to
The guerrillas extend their fronts and the probability of successful negotiation.
operations without any realistic agenda or Nevertheless, the positive effects of the
proposals capable of transforming their mil- January 2002 events and the peace process
itary advances into political conquests. On itself have opened up an opportunity.
the other hand, the government has given
top priority to a strategy based on politics
and negotiation, generating high expecta-
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
Villalobos Working Paper 3
Achievements up to the January Crisis become a credible player in the negotiations
The government took the initiative in Janu- was to distance itself from the paramilitary
ary. The need to improve the Conservative forces.
party’s electoral position forced it to recon-
sider its negotiating strategy. The search for The paramilitaries thus have been forced to
short-term concrete results led to the first look for their own political legitimacy.
instance in which the government com- There is little doubt of their origins as
bined the use of force (at least the threat of enactors of a dirty war, eventually develop-
it) and negotiation. There is, for the time ing into an entity and acquiring a life of its
being, less of a public stage for rhetoric. own. If no one were to take responsibility
for the actions of the paramilitaries, they
The FARC has become dependent on the would remain an ambiguity of the conflict
demilitarized zone. The area is part of the that would be very difficult to resolve. Their
guerrillas’ political legitimacy, and it is now out-in-the-open fight for legitimacy rounds
clear that they are expected to make some out the elements of the process, making
“ …it is either a
residual conflict of the
Cold War dominated by
type of concession in order to preserve it.
One of the negotiation’s major problems
was the FARC’s relative autonomy from
external and internal forces. The guerrilla
viable the future control of this other
expression of violence.
These aspects of the Colombian conflict are
group’s conversion into a political player is still in an early stage of development, but
political ideology, or it is they have strategic value in future scenarios
directly linked to the existence of the zone.
the first great war At the same time, this territory has become and in the outcome of the process. The com-
a strategic military re-supply area that is bination of all these factors in the time frame
against drug trafficking
equally difficult to give up. This issue, as of the elections and of the demilitarized zone
as a socio-political well as all the other crucial aspects of the has created an opportunity for the negotiat-
process, is tied to the continued existence ing process. The government has taken the
”
phenomenon.
of the zone. initiative, forcing the FARC to make con-
cessions. The problem remains the absence
The internationalization of the peace of practical and concrete content. If this
process was consolidated. Both the does not appear on the table directly or
government and the FARC have accepted indirectly, the opportunity to achieve
third party participation, either as facilita- progress in the short term could be lost.
tors or for a future verification role. The
participation of the United Nations and The Nature of the Conflict: A State That
the países amigos (friends of the process) Does Not Control Its Territory
was the instrument needed to bring about The possible content of the negotiation
real peace. depends on the nature of the conflict; yet,
this does not always correspond with what
The process has forced the separation of the parties say or propose. In the Colom-
the paramilitary forces and the government. bian case, the nature of the conflict contin-
The only way that the government could ues to be a subject of diverse interpretation
4 Colombia: Negotiate, But What?
on which there is little consensus. On one population of the country, the number of
extreme, there are those who explain the armed men in the guerrilla movements and
conflict as rooted in poverty; on the other, their territorial dislocation, the popular sup-
those who consider it to be a drug issue. In port they receive, the country’s proportion
essence, the conflict is situated between two of urban to rural populations, and—finally
alternatives: it is either a residual conflict of —the government’s inability to exercise
the Cold War dominated by political ideol- authority over its own territory through
ogy, or it is the first great war against drug police and military forces. A correlation of
trafficking as a socio-political phenomenon. these variables reveals that the Colombian
There is enough evidence to believe that conflict has more to do with the govern-
Colombia is a case of the former in transi- ment’s lack of control over a large part of its
tion to the latter. The age of the guerrilla territory than with abuses of state power.
movement places the roots of the conflict
on the same ideological stage as many oth- The Colombian political system is, in spite
ers in Latin America, but its expansion of its defects, a democracy with consider-
along the lines of the drug trade defines it ably more political legitimacy than the gov-
“
as a new type of conflict. ernments of Batista in 1959, Somoza in
…the Colombian
1979, or the Salvadoran military in 1980.
The persistence and proliferation of armed This legitimacy is directly related to the conflict has more to do
rural groups in Colombia throughout sever- insurgency’s possibility of prospering, to the
with the government’s
al decades—in spite of the existence of cen- point that a small guerrilla group is able to
tury-old political parties and a stronger cause significant damage and even take lack of control over a
democracy than that in many other Latin control. In authoritarian regimes, the gov-
large part of its territory
American countries—lends little support to ernment is illegitimate but strong. In
the idea that the guerrillas can be explained Colombia, the government is legitimate but than with abuses of
as a reaction to a lack of political freedom. weak, evidenced largely by its inability to
”
state power.
The tendency to equate political violence project coercive force over much of its terri-
with poverty can be discarded after a quick tory. This weakness fosters the emergence
comparison to other countries. Some coun- of armed groups, be they guerrillas fighters,
tries poorer than Colombia did not experi- paramilitary groups, or drug dealers, who
ence war, and some with better conditions then substitute the government’s authority
were gripped by insurgency. In fact, the with their own. The groups then assume
norm was that guerrilla forces sprouted postures of self-defense, security, or outright
and grew during authoritarian periods as conflict for territorial control related to var-
in the cases of Central America, Cuba, ious productive resources.
and Argentina. Colombia thus appears to
be atypical. Some analysts estimate that the FARC
could have up to 20,000 men in seventy-
To gain a proper perspective on the nature two fronts and the National Liberation
of the conflict in Colombia, it is helpful to Army (ELN) 5,000 in thirty-two fronts.
understand the territorial extension and Some surveys indicate that the guerrillas
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
Villalobos Working Paper 5
have the support of about 2 percent of the the social problems of poverty, which are in
population in a territory of 1,141,000 any case similar to or more moderate than
square kilometers, with 37 million inhabi- those of other Latin American countries.
tants, of whom 24 percent live in rural areas
and 76 percent in urban. Comparing these The growth, territorial control, and
data with those for El Salvador with 10,000 effectiveness of the guerrillas appear to be
guerrilla fighters and Cuba and Nicaragua related to the expanding social and eco-
with 3,000, the Colombian war and guerril- nomic power of the drug trade or to the
la force in relation to the territory and its existence of other resources against a weak
inhabitants seem extremely weak. This state that cannot control its territory. A
impression holds true when compared with 2 percent rate of popular support appears
Guatemala in the 1980s, or Argentina and to be minimal from a political perspective,
Uruguay in the 1970s. In El Salvador, there but—given that it may be understood as a
was a guerrilla fighter for every two square sign of approval of local social violence—it
kilometers and every fifty inhabitants; in is actually very high. Considering that 24
“ Colombia’s
wealth of natural
resources, illegal crops,
Colombia, there is a guerrilla fighter for
every fifty-seven square kilometers and
every 1,850 inhabitants.
percent of the population lives in rural
areas, we can conclude that both the leader-
ship and the troops of the armed forces are
predominantly of urban origin, which in
Comparing the size of El Salvador’s and turn points to another weakness in main-
rural rebellions, and
Colombia’s armed and police forces and taining authority in the countryside. This
inability to control its their territorial deployments, the Salvado- problem was also present in Nicaragua in
ran state appears much stronger. In 1980, the 1980s, where the army—born of an
territory seem to be at
the Salvadoran armed forces consisted of insurrection in the cities—was mainly of
the heart of the about 15,000 men, yet the (legal) paramili- urban social origin, while the Contras—
tary organization had over 150,000 men born of the serious errors of the agrarian
”
conflict.
distributed in a highly organized manner by reform of the Sandinista revolution—were a
municipality and village over a territory of rural army.
only 21,000 square kilometers.
The scarce population density phenomenon
These comparisons are mainly speculative. may be present in other countries, but those
The main point is that, in spite of every- cases did not also have a relatively large
thing, the FARC has been able to strength- residual guerrilla organization, coca, and a
en itself militarily and become the center of democracy unsuccessful in its ability to con-
Colombian politics. This fact does not cor- trol its country’s territory. Authoritarian
relate with the appearance of weakness that regimes, on the other hand, made sure of
the statistics would imply. What we can their ability to exercise coercive power
point out, therefore, is that the growth and throughout their territories, as in Somoza’s
expansion of the FARC cannot be directly national guards, Guatemala’s self-defense
associated with a crisis in the political sys- forces, or the Salvadoran army’s paramili-
tem. Neither is it an automatic response to tary forces of the 1980s.
6 Colombia: Negotiate, But What?
Colombia’s wealth of natural resources, ille- methods of financing and securing logistical
gal crops, a tradition of rural rebellions, and resources are notorious for being dispersed
the state’s inability to control its territory and dependent on the different drug cartels
seem to be at the heart of the conflict. The or on each front’s extortion and kidnapping
numerous fronts of the two guerrilla orga- abilities. This situation emphatically reaf-
nizations reflect a high degree of dispersion firms that issues of territorial dominance
that, given the distances and rough terrain, and the exercise of local power are at the
must present serious difficulties in coordi- center of the Colombian conflict.
nation. Under such conditions, it is almost
impossible to expect obedience to a central Although an ideological-political root
authority, and it is likely that a great deal of exists—manifested in the existence of cen-
military and political autonomy has been tralized control structures representing the
generated among the fronts, making it less two big guerrilla and self-defense organiza-
likely that the conflict can be solved tions—it is difficult to evaluate the extent
through agreements made with a central to which these forces have real authority
command structure. and active control over each front, given
“
their scant political nature and great materi-
How and What to Negotiate? Centralized al autonomy. The renewed attacks after the Controlling a
Political Negotiation and Fractionalized January agreements can be interpreted in guerrilla force requires
Territorial Negotiation two ways: the first is that the actions were
If political factors are not fueling the more than a title; it is
intended to strengthen the FARC’s position
recruitment of combatants, it may be at the negotiating table; the second is that fundamental that the
inferred that ideology is not the central they indicated a rejection of the agree-
leaders have a monopoly
issue, but rather personal convenience and ments. To support the first option, the
”
conflicts over territorial resources. State actions, as discussed above, should bear a over resources.
weakness coupled with the existence of relationship to the agenda. Yet the agenda is
alternative centers of power with economic so general that it is impossible to establish
resources in rural areas have produced small such a relationship.
armies which, even after achieving political
representation and a unique national identi- The offensive of the Salvadoran guerrilla
ty, are more responsive to local than nation- force on the capital and other cities in 1989
al conflicts. Controlling a guerrilla force was calculated to bring about the interven-
requires more than a title; it is fundamental tion of the United Nations and to force
that the leaders have a monopoly over political reforms at the negotiating table. In
financial and logistical resources. Colombia, it seems that the military activity
that took place during and after the January
In El Salvador, control over weapons and crisis was a means for certain members of
finances by a central authority in charge of the FARC to express their opinion about
the political management of these resources negotiations in which they did not partici-
ensured a disciplined, politicized, and obe- pate. It is this phenomenon of autonomous
dient guerrilla force. In Colombia, the fronts that explains why a local FARC unit
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
Villalobos Working Paper 7
can kill three U.S. citizens, murder a former Attempts to bring the insurgents into
minister or kidnap UN officials at the same Colombia’s halls of urban power are des-
time that its political leadership is negotiat- tined to failure regardless of the guerrillas’
ing with the government. Negotiations that rhetoric. Many of the human rights viola-
ignore the possible autonomy of the FARC tions that at times seem incomprehensible
fronts are likely to contribute to an uncon- for a guerrilla group vying for sympathy
trollable increase in violence. may possibly be related to a guerrilla force
characterized by a fundamentally rural cul-
The negotiating model currently being used ture. This leads to the perception that the
assumes that the FARC is a political group rules of power and urban culture are the
that aspires to political power and gover- enemy. A potential Pol Pot mentality may
nance. In general terms, this statement is develop that, if allowed to take root, would
correct. Power is at the root of all such con- produce even worse atrocities than those
flicts, and the solution must lie in the that have already occurred, especially if one
reconstruction of the rules associated with considers the drug trade as an additional
it. The main challenge is to discover factor of decomposition.
through the nature of the conflict which
“
rules should be redesigned, and just how the The Incorporation of Local Guerrilla
…even with
interested parties are to participate in the Commands in the Negotiations
power, the FARC reconstruction process. The rhetoric of The profusion of armed groups and narrow
and the ELN both the FARC and the ELN has attempt- interests means that local guerrilla leader-
ed to paint them as groups with revolution- ship should be invited to participate in the
would not obtain ary political goals, but their military and negotiations. It also means that the cease-
intellectual realities are very far from vali- fire should be treated as an end in itself in
”
votes.
dating their stated purposes. In fact, a con- order for the state to regain territorial con-
version of these organizations into political trol of the country. This decision would
parties would destroy them and frustrate inevitably lead to the creation of a territorial
their militants. force composed of the army and the police,
integrating insurgents to local social reali-
Herein lies one of the most complex prob- ties. In pragmatic terms, this goal could be
lems of the Colombian peace process. The achieved through separate local negotia-
traditional way of transferring power to tions or through the participation of the
insurgent groups by transforming them guerrillas’ local leadership at the main
into political forces is not appropriate in negotiating table.
this case: even with power, the FARC and
the ELN would not obtain votes. The The development of the peace process is
insurgents are clearly linked to a rural slowly making apparent that we are up
Colombia that has little population, weak against a dispersed and multifaceted phe-
state presence, and a lot of wealth—and in nomenon that is not controllable through a
direct confrontation with an urban and simple scheme of centralized negotiations.
democratic Colombia. From a global perspective, the paramilitary
8 Colombia: Negotiate, But What?
forces, smaller guerrilla organizations, and The challenge then is how to convert a cen-
even local drug cartel armies, which—along tralized negotiating agenda into a fraction-
with the FARC and the ELN—challenge alized and multifaceted one that takes into
and at times substitute for the state’s coer- account the diversity of interests of the
cive authority in rural areas, must be con- armed groups, especially the FARC and the
sidered when analyzing the pacification ELN. This would be the defining concept
problem. We should also keep in mind that that would govern all negotiations, includ-
negotiations with insurgent groups in ing those with the paramilitaries. The
Colombia have traditionally been conduct- FARC, for example, might be encouraged
ed in a fractionalized fashion and have to widen its representation in the negotia-
often been shaped by local characteristics. It tions to include the leadership of the fronts.
thus becomes clear that even when there are Territorial representation of the insurgents
scenarios of wider media and political rele- would help guarantee global political
vance, the peace process may require multi- accords and, most importantly, would lead
ple smaller negotiating tables, even with the to resolving the problem of the restoration
FARC itself. of the state’s authority and the use of coer-
cive force in the rural areas. Fractionalized
“
The alternative is for the process to turn negotiation does not imply the considera-
…the best
into continuous negotiations with some tion or satisfaction of multiple political
becoming residues of previous ones, as agendas; this is neither necessary nor possi- way to counteract
occurred with the Nicaraguan Contras. In ble. Multifaceted negotiations rather would the problem is to
Nicaragua, the rural-urban problem was at avoid or reduce political dissidence within
the core of the conflict in spite of the fact the insurgency and allow the parties to dis- follow a policy of
that the democratic reform issues had been cuss the concrete problem of the combat-
”
inclusion.
settled since the 1990 elections and the ants’ future.
change of government. The peace initiative
lasted almost six years with dozens of nego- Smaller negotiations could be carried out
tiations involving groups of varying levels of locally on a case-by-case basis, since the
importance that became gradually assimi- fronts and groups have varying degrees of
lated—again, very much in spite of the fact strength and social representation. On the
that the Contras were a single organization other hand, a disarmament and cease-fire
financed and supported by the United process may be impossible to be carried out
States. In Colombia, the level of fractional- as perfectly in Colombia as it was in El Sal-
ization could be even higher given the vador. Colombia will no doubt experience
autonomy in logistics and financial guerrilla resurgence, regular banditry, and
resources of the various groups and fronts. ex-combatants crossing over to the drug
This is why the best way to counteract the trade. Negotiations should attempt to
problem is to follow a policy of inclusion. reduce these problems to a minimum.
To do otherwise is to invite attack and sab-
otage by the excluded groups.
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
Villalobos Working Paper 9
Local Peace Forces da, would focus on the diverse aspirations of
Centralized political negotiation coupled the insurgents and other sectors of Colom-
with fractionalized territorial negotiation bian society, targeting issues to combat the
would use the cease-fire as a way to find a causes of violence, including constitutional
solution to the issue of the state’s use of reform, political participation, illegal crop
coercive force in rural areas. Territorial local- substitution, social programs, etc. A second
ization of forces and control over weapons agenda would focus on specific problems of
are necessary for the cease-fire to work. In local power and on ways of distributing
Colombia, it is very difficult to give serious excess wealth in the conflict areas. This lat-
consideration to an international peacekeep- ter agenda would deal with all the problems
ing/verification force, armed or unarmed, related to the alternative forces created by
given the political problems and the risk of the various armed groups. The first agenda
violence. The verification process will have would be the gala stage for the solution; the
to be adapted to its own reality. It will surely second would look to solve the central
require some sort of international contin- problem of occupation and state control of
gency force, but its main component must the territory.
be Colombian. The Nicaraguan experience
is therefore most helpful to Colombia in Expanding the State and Converting
“ …some of the
combatants may exert
power through public
that so-called disarmament brigades were
created consisting of an equal number of
army and Contra soldiers.
Ex-combatants into Public Servants
This process of conversion would be based
on the elimination of the use of violence by
local powers and the creation of institutions
An early commitment of the insurgencies by which the Colombian state could control
”
service…
to cease-fire control duties in collaboration rural areas. This would provide a foundation
with the armed forces and the police (and on which to develop effective processes to
under international supervision) would not assimilate the combatants, not only into the
only contribute to reconciliation and guar- public security area or the army, but also
antee security, but would also begin to lay into public services such as education,
down the guidelines for the organization of health, justice, and infrastructure.
a territorial force in anticipation of the
restoration of state authority in rural areas. All of this implies that the solution must
This same modality could be applicable to entail an expanded state presence in the
the paramilitaries and other armed groups rural areas, incorporating the insurgents
that are currently supplanting the govern- into formal jobs and educating them to
ment in the security area. respect the law and institutions. Combat-
ants interested in electoral political partici-
Two Simultaneous Tables: Global Politics pation are possibly very few, but those who
and Local Power could assume responsibilities as civil ser-
To organize the content of the negotiations, vants are probably a majority.
there could be two tables and two agendas.
The first, a global or formal political agen-
10 Colombia: Negotiate, But What?
It is vital to remember that many of the that they can represent the government
combatants have been fighting for so long within a single legal framework. In this
that they would find it almost impossible to manner, some of the combatants may exert
adapt to a productive activity, and the frus- power through public service without nec-
tration they would suffer in unsuccessful essarily competing in an electoral process
projects would only incite another cycle of and without upsetting democracy at the
violence. The growth of the job market local level. A guerrilla force is fundamental-
depends on the peace and stability of the ly a territorial organization that seeks to
country, and this is only possible if the state build political support through pressure, but
is able to control its territory. This control, it also looks to provide solutions to local
in turn, can only be achieved if the govern- problems. Transforming the guerrilla appa-
ment negotiates with the alternative forces ratus to carry out public service and security
that have come to power at the local level, duties would not only lead to peace, but
institutionalizing and regulating them so would also strengthen the state.
INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE
Villalobos Working Paper 11
I N T E R -A M E R I C A N D I A L O G U E
The Inter-American Dialogue is the premier center for policy analysis and
exchange on Western Hemisphere affairs. The Dialogue’s select member-
ship of 100 distinguished private citizens from throughout the Americas
includes political, business, academic, media, and other nongovernmental
leaders. Nine Dialogue members served as presidents of their countries and
more than a dozen have served at the cabinet level.
The Dialogue works to improve the quality of debate and decisionmaking
on hemispheric problems, advance opportunities for regional economic and
political cooperation, and bring fresh, practical proposals for action to gov-
ernments, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations.
Since 1982—through successive Republican and Democratic administra-
tions and many changes of leadership in Latin America, the Caribbean,
and Canada—the Dialogue has helped shape the agenda of issues and
choices on inter-American relations.
1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 510
Washington, DC 20036
PHONE: 202-822-9002 s FAX: 202-822-9553
EMAIL: iad@thedialogue.org s WEB SITE: www.thedialogue.org
