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					                                                                       ANNAls Of bUsiNEss


                                                            THE sURE THiNG
                                                                    How entrepreneurs really succeed.

                                                                    bY MAlcOlM GlAdWEll


                                        I  n 1969, Ted Turner wanted to buy a
                                           television station. He was thirty years
                                        old. He had inherited a billboard busi-
                                                                                         company. He had inherited the largest
                                                                                         outdoor-advertising firm in the South,
                                                                                         and billboards, in the nineteen-sixties
                                        ness from his father, which was doing            and seventies, were enormously lucra-
                                        well. But he was bored, and television           tive. They benefitted from favorable tax-
                                        seemed exciting. “He knew absolutely             depreciation rules, they didn’t require
                                        nothing about it,” one of Turner’s many          much capital investment, and they pro-
                                        biographers, Christian Williams, writes          duced rivers of cash. WJRJ’s losses could
                                        in “Lead, Follow or Get Out of the Way”          be used to offset the taxes on the profits of
                                        (1981). “It would be fun to risk every-          Turner’s billboard business. A television
                                        thing he had built, scare the hell out of        station, furthermore, fit very nicely into
                                        everybody, and get back in the front seat        his existing business. Television was about
                                        of the roller coaster.”                          selling ads, and Turner was very experi-
                                            The station in question was WJRJ,            enced at ad-selling. WJRJ may have been
                                        Channel 17, in Atlanta. It was an inde-          a virtual unknown in the Atlanta market,
                                        pendent station on the UHF band, the             but Turner had billboards all over the city
                                        lonely part of the television spectrum           that were blank about fifteen per cent of
                                        which viewers needed a special antenna to        the time. He could advertise his new sta-
                                        find. It was housed in a run-down cinder-         tion free. As for programming, Turner
                                        block building near a funeral home, lead-        had a fix for that, too. In those days, the
                                        ing to the joke that it was at death’s door.     networks offered their local affiliates a full
                                        The equipment was falling apart. The             slate of shows, and whenever an affiliate
                                        staff was incompetent. It had no decent           wanted to broadcast local programming,
                                        programming to speak of, and it was los-         such as sports or news, the national shows
                                        ing more than half a million dollars a year.     were preëmpted. Turner realized that he
                                        Turner’s lawyer, Tench Coxe, and his ac-         could persuade the networks in New York
                                        countant, Irwin Mazo, were firmly op-             to let him have whatever programming
                                        posed to the idea. “We tried to make it          their affiliates weren’t running. That’s ex-
                                        clear that—yes—this thing might work,            actly what happened. “When we reached
                                        but if it doesn’t everything will collapse,”     the point of having four preempted NBC
                                        Mazo said, years later. “Everything you’ve       shows running in our daytime lineup,”
                                        got will be gone. . . . It wasn’t just us, ei-   Turner writes in his autobiography, “Call
                                        ther. Everybody told him not to do it.”          Me Ted” (2008), “I had our people put up
                                            Turner didn’t listen. He was Captain         some billboards saying ‘THE NBC NET-
                                        Courageous, the man with nerves of steel         WORK MOVES TO CHANNEL 17.’ ”
                                        who went on to win the America’s Cup,                Williams writes that Turner was “at-
                                        take on the networks, marry a movie star,        tracted to the risk” of the deal, but it seems
                                        and become a billionaire. He dressed like        just as plausible to say that he was at-
                                        a cowboy. He gave the impression of sign-        tracted by the deal’s lack of risk. “We don’t
                                        ing contracts without looking at them. He        want to put it all on the line, because the
                                        was a drinker, a yeller, a man of unstoppa-      result can’t possibly be worth the risk,”
                                        ble urges and impulses, the embodiment           Mazo recalls warning Turner. Put it all on
                                        of the entrepreneur as risk-taker. He            the line? The purchase price for WJRJ
                                        bought the station, and so began one of          was $2.5 million. Similar properties in
                                        the great broadcasting empires of the            that era went for many times that, and
                                        twentieth century.                               Turner paid with a stock swap engineered
                                            What is sometimes forgotten amid             in such a way that he didn’t have to put
                                        the mythology, however, is that Turner           a penny down. Within two years, the
                                        wasn’t the proprietor of any old billboard       station was breaking even. By 1973, it
24   THE NEW YORKER, JANUARY 18, 2010
                       was making a million dollars in profit.
                           In a recent study, “From Predators to
                       Icons,” the French scholars Michel Vil-
                       lette and Catherine Vuillermot set out to
                       discover what successful entrepreneurs
                       have in common. They present case histo-
                       ries of businessmen who built their own
                       empires—ranging from Sam Walton, of
                       Wal-Mart, to Bernard Arnault, of the
                       luxury-goods conglomerate L.V.M.H.—
                       and chart what they consider the typical
                       course of a successful entrepreneur’s career.
                       There is almost always, they conclude, a
                       moment of great capital accumulation—a
                       particular transaction that catapults him
                       into prominence. The entrepreneur has
                       access to that deal by virtue of occupying
                       a “structural hole,” a niche that gives him
                       a unique perspective on a particular mar-
                       ket. Villette and Vuillermot go on, “The
                       businessman looks for partners to a trans-
                       action who do not have the same definition
                       as he of the value of the goods exchanged,
                       that is, who undervalue what they sell to
                       him or overvalue what they buy from him
                       in comparison to his own evaluation.” He
                       moves decisively. He repeats the good
                       deal over and over again, until the oppor-
                       tunity closes, and—most crucially—his
                       focus throughout that sequence is on
                       hedging his bets and minimizing his
                       chances of failure. The truly successful
                       businessman, in Villette and Vuillermot’s
                       telling, is anything but a risk-taker. He is
                       a predator, and predators seek to incur the
                       least risk possible while hunting.
                           Giovanni Agnelli, the founder of Fiat,
                       financed his young company with the
                       money of investors—who were “subse-             Successful entrepreneurs are seen as bold gamblers; in reality, they’re highly risk-averse.
                       quently excluded from the company by a
                       maneuver by Agnelli,” the authors point         started making planes for the military, he     management business in the nineteen-
                       out. Bernard Arnault took over the Bous-        made sure he was paid in advance.              nineties and built it into a juggernaut, and
                       sac group at a personal cost of forty million       People like Dassault and Eastman and       Gregory Zuckerman’s recent account of
                       francs, which was a fraction of the “imme-      Arnault and Turner are all successful entre-   Paulson’s triumph, “The Greatest Trade
                       diate resale value of the assets.” The French   preneurs, businessmen whose insights and       Ever,” offers a fascinating perspective on
                       industrialist Vincent Bolloré “took charge      decisions have transformed the economy,        the predator thesis.
                       of the failing family company for almost        but their entrepreneurial spirit could not        Paulson grew up in middle-class
                       nothing with other people’s money.”             have less in common with that of the dar-      Queens, the child of an immigrant father.
                       George Eastman, the founder of Kodak,           ing risk-taker of popular imagination.         His career on Wall Street started relatively
                       shifted the financial risk of his new enter-     Would we so revere risk-taking if we real-     slowly. He launched his firm in 1994,
                       prise to his family and to his wealthy friend   ized that the people who are supposedly        when he was nearly forty years old, spe-
                       Henry Strong. IKEA’s founder, Ingvar            taking bold risks in the cause of entrepre-    cializing in merger arbitrage. By 2004,
                       Kamprad, arranged to get his furniture          neurship are actually doing no such thing?     Paulson was managing about two billion
                       made in Communist Poland for half of                                                           dollars of other people’s money, putting

                                                                       T
JEAN-FrANçoiS MArTiN




                       what it would cost him in Sweden. Marcel            he most successful entrepreneur on         him in the middle ranks of hedge funds.
                       Dassault, the French aviation pioneer, did          Wall Street—certainly of the past          He was, Zuckerman writes, a “solid inves-
                       a study for the French Army that pointed        decade and perhaps even of the postwar         tor, careful and decidedly unspectacular.”
                       out the value of propellers, and then took      era—is a hedge-fund manager named              The particular kinds of deal he did were
                       over a propeller manufacturer. When he          John Paulson. He started a small money-        “among the safest forms of investing.”
                                                                                                                      THE NEW YORKER, JANUARY 18, 2010         25
One of Paulson’s mentors was an investor         subprime loans, happily pocketing the an-           At one point before the crash, Zucker-
named Marty Gruss, and, Zuckerman                nual premiums in the belief that there was      man writes, a trader at Morgan Stanley
writes, “the ideal Gruss investment had          little chance of ever having to make good       “hung up the phone after yet another
limited risk but held the promise of a po-       on the contract. Paulson, as often as not,      Paulson order and turned to a colleague in
tential fortune. Marty Gruss drilled a           was the one on the other side of the trade.     disbelief. ‘This guy is nuts,’ he said with a
maxim into Paulson: ‘Watch the down-             He bought C.D.S. contracts by the truck-        chuckle, amazed that Paulson was agree-
side; the upside will take care of itself.’ At   load, and, when he ran out of money, he         ing to make so many annual insurance
his firm, he asked his analysts repeatedly,       found new investors, raising billions of        payments. ‘He’s just going to pay it all
‘How much can we lose on this trade?’ ”          new dollars so he could buy even more. By       out?’ ” Wall Street thought that Paulson
Long after he became wealthy, he would           the time the crash came, he was holding         was crazy.
take the bus to his offices in midtown, and        insurance on some twenty-five billion dol-           But Paulson wasn’t crazy at all. In 2006,
the train out to his summer house on             lars’ worth of subprime mortgages.              he had his firm undertake a rigorous anal-
Long Island. He was known for getting                 Was Paulson’s trade risky? Conven-         ysis of the housing market, led by Paul-
around the Hamptons on his bicycle.              tional wisdom said that it was. This kind       son’s associate Paolo Pellegrini. At that
    By 2004-05, Paulson was increasingly         of deal is known, in Wall Street parlance,      point, it was unclear whether rising hous-
suspicious of the real-estate boom. He de-       as a “negative-carry” trade, and, as Zucker-    ing prices represented a bubble or a legiti-
cided to short the mortgage market, using        man writes, negative-carry trades are a         mate phenomenon. Pellegrini concluded
a financial tool known as the credit-default      “maneuver that investment pros detest al-       that housing prices had risen on average
swap, or C.D.S. A credit-default swap            most as much as high taxes and coach-class      1.4 per cent annually between 1975 and
is like an insurance policy. Wall Street         seating.” Their problem with negative-          2000, once inflation had been accounted
banks combined hundreds of mortgages             carry is that if the trade doesn’t pay off       for. In the next five years, though, they had
together in bundles, and investors could         quickly it can become ruinously expensive.      risen seven per cent a year—to the point
buy insurance on any of the bundles they         It’s one thing if I pay you a hundred thou-     where they would have to fall by forty
chose. Suppose I put together a bundle of        sand dollars for one year’s insurance on a      per cent to be back in line with historical
ten mortgages totalling a million dollars.       million dollars’ worth of mortgages, and        trends. That fact left Paulson certain that
I could sell you a one-year C.D.S. policy        the mortgages go belly up after six months.     he was looking at a bubble.
on that bundle for, say, a hundred thou-         But what if I pay premiums for two years,           Paulson’s next concern was with the
sand dollars. If after the year was up the       and the bubble still hasn’t burst? Then I’m     volatility of the housing market. Was this
ten homeowners holding those mortgages           out two hundred thousand dollars, with          bubble resilient? Or was everything poised
were all making their monthly payments,          nothing to show for my efforts. And what         to come crashing down? Zuckerman tells
I’d pocket your hundred thousand. If,            if the bubble hasn’t burst after three years?   how Pellegrini and another Paulson asso-
however, those homeowners all defaulted,         Now I have a very nervous group of inves-       ciate, Sihan Shu, “purchased enormous da-
I’d owe you the full value of the bundle—        tors. To win at a negative-carry trade, you     tabases tracking the historic performance
a million dollars. Throughout the boom,          have not only to correctly predict the pres-    of more than six million mortgages in var-
countless banks and investment firms sold         ence of a bubble but also to correctly pre-     ious parts of the country.” Thus equipped,
C.D.S. policies on securities backed by          dict when the bubble is about to burst.
                                                                                                 they crunched the numbers, tinkered with
                                                                                                 logarithms and logistic functions, and ran
                                                                                                 different scenarios, trying to figure out what
                                                                                                 would happen if housing prices stopped ris-
                                                                                                 ing. Their findings seemed surprising: Even if
                                                                                                 prices just flatlined, homeowners would feel
                                                                                                 so much financial pressure that it would re-
                                                                                                 sult in losses of 7 percent of the value of a
                                                                                                 typical pool of subprime mortgages. And if
                                                                                                 home prices fell 5 percent, it would lead to
                                                                                                 losses as high as 17 percent.

                                                                                                     This was a crucial finding. Most peo-
                                                                                                 ple at the time believed that widespread
                                                                                                 defaults on mortgages were a function of
                                                                                                 some combination of structural economic
                                                                                                 factors such as unemployment rates, in-
                                                                                                 terest rates, and regional economic health.
                                                                                                 That’s why so many on Wall Street were
                                                                                                 happy to sell Paulson C.D.S. policies:
                                                                                                 they thought it would take a perfect storm
                                                                                                 to bring the market to its knees. But Pel-
                                                                                                 legrini’s data showed that the bubble was
                                                                                                 being inflated by a single, rickety factor—
                                                                                                 rising home prices. It wouldn’t take much
             “Which of tonight’s specials is the most sanctimonious?”                            for the bubble to burst.
    Paulson then looked at what buying di-            tage is one of temperament—he’s braver         had already been paying the Braves six
saster insurance on mortgages would cost.             than the rest of us are. In the predator       hundred thousand dollars a year for the
C.D.S. contracts can sometimes be pro-                model, the entrepreneur’s advantage is an-     rights to broadcast sixty of the team’s
hibitively expensive. In the months leading           alytical—he’s better at figuring out a sure     games. What the deal consisted of, then,
up to General Motors’ recent bankruptcy,              thing than the rest of us. Paulson looked      was his paying an additional six hundred
for example, a year’s insurance on a mil-             at the same marketplace as everyone else       thousand dollars or so a year, for eight
lion of the carmaker’s bonds sold for eight           on Wall Street did. But he saw a differ-        years: in return, he would get the rights to
hundred thousand dollars. If Paulson had              ent pattern. As an outsider, he had fresh      all a hundred and sixty-two of the team’s
to pay anything like that amount, there               eyes, and his line of investing made him       games, plus the team itself.
wouldn’t be much room for error. To his               a lot more comfortable with negative-              You and I might not have made that
amazement, though, he found that to in-               carry trades than his competitors were.        deal. But that’s not because Turner is a
sure a million dollars of mortgages would             He looked for and found partners to the        risk-taker and we are cowards. It’s be-
cost him just ten thousand dollars—and                transaction who did not have the same          cause Turner is a cold-blooded bargainer
this was for some of the most dubious and             definition as he of the value of the goods      who could find a million dollars in some-
high-risk subprime mortgages. Paulson                 exchanged—that is, the banks selling           one’s back pocket that the person didn’t
didn’t even need a general housing-market             credit-default swaps for a penny on the        know he had. Once you get past the more
collapse to make his money. He needed                 dollar—and he exploited that advantage         flamboyant aspects of Turner’s personal
only the most vulnerable of all homeown-              ruthlessly. At one point, incredibly, Paul-    and sporting life, in fact, there is little
ers to start defaulting. It was a classic asym-       son got together with some investment          evidence that he had any real appetite
metrical trade. If Paulson raised a billion           banks to assemble bundles of the most ab-      for risk at all. In his memoir, Turner tells
dollars from investors, he could buy a year’s         surdly toxic mortgages—which the banks         us that when he was starting out in the
worth of insurance on twelve billion dollars          then sold to some hapless investors and        family business his father, Ed, bought
of subprime loans for a hundred and twenty            Paulson then promptly bet against. As          another billboard firm, called General
million. That’s an outlay of twelve per cent          Zuckerman points out, this is the equiva-      Outdoor. That was the acquisition that
up front. But, Zuckerman explains,                    lent of a game of football in which the de-    launched the Turner company as a major
                                                      fense calls the plays for the offense. It’s     advertising player in the South, and it in-
because premiums on CDS contracts, like those         how a nerd would play football, not a          volved taking on a sizable amount of
on any other insurance product, are paid out
over time, the new fund could keep most of its        jock.                                          debt. Young Ted had no qualms, intel-
money in the bank until the CDS bills came                This is exactly how Turner pulled off       lectually, about the decision. He could do
due, and thereby earn about 5 percent a year.         another of his legendary early deals—his       the math. There were substantial econo-
That would cut the annual cost to the fund to a
more reasonable 7 percent. Since Paulson              1976 acquisition of the Atlanta Braves         mies of scale in the advertising business:
would charge 1 percent a year as a manage-            baseball team. Turner’s Channel 17 was         the bigger you got, the lower your costs
ment fee, the most an investor could lose would       the Braves’ local broadcaster, having ac-      were, and paying off the debt from the
be 8 percent a year. . . . And the upside? If Paul-
son purchased CDS contracts that fully pro-           quired the rights four years before—a          General Outdoor purchase, Ted Turner
tected $12 billion of subprime mortgage bonds         brilliant move, as it turned out, because it   realized, probably wasn’t going to be a
and the bonds somehow became worthless,               forced every Braves fan in the region to       problem. But Turner’s father did some-
Paulson & Co. would make a cool $12 billion.
                                                      go out and buy a UHF antenna. (Well            thing that Turner, when he was building
    “There’s never been an opportunity like           before ESPN and Rupert Murdoch’s               his empire, always went to extraordinary
this,” Paulson gushed to a colleague, as he           Sky TV, Turner had realized how impor-         lengths to avoid: he put his own capital
made one bet after another. By “never,” he            tant live sports programming could be in       into the deal. In the highly unlikely event
meant never ever—not in his lifetime and              building a television brand.) The team         that it didn’t work out, Turner Advertis-
not in anyone else’s, either. In one of the           was losing a million dollars a year, and the   ing would be crippled. It was a good deal,
book’s many memorable scenes, Zucker-                 owners wanted ten million dollars to sell.     not a perfect one, and that niggling im-
man describes how a five-point decline in              That was four times the price of Channel       perfection, along with the toll that the
what’s called the ABX index (a measure of             17. “I had no idea how I could afford it,”      uncertainty was taking on his father, left
mortgage health) once made Paulson                    Turner told one of his biographers, al-        Turner worried sick. “During the first six
$1.25 billion in one morning. In 2007                 though by this point the reader is wise to     months or so after the General Outdoor
alone, Paulson & Co. took in fifteen bil-              his aw-shucks modesty. First, he didn’t        acquisition my weight dropped from 180
lion dollars in profits, of which four billion         pay ten million dollars. He talked the         pounds to 135,” he writes. “I developed a
went directly into Paulson’s pocket. In               Braves into taking a million down, and         pre-ulcerative condition and my doctor
2008, his firm made five billion dollars.               the rest over eight or so years. Second, he    made me swear off coffee. I’d get so tired
Rarely in human history has anyone made               didn’t end up paying the million down.         and agitated that one of my eyelids devel-
so much money is so short a time.                     Somewhat mysteriously, Turner reports          oped a twitch.”
                                                      that he found a million dollars on the             Zuckerman profiles John Paulson

W       hat Paulson’s story makes clear is
        how different the predator is from
our conventional notion of the successful
                                                      team’s books—money the previous own-
                                                      ers somehow didn’t realize they had—and
                                                      so, he says, “I bought it using its own
                                                                                                     alongside three others who made the
                                                                                                     same subprime bet—Greg Lippmann, a
                                                                                                     trader at Deutsche Bank; Jeffrey Greene,
businessman. The risk-taking model sug-               money, which was quite a trick.” He now        a real-estate mogul in Los Angeles; and
gests that the entrepreneur’s chief advan-            owed nine million dollars. But Turner          Michael Burry, who ran a hedge fund in
                                                                                                     THE NEW YORKER, JANUARY 18, 2010         27
Silicon Valley—and finds the same pat-             who bought them six-per-cent interest.         risks are unavoidable: would-be entre-
tern. All were supremely confident of              Treasury bonds, the safest investment in       preneurs take them because they have
their decision. All had done their home-          the world, were paying almost five per          no choice. But a good many of these risks
work. All had swooped down, like perfect          cent at that point. Nor could he compre-       reflect a lack of preparation or foresight.
predators, on a marketplace anomaly.              hend why so many banks were willing
But these were not men temperamentally
suited to risk-taking. They worked so
hard to find the sure thing because any-
                                                  to sell him C.D.S. insurance at such low
                                                  prices. Why would someone, in the mid-
                                                  dle of a housing bubble, demand only one
                                                                                                 S   hane’s description of the pattern of
                                                                                                     entrepreneurial failure brings to mind
                                                                                                 the Harvard psychologist David McClel-
thing short of that gave them ulcers. Here        cent on the dollar? At the end of 2006,        land’s famous experiment with kinder-
is Zuckerman on Burry, as he waited for           Merrill Lynch paid $1.3 billion for First      garten children in the nineteen-fifties.
his trade to pan out:                             Franklin Financial, one of the biggest         McClelland watched a group of kids play
                                                  subprime lenders in the country, bringing      ringtoss—throwing a hoop over a pole.
    In a tailspin, Burry withdrew from his
friends, family, and employees. Each morn-        the total value of subprime mortgages on       The children who played the game in the
ing, Burry walked into his firm and made a         its books to eleven billion dollars. Paulson   riskiest manner, who stood so far from
beeline to his office, head down, locking the      was so risk-averse that he didn’t so much      the pole that success was unlikely, also
door behind him. He didn’t emerge all day,
not even to eat or use the bathroom. His re-      as put a toe in the water of subprime-         scored lowest on what he called “achieve-
maining employees, who were still pulling         mortgage default swaps until Pellegrini        ment motive,” that is, the desire to suc-
for Burry, turned worried. Sometimes he got       had done months of analysis. But Merrill       ceed. (Another group of low scorers were
into the office so early, and kept the door
closed for so long, that when his staff left at   Lynch bought First Franklin even though        at the other extreme, standing so close
the end of the day, they were unsure if their     the firm’s own economists were predict-         to the pole that the game ceased to be a
boss had ever come in. Other times, Burry         ing that housing prices were about to drop     game at all.) Taking excessive risks was,
pounded his fists on his desk, trying to release
his tension, as heavy-metal music blasted         by as much as five per cent. “It just doesn’t   then, a psychologically protective strat-
from nearby speakers.                             make sense,” an incredulous Paulson told       egy: if you stood far enough back from
                                                  his friend Howard Gurvitch. “These are         the pole, no one could possibly blame you

P    aulson’s story also casts a harsh light
     on the prevailing assumptions behind
corporate compensation policies. One
                                                  supposedly the smart people.”
                                                      The economist Scott Shane, in his
                                                  book “The Illusions of Entrepreneur-
                                                                                                 if you failed. These children went out of
                                                                                                 their way to take a “professional” risk in
                                                                                                 order to avoid a personal risk. That’s what
of the main arguments for the generous            ship,” makes a similar argument. Yes, he       companies are buying with their bloated
stock options that are so often given to          says, many entrepreneurs take plenty of        C.E.O. stock-options packages—gam-
C.E.O.s is that they are necessary to en-         risks—but those are generally the failed       bles so wild that the gambler can lose
courage risk-taking in the corporate suite.       entrepreneurs, not the success stories.        without jeopardizing his social standing
This notion comes from what is known as           The failures violate all kinds of estab-       within the corporate world. “As long as
“agency theory,” which Freek Vermeulen,           lished principles of new-business for-         the music is playing, you’ve got to get
of the London Business School, calls “one         mation. New-business success is clearly        up and dance,” the now departed C.E.O.
of the few academic theories in manage-           correlated with the size of initial capital-   of Citigroup, Charles Prince, notoriously
ment academia that has actually influ-             ization. But failed entrepreneurs tend         said, as his company continued to pile
enced the world of management practice.”          to be wildly undercapitalized. The data        one dubious investment on another. He
Agency theory, Vermeulen observes, “says          show that organizing as a corporation is       was more afraid of being a wallflower
that managers are inherently risk-averse;         best. But failed entrepreneurs tend to         than he was of imperilling his firm.
much more risk-averse than                                       organize as sole proprietor-        The successful entrepreneur takes the
shareholders would like                                          ships. Writing a business       opposite tack. Villette and Vuillermot
them to be. And the theory                                       plan is a must; failed entre-   point out that the predator is often quite
prescribes that you should                                       preneurs rarely take that       happy to put his reputation on the line in
give them stock options,                                         step. Taking over an exist-     the pursuit of the sure thing. Ingvar Kam-
rather than stock, to stimu-                                     ing business is always the      prad, of IKEA, went to Poland in the nine-
late them to take more risk.”                                    best bet; failed entrepre-      teen-sixties to get his furniture manufac-
Why do shareholders want                                         neurs prefer to start from      tured. Since Polish labor was inexpensive,
managers to take more risks?                                     scratch. Ninety per cent of     it gave Kamprad a huge price advantage.
Because they want stodgy                                         the fastest-growing compa-      But doing business with a Communist
companies to be more entrepreneurial,             nies in the country sell to other busi-        country at the height of the Cold War was
and taking risks is what everyone says that       nesses; failed entrepreneurs usually try       a scandal. Sam Walton financed his first
entrepreneurs do.                                 selling to consumers, and, rather than         retailing venture, in Newport, Arkansas,
    The result has been to turn executives        serving customers that other businesses        with money from his wealthy in-laws.
into risk-takers. Paulson, for his part, was      have missed, they chase the same people        That approach was safer than turning to a
stunned at the reckless behavior of his           as their competitors do. The list goes on:     bank, especially since Walton was forced
Wall Street counterparts. Some of the             they underemphasize marketing; they            out of Newport and had to go back to his
mortgage bundles he was betting against—          don’t understand the importance of fi-          wife’s family for another round. But you
collections of some of the sketchiest sub-        nancial controls; they try to compete on       can imagine that it made for some tense
prime loans—were paying the investors             price. Shane concedes that some of these       moments at family reunions for a while.
28       THE NEW YORKER, JANUARY 18, 2010
Deutsche Bank’s Lippmann, meanwhile,
was called Chicken Little and Bubble Boy
to his face for his insistence that the mort-
gage market was going to burst.
    Why are predators willing to endure
this kind of personal abuse? Perhaps they
are sufficiently secure and confident that
they don’t need public approval. Or per-
haps they are so caught up in their own
calculations that they don’t notice. The
simplest explanation, though, is that it’s
just another manifestation of their relent-
lessly rational pursuit of the sure thing. If
an awkward family reunion was the price
Walton had to pay for a guaranteed line
of credit, then so be it. He went out of his
way to take a personal risk in order to
avoid a professional risk. Reputation, after
all, is a commodity that trades in the mar-
ketplace at a significant and often excessive
premium. The predator shorts the danc-
ers, and goes long on the wallflowers.                        “They’ve got Hank on some of that medical marijuana.”


W     hen Pellegrini finally finished his
      research on the mortgage mar-
ket—proving how profoundly inflated
                                                                                        •          •

home prices had become—he rushed in               people who like what they do are pro-         Bob Naegele. Turner was grief-stricken.
to show his findings to his boss. Zucker-          foundly conservative. When the soci-          But he fought back. He hired away the
man writes:                                       ologists Hongwei Xu and Martin Ruef           General Outdoor leasing department.
    “This is unbelievable!” Paulson said, un-     asked a large sample of entrepreneurs         He began “jumping” the company’s
able to take his eyes off the chart. A mischie-   and non-entrepreneurs to choose among         leases—that is, persuading the people
vous smile formed on his face, as if Pellegrini   three alternatives—a business with a po-      who owned the real estate on which the
had shared a secret no one else was privy to.
Paulson sat back in his chair and turned to       tential profit of five million dollars with     General Outdoor billboards sat to cancel
Pellegrini. “This is our bubble! This is proof.   a twenty-per-cent chance of success, or       the leases and sign up with Turner Ad-
Now we can prove it!” Paulson said. Pel-          one with a profit of two million with a        vertising. Then he flew to Palm Springs
legrini grinned, unable to mask his pride. The
chart was Paulson’s Rosetta stone, the key to     fifty-per-cent chance of success, or one       and strong-armed Naegele into giving
making sense of the entire housing market.        with a profit of $1.25 million with an         back the business. Turner the rational
Years later, he would keep it atop a pile of      eighty-per-cent chance of success—it          actor negotiated the deal. But it was Tur-
papers on his desk, showing it off to his cli-
ents and updating it each month with new          was the entrepreneurs who were more           ner the romantic who had the will, at the
data, like a car collector gently waxing and      likely to go with the third, safe choice.     moment of his greatest grief, to fight
caressing a prized antique auto. . . . “I still   They weren’t dazzled by the chance of         back. What Turner understood was that
look at it. I love that chart,” Paulson says.
                                                  making five million dollars. They were         none of his grand ambitions were pos-
    There are a number of moments like            drawn to the eighty-per-cent chance of        sible without the billboard cash ma-
this in “The Greatest Trade Ever,” when           getting to do what they love doing. The       chine. He had felt the joy that comes with
it becomes clear just how much Paulson            predator is a supremely rational actor.       figuring out a particularly knotty prob-
enjoyed his work. Yes, he wanted to make          But, deep down, he is also a romantic,        lem, and he couldn’t give that up. Nae-
money. But he was fabulously wealthy              motivated by the simple joy he finds in        gele, by the way, asked for two hundred
long before he tackled the mortgage busi-         his work.                                     thousand dollars, which Turner didn’t
ness. His real motivation was the chal-               In “Call Me Ted,” Turner tells the        have. But Turner realized that for some-
lenge of figuring out a particularly knotty        story of one of his first great traumas.       one in Naegele’s tax bracket a flat pay-
problem. He was a kid with a puzzle.              When Turner was twenty-four, his fa-          ment like that made no sense. He coun-
    This is consistent with the one undis-        ther committed suicide. He had been de-       tered with two hundred thousand dollars
puted finding in all the research on entre-        pressed and troubled for some months,         in Turner Advertising stock. “So far so
preneurship: people who work for them-            and one day after breakfast he went up-       good,” Turner writes in his autobiog-
selves are far happier than the rest of us.       stairs and shot himself. After the funeral,   raphy. “I had kept the company out of
Shane says that the average person would          it emerged that the day before his death      Naegele’s hands and it didn’t cost me a
have to earn two and a half times as much         Turner’s father had sold the crown jew-       single dollar of cash.” Of course it didn’t.
to be as happy working for someone else           els of the family business—the General        He’s a predator. Why on earth would he
as he would be working for himself. And           Outdoor properties—to a man named             take a risk like that? 
                                                                                                THE NEW YORKER, JANUARY 18, 2010         29

				
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