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Report of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on the
escape of Annaneas Mathe from CMax in Pretoria:
The Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services having undertaken an oversight visit
to the CMax maximum security institution in Pretoria, had deliberations on the matter on
20 February 2007 and on 06 March 2007, reports as follows.
A. Introduction
The Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services decided in its meeting held
on 23 January 2007 to undertake an oversight visit on 25 January 2007 to the
CMax prison to gain first hand knowledge of how a particular offender
escaped and to investigate the route of escape. The Committee further decided
that it will call the Minister to report the findings of the investigating team to
the Committee.
B. Delegation
The following Members of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services
visited the above-mentioned centre on the 25 January 2007. The Select
Committee, under the Chairmanship of Kgoshi ML Mokoena, also joined the
Portfolio Committee.
Mr. DV Bloem (ANC) (Chairperson)
Mr. ML Mokoena (ANC – Select Committee Chairperson)
Mr. MA Cele (ANC)
Mr. Fielding (ANC – Select Committee)
Mr. NB Fihla (ANC)
Mr. Motseki (ANC – Select Committee)
Ms. ZN Nawa (ANC)
Ms. W Ngwenya (ANC)
Mr. Thetsang (ANC – Select Committee)
Mr. LJ Tolo (ANC)
Mr. ET Xolo (ANC)
Mr. J Selfe (DA)
Mr. MR Shah (DA)
Mrs. SA Seaton (IFP)
The following Members submitted their apologies:
Mr. S Mahote (ANC)
Mr. S Swart (ACDP)
Ms. S Rajbally (MF)
C. The objectives of the visit:
To understand and get first hand information about the circumstances
around the escape of Annaneas Mathe from CMax.
To get clarity on claims of non-compliance in terms of security.
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D. Findings
Overview of CMax Centre
The following are some of the key issues for further consideration arising from
this visit:
CMax centre which is situated on the grounds of the Pretoria Local Prison, is a
Closed Maximum Facility for dangerous inmates. It houses up to 219 offenders.
CMax is essentially a programme that offenders go through rather than a
Correctional Centre. Offenders are closely monitored, because of the serious
nature of their crimes as well as their violent behaviour. This is aimed at
rehabilitating those most dangerous to society. As reported previously, the
programme is divided into 2 phases. Phase 1 consists of a 6-week programme
during which time new arrivals to the facility are given extremely limited
privileges. Offenders spend 23 hours a day locked up in single cells. They are
handcuffed when on exercise and exercise is done in individual small cages.
They receive intense social and psychological assessment during this phase and
are evaluated after 6 weeks by a committee that makes a recommendation to the
Area Commissioner for approval. A decision is then taken as to whether the
offenders should commence to Phase 2 or remain for a longer period in Phase 1.
Phase 2 is divided in 3 groups- A, B and C groups. Privileges for each group are
gradually increased and the offenders will progress from one group to another. If
they transgress at any stage, they start the programme again from the beginning.
Completion of the programme without transgressions will take 2 years after which
offenders will be transferred back to the prison from which they came from.
The DCS stated that after the previous security breach at CMax, in which a senior
Correctional Services official was killed, most inmates were moved to Kokstad
Super Maximum Centre. The DCS receiveS many requests from the SAPS and
the courts to hold certain offenders at CMax, because of the serious nature of their
crimes. CMax is supposed to hold only sentenced offenders but because of these
requests, sometimes holds unsentenced offenders.
Profile of Offender Annaneas Mathe
The offender was first held in Police custody from which he escaped. He was then
re –arrested and the judiciary then recommended that he be kept in CMax. The
offender is a Mozambican National and has received military training as far as in
China. The offender was part of crime syndicates and still has organised crime
formations outside of Correctional facilities.
The Route of Escape
Offenders are held in single cells and should be handcuffed at all times. The cell
is equipped with a steel bed with a mattress, a desk and sanitary facilities. There is
a monitoring window in the cell from which the officials can monitor the offender
from the catwalk above the cells. One official should monitor one passage.
According to the DCS, the offender pushed out the window from the window
pane; pulled himself out of the cell and onto the catwalk. He then removed out the
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louvre window panes of another window and climbed through the window onto
the roof area.
The offender then jumped off the roof area and moved towards the tower
(tower2), which is suspected not have been manned at the time. The DCS said he
then used rope with a hook, made out of the steel from the bed in his cell, through
it over the perimeter wall and made his escape. The offender was then picked up
by a getaway vehicle which was in close proximity to the Correctional centre.
Matters of Concern
At the time of the visit, the monitoring window of the cell in which
offender Mathe was hold, was cemented. The Committee questioned why
that was the only monitoring window that was cemented? The response
was that it was merely an action to prevent any further breaches.
The Committee was concerned that there were structural defaults to the
monitoring window in the offenders’ cell, but nothing was done about it,
though reported.
The Committee also questioned the visibility of staff i.e. those who were
supposed to monitor the catwalk as well as the towers.
The Committee questioned the fact that the offender could force his body
through the small monitoring window, without being assisted.
The Committee also questioned the fact that the handcuffs and foot cuffs,
which one padlock, were found in the cell of the offender.
At the time of the escape, it was alleged that the offender used petroleum
jelly (Vaseline) on his body to aide the escape. On the day of the visit, a
Vaseline container was still in the offender’s cell. The Committee was
concerned that it was still in the cell and why it has not been taken for
forensic testing.
E. Briefing by the Investigative Task Team: 20 February 2007.
The Committee was briefed by the Ministerial Investigative Task Team on its
findings and recommendations into the Mathe escape. The team conducted
interviews with staff, has sworn statements, conducted lifestyle analysis of DCS
officials as well as conducting polygraph testing of some officials.
A comprehensive security analysis, benchmarking CMax with Ebongweni,
Mangaung and Kutama Sinthumule Centres, was also done.
The team investigated two routes of escapes, the probable route is that Mathe has
escaped through the monitoring window to the outside and the alternative route is
that Mathe was aided in the escape.
Alternative route requires a much bigger conspiracy of people being involved. To
many people would have been drawn into the conspiracy e.g. person in charge of
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key control, the person at the main gate, transport had to be provided out of
vehicle entrance gate, person in charge of the access control point.
The probable route has circumstantial evidence to the escape. Mathe removed the
monitoring window, unintentional aiding (non- compliance through gross
negligence by officials). He then went through the monitoring window, onto the
catwalk, broken the window panes and went through that window, he moved
across exercise area, jumped on the ramp that lead to tower post 2, probably
scaled the perimeter wall close to tower 2 or have gone through a potentially
unmanned tower 2. Mathe even gave a description of tower 2 and he could only
give this description if he had been in the tower. He hooked the rope on perimeter
wall, went over chain link fence, at tower 2 there is a fence that separates the
institution from staff residences.
Findings of the Task Team:
Standard operating procedures requires that when an official is on duty in a tower,
the person is locked up in tower, but the key of tower post was taken home by an
official who was on the previous shift. The door of the tower was open. This is
clear non -compliance in terms of standard operating procedures of the DCS.
There were also institutional directives issued in terms of how Mathe should be
cuffed and rotated in the sections, but since 13 November 2006, Mathe was not
rotated. The prevailing weather conditions and the fact that some officials were
watching television hampered the audibility and visibility in the Centre. An
environment was created in the section that abled Mathe to escape. The delay in
the discovery of the escape, the key controls, the unmanned tower, the
unmaintained window on the catwalk, the monitoring of catwalk, the fraudulent
completion of journals e.g. the daily activity registers, are part of a deliberate
attempt to cover up the escape.
Recommendations of the Task Team:
The Task Team recommended the following:
That internal disciplinary action is instituted for non-compliance with
duties that aided the escape of Mathe.
The immediate institution of a dedicated team to assess and oversee the
viability of the latest technological security system and security
organisational models as well as the implementation thereof.
That National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and South African Police
Service (SAPS) Crime Intelligence further investigate the possible
corruption and bribery of DCS officials that could have aided in the
escape.
That SAPS pursue criminal charges against the DCS officials who through
gross negligence aided in the escape of escape.
F. Formal deliberations by the Committee on the Report of the Investigative
Task Team on 06 March 2007:
The Committee, through various interactions with regard to the escape of offender
Mathe, was not satisfied with the reports given by the DCS officials during the in
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loco inspection at CMax as well as the report of the Investigative Task Team.
Though the Committee understands that the investigation by NIA and SAPS are
still continuing, the Committee was of the opinion that important information was
withheld.
Through these interactions, it was not clear whether the offender escaped by
merely taking advantage of the non-compliance of procedures by the officials or
whether the offender was aided in the escape. The Committee felt that there is no
way, given the measurements of Mathe’s body that he could have gone through
the window without being assisted. The report given by the Task Team was silent
on the allegation of Mathe using Vaseline to escape and that officials were bribed
with R 80 000.00. The Committee indicated that these are serious allegations and
it should be known who and why these allegations were made.
The Committee indicated that it must report back to Parliament on its findings and
the Committee cannot report on a probable or alternate route of escape During the
briefing by the investigating team on the 20 February 2007, it seemed as if the
investigators tried to avoid some of the questions the members had been asking
and it is clear that there is a major cover up in terms of the escape.
G. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Committee proposed that a new task team be constituted, made up of either
a retired judge or a senior advocate, to start a new investigation and weigh
evidence against evidence.
2. The Committee also recommends that those DCS officials implicated in the
escape must be criminally charged as the court case will elaborate on the
escape and circumstances surrounding it.
3. The Committee recommends that the entire shift working on the day of the
escape as well as the Head of the Centre should be criminally charged.
4. The Committee recommends that the DCS must fast track all disciplinary
procedures and put timeframes to it. The Committee needs conclusions to the
decisions taken and the recommendations made.
H. Conclusion
The Committees was not satisfied with the explanations/details provided by the
Department on how the offender escaped from the facility. There is a lot of
information that was not relayed to the Committee, and it agreed that the report is
very vague and unspecific. The Committee indicated that it needs to report back
to Parliament on the matter and cannot do so unless it is clear of its facts and
findings.
The Committee unanimously rejected the report of the Investigative Task Team.
Report to be considered.
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