WOMEN’S BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Statement in Support of Judge Sonia Sotomayor June 30, 2009 Introduction The Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York (“WBASNY”), representing more than 3,800 attorneys, judges, and law students from across the State of New York, is honored and proud to support President Obama’s nomination of Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor – a WBASNY member – to the United States Supreme Court. Judge Sotomayor’s wealth of experience, keen intelligence, and moderate judicial philosophy make her extremely well-qualified to serve as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Outstanding Experience Judge Sotomayor has superb educational credentials and more than sixteen years’ experience as a federal judge. After graduating summa cum laude from Princeton University, she served as an editor of The Yale Law Journal while pursuing her law degree at Yale Law School.1 For the first five years of her career, Judge Sotomayor was an assistant district attorney for the County of New York, prosecuting such crimes as murder, robbery, child abuse, police misconduct, and fraud.2 New York District Attorney, Robert M. Morgenthau, calls her a “fearless and effective prosecutor,” who “believes in the rule of law.”3 After leaving the district attorney’s office, Judge Sotomayor worked for a private law firm as a corporate litigator, where she handled complex commercial cases, both international and domestic. Her work focused on the areas of intellectual property, real estate, employment, banking, contracts, and agency law. 4 In October 1992, Judge Sotomayor was appointed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by President Bush and became the youngest judge on the Court.5 In her six years as a district court judge, Judge Sotomayor presided over approximately 450 cases,6 earning a reputation as a “sharp” and “fearless” jurist.7 She was elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1998 by President Clinton, where she has participated in more than 3000 appeals and written approximately 400 published opinions. 8 Her colleagues on the Second Circuit bench have praised her as “a brilliant lawyer and a very sound and careful judge” who is “fair and decent in all her dealings.”9 Judicial Philosophy – A Passion for Moderation Judge Sotomayor’s judicial opinions faithfully adhere to applicable legal precedents, defer to legislative and regulatory decision-making, and carefully examine the facts of each case. Because she applies the same principled analysis to each matter she reviews, her conclusions do not fall into superficially predictable categories. 10 Judge Sotomayor’s application of the law hews closely to established law and precedents. Hers is a clear and consistent voice for moderation that demonstrates an appreciation for the far-reaching implications of appellate decisions. Essentially limiting the scope of her own power, Judge Sotomayor is a model of judicial restraint.
Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York June 30, 2009
In dissenting from the Second Circuit’s reversal of a district court decision that dismissed an age discrimination claim brought by a seventy-year-old clergyman, Judge Sotomayor wrote that the majority opinion “violate[d] a cardinal principle of judicial restraint by reaching unnecessarily the question of [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act]’s constitutionality” when the question had not been presented to the Court.11 Similarly, upon reviewing an immigration asylum case that addressed China’s restrictive family planning policies, Judge Sotomayor wrote that the majority opinion “mark[ed] an extraordinary and unwarranted departure from our longstanding principles of deference and judicial restraint.”12 Judge Sotomayor’s awareness of the long-range effects of judicial decisions undergirds her passion for judicial restraint. Addressing an immigration asylum claim brought by three women who had been subjected to female genital mutilation in their native Guinea, Judge Sotomayor wrote that a colleague’s analysis of continuing persecution claims was “unnecessary . . . may never need to be decided, . . . [and]. . . could have far reaching implications in other types of cases.”13 Reviewing a Fourth Amendment claim of illegal search in the context of a plaintiff’s suit for money damages, Judge Sotomayor reminded her colleagues of the Supreme Court’s articulation of the applicable law: [T]he Supreme Court has struck a careful balance between the vindication of constitutional rights and government officials' ability to exercise discretion in the performance of their duties. Our case law, in subtle but important ways, has altered this balance . . . In the vast majority of cases, including this one, the particular phrasing of the standard will not alter the outcome . . . [y]et the effect in future cases may not always be so benign. . . . It is time to . . . reconcile our . . . analysis with the Supreme Court's most recent, authoritative jurisprudence. 14 Distinctive Common-Sense Perspective Judge Sotomayor brings a distinctive common-sense perspective to the Court, and an appreciation of the differences among litigants’ individual attributes and experiences. In 2007, then-Senator Obama might have been describing Judge Sotomayor when he said, “Part of the role of the Court is . . . to protect people who may be vulnerable in the political process, the outsider, the minority, those who are vulnerable, those who don’t have a lot of clout.”15 While always adhering to established law and precedent, her opinions and decisions reveal a special sensitivity to challenges facing those whom WBASNY seeks to protect: women and other groups for whom the equal administration of justice has been elusive, such as immigrants, children, and the disabled.16 Judge Sotomayor is eminently qualified for the Supreme Court without regard to gender. However, the members of WBASNY believe that her gender enhances her other stellar qualifications. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently stated that the Supreme Court needs another woman: “[T]here are perceptions that we have because we are women. . . .
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Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York June 30, 2009
Women belong in all places where decisions are being made. I don't say (the split) should be 5050. It could be 60% men, 40% women, or the other way around. It shouldn't be that women are the exception.”17 Similarly, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated, “Despite the encouraging and wonderful gains and the changes for women which have occurred in my lifetime, there is still room to advance and to promote correction of the remaining deficiencies and imbalances.” 18 Addressing an audience of WBASNY members in 1999, Judge Sotomayor discussed the impact of her gender on her own jurisprudence: Each day on the bench, I learn something new about the judicial process and its meaning, about being a professional woman in a world that sometimes looks at us with suspicion. . . . I can and do . . . aspire to be greater than the sum total of my experiences but I accept my limitations. I willingly accept that we who judge must not deny the differences resulting from experience and gender but attempt . . . continuously to judge when those opinions, sympathies and prejudices are appropriate.19 Judge Sotomayor’s decisions reflect an understanding of “women’s issues” and how they are essentially human issues. Dissenting from an immigration decision, Judge Sotomayor wrote, The majority concedes that both spouses suffer a “profound emotional loss” as a result of a forced abortion or sterilization, but it never sufficiently explains why the harm of sterilization or abortion constitutes persecution only for the person who is forced to undergo such a procedure and not for that person's spouse as well. . . . [T]he majority's conclusion disregards the immutable fact that a desired pregnancy . . . necessarily requires both spouses to occur, and that the state's interference with this fundamental right “may have subtle, far reaching and devastating effects” for both husband and wife. The termination of a wanted pregnancy under a coercive population control program can only be devastating to any couple, akin, no doubt, to the killing of a child.20 In the same case, Judge Sotomayor addressed the Court’s obligation to consider the differences between Chinese asylum seekers and U.S. citizens when making assumptions about parties’ actions: We simply have no foundation on which to conclude that all couples have the financial resources to escape at the same time, and as the government stated at oral argument, it is not uncommon for Chinese couples to separate and have one spouse go abroad in order to amass the necessary resources to bring over the other spouse. I believe the majority here is opining on a subject – imbued with potentially significant cultural differences – with
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Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York June 30, 2009
which it has no expertise or empirical evidence.21 Judge Sotomayor has also demonstrated an understanding of the particular difficulties women and girls face in our society. In a case alleging discriminatory failure to promote and retaliatory discharge, Justice Sotomayor held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that she was discriminated against on either basis. 22 However, addressing the same employee’s claim of sexual harassment, Judge Sotomayor held that testimony that the woman’s supervisor repeatedly commented that “women should be barefoot and pregnant . . . [and that he] would stand very close to women when talking to them and would ‘look[ ] at [them] up and down in a way that's very uncomfortable’” was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a jury trial on the question of whether she had been subjected to a hostile work environment.23 In a case involving strip searches of young girls admitted to juvenile detention centers, Judge Sotomayor wrote that the majority failed adequately to consider “the privacy interests of emotionally troubled children,” most of whom “have been victims of abuse or neglect, and may be more vulnerable mentally and emotionally than other youths their age.” She cautioned, “We should be especially wary of strip searches of children, since youth ‘is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.’” 24 Dissenting from a dismissal of a claim that a school district had discriminated against an African American child in demoting him from first grade to kindergarten, Judge Sotomayor wrote, “I consider the treatment this lone black child encountered . . . to have been . . . unprecedented and contrary to the school’s established policies.” 25 She found it “crucial” that the student was “the only black child in this classroom and one of the very few black students in the entire school.”26 Addressing a claim brought by a father who was investigated by the Vermont Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services after his estranged wife accused him of sexually abusing his three-year-old son, Judge Sotomayor first noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has afforded constitutional protection to parents’ interest in the care, custody and management of their children, then addressed the “compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor children, particularly in circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against the parents themselves.”27 Carefully analyzing the actions of the social workers sued by the father, and the applicable law available to guide the actions of those social workers, Judge Sotomayor ultimately held that despite problems with the investigation, “we conclude that defendants had a reasonable basis for their substantiation determination and that they therefore did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights.”28 However, she also provided clear guidance to child protection workers: “[F]rom this day forward, these and other case workers should understand that the decision to substantiate an allegation of child abuse on the basis of an investigation similar to but even slightly more flawed than this one will generate a real risk of legal sanction.”29 Judge Sotomayor has also thoughtfully applied the law governing the rights of disabled persons. In holding that the court below had inaccurately formulated a jury charge in an
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Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York June 30, 2009
employment discrimination case, Judge Sotomayor wrote, “Taken as a whole, the charge suggests that an employer may offer any accommodation that does not cause an undue hardship, including reassignment to an inferior position, and that the plaintiff is required to accept . . . . The district court . . . erred.”30 As a district judge for the Southern District of New York, Judge Sotomayor considered a claim brought by a woman with a learning disability who sought reasonable accommodations in taking the New York State Bar Examination. Judge Sotomayor conducted a total of twenty-five days of trial, reviewed thousands of pages of exhibits and briefs, and heard testimony from eight experts, finally concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to accommodations of her disability in taking the bar examination, and $7,500 in damages.31 Her detailed and respectful treatment of the parties and witnesses in a decision on a matter involving less than ten thousand dollars in damages is testament to her commitment to the fair and equal administration of justice to all who come before her. In another case, Judge Sotomayor considered a district court’s dismissal of the claim of a former employee who alleged that he was discharged after he suffered a disabling back injury. 32 In a clear and erudite decision, Judge Sotomayor addressed the interplay of three different disability statutes, evaluated complex procedural issues, and analyzed the potential liability of a parent corporation and a sister corporation for employment discrimination. Her succinct conclusion reinstated the employee’s claim against his employer, affirmed the dismissal of the claim against the sister corporation, and resolved the procedural issues. 33 Conclusion Judge Sotomayor’s jurisprudence defies easy categorization because each of her decisions is characterized by careful consideration of the law and the facts. Her clear and compelling analyses and her fair treatment of the parties epitomize the ideal qualities of a Supreme Court Justice. She will bring balance and perspective to the Court and will enhance the delivery of justice to all.
Notes
1. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Judge Sonia Sotomayor,” at 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov /the_press_office/Background-on-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor/ (5/26/09). 2. Id. 3. Robert M. Morgenthau, “Sotomayor is Highly Qualified,” The Wall Street Journal, Letters at 1, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124183198437502843.html (5/9/09). 4. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra. 5. Id. 6. Id. 7. James C. McKinley Jr., "Baseball: Woman in the News; Strike-Zone Arbitrator -- Sonia Sotomayor," The New York Times, at 1, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/01/us/baseball-woman-in-the-news-strike-zone-arbitrator-soniasotomayor.html (4/1/95). 8. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, supra. 5
Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York June 30, 2009
9. Mark Hamblett & Vesselin Mitev, “New Yorkers Welcome Nomination, Praise Judge as ‘Fair,’ ‘Intelligent,’” New York Law Journal, at 1, 2, http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202430987678&slreturn=1 (5/27/09) (quoting Guido Calabrese, J., and Dennis Jacobs, C.J.) 10. Compare United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 2007) (relying on Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent to hold drivers and passengers in a vehicle traveling on the thruway have a diminished expectation of privacy in the contents of the vehicle, and allowing a warrantless search of the vehicle) with Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, — F.3d — , No. 07-0893-cv (2d Cir. 5/22/2009) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “clearly established precedent” protects misdemeanor arrestees from strip searches absent reasonable suspicion). See also Emily Bazelon, “Sotomayor’s Manly Man Ruling,” at 2, http://www.slate.com/id/2219695/ (6/3/09) (Judge Sotomayor’s ruling in a sex discrimination case involving stereotyping was the “opposite of activist, in the sense that she was following previous rulings from her circuit;” her ability to persuade fellow judges “bodes well for her potential to work with conservatives on the Supreme Court”). 11. Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also Center for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 195 (2d Cir. 2002) (“It would be ironic if, in our desire to avoid rendering an advisory opinion, we were to address a novel standing question in a case where the result is foreordained by another decision of this Court.”) 12. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 327 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J, concurring). 13. Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 125 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 14. Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 171 (2d Cir. 2007) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). See also Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda (New York) Ltd., 229 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from a denial of rehearing in banc) (“[The legal question’s] import reaches well beyond our government, to our relations with foreign nations, and the access of foreign entities and individuals to the federal courts. . . . When issues of such enduring significance are presented, I believe that the Court in banc should reexamine the merits of its conclusion to ensure that substantial numbers of individuals and corporations are not erroneously deprived of access to our federal courts.”); Ctr. for Reproductive Law & Policy, supra, 304 F.3d at 190 (“Planned Parenthood not only controls this case conceptually; it presented the same issue. . . . and no intervening Supreme Court case law alters its precedential value.”); Hankins, supra, 441 F.3d at 111 (“The most troublesome aspect of the majority’s ruling on waiver, however, is that it fundamentally misconstrues the nature of [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act] and First Amendment rights, and, in doing so, directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent.”); Lin, supra, 494 F.3d at 328 (“The majority’s zeal in reaching a question not before us requires the unprecedented step of constricting the [Board of Immigration Appeal]’s congressionally delegated powers – a decision whose ramifications we are ill-prepared . . . to understand or appreciate fully.”) 15. “The Democratic Debate,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/us/politics/15debatetranscript.html? r=2&adxnnl=1& oref=slogin&pagewanted=39 (11/15/07). 16. “WBASNY’s mission is [t]o promote the advancement of the status of women in society and of women in the legal profession; to promote the fair and equal administration of justice; and to act as a unified voice for its members with respect to issues of statewide, national and international significance to women generally and to women attorneys in particular.” http://www.wbasny.bluestep.net/my/shared/custompage/custompage.jsp?_event=view&_id=445505_c_sU127802_s _i137468. 17. Joan Biskupic, “Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman,” USA Today, at 2, 1, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-05-05-ruthginsburg_N.htm?csp=34 (6/5/09). 18. Ronald Smothers, “Conferees Seek ‘Founding Mothers,’” The New York Times, at 1, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/12/us/conferees-seek-founding-mothers.html (2/12/88). 19. Judge Lisa Margaret Smith, “One Judge’s View of the Impact of Women on the Judiciary,” at 4 (1999) (reporting on Judge Sotomayor’s keynote address at the annual WBASNY convention). 20. Lin, supra, 494 F.3d at 330, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 21. Lin, supra, Id. at 331, n.6. 22. Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2000). 23. Id. 202 F.3d at 571 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing a dismissal of a female police officer’s sexual harassment hostile work environment and retaliatory discharge claims). 6
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24. N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 239 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 149 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t strains credulity to suggest that a father who searches the world for his child to get her back and files a petition . . . to do so, would, upon succeeding in his efforts, simply permit his child to stand abandoned in the airport upon her return. . . . This concept . . . that the child is best served by entrusting decisions regarding his or her custody to the courts of the child's country of habitual residence – stands in direct contradiction to the majority's parochial view that foreign courts cannot be trusted in the same manner as American courts to competently make necessary decisions regarding the child. Moreover, the majority[ ] . . . fails to account for the [Hague] Convention's protection of any number of joint custody arrangements in which the parents trade physical custody or in which one parent possesses physical custody and the other parent contributes to decisions about the child's upbringing. By the majority's reasoning, were the parent with physical custody to remove the child from the country of habitual residence, the court would have no power to return the child, because no adult would be required to care for him or her upon return.”) 25. Gant v. Wallingford, 195 F.3d 134, 151 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 26. Id. at 153. 27. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1999). 28. Id. at 106. 29. Id. at 107. 30. Norville v. Staten Island University Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir.1999). 31. Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 93 Civ. 4986(SS) (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (J. Sotomayor, sitting by designation). The case was appealed to the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court, and it was eventually remanded to the Southern District of New York after Judge Sotomayor had ascended to the Second Circuit bench. She conducted four additional days of trial after that remand, sitting by designation. 32. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000). 33. Id. at 342.
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