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Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR - FINAL

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					                 Prepared for the Office of Emergency Communications




                                           ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


                             Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                             December 2008




                                      Golden Phoenix 2008
                               After Action Report—FINAL




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
                                                             Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                                           ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0




Executive Summary
This document provides three distinct outcomes for Golden Phoenix 2008:
1. The After Action Report (AAR) generated by the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance
   Program (ICTAP);
2. A compilation of most other AARs and reports generated by participants and observers; and,
3. Best practice planning information to assist other regions interested in conducting a similar joint
   training event.
The AAR content is based directly on observations expressed by local first responders and technical
experts that participated in the exercise. The AAR reviews key findings identified during the training
event.

Overview
Golden Phoenix 2008 was a collaborative training event that provided more than 150 local, tribal, state,
and federal public safety agencies, industry, non-governmental organizations, and military units with the
opportunity to conduct their training in a multi-jurisdictional environment. Agency specific training
objectives were met through robust cross-agency scenario play.

The Golden Phoenix collaborative training approach is unique in that all agencies and organizations that
participate fund their own activities through budgets for training, marketing, or research and development.
Sponsored by The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Emergency Communications
(OEC), ICTAP provided interoperable communications expertise during the planning process. For the
training event, ICTAP coordinated and provided data/information capture services and observing subject
matter experts who subsequently generated this After Action Report.
Golden Phoenix 2008 was a collaborative training event utilizing the following overarching scenario:
        Terrorists located outside the country decide to attack a large city with a weaponized
        biohazard to be delivered from a variety of platforms by land and by sea. Ten suspects
        carrying the biohazard in backpacks are apprehended and interrogated. Prior to
        identifying the substance as a hazard, an entire Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
        station, several individuals, and two helicopters are contaminated.
        More terrorists are apprehended in a variety of circumstances on Day 2 of the training
        event, requiring first responders to work in a variety of environments and conditions. Two
        civil support teams are on hand to respond to the incident with testing, communication,
        and decontamination services.
        As the public becomes aware of the possible attack, many begin self-referring to local
        hospitals for treatment of real and perceived symptoms. Hospitals implement security and
        mass casualty response plans requiring support of local, state, and federal resources
        (law enforcement, decontamination support, air transport assets, and so on). The county
        emergency operations center (EOC) was activated to support the crowd management
        efforts and to coordinate the distribution of prophylactic drug kits.
Throughout the scenario, experiments were conducted at a site near Yuma, Arizona, at Brown Field in
southern San Diego County, and at the San Diego State University (SDSU) Visualization Lab. Yuma
focused on obtaining, processing, declassifying, and transmitting imagery to end users (located at the
notional EOC at the Visualization Lab). Brown Field focused on processes, procedures, and
communications necessary to support incident response and recovery. The Brown Field site emulated a
refugee camp with many nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and vendors meeting at an austere
location, attempting to establish communications and perform planned tasks.




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Conclusion
Golden Phoenix 2008 highlighted successes associated with the collaborative training approach:

     •   Collaborative training can be conducted using small or existing training budgets.
     •   While lacking much of the structure and funding associated with formal regional exercises
         developed from the top down, the low cost bottom up collaborative approach minimized the
         scrutiny associated with traditional exercises, while still leveraging Homeland Security Exercise
         and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) principles. Participants could play and make mistakes without
         endangering careers, grant opportunities, or future endeavors.
     •   While the collaborative training approach has been very low cost, measured support from federal
         sponsors for planning and facilitation is highly recommended for future events. It is very important
         that future sponsors maintain the no fault training environment and allow participants to control
         their own training objectives and assessments, and allow participants to provide overall
         leadership.
     •   The training provided a wide variety of non-traditional partners and gave participants the
         opportunity to build the relationships that will strengthen future collaborative training and enhance
         coordination during catastrophic incident response. Relationships formed and procedures
         developed during previous Golden Phoenix events enhanced response to San Diego firestorms.
         Obtaining scarce resources and establishing interoperable communications between military
         helicopters and civilian fire fighting personnel were some of the improved responses.
     •   Because training is focused on the tactical level by each agency’s objectives, there is no driving
         requirement or multi-jurisdictional funding for an Incident Command System (ICS) structure to be
         established in support of regional scenario play. It is recommended that future event planners
         identify early an agency interested in supporting regional training of the ICS for all participants.
         Once established, an ICS would generate additional real-world multi-jurisdictional response
         challenges.
     •   The Golden Phoenix events have provided important military-civil interoperability operations inter-
         action. The military and civil public safety cultures have many fundamental differences which may
         impede smooth coordination in an emergency. The military command and control is top down,
         while civil public safety responds in a collaborative command and control environment. Military
         equipment and operations have been developed with significant funding to meet missions
         primarily focused overseas, while civil systems and operations support a wide variety of domestic
         missions and are funded by individual jurisdictions. The Golden Phoenix approach brings
         together both officers and tactical level responders from these diverse cultures over an extended
         period and challenges the military to understand and support a civil response, while challenging
         civil agencies to utilize military resources that may one day be available for mutual aid during a
         real incident.
     •   Collaborative training events provided vendors, academics, and others the opportunity to operate
         and evaluate systems and procedures in field conditions; an environment essential to developing
         viable tools.
     •   Joint collaborative events such as Golden Phoenix are recommended as a Best Practice for any
         region of the nation. Out of the Ashes—Conducting Your Own Regional Collaborative Training
         Events is a white paper included in this report that provides the information necessary to do so.

Golden Phoenix 2008 highlighted several successes associated with a collaborative training event that
will positively influence public safety throughout the San Diego region:

     •   Imagery from unmanned aerial systems (UAS) can be delivered rapidly and effectively to end
         users in an EOC environment.
     •   Local, regional, state, federal, and nontraditional agencies and organizations throughout the
         region can work together effectively in a no fault, collaborative environment.
     •   Initial procedures were identified/suggested for implementation of UAS into the National Incident
         Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS).



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    •   Observers identified and documented best communication practices for satellite, wireless local
        area network, and interoperable communications in the region.
    •   Collaboration tools and protocols were identified for incident response—with a minimum amount
        of training, these sites can become invaluable to supporting incident response and recovery.

The training event identified several opportunities for improving regional disaster response and
interoperable communications. Major recommendations, which are detailed in this report, include:

    •   Integrate interoperable communications, a critical support function, into all aspects of
        collaborative training and incident response and recovery.

        o   Collaborative training event leadership must establish a functional communications
            committee that works closely with the planning committee to identify realistic interoperable
            communications events for every scenario event and training module that occurs.
        o   Deploy a communications unit leader (COML) with a mandate for strong management of not
            only voice, but also wireless local area network, satellite, and all other incident response and
            recovery communications.
        o   Develop tools with open source applications and commercial systems to evaluate and
            manage the spectrum used to support disaster response and recovery operations.
        o   Develop, and then maintain, a comprehensive communications plan (ICS205) to be used
            throughout the planning and event process.

    •   Work closely with industry partners and vendors to identify how they can support incident
        response and recovery operations. Provide them an opportunity to take part in training
        opportunities.
    •   Develop Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA), and other
        communication agreements.
    •   Address interagency and inter-jurisdictional communications, in existing and planned MAAs,
        encouraging the earliest implementation of interoperability possible.
    •   Develop regional interoperable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in accordance with NIMS
        guidelines.
    •   Review and train all regional agencies in existing communication SOPs.
    •   Emphasize incorporating disparate communication resources into a communications
        interoperability plan.
    •   Consolidate key local agencies to regional standards based shared systems.
    •   Establish policies, procedures, and training to establish and operate a Unified Command system,
        including a designated COML.
    •   Disseminate information about regional communication interoperability capabilities to the user
        (field and dispatch) level on a regular basis.
    •   Continue to incorporate interoperable communications into existing local, regional, and state
        exercise and training opportunities.

Collaborative training events are recommended as an important step toward improving regional
communications interoperability and disaster response capabilities in any part of the nation. Perhaps the
greatest benefit is the establishment of interpersonal and interagency relationships, which have proven to
be invaluable during past real incident responses. People learn who runs what and have the shared
experience that prepares them to ask for, or offer, mutual aid. The training event key findings identify best
practices and include lessons learned with recommendations. Acting on the various training event
recommendations will significantly improve regional communications. The training event success is a
testament to regional participants’ commitment to increased preparedness.




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Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................III
     Overview.................................................................................................................................................. iii
     Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. iv
1.           INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................1
2.           GOLDEN PHOENIX 2008 – BACKGROUND ..................................................................5
3.           CREATING AND CONDUCTING YOUR OWN COLLABORATIVE TRAINING EVENT.7
     3.1          Creating a Collaborative Training Event ................................................................................. 7
     3.2          Planning for a Collaborative Training Event........................................................................... 7
     3.3          Conducting a Collaborative Training Event............................................................................ 8
4.           GOLDEN PHOENIX 2008 KEY FINDINGS ......................................................................9
     4.1     Collaborative Training Event Planning Process .................................................................... 9
       4.1.1    Planning Best Practices ........................................................................................................ 10
       4.1.2    Planning Lessons Learned.................................................................................................... 10
     4.2     Use Open Source Content Management System to Inform and Update Participants ...... 14
     4.3     Field Training Best Practices and Lessons Learned ........................................................... 15
       4.3.1    Day 1: Customs and Border Protection–Imperial Beach Station—Best Practices ............... 15
       4.3.2    Day 1: Customs and Border Protection–Imperial Beach Station—Lessons Learned........... 16
       4.3.3    Day 1: MCAS Miramar—Best Practices................................................................................ 17
       4.3.4    Day 1: MCAS Miramar—Lessons Learned ........................................................................... 17
       4.3.5    Day 2: Qualcomm Stadium and Warehouse—Best Practices .............................................. 18
       4.3.6    Day 2: Qualcomm Stadium and Warehouse—Lessons Learned ......................................... 18
       4.3.7    Day 3: Hospitals—Best Practices.......................................................................................... 18
       4.3.8    Day 3: Hospitals—Lessons Learned ..................................................................................... 19
       4.3.9    Day 3: Emergency Operations Center—Best Practices ....................................................... 20
       4.3.10 Day 3: Emergency Operations Center—Lessons Learned................................................... 20
     4.4     UAS Communications Experiment and Training Activities in Yuma ................................. 20
       4.4.1    UAS Operations .................................................................................................................... 20
       4.4.2    Airspace Acquisition and Use................................................................................................ 21
       4.4.3    Preparing for Communications.............................................................................................. 21
       4.4.4    Yuma—UAS Operations—Best Practices............................................................................. 22
       4.4.5    Yuma—UAS Operations—Lessons Learned ........................................................................ 22
       4.4.6    Yuma—Information Transfer Methods and Processes—Best Practices .............................. 24
       4.4.7    Yuma—Information Transfer Methods and Processes—Lessons Learned.......................... 24
     4.5     Public Safety and Military Air Operations ............................................................................. 25
     4.6     Support Oriented Agencies, Vendors, and Activities .......................................................... 26
       4.6.1    Tribal Government Involvement—Best Practices ................................................................. 26
       4.6.2    Tribal Government Involvement—Lessons Learned............................................................. 26
       4.6.3    Air-to-Ground and Ground-to-Air Communications—Best Practices .................................... 26
       4.6.4    Air-to-Ground and Ground-to-Air Communications—Lessons Learned ............................... 26
       4.6.5    Vendor Integration and Involvement—Best Practices........................................................... 27
       4.6.6    Vendor Integration and Involvement—Lessons Learned...................................................... 27
       4.6.7    Communications—Satellite—Best Practices ........................................................................ 29
       4.6.8    Communications—Satellite—Lessons Learned.................................................................... 30
       4.6.9    Communications—Wireless Local Area Networks—Best Practices ..................................... 32
       4.6.10 Communications—Wireless Local Area Networks—Lessons Learned ................................ 32



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       4.6.11 Communications—Cellular Phone—Best Practices.............................................................. 33
       4.6.12 Communications—Cellular Phone—Lessons Learned ......................................................... 33
       4.6.13 Communications—Interoperability—Best Practices.............................................................. 34
       4.6.14 Communications—Interoperability—Lessons Learned ......................................................... 34
       4.6.15 NIMS ICS Implementation—Best Practices .......................................................................... 35
       4.6.16 NIMS ICS Implementation—Lessons Learned ..................................................................... 35
       4.6.17 Situational Awareness and Common Operational Picture—Best Practices ......................... 35
       4.6.18 Situational Awareness and Common Operational Picture—Lessons Learned..................... 36
       4.6.19 Notional EOC—Best Practices.............................................................................................. 37
       4.6.20 Notional EOC—Lessons Learned ......................................................................................... 37
       4.6.21 Child Care During Incident Response and Recovery—Best Practices................................. 38
       4.6.22 Child Care During Incident Response and Recovery—Lessons Learned ............................ 38
       4.6.23 Simplify User Interface —Best Practices .............................................................................. 39
       4.6.24 Simplify User Interface—Lessons Learned........................................................................... 39
       4.6.25 Media Participation in Collaborative Training Events —Best Practices ................................ 39
       4.6.26 Media Participation in Collaborative Training Events—Lessons Learned ............................ 39
       4.6.27 Power Sustainability—Best Practices ................................................................................... 40
       4.6.28 Power Sustainability—Lessons Learned............................................................................... 41
       4.6.29 Access and Use of Controlled Unclassified Information—Best Practices............................. 43
       4.6.30 Access and Use of Controlled Unclassified Information—Lessons Learned........................ 43
     4.7      Integration of Industry and Non-governmental organizations............................................ 44
     4.8      Actions...................................................................................................................................... 44
       4.8.1     Publish Satellite and Cell Phone Communication Procedures Used to Deliver Imagery from
       Ground Stations to End Users ............................................................................................................. 44
       4.8.2     Improve NIMS ICS Familiarity and Usage ............................................................................ 44
     4.9      Training and Education—“If you didn’t make a mistake, you weren’t training.”.............. 45
       4.9.1     Intelligence Workshops—Inform Civil Authorities and Educate Intelligence Providers ........ 46
       4.9.2     Benefits of Collaborative Training to Local Participants........................................................ 46
       4.9.3     Relationships are Critical to the Success of Collaborative Response (for Real or for
       Training) 47
       4.9.4     Collaborative Training Events need a Dedicated and Funded Small Staff ........................... 47
     4.10     Overall Training Recommendations ...................................................................................... 49
5.           TRAINING EVENT OVERVIEW .....................................................................................51
     5.1     Participating Organizations .................................................................................................... 51
       5.1.1   Local Agencies ...................................................................................................................... 51
       5.1.2   State Agencies ...................................................................................................................... 52
       5.1.3   Federal Agencies .................................................................................................................. 52
       5.1.4   Private Organizations ............................................................................................................ 53
     5.2     Target Capabilities................................................................................................................... 54
       5.2.1   Phase I (14 – 17 July) ........................................................................................................... 54
       5.2.2   Phase II (19 – 20 July) .......................................................................................................... 54
       5.2.3   Phase III A – Federal/Civil Focus (21 July) ........................................................................... 55
       5.2.4   Phase III B – DOD/NG/NGO/Industry Focus (21 July) ......................................................... 55
       5.2.5   Phase III C (22 July).............................................................................................................. 55
       5.2.6   Phase III D (23 July).............................................................................................................. 56
       5.2.7   Phase IV (24 July) ................................................................................................................. 56
       5.2.8   Phase V (25 July) .................................................................................................................. 56
     5.3     Golden Phoenix 2008 Training Event Objectives ................................................................. 56
6.           TRAINING EVENT SUMMARY ......................................................................................57
     6.1         Training Event Planning and Preparation ............................................................................. 57


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       6.1.1   Organization and Process ..................................................................................................... 57
       6.1.2   Scope .................................................................................................................................... 57
     6.2     Golden Phoenix 2008 Training Event Scenario .................................................................... 57
7.           CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................61
APPENDIX A                   GLOSSARY .................................................................................................. A-1
APPENDIX B  OUT OF THE ASHES – CONDUCTING YOUR OWN REGIONAL
COLLABORATIVE TRAINING EVENTS ................................................................................. B-1
APPENDIX C                   INTEROPERABILITY CONTINUUM............................................................. C-1
APPENDIX D                   PARTICIPANT AFTER ACTION REPORT SUBMISSIONS ........................ D-1
     D.1      Federal, including Military .................................................................................................... D-3
       D.1.1    MAG-46 After Action Report for Golden Phoenix 2008 ...................................................... D-5
       D.1.2    Data Communications in Support of Tactical Level Emergency Response Collaborative
       Training – Coby Leuschke AAR......................................................................................................... D-7
       D.1.3    Human Dimensions Research Team AAR, Operation Golden Phoenix (20-25 July 2008),
       San Diego, California......................................................................................................................... D-9
       D.1.4    DHS Science and Technology Information Sharing Project and Controlled Unclassified
       Information AAR............................................................................................................................... D-11
       D.1.5    Customs and Border Protection San Diego, California Operation Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR
                D-13
       D.1.6    CBP AMOC GP08 AAR Submission ................................................................................. D-15
       D.1.7    Homeland Security Science and Technology Transfer Team Golden Phoenix Observations
       21–23 July........................................................................................................................................ D-17
       D.1.8    DEA AAR Bullets ............................................................................................................... D-19
       D.1.9    Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern California Agency AAR .............................................. D-21
     D.2      State and Local Organizations and Agencies................................................................... D-23
       D.2.1    9th Civil Support Team WMD AAR .................................................................................... D-25
       D.2.2    San Diego Fire-Rescue Golden Phoenix AAR.................................................................. D-27
       D.2.3    UCSD Medical Center AAR............................................................................................... D-29
       D.2.4    Beauchamp Observer Report............................................................................................ D-31
     D.3      Nongovernmental Organizations ....................................................................................... D-33
       D.3.1    National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue AAR ...................................................... D-35
       D.3.2    Project K.I.D Operation Golden Phoenix-HoldSafe 2008 Collaborative Training Event AAR
                D-37
       D.3.3    SDSU Visualization Center and Regional Technology Center Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR . D-
       39
     D.4      Vendors................................................................................................................................. D-41
       D.4.1    AC3 Systems Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR ........................................................................ D-43
       D.4.2    Alion Science and Technology Team AAR ....................................................................... D-45
       D.4.3    Balfour Technologies Automated Situational Awareness Portal Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR
                D-47
       D.4.4    Compass Energy Solutions Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR................................................... D-49
       D.4.5    Desert Hawk III AAR ......................................................................................................... D-51
       D.4.6    Fortified Data Communications, Inc. AAR Submission ..................................................... D-53
       D.4.7    Latitude Engineering, Golden Phoenix After Action Report .............................................. D-55
       D.4.8    Microsoft and Partners JEPRS Demonstration Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR..................... D-57
       D.4.9    Ready2Protect AAR .......................................................................................................... D-59
       D.4.10 RP Flight Systems, Inc. AAR – Golden Phoenix 2008...................................................... D-61
       D.4.11 sStitch.com AAR for Golden Phoenix ............................................................................... D-63
       D.4.12 Swan Island Networks AAR Input ..................................................................................... D-65




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      D.4.13 Team Epsilon Systems’ Rapid Deployment of an Integrated Security and Surveillance
      Solution in Support of Golden Phoenix 2008 – July 21–24, 2008 ................................................... D-67
      D.4.14 TW Mobile Engineering GP08 AAR .................................................................................. D-69
      D.4.15 URS Washington Division, Red Team AAR: Operation Golden Phoenix ......................... D-71


Table of Figures
Figure 1. Delay or Latency Introduced Using Multiple Hops....................................................................... 31
Figure 2. Power Distribution Point with 20-amp Twist Lock Receptacles................................................... 41

Figure C - 1. Interoperability Continuum ................................................................................................... C-2




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1.       Introduction
This document provides three distinct outcomes for Golden Phoenix 2008 (GP08):

1. The After Action Report (AAR) generated by the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance
   Program (ICTAP);
2. A compilation of most other AARs and reports generated by participants and observers; and,
3. Best practice planning information to assist other regions interested in conducting a similar joint
   training event.

View the suggested actions in this report as recommendations only. In some cases, agencies may
determine if the benefits of implementation are insufficient to outweigh the costs. In other cases, agencies
may identify alternative solutions that are more effective or efficient. Each agency should review the
recommendations and determine the most appropriate action and the resources needed (i.e., time, staff,
and funding) for implementation.

Golden Phoenix 2008 was a collaborative training event that provided a multitude of local, regional, state,
and federal public safety agencies, industry equipment and service providers, non-governmental
organizations, and military units the opportunity to consolidate training requirements and opportunities.
Agency specific training objectives provided the opportunity to develop robust training scenarios that met
the training needs of Golden Phoenix 2008 participants. The scenarios provided focus for sponsoring
agencies and provided training event planners the opportunity to create challenging and effective
scenarios to meet participant needs.

While lacking much of the structure associated with exercises and training developed from the top down,
the bottom up collaborative approach minimized the risks associated with traditional exercises.
Participants could play and make mistakes without endangering careers, grant opportunities, or future
endeavors. The training provided a wide variety of non-traditional partners (public safety, military, non-
governmental organizations, and industry) and participants the opportunity to build the relationships that
will lead to more collaborative training and effective collaboration during catastrophic incident response.

Golden Phoenix 2008 planning began in October of 2007, culminating with a week of intelligence
briefings and training followed by four days of training events that took place in the following locations
July 20 through July 23, 2008:
     •   R2301W (an auxiliary airfield with restricted airspace used for flight training and testing) near
         Yuma, Arizona – Conducted a variety of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) experiments, most with
         the intent of processing, declassifying, and distributing imagery rapidly and effectively. The UAS
         experiments also led to invaluable discoveries for air operations in support of incident response
         and recovery and best practices for using a “strong” communications unit leader (COML) to
         manage wireless local area networks and satellite communication resources.
     •   Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Imperial Beach (IMB) – Interrogated 10 suspects detained
         near the border and transported from a nearby airfield. Once the suspected drugs were
         discovered, incident command was passed to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The
         various players coordinated the interrogation, quarantined the facility, shifted responsibilities to a
         different station, and handled incident response, eventually turning the biohazard over to the
         Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for disposition.
     •   Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar East – National Guard Civil Support Team (CST),
         Navy, and Marine Corps personnel decontaminated Marines and helicopter that were exposed to
         the biohazard during the pick up and transport of the suspects.




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    •   Brown Field – Set up an incident command for the nongovernmental organization (NGO), industry
        partner, and vendor area of the “refugee camp” to support experiments and training. Worked with
        Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 46 and CBP camp as needed. Several planned and ad hoc
        experiments were conducted at Brown Field.
    •   Warehouse – San Diego Police Department (SDPD) and FBI conducted assault training wearing
        personal protective equipment on a facility housing suspected terrorists preparing to deliver the
        bio weapon. San Diego Fire Department (SDFD) and CST provided assistance and training for
        decontamination of all involved, including treatment of wounded suspects.
    •   Qualcomm Stadium – SDPD and FBI teams practiced assault techniques for high-speed chase
        involving a vehicle intent on carrying out a terrorist attack. The assault teams also had to rescue a
        hostage the terrorists had taken captive.
    •   SDSU Visualization Lab – Provided place to receive and use imagery sent from Yuma (notional
        emergency operations center) and a location for vendors to conduct, or develop ad hoc,
        experiments for processing large amounts of data for consumption by other end users. It was also
        a location for demonstrating applications and other systems.
    •   UCSD Medical Center Hillcrest and La Jolla Hospitals – Conducted mass casualty, triage, and
        decontamination of people self-referring themselves for treatment. Worked with local law
        enforcement as part of an incident command, ensuring hospital security can communicate or
        coordinate with law enforcement. Law enforcement would establish and provide crowd
        management. Worked with hospital security staff, federal and local law enforcement, and Scripps
        Mercy Hospital to secure and transport controlled medications.
    •   Scripps Mercy Hospital – Conducted mass casualty, triage, and decontamination of people self-
        referring themselves for treatment. Work with local law enforcement as part of an incident
        command, ensuring hospital security can communicate or coordinate with law enforcement. Law
        enforcement would establish and provide crowd management.
Definitions
The AAR uses the following terms frequently. Here are the definitions so everyone may read this with a
common understanding of the terms. The Glossary is located in Appendix A.

                            Developed from the bottom up by key participating agencies that want to
Collaborative Training
                            collaborate to meet common training objectives with the intent of developing
Event
                            and improving interpersonal and interagency relationships.

                            An organization not part of the local, state, or federal government–In most
Nongovernmental             cases the organization is a nonprofit organization that provides critical
Organization (NGO)          services. GP08 examples–The National Institute for Urban Search and
                            Rescue (NIUSR), the American Red Cross, and Project K.I.D.

                            These terms are used interchangeably throughout this report. Vendors and
                            industry partners are organizations that participated in experiments, tested
Vendor/Industry Partner
                            and demonstrated systems and equipment, or provided a wide variety of
                            services as part of Golden Phoenix.

Sponsor
The Golden Phoenix collaborative training is unique in that all agencies and organizations that
participated paid their own way. The various agency and organization training, marketing, or research and
development budgets funded participation. The collaborative training event coordinators paid a total of
around $500 dollars for coffee and refreshments during the initial, midterm, and final planning
conferences. The various participants absorbed all other costs.




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Sponsored by The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Emergency Communications
(OEC), ICTAP provided interoperable communications expertise during the planning process. For the
training event, ICTAP coordinated and provided data/information capture services and observing subject
matter experts who subsequently generated this After Action Report. OEC supports and promotes the
ability of emergency responders and government officials to communicate in the event of natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, or other human-caused disasters, and works to ensure, accelerate, and attain
interoperable and operable emergency communications nationwide. ICTAP provides technical assistance
to states and urban areas applying Urban Area Security Initiative grants and other funds to voice and data
interoperability projects. ICTAP works with local, state, and federal interoperability efforts to enhance
agencies and individuals’ overall capacity to communicate with one another.




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2.      Golden Phoenix 2008 – Background
The Golden Phoenix series of collaborative training events occurred in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The
collaborative training events were the result of tasking by a Marine Air Group commander to identify how
Marines can effectively serve with and support civilian first responders during disaster response.

MAG-46 had a number of Marines whose primary jobs were law enforcement or fire fighting, resulting in
established relationships and a contact list with several Los Angeles and Orange County public safety
agencies. Introductions were made, needs were identified, public safety leadership obtained buy-in, and
MAG-46 provided personnel to facilitate, and participate in the collaborative training event.

During the 2006 collaborative training event, five agencies participated for four hours of training with
about 200 people. The training took place in the Los Angeles and Orange County region. In 2007, 60
agencies participated for 30 hours of training involving around 2000 people. The training still took place in
the Los Angeles and Orange County region. In 2008, 150 agencies participated for just over 4 days of
training that involved over 750 people in San Diego County. Additional agencies and personnel
participated in intelligence and Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) training the week before
the collaborative training event.

The relationships with the various public safety organizations and agencies, military commands, non-
government organizations, and industry partners have proven invaluable to regional public safety entities
in San Diego, Los Angeles, and Orange Counties. Participants identified and developed capabilities and
procedures to address a variety of communications interoperability, data interoperability, and system
failures discovered during the planning process or during the training event. Were it not for this training
event, these issues would be discovered during incident response (when lives and property are on the
line) or exercise play (when reputations and funding may be on the line).




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3.      Creating and Conducting Your Own Collaborative
        Training Event
GP08 is a unique training event in that it is low cost, meets an agency’s actual training requirements, and
most importantly, builds personal relationships across the various jurisdictional, discipline, and
governance cultures one finds in every region across the country. These personal relationships help
develop the social fabric necessary to find solutions and work together as a team when disaster strikes.
Out of the Ashes—Conducting Your Own Regional Collaborative Training Events, located in Appendix B,
provides detailed information for creating, planning, and conducting your own collaborative training event.
Collaborative training events provide tremendous value to the personnel that carry out incident response
and recovery. It should not come as a surprise that people, and supportive organizations, are critical to
the success of a collaborative training event.

3.1     Creating a Collaborative Training Event
What are the needs of your community or region? Talk to your public safety personnel. They know what
the issues are for your community. They know what works, what is broken, and what could be made
better. With these needs in mind, ask another question, “What incidents or disasters are likely to threaten
my community in the next year, next five years, and next ten years?” If you ask qualified people, your
biggest threat will not be delivery of a weaponized biohazard, but something more mundane. A hurricane,
tornado, flood, earthquake, blizzard, pandemic diseases that threaten livestock and agriculture, or failure
of critical infrastructure are more likely to occur than a dirty bomb. Consider your region. Could you face,
and manage, the migration of hundreds of thousands of people from adjoining cities or states if they face
a disaster similar to those listed above?
With the answers to these questions, you can begin planning a consolidated training event. As you ask
these questions, you will meet like-minded individuals that want to join with you to address community
deficiencies so that when the incident does happen, you are prepared. Identify three or four key
participating agencies that can support planning and leadership efforts. Consolidate a set of training
objectives, schedule an initial planning conference, and then invite every organization, agency, and
industry partner that you think it would be good to invite.
Collaborative training events require a small cadre of personnel from participating organizations to
facilitate participation, lead planning efforts, and observe, analyze, and document event results. The
cadre must be open to all and able to make tough decisions quickly as needed. The white paper identifies
required and optional roles with associated descriptions. The white paper also provides personal
attributes and organizational attributes that are essential for planning and conducting a collaborative
training event.

3.2     Planning for a Collaborative Training Event
The planning cycle for a small collaborative training event will take 9 to 12 months. A greater number of
participants or more complex event will require a longer planning cycle. Once a small cadre of planners
and leaders form, they should systematically reach out to other public safety agencies, industry partners,
NGOs, private companies, and other entities that may be interested in participating. If your region has a
large military presence, reach out to their leadership. If you live near a Coast Guard base or military
reserve facility, reach out to counterparts within those organizations. If your region is near an international
border, reach out to similar organizations located in the neighboring country. If your small group’s network
has Department of Defense (DoD) or U.S. State Department contacts, consider inviting them. Both
departments have strong mandates to support disaster response throughout the world. Do not forget
vendors with tremendous logistics capabilities. Many companies have learned that they need to care for




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their employees during disaster response and recovery. Collaborative training events help them identify,
and prepare for, issues they may not have anticipated.

As you are reaching out to invite participants, document your training objectives and form the
communications and planning committees. These two committees need to identify potential scenarios
that include a robust interoperable communications component that will meet participants’ training
objectives. Prior to the initial planning conference, identify and distribute a potential scenario, current
training objectives, and templates for other participants to begin submitting their training and experiment
objectives. Ensure you have staff prepared to gather the relevant information.

Continue the planning process using established regional planning procedures. If your region is lacking in
this area, use the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidelines and treat the
entire planning process as training.

Collaborative training events are bottom up events. Ensure you have people with the attributes identified
in Appendix B filling the various roles necessary to conduct a collaborative training event. If you have
local or regional expertise, use it. Provide people the opportunity to build the relationships their lives may
depend on during disaster response and recovery.

3.3     Conducting a Collaborative Training Event
Incorporate all aspects of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System
(ICS) into your collaborative training event. NIMS/ICS contains several broad frameworks that identify the
various organizational and management pieces necessary for successful incident response and recovery.
If your training event is small, it will identify NIMS/ICS responsibilities. If your collaborative training event
is large, complex, and spread out over several locations NIMS/ICS can provide the structure necessary to
establish and run unified command or unified area command.

Identify observers, and where necessary, controllers. Use the observers to capture what works and what
does not work during the event. Depending on your event scenario and interoperable communications
activity, controllers can provide the necessary inputs or prompts that will allow event play to continue if
actual performance fails.




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4.      Golden Phoenix 2008 Key Findings
The Golden Phoenix 2008 collaborative training event was conducted in a no fault training environment to
provide participants the opportunity to perform their various tasks, and if need be, learn from their
mistakes. Using a no fault approach leads to a natural response, not the scripted, safe, risk free response
found in many exercises. Observations were made of all training event activity, beginning with Day 0 in
Yuma through Day 3 at Brown Field, SDSU, and Yuma. Notes were taken at the training event hotwash,
less than 48 hours after training event completion. Observer debrief sessions were held less than 24
hours after training event completion. This year, training event participants were asked to provide an
agency after action report submission and to complete an ICS214 Unit Activity Log, if they wanted to.
As a result, over 80 files were available to identify best practices and lessons learned. All of this
information was reviewed and takeaways (an item that stood out) were identified. In many cases,
submitted after action reports contained items a vendor or agency considered a best practice or lesson
learned. Most of these were elevated to takeaway status and then rapidly categorized as a best practice,
lesson learned, or recommendation (an action that, if taken, will help fix the issue or problem discussed in
a lesson learned). The takeaways were categorized as a best practice based largely on appearance in a
primary source (observer, debrief, and hotwash notes). Items from AAR submissions were categorized
and included if they had been addressed in at least one of the three primary sources or if they appeared
in multiple after action report submissions.
Vendor suggested best practices that were clearly copied from marketing literature, product briefings, or
system demonstrations, were not categorized as a best practice or lesson learned. Their submissions
were reviewed, and if content substantiated or corroborated other best practices, lessons learned, or
recommendations, were used. Except for identifying source documents used to develop the best
practices or lessons learned, every reference to a specific company or individual has been deleted.
Throughout this section, you will see the terms best practice and lessons learned. The HSEEP definitions
from HSEEP Volume III, February 2007, for each term follow:
Best Practice
Exemplary, peer-validated techniques, procedures, good ideas, or solutions that work and are solidly
grounded in actual operations, training, and exercise experience.
Lesson Learned
Knowledge and experience, positive or negative, derived from actual incidents, as well as those derived
from observations and historical study of operations, training, and exercises.
This after action report and these key findings do not imply endorsement of any product or system by the
Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, or any other organization that participated
directly or indirectly in the Golden Phoenix 2008 collaborative training event. Press releases and other
correspondence directly or indirectly implying endorsement by DoD, DHS, or other participants are not
authorized and could have a negative impact on that company’s dealings with DoD, DHS, or other
participants.

4.1     Collaborative Training Event Planning Process
The best practices and lessons learned from collaborative training event planning and coordination are
contained in this section. Since training took place in three primary locations and several small venues,
there may be best practices and lessons learned that appear to contradict each other. The advantage of a
multisite collaborative training event is the opportunity to observe a variety of practices in different
settings, providing an opportunity to rapidly identify training event successes.




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4.1.1       Planning Best Practices
4.1.1.1     Incorporate Training and Intelligence Briefs into Planning Process
Description–This year, each planning conference was preceded by a day of training or education. The
intelligence workshops and briefs were beneficial to all attending. (Hotwash, debriefs)
4.1.1.2     Identify Key Coordinating Agencies and Individuals Early in Planning Process
Description–Identification of a lead organization or lead individual (National Institute for Urban Search
and Rescue (NIUSR) at Brown Field and Major Fernandez at Yuma) provides a clear point of contact for
participants to identify, coordinate with, and work with during the planning phases and the training event.
(Observer notes, hotwash, debrief, National Defense University (NDU) AAR) Early identification of key
planning personnel builds relationships that facilitate planning and preparation. The NIUSR picnic prior to
the training event was a fun way for several participants to get to know each other outside the planning
processes.
4.1.1.3     Outgoing and Proactive Leadership Increases Participation
Description–GP08 leadership consistently conveyed their expectations of participating groups during the
planning process. NIUSR approached isolated agencies, encouraging them to participate with other
groups, helping spearhead the collaboration effort at the Brown Field “refugee camp.” (Observer notes,
hotwash, debrief, NDU AAR)
4.1.1.4     Online Collaboration Site (www.civmil.org) Improves Information Dissemination
Description– Civmil.org proved to be an effective collaboration site for most participants. The early
dissemination of information in the planning process through civmil.org and emails led to a higher level of
trust among participants creating a more collaborative working environment by giving a sense of
inclusion. (Debriefs, Beauchamp AAR, NDU AAR, SD Fire and Rescue AAR, Leuschke AAR)
4.1.1.5     Bringing Personnel Together throughout the Planning Process and Event Improves
            Interpersonal and Interagency Relationships
Description– Bringing the various entities together, provides opportunities for relationships between
agencies, industry, and organizations to develop and mature. These relationships will enhance future
operations during training events and incident response (Hotwash, debriefs, SD Fire and Rescue AAR).

4.1.2       Planning Lessons Learned
4.1.2.1     Detailed Event Script Hindered Formation of Collaborative Partnerships
Description– Too much of the event was scripted, hindering creation of collaborative partnerships.
(Hotwash, some vendor AARs)
Recommendation–Detailed scripts were only used in a handful of training modules that were part of the
overall training event. The high-level scenario provided lots of opportunity for anyone wanting to
collaborate to do so. Organizations (including NGOs, vendors, and industry partners) wishing to
collaborate must identify their training objectives early and become involved in the planning process.
Recommendation 1.       Identify training objectives early.
Recommendation 2.       Become involved in the planning process.
Recommendation 3.       Promote development of scenario elements that would include your organization.
4.1.2.2     Multiple Roles and Responsibilities Impacted Span of Control at Brown Field
Description– There were very few coordinators at the Brown Field venue. The people most heavily
involved in Golden Phoenix wore too many hats, slowing high-level decision making and response time.
(Hotwash, debriefs, Alion AAR)




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Recommendation–During planning, encourage incident commanders/coordinators to use NIMS ICS as
they prepare for and conduct the event.
Recommendation 1.        Identify a lead organization or individual to coordinate activities at a specific
                         venue.
Recommendation 2.        The identified leader should implement NIMS ICS and begin identifying
                         personnel to fill the various positions as needed.
Recommendation 3.        Identify and activate personnel and assets to fill appropriate ICS positions as
                         span of control grows.
Recommendation 4.        Deactivate personnel as incident winds down.
Recommendation 5.        During the planning phases, determine what NIMS ICS positions will be
                         necessary to support the planned scope of the training event. If participating
                         organizations cannot provide the necessary personnel, consider paying for the
                         services of key qualified personnel.
4.1.2.3     Many Participants did not Understand What Was Happening during the Training Event
Description–Several participants and visitors expressed difficulty understanding what was going on
during the three-day collaborative training event. The event took place in three different venues (Brown
Field, SDSU Visualization Lab, and Yuma) with focused training modules located at six other locations
(CBP IMB, warehouse, Qualcomm Stadium, and the three hospitals). This does not take into account the
parts of the scenario that took place before the training event, the international aspect of CBP training
with Mexican counterparts, and the unofficial training that was taking place concurrently at other
locations. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs, TW Mobile AAR)
Training event planners provided a scenario timeline in a widely distributed matrix and in briefs at the
planning conferences. ICTAP turned the matrix into a bubble chart showing the daily flow of activity
across the multiple training locations. This chart also identified (when known) the communication methods
that would be used for communications.
Both tools were made available before the training event on the civmil.org collaboration site and during
the event at the various locations (combat operations center, NIUSR, Yuma operations tent, SDSU
Visualization Lab, and so on). While accurate and effective, these tools were two-dimensional and were
not easily updated once the event commenced.
As mentioned elsewhere in this report, a comprehensive and current common operational picture was not
maintained throughout the training event.
Recommendation–Collaborative training events will vary in size and scope. When the event is going to
be large or distributed over a large geographic area, identify an agency or industry partner (or partners) to
provide and maintain the common operational picture. The picture should be easily updatable from all
venues and be able to provide the picture to all participants and guests. While maintaining the picture,
you will not want to reveal sensitive techniques, tactics, or procedures (or the locations those are being
trained at).
Recommendation 1.        Develop, disseminate, and update the scenario during all phases of planning.
Recommendation 2.        Brief the scenario at planning conferences and make the scenario available in
                         narrative, matrix, and visual formats on the training event collaboration site.
Recommendation 3.        Track participant participation in briefing sessions.
Recommendation 4.        Enforce deadlines for submitting training objectives and other material necessary
                         to ensure all are kept informed.
Recommendation 5.        Identify equipment and personnel to build and maintain a common operational
                         picture.




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Recommendation 6.        Keep the picture simple and visual, but allow drilling down to get more
                         information or view activities when appropriate.
Recommendation 7.        Ensure the common operational picture can be delivered to all training event
                         participants and visitors.
4.1.2.4     Identify and Fund Dedicated Training Event Planning and Support Staff
Description–The Golden Phoenix series of collaborative training events were a result of motivated
individuals and organizations getting together to develop training that met their training objectives during
regional incident response and recovery training. All of the key organizations provided personnel to lead,
plan, and carry out the training. While some provided an individual full-time, several leaders and planners
performed other “full-time” duties in addition to their Golden Phoenix responsibilities. As the size and
scope of the collaborative training events grew, so did the responsibilities. Identifying funding and
personnel to perform leadership and planning duties is essential to the successful regional application of
collaborative training. (Observer notes, debriefs)
The funding and leadership should originate from local sources and participating agencies. At no point
should collaborative training events become a “program” requiring program managers. The Out of the
Ashes – Conducting Your Own Regional Collaborative Training Events white paper in Appendix B
provides an overview of funding options and identifies roles that should be made full-time during the
planning and execution phases of the collaborative training event.
Recommendation–Identify key planning, leadership, and support staff for collaborative training events
and incorporate funding into local and regional budgets when deemed necessary.
Recommendation 1.        Identify scope and size of collaborative training event.
Recommendation 2.        Identify agencies with key planners, leadership, and support personnel.
Recommendation 3.        Incorporate funds into those budgets if necessary.
Recommendation 4.        Avoid creating a collaborative training event program with program managers.
                         Keep control at the local or regional levels.
Recommendation 5.        Identify funds or funding sources.
Recommendation 6.        If deemed large enough, create a full-time staff to plan, record, and facilitate
                         collaborative training events.
4.1.2.5     Consider and Budget for Overtime Funding
Description–Collaborative training events provide realistic training in a no fault environment that builds
significant interpersonal relationships essential to improved incident response and recovery. Training
often requires first responders working outside of their normal working hours, which in turn requires
overtime. In some cases, overtime budgets will not allow for significant participation of first responders in
the training. (hotwash, debriefs)
Recommendation–Consider local or regional ramifications of paying overtime (not all participating
agencies have the funds to do so and many participants are funding themselves). Where deemed
appropriate, incorporate overtime funding to support first responder participation in collaborative training
events like Golden Phoenix.
4.1.2.6     Encourage Local Government and Tribal Authorities to Develop and Improve
            Relationships, while Honoring Proper Chains of Command
Description–Communications (cell phone during the event and telephone, email, and fax during planning
phases) between GP08 facilitators, planners, tribal governments, incident commanders, and Bureau of
Indian Affairs were successful. The tribal agencies also completed a successful scenario, working with
NIUSR (incident command) and other organizations to deliver a box of scenario related medications to
the Rincon Fire Department for further delivery to a tribal health clinic. (Debriefs, Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) AAR)




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Recommendation–Include the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern California Agency and tribal
government agencies in emergency planning (training or real events) so public safety resources, training,
and personnel can be used during incident response.
Recommendation 1.        Coordinate with the BIA, Southern California Agency to begin building
                         relationships with local and regional tribal public safety agencies.
Recommendation 2.        Where relationships already exist, mutual aid agreements or shared procedures
                         are already established, encourage participation in all phases of collaborative
                         training events.
Recommendation 3.        Educate and inform appropriate personnel of the proper local and regional chains
                         of command for engaging tribal governments in regional incident response and
                         recovery planning.
4.1.2.7     Delayed or Late Involvement and Failure to Meet Deadlines Hindered Participation

Description–Several organizations and vendors waited until deadlines expired to commit to and prepare
for participation in GP08, making it difficult for all concerned to take advantage of opportunities to
integrate or experiment with vendor and non-vendor systems and technologies. (Observer notes,
hotwash, debrief, vendor AARs).

Several vendors expressed frustration at not being able to integrate or implement various technologies.
They also realized it was due to their late arrival in the planning process.

Event organizers were clear from the beginning about expectations from all (including NGOs and
vendors) participants. All participating organizations were expected to develop and submit training
objectives in addition to requested administrative information. The requests for these were posted on the
training event collaboration site (civmil.org) and potential participants were constantly and consistently
pointed to civmil.org for the latest information. In spite of clear deadlines and requests for information,
many participants refused to provide the information or provided it late and in varying formats, increasing
the support staff workload.

Recommendation–Collaborative training event planners need to reach out early (before the initial
planning conference) to invite appropriate public safety, industry partners, NGOs, and vendors to
participate. In addition to reaching out, they need to consider the following recommendations:
Recommendation 1.        Identify what is necessary to participate (training objectives, commitment to
                         attending the planning conferences, planning support, commitment to working
                         within the scenario, and so on).
Recommendation 2.        Provide a preliminary scenario and schedule of events during the initial planning
                         conference.
Recommendation 3.        Establish communications and planning committees before the initial planning
                         conference and invite people to participate in all of those meetings.
Recommendation 4.        Provide training objectives and make a commitment to helping others meet their
                         training objectives.
Recommendation 5.        Set realistic deadlines, and enforce them.
Recommendation 6.        Define information or data collection sets early, and request the information once,
                         use it as needed, and make it easy for participants to update.
Recommendation 7.        Leave the “trade show mentality” at home, work with competitors and potential
                         customers to resolve issues, not sell product or services.




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4.1.2.8     Key Participants must Emphasize the Use and Evaluation of Interoperable
            Communications during the Planning Phases of the Training Event
Description–GP08 had several training modules and venues. All of them provided great opportunities to
incorporate and exercise interoperable communications. Out of the numerous opportunities, only two or
three were used. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs, AAR submissions)
The various venues and training modules allowed participants to meet training or experiment objectives.
While accomplishing these objectives, participants routinely used a variety of radios. The closest anyone
came to interoperable communications via radio was on Day 1 when communications between CBP and
the MAG-46 helo were planned, but the radio in the CH-46 did not work or was on the wrong channel. On
Day 3 at the hospitals, when military, law enforcement, medical personnel, and hospital security
personnel had to communicate with each other, radios were everywhere. Some vendors were invited to
play. Not one agency set up a gateway or identified and used shared channels.
Debriefs of police personnel indicated the shared channels were available, and hospital security
personnel could have interoperated (with hospital radios or cache radios was not made clear) with the
police department.
Radios, like cell phones, are ubiquitous communication devices. They enable communications, a critical
support function. Since they provide support, they can easily be integrated into the various training
objectives!
Recommendation–The key collaborative training event participants must plan for and insist on
interoperable communications from the earliest possible phases of a collaborative training event. Treat
interoperable communications as a critical support function.
Recommendation 1.       Create a communications planning cell tasked to identify viable interoperable
                        communications opportunities to support accomplishment of training objectives.
Recommendation 2.       Plan on using shared channels, cache radios, or gateways throughout the
                        collaborative training event.
Recommendation 3.       Use the ISC205 and COML to plan for, activate, maintain, and deactivate
                        interoperable communications.
Recommendation 4.       Distribute procedures to all participants.
Recommendation 5.       If vendors plan on bringing interoperable communication systems, make them
                        play for real, not perform demonstrations on Family Radio Service (FRS) or
                        general radio service (GRS) handhelds. Make them deal with real field
                        conditions, with their systems and procedures exercised by COMLs, not a
                        marketing representative.
Recommendation 6.       Take away all cell phone communications for at least one day.
Recommendation 7.       Invite cellular providers to establish set up portable systems during that day for
                        use during the remainder of the training event.
Recommendation 8.       Provide a robust schedule for communications personnel to meet prior to
                        planning conferences to identify and resolve interoperable communications
                        support issues prior to the planning conferences and the training event.

4.2       Use Open Source Content Management System to Inform and
          Update Participants
Used an open source content management system (Drupal) to develop and host www.civmil.org for
training event collaboration, discussion, and information dissemination. The civmil.org site provided users
the opportunity to choose how they would be informed, the information necessary to prepare for
participation, and locations (maps) of all events. To quote an observer, “Observers or others unfamiliar
with a typical drill or exercise were given a voice and a means to communicate at open meetings and/or a



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web group site for this purpose at civmil.org.” The cost of deployment is limited to the cost of an ISP, the
bandwidth necessary to host it, and the time it took the site developer to create and update the site.
Registered users (over 550), participants, and the developer did not have to pay for the software or
licenses.

While most reviews of civmil.org were positive, some found it difficult to access and use. Simplicity has to
be incorporated in all types of communication systems and into the operator training developed for those
systems.

4.3       Field Training Best Practices and Lessons Learned
Field training includes the operations oriented organizations, agencies, and activities traditionally
associated with first response. In this AAR, these include law enforcement, fire departments, hazardous
materials response, public health, National Guard, and military units, commands, and agencies. The best
practices and lessons learned are organized by venue or activity where the various training activities took
place. Best practices and lessons learned for support oriented agencies, vendors, and activities are
contained in section 4.4.

4.3.1       Day 1: Customs and Border Protection–Imperial Beach Station—Best
            Practices
4.3.1.1     CBP, DEA, and FBI Personnel Worked and Communicated Well with Each Other
Description–During the suspect interrogation part of the scenario at the CBP IMB station, several federal
law enforcement agencies and personnel worked very well together. Once CBP agents discovered the
“methamphetamine like” substance, they coordinated with the DEA. CBP and DEA agreed to team one
agent from each agency for the interrogation. Observers were amazed at how well the two agents worked
together, shared information, and worked as a team. It seemed as if the two individuals had been working
together for years. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs)
The shift supervisor asked for help when necessary, and shared information easily and effectively with
the other responding agencies. As command of the incident moved eventually to the FBI, their
communications with other agencies went well too.
4.3.1.2     DEA Developed SOPs to Address Critical Process Failure Discovered During This
            Module
Description–The scenario, discovering a substance originally suspected of being drugs do not test
positive, revealed a possible gap. The DEA immediately identified and developed a standard operating
procedure (SOP) for agents responding to CBP call-outs that identified the actions their agents should
take when they encounter substances that do not test positive for drugs, but could be possible chemical
or biological agents. (Debriefs, DEA AAR)
4.3.1.3     Planning, Preparation, and Troubleshooting Facilitate Interoperable Communications
Description–CBP Border Patrol, Search, Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) conducted system tests and
training a few weeks before commencement of training event activities. During the course of routine
operations, they also identified strategic locations that allow them to effectively deploy their interoperable
communications vehicle in areas that provide the best tactical support to operations. (Observer notes,
debriefs)
The system tests, training, and preparation paid off. The original BORSTAR gateway could not patch
military and other installed radios. A gateway that would support the BORSTAR operational requirements,
including establishment of patches to military radios, was obtained, configured, and tested. Operators
received training.




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On Day 1, the vehicle deployed early to one of the strategic locations to provide interoperable
communications between the CBP headquarters in Chula Vista, CBP IMB, Brown Field, and the aircraft
tracking down and transporting the suspects from eastern Otay Mesa. Operators set up on the planned
channel, and when that channel did not work; established communications on a backup channel. When
communications with the United States Marine Corps (USMC) aircraft could not be established, the
system operator worked through several troubleshooting steps (use another channel, verify power and
transmission specifications, try different antennas, and so on).

4.3.2       Day 1: Customs and Border Protection–Imperial Beach Station—
            Lessons Learned
4.3.2.1     Lack of In-Building Cell Phone and Radio Coverage at the CBP Imperial Beach Station
Description–As the scenario at CBP IMB played out, incident command was passed to the DEA, then to
the FBI. Throughout this timeframe, DEA agents and CBP personnel could not contact people outside the
facility (in the parking lot or at other locations) using radios or cell phones. Communications to the
incident command post had to be delivered by runners, or individuals had to walk outside. While obtaining
background information on the suspects, names spelled phonetically over handheld radios was a slow
and difficult process. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs)
Recommendation–Identify and install the necessary system(s) to provide in-building RF coverage for
radios and cell phones.
Recommendation 1.       Conduct an RF survey of the building and property.
Recommendation 2.       Identify equipment and systems (in-building RF amplifiers, leaky coax, and so on)
                        necessary to provide effective radio and cellular communications in the building
                        and areas surrounding it.
Recommendation 3.       Identify interoperable communications system for use in or near the CBP IMB
                        and other structures needing temporary in-building communications support.
Recommendation 4.       Consider use of other communication technologies that are available in the
                        building (fax machines, phones, networked computers with instant messaging or
                        email, and so on).
4.3.2.2      Radio Operators/Users were not on the Same Frequency
Description–Some radio operators (pilots, law enforcement, communications personnel) were using
incorrect frequencies or channels during this training module. (Observer notes, debriefs)
Recommendation–Prepare the Communications Plan (ICS205) before the Final Planning Conference for
review and familiarization. Update and distribute as needed during the event.
4.3.2.3     Number of Observers and Observer Behavior Interfered with Training
Description–The number and behavior of observers at CBP IMB was disruptive and interfered with
training and communications. Many personnel were introducing themselves and others to other observers
and participants, during training event play. Several agents and officers from different organizations could
not hear communications over the noise. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs)
Recommendation–Find ways to limit the number of observers in the immediate vicinity of training event
activities. The only observers allowed in should be those with the task of capturing what happens so
others can determine what worked and what needs to be fixed. Vendors, very important persons (VIP),
and similar observers should be located in an area where they cannot interfere with training.
Recommendation 1.       Organize and mandate short (15 minutes or less) training for new observers,
                        vendors, and VIPs to attend prior to the training event.
Recommendation 2.       Brief behavior expectations before commencement of exercise.
Recommendation 3.       Kick out observers that become a distraction.




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Recommendation 4.       Set up an observation site showing closed circuit television coverage of the
                        training activity.
Recommendation 5.       Obtain earpieces for use by personnel using handheld radios.
4.3.2.4     Observers Gave Away Portions of the Training Scenario
Description–Observers were given the scenario several weeks before the training event without being
told by planners that the players had not been briefed about the scenario or training event. During the
course of the event, observers often asked questions that either puzzled the player (who did not know
what was coming) or gave the action or event away. (Observer notes, debrief)
Recommendation–Planners should ensure observers, evaluators, and controllers know what is going to
happen and how much the players know about the training event.
Recommendation 1.       Clearly define observer roles (if you do not want them asking questions, say so).
Recommendation 2.       Keep everyone informed.
4.3.2.5     Except for Face-to-Face Communications, Interoperable Communications were
            Seldom Seen
Description–There was a lack of interoperable communications using shared channels/talkgroups, cache
radios, or gateways. Agencies communicated with their personnel on their system. They communicated
face-to-face with personnel from other agencies inside and outside the building. (Observer notes,
debriefs)
Recommendation–While face-to-face communications are viable interoperable communications, training
event participants should plan for interoperable communications using cache radios, shared
channels/talkgroups, or gateways. Training event planners should ensure interoperable communications
are incorporated into every training module and every training event.
Recommendation 1.       Ensure there is a strong communications planning committee.
Recommendation 2.       Communications Committee should work with the Planning Committee to ensure
                        every training objective has an observable and measurable interoperable
                        communications component built into it.
Recommendation 3.       Identify training event and training module COML to create and update incident
                        communication plans for each training location.

4.3.3       Day 1: MCAS Miramar—Best Practices
4.3.3.1     CST Planning and Preparation Ensure Successful and Reliable Intra Agency
            Communications
Description–National Guard CST was available at this venue to decontaminate the Marine helicopter
and personnel that could have been exposed to the substance being transported by the suspects. Their
extensive planning, preparation, and training prior to deployment was evident as their
observer/controller/trainers met with the rest of the CST. They discussed proper set up of the scenario
and briefed all teams before training began. The CST used LTS-2000 handhelds as a back-up comm.
Decontamination teams communicated with each other and their base camp while working in personnel
protective equipment. (Observer notes, debrief)

4.3.4       Day 1: MCAS Miramar—Lessons Learned
4.3.4.1     Lack of Assigned Frequencies and Gateways Limit Interoperable Communications
Description–Lack of identified frequencies and gateways prevented establishment of interoperable
communications with other units. (Observer, debrief)




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Recommendation–Perform communications planning before commencement of the training event.
Recommendation 1.        Identify COML or communications officers to develop and publish incident
                         communications plan (ICS205).
Recommendation 2.        Establish Communications Committee to identify and assign frequencies,
                         channels, or talkgroups before the Final Planning Conference.
Recommendation 3.        Identify necessary personnel and equipment to support interoperable
                         communications for each training event site and module.

4.3.5       Day 2: Qualcomm Stadium and Warehouse—Best Practices
Outstanding hostage rescue and terrorist interdiction training was held at these venues. However, the
only interoperable communications between agencies were conducted face-to-face. Assault teams at the
warehouse were dispatched with hand signals. The participating agencies used their own dispatchers and
communication systems. They did not establish interoperable communications. (Observer notes)

4.3.6       Day 2: Qualcomm Stadium and Warehouse—Lessons Learned
4.3.6.1     Interoperable Communications Using Radios Were Not Established
Description–The various participants did not establish interoperable radio communications with each
other at either location. The assault teams used their own systems, face-to-face communications, or hand
signals to communicate. (Observer notes, debriefs)
Though the scenario for these training modules did not require interoperable communications, it was
apparent all concerned could have benefitted from their establishment and use. In the warehouse
module, law enforcement personnel could have communicated with personnel from local, state, and
federal public safety personnel outside the facility. At the stadium training module, the vehicles following
the terrorist vehicle could have communicated with the local and the federal assault teams.
The lack of interoperability did prompt local law enforcement to obtain an ACU1000 gateway to facilitate
quick establishment of interoperable communications during future incidents.
Recommendation–Plan interoperable communications into every training event and module.
Recommendation 1.        Consider common local or regional scenarios that would require quick
                         establishment of interoperable communications.
Recommendation 2.        Use these incident scenarios to refine interoperable communications training
                         objectives.
Recommendation 3.        Incorporate these training objectives into training event plans.
Recommendation 4.        Establish communications committee and planning committee early in the
                         training event planning process.
Recommendation 5.        Publish the communications plan before the Final Planning Conference.

4.3.7       Day 3: Hospitals—Best Practices
4.3.7.1     Hospitals Worked With Law Enforcement to Secure, Transport, and Return Controlled
            Drugs
Description–Previous real incidents had identified the securing, transport, and control of medical
narcotics as an issue that needed addressing. GP08 provided local hospitals, public health, and law
enforcement the opportunity to develop and evaluate procedures to address this issue. Personnel at a
local hospital secured and packaged their drugs, notifying law enforcement the drugs were ready for
transport. Hospital security personnel turned the shipment over to law enforcement, which transported
them by helicopter to another hospital. The hospital took shipment of the drugs, performed an inventory,



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and then prepared the drugs for return shipment to the original hospital in accordance with the scenario.
This time, the shipment went in a law enforcement vehicle. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs, hospital
and law enforcement AARs)
A variety of hospital employees (pharmacy and security personnel from two different hospitals) and local
and federal law enforcement agencies secured, transported, inventoried, and returned the drugs.
4.3.7.2     Local Hospital Security had a Seat in the San Diego Police Department Command
            Vehicle
Description–A local hospital had a member of their security team seated in the SDPD command vehicle.
When queried, the individual indicated that this was a regular thing for mass casualty drills and incident
response. The individual had a radio for communications with hospital incident command and could listen
in to the various police department communications. The individual coordinated with law enforcement
personnel in the vehicle and did not appear to have access to police communications. (Observer notes,
debrief)
While clearly a best practice, interoperable communications could be established by using the various
mutual aid channels or talkgroups set up on the police communications system. Interoperable
communications could be enhanced by using a gateway that would allow hospital radios to operate on the
law enforcement system.

4.3.8       Day 3: Hospitals—Lessons Learned
4.3.8.1     Hospital Security Staff Communications were not Connected to Law Enforcement
Description–Some of the participating hospitals’ security personnel did not have procedures or
equipment in place allow establishment of communications with law enforcement deployed to the site.
(Observer notes, debriefs, UCSD Medical Center and law enforcement AARs)
GP08 had three hospitals involved in the Day 3 training module. While this lesson learned is valid, at least
one of the hospitals “…had a seat reserved for them…” in an SDPD command vehicle. During the early
parts of the training module, this seat was empty, but the incident commander and hospital security forces
ensured the seat was filled. This seldom observed level of access and cooperation is identified as a best
practice above.
Recommendation–Hospital and local law enforcement personnel should coordinate with each other to
identify interoperable communication assets (shared channel/talkgroups, gateways, cache radios) they
can develop simple procedures for establishing interoperable communications.
Recommendation 1.       Identify interoperable communication assets.
Recommendation 2.       Identify viable interoperable communication methods to connect hospital
                        response personnel to appropriate public safety personnel.
Recommendation 3.       Develop easy to use procedures.
Recommendation 4.       Provide training on procedure implementation and equipment operation.
Recommendation 5.       Incorporate where possible into daily operations.
4.3.8.2     Lack of Plain Language May Interfere with Effective Interagency Communications
Description–During incident communications at one of the hospital sites, law enforcement personnel and
dispatch were heard using 10 Codes. (Observer notes, debriefs)
While plain language is essential for successful interoperable communications, they are used in regular
operations, providing some efficiency. Until agencies stop using 10 codes on a regular basis and teaching
them in the various law enforcement academies, it will be difficult to change this. Since one local
academy provides many of the new police officers for regional law enforcement, most of the 10 codes are
the same.



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Recommendation–Use of 10 codes is a result of institutional decisions made long ago. During high
stress situations, most first responders revert to what they first learned in school or on the job. For
incident response requiring multiple or outside agencies, work on use of plain language.
Recommendation 1.        Limit or discontinue teaching of 10 codes in police academies.
Recommendation 2.        Encourage use of plain language, especially during incident response.
4.3.8.3     Well-Intentioned Communications Still Cause Confusion
Description–Training event staff passed out flyers informing people arriving at the hospitals about the
training module activities. The driver of an ambulance that was not part of the training event received the
flyer. He was confused about the priority or importance of the event and did not continue on to the
hospital. The patient being transported had to wait 15 extra minutes to be transferred. (Observer notes,
debrief)
Recommendation–There needs to be need-to-know brief of non-participating hospital personnel prior to
the event to ensure everyone knows the priority of the event in relation to their actual jobs and roles in the
day to day hospital activities.

4.3.9       Day 3: Emergency Operations Center—Best Practices
4.3.9.1     Streaming Video Feeds Provide EOC Awareness of Activity at Hospitals
Description–Streaming video feeds from the three hospitals were being displayed at the County
emergency operations center (EOC), providing visual situational awareness of activity at the three
hospitals. (Observer notes, debriefs)

4.3.10      Day 3: Emergency Operations Center—Lessons Learned
4.3.10.1    Script Development During the Training Module Hindered EOC Communications and
            Training
Description–County EOC leadership were using a piece of paper to script scenario activity, diminishing
the impact on EOC role players. EOC role players did not have the opportunity to implement procedures,
skills, knowledge in response to real or notional activity. (Observer notes)
Recommendation–Develop the script before the training event/training module, and modify if needed for
the actual activity. Provide EOC role players the opportunity to make mistakes during the course of
dealing with the various situations that develop from the training evolution.
Recommendation 1.        Develop script before the event.
Recommendation 2.        Share entire script only with observers, evaluators, or controllers when
                         necessary.
Recommendation 3.        Provide EOC personnel the opportunity to work within the framework of the
                         scenario.
Recommendation 4.        Use controllers to regulate and encourage EOC event play when remote training
                         modules (hospitals in case of GP08) move to fast, too slow, or fail to provide a
                         critical input.

4.4       UAS Communications Experiment and Training Activities in
          Yuma
4.4.1       UAS Operations

Vendors and agencies were invited to bring or authorize the use of their UAS and ground stations in
R2301W, a restricted airspace south of Yuma, Arizona. The Global Hawk provided imagery from 50 to 60


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thousand feet; the CBP Predator flew from restricted air space in vicinity of Fort Huachuca to R2301W
near Yuma and provided coverage from 18 to 19 thousand feet. Vendors flew event driven missions using
a variety of small and handheld UAS (Desert Hawk III, RP Flight Systems, Aerostat, etc.). The UAS
provided imagery to the ground stations in an effort to identify methods and processes required to
communicate the data and information to the end user in a timely manner.

4.4.2       Airspace Acquisition and Use

Major Fernandez coordinated the use of the R2301W (Aux II) restricted airspace to support GP08.
Planning for obtaining and using the airspace, and the territory under it, took up to nine months. Aux II is
located near an international airport. Great care was taken to ensure UAS and other frequencies did not
interfere with their operations. A Marine Mobile Air Traffic Control Team (MMT) was used to support
operations of small UAS in vicinity of piloted aircraft (UH-1 and AH-1) during experiments involving using
a UAS to locate, track, and support the interdiction of moving targets. Using an MMT or equivalent public
safety unit when operating UAS in vicinity of manned aircraft was identified as a best practice.

Use of the restricted airspace also involved extensive coordination with the several agencies that have
jurisdiction for the territory under the airspace. Best practices and lessons learned are outlined below.

4.4.2.1     CBP AMOC Planned and Coordinated First UAS Flight Between Restricted Areas
Description–CBP Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) planned, coordinated, and conducted a
flight of a Predator UAS from one restricted operations area to R2301W, the area where the GP08 UAS
experiments were conducted. The mission was a success, providing valuable imagery which was sent to
the ground station at R2301W (Yuma) for processing and transmission by internet to the notional EOC at
the SDSU Visualization Lab. The mission lasted three hours. (Observer notes, debriefs, CBP AMOC
AAR)
4.4.2.2     GP08 Validated Use of UAS for Imagery Support for Incident Response and Recovery
Description–Response and recovery efforts associated with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have shown the
benefits of dedicated airborne communications and surveillance (UAS or satellite) systems. These
capabilities are unparalleled for coordinating and de-conflicting air and ground based assets and
personnel. GP08 UAS experiments and DSCA training helped everyone participating identify how to
request and manage UAS support or products, how to successfully operate UAS in dynamic air
operations environments, process data, and deliver the data to the end user in near real-time. (Observer
notes, debriefs CBP AMOC AAR)

4.4.3       Preparing for Communications
4.4.3.1     Communications Support for Delivering the Large Volume of Data and Information
            from Ground Stations to the End User (Emergency Operations Centers, Command
            Centers, and Operators in the Field)

GP08 operations in Yuma and at the SDSU Visualization lab identified methods, processes, and
procedures to deliver imagery from UAS ground stations in austere environments to the end user via the
internet. Two paths (satellite communications (SATCOM) and Cellular) were identified and evaluated. The
communications support team and industry participants identified processes to filter and prioritize
information before it was placed in the communications pipeline. The processes were used to support
imagery delivery from Global Hawk, Predator, Desert Hawk III, and a variety of small UAS platforms.




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4.4.3.2     Best Practices for Establishing and Controlling Data Communications Environment

Due to the tight operating schedule and proximity to an international airport, UAS and communication
frequencies were identified before the training event and monitored during the event. Members of the
communications team used a spectrum analyzer to identify all frequencies in use at the experiment site,
including the wireless local area network systems. Systems causing interference were shut down or
switched to alternate frequencies. None of the various systems interfered with operations outside the
immediate area of the Aux II camp.

4.4.4       Yuma—UAS Operations—Best Practices
4.4.4.1     Marine Mobile Air Traffic Control Team Essential for Successful Operation of UAS in
            Vicinity of Manned Aircraft
Description–USMC deployed a Marine Mobile Air Traffic Control Team (MMT) to Yuma to provide
forward air control (FAC) to manned and unmanned air operations during the GP08 training event. The
MMT provided visual air traffic control of manned and unmanned flight operations. The MMT was critical
to the successful operation of small unmanned aerial systems in support of manned air operations. The
MMT established and maintained communications with manned aircraft and person-to-person
communications with UAS operators. Pilots and operators were kept informed of activities affecting or
potentially interfering with safety of flight. The MMT terminated UAS operations if small UAS activities or
the communications situation posed a threat to safety of flight. (Observer notes, debriefs, hotwash, RP
Flight Systems AAR, HSSTT AAR, Desert Hawk III AAR)
4.4.4.2     Yuma Training Module Provided Outstanding Opportunity for Industry, Military, and
            Civilian Law Enforcement to Work Together
Description–The AUX II Air Operations area near Yuma provided an ideal, if austere (temperatures over
105 degrees during the day, dust, sand, limited communications, and so on), operating environment for
all to evaluate their various air and ground systems and procedures, while meeting a host of training
objectives. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs, RP Flight Systems AAR, Desert Hawk III AAR)
Industry competitors met and worked towards the common goal of identifying methods and procedures to
send large amounts of imagery via from remote ground stations over small communication pipelines to an
end user. This goal was achieved while providing the various companies an opportunity to fly their UAS in
the desert, operate support systems in the desert, and practice target acquisition, tracking, and
identification in an environment hostile to such activities.
The thorough planning and preparation for operations at the Yuma location enabled the planning and
performance of industry and military flight scenarios without incident, all with easy and effective
coordination by all concerned.
The preparation and planning supported and accommodated the creation of additional flight scenarios
that supported CBP and USMC operations. Federal (USMC and CBP) agencies provided real targets for
industry teams to track with their UAS. The benefit to all involved is invaluable.

4.4.5       Yuma—UAS Operations—Lessons Learned
4.4.5.1     MMT Capabilities are Essential to Manned and Unmanned Flight Operations in Same
            Airspace
Description– Marine Mobile Air Traffic Control Teams have the capability and experience to monitor and
control airspace containing manned and unmanned aerial systems and have the capability to ensure the
necessary aircraft separation is maintained. (Debriefs, HSSTT AAR, RP Flight Systems AAR)
Recommendation–Not all incident response or recovery scenarios require the use of small unmanned
aerial systems (SUAS). However, some incidents could easily benefit from the operation of SUAS that
may occur near manned aircraft operations. Identify the actions necessary to obtain MMT or FAC types of
air traffic control during incident response and recovery.


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Recommendation 1.        Identify situations where MMT capabilities could viably support SUAS and
                         manned aircraft operations.
Recommendation 2.        Develop or update procedures for requesting and providing MMT support.
Recommendation 3.        Investigate feasibility of obtaining MMT training for NIMS ICS Air Operations
                         personnel.
Recommendation 4.        Identify and develop updates to NIMS ICS Air Operations procedures as needed
                         to support SUAS operations in vicinity of manned air operations.
4.4.5.2     Current NIMS Structure for Flight Operations Oversight is Insufficient and Not All
            Inclusive
Description–NIMS structure for oversight of flight operations does not take into account the likely use of
UAS or small UAS during future incident response and recovery. (RP Flight Systems AAR, Dessert Hawk
III AAR) Vendors and industry partners have developed several UAS that now provide a number of
capabilities that could easily be incorporated into incident response and recovery.
Recommendation–Investigate, update, and incorporate UAS procedures into NIMS ICS architecture.
Recommendation 1.        Incorporate UAS flight rules and regulations into existing fixed wing procedures
                         and protocols.
Recommendation 2.        Create a substructure or category for unmanned aerial systems; providing control
                         and monitor functions by a single entity.
4.4.5.3     Small UAS Long Range Target Identification is Difficult
Description–Several vendors operated small UAS at the Yuma site. All had some difficulty locating small
or moving targets in the desert. When small vehicles left the roads target location and identification was
made more difficult. (Observer notes, hotwash, debrief, Desert Hawk III AAR, HSSTT AAR)
Recommendation–UAS operators developed proficiency identifying and following known landmarks
(hills, roads, and so on) that helped them identify targets on roads or near features. Provide operator
training for target identification and consider the following:
Recommendation 1.        Use large UAS to locate targets and turn them over to small UAS.
Recommendation 2.        Incorporate motion detection algorithms into the UAS or initial processing at the
                         ground station.
Recommendation 3.        Develop motion detection algorithms or systems that cue the operator or a
                         refined target location system.
4.4.5.4     Most Federal (DoD and Non-DoD) UAS Operations in U.S. Airspace Are Limited
Description–Due to privacy laws and regulations governing DoD support to civil authorities, federal UAS
assets do not perform very much information gathering while flying over the United States or its territories.
(Hotwash, debriefs, HSSTT AAR)
Recommendation–Identify federal, state, and regional UAS capabilities that could be used to support
incident response or recovery. Research the laws governing their use to identify the procedures and
steps that are necessary to obtain the desired UAS support, thereby minimizing reaction time during
disaster response or recovery.
Recommendation 1.        Identify UAS capabilities that support various incident response and recovery
                         functions.
Recommendation 2.        Review relevant federal, state, and regional laws regarding use of federal (or
                         state, regional, and private) reconnaissance systems to support incident
                         response and recovery.
Recommendation 3.        Recommend appropriate legislation, if necessary.



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Recommendation 4.        Develop and publish procedures for obtaining the desired UAS support.

4.4.6       Yuma—Information Transfer Methods and Processes—Best Practices
4.4.6.1     SATCOM and Cell Phone Links Used to Deliver Declassified and Unclassified Imagery
            from Ground Stations to End Users
Description–SDSU visualization lab communications personnel used a limited number of communication
links (two SATCOM and one cell phone) and bandwidth to deliver declassified and unclassified imagery
near real time from a variety of UAS ground stations located near Yuma, Arizona, to end users in San
Diego. A feed from the visualization lab was used to verify receipt and measure delivery and delay times.
Three computers were used to process, deliver, and monitor delivery of the UAS imagery files. Two of the
computers managed communication links and incoming or outgoing imagery streams/files while the third
provided text communications with end users receiving the various output. (Observer notes, hotwash,
debriefs, and SDSU AAR)
4.4.6.2     Training Used to Support Hurricane Dolly Response
Description–GP08 training event involved deployment of CBP BORSTAR communications van from
Texas to Yuma to support training objectives. The van and associated equipment was delivered using a
Marine Reserve C-130. The flights were prepared and planned as part of the training event. After
deployment to Yuma, the BORSTAR communications van was tasked to provide communications support
in support of Hurricane Dolly. Using scheduled air assets and experienced gained during event planning
and training evolutions, the van was loaded into the aircraft and relocated to Corpus Christi, Texas
without any delay. (Observer notes, hotwash, debrief, and CBP AAR)
4.4.6.3     Yuma Command Center Maintained Situational Awareness with Video Feed from
            Notional EOC at SDSU Visualization Lab
Description–Yuma players saw all events and the Yuma feed at the Visualization Lab in real time. They
controlled a camera in the lab, rotating it 360 degrees to observe activity in the Visualization Lab and to
ensure Yuma feeds were making it to SDSU. (Observer notes)
4.4.6.4     Industry Partners Gathered and Distributed UAS Imagery Using USTREAM TV, an
            Open Source Internet Site
Description–Multiple industry partners were able to cooperatively gather, collect, and distribute UAS
imagery, using an open source internet site (USTREAM TV) to distribute imagery to end users (located at
the SDSU Visualization Lab and Brown Field). The operations center in Yuma monitored the live UAS
feed, the feed the Visualization Lab received from Yuma, and the feed returning from the Visualization
Lab. Throughout the experiment, the end user (SDSU Visualization Lab) experienced an approximate
three to four second delay. (Observer notes, debriefs)

4.4.7       Yuma—Information Transfer Methods and Processes—Lessons Learned
4.4.7.1     Predator Ground Station Can Output Imagery for Delivery via the Internet
Description–Ground station operators and SDSU communications personnel reviewed the relevant
manuals and connected the Predator ground station output to the processing system developed by
SDSU. Operators at the Visualization Lab (notional EOC) and at Brown Field could view streaming video
from the Predator. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs, CBP AAR)
Recommendation–Identify and publish specifications and operating procedures for equipment SDSU
connected to Predator (and other UAS) ground station for imagery processing and dissemination.
Recommendation 1.        Identify equipment and applications necessary to process information (imagery)
                         from various UAS ground stations.
Recommendation 2.        Publish procedures for obtaining and configuring the various applications and
                         equipment.



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Recommendation 3.        Develop procedures for requesting support from DHS CBP UAS assets and
                         provide to local and regional first responders.
Recommendation 4.        Train all UAS operators on these procedures.
Recommendation 5.        Include procedures and training in COML or appropriate NIMS ICS training
                         programs.
4.4.7.2     Limited Satellite Bandwidth Poses Challenge to Delivery of UAS Information from
            Ground Stations to End Users
Description–Limited satellite communications bandwidth slowed delivery of imagery from the GP08
Yuma site to various end users. (Observers, hotwash, debriefs, Desert Hawk III AAR) The experimental
nature of this portion of GP08 was focused on identifying methods, procedures, and technology to
declassify large amounts of imagery (information and data) and transmit it to the end user, a notional
emergency operations center established in the SDSU visualization lab. Event and site planners worked
closely with vendors to identify experiments and flight times at the AUX II restricted air operations site
near Yuma, Arizona.
While bandwidth was limited, the vendor was trying to send information from the ground station to several
(two or more) end users, creating congestion for the vendor. During the Yuma experiment, operators also
lost part of their satellite bandwidth due to real world activity (Hurricane Dolly). Communication bandwidth
of all types will be limited during disaster response and recovery operations. Vendors, industry partners,
and NGOs must prepare to operate in less than optimal circumstances and configurations for some time
during disaster response and recovery.
Recommendation–Consumers and providers of imagery and other large data or information files must
prepare for limited bandwidth during disaster response and recovery.
Recommendation 1.        Identify multiple communication paths (satellite, cell phone, and so on)
                         communication paths for data and information transfer.
Recommendation 2.        Identify or develop one or more remote web sites (public, private, or vendor) for
                         hosting imagery (push once, pull many) during incident response prior to a
                         training event or incident. The site should facilitate the following:
                         a. Provide a single destination from multiple ground stations or information
                            sources.
                         b. Allow several end users (emergency operations centers and front line
                            consumers) to pull (streaming video, area imagery files, and tasked imagery
                            requests) data and information from the site.
                         c.   Provide low bandwidth notification to end users of information availability
                         d. Enable automated backup (that does not interfere with end user consumption
                            at the disaster site) to one or more similar sites.
Recommendation 3.        Tailor imagery request forms and procedures to ensure the request is done right
                         the first time.
Recommendation 4.        Identify and deliver the imagery resolution, file size, and delivery timeframe that
                         meet the needs of the end user.

4.5       Public Safety and Military Air Operations
CBP Air and Marine Operation Center (AMOC) used a variety of tracking (air radar, ground radar, and
satellite) methods to monitor progress of air assets supporting CBP operations. One aircraft without a
satellite tracker could not be monitored when it was surrounded by high terrain. Identify and provide or
deploy satellite tracking systems on military aircraft supporting CBP missions.



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Communications and IFF channel assignments should be coordinated early and verified prior to
commencement of military air operations supporting civilian missions.

4.6       Support Oriented Agencies, Vendors, and Activities
While every incident response often begins with operations, the support functions (logistics,
communications, planning, finance, and so on) are essential to a successful response and recovery. The
Golden Phoenix collaborative training events invite vendors, non-governmental organizations, and others
with ideas and solutions for helping regions respond to and recover from disasters to participate. In an
effort to provide important information to readers of this AAR, this section is organized into problem
statements and related solution sets or capability best practices and/or lessons learned. The organization
should help readers identify, consider, address, and resolve similar problems in their regions.

4.6.1       Tribal Government Involvement—Best Practices
4.6.1.1     Identify Primary and Secondary Points of Contact
Description–The Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern California Region, identified an individual to
participate in the various planning conferences and other activity associated with Golden Phoenix
participation. Two points of contact would have allowed coverage of multiple events while providing the
primary point of contact with a backup. (BIA AAR)

4.6.2       Tribal Government Involvement—Lessons Learned
4.6.2.1     Tribal Governments have Trained and Certified First Responders, but may not have
            Mutual Aid Agreements with Local and Regional Agencies
Description–Contact tribes early so they can participate at same level as local, regional, and state
agencies. (BIA AAR)
Recommendation–Involve tribal governments in collaborative training events early in the planning
process. Tribes have trained and certified first responders available to help in disaster situations.

4.6.3       Air-to-Ground and Ground-to-Air Communications—Best Practices
None identified

4.6.4       Air-to-Ground and Ground-to-Air Communications—Lessons Learned
4.6.4.1     Communications with Military Aircraft (from Military and Non-Military Sources) were
            Difficult to Establish
Description–Communications with military helicopters were difficult to establish. The reasons were
varied, ranging from equipment malfunction to operation on incorrect channels. Good trouble shooting
steps were taken, leading to resolution of some, but not all communication issues. (Observer notes
debriefs)
Recommendation–Communications are essential to supporting and working with various agencies.
Recommendation 1.        Review and improve communication procedures.
Recommendation 2.        Test and establish communications early enough to fix identified problems.
Recommendation 3.        Develop, update, and use communication plans.




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4.6.5       Vendor Integration and Involvement—Best Practices
4.6.5.1     GP08 is an Optimum Test Bed for Interoperable Communications and Surveillance
            Systems
Description–Vendors had the opportunity to deploy their systems to venues that emulate field conditions.
Environmental and operational circumstances provided a great test platform, allowing designers,
manufacturers, and marketers to see the conditions their equipment would have to operate in during
disaster response and recovery. (Observer notes, TW Mobile ARR,
4.6.5.2     Collaborative Training Events like Golden Phoenix Provide Industry Partners and
            Vendors an Opportunity to Operate in Realistic Field Conditions
Description–GP was a great event where it could be determined how to best use industry in a real world
disaster . Organizations felt that being exposed to field users in a real time situation was good for the
designers of the products that the users potentially use. (Observer notes, debriefs, Vendor AARs)

4.6.6       Vendor Integration and Involvement—Lessons Learned
4.6.6.1     Limited Time for Vendor Participation
Description–Many vendors that participated at the various experiment or remote locations (Brown Field,
SDSU Visualization Lab, and Yuma) indicated training opportunities, ability to inject their ideas into
training event scenarios to validate on-the-fly solutions, and time to be involved was limited. (hotwash,
debriefs, Epsilon AAR, PK AAR, Compass Energy Solutions AAR, Ready 2 Protect AAR)
Each of the above venues provided at least three full working days for vendors to operate. The nature of
the various experiments and locations determined how rigid or flexible each site was to ad hoc
experimentation, on-the-fly validation, and so on.
Due to the nature of flight operations in restricted airspace, the events at Yuma were highly structured
and most were planned several weeks before July 20. However, the rigor ensured planned events were
completed and provided the opportunity for at least four more experiments to be planned and conducted
at the site.
The Visualization Lab venue was established to provide a focal point for common operational picture,
situational awareness, and communications experiments. It depended on activity at other sites to initiate
and complete activities, making the situation very fluid. The flexibility at the Visualization Lab
accommodated several application or system demonstrations and could have handled more experiments.
Brown Field was set up to provide all NGO and vendor participants the opportunity to train and
experiment. The MAG-46 side was set up to facilitate USMC and CBP training, while providing some
openness to interaction with NGO and vendor participants. Though remote and with an environment
somewhat hostile to operations, Brown Field held daily briefings and planning meetings. It was the most
spacious and least restrictive of environments, providing everyone the opportunity to wander around,
asking questions, meeting people, and discovering what they were there to do. For several companies
and NGOs, this provided tremendous opportunity to develop and conduct experiments with previously
unknown or untested partners.
Recommendation–Several vendors, NGOs, and organizations that participated in GP08 reported
tremendous success! In those cases, the reporting entity came prepared to play, whether the
preparations was completed several weeks before Day 1, or they were prepared to be open to new ideas,
technologies, and partners at the various venues during the events; they were prepared. In the words of
one observer, “Vendors need to come prepared to play, not just display.”
Recommendation 1.       Collaborative Training Event organizers and planners must reach out to vendors
                        early, provide a useful forum for collaboration and planning, and provide a
                        sustainable collaboration site (like civmil.org) for all participants.




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Recommendation 2.        Training Event organizers should provide an afternoon near the end of the event
                         for vendor participants wishing to display and sell their wares to do so.
Recommendation 3.        When possible, event organizers should attempt to provide real data to vendors
                         that have defined their experiment data requirements. In addition to experiencing
                         the reality of field operations, their systems get to experience the reality of real,
                         sometimes imperfect, or corrupt data. If possible, provide the data in real time.
Recommendation 4.        Training event participants, especially vendors, NGOs, and other agencies not
                         normally part of similar events, must take advantage of the collaboration and
                         planning activities and resources provided by event organizers and planners.
                         Attend the planning conferences, coordinate with entities you want to work with,
                         and use the available collaboration tools early and often.
Recommendation 5.        Plan your experiments and identify the data requirements necessary to perform
                         your experiments. Share these requirements with event planners and potential
                         partners to determine and plan what you will do before the event starts.
Recommendation 6.        Realize this is not a trade show. Limit demonstrations and focus on participation,
                         experimentation, and problem solving.
Recommendation 7.        Attend the event planning and coordination meetings. If you have a good idea,
                         share it and be ready to run with it.
Recommendation 8.        Move away from your booth or piece of real estate and see what is going on.
                         Identify issues you can address or problems you can solve.
Recommendation 9.        Listen to other event participants, without trying to solve their problems by selling
                         them your product.
Recommendation 10. Unless listeners have questions or are there specifically to get detailed
                   information about your product, keep your sales brief to 30 seconds or less.
4.6.6.2     Vendors Interfered with Training at Some Venues
Description–Vendors attempting to test or establish their products and systems occasionally interfered
with training scenarios. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs) In some cases, planners did not anticipate
the number of interested vendors or actual deployment of responding players and their equipment. In
other cases, vendors seemed unaware of the traditional roles of player, observer, evaluator, or controller
and walked up to players requesting samples of sensitive material without prior coordination. Vendors
and some observers became distractions, whether due to unprofessional dress or glad-handing side
discussions during training that was being observed by a variety of local, regional, state, and federal
personnel and being evaluated by participating agencies.
Recommendation–Vendors, industry partners, and NGOs are important partners in collaborative training
events and incident response. It will be helpful to all involved if these personnel receive briefing regarding
their participation.
Recommendation 1.        At some point after the initial planning conference, provide a vendor briefing that
                         addresses training event safety concerns, general guidelines for observing or
                         participating as a vendor, and a brief orientation of professional and proper dress
                         and conduct.
Recommendation 2.        Anticipate and develop a list of frequently asked questions (FAQ) for vendors and
                         other participants.
Recommendation 3.        Record and narrate the vendor briefing for posting on the collaboration site
                         (civmil.org in the case of GP08).
Recommendation 4.        Post the FAQ to the collaboration site.
Recommendation 5.        Develop a low overhead means to track participation in the actual or online brief.




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4.6.6.3      Lack of Sample Data Hindered Training and Experiments
Description–Lack of sample data inputs, even at Brown Field, hindered some training and experiment
objectives. (Observer notes, sStich AAR) Lack of data samples could be traced to the perception that
there is a great deal of activity at incident sites. While there is activity, it may not be of the type or intensity
necessary to conduct a valid experiment. At Brown Field, this issue was resolved when a real brush fire
broke out south of a nearby highway, providing the necessary sample type and volume to conduct the
experiment.
Recommendation–Companies requiring certain types of data should identify the type and amount of
data they will need to perform the experiment. This provides them the opportunity to coordinate with
training event planners to determine whether scenario or real activity will provide the samples they need.
Set clear experiment objectives.
Identify amount and type of data necessary to conduct experiment.
Coordinate with training event planners to identify or provide enough training and real activity to provide
the necessary samples.
Develop and bring your own sample data in case training event activities do not generate enough
samples.
4.6.6.4      Available Bandwidth May Limit Access to Internet or Systems Located Off Site
Description–Limited bandwidth slowed Initial experiments using map software on remote servers.
(Observer notes, hotwash, debrief, sStich AAR) Developers switched to a map application requiring less
bandwidth. The leaner application made it easy to work at a remote location (Brown Field), sending
images and tags to a remote server for integration with map software and system generated tagging
suggestions, which were then returned to originator and other participants at Brown Field, all when
bandwidth was limited. As experiment participants updated their images and tag sets, the information was
returned to the server for further reporting resolution and display. The results were displayed on civmil.org
for their users.
Recommendation–Anticipate and prepare for network connectivity issues at incident response and
recovery sites.
Recommendation 1.         Develop applications to use very little bandwidth.
Recommendation 2.         Identify alternative or multiple communication paths for transmitting information to
                          remote servers.
Recommendation 3.         Minimize bandwidth hogging techniques or technologies when possible.
4.6.6.5      Social Networking Interfered with Training
Description–Social networking (meeting and getting to know other training event participants and
capabilities), though greatly appreciated, often interfered with training. (Observers, debriefs, Vendor
AARs)
Recommendation–Identify, provide, and limit time spent demonstrating or selling products while
encouraging everyone to develop and participate in planned and unplanned training and experiments.
Recommendation 1.         Require well-defined training objectives from all potential participants.
Recommendation 2.         Use training objectives to plan and develop training and experiments.
Recommendation 3.         Limit participation to those with well-defined training objectives.

4.6.7        Communications—Satellite—Best Practices
None observed




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4.6.7.1       BGAN Satellite Terminals Provide Mobile and Stationary Satellite Communications
Description–Several vendors and industry partners deployed Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN)
terminals to the Yuma and Brown Field venues. In the desert, at least one system established and
maintained satellite communications while moving. One BGAN feed was aggregated with a Very Small
Aperture Terminal (VSAT) feed at Brown Field, two feeds to appear as one to the wireless local area
network. BGAN terminals were used to demonstrate video conferencing and other applications capable of
operating with other agencies or companies located around the world (Washington D.C., Seattle, San
Diego, Afghanistan, and so on). (Observer notes, vendor AARs)

4.6.8         Communications—Satellite—Lessons Learned


4.6.8.1       Multiple Command Post/Communication Vehicles with Satellite Communications
              Create Problems when a Small Incident Command Post Scales to a Large Incident or
              Unified Command Post
Description–On Day 1, Brown Field began operations with three or four trailers on the nonmilitary side,
and a semi trailer with one or two containers. Satellite communications were not established. Within three
hours, there were multiple VSAT and BGAN systems operating. Each of these systems had their own
connections to routers and other equipment for establishing a wireless local area network (WLAN). While
each system worked, it provided limited and uncoordinated access to the internet. (Observer notes,
debriefs, Vendor AARs, and CGL AAR)
Individual satellite terminals with a small local area network (LAN) may be ideal (essential in an
infrastructure-collapsed environment) for supporting small incidents. However, the addition of more
satellite terminals and small LANs create a series of issues that should be managed.
     •    Uplink bandwidth is limited and must be used wisely.
     •    Virtual Private Network (VPN) packets are encrypted, which usually prevent satellite modems
          from compressing and encrypting each packet sent to maximize performance. The VPN packet is
          not optimized for satellite transmission.
     •    Video and other streaming services may be a violation of the terms of service. Since satellite
          based network bandwidth is very valuable, the use of streaming packets is tightly controlled.
          Access to this of level of service typically requires a committed information rate (CIR) from the
          service provider, with an increase in cost.
     •    Video and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) streaming services are also susceptible to errors
          caused by packets delivered out of order. Satellite based communications can not guarantee the
          same rate of ordered packet delivery as a terrestrial network.
     •    As multiple satellite terminals are integrated to support a unified command, the distance a packet
          must travel increases, causing delivery problems. Figure 1 shows the approximate distance a
          packet must travel, with associated delay, on a satellite-based network. The distances are
          acceptable if ground terminals are geographically distant. However, when two systems are sitting
          side-by-side, the prospect that every packet must travel approximately 90,000 miles to
          communicate between two clients 50 feet away is not acceptable.




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                    Figure 1. Delay or Latency Introduced Using Multiple Hops
Recommendation–Satellite voice and data communications are becoming ubiquitous in incident
command and communication vehicles and systems. Individuals acquiring, supporting, and operating
these systems must have a thorough understanding of their associated capabilities and deployment
methods.
Recommendation 1.      Deploy mesh nodes at each of the vehicles and locations with a satellite system.
   •   Configure the mesh nodes to advertise as an internet gateway, effectively aggregating the
       available backhaul over the wireless mesh.
   •   More work and equipment would be required to make this available on wired connections and
       there is no guarantee that the gateways are load-balanced as access to the gateways would
       likely be based on closest gateway to the client.
   •   Deploy involved systems with mesh gear running the same mesh software (perhaps the simplest
       and most dynamic fix, with many variables working with zero configuration in the field). This
       method would need to be thoroughly tested.
Recommendation 2.      Deploy a load balancing multi-WAN router.
   •   Several on the market are capable of handling the needs of large deployments (see
       http://www.peplink.com/ and http://www.pfsense.com/).
   •   Run a cable from each of the satellite systems to one or two of these routers (depending on
       failover set-up).
   •   Use this router to aggregate all of the satellite connections, creating a unified LAN, wired and
       wireless, and a load balanced and fault tolerant wide area network (WAN).
   •   Investigate the policy issues associated with implementing this solution (achievable in the field at
       relatively low cost).
Recommendation 3.      Provide training and education to COML, COMM, and operators in agencies
                       owning satellite communication about ways to effectively consolidate multiple




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                        systems in a manner that provides efficient and timely communications support
                        to personnel using the local area network.

4.6.9       Communications—Wireless Local Area Networks—Best Practices
4.6.9.1     Strong Control of Wireless Local Area Networks is Essential with Limited Assets
Description–During operations at the Yuma site, participants did not experience the problems
encountered at Brown Field. Various actions taken during the planning, preparation, and implementation
phases of the event ensured participants had access to the internet over limited SATCOM assets and
avoided cancelling each other out. (Observer notes, debriefs, Vendor AAR submissions)
Prior to set up of the Yuma experiment, a survey of wireless frequencies in use was conducted by one of
the communication technicians from SDSU using a spectrum analyzer. Little to no potential interference
was discovered. As participants began setting up their equipment and satellite connections were
established, a wireless local area network with access to the internet became available.
During the experiments, the communications technician monitored WLAN and SATCOM activity for
spikes that indicated communications were exceeding optimum capacity, which could interfere with the
primary reason for SATCOM, providing a path to deliver imagery from UAS ground stations.
On one or two occasions, a spike was noticed and communications output began to slow. The technician
would examine the content of the packets being sent over the network, identifying the origin of the
communications interfering with delivery of the imagery. Participants causing the problem were asked to
refrain from outside communications until the primary mission was complete. The site coordinator looked
at the schedule and briefed participants about time periods they could use to send email or other files to
avoid a communications slow down. If necessary, the technology was available to limit “unauthorized
access.”

4.6.10      Communications—Wireless Local Area Networks—Lessons Learned
4.6.10.1    Limited Availability of Wireless Local Area Networks Hindered Completion of
            Experiments and Training
Description–Training even participants established several wireless local area networks (WLAN) at the
Brown Field venue. Very few of the WLANs provided a connection to the internet. In some cases, well-
planned wireless infrastructure was rendered useless because some essential, but unplanned or
unannounced, communication systems were activated. Internet access relied on systems that were not
operational when owners or operators shut them down at the end of the workday. (Observer notes,
hotwash, debriefs, vendor and other AARs)
Recommendation–As various training modules and experiments are planned, identify the wireless and
internet resources necessary to support and conduct the training and experiments. Work with vendors
and other participants to establish and maintain services.
Recommendation 1.       Incorporate WLAN use and planning into initial, mid-term, and final planning
                        conferences.
Recommendation 2.       Identify a vendor, industry partner, or participating agency with appropriate
                        equipment to set up and operate WLAN and internet access throughout the
                        training event.
Recommendation 3.       Prepare for “after hours” operation if possible.
4.6.10.2    Uncoordinated Use of Multiple Mesh Networks Limit Their Effectiveness
Description–Several vendors at Brown Field deployed with mesh networks, but did not follow instructions
addressing coordination with other vendors located nearby. Multiple systems using the same frequencies
created significant amounts of interference and created circumstances where a user could get on a
network, but not have access to the internet. (Observer notes, hotwash, vendor AAR submissions)



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Recommendation–Develop and implement procedures that limit the number of independent wireless
LANs operating at a command post.
Recommendation 1.        Provide responding organizations the information necessary to locate and log on
                         to the network.
Recommendation 2.        Obtain the responding organizations estimated bandwidth needs (estimate by
                         identifying what they need internet access for).
Recommendation 3.        Identify and designate an appropriately trained COML, COMM, or operator as a
                         network administrator.
Recommendation 4.        Allow the network administrator to activate and deactivate networks (with
                         appropriate coordination).
4.6.10.3    Multiple Network and Frequency Use Degraded Brown Field Wireless LAN
Description–Too many individual (vendor, NGO, industry partner, DoD) wireless local area networks
were established at Brown Field with very little coordination or cooperation, creating channel interference.
The interference effectively jammed operations for some systems, slowed data flow on parts of other
systems, or created communications and network issues that led to many of the various issues identified
in the submitted AARs. In addition to the technical issues, participants experience confusion and
frustration as methods or systems that worked for a reasonable period, disappeared altogether or failed to
work the next day. (Observer notes, HSSTT hot rinse, vendor AAR submissions)
Recommendation–Create a frequency manager and network administrator position to deal with these
issues. The position must have the tools (spectrum analyzer, network monitoring applications) to identify
and locate problems and the authority to address (configures participating assets, removes networks, and
so on).
Recommendation 1.        Prior to event or during establishment of an incident command post, perform a
                         spectrum survey to identify possible sources of interference to wireless local
                         networks.
Recommendation 2.        Using survey results, design best configuration for the initial wireless local area
                         network assets.
Recommendation 3.        Assign incoming personnel to connect to the identified network (provide SSID
                         and other relevant information).
Recommendation 4.        Gather information about incoming assets to support development and
                         integration into larger wireless and wired local area networks.
Recommendation 5.        Provide COML personnel the training and tools necessary to perform this
                         function.

4.6.11      Communications—Cellular Phone—Best Practices
None observed

4.6.12      Communications—Cellular Phone—Lessons Learned
4.6.12.1    Reliance on Cellular Phones and Infrastructure for Critical Communications
Description–Participants in the training event relied too much on cell phone and other infrastructure
technologies (email, internet, and so on) that most likely will not be available during the initial phases of
disaster response and recovery. (Observer notes, debriefs, AAR submissions)
Several agencies mentioned their own reliance on cell phones, but indicated the cache radios available to
them during incident response were too complicated for individuals to use without regular training and



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use. In many cases, the talkgroups and channels have been identified, the equipment is available, but
operations are difficult, making it easier and quicker to use the cell phone. Personnel discussing the issue
often said the only way people would learn is if they were made to give up their cell phone for some part
of a training event.
Recommendation–Create a portion of the scenario that suspends cell phone operation. Collect the
phones, enforce phone shut-off rules, and limit use.
Recommendation 1.        Identify a portion of the scenario that would benefit from use of interoperable
                         communications.
Recommendation 2.        Secure, and enforce, no cell phone use during this period.
Recommendation 3.        Invite vendors to set up and operate portable cellular systems.
Recommendation 4.        Allow use of cellular phones once the portable systems are set up.

4.6.13      Communications—Interoperability—Best Practices
None observed

4.6.14      Communications—Interoperability—Lessons Learned
4.6.14.1    Use of Certain Scenarios Discourages Implementation of Interoperable
            Communications into Training Event Planning
Description–The use of weaponized biological or chemical hazards in scenarios limits interoperable
communications since most of the participating and planning agencies fear it could inadvertently cause
panic or reveal a sensitive or undisclosed tactic used to mitigate or defeat the threat. However, press
releases were sent to local media prior to the commencement of training event activity. (Observer notes,
debriefs)
While certain tactics should not be revealed, implementing interoperable communications should be an
integral part of the various training modules set up during the training event. Actions as basic as a
communications check between participants prior to performance of major training would prove whether
different agencies could communicate, or not. As regional communications interoperability skills grow, the
size and scope of interoperable communications training can grow too.
Recommendation–Integrate interoperable communications into collaborative training planning by
creating a communications committee that identifies and implements viable, region and event specific,
support communication requirements into all training modules. The interoperability continuum contained
in Appendix C shows SOP, Technology (data and voice elements), Training and Exercises, and Usage
items for incorporation, evaluation, and correction in collaborative training events.
Recommendation 1.        During initial collaborative training event planning, identify a qualified
                         communications committee charged with identifying viable and relevant
                         interoperable communications activities to train participants.
Recommendation 2.        Task the collaborative training event planning committee to work with the
                         communications committee, incorporating interoperable communication elements
                         into all aspects of the training event.
Recommendation 3.        Select broad, viable scenarios that will not encourage participants to limit
                         communications use to cellular phones.
Recommendation 4.        Encourage agencies and organizations with robust voice and data
                         communication capabilities to identify interoperable communication methods that
                         support secondary and tertiary mission objectives.




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4.6.15      NIMS ICS Implementation—Best Practices
Golden Phoenix 2008 was a collaborative training event. An incident commander was identified for the
NGO and vendor area at Brown Field, but the Operations, Planning, and Logistics Section functions and
responsibilities were not clearly assigned or identified. A few individuals were identified as people you “go
to” for communications (wireless network integration), power, or space; but the scheduling discipline
associated with responders using NIMS ICS was not readily apparent.
On Day 1, incident command was established at the CBP IMB station once it was discovered the
suspects may have had drugs. Incident command was passed from CBP to DEA. At some point, DEA
passed incident command to the FBI.
On Day 3, each of the three hospitals set up an incident command post as did local law enforcement.
Overall, there were several opportunities where Unified Command or Area Command could have been
established and practiced. The best opportunities would have been the three venues that were operating
throughout the training event (Yuma, Brown Field, and the SDSU Visualization Lab). At Brown Field,
there were multiple participating agencies in the non-military area and two major participants (MAG-46
and CBP) on the military side. Establishing a unified command, and its associated sections, between the
three “incident commands” may have improved overall accomplishment of training and experiment
objectives. Identification of a COML with satellite and network data communications expertise would have
facilitated establishment and maintenance of internet communications, while providing the authority
necessary to encourage or force cooperation.

4.6.16      NIMS ICS Implementation—Lessons Learned
4.6.16.1    Schedule Regular Informational, Planning, and Problem Resolution Briefs
Description–NIUSR held a morning informational brief every day that was informative. For those that
attended, it informed vendors and NGOs were aware of capabilities other participants were offering.
Overviews of planned experiments were briefly presented and the meeting time for future collaboration
was usually identified. (Observer notes, hotwash, AAR submissions)
Recommendation–Plan a robust schedule of informational and planning briefs to meet the needs of new
arrivals, new ideas, or new issues. Hold problem resolution briefs as needed.
Recommendation 1.        Require all arrivals to check in and out of the incident.
Recommendation 2.        Conduct two or three informational briefs to keep everyone up to speed of new
                         training, experiments, and opportunities.
Recommendation 3.        Conduct two or three planning briefs where experiment status can be briefed and
                         opportunities or needs for collaboration can be shared.
Recommendation 4.        If problems are identified (for example, the WLAN and SATCOM issues), set up
                         briefs as needed to brainstorm, identify, and implement solutions. If the problem
                         does not require that level of support, include it as a briefing item in the
                         informational brief.

4.6.17      Situational Awareness and Common Operational Picture—Best
            Practices
None observed




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4.6.18      Situational Awareness and Common Operational Picture—Lessons
            Learned
4.6.18.1    Common Operational Picture and Situational Awareness Systems are Underused
Description–Various participants used COP systems during Golden Phoenix 2008 to provide streaming
video from a UAS in the desert or cameras located near the hospitals, keep each other informed of
activities going on at other training modules, and to report commencement or end of the various training
modules. In the words of one participant, “We are using this COP to show pretty pictures and IM (instant
message) each other.” (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs, AAR submissions)
One of the simple situational awareness (SA) tools observed was a laptop projecting a Google Earth map
onto a whiteboard with incident commander annotations showing where law enforcement assets and
personnel were deployed. That level of detail was not available for viewing on the COP tool at the EOC.
COP systems compile large volumes of information for use by planners, logisticians, and other users
during incident response and recovery. To meet the requirements of disaster response and recovery,
COP systems should be used daily. Daily use by all end-users ensures system familiarity and confidence.
When unexpected events transpire, familiarity with the COP system will facilitate transition from daily
operations to incident response and recovery with minimal delay. Familiarity with the system will also help
identify and implement solutions to new problems.
Another area for COP growth and development is the integration of open source information into the
COP. The proliferation and popularity of mobile devices and social networking tools lead to a constant
stream of information available on the internet. Citizen or self-reporting (an individual with a mobile
device) can provide an accurate and more timely picture of some disasters. One fire department currently
using Twitter is the Los Angeles Fire Department (http://twitter.com/lafd). A detailed discussion about
some possibilities can be found at http://factoryjoe.com/blog/2007/10/22/twitter-hashtags-for-emergency-
coordination-and-disaster-relief/. While social networking tools can inform, they can also help rumors or
incorrect information spin out of control. A Public Information Officer (PIO) with access to the COP can
identify and address the rumor or incorrect information on the social network and traditional media.
Recommendation–Encourage use of common operational picture and situational awareness systems at
the lowest effective level. Integrate them into daily operations and take full advantage of all of their
capabilities. Build NIMS ICS into the system to facilitate creation of relevant forms and consolidation of
various data requirements.
Encourage daily use of COP and SA systems.
Integrate all aspects of disaster response and recovery into a COP.
Explore integration of open source information and information dissemination into the COP.
4.6.18.2    Deployment of Multiple COP and SA Systems Hinders Use and Experimentation
Description–Vendors displayed several common operational picture and situational awareness tools
during Golden Phoenix 2008. Only one of the systems is widely used by agencies in the region. As
planned, participants and the county EOC used the current system. The remaining COP/SA systems
were largely demonstrated, though they were initially meant to participate in vendor-planned experiments.
The lack of data and personnel to supply the systems with relevant information hindered completion or
participation in various experiments. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs, AAR submissions)
Recommendation–Limit use of COP/SA systems during training events to those currently in use by
participants or under consideration for purchase (limit this to the one or two best choices) by participants.
Operation of COP/SA systems requires dedicated users to provide, update, maintain, and use the
COP/SA system.
Recommendation 1.        Identify regional system or systems and develop participant specific training
                         objectives.
Recommendation 2.        Provide a mix of experienced and inexperienced personnel to participate in
                         system operation and training.


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Recommendation 3.       Identify subject matter experts to provide training on underused or unique
                        features.
Recommendation 4.       Develop training and evaluation objectives if you are evaluating a new COP/SA
                        system.

4.6.19      Notional EOC—Best Practices
None observed

4.6.20      Notional EOC—Lessons Learned
4.6.20.1    Lack of EOC Staff at Visualization Lab
Description–While the SDSU Visualization Lab served as a notional EOC, there was not an EOC staff
located there. For planning purposes, the notional EOC was located at the Visualization Lab to emulate
end users receiving imagery from and supporting end users at a remote location (Yuma and Brown Field).
The lab also provided a venue for vendors to conduct experiments and demonstrate situational
awareness and common operational picture applications. Vendors were encouraged to develop their
training objectives and to identify partnering opportunities with other GP08 participants. (Observer notes,
hotwash, debriefs, numerous vendor AAR submissions)
Lack of personnel performing EOC functions at the notional EOC did not create the need for Brown Field
and other participants to keep the notional EOC involved. Without dedicated personnel to maintain a
common operational picture, the visualization lab became a technology evaluation (in the case of Yuma
operations), technology experiment (in case of a few vendors that did do experiments with remote
operators), and technology demonstrate (most vendors demonstrated equipment with a few using the
data feeds from remote sites to enhance the presentation) area. Lack of a clearly defined Area or Unified
Command did not provide all involved the motivation to establish and maintain situational awareness or a
common operational picture.
Recommendation–When establishing a notional or training emergency operations center, there must be
well-defined training objectives and plans to achieve them! Identifying the objectives and creating the
plans early in the process provides participants the opportunity to identify personnel, assets, and
positions necessary to create a viable, if notional, emergency operations center.
Recommendation 1.       Limit vendor application demonstrations to one day or a specific timeframe each
                        day.
Recommendation 2.       If vendors want to evaluate or experiment with their tools in an EOC environment,
                        they must proactively engage with training event participants to provide
                        personnel to perform EOC functions. An alternative would be to bring their EOC
                        staff.
Recommendation 3.       Identify shared training objectives (between first responder EOC personnel and
                        vendor needs).
Recommendation 4.       Identify and provide an incident management or command system structure that
                        requires an active and engaged EOC.
Recommendation 5.       Use an actual EOC with the staff that would populate it during an incident
                        response or recovery.
Recommendation 6.       Provide or emulate the necessary data and communication feeds.




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4.6.21      Child Care During Incident Response and Recovery—Best Practices
4.6.21.1    Preparation by Project K.I.D. Enabled Completion of Several Planned and Unplanned
            Experiments with Other Participants
Description–Project K.I.D. developed a comprehensive set of training objectives that built on their
experiences during Hurricane Katrina, training in Hamilton County, Indiana, and Golden Phoenix 2007.
Their training objectives, current and previous partnerships, and willingness to collaborate with other
Golden Phoenix participants allowed for planned experimentation, validation of equipment and
procedures, and the ability to identify and exploit new opportunities. The comprehensive training
objectives provided a framework that enabled development and completion of unplanned experiments
with other Golden Phoenix participants. (Observer notes, debriefs, Project K.I.D. AAR)
During two days of a three-day event, Project K.I.D. evaluated at least two shelter systems, worked with a
vendor partner to successfully perform background checks for child care volunteers, validated
child/parent reunification procedures, experimented with low-cost cell phone tracking devices, and
evaluated a child-tracking system. The results of the experiments were documented in their after action
report which is included in Appendix D.3.2.
Project K.I.D. an NGO focused on identifying the best methods to address the unique and all too often
overlooked needs of children during incident response and recovery, came to Golden Phoenix 2008 with
an ambitious set of training objectives. This NGO arrived with Having worked in actual recovery
operations (Hurricane Katrina), participated in local (Hamilton County, Indiana) exercises and trainings,
and Golden Phoenix 2007; Project K.I.D. came to Golden Phoenix 2008 with several specific training and
equipment evaluation objectives on paper. (Observer notes, Project K.I.D. AAR)
4.6.21.2    Project K.I.D. Collaborated with American Red Cross and Other Organizations to
            Reunite Parents with Recovered Child
Description–Since the National Center for Missing and Abducted Children was not participating in this
event, American Red Cross collaborated to help coordinate and conduct a child/parent reunification. The
training module involved law enforcement verification of parent identities, transportation from Angel Flight,
coordination with a variety of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, check-in procedures,
and reunification. The collaboration allowed both groups to evaluate and refine procedures. (Observer
notes, debriefs, Project K.I.D. AAR)

4.6.22      Child Care During Incident Response and Recovery—Lessons Learned
Project K.I.D. identified several best practices, lessons learned, and recommendations during Golden
Phoenix 2008. The detailed list is in Appendix D.3.2.
4.6.22.1    Develop and Distribute Formal Site Operations and Training Manuals for Distribution
            Online
Description–Project K.I.D. uses an established and tested (during Hurricane Katrina recovery
operations, local exercises and trainings, and Golden Phoenix 2007) model for holding children safe and
caring for them during incident response and recovery. During Golden Phoenix 2008, they evaluated
implementation of the model by regional volunteers. Some variations were discovered during application
of the model, training, and associated experiments. (Project K.I.D. AAR)
Recommendation–Facilitate the consistent application of proven procedures by creating Site Operations
and Training Manuals. Online distribution ensures wide availability and implementation of the model.
4.6.22.2    State Policies and Legal Requirements Ensuring Safety of Unaccompanied Minors in
            Emergencies Vary
Description–State polices and legal requirements that ensure the safety of unaccompanied minors
during emergencies and the guidelines for implementation by the various agencies and first responders in
that state are not the same. (Project K.I.D. AAR)




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Recommendation–Investigate state-by-state policies and legal requirements to ensure the safety of
unaccompanied minors in emergencies and the development of appropriate child protection guidelines for
implementation by all agencies, including first responders, working with children in disasters.

4.6.23      Simplify User Interface —Best Practices
None observed

4.6.24      Simplify User Interface—Lessons Learned
4.6.24.1    Simplify Operation of New Technologies and Systems
Description–During a training event module involving the detection of a radiological threat, the device in
use detected the hazard. However, the operator, viewing a series of light emitting diodes (LED), did not
understand the nature or scope of the threat and did not act on the valid alert. The operator had received
and successfully completed training during the preceding week. The issue with the detection device and
other systems is complexity. Many of the devices are not used on a daily basis. They are only deployed
when needed, decreasing the opportunity to develop skills operating a complex system. (TW Mobile AAR
Submission, Event Hotwash, Debrief Notes)
Recommendation–Simplify the user interface. “If it has more than three or four buttons, it is too
complicated!”
Recommendation 1.        Simplify user interfaces for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
                         explosive detection devices.
Recommendation 2.        Simplify interoperable communication gateway user interfaces and develop
                         operating and maintenance procedures with the field user in mind.
Recommendation 3.        Where possible, provide daily opportunities to use the various complex devices
                         through day-to-day operations or short/no notice training.

4.6.25      Media Participation in Collaborative Training Events —Best Practices
None observed

4.6.26      Media Participation in Collaborative Training Events—Lessons Learned
The media were invited to two parts of the GP08 training event. On Day 2, media was invited to come to
the Brown Field site. A Marine Public Affairs Officer provided familiarization tours of the MAG-46
compound, combat operations center, and the NGO and vendor part of the encampment. Reporters had
a great deal of freedom at this venue, observing and reporting on various (military and non-military)
activities taking place at Brown Field. On Day 3, the media were invited to set up and observe the mass-
casualty portion of the training event at the three local hospitals. Helicopters landing and taking off, law
enforcement in personal protective equipment and wide access to hospital, first responder, and military
liaisons provided great opportunities for questions, answers, and dramatic video.
4.6.26.1    Media Location and Involvement Influenced Participant Behavior
Description–The media were invited to observe portions of the training event at the various hospitals. As
they set up, it became apparent that some local agencies and vendors were jockeying for the best
camera angles. (Observer, Hot Rinse, and Debrief notes)
Recommendation–Plan and prepare for these media issues and activities.
Recommendation 1.        Identify and enforce media set up locations.




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Recommendation 2.       Use agency PIOs (with strict guidelines) to identify and work with VIPs and/or
                        their press personnel.
Recommendation 3.       Establish vendor and agency guidelines regarding the media—this is a training
                        event, everyone should be participating to achieve several shared objectives.
                        Looking good at the expense of others is grounds for eviction from the training
                        event.
4.6.26.2    High Level of Media Interest Led to Close Contact with Training Personnel
Description–When the Marines flew in local law enforcement in personal protective equipment to
manage the crowds (self-referrers) rushing the hospital with symptoms and for treatment (part of the
overall scenario), the media pressed in very close to the police officers, so much so that there was some
jostling. The officer in charge of the detail took charge of the situation and began moving the media along
with the crowds back to appropriate positions and began to effectively manage the crowds. (Observer,
Hot Rinse, and Debrief notes)
Recommendation–Anticipate these situations and prepare first responders for the “spotlight.”
Recommendation 1.       Prepare for these types of situations—events involving concerned crowds will
                        lead to rushing crowds and media, requiring the implementation and use of
                        effective crowd management tactics.
Recommendation 2.       Establish and enforce perimeters for media and people just watching.
4.6.26.3    Media Involvement Led to Modified Training Objectives
Description–In at least one instance, law enforcement training was changed to limit or prevent the media
from observing, recording, and showing sensitive procedures and tactics.
Recommendation–During the training event planning process, carefully consider training objectives and
the use of sensitive tactics. Use that knowledge to identify and use isolated venues and to manage media
involvement.
Recommendation 1.       Limit media coverage of sensitive training or tactics by selecting isolated training
                        venues.
Recommendation 2.       Schedule a robust media day to provide media the opportunity to see tactics and
                        technologies that are not sensitive.
Recommendation 3.       Provide public safety PIOs the best possible training to not only inform, but to
                        manage the information and access given to the media.

4.6.27      Power Sustainability—Best Practices
Often overlooked during the early phases of incident response, electrical power is an essential
component facilitating response and recovery. All Brown Field participants were directed during the
planning phases to bring/provide their own power and other operating resources. Several vendors and
NGOs did not arrive with the essentials. Cell phones and laptops were plugged into personal vehicles to
recharge batteries. Some vendors did not bring enough power generating resources for their equipment
(often relying on RV or low wattage backup generators).
4.6.27.1    Deployment and Implementation of Systems in the Field Identifies Points of Failure
Description–NIUSR arranged for a vendor to donate a commercial grade rental generator to supply
power to the industry and partner area of Brown Field. The generator provided power that supported 80
percent of the equipment brought to Brown Field and was one of the first major pieces of equipment up
and running. (Observer notes, CGL AAR)
As vendors, NGOs, and other participants arrived with inadequate or limited power supplies, people
wanted to use this power source. The generator came with a power distribution point (spider) that had 20-
amp twist lock receptacles (see Figure 2).




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                Figure 2. Power Distribution Point with 20-amp Twist Lock Receptacles
Commercial contractors would likely have the 20-amp twist lock extension cords, but this may not be the
case for response units, NGOs, or industry partners showing up at a real refugee camp or evacuation
center. Of less concern during the training event, but of greater concern during incident response and
recovery, a generator mechanic was not on hand to fix or maintain the unit. This could lead to serious
issues as more systems become established and responders rely on them for essential services.
Recommendation–Fund collaborative training events to identify system points of failure during incident
response and recovery. Use challenging, but realistic, operations environments to test the equipment and
procedures.
Recommendation 1.       Fund collaborative training events at the local, regional, state, and federal levels.
Recommendation 2.       Identify new or possible systems for deployment in field conditions.
Recommendation 3.       Observe and analyze performance and perform gap analysis to identify where
                        systems will fail and plan to either prevent or overcome the failure.
Recommendation 4.       Deploy the system with the procedures the end user is expected to use.
4.6.27.2    Portable Solar and Wind Generators Recharged System Batteries
Description–Portable solar and wind power generators recharged small UAS batteries, laptops, cell
phones, digital cameras, and other critical equipment at Yuma and Brown Field. (Observer notes,
debriefs, and Compass Energy Solutions AAR)

4.6.28      Power Sustainability—Lessons Learned
4.6.28.1    Large Power Generators and Air Conditioning Systems are Essential for Operation of
            Large Communication and Computer Systems
Description–At Yuma, the USMC provided two large generators (output unknown) to run the various
computer systems, UAS ground stations, and two air conditioners. The air conditioners provided the
cooling and filtering necessary to operate comfortably in large tents. At Brown Field, the USMC had
contracted with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Base-X to provide power,


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communications, area security cameras, air conditioning, and climate controlled tents for critical
operations elements. The power and communications at Brown Field were not provided to vendors or
NGOs. (Observer notes, hotwash, debriefs, numerous AAR submissions)
Recommendation–Consider power an individual responder or individual organization (NGO, public
safety, vendor, industry partner, and so on) responsibility. Perform the following to determine power
needs and facilitate transition from individual to collaborative operation.
Recommendation 1.       Identify how much power your equipment will need to operate at peak levels.
Recommendation 2.       Obtain portable power (generator and or battery) support to operate for a week or
                        longer.
Recommendation 3.       Provide fuel, if necessary, to operate the generator for a week or longer.
Recommendation 4.       Be prepared to provide power consumption figures to logistics planners if
                        necessary.
4.6.28.2    Portable Wind and Solar Generators as a Viable Backup Power Source
Description–Portable power generators were deployed to Yuma and Brown Field during GP08. The
solutions included solar and wind generating systems. The power sources were used to recharge small
UAS, cell phone, laptop, and radio batteries. Such power systems could provide homes and businesses
enough power to engage in basic operations during incident recovery. (Observer notes, debriefs, and
Compass Energy Solutions AAR)
Recommendation–Obtain and/or provide portable solar and wind power generation systems to key
personnel and recovery partners.
Recommendation 1.       Identify personnel or partners that could benefit from prepositioning.
Recommendation 2.       Encourage individuals to incorporate into their survival kit.
Recommendation 3.       Be assertive if you have alternative power sources that could meet the needs of
                        first responders, NGOs, vendors and so on. Inform the Planning Branch or
                        Logistics Branch of your capabilities.
Recommendation 4.       Work with a team, identify personnel and systems that need power, and
                        collaborate with them to provide it.
4.6.28.3    Portable Solar and Wind Generators Powered Essential Equipment
Description–Portable solar and wind generator power was incorporated into vendors’ daily routines,
powering laptops, cell phones, UAS, and interoperable communications (a gateway) equipment. While
useful for recharging battery-operated systems, are solar, wind, and other alternative power sources
capable of providing the power necessary to sustain wide area interoperable communications, provide
heating or cooling for ground station operations, and provide enough power to operate the ground
station(s)? (Observer notes, debriefs, and Compass Energy Solutions AAR)
Recommendation–Identify, document, and publish system power production and consumption
specifications.
Recommendation 1.       Document and publish power production figures for each system in a format that
                        is easy for incident response and recovery planners to determine how many or
                        whether an alternative system can provide enough power to meet their operating
                        needs.
Recommendation 2.       Equipment manufactures need to clearly identify power consumption
                        specifications during high volume operations under adverse conditions in a
                        manner that is easy for incident response and recovery planners to determine
                        how much power they need.




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4.6.29      Access and Use of Controlled Unclassified Information—Best Practices
4.6.29.1    DEA Established Liaison with DHS Office of Science and Technology to Push
            Intelligence to other Law Enforcement Agencies
Description– DEA established liaison with the DHS Office of Science and Technology to identify ways to
push intelligence to other law enforcement agencies. GP08 provided opportunities to identify intelligence
products that local and regional law enforcement may need and in what formats it can be delivered and
used. While DEA and local law enforcement may be able to request and supply intelligence in a workable
manner, other federal agencies and the DoD often speak a language that is foreign to local or regional
law enforcement intelligence consumers. GP08 identified and served as a place to begin determining the
scope of this problem. DEA and DHS plan to test this arrangement in the near future. (Observer notes,
debriefs, DEA AAR)

4.6.30      Access and Use of Controlled Unclassified Information—Lessons
            Learned
4.6.30.1    Golden Phoenix Participants were not Aware of the Institution of Controlled
            Unclassified Information
Description–Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) is material produced by a variety of federal
government agencies and organizations that is not classified, but still has some controls on who may see
or use it or where it can be disseminated. The president signed a memorandum regarding CUI the month
before Golden Phoenix. (DHS S&T AAR)
Recommendation–Brief and train first responders and the appropriate producers and disseminators of
controlled unclassified information about the memorandum in appropriate forums. Identify, develop,
publish, and disseminate policy and procedures.
Recommendation 1.       Provide training about CUI to the homeland security community
Recommendation 2.       Develop simple procedures for submitting requests
Recommendation 3.       Identify delivery procedures and formats that will allow end users to effectively
                        use the CUI
Recommendation 4.       Avoid creating another level of control for controlled unclassified information




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4.7     Integration of Industry and Non-governmental organizations
Invite industry and non-governmental organizations early and involve them in the initial planning
conference (IPC), mid planning conference (MPC), and final planning conference (FPC). Early
involvement provides them the opportunity to benefit from the training and education opportunities that
occur with the planning conferences, allows them to coordinate their participation objectives with public
safety and military training objectives, and provides them the opportunity to develop relationships.

GP08 provided industry unparalleled access to harsh and hostile operating environments. UAS operators,
communication vendors, and sustainable energy vendors operated in a restricted air operations area
(R2301W) south of Yuma, Arizona. The temperature was over 104 degrees and the conditions were dry,
dusty, and hot. Industry and non-governmental organizations operating at Brown Field operated in a dry,
dusty environment with temperatures over 80 degrees. With the exception of sanitation, the only services
available to the public safety, vendor, and non-governmental organizations at Brown Field were those
they brought with them. It was a harsh reality check for several as the bright light, high temperatures,
unending dust, lack of dedicated communication pipelines to the internet, and limited power provided
severe operating challenges.

Involving industry and other non-governmental organizations provides all participants the opportunity to
identify command systems, critical support requirements (shelter, power, communications, and so on),
and ways to effectively use the equipment, materials, and services industry and non-governmental
organizations provide during disaster response or training events. At least one vendor was able to test
operations of existing gear, identify and address issues, and modify their prototypes prior to delivery to
their client. Other vendors tested gear and identified issues. Several new methods and systems were
identified for further research and consideration.

Non-governmental organizations such as NIUSR, Project Kid, and the American Red Cross; must find a
way to obtain, practice, and use NIMS ICS to allow incident and unified commands to effectively integrate
their services and capabilities into catastrophic incident response. These organizations should identify a
liaison officer, have a member on the planning team, and, if it adds value to the overall effort, have a
public information officer that can inform or work with the Joint Information Center. NIMS ICS training and
usage are critical in that too many GP08 participants were using “…our own version of the ICS.”

Appropriate NIMS ICS training should be identified for vendors that will volunteer services or donate
supplies so their donations go to the correct part of the incident response (not necessarily a location but a
logistics issue – semi trucks with supplies turned away by Red Cross, etc.).

4.8     Actions
4.8.1       Publish Satellite and Cell Phone Communication Procedures Used to
            Deliver Imagery from Ground Stations to End Users
Description–SDSU visualization lab communications personnel identified and evaluated equipment and
procedures to deliver imagery from remote ground stations over limited satellite and cellular phone
communication paths to end users. Three computers were used to process information, monitor and
manage communication links, and communicate with end users (low bandwidth text communications).
Provide widest possible dissemination of these procedures.

4.8.2       Improve NIMS ICS Familiarity and Usage

Description–NIMS ICS were widely used at the site where the biohazard was discovered (CBP IMB
facility), the hospitals, and at Brown Field. At the CBP IMB site, significant communication problems were
encountered and overcome, leaving several lessons learned. Incident Command was successfully



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established and then passed from CBP to DEA and DEA to FBI during the course of the training event
play. Best practices were close cooperation and collaboration between CBP and DEA interrogators
(observers could not tell DEA from CBP in the holding room and they shared information quickly and
without prompting.

The training events at the hospitals had incident commands established with individual sites and the
police department. One observer noted that a unified command was established between local law
enforcement, UCSD Medical Center La Jolla (Thornton Hospital), and Scripps Memorial Hospital. Local
law enforcement in personal protective equipment identified way to overcome garbled radio
communications – turn off the suit’s voice amplifier. Once that was done, voice radio communications
could be successfully performed.

At Brown Field, control of the frequency environment was limited. In several cases, multiple participants
(industry and military) were using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Wi-Fi systems that were creating
multipath interference, negating access to the backbone. On Day 1, some Wi-Fi systems were tied to a
SATCOM feed, providing access to the internet that was turned off at the end of the day, taking away
access to the internet for other participants. Without firm, if not strong, control of the various data
communication systems, all responders to a disaster will be negatively impacted. NIMS ICS
Communications Unit Leaders should be provided the tools and training to manage this type of data
communications environment.

Action–Communities and regions must encourage wide adoption of NIMS ICS or similar incident
command and management system. Identification and adoption of NIMS ICS provides traditional and
nontraditional responders the familiarity and tools necessary to effectively integrate their capabilities with
the needs identified during incident response and recovery. The following actions promote a wide
understanding and implementation of NIMS ICS:

1. Adopt, integrate, train, and use NIMS ICS for disaster response and collaborative training events.
2. Make access to online NIMS ICS training available to vendors, non-governmental organizations,
   military, and other non-traditional public safety communities.
3. Encourage industry partners to take advantage of the online training (for example, many Las Vegas
   hotel security staff use a variation of NIMS ICS to manage/command incidents and coordinate
   incident response with local first responders).
4. Provide access to low-cost local NIMS ICS training.

Structure and limited control provide an effective flow and interaction of training event play. For example,
in Yuma the two SATCOM pipes were monitored to support delivery of imagery. When optimum operating
peaks were exceeded, sweeps of the camp were conducted to identify systems or users that were also
using the pipe. Once identified, the users were taken off the feed. In some cases, the wireless LAN was
deactivated. Once the additional users and needs were identified, periods were identified so participants
could use a Wi-Fi bubble to handle administrative needs or perform other experiments.

4.9     Training and Education—“If you didn’t make a mistake, you
        weren’t training.”
Training and Education are imperative if public safety, military, and non-government personnel are going
to effectively conduct and use interoperable communications in multidiscipline, multiagency, multi-hazard,
and catastrophic event response. Leaders at all levels, but especially the middle and upper management
levels, need to know how to effectively request and use military resources, Civil Support Team
assistance, and a wide variety of federal support. Military and federal officials and programs need to
simplify their offerings and terminology, and then brief their capabilities; making it easier for incident
command personnel to obtain what they need the first time they request it.



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Weave training and education into the collaborative training event planning and execution processes.
When participants attend initial, mid term, and final planning conferences, there should be one day of
training at each conference coupled with a day of planning. Tailor the training to the goals and objectives
of the participating agencies. As the event approaches, continue tailoring the training to meet the
participants refined training needs.

Collaborative training events meet organizational training objectives while providing opportunities for
other agencies to participate. Use training and education opportunities to prepare participants for large-
scale exercises.

4.9.1        Intelligence Workshops—Inform Civil Authorities and Educate
             Intelligence Providers

As participating agency training objectives became clear, GP08 planners were able to involve a variety of
intelligence agencies. The agencies helped develop realistic intelligence play that was used to enhance
the scenario and add realism to the various training event elements. Involvement of intelligence personnel
provided a unique opportunity for public safety and intelligence agencies to interact and work on shared
issues.

4.9.2        Benefits of Collaborative Training to Local Participants

While some of the following are in other discussions, they are included here to answer the question,
“What impact did a collaborative civil military training event have on local or regional agencies and
organizations?” Overall, the most significant benefit was the establishment and maintenance of
relationships. Local and regional officials now have faces and relationships to put with the names and
titles of those that will be providing some type of help during the next natural disaster. While there are
established and practiced protocols and procedures to follow, there is the awareness that they can reach
out to counterparts before, during, and after the initiation of protocols. Identified local benefits follow:

     •   SDPD Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) trained with the FBI to stop and apprehend heavily
         armed suspects during a chase while rescuing a hostage. Players observed each other’s
         equipment and procedures, providing lessons learned regarding training rules of engagement,
         safety, interoperable communications, and procedures.
     •   SDPD SWAT, FBI, SDFD hazardous materials (HAZMAT), and a Civil Support Team worked
         together to apprehend suspects, rescue a hostage, perform triage, and then decontaminate all
         participants in an environment contaminated with a bio hazard. The incident required sharing of
         radios, which led to rapid acquisition and deployment of an ACU1000 to facilitate interoperable
         communications between SDPD, FBI, and other agencies during similar operations. Difficulties
         encountered during wearing of protective equipment led to development of solutions that were
         shared with all participants.
     •   Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Southern California Agency participated in GP08 as part of a
         unified command established by CBP. The BIA participation led to the following:
              o The unified command led to coordination with NIUSR, which sent a plane with medical
                  supplies to Rincon Fire Department, who had obtained permission to use the Pauma
                  Valley airport for this event.
              o The Rincon Fire Department delivered the medicine to the local Indian health clinic,
                  which was then responsible for distributing the medicine to five local communities.
              o The Agency wrote several lessons learned that open the door for creation or identification
                  of a BIA emergency preparedness contact person or persons to coordinate training and
                  real emergency event participation.
              o The tribes expressed a desire for contact earlier in the planning process, improving the
                  likelihood they can participate in future collaborative training events.




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            o    The Agency determined that the tribes have trained and certified first responders
                 available and that the tribes expressed a desire to participate in (create) mutual aid
                 agreements. “Relationships need to be made by the city, county, and state governments.”
    •   Three local hospitals worked closely with local public safety, DEA, and MAG-46 to accomplish
        several mutually beneficial training objectives. Specifics follow:
            o Scripps Memorial Hospital (private company) had access to dedicated seat in PD
                 communications vehicle to coordinate incident related communications between incident
                 command (PD) and hospital security. One observer with wide medical/hospital
                 experience was amazed and recommended this as a best practice.
            o Discussion with PD representative also indicated that the PD has mutual aid
                 channels/talkgroups on the city communications system (as does the county regional
                 communications system) for hospital/medical communications during incident response.
            o University of California San Diego Medical Center, Hillcrest and La Jolla (Thornton
                 Hospital) worked with the University of California San Diego Campus Police Department,
                 DEA, and Chula Vista PD (activated by mutual aid agreement) to secure, transport by
                 helo, deliver, and secure a pharmaceutical cache between hospitals, using the Scripps
                 Memorial Hospital helo pad. Local law enforcement and the DEA participated in the
                 return of the cache. Lessons learned during the 2007 wildfires prompted the objectives
                 and plan used for this collaborative training.
            o Hospital security personnel worked closely with several local law enforcement agencies
                 to maintain order and crowd control while other local law enforcement personnel
                 maintained traffic control.
            o Hospital staff performed triage, decontamination, and other mass-casualty related drills in
                 a mock biohazard environment.
    •   Local police and fire departments were exposed to the chemical, biological, radiological, and
        nuclear response and communication resources and capabilities of the National Guard Civil
        Support Teams. Additionally, first responders experienced the procedures used during
        decontamination activities and developed invaluable relationships and an understanding of what it
        takes to activate a CST.
    •   Regional decision makers were exposed to the volume, type, and procedures associated with
        obtaining imagery to support the end user. The same decision makers also learned how and
        when to request military support and how the military prioritizes its response.
    •   Regional decision makers learned how to obtain large volumes of information to improve
        situational awareness. They also learned about the challenges associated with establishing and
        maintaining the infrastructure necessary to support the information flow.
    •   Understanding of military support, and how to obtain it, was gained by all who participated in
        DSCA training sessions provided during some of the planning and intelligence phases of Golden
        Phoenix. Local public safety personnel know they can request help and have a realistic
        understanding of what may be provided.

4.9.3       Relationships are Critical to the Success of Collaborative Response (for
            Real or for Training)

GP08 was an extremely effective professional networking activity that allowed participants to build
working relationships that will last a lifetime! GP08 was not a social event that provided everyone a
chance to swap cards, listen to sales pitches, and move on. Instead, GP08 brought diverse people with
diverse skills together to address and solve shared problems. Relationships were built and matured
because folks had to work together to solve tough problems.

4.9.4       Collaborative Training Events need a Dedicated and Funded Small Staff

Though collaborative and developed from the bottom up, training events with 148 participating
agencies/organizations require more than three or four people planning, coordinating, and carrying out


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the training event as a collateral duty. Effective training does not require a budget of 12 to 32 million per
event, but should have the funds necessary to pay key planners and coordinators, a data/information
capture team, event analysis team, and the after action report writer/editor.

Participant safety regarding role player rules of engagement and equipment use and operation must be
addressed. A dedicated staff (small staff) should include the roles of safety planner/controller to anticipate
and minimize real threats to training event participants.

Have focused planning cells for key planning issues (for example, communications). A dedicated group of
planners focuses on key aspects of the training event (for example, candidates, communications, PIO,
vendor integration, scenario, public information, and public affairs). The focused teams would plan their
parts of the training event while collaborating with the planning committee. The various pieces would then
be integrated in the larger collaborative training event plan and scenario.

4.9.4.1       Participating Agencies Selected and Published their Training Objectives
Description–Collaborative training events provide participants the opportunity to establish their own
training objectives and/or training events (often called training modules) that fit into the main event. The
event staff and the planning and communications committees receive these objectives, allowing them to
identify collaboration opportunities and develop a scenario capable of supporting accomplishment of the
various participant training objectives.
4.9.4.2       Civil Authorities Have Three Paths to Request Support from DoD
Description–GP08 and earlier Golden Phoenix events clearly demonstrate the need to constantly train
and reinforce the proper methods for requesting DoD support. (Debrief sessions and observations) The
three avenues to request support are:
      •   Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA),
      •   Immediate Request Authority (IRA), and
      •   Mutual Aid Agreement (established before it is needed).
DSCA
Support from DoD is requested by the state. In California, local and regional authorities would elevate
their request for support to the California Office of Emergency Services. The state then requests the
support from the federal government, which in turn would determine availability and provide if possible.
IRA
If a region has a significant military presence, local authorities may request support. The local
commander, for example the commander of MAG-46, has the authority for 72 hours to determine whether
their assets and personnel may be used to provide the requested support. If a disaster is not declared
and higher authority does not approve support, expenses incurred during the response come from the
command’s operating budget.
Mutual Aid Agreement
Mutual aid agreements are common between first responder agencies. In this case, the agreement would
be between similar first responder agencies. For example, a local fire department might establish an
agreement between their department and the Federal Fire Department on a nearby base to provide
backfill or other types of support.
Regulations Relevant to Use of DoD Assistance
The use of DoD assets and resources in the support of civil authorities is governed by the following three
regulations: Stafford Act, the Posse Comitatus Act, and the Insurrection Act. Individuals wanting to obtain
a better understanding of what DoD and DoD commands are allowed to do should spend time reviewing
these pieces of legislation.




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4.9.4.3      No Fault Environment Promotes Effective Training, Learning, and Interaction
Description–The GP08 training event was a no fault training environment. Participants had plenty of
room to make mistakes and identify solutions. The mistakes usually point to significant gaps or issues
that can often be resolved effectively at the appropriate levels. In some cases, problems were identified
by participants and resolved on the spot (for example, law enforcement in personal protective equipment
could not be understood by dispatcher or others on the talkgroup until the officer exercised their own
initiative and turned the sound amplifier in the mask off). Other problems or issues led to procedure
updates, procedure development, identification of training objectives, and so on. All of the solutions are
not expensive and were accomplished with little to no political turmoil. (Observer notes, hotwash,
debriefs, and NDU AAR)

4.10 Overall Training Recommendations
Training can make a substantial improvement in the knowledge responders possess and their ability to
apply that knowledge to the incident at hand. Many of the deficiencies in performance or knowledge as
displayed by responders and communications specialists during the training event can be rectified by an
increase in applicable training. Many participants responded to questions with an honest “I don’t know…”
or when given details regarding available regional resources an equally honest “I didn’t know that.”
Develop a training protocol that includes the whole spectrum of emergency responders from the local to
the state and federal levels. Although by no means exhaustive, some additional examples of
recommended training opportunities that could be pursued include:
    1. Discipline-specific communications training. Trainings of this type are available through groups
       such as Association of Public Safety Communications Officials (APCO), National Emergency
       Number Association (NENA), ARES, etc.
    2. Computer aided simulations specific to interoperable communications or multi-jurisdictional
       incidents.
    3. Regional subject matter experts who can either instruct or become instructors in applicable
       training topics through train-the-trainer courses.
    4. Routine training opportunities such as weekly radio-net tests, etc.
The following are some online training resources:
Texas Engineering Extension Service (TE-EX) http://www.teexwmdcampus.com/ has two online
courses of interest:
    •     WMD 005, WMD/Terrorism Awareness for Emergency Responders
    •     WMD 006, WMD Incident Management/Unified Command Concept
Upon completion you will receive certifications from NERRTC (National Emergency Response & Rescue
Training Center), DHS, and the OG&T (State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness).
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) "NETC (National Emergency Training Center)
Virtual Campus" at http://www.training.fema.gov/wrningBanner.asp has two online courses of interest:
    •     IS 100, Introduction to Incident Command System for Federal Disaster Workers
    •     IS 700, Introduction to NIMS (National Incident Management System)
Upon completion, you will receive certifications from the Emergency Management Institute and the United
States Fire Administration.
NTPI (National Terrorism Preparedness Institute) at http://terrorism.spcollege.edu produces monthly TV
News Magazine style shows called CoMNET (Communications, News, Equipment, and Training) and Live
Response.




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Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) at http://cdp.dhs.gov/training.html provides classes for law
enforcement, public works, hazardous materials, medical services, emergency management, public
official, fire and rescue professional, and other emergency response personnel. The CDP is the
Department of Homeland Security’s only federally chartered weapons of mass destruction (WMD) training
center. The training is completely funded for state or local responders by the Department of Homeland
Security.




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5.      Training Event Overview
Collaborative Training Events help participants develop interpersonal and interagency relationships that
improve collaboration and cooperation during incident response and recovery. While allowing participants
to accomplish training objectives, the training events also provide a no fault environment for identifying
issues with interoperable communications and other critical support functions that could occur during a
large-scale multiagency incident. This AAR identifies several best practices and lessons learned with
recommendations to address those issues. ICTAP uses a first responder driven approach to ensure
realistic responses to exercise events and to obtain unvarnished input from actual users of the various
communication systems. The approach minimizes ambiguity and helps ensure effective interoperable
communication solutions are identified and implemented.
“Communications Interoperability refers to the ability of public safety agencies to talk across disciplines
and jurisdictions via radio communication systems, exchanging voice and/or data with one another on
demand, in real time, when needed, and as authorized. 1 ” Agencies included in the exercise are local,
state, and, often, federal agencies operating in close proximity. Traditional first responders include law
enforcement, fire departments, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency management
support. Other agency disciplines that could be included in critical incidents include public service
organizations, utilities, communications carriers, transportation services, private security forces, and other
involved groups with communications needs.
The Golden Phoenix 2008 training event includes a wide range of public safety, government, military, and
industry agencies and organizations. The event facilitator and planners planned and conducted the
training event:

5.1     Participating Organizations
Exercise participants included representatives from the following organizations.

5.1.1        Local Agencies

City of San Diego

Emergency Ops Center                                       Fire and Rescue Department
Office of Homeland Security                                Police Department
Public Information Officer

San Diego County

Emergency Ops Center                                       Hazardous Incident Response Team
Public Health                                              Public Information Officer
Rincon Fire Department                                     San Diego OES
San Diego Sheriff’s Department




1
 Interoperability Continuum Brochure. Office of Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC), U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. April 2005. http://www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/5C103F66-A36E-4DD1-A00A-
54C477B47AFC/0/ContinuumBrochure40505.pdf. Page 2



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5.1.2        State Agencies

California

J6 (communications)                                 Los Angeles Sheriffs Department
National Guard 9th Civil Support Team               Office of Emergency Services
Office of Homeland Security                         San Diego State University Visualization Lab
University of California Police Department

Oregon

National Guard 102nd Civil Support Team

Arizona

Arizona State University

5.1.3        Federal Agencies
5.1.3.1      Non Military

Department of Homeland Security

Customs and Border Protection                       National Protection and Programs Directorate
Science and Technology Directorate                  Transportation Security Administration

Bureau of Indian Affairs

Southern California Agency

Department of Justice

DEA                                                 FBI

Department of Energy

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory              Z Division

Department of Health and Human Services

Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Global Migration and Quarantine

Intelligence Community

Various agencies




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5.1.3.2     Military

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and
                                                     JPM Guardian Installation Protection Program
Biological Defense

USMC

HQMC                                                 Marine Corps Installations West
Marine Forces North                                  1st Marine Expeditionary Force
4th Marine Aircraft Wing                                 MAG-46
     Marine Aircraft Group-41                            Marine Wing Support Squadron-473
     Marine Wing Communication Squadron-48               Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron-452
     Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron-234       Marine Light Attach Helicopter Squadron-775

US Navy

Commander Navy Reserve Forces Command                Naval Environmental Preventative Medicine Unit-5
Naval Health Research Center                         Naval Medical Center Balboa
Naval Medical Research Center                        Naval Operational Medical Lessons Learned
                                                     Center
Naval Space and Warfare Systems Center San           Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers
Diego

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Instrumentation Branch

5.1.4       Private Organizations

Non-Governmental Organizations

American Red Cross                                   Angel Flight
National Institute Urban Search and Rescue           Project K.I.D. HoldSafe
STAR-TIDES

Industry Observers

BAE Systems                                          Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line (North America) Inc.
PAR Government Systems                               QUALCOMM Wireless Business Solutions
Southwest Antennas (SWA)                             UAMS Medical Center Hospital Administration
Washington Safety Management Solutions               Western Operations

Hospitals

Scripps Memorial La Jolla Hospital                   University of California San Diego Medical Center,
                                                     Hillcrest and La Jolla (Thornton Hospital)


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Vendors

AC3 Systems                                            Advanced Products and Technology
Alion Science and Technology                           Balfour Technologies
Base-X                                                 Battelle
BW Solutions                                           CommsFirst
Compass Energy Solutions                               Connecting First Responders
Defentech                                              Echo Storm
Embedded Technologies Corp.                            Epsilon Systems Solutions Inc.
Fortified Data Communications                          Frontier Data Communications
GATR-Technologies                                      Global Mesh Technologies
GPSit                                                  Harris Corporation
Infusion Development                                   IP Access International
L-3                                                    Latitude Engineering
Lockheed Martin Corporation                            MedWeb
Mesh Cities                                            Microsoft Corporation
Morrow-Mobiles                                         Organizational Readiness Consultants
Polimatrix                                             Prawl Government Systems
Priora                                                 QuickSet International
Quintron                                               Ready2Protect
Reality Mobile                                         Retriever Software
RP Flight Systems                                      Sabre Systems, Inc.
Science Applications International Corporation         SightLogix
Shelter Systems                                        sStitch
Swan Island Networks, Inc.                             SYS Technologies
ThunderWorks Mobile Engineering                        Toucan Education
Twisted Pair                                           URS


5.2      Target Capabilities
5.2.1        Phase I (14 – 17 July)
Civil and military agencies conduct classified and unclassified workshops and training at a variety of
locations to discuss intelligence sharing, interagency coordination, and methods for moving and sharing
critical information. First responder and public safety agency intelligence needs are discussed and local,
state, and federal agencies share and practice processes for meeting those needs to address the
following capabilities:
     •   Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination
     •   Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings
     •   Intelligence Analysis and Production

5.2.2        Phase II (19 – 20 July)
This phase involves preparation and positioning of the various systems and personnel for Golden
Phoenix 2008 at the various venues.




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5.2.3       Phase III A – Federal/Civil Focus (21 July)
The CBP IMB Station will be the main location for local, state, and federal first responders as they
conduct training to address the following capabilities:
    •   Communications
    •   Planning
    •   Risk Management
    •   WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
    •   Isolation and Quarantine
    •   On Site Incident Management
    •   Responder Safety and Health
    •   Emergency Operations Center Management (minimal staffing)
    •   Emergency Public Information and Warning
    •   Laboratory Testing
    •   Emergency Public Safety and Security Response

5.2.4       Phase III B – DOD/NG/NGO/Industry Focus (21 July)
MCAS Miramar, Brown Field, San Diego State University, and Yuma, Arizona are the venues used by
public safety agencies, the military, the university, and industry to conduct training and address the
following capabilities:
    •   Communications
    •   Planning
    •   Risk Management
    •   WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
    •   Isolation and Quarantine
    •   On Site Incident Management
    •   Responder Safety and Health
    •   Laboratory Testing

5.2.5       Phase III C (22 July)
San Diego provides venues used for local and federal law enforcement, fire, and HAZMAT training
conducted with a National Guard Civil Support Team. The training venues are closed.
The CBP and MAG-46 use Brown Field is by to conduct humanitarian operations, communications, and
security training. Industry and non-government organizations conduct humanitarian operations and
communications and sensor experiments. At the SDSU Visualization Lab, the university, industry, and
non-government organizations conduct a variety of experiments.
A variety of industry and agency participants conduct training, demonstrations, and experiments at Yuma,
which focus on identifying and capturing the processes used to move large amounts of data and
information to end users located in an EOC and at Brown Field.




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5.2.6        Phase III D (23 July)
San Diego provides venues for security training involving military and public safety personnel at three
local hospitals.
Training, experiments, and operations continue at Brown Field, Yuma, and SDSU.

5.2.7        Phase IV (24 July)
Experiments continue in the morning at Brown Field and SDSU. In the afternoon, all Brown Field
participants pack up and depart the field. University, Industry, and Non-government organization
experiments continue until complete.
The key planners (invitation only) debrief on MCAS Miramar in the morning.

5.2.8        Phase V (25 July)
Hotwash takes place 9:00AM to 12:00 AM at the Hub, located on MCAS Miramar. All participants are
welcome to attend.

5.3      Golden Phoenix 2008 Training Event Objectives
While there are numerous agency, organization, and industry objectives, the primary objectives are:
     •   Identify Best Practices for Organizing and Conducting Combined Civilian Military Operations
     •   Identify the Processes and Methods for Moving Data obtained from Unmanned Aerial Systems to
         End Users (Emergency Operation Centers and Front Line Personnel)
     •   Provide Civilian Public Safety and Military Personnel Opportunities to Train Together
     •   Train with and Use Interoperable Communications Procedures and Equipment
     •   Identify and Evaluate Viable Communications and Command System Infrastructure capable of
         supporting Interoperable Communications (Technical, Human, and Cultural) between Non-
         government Organization, Public Safety Organization, Military, and Industry Personnel
     •   Provide Industry the Opportunity to Experiment with and Evaluate Communication and
         Processing Systems designed to Support Organizations and Agencies Performing Disaster
         Response
The training event was conducted in a format that allowed players to implement their plans and
procedures in a no-fault learning environment. At the same time, observers collected information to
identify best practices and lessons learned during training.




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6.      Training Event Summary

6.1     Training Event Planning and Preparation
6.1.1       Organization and Process
The Golden Phoenix 2008 planning team developed a plausible and effective incident scenario involving
a response coordinated across multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions. Regional exercise planners
incorporated critical communications interoperability elements into the training event. The interoperable
communications focus provided an opportunity to identify and document gaps in current capabilities and
processes. The communications focus also sparked productive discussions among scenario players that
enabled the sharing of different approaches and operating procedures with other jurisdictions.

6.1.2       Scope
The scope for play during Golden Phoenix 2008 was broad and included areas or modules focused on
responding to and recovering from a multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional incident.
The training event was NOT designed to focus on equipment performance or personnel competency.

6.2     Golden Phoenix 2008 Training Event Scenario
The key participants developed a plausible incident scenario capable of supporting several training
modules to help first responders from local, state, federal, and private organizations meet their training
objectives. Additionally, when industry partners, vendors, or NGOs shared experiment objectives or
training objectives, they were incorporated into the scenario, if their participation did not jeopardize other
training objectives. The scenario is unique to San Diego County and other regions with an international
border.
The following biohazard scenario was used for Golden Phoenix 2008:
        Overview
        Terrorists from an unidentified island nation planned and carried out the development,
        testing, and delivery of weaponized anthrax to a large United States city. The bio agent
        was delivered by sea and over land. U.S. intelligence obtained credible information about
        the plan only after the delivery phase of the attack was already in motion.
        Due to the credible nature of the threat, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) requested
        and received support from the Department of Defense. MAG-46 aircraft began
        conducting patrols with CBP air assets. MAG-46 deployed to support air operations,
        provide security for their air operations, and respond to other contingencies. Additionally,
        the California National Guard 9th CST and Oregon Army National Guard 102nd CST were
        deployed to the region to provide support as needed.
        Given the viable nature of the threat and the anticipated route of delivery, DoD and CBP
        unmanned aerial systems were tasked to provide reconnaissance support (actually flown
        in Yuma, though during an incident of this type they would have flown in the southern part
        of San Diego County) to public safety personnel.
        Day 1
        On Day 1, 10 suspects were observed just north of the border between the United States
        and Mexico. CBP and USMC air assets with law enforcement teams onboard landed and
        apprehended the 10 suspects, broke them into two groups and flew them back to the
        Navy Outlying Landing Field Imperial Beach. The suspects were transported to the CBP


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        IMB (Customs and Border Protection Imperial Beach) station for questioning. As part of
        the booking process, bricks of a white, powder like substance were discovered in the
        backpacks of the 10 suspects. Suspecting methamphetamines, the CBP notified the
        DEA. DEA and CBP agents began interrogating the suspects. At some point, the
        unidentified white substance was tested by the DEA. Results were negative for any
        known drug. The DEA and CBP notified their respective chains of command. The DEA
        also notified the FBI, which notified its HAZMAT personnel. CBP also contacted San
        Diego Fire Department HAZMAT, who responded to CBP IMB. CBP also informed MAG-
        46 Air Operations at MCAS Miramar that the helicopter and Marines onboard had been
        exposed to anthrax. Air Operations directed the helicopter to Miramar East, a remote part
        of the MCAS, where the 102nd CST from the Oregon Army National Guard was deployed.
        The 9th CST, deployed in the vicinity of CBP IMB, suited up and tested the unknown
        substance, which turned out to be anthrax. Throughout this process, CBP IMB was
        quarantined with its duties assumed by the Chula Vista station. SDFD and the 9th CST
        would decontaminate personnel and the station. County Public Health would administer
        prophylactic doses of doxycycline. The FBI would take charge of the remaining biohazard
        material for evidentiary purposes and for disposition.
        After the Marine helicopter landed, the 102nd CST, Navy BARD, and Federal FD
        HAZMAT decontaminated the Marine crew and the helicopter.
        Events in Yuma focused on identifying the processes and methods required to deliver
        large volumes of imagery from UAS ground stations to personnel (end users) in a
        notional EOC, which was emulated by the SDSU Visualization Lab. The SDSU
        Visualization Lab focused on processing the data, forwarding it to end users at Brown
        Field, and using the data and their capabilities to evaluate the common operational
        picture (COP) and situational awareness (SA) equipment provided and operated by
        Golden Phoenix 2008 industry partners.
        Military, vendor, and NGO personnel would be setting up operations concurrently at
        Brown Field. MAG-46 would set up a base camp and Combat Operations Center (COC)
        while the NIUSR would be the incident command post for vendor and NGO personnel
        conducting training and experiments at Brown Field. The Marines would provide security
        for the entire compound, while the non military participants would be a notional refugee
        camp, with participants identifying and testing operation and set up of their equipment in
        a field environment. The only facilities provided by MAG-46 to the vendor and NGO
        participants were sanitation facilities (porta potties). Vendors and NGOs were expected to
        check in, set up, and provide their own power, shelter, communications, and so on.
        Day 2
        On Day 2, operations, training, and experiments would continue at Yuma, SDSU
        Visualization Lab, and Brown Field. Training modules were also set up for a variety of
        regional and federal law enforcement, regional HAZMAT, and National Guard CST
        assets.
        In the morning, San Diego Police Department and FBI teams would practice assaults in
        environments requiring the use of personal protective equipment. San Diego Fire and
        Rescue HAZMAT would work with CST personnel to decontaminate law enforcement and
        apprehended terrorist suspects.
        In the afternoon, SDPD and FBI personnel would practice a hostage rescue scenario
        involving terrorist suspects and a hostage.
        Day 3
        On Day 3, operations, training, and experiments would continue at Yuma, SDSU
        Visualization Lab, and Brown Field with all three venues terminating operations toward
        the end of the day. Training modules were set up for a variety of regional and federal law
        enforcement, staff at three local hospitals, and MAG-46 aircraft.


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        The scenario on Day 3 involves citizens, who have heard about the possible release of a
        biohazard, self-referring to local hospitals to obtain treatment for a variety of symptoms
        they believe are related to the attack. Hospitals and regional public health are responding
        to the crisis, preparing to deliver prophylactic medicines to the communities exposed to
        the biohazard.
        Hospitals set up triage, treatment, and decontamination areas. They request crowd
        management support from local law enforcement and specialized support from federal
        law enforcement. A MAG-46 helicopter is tasked to bring in a law enforcement crowd
        management team in full personal protective equipment to manage the growing crowds.
        Hospitals will work to maintain security and treat victims.
        Routine operations would continue at all three hospitals during this training module.
        The county EOC would be activated to aid in coordination and observation of the
        response to the scenario. Public Information Officers would be deployed by the various
        agencies participating in the training and by the hospitals.
        The hospital scenario would last about an hour at each participating hospital. As
        experiments were concluded at the other venues, they would terminate operations.
After completing the training event, exercise players, observers, and support personnel were given the
opportunity to talk and listen to each other during a facilitated hotwash period. The hotwash provided all
participants an opportunity to share their observations, correct misconceptions, and help improve
communications interoperability knowledge. Both exercise play and hotwash notes/comments were
consolidated through a process that identifies and discusses interoperable communication items (gaps)
and provides recommendations to eliminate the gap. Regional terminology, acronyms, and abbreviations
used in this document are recorded in the glossary (see Appendix A).




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7.       Conclusion
Golden Phoenix 2008 highlighted successes associated with the collaborative training approach:

     •   Collaborative training can be conducted using small or existing training budgets.
     •   While lacking much of the structure and funding associated with formal regional exercises
         developed from the top down, the low cost bottom up collaborative approach minimized the
         scrutiny associated with traditional exercises, while still leveraging HSEEP principles. Participants
         could play and make mistakes without endangering careers, grant opportunities, or future
         endeavors.
     •   While the collaborative training approach has been very low cost, measured support from federal
         sponsors for planning and facilitation is highly recommended for future events. It is very important
         that future sponsors maintain the no fault training environment and allow participants to control
         their own training objectives and assessments, and allow participants to provide overall
         leadership.
     •   The training provided a wide variety of non-traditional partners and gave participants the
         opportunity to build the relationships that will strengthen future collaborative training and enhance
         coordination during catastrophic incident response. To this point, there are several examples of
         enhanced response to San Diego firestorms because of relationships formed during Golden
         Phoenix events.
     •   Because training is focused on the tactical level by each agency’s objectives, there is no driving
         requirement or multi-jurisdictional funding for an Incident Command System (ICS) structure to be
         established in support of regional scenario play. It is recommended that future event planners
         identify early an agency interested in supporting regional training of the ICS for all participants.
         Once established, an ICS would generate additional real-world multi-jurisdictional response
         challenges.
     •   The Golden Phoenix events have provided important military-civil interoperability operations inter-
         action. The military and civil public safety cultures have many fundamental differences which may
         impede smooth coordination in an emergency. The military command and control is top down,
         while civil public safety responds in a collaborative command and control environment. Military
         equipment and operations have been developed with significant funding to meet missions
         primarily focused overseas, while civil systems and operations support a wide variety of domestic
         missions and are funded by individual jurisdictions. The Golden Phoenix approach brings
         together both officers and tactical level responders from these diverse cultures over an extended
         period and challenges the military to understand and support a civil response, while challenging
         civil agencies to utilize military resources that may one day be available for mutual aid during a
         real incident.
     •   Collaborative training events provided vendors, academics, and others the opportunity to operate
         and evaluate systems and procedures in field conditions; an environment essential to developing
         viable tools.
     •   Joint collaborative events such as Golden Phoenix are recommended as a Best Practice for any
         region of the nation. Out of the Ashes—Conducting Your Own Regional Collaborative Training
         Events is a white paper included in this report that provides the information necessary to do so.

Golden Phoenix 2008 highlighted several successes associated with a collaborative training event that
will positively influence public safety throughout the San Diego region:

     •   Imagery from unmanned aerial systems (UAS) can be delivered rapidly and effectively to end
         users in an EOC environment.
     •   Local, regional, state, federal, and nontraditional agencies and organizations throughout the
         region can work together effectively in a no fault, collaborative environment.



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     •   Initial procedures were identified/suggested for implementation of UAS into the National Incident
         Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS).
     •   Observers identified and documented best communication practices for satellite, wireless local
         area network, and interoperable communications in the region
     •   Collaboration tools and protocols were identified for incident response—with a minimum amount
         of training, these sites can become invaluable to supporting incident response and recovery.

The training event identified several opportunities for improving regional disaster response and
interoperable communications. Major recommendations, which are detailed in this report, include:

     •   Integrate interoperable communications, a critical support function, into all aspects of
         collaborative training and incident response and recovery.

         o   Collaborative training event leadership must establish a functional communications
             committee that works closely with the planning committee to identify realistic interoperable
             communications events for every scenario event and training module that occurs.
         o   Deploy a communications unit leader (COML) with a mandate for strong management of not
             only voice, but also wireless local area network, satellite, and all other incident response and
             recovery communications.
         o   Develop tools with open source applications and commercial systems to evaluate and
             manage the spectrum used to support disaster response and recovery operations.
         o   Develop, and then maintain, a comprehensive communications plan (ICS205) before the
             initial planning conference. Use the plan throughout the planning and event process.

     •   Work closely with industry partners and vendors to identify how they can support incident
         response and recovery operations. Provide them an opportunity to take part in training
         opportunities.
     •   Develop Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA), and other
         communication agreements.
     •   Address interagency and inter-jurisdictional communications, in existing and planned MAAs,
         encouraging the earliest implementation of interoperability possible.
     •   Develop regional interoperable SOPs in accordance with NIMS guidelines.
     •   Review and train all regional agencies in existing communication SOPs.
     •   Emphasize incorporating disparate communication resources into a communications
         interoperability plan.
     •   Consolidate key local agencies to regional standards based shared systems.
     •   Establish policies, procedures, and training to establish and operate a Unified Command system,
         including a designated COML.
     •   Disseminate information about regional communication interoperability capabilities to the user
         (field and dispatch) level on a regular basis.
     •   Continue to incorporate interoperable communications into existing local, regional, and state
         exercise and training opportunities.

Collaborative training events are recommended as an important step toward improving regional
communications interoperability and disaster response capabilities in any part of the nation. Perhaps the
greatest benefit is the establishment of interpersonal and interagency relationships, which have proven to
be invaluable during past real incident response. People learn who runs what and have the shared
experience that prepares them to ask for, or offer, mutual aid. The training event key findings identify best
practices and include lessons learned with recommendations. Acting on the various training event
recommendations will significantly improve regional communications. The training event success is a
testament to regional participants’ commitment to increased preparedness.




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Appendix A        Glossary

Item/Acronym    Definition
AAR             After Action Report
ACU1000         Also known as JPS, gateway device for linking disparate radios
AH-1            Cobra helicopter
AMOC            CBP Air and Marine Operations Center
amp             ampere – unit of measurement for electricity
Aux II          Auxiliary landing field associated with restricted airspace R2301W
                broadband global area network—works over international marine satellite
BGAN            communications. Charges by the amount of data sent (greater the file size, greater
                the cost.
BIA             Bureau of Indian Affairs
BORSTAR         Border Patrol, Search, Trauma, and Rescue
CBP             Customs and Border Protection
CH-46           Chinook helicopter
civmil.org      www.civmil.org – civilian military collaboration site
COC             Combat Operations Center
COML            Communications unit leader
COP             common operational picture
COTS            commercial off the shelf
CST             National Guard Civil Support Team
CUI             controlled unclassified information
DEA             Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS             Department of Homeland Security
DoD             Department of Defense
DSCA            Defense Support to Civilian Authorities
DTRA            Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EMS             Emergency Medical Services
EOC             Emergency Operations Center
FAC             forward air control
FAQ             frequently asked questions
FBI             Federal Bureau of Investigation
FD              fire department
FEMA            Federal Emergency Management
FPC             final planning conference
FRS             family radio service
GP08            Golden Phoenix 2008
GRS             general radio service
HAZMAT          Hazardous Materials
HSEEP           Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
ICS             Incident Command System




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Item/Acronym         Definition
ICTAP                Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program
IPC                  initial planning conference
IRA                  immediate request authority
LAN                  local area network
LED                  light emitting diode
MAA                  Mutual aid agreement
MAG                  Marine Air Group
MCAS                 Marine Corps Air Station
MMT                  Marine Mobile Air Traffic Control Team
MOU                  Memorandum of understanding
MPC                  mid planning conference
NDU                  National Defense University
NGO                  Nongovernmental Organization
NIMS                 National Incident Management System
NIUSR                National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue
OEC                  Office of Emergency Communications
PAO                  Public Affairs Officer
PD                   police department
PIO                  Public Information Officer
SA                   situational awareness
SATCOM               satellite communications
SDFD                 San Diego Fire Department
SDPD                 San Diego Police Department
SDSU                 San Diego State University
SOP                  Standard Operating Procedure
SWAT                 special weapons and tactics
UAS                  Unmanned aerial system
UCPD                 University of California San Diego Campus Police Department
UCSD                 University of California San Diego
UH-1                 Huey helicopter
USMC                 United States Marine Corps
VIP                  very important person
VPN                  virtual private network
                     very small aperture terminal—widely deployed, usually established with a set
VSAT                 amount of bandwidth for communications with guaranteed uplink and downlink
                     speeds
WAN                  wide area network
WLAN                 wireless local area network
WMD                  Weapons of Mass Destruction




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Appendix B Out of the Ashes – Conducting Your Own
Regional Collaborative Training Events




December 2008                                                           B-1
                               ICTAP-OEC-TRNWHTPAP-001-R0




               Conducting Your Own Collaborative Training Events

                                                   October 2008




      Out of the Ashes – Conducting Your
Own Regional Collaborative Training Events




          Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Out of the Ashes – Conducting Your Own Regional Collaborative Training Events
ICTAP-OEC-TRNWHTPAP-001-R0




Abstract
This white paper identifies the personal and organizational attributes, methods, and procedures
necessary for anyone and any organization with the will and supporting circumstances to propose, plan,
and conduct a collaborative training event.

American cities, towns, and villages routinely address a variety of challenges on their own and in
collaboration with others. Foremost among the challenges these communities face is the ability to
respond to and recover from disaster. While communities may prepare for disaster, it is difficult to train for
response and recovery in an efficient or effective manner because most of the variables are beyond their
control. Communities seldom have the opportunity to choose the disaster they will face, the extent and
type of damages incurred, and whom they will work with during the response and recovery!

Regional and Community Collaborative Training Events provide communities the opportunity to address
and improve the things they can control: interpersonal and interagency relationships, organizational and
leadership knowledge and skills, and the use of situational awareness tools to maintain a common
operating picture. Collaborative training events provide communities a low-cost opportunity to develop
interpersonal and interagency relationships, meet their training objectives, and improve their incident
command and management skills.

Communities remain the target of domestic and international terrorists. Plans discovered in the handbag
of the FBI’s “most wanted” woman point to a continued effort to plan and carry out attacks against
Americans. While terror is a threat, natural disaster routinely wreaks havoc, injuring or killing hundreds
each year while destroying billions in property and infrastructure. The reality and high probability of
natural disasters, possibility of terrorist attacks, and other mass casualty incidents should motivate
competing organizations to set aside differences and work together to build the social fabric necessary to
efficiently respond to unimagined scenes of destruction.




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Purpose
This white paper identifies the personal and organizational attributes, methods, and procedures
necessary for anyone and any organization with the will and supporting circumstances to propose, plan,
and conduct a collaborative training event.

Collaborative training events are low-cost training and education opportunities organized from the bottom
up by the agencies, organizations, and vendors willing to participate. The bottom up organization and
focus helps community and regional organizations leverage their training objectives, training budgets,
personnel, equipment, and relationships to improve their ability to respond and recover from a disaster.

The planning process and training event provide a no-fault venue to practice interoperable
communications (voice and data), become familiar with supporting agency personnel and procedures,
and build relationships with local, regional, and national organizations and agencies. In addition to
traditional participants, consider inviting nontraditional participants. These could include, but are not
limited to, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), vendors, Department of State, and Department of
Defense participants. The relationships and education gained improves integration of valuable capabilities
and services during disaster response and recovery.

Every community or region with a desire to practice interoperable communications, improve interpersonal
and interagency relationships, and develop effective and flexible response and recovery strategies should
be able to plan and carry out their own collaborative training event. Out of the Ashes – Conducting Your
Own Regional Collaborative Training Events provides the basic information, attributes, methods, and
procedures necessary for any community to plan for and conduct their own collaborative training event.


Introduction
American cities, towns, and villages routinely address a variety of challenges on their own and in
collaboration with others. Foremost among the challenges these communities face is the ability to
respond to and recover from disaster. While communities may prepare for disaster, it is difficult to train for
response and recovery in an efficient or effective manner because most of the variables are beyond their
control. Communities seldom have the opportunity to choose the disaster they will face, the extent and
type of damages incurred, and whom they will work with during the response and recovery!

Problem Description

Every American community faces potential disaster. Whether earthquakes, floods, wildfires, pandemic
influenza, hurricanes, severe weather, chemical spills, or terrorist attack; every community must prepare
to respond with all of the local, regional, state, and national resources available to them. While
“relationships” between these various agencies and organizations exist on paper, they are seldom
provided the opportunity to grow into strong personal relationships capable of building and maintaining a
resilient social fabric.

Communities may participate in exercises, but these are often very expensive and tied to disbursement of
money critical to resource acquisition. The importance of passing the exercise at all costs (avoiding the
reality or perception of failure) leads to tightly scripted and controlled training that fails to identify or fix
critical gaps or develop effective interagency working relationships. First responders may not have time to
develop and renew strong interpersonal and interagency relationships that allow disaster response
leaders and operators to perform quick resource integration during a crisis.




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Large-scale disasters are too big for one agency to handle alone. Since “…85 percent of our nation’s
critical infrastructure is controlled not by government but by the private sector 1 …” private companies with
critical infrastructure in the region should be invited to participate in collaborative training events.

Though the relationships established during a collaborative training event are invaluable, they are not
necessarily permanent since people retire, are promoted, or move to different agencies. For example, the
fire chief at the 2009 collaborative training event may not be there the following year. Communities need
an affordable training alternative that enables them to effectively prepare their first responders and
citizens to perform response and recovery operations with a wide variety of traditional and non-traditional
agencies and organizations. Communities also need an affordable tool to develop strong and effective
interpersonal relationships between first responders of all levels. Good interpersonal and interagency
relationships will help create organizational climates that facilitate interoperable communication
improvements and interagency collaboration and response. Collaborative training events are affordable
and prepare responders and citizens to work with each other.

White Paper Development

After planning for, conducting, and documenting the results of three Golden Phoenix collaborative training
events, it was apparent that this type of training was effective, economical, and beneficial to communities
across the country. Since the key leadership remained consistent for all three events, we interviewed
planners, coordinators, and facilitators for this year’s event. To obtain and distill the necessary
information, the authors of this white paper asked, “What is necessary for any community to create and
conduct their own low-cost collaborative training event?” It was clear the facilitators and planners had
some unique personal attributes critical to getting everything done. Informal discussions provided clear
indicators of the attributes essential to identifying future facilitators and leaders. The facilitators and
planners were quick to point out that they could not have succeeded without the support of their
respective organizations and the people that work with them. That led to the understanding that certain
organizational attributes were essential to success. Questions were drafted to identify attributes,
methods, and procedures. The authors conducted several interviews averaging an hour in length. The
resulting answers were examined to identify common threads, personal and organizational attributes,
methods, and procedures. The results led to the identification of roles that will help you develop your own
collaborative training event. The roles were broken into required and optional, with the attributes for each
listed to help identify personnel qualified to perform the role.

Reasons for Planning and Participating

Collaborative training events provide a no fault, low-cost opportunity to develop relationships with various
organizations, agencies, NGOs and businesses involved in disaster response and recovery.
Relationships foster trust and provide an improved awareness and understanding of each other’s
missions, responsibilities, and capabilities. As the planning process and event take place, learning is
reinforced and relationships grow. The planning process and event provide an opportunity for personnel
to develop the bonds and camaraderie essential for sustaining collaboration during long-term response
and recovery efforts.

Long-term results include complimentary and synergistic partnerships between regional, state, and
federal entities, NGOs, and industry. The partnerships identify ways to improve disaster response and
recovery, without the costly trial and error associated with most disaster responses.




1
    9/11Commission Report, the 9/11 Commission, Government Printing Office, August 2004.


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Planning and Conducting a Collaborative
Training Event
Funding

Community and regional priorities and methodologies should drive budget creation for collaborative
training events.

Training event costs should come from agency operations or training budgets – each agency pays their
own way. Golden Phoenix training costs came from the operations and training budgets of participating
agencies and organizations. The following are proposed budget line items:

Facilitator/Coordinator – A neutral individual with the attributes identified in Table 1. This could be a
collateral job for small collaborative training events, or a dedicated assignment for larger ones.

Observers/Analysts – Paid or volunteer personnel during the Initial Planning Conference (IPC), Midterm
Planning Conference (MPC), and Final Planning Conference (FPC). Many of these positions could be
volunteer or internship positions from local universities, colleges, and academies. Table 1 and Table 2
identify the attributes for these positions.

Additional funding considerations:

Regional governing authorities could sponsor or conduct collaborative training events, by providing
funding to support public safety agency training.

When regional agencies participate in major exercises, a portion of the exercise funds are usually
mandated for conferences and training. Spend some of that money on a collaborative training event. The
collaborative training event could improve regional capabilities and preparedness consistent with the
exercise goals and objectives. Using a collaborative training event provides an opportunity to address
gaps or issues prior to the exercises – when done as part of exercise preparation.

Regional Focus

Collaborative training events enable effective training in your region. Ensure the team maintains a
regional focus. To develop a strong and motivating regional focus, consider doing some or all of the
following items:

    •   Provide training that is specific to realistic regional threats – identify your major regional threat(s).
    •   Define the scenario – regional participants play to that scenario.
    •   Emphasize regional focus to expose all participating entities to regional strengths and
        weaknesses – laying the groundwork for future cooperation and collaboration.

Evaluation

Success Criteria

Collaborative training events, and the procedures involved in making them a success, contribute directly
to successful incident response and recovery. Initial evaluation criteria consist of tracking regional
interest. Organizations invited to participate, the number that participated in each of the planning



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conferences, and finally, the number that participated in the actual event. Did the numbers increase or
decrease? Are more organizations interested in the next one? A successful event would see growth in
interest. Participant skill levels are another metric for measuring success.

Participating organizations answer post-event questions in a positive manner or with items that can be
effectively examined and addressed, the collaborative training event was a success. For example, here
are some post-event questions that can be distributed via surveys or answered at a hotwash:

    •    How effective was the collaborative training event in helping your agency, organization, or
         company achieve your training objectives?
    •    How did the training event improve your communications interoperability with other
         organizations?
    •    How did the training event improve your ability to work with other organizations?
    •    What gaps, issues, or failures did participating entities identify that need to be fixed?

Another measure of success would be training event debriefs asking participants what they learned,
whether or not they achieved their training objectives, and that encourages them to identify successes or
failures they observed or were part of. Remember, this is not for attribution, so individual people or
agencies should not be criticized by name. Identify the local and regional issues, and ways to fix them.

Evaluation Tools and Techniques

Use direct observation of the collaborative training event, submission of participant ICS214 (Unit Activity
Log), participating entity after action report submissions, notes taken during the collaborative training
event hotwash, and observer team debriefs to develop a collaborative training event after action report.
The report identifies community or regional best practices and lessons learned. When lessons learned
are identified, there should be recommendations included that provide a way to address the issue.

Use the training event to evaluate various systems or technologies for regional use. Share information
developed during this process with regional clients and the vendor that demonstrated or operated the
specific system.

While some organizations may want to evaluate their play, evaluation in the strict sense used during
exercises should be avoided during training events. The objective is to provide an arena and scenario
that allow participating agencies to achieve training objectives, even if mistakes are made during the
training. Many of the best lessons learned are a result of mistakes. Instead of pointing fingers and laying
blame, participants have the opportunity to work together to identify and fix the real problems.

Observers with a good understanding of the training objectives observe participants and record what
happens. Placed at various incident sites, they will be able to identify and capture a set of criteria defined
by the collaborative training event sponsors and planners. Ideally, the observer and documentation team
would be a neutral third party.

Every Participating Entity Benefits From the Evaluation

Collaborative training events are a no-fault training environment, not hurting anyone, but allowing them to
look back and see if they met their training objectives.

Collaborative training event participants will see the final after action report. They can use the best
practices, lessons learned, and recommendations to:

    •    Improve all aspects of communications interoperability,
    •    Fix issues while preparing for a larger field exercise,


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    •   Influence local, regional, and state policy about issues of importance to local and regional first
        responders, and
    •   Use the contacts and relationships created during the training event to get things done!


Roles and Personal Attributes
Collaborative training events require a small team of personnel from participating organizations to
facilitate participation, lead planning efforts, and observe, analyze, and document event results. The team
must be open to traditional and non-traditional participants or organizations with new or different ideas.
With regional threats and training objectives in mind, the team must be able to make tough decisions
quickly as needed. Roles are broken into two categories, required and optional. Role descriptions follow
each matrix (Table 1 and Table 2). Attribute descriptions follow the optional role descriptions.

Communities and regions make collaborative training event staffing decisions based on their objectives
and the availability of personnel and resources. Identifying the Facilitator/Coordinator is the most critical
decision. They must have all of the attributes listed below and be perceived as neutral by the principle
participating agencies. It is important to note that many of the roles are similar to roles identified in the
Incident Command System. If your region has, or wants to develop, these National Incident Management
System Incident Command System (NIMS ICS) roles, use NIMS ICS for the planning process and during
the event. Table 1 provides a list of required and optional roles with recommended attributes.

Required Roles

The roles in Table 1 are essential to the successful planning and execution of a collaborative training
event. For small events, the roles could be a collateral assignment performed by a willing and qualified
member of a participating agency. As event size grows, participating agencies may want to assign an
individual to perform the role as their only job during the planning process and training event (10 to 12
months), or hire qualified individuals to perform various roles.

                          Table 1. Required Roles and Associated Attributes



                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Planners and Participants
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Shares Experiences with

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Open/Easy to Talk To,
                                                                                                                                                    Builds and Maintains
                                                  Persuasive Speaker



                                                                                   Not Afraid to Take a




                                                                                                                                                                           Narrowly Focused
                                                                                                                                                                           An Expert, but not
                               Right Motivation




                                                                                                                                                                                                Condescending
                                                                                                                                                                                                Competent, not
                                                                                                                                  Driven, but not



                                                                                                                                                    Relationships




  Roles
                                                                                   Political Hit




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             Personable
                                                                                                                                  Obsessive
                                                                       Organized




                                                                                                          Confident

                                                                                                                      Resilient




  Facilitator/Coordinator      X                  X                    X                X                 X           X              X                   X                     X                   X                   X                          X
  Facilitator Assistant        X                  X                    X                X                 X           X              X                   X                     X                   X                   X                          X
  Communications
  Planner                      X                                       X                                  X           X              X                   X                     X                   X                   X
  Observer Coordinator                                                 X                                                                                                       X                                       X                          X
  Planning Team
  Members                      X                                       X                                  X                                              X                     X                   X                   X                          X



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                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Planners and Participants
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Shares Experiences with

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Open/Easy to Talk To,
                                                                                                                                                        Builds and Maintains
                                                      Persuasive Speaker



                                                                                       Not Afraid to Take a




                                                                                                                                                                               Narrowly Focused
                                                                                                                                                                               An Expert, but not
                                   Right Motivation




                                                                                                                                                                                                    Condescending
                                                                                                                                                                                                    Competent, not
                                                                                                                                      Driven, but not



                                                                                                                                                        Relationships
    Roles




                                                                                       Political Hit




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Personable
                                                                                                                                      Obsessive
                                                                           Organized




                                                                                                              Confident

                                                                                                                          Resilient
    Data/Info Capture
    Team Members                                                           X                                  X                                              X                     X                                                                  X

Facilitator/Coordinator

Leads and facilitates planning conferences, collaborative training event, and activities necessary to
achieve desired goals and objectives. Reaches out to agencies, organizations, industry partners, and
nongovernmental organizations. Guides planning process and scenario development. Resolves issues
between organizations. Leads post-event hotwash and debrief activities.

Facilitator Assistant

A peer that works closely with the facilitator. Attends meetings when there are schedule conflicts, steps in
for the facilitator when needed due to other obligations, and serves as a lead for distinct or remote
incident locations. Your training event may have additional venues requiring the same planning,
coordination, and facilitation as that done by the Facilitator/Coordinator.

Planning Team Member

Planning Team members are key members of participating agencies, organizations, and vendors that
work with the various committees to develop plans and scenarios that allow achievement of training
objectives.

Communications Planner

Coordinates and plans training event and support communications (voice and data). The scope depends
on the region, but may include voice, WLAN, SATCOM, and other communication mediums. The planner
should address frequency or channel use and management, equipment and user manuals, mutual aid
channels, and interoperable communication procedures. Ideally, the regional communications planner is
a qualified Communications Unit Leader (COML) familiar with the region’s major communication systems.
Include industry partners (hospitals, logistics, critical infrastructure operations, and so on).

Observer Coordinator

Manages observers and data/information capture team members, leads data and information capture
during the collaborative training event (if possible, during the planning phases too), and analyzes and
reports results. Responsibilities may include writing the after action report.




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Data/Information Capture Team Members

At least one member of this team handles Facilitator/Coordinator (and when needed, Assistant Facilitator)
scheduling, attends meetings and conferences to take minutes/notes, and receives copies of all
Facilitator/Coordinator (and when needed, Assistant Facilitator) emails (to support scheduling and for
archival purposes). Archives all collaborative training event correspondence. Other data or information
capture team members could be short-term observers. Ensure observers are qualified or receive
appropriate training.

Optional Roles

Choosing optional roles in Table 2 depends on the size, scope, and resources available to support a
collaborative training event in your community or region. For small events, the roles could be a collateral
assignment. As event size grows, participating agencies may assign someone to perform a role full-time
or hire a qualified individual to perform the role. Do not overlook possibility of using a qualified volunteer
that can commit to doing the assigned tasks.

                           Table 2. Optional Roles and Associated Attributes




                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Planners and Participants
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Shares Experiences with

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              Open/Easy to Talk To,
                                                                                                                                                     Builds and Maintains
                                                Persuasive Speaker



                                                                                    Not Afraid to Take a




                                                                                                                                                                            Narrowly Focused
                                                                                                                                                                            An Expert, but not
                             Right Motivation




                                                                                                                                                                                                 Condescending
                                                                                                                                                                                                 Competent, not
                                                                                                                                   Driven, but not



                                                                                                                                                     Relationships
  Roles
                                                                                    Political Hit




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              Personable
                                                                                                                                   Obsessive
                                                                     Organized




                                                                                                           Confident


                                                                                                                       Resilient




  Funds Manager              X                                       X                                     X                                              X                     X                                                                  X
  Logistics
  Coordinator
                             X                                       X                                     X                                              X                     X                   X                                              X
  Event PIO                  X                  X                    X                                     X                                              X                     X                   X                   X                          X
  SMEs as needed             X                                       X                                     X                                                                    X                                                                  X

Funds Manager

Secures, manages, tracks, and distributes shared funds. May be necessary when event and planning
process uses contractors or consultants to fill the required or optional roles.

Logistics Coordinator

Secures shared resources deemed essential to the successful completion of the training event or
planning process.

Event Public Information Officer (PIO)

Works with facilitator and staff to identify, develop, and disseminate training event related press releases,
coordinates media observation or participation. Participates in planning sessions to identify training and



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education opportunities for participating agency PIOs. Collaborative training involvement with media
should be defined based on community needs and experience.

Personal Attribute Descriptions

These are the attributes necessary for people to fill the various roles identified in this white paper.

Right Motivation – Individual recognizes need for collaborative training, and makes that their primary
motive for participating. Promotion and recognition are not what motivates them.

Persuasive Speaker – Individual can explain and convince listeners. Listeners feel like they matter and
want to be part of what is being proposed. Listeners are motivated to tell others about the event.

Organized – Capable of maintaining a busy and changing schedule. Working alone and with others,
meets objectives and deadlines.

Not Afraid to Take a Political Hit – Able to speak frankly with people. Realizes toes may be stepped on,
but is not afraid to act. Willing to apologize for mistakes and the mistakes of others.

Confident – Makes good decisions quickly. Does not waffle. Fixes mistakes and moves on.

Resilient – Able to take political hits and endure warranted and unwarranted criticism. Working with
people from diverse organizations can lead to “political” mistakes and criticism. Must be able to listen,
endure, and shake off gaffes and attacks of others.

Driven, but not Obsessive – Gets things done, but does not focus so tightly that they miss other things.

Competent, not Condescending – Subject matter expert and knowledgeable, but does not talk down to
others or spend time pushing their own agenda, knowledge, or expertise.

Builds and Maintains Relationships – Interested in the ideas and issues of others. Works to find ways
that allow participation. Realizes one event is not the goal; long-term relationships, long-term capabilities
improvement, and readiness for future incidents and events are the goal.

An Expert, but not Narrowly Focused – Great in their field of expertise, but easily understands the big
picture and other components of the big picture.

Shares Experiences with Planners and Participants – Training and education happen when in the
presence of this individual. Participants learn, whether participating for one day or the entire process.

Personable – People can approach with new ideas, suggestions, or disagreements. Easy to work with,
even when you have disagreements.


Organizational Attributes
These are attributes essential in organizations supporting a collaborative training event or providing key
personnel to assist in the planning and execution of the event. The Facilitator/Coordinator and planning
team need the trust, freedom, and support of their superiors and organization.




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Vision – Recognize the importance of using collaborative training to build interpersonal and interagency
relationships and improve organizational ability and flexibility during disaster response and recovery.

Open Minded – Develop partnerships with traditional and non-traditional entities (agencies,
organizations, industry, and so on). Identify and overcome traditional barriers, enabling a quicker, more
effective response.

Committed – Will serve the public in the best way possible, see the event through, and provide a well
qualified (has most of the personal attributes identified above) planning team and staff members.

Realistic expectations – Understand what they are signing up for and know they can accomplish the
task. Industry participants must be willing to forgo marketing (realistic expectations, this is not a trade
show).


Methods and Procedures
Identify people and organizations to perform required and optional roles, apply methods, and develop and
perform procedures. Tailor these methods and procedures to serve your community or region. Methods
consist of people and organizations performing tasks to achieve a desired outcome. Procedures are a
series of actions or steps used to accomplish defined tasks.

Methods

High-level descriptions of what the various role players and organizations must do to plan for, implement,
and execute collaborative training events. Many regional organizations and agencies have established
training or planning expertise and procedures.

Instigation and Start Up

The person with the desire, passion, or brilliant idea to do a collaborative training event may be seeking
answers and stumble on this white paper, or be directed to plan and coordinate a collaborative training
event by their boss. They identify and bring the first few collaborators together in a meeting or meetings
before the IPC. If the instigator has the necessary attributes, assign them to a required role or make them
a member of the planning or communications committee. All involved will benefit from their passion.

Outreach

Principals identify the broad scope of the collaborative training event and begin personally inviting
counterparts and people from their personal networks to play. If the principals have identified and
confirmed an interest in participating with industry partners, they should reach out to personal contacts
and local, regional, state, and national industry or business associations.

Organization Structure

Use a flat or horizontal organizational structure made up of the key participating agency leaders to
provide leadership. This structure provides the flexibility to lead all participants without hindering or
limiting the participation and contribution of participants, committees, and so on. The flat structure also
provides the capability to assign qualified and informed individuals to experiments or venues that could
overwhelm the facilitator’s span of control.




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User and Agency Centered Design

Ideally, collaborative training events develop from the bottom up. As a result, the event should meet
participating agency training objectives during scenario development and planning. Keep budgets,
capabilities, and community or regional threat preparedness needs in mind. Depending on regional
collaborative training objectives, determine the amount of control required to achieve those objectives –
some scenarios and objectives benefit from loosely coupled training with a minimal amount of control.
Other scenarios and objectives benefit from tight control, simulated or notional activity, and injects.

Loosely Coupled Training – Training modules stand alone and do not depend on successful completion
of a scripted task or module. Successful completion requires a few well-defined objectives with some
plans or guidelines to help participants move through the training module.

Depending on module guidance, there could be a great deal of freedom, providing participants
opportunity to develop unique or new solutions. It could also be very focused, with little room for
improvisation. Though loosely coupled, the modules bring together participating organizations and
personnel.

To meet training objectives, planners may need to identify and provide simulated activity or injects, even
though the event is loosely coupled. Failure to identify or meet these needs may prevent some
participants from meeting their training objectives.

Tightly Coupled Training – Training modules depend on successful completion of scripted tasks or the
output of other training modules before initiation or completion. Tight control requires notional and
simulated injects for a controller to insert when the triggering information is missed or not available.

Observation, Analysis, and Documentation

Decide early (before the IPC) what you want to document for your collaborative training event participants
and sponsors. This decision drives the number, timing, and type of observers you identify to document
the best practices and lessons learned for your region. Ensure observers are available for all activities
you want to document and improve.

Procedures

Procedures are repeatable actions that should yield consistent results. Many regions have procedures in
place. If documented, use them and update them with the lessons learned. If regional responders say,
“Our procedures are in our heads, we know what they are…,” use the initial collaborative training event to
capture and document the procedures. Responders unfamiliar with regional procedures will be able to
integrate more effectively into regional response and recovery efforts.

Use the following high-level procedures, modifying as necessary to support your collaborative training
event needs.

Startup Procedures

Briefly consider how your community or region would benefit from holding a collaborative training event.

     •   What are the personal relationships with other first response organizations and industry partners
         you would use to perform critical tasks or obtain critical resources?
     •   What are the recurring community or regional problems that negatively affect response and
         recovery?



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    •   Finally, identify the top two or three realistic potential disasters that require

        o      activation of mutual aid agreements,
        o      help from regional, state, or federal authorities, and
        o      assistance of nongovernmental organizations and industry partners.

The responses provide a loose framework for creating collaborative training event goals and objectives.
Draft a list of local, regional, state, federal, and commercial entities capable of providing people qualified
to plan and carry out a collaborative training event. Limit the initial group size to 10 or fewer people
representing several important or influential participating agencies. These must be respected individuals
capable of encouraging others to participate and able to commit to the long-term training event success.

Prior to announcing the IPC, meet and broadly identify or outline the following:

    •   a short list of neutral third party agencies capable of providing a Facilitator/Coordinator
    •   each principal’s training objectives for the next two years
    •   grant or other funding tied to meeting certain training objectives
    •   grant or other funding tied to implementation or deployment of new systems or equipment
    •   current community and regional threats (natural or manmade disasters – keep realistic)
    •   current community and regional first response problems and issues
    •   current community and regional interoperable communication issues
    •   identify technologies, systems, and capabilities you want to evaluate during the training event
    •   recommended leadership for the various committees
    •   potential venues consistent with the training objectives and scenario
    •   type of scenario (for example, natural disaster, infectious disease, terrorist attack, and so on)
    •   planning conferences (IPC, MPC, and FPC) dates and locations
    •   collaborative training event dates and locations
    •   support staff requirements, identification, and funding if applicable
    •   desired number and type of participating agencies and organizations

As your team is formed, invite or encourage others to participate. Identify the Facilitator/Coordinator and
administrative support staff early to handle the responses and questions of those you invite. The support
staff can begin preparations for the IPC. Depending on community or regional training objectives and
needs, identify and invite government and nongovernment agencies to participate in the planning and
execution of your training event. To the extent that it meets your objectives, open the door wide for people
to participate!

Preparation Procedure

In preparation for the IPC, identify, appoint, and brief the personnel identified to fill the various roles on
their responsibilities and duties. Ensure they have the support they need to get the job done. The
following are additional items to address while preparing for the planning conferences:

    •   Identify various committees needed to ensure success. At a minimum, there should be a planning
        and a communications committee. Assign qualified personnel to lead and fill these committees.

        o      The Planning Committee should include a representative from the Communications
               Committee (preferably the chairperson).
        o      The Communications Committee should develop clear and specific interoperable
               communication (voice and data) plans to allow all participants to improve interoperable
               communications skills.




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     •   Identify the training event scenario and its broad parameters.
     •   Develop agendas, presentations, and handouts for the planning conference(s) that reflect
         regional training objectives, participant training objectives, committee plans, and the overall scope
         and purpose of the regional collaborative training event.
     •   Templates for planning conference agendas, briefs, and support materials can be found at
         https://hseep.dhs.gov/hseep_vols/allDocs.aspx?a=O.
     •   Modify the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) templates to reflect the
         size and scope of your collaborative training event.
     •   Announce the IPC time and location to everyone that has been invited or shown interest.

Reach out to all regional public safety agencies, organizations, and business associations, inviting them
to participate in the IPC. Share the identified regional training objectives and needs. Visit and brief
industry trade groups, inviting them to participate. Visit local business organizations, letting them know
what you will be doing and how they can participate. In short, reach out to any organization, agency, or
business that could play a role in disaster response and recovery.

Planning Procedure

The planning conferences are where the small team’s vision for the collaborative training event is
broadcast to other interested parties. Agenda, brief, and other templates are on the HSEEP website at
https://hseep.dhs.gov/hseep_vols/allDocs.aspx?a=O. MPC templates are located at
https://hseep.dhs.gov/hseep_vols/allDocs.aspx?a=M, and an FPC agenda template is at
https://hseep.dhs.gov/HSEEP_Vols/viewResults.aspx?qsearch='FPC%20Agenda'. Remember to modify
these templates to meet your needs. Do not allow the template to drive your training event.

As people arrive at the planning conferences, capture their name and contact information. Since these
are low-cost events, consider using business cards as the primary registration medium with a sign-in
sheet for those who do not have cards. Position the welcome and registration area between the entrance
and the refreshments, gently persuading people to give up their contact information before they begin
networking. Obtain a business card scanner and use it to record contact information. The registration
table is also an ideal area to provide participants the agenda or other relevant handouts.

Cover the following during the IPC: Welcome and Introductions, Collaborative Training Event
Overview, Collaborative Training Event Participants, Collaborative Training Event Design, Identify
Training Objectives, Scenario Elements and Venue, Documentation, Evaluation, Support Requirements,
Action Items, and Next Steps.

Cover the following during the MPC: Welcome and Introductions, IPC Review, Objectives – Key
Decisions and Actions, Collaborative Training Event Design (Collaborative Training Event Scenario and
Documentation), Collaborative Training Event Evaluation (Functional Areas, Evaluators, Collaborative
Training Event Evaluation Guides), Venue Site and Logistics, Participants, Timelines, Review / Action
Items, and Questions.

Cover the following during the FPC: Introductions, Collaborative Training Event Purpose, Scope, and
Objectives, Scenario timeline, Participating Agencies, Collaborative Training Event Facilitation,
Collaborative Training Event Evaluation, Collaborative Training Event Documents, Collaborative Training
Event Logistics, Meeting Dates, and Closing.

The above are suggested agenda items. Modify as needed to support your collaborative training event.




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Collaboration and Communication Procedure

Depending on the size of your collaborative training event, your Facilitator/Coordinator and some staff will
be overwhelmed by email correspondence. During the recovery phase of incident response, leadership
and staff experience similar communication demands. Collaborative training events are an ideal time to
practice using low to no-cost internet collaboration tools capable of supporting users from various network
and equipment domains. Visit the civmil.org site to see how an online collaboration tool works. The
Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report may also be available there, containing detail about
establishing your own collaboration site or obtaining access to other collaboration sites.

The ideal collaboration tool provides a location to place relevant policies, procedures, and information in a
forum accessible to training event participants. Participants are able to join groups that mirror their
functions and interests in the actual training event or incident.

Communications personnel interested in communication plans and issues could sign up for and get
access to the communications group. If they want or need all content, they can opt to have the content
automatically emailed to them. If they do not want to read several email messages every day, they can
opt to log onto the collaboration site and sign into the group to review the various communications. If they
need the communications plan, a template, or some other piece of information, they can download it to
their device.

Collaboration tools provide layered access to relevant information. While extremely valuable, the best
collaboration tool cannot take the place of personal communications – a phone call or face-to-face
discussion. When issues or conflicts begin to arise, do not hesitate to call or visit the individual.


Conclusion
Background

The Golden Phoenix series of collaborative training events occurred in 2006, 2007, and 2008. The
collaborative training events were the result of tasking by a Marine Air Group commander to identify how
Marines can effectively serve with and support civilian first responders during disaster response.

MAG-46 had a number of Marines whose primary jobs were law enforcement or fire fighting, resulting in
established relationships and a contact list with several Los Angeles and Orange County public safety
agencies. Introductions were made, needs were identified, public safety leadership obtained buy-in, and
MAG-46 provided personnel to facilitate and participate in the collaborative training event.

During the 2006 collaborative training event, five agencies participated for four hours of training with
about 200 people. The training took place in the Los Angeles and Orange County region. In 2007, 60
agencies participated for 30 hours of training involving around 2,000 people. The training still took place
in the Los Angeles and Orange County region. In 2008, 150 agencies participated for just over 4 days of
training that involved over 750 people in San Diego County. Additional agencies and personnel
participated in intelligence and Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) training the week before
the collaborative training event.

The relationships with the various public safety organizations, military commands, NGOs, and industry
have proven invaluable to regional public safety entities in San Diego, Los Angeles, and Orange
Counties. Participants identified and developed capabilities and procedures to address a variety of
communications interoperability, data interoperability, and system issues discovered during the planning
process or training event. Were it not for this training event, these issues would be discovered during




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incident response (when lives and property are on the line) or exercise play (when reputations and
funding may be on the line).

Results

Regional collaborative training events provide communities the opportunity to improve relationships,
skills, and knowledge. Conducting the event improves interoperable communications and exposes
participating agencies, organizations, and industry partners to situations requiring the use of an incident
command and management system capable of integrating local, regional, state, and federal responders.
Collaborative training events provide an opportunity to evaluate programs, equipment, and procedures
that support incident response and recovery. Some notable successes are summarized below:

     •   Project K.I.D., an organization focusing on community development and provision of respite and
         recovery childcare during disaster response and recovery evaluated several technologies,
         policies, and procedures during the 2007 and 2008 collaborative training events that addressed
         the following issues:
              o safe childcare during incident response
              o provision of medical treatment for children in a response environment
              o performance of background checks on volunteers at a response site
              o use of low and high technology tools to identify and track children across jurisdictions
              o parent or guardian and child reunification procedures
              o procedures for establishing computer connections over their own and other networks
     •   During 2007 event, public safety and USMC personnel reviewing a gateway manual “knew” they
         could connect public safety and USMC communication systems. Leadership insisted they
         connect the systems and perform a communications check. While attempting to connect a radio
         to the gateway, they discovered both connection points were male. An adaptor fixed the problem.
         Radios are now deployed with an adaptor.
     •   Participants created cables during the 2007 event to interconnect military communications
         systems with firefighter gateways. Three months later, the cables were retrieved from storage,
         enabling communications and coordination between military aircraft and incident command
         personnel during the 2007 wildfires.
     •   Performing a UAS experiment during the 2008 event led to the following discoveries and
         recommendations:
              o develop procedures for operating small unmanned air systems in vicinity of manned
                  aircraft validated need for frequency spectrum evaluation and management, and COML
                  control of wireless access point channel assignments during incident response
              o collaboration sites can be located and maintained on the internet using open source
                  content management systems which facilitate access to information by all participants
              o identified methods and procedures for declassifying imagery at UAS ground stations and
                  transmitting it to end users at an EOC over limited satellite and cellular bandwidth

Looking Forward

Community and regional collaborative training events efficiently prepare first responders and regional
partners to address incidents the region is most likely to face. They are a bottom up, low-cost approach to
examine regional incident response and recovery issues without the pressures of a top down exercise.

To quote the 9/11 Commission Report, “The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the
attacks on 9/11. Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can be prevented,
civilians and first responders will again find themselves on the front lines. We must plan for that
eventuality. A rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we




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lost that day. 2 ” Regional collaborative training events prepare communities for that next event, whether it
is a natural disaster or man made.




2
    The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, Government Printing Office, August 2004.


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Appendix C      Interoperability Continuum




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                                                Figure C - 1. Interoperability Continuum



C-2                                                                                        December 2008
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Appendix D               Participant After Action Report Submissions
Golden Phoenix 2008 planners asked participants to submit After Action Reports capturing what they
thought were best practices, lessons learned, and recommendations. Many submissions contain useful
information that can be used by all who wish to plan or participate in future collaborative training events
similar to Golden Phoenix. Some of the submissions contained best practices, lessons learned, and
recommendations that only applied to the services or equipment they market. The content of their
submission differed little from that provided in demonstrations or product fact sheets handed out during
demonstrations.
The following after action reports do not imply endorsement by any local, regional, state, or federal
organization or department. The reports are presented here as we received them without modification or
editing. Release statements were provided for each submitted AAR. The following AAR submissions are
categorized by discipline (military, public safety, public health, vendors, and nongovernmental
organizations).




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                                    Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
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D.1   Federal, including Military




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D.1.1    MAG-46 After Action Report for Golden Phoenix 2008




December 2008                                                                        D-5
                                      DRAFT
                          UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
                               MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP 46
                                 4TH MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
                                      PO BOX 452024
                            MCAS MIRAMAR SAN DIEGO CA 92145-2024


                                                                    2000
                                                                    OPS
                                                                    22 OCT 08

From:   Lieutenant Colonel John Persano III, Annual Training Coordinator
To:     Colonel Gregory Ryan, Commanding Officer

Subj:   AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR “GOLDEN PHOENIX”

1. Executive Summary: Golden Phoenix 2008 was a multi-agency, collaborative
training event in which over 150 Local, State, Federal, DoD, Non-Government
Agencies (NGOs), industry and academic entities participated or observed. A
simulated bio-weapon attack in Southern CA was the impetus for planners to
address the challenges of a multi-agency response to a weapon of mass
destruction. All efforts were focused upon the issues faced by tactical-level
responders utilizing organic equipment and operating under existing protocols.
No Federal or State funding was secured for the planning or execution of
Golden Phoenix and all participants incurred the costs associated with an
eight-day training event. Golden Phoenix was neither an exercise nor an
operation, but a true collaborative training event in which each participating
entity planned and executed respective training goals and requirements, which
were coalesced into overall training objectives. Post-event feedback from
participating and observing personnel deemed the event a tremendous success,
and all stressed the need for similar training in the immediate future.

1.1 Background: Marine Forces Reserve and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing’s response
to Hurricane Katrina and the challenges faced therein served as a catalyst for
the conception of Golden Phoenix (GP). In October of 2005 the commanding
officer of MAG-46 raised the question of potential roles MAG-46 and other 4th
Marine Aircraft Wing units may play in the event of a catastrophic man-made or
natural disaster in Southern California. MAG-46 staff officers were assigned
the duties of coordinating a series of civil/military training events that
culminated in a four-hour demonstration of civil/military cooperation in the
July 2006 timeframe. The successes of the 2006 demonstration led to a larger
and more dynamic collaborative training event in July of 2007. GP 07 enjoyed
the support and participation of over 60 local, State, Federal and industry
entities, which included over 1,000 personnel. Upon completion of GP 07, San
Diego City first responders approached the lead planner for MAG-46 and
requested that a similar event be held in the San Diego area in 2008. MAG
planners then reached out to associates residing within Customs and Border
Protection San Diego Sector’s Emergency Management Division who immediately
recognized the benefits of GP-type events and offered to assume a lead role in
the planning.

Marine Aircraft Group 46 has been the lead facilitator for Golden Phoenix
since its inception. The unit decommissions in June of 2009 and will no
longer assume a role in planning or participate in future events. The purpose
of this After Action report is to convey best practices to interested parties
and seek an entity or entities to assume a leadership role for future
collaborative training events if so desired.

1.2 Lessons Learned: There are 18 topics discussed, in detail, in the main
body of this document. Within the Executive Summary section, nine of the 18
topics are briefly discussed.


                                      DRAFT
                                  DRAFT

1.2.1 Collaborative Training: All agencies involved in disaster preparedness
and response are required to maintain certain core competencies and provided
with funding to do so. Historically, traditional mutually supporting elements
gravitate solely towards one another and do not often capitalize on
opportunities to train with agencies outside their normal scope of duties.
Time, personnel, and funding shortages demand an approach in which training
efforts are consolidated to maximize gain. Collaborative training places no
restrictions on interested agencies regarding the type of training that they
wish to execute. In fact, emphasis is placed on all potential players
executing annual requirements in order to maximize time and cost. The job of
the design team is to expose the links between training requirements and
coalesce them into overall goals allowing participants to satisfy requirements
of its choosing while simultaneously gaining exposure to non-traditional
partners. Because every agency is required to train and provided with a budget
to do so, why not train together?

1.2.2 Civil/Military Local Tactical-level Training, Polices, and Protocols:
Local, State and Federal policies and protocols clearly delineate the
guidelines from which all agencies must operate in regards to disaster
response. While responding elements are generally extremely well versed in
the policies and protocols that govern their role in disaster management, a
gap of knowledge sometimes exists at the tactical level when one discusses
policies and procedures not organic to individual organizations. The need for
basic understanding of the rules that govern entities who may serve as
supporting or supported elements are critical to seamless response and
cooperation in the event of a man made or natural disaster. Opportunities
must be put in place, at the tactical level, for all potential responders to
gain knowledge regarding the governance under which different groups operate.

1.2.3 Civil/Military Local Tactical-Level Training and Field Execution: The
time for understanding one another’s standard operating procedures and
equipment capabilities/compatibilities lies well before an actual response is
required. The opportunity for those interested to train at levels
commensurate with their capabilities and those of potential supporting
agencies must be afforded and more importantly supported to ensure entities
throughout the country are properly prepared. Requirements to ensure that
senior-level agencies are appropriately educated and equipped, at times,
create a void at the location where execution takes place. While the
abilities or organization of senior-level entities has a direct impact upon
subordinate members, the burden of execution lies with mid-level managers and
officials. Local training events form a foundation from which tactical
disaster response execution policies may be formed and provide an opportunity
for senior agencies to validate protocols at such levels. Also, they provide
response entities a venue from which to examine challenges faced and to offer
solutions when dissimilar agencies are required to operate in a cohesive
manner.

1.2.4 Collaborative Tactical-Level Training Versus Exercises: Training events
provide an opportunity for participants to not only satisfy annual
requirements but also test new technologies, tactics, and procedures in a no-
fault environment. The level of scrutiny resident in exercises does not exist
in training events and the absence of a sole sponsor dictating requirements
provides an inherent flexibility regarding training opportunities. How can
entities be expected to perform during a multi-agency functional exercise if
they are not allotted multiple opportunities, formal or informal, for
collaborative training beforehand? Furthermore, by being designed at the
level in which response occurs, tactical-level training events are able to
address the concerns of tactical-level personnel that are sometimes overlooked
in large-scale exercises.
                                      2

                                  DRAFT
                                  DRAFT

1.2.5 Collaborative Training, Planning: Perhaps the greatest benefit MAG/CBP
planners were able to contribute to Golden Phoenix was that of a “neutral”
third party. As a Marine Reserve unit and Federal Law Enforcement Agency,
MAG-46’s/CBP’s interest lay only with providing a template from which civil-
federal-military response challenges could be addressed at the tactical level.
MAG-46/CBP were never in competition with local or State agencies for
personnel, funding, resources, or accolades, thus posing no threat, real or
perceived, to said agencies. By serving as a catalyst at times and a
lubricant at others, MAG/CBP planners were able to bring together an amazing
array of entities to train in a collaborative environment.

1.2.6 Social Networking and Personal Relationships: Relationships created at
the tactical level have a direct impact upon the success of any response.
Increased knowledge of capabilities and responsibilities will certainly
contribute to more effective execution, but it is the personal trust and
respect gained during tactical-level collaborative training that truly
facilitates cohesion. Individuals or entities that train together and have a
mutual respect for one another are better positioned to overcome challenges
and provide solutions than those not afforded the opportunity.

1.2.7 Funding: The concept behind collaborative training is to maximize use
of available training and operational funds to minimize costs associated with
emergency management preparation and response. The desire and willingness to
explore creative methods to financially support such training can be best
manifested by the success of Golden Phoenix; from 2006 to 2008 over 200
agencies and 1500 personnel participated in GP events, utilizing zero funding
outside that of operational and training budgets.

1.2.8 Interoperable Communications (Voice): The technology for interoperable
communications is in place and continues to improve. Standing plans have
incorporated the technological solutions and yet we still face tremendous
challenges talking between “traditional” and “non-traditional” responders at
the tactical level. The main issue appears to be TRAINING. Put simply, there
are not enough training opportunities for non-traditional partners to exercise
and address communications issues and protocols at the tactical level.
Communications training is unique in nature and has to be executed with real
people using real equipment in the operational environment rather than tested
in a table-top environment or discussed in theory. Table tops must certainly
be used to plan communications training but fall well short of providing
responders with accurate assessments of interoperability.

1.2.9 Interoperable Communications (Data) and Common Operating Pictures: In
recent years technological advances have dramatically increased the ability
for vertical information sharing within emergency management and disaster
response entities. However, tremendous challenges remain in regards to
horizontal information sharing between traditional and non-traditional
entities. As more systems are developed and purchased, a growing disparity
has arisen regarding which agency has access to what systems. Requirements
for software or hardware installations, restricted access to websites, lack of
bandwidth, lack of training, lack of adherence to Federal standards,
prohibitive costs, and misunderstanding of responder requirements all impede
cross-boundary information sharing.




                                      3

                                  DRAFT
                                    DRAFT
2.    Golden Phoenix 08 Overall Training Objectives:
     • Provide a flexible no-fault training environment that facilitates the
        achievement of common goals while supporting individual agency/entity
        objectives;
     • Build and enhance relationships between local, State, Federal, tribal,
        academic, private sector, non-governmental organizations, and industry
        partners;
     • Build on the foundation of existing emergency management plans, systems,
        and capabilities in order to broaden their applicability to full-
        spectrum emergencies;
     • Emphasize the implementation of emergency management measures known to
        be effective;
     • Integrate emergency management planning into mainstream policy-making
        and operational systems; and
     • Expose participating entities to non-traditional partners’ policies,
        procedures, and capabilities.

3.    Golden Phoenix 08 Highlights:
     •  Classified and Unclassified Intelligence Workshops/briefings occurred
        14-17 July in San Diego, CA.
     • Full-scale activities occurred on June 26, 2008 at the Port of Long
        Beach, and July 21-24, 2008 in both Yuma, Arizona and San Diego,
        California.
     • A series of workshops and information briefs culminated in a 72-hour
        tactical-level field-training evolution;
     • 150 local, State, Federal, tribal, academic, non-government
        organizations, and private sector entities were involved;
     • Provided a flexible no fault training environment that facilitated the
        achievement of common goals while supporting individual agency/entity
        objectives;
     • Established real-time, web-based situational awareness horizontally
        across the multi-agency spectrum of participants for a common operating
        picture;
     • Tested and trained mechanisms to communicate intelligence of a credible
        threat from the Classified-level to Unclassified-level;
     • Tested and trained mechanisms to integrate Unmanned Aerial Systems with
        ground-based personnel while providing situational awareness to national
        command;
     • Tested and trained the interdiction of a biological weapon of terror
        from the maritime and land domain;
     • Tested and trained mechanisms to coordinate non-government organizations
        integration into a disaster response/emergency response framework;
     • Tested and trained coordination with Federally recognized Indian Nations
        in California through the Bureau of Indian Affairs;
     • Tested and trained mechanisms to manage mass, displaced populations;
     • Tested and trained mechanisms to re-unify families separated during
        disasters;
     • Tested and trained a unified response to hospital surge and civil
        unrest;
     • Tested and trained joint local-Federal tactical special response team
        operations;
     • Tested and trained CBP – Department of Defense coordination for the
        tactical air-lift of national CBP Special Operations Group personnel and
        resources;
     • Socialized the role of the DHS/Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Lead
        Field Coordinator for FEMA Region IX;

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     •     Identified and addressed select communication, coordination, and
           interoperability issues applicable to States of Emergency and Federal
           Disasters;
     •     Created new relationships and enhanced existing ones between local,
           State, Federal, tribal, academic, private sector, non-government
           organizations and private industry partners;
     •     Explored existing emergency management plans, systems, and capabilities
           in order to broaden their applicability to full spectrum emergencies;
     •     Integrated emergency management planning into mainstream policy-making
           and operational systems;
     •     Exposed participating entities to non-traditional partners’ policies,
           procedures and capabilities; and
     •     The total cost for planning and implementation of this event, not
           including existing travel and training budgets, was $535.00 for
           refreshments during planning conferences.

4.       After Action Items

4.1 Item:      Collaborative Training

Discussion: All agencies involved in disaster preparedness and response are
required to maintain certain core competencies and do so through a series of
annual training events. At times, a cultural mindset prevails in which
traditional mutually supporting elements tend to gravitate towards one another
and only when necessary. They do not often capitalize on opportunities to
train with agencies outside their normal scope of duties. Such coordination
usually only occurs during catastrophic events. More often than not it is
perceived that time, personnel and funding shortages preclude multi-agency
collaborative functional training. In fact, time, personnel, and funding
shortages demand an approach in which training efforts are consolidated to
maximize gain. Every agency is required to train and is generally provided
with a budget to do so. The challenge arises when multiple agencies in the
same geographic area have dissimilar training objectives. In this case, a
thread must be found to tie disparate objectives to a common goal. Recurring
common threads to be exploited are communications and logistical support
requirements. Regardless of the individual entities’ training objectives they
will always need basic supplies and the ability to communicate inter and intra
agency. Once a common thread is found, it can be expanded upon to include
opportunities that fall outside standard training guidelines.

Recommendation: Support and encourage local/regional collaborative training
events such as Golden Phoenix, whenever the opportunity arises. Such training
exponentially increases the return for participating entities by not only
satisfying their stated objectives but by exposing all to the capabilities and
limitations of outside agencies directly involved with or on the periphery of
disaster response. GP has a proven track record of allowing participants to
focus on their individual needs and be engaged in the overall event to
whatever extent they desire. This flexibility is not often seen in emergency
management, response drills, or training exercises. Three events were
accomplished in three years, all progressively successful and dynamic. All
were accomplished solely through the volition of participating agencies and
with zero local, State, or Federal/DoD funding outside of existing individual
entity training budgets.

4.2 Item: Civil/Military Local Tactical-Level Training, Polices, and Protocols

Discussion: Local/Regional/State Mutual Aid, the National Response Framework
(NRF), Incident Command System (ICS), Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA) protocols, and the Federal Request for Assistance Process (RFA) clearly
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delineate the guidelines from which all agencies must operate in regards to
disaster response. During GP, responding elements were extremely well versed
in the policies and protocols that govern their role in disaster management.
However a gap of knowledge, at the tactical level, was manifested when one
discussed policies and procedures not organic to their organization. Law
Enforcement personnel are intimately familiar with the ICS but, for the most
part, unfamiliar w/ DSCA. DoD personnel may know DSCA but have limited
knowledge of Mutual Aid policies and protocols. The need for basic
understanding of the rules that govern entities who may serve as supporting or
supported elements are critical to seamless response and cooperation in the
event of a man-made or natural disaster. Opportunities must be put in place,
at the tactical level, for all potential responders to gain knowledge
regarding the governance under which different groups operate.

A unique approach GP planners took was to incorporate training with planning
conferences. Initial, mid, and final planning conferences were scheduled and
executed prior to GP field training. Each conference, averaging 150
participants, consisted of one day of training followed by one day of
planning. Topics briefed included: CA Mutual Aid, ICS, capabilities and
policies of key participating agencies, DSCA, and RFA processes. To a person,
attendees commented on the extensive value of such briefs. When operating in
a multi-agency environment, it is imperative that all participants have a
baseline of understanding regarding not only the capabilities, but also the
governance of participating agencies.

Recommendation: Increase awareness of local State and Federal disaster relief
policies and procedures at the tactical level through Golden Phoenix-type
training evolutions. Tie familiarization briefs to planning conferences to
ensure that all participants have a baseline knowledge of rules, regulations
and capabilities of committed entities. Since Hurricane Katrina there has
been a tremendous effort to familiarize executive-level individuals with the
protocols required to provide assistance in time of need. However the initial
request comes not from the executive but from an operational-level manager at
the disaster site. Furthermore it is not the executive but rather the
responding individuals who must work hand-in-hand to provide the support
required to expeditiously provide assistance to those in need. By increasing
awareness of the responders and support staff, be they local, State, Federal,
DoD, industry, NGO’s or academia, executives can be assured that operations at
the tactical level will comply with all appropriate regulations. In order to
accomplish this goal it is imperative that such events utilize subject matter
experts such as designated civil authority emergency services personnel,
Defense Coordinating Officer/Element and DoD Emergency Preparedness Liaison
Officers in order to ensure compliance.

4.3 Item: Civil/Military local Tactical-Level Training and Field Execution

Discussion: Prior training and familiarization are crucial in the event of a
multi-agency response to a man-made or natural disaster. The time for
understanding one another’s standard operating procedures and equipment
capabilities/compatibilities lies well before an actual response is required.
In the case of civil-military training, there are a finite number of
opportunities to provide “sanctioned” training mostly due to personnel and
equipment shortages. If four major events take place in a given year, those
who are unable to participate due to geographic restrictions, funding issues,
or manpower shortages do not directly reap the benefits gained during the
event. The opportunity for those interested to train at level commensurate
with their capabilities and those of potential supporting agencies must be
afforded and more importantly supported to ensure entities throughout the
country are properly prepared.

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Requirements to ensure that senior-level agencies are appropriately educated
and equipped at times create a void at the location where execution takes
place. Top-level command and control and policy exercises are obviously
critical and necessary to the functions that lie within disaster response.
However it is at the tactical level where such policies will be executed.
While the abilities or organization of senior-level entities have a direct
impact upon subordinate members, the burden of execution lies with mid-level
managers and officials. Local training events form a foundation from which
tactical disaster response execution policies may be formed and provide an
opportunity for senior agencies to validate protocols at such levels. Also,
they provide response entities a venue from which to examine challenges faced
and to offer solutions when dissimilar agencies are required to operate in a
cohesive manner.

Recommendation: Utilize local tactical-level training events such as Golden
Phoenix to complement exercises at the operational and executive levels.
Field test policies and procedures where they will be executed and capitalize
on the knowledge base of responders. Support such events with the required
funding, guidance, and observers in order to gain lessons learned and increase
preparedness throughout the responder community. Concepts employed during the
planning and execution phase of Golden Phoenix may serve as a template for
such events.

4.4 Item:   Collaborative Tactical-Level Training Versus Exercises

Discussion: In the fall of 2007, MAG-46 offered the period of its annual
training (July 2008) for any local first responder, National Guard, Federal,
industry, NGO, academic or DoD agency to participate in a collaborative
training event in accordance with all applicable regulations. No restrictions
were placed on interested agencies regarding the type of training they wished
to execute. In fact, emphasis was placed on all potential players executing
annual requirements in order to maximize time and cost. The job of the design
team was to expose the links between training requirements and coalesce them
into overall goals. Each participating entity was able to satisfy training
goals of its choosing while simultaneous gaining exposure to elements with
which they do not normally operate. Participants chose to address the
challenges of command and control, equipment capabilities/compatibilities,
standard operating procedures, and communications interoperability at the
tactical level. The flexibility inherent to a training event versus exercise
was readily apparent to all participants. All understood that GP was a no-
fault environment and many entities took the opportunity to test new
technologies, tactics, and procedures.

More often than not, formally structured exercises neither allow nor encourage
operational experiments. Also, during exercises, participants are reticent to
utilize technologies or procedures that are not proven for fear of failure and
embarrassment. A tremendous amount of scrutiny surrounds formal exercises
that normally have a large amount of controllers, evaluators, and observers,
many at very senior levels of government. Rightly or wrongly there is a
perception that potential funding is tied to performance during exercises and
for this reason participating entities often retract within their comfort zone
to ensure that success is attained. Also, exercises tend to be controlled by
a single entity that dictates the scope and direction of the event, thus
limiting the opportunities for participating entities. One can certainly
understand why exercises are structured as they are. There needs to be a
benchmark from which senior leadership can measure preparedness and allocate
resources. There is no argument here regarding the need for exercises, rather
the concern lies within the arena of how many opportunities are available to
train together before we are thrust into the spotlight and evaluated.

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Concerns with making Golden Phoenix an exercise were numerous. Lack of
funding, trained exercise design staff, controllers, evaluators, and
simulation cell personnel all precluded structuring GP as an exercise.

GP was never intended to replace State, Federal or DoD exercises. It was
designed to maximize efforts in order to better prepare agencies for
participation in exercises while simultaneously satisfying yearly training
requirements. How can entities be expected to perform well during a multi-
agency functional exercise if they are not allotted multiple opportunities,
formal or informal, for collaborative training beforehand? Furthermore, by
being designed at the level in which response occurs, GP is able to address
the concerns of tactical-level personnel that are sometimes overlooked in
large-scale exercises.

Recommendation: Establish protocols from which events such as Golden Phoenix
can operate. Recognize the benefits of, and need for such training and
properly support with adequate funding and personnel. Training funds covered
operational costs but could not be used for conferences, travel, overtime,
after-action requirements, printing, refreshments, etc., while exercise funds
can cover such costs. If such a training event is to be utilized to prepare
for an exercise, or simply increase response capabilities, it should be
supported accordingly.

4.5 Item:   Social Networking and Personal Relationships

Discussion: Over 800 individuals from over 150 local, State, Federal, DoD,
NGO’s, industry and academic entities either directly participated in or
observed Golden Phoenix. The social network created during this event cannot
be understated. Relationships between non-traditional partners were
established and nurtured through an increased understanding and mutual respect
of the challenges faced by all during a disaster response. The fact that a
robust social network was created is not the distinguishing element, certainly
such networks existed beforehand. It is the level at which a network was
established and the diversity of the social network that made Golden Phoenix a
unique event.

Relationships created at the tactical level have a direct impact upon the
success of any response. Increased knowledge of capabilities and
responsibilities will certainly contribute to more effective execution, but it
is the personal trust and respect gained during tactical-level collaborative
training that truly facilitates cohesion. Individuals or entities that train
together and have a mutual respect for one another are better positioned to
overcome challenges and provide solutions than those not afforded the
opportunity.

In fact, the personal relationships established during Golden Phoenix were the
largest contributor to the success of the training. In the planning phase
obstacles that normally would take considerable time to overcome were often
settled with a phone call or email from a mutually respected third party. A
simple email introduction stating “I vouch for this individual” or an answer
to “Who do you know that I can trust in agency x?” went a considerable
distance towards providing solutions and facilitating training. During the
field portion, observers from all levels of government were astounded at the
collaborative atmosphere all participants enjoyed. The fact that prior social
validation had occurred and a level of trust existed provided agencies the
comfort level necessary to focus on execution versus concerns of an agency’s
intent or reputation.

Recommendation: Continue to foster tactical-level social networks at the
region level through the use of working groups, information sessions, and
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collaborative training events. Build regional training plans that include
traditional as well as non-traditional response entities. Assign liaison
officers to actively solicit relationships with all potential response
entities in the region. Provide opportunities for liaison officers to build
both formal and informal relationships to ensure that a robust network is
established.

4.6 Item:   First Responder Versus USMC/CBP Mindsets

Discussion: One of the greatest takeaways from Golden Phoenix was the insight
as to how diverse agencies operate at the tactical level. Fire, Law
Enforcement, and Emergency Management personnel who participated in Golden
Phoenix had often worked together before during training events or real-world
responses. Outside those involved in the training of 2006/7, or MAG personnel
who are first responders in their civilian careers, few MAG members had worked
directly with first responders prior to July of 06/07. Fortunately a mutual
respect between first responders and their Marine Corps/CBP counterparts
existed/exists and set the tone for the proposed training.

While MAG/CBP and first responder planners and operators enjoyed an excellent
relationship, a major obstacle faced by the design team was the bridging of
cultural mindsets regarding planning versus execution. First responders, by
nature of their duties, are afforded the opportunity to not only train in
their skill sets regularly, but engage in them on a daily basis. Years of
experience dealing with real-world large and small-scale disasters have
afforded first responders/CBP personnel the experience reservoir needed to
quickly react to events with minimal planning. Few MAG personnel possessed
such a vast knowledge base and required a more structured approach to planning
and executing a disaster response event. This, coupled with the DoD culture
of always investing a tremendous amount of time and effort in planning caused
challenges to arise during preparations for Golden Phoenix. At times,
information USMC/CBP personnel believed to be essential for event preparation
was difficult to obtain. Never did first responders intentionally withhold
information; it was simply a difference in perception of what information was
or was not required. Also, because Golden Phoenix was a non-funded training
event, MAG-46 and CBP possessed the only full-time Golden Phoenix planners.
Other key personnel were understandably required to perform all expected
duties first, then plan their portion of the training in the remaining time
available. Lack of dedicated planners, coupled with higher priorities, lead
to a lag in response time for some requested information.

As planning progressed, MAG/CBP personnel and first responders gained
increasing respect for the abilities and methodologies of one another. Some
information once believed to be essential by MAG/CBP planners was deemed not
required and requests perceived to be too detailed by first responders were
satisfied. Common ground was eventually found throughout the planning process
as evidenced by first responder use of military planning tools such as
execution matrices and aviation plans and military use/understanding of the
Incident Command System.

Recommendation: Recognize the need for continued civilian, Federal, and
military training at the tactical level and support it accordingly with proper
funding. It is not a question of if, but a question of when first responders
and DoD/CBP elements will next work hand-in-hand at such a level.
Understanding how each group operates in a benign training environment allows
participants to identify potential challenges and create solutions needed to
maximize response efforts. Interested DoD/CBP elements should be encouraged
to reach out to first responders, with adherence to existing protocols (or
vice versa) in their communities and establish a baseline of operational
knowledge and understanding with their first-responder counterparts.
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4.7 Item:   Collaborative Training and Planning

Discussion: MAG/CBP planners were often asked how they were able to pull such
a diverse group of agencies together, without funding, for a collaborative
training event. While the challenges were many, there were several factors
that enabled MAG/CBP planners to demonstrate the benefit of such training.

As a Marine Corps Reserve unit, MAG-46 is comprised of personnel from all
walks of life. Several MAG Marines are emergency planners, Law Enforcement
Officers, Firemen, or city officials who work directly in the disaster
response realm. Such a base of civilian specialties provided the MAG with
direct links to first-responder agencies that may not be readily available in
an active-duty unit. Once tasked with investigating training opportunities
with civil authorities, it was a natural progression for MAG planners to
capitalize on the knowledge and social networking skills of its first-
responder Reservists.

The creation of the Lead Field Coordinator responsibility for CBP Sector
Chiefs provided CBP with not only the opportunity, but also the responsibility
to reach out to their first responder/DoD counterparts to ensure seamless
integration in disaster response preparation.

In Southern California, first-responder agencies are well familiar with the
work ethic and professionalism of Marines/CBP and other DoD, National
Guardsmen, and Federal Law Enforcement entities that reside in their
community. In fact, many first-responder agencies (as well as Federal Law
Enforcement) in the area are comprised of numerous Reserve, National Guard, or
retired/former military personnel who maintain links with those still serving.
The reputation of military personnel within their organization, specifically
Marines in the case of Golden Phoenix, provided instant validity to the items
brought forth by MAG planners.

The capabilities, professionalism and work ethic of CBP personnel in the
region also had a direct impact on acceptance of Golden Phoenix planners by
local first responders and Federal Law Enforcement. Furthermore, tactical-
level first responders, Federal Law Enforcement, and DoD/National Guard
personnel tend to naturally gravitate towards one another, sharing a mutual
respect for the dangers faced and sacrifices made on a daily basis.

Perhaps the greatest benefit MAG/CBP planners were able to contribute to
Golden Phoenix was that of a “neutral” third party. As a Marine Reserve unit
and Federal Law Enforcement Agency, MAG-46’s/CBP’s interest lay only with
providing a template from which civil-federal-military response challenges
could be addressed at the tactical level. MAG-46/CBP were never in
competition with local or State agencies for personnel, funding, resources, or
accolades, thus posing no threat, real or perceived, to said agencies. By
serving as a catalyst at times and a lubricant at others, MAG/CBP planners
were able to bring together an amazing array of entities to train in a
collaborative environment.

Recommendation: When planning multi-agency collaborative training events seek
out former, retired or currently serving Reservists and/or National Guard
personnel in first responder agencies to serve as training liaison officers.
Such personnel provide a critical bridge between organizations that may not
enjoy multiple opportunities to train together. Liaisons can offer unique
insight and understanding of how each entity operates, thereby reducing
confusion and facilitating interagency cooperation.


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When constructing the planning cell, it is important to include personnel from
entities who are well versed in the policies and protocols of emergency
response but may play a periphery role. The “neutral third party” concept
discussed above was perhaps the single greatest contributor towards the
success of Golden Phoenix.

4.8 Item:   Funding

Discussion: As mentioned earlier, Golden Phoenix was executed utilizing
solely training funds and operational budgets from participating
organizations. CBP and San Diego State University (SDSU) provided the only
general monetary commitment in the form of $535.00 for coffee and refreshments
during the three planning conferences. Funding for capture teams was secured
through the DHS’s Office of Emergency Communications and Science and
Technology’s Special Programs Division. This funding was utilized to document
the planning and execution process as well as compile the formal After Action
report. GP planners went to great lengths to ensure all participants that the
capture teams’ sole responsibility was to document the event and not evaluate
performance.

Lack of funding is a double-edged sword. On one side it is a benefit; without
funding and a sponsor, participants are granted the freedom to address
challenges they deem to be the most critical to their agency. In other words,
if no one is paying for the event, no one can tell participants what they can
and cannot do.

On the other hand, lack of funding is a detriment to such events. There were
countless occasions during the planning process when first responder and other
entities commented that if there were money to pay overtime/maintenance they
would have invested significantly more personnel and equipment into the event.

Lack of funding also forced participating agencies to assign action officers
who had a myriad of higher priority responsibilities, which at times lead to
challenges in the planning process. First responder and emergency management
agencies cannot afford to augment the salaries of potential planners out of
their operating budgets. During the planning of GP action, officers often
took GP planning work home and completed it on their own time, without
compensation, because they saw the intrinsic value in such an event.

Recommendation: Create a methodology for entities to participate in
collaborative training events that have a select amount of funding.
Presently, there is no procedure in place for entities to secure DHS/grant
funding for collaborative training other than that which is tied into existing
exercises or comes out of their training budget. When a major exercise is
scheduled and placed in the National Exercise System, participating agencies
are allowed to use DHS funds to prepare for their involvement in the form of
table-tops and drills. Only when the sponsoring entity for the exercise is
willing to provide funds for all participants to train, will an opportunity
such as Golden Phoenix present itself within a formal exercise cycle.

The issue here is one we have addressed in previous sections of this report.
Once a sponsoring agency dictates what will be done and where, the flexibility
of choosing one’s own objectives and perception of no-fault training is
removed. Once an event is entered into the National Exercise System and DHS
funds are committed and utilized, participants must adhere to the Homeland
Security Exercise Evaluation Program (HSEEP) policies and procedures. The
HSEEP, understandably, has a robust set of guidelines designed to ensure
maximum benefit to all participants as well as proper use of DHS funds. The
requirements one must adhere to w/in the HSEEP may, at times, be too robust
for a collaborative training event. Listing of Master Scenario Event List
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items, simulation cells, evaluators, controllers, observers etc., may not be
necessarily required while operating under the guise of a collaborative
training event.

Seek low- or no-cost opportunities to prepare for such events. During GP 08
all planning conference were held at SDSU or aboard Marine Corps Air Station
Miramar. Both locations offered large-scale meeting spaces for zero cost and
SDSU and/or CBP provided the refreshments out of their own good graces
(funding should be provided for basic refreshments at planning conferences
rather than rely upon participating entities to do so). Also, the majority of
subject matter experts required to provide briefings or assistance were
solicited from the local area rather than outside the region thus reducing
travel costs. For those subject matter experts who did travel from outside
the region, they did so with the understanding that their organization would
provide the necessary funding and no compensation from Golden Phoenix agencies
would be forthcoming.

Structure Golden Phoenix-type events to be local and regional in nature. If
the core group of participants resides within the general area in which the
event is to take place, travel and other costs can be significantly
diminished. This approach will also keep the event manageable for the limited
planning staff.

Utilize training funds to the greatest extent possible and schedule
collaborative training events one to two years ahead of execution. One of the
challenges faced by GP participants was the “short-fuse” nature of the
planning cycle. First responder and other entities tend to plan one to two
years out and commit recourses well ahead of execution timelines. When
approached by GP planners, many agencies had already committed training funds
to other events.

Partner with local universities, community colleges, and other educational
organizations to make the training part of the educational curriculum. This
can both help bring in people to be formally involved as they assist with
planning as part of their course work, but can also help provide resources
such as space and networks as part of the classes. This also assists in
linking long-term training and education to field exercises and linking the
upcoming generation of leaders to practioneers in the emergency management
world, who can also learn new technologies at the same time as mentoring
students in the classes. In addition, some of those working on the project
can acquire university, community college, or continuing education credits to
apply to degree work or required life-long learning requirements within their
professions.

4.9 Item:   Collaboration Tools and Portals

Discussion: During the initial phases for GP 07, planners were faced with the
challenge of how to post and share information with participating agencies and
observers. Multiple options were presented in the form of DoD and DHS
collaboration tools and portals designed to facilitate information sharing.
However, many of such portals or tools required installation of specific
software, licensing agreements, association with an “officially” sponsored
exercise, and/or user access requests granted by a third party, all which
posed several problems. Most, if not all, local, State, Federal and DoD
agencies have very stringent protocols surrounding what types of software can
be installed on computer systems and what websites personnel can access. Many
of the collaboration options presented to GP planners/participants required a
robust amount of training needed to properly use and exploit the system. Also,
GP was not an “officially” sponsored event therefore unable to take advantage
Of some of the more traditional options available.
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Planners sought a system that could be used by participants with drastically
varying levels of proficiency, did not require additional software
installation, would not be blocked by firewalls or other information security
restrictions, and allowed select GP planners to serve as the gatekeeper for
access to the portal. Based upon these requirements, one of the lead planners
for GP created a website named www.civmil.org.

Civmil.org was constructed and maintained at minimal cost using Open-Source
standards. It provided and continues to provide planners, participants, and
observers a location to post, share, collaborate, and facilitate information
flow. All members were/are allowed to post and comment on information within
the site and utilize it as repository for information pertaining to the event.
All briefs, matrices, planning conference information, and resource documents
were posted on the site and were readily accessible to all. The site also
served as a social networking tool, allowing participants and observers a
virtual location to interact and address concerns regarding the event or
emergency management in general.

Upon completion of GP 08 there were over 600 approved members of
www.civmil.org.

Recommendation: Encourage the use of information sharing and social
networking websites such as civmil.org. Support such sites with the necessary
funding and personnel required to ensure proper use and execution. The
National Exercise System has a robust information sharing capability that may
be utilized for entities that participate in collaborative training events,
versus formal exercises.

4.10 Item:   Interoperable Communications (Voice)

Discussion: There are countless concerns leadership must address when facing a
catastrophic disaster, none which is more important than the ability to
communicate among agencies. Without interoperable communications, response
efforts cannot be coordinated. Great strides have been made in recent years to
ensure that traditional first responders possess interoperable communications.
Mutually supporting agencies, such as Fire and Law Enforcement, who were once
unable to share information via voice communications, now enjoy the capability
to do so. DHS grants, and funding taken from operational budgets, have
provided a dramatic increase in interoperable radios and bridging equipment
available to “traditional” first responders. Training, also funded through
DHS and operational budgets, has been, and continues to be, provided to ensure
that “traditional” responders can quickly and seamlessly share information
critical to response activities. Furthermore, many larger urban areas have
robust and redundant mutual aid communications networks and operators who are
well versed in their use. Despite these dramatic improvements, interoperable
communications remains the greatest challenge in a multi-agency response
scenario.

Traditional first responders comprise only a portion (albeit the largest
portion) of the overall response community. In times of need, Federal, DoD,
NGOs, industry, and academic entities have all provided invaluable assistance
to those in need. Each non-traditional response entity has faced their own
challenges when trying to integrate into the communications plan of a large-
scale disaster response. Dissimilar capabilities such as: operations in
differing frequency ranges, outdated or limited communications equipment, and
incorrect understanding of communications protocols all have lead to
integration issues. However the issues are far from insurmountable and the
technology continues to improve facilitating greater and greater levels of
communication interoperability. In the area of DoD integration (DoD operates
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in the UHF and VHF range and most responders operate in the 800 MHz range for
the most part), many urban areas have constructed communications plans that
incorporate bridging equipment designed to allow personnel operating in
dissimilar frequency bands to communicate.

In 2006 MAG personnel approached LA County first responders, National Guard
personnel, DHS and other DoD entities asking how MAG personnel could
communicate directly with first responders. The solution presented was to use
an ACU-1000, which is a piece of equipment designed to “bridge” dissimilar
frequencies. MAG communication officers and their Fire Department
counterparts attempted to implement the solution only to find a special
cable/connector was required to plug in USMC tactical radios to an ACU-1000.
A field expedient solution was quickly designed and interoperable
communications were enabled. During the 2007 Wildfires in San Diego, MAG
planners were contacted at the onset of the response and asked for the cables.
Military personnel had provided an emergency operations center with a tactical
radio and emergency management personnel were unable to integrate the radio
via a bridging system into the mutual aid communications systems without the
cable. One cannot say with certainly that the “cable issue” would not have
been realized in Southern CA if GP-type training did not occur but the fact
the issue was realized during a collaborative training event lends credence to
the value of such events.

Technology for interoperable communications is in place in many jurisdictions
and the technology continues to improve. Standing plans have incorporated
many technological solutions and yet we still face tremendous challenges
talking between “traditional” and “non traditional” responders at the tactical
level. The issue is generally TRAINING.

Put simply, there are not enough training opportunities for non-traditional
partners to exercise and address communications issues and protocols at the
tactical level. Lack of funding and personnel are the main factors precluding
such activities. Also, communications training is unique in nature and has to
be executed with real people using real equipment in the operational
environment rather than tested in a table-top environment. Table tops must
certainly be used to plan communications training but fall well short of
providing responders with accurate assessments of interoperability.

The original intent of GP 08 was to provide participants with a robust
opportunity to test and address voice communications issues. Unfortunately GP
08 fell short of attaining intended overall objectives regarding interoperable
voice communications. Causal factors include the lack of dedicated planning
personnel and in particular the lack of a Communications Unit Leader and the
lack of funding. In addition the scenario did not require integration of the
communications assets of non-traditional partners on a large scale
(infrastructure and standard communications were all not affected in the
scenario). In addition there was a reluctance of some participating agencies
to nominate a communications representative and provide their communications
capabilities and protocols. Despite the factors mentioned above, there were
several notable achievements regarding interoperable communications during GP
08, most notably, the establishment of a series of interoperable
Communications best practices between MAG-46 and CBP.

Recommendation: Establish regional communications leaders where they do not
exist and provide requisite training required for familiarization with
policies, procedures and equipment of not only traditional but non traditional
partners. Augment interoperable communications working groups at the regional
level to incorporate ALL potential responders for threats organic to the
region. Create regional interoperability resource documents such as
templates, capabilities databases and points of contact lists to ensure
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information flow and exchange. Allow and encourage participants to regularly
train and address interoperable communications issues in a no-fault
environment. Support communications exercises with adequate funding and
personnel to accurately assess regional gaps and concerns regarding
interoperable communications. Provide necessary funding to initiate
improvement plans that incorporate ALL potential responders. Encourage
Federal-level working groups designed to support and address communications
concerns to not only integrate non-traditional responders, but provide
requisite technical and training support. Utilize subject matter experts not
only for technical assistance but exercise and training assistance.
Capitalize on available online and classroom instruction provided free of
charge by DHS. Seek non-standard training opportunities such as collaborative
Training events to accomplish above stated objectives. Train, train, train.

4.11 Item:   Communications (Data) and Common Operating Pictures

Discussion: In recent years technological advances have dramatically increased
the ability for vertical information sharing within emergency management and
disaster response entities. Numerous systems exist in which Fire, Law
Enforcement and emergency managers have the ability to access and share
information within their organization. In many major metropolitan areas as
well as regions prone to natural disasters, authorities have taken information
sharing a step further and have created or purchased systems that allow not
only vertical, but horizontal information sharing. That is, information that
may have once only been available to Fire personnel can now be shared with
personnel across the traditional responder spectrum. In the case of Golden
Phoenix 2008 in San Diego, CA, the system of choice for the county (region)
was WebEoC.

There is no intent here to discuss the benefits or detriments of specific
common operating pictures or information sharing systems. The only reason
WebEoc is mentioned is due to the fact that it is the system of record in San
Diego County and as such, was utilized by first responders, emergency managers
and MAG-46 during Golden Phoenix.

The ability to share information across response entities is paramount to the
successful management of any disaster. However simply having the ABILITY to
share information does not guarantee success. Implementation, proper use and
wide access of information sharing and common operating picture systems are
the keys to successful management.

Human nature dictates that in times of stress one will often revert back to
their “comfort zone” and utilize systems and procedures personally known to be
successful. That is, if they do not use the system or procedure on a daily
basis, people will be very unlikely to use it during a disaster. One of the
challenges associated with many information sharing systems and common
operating pictures is the “break in the event of emergency” concept. Many
such systems are touted as the solution to cross boundary information sharing
challenges during a disaster but few focus on how such systems can improve
productivity and information sharing on a daily basis.

Another challenge that arises when discussing information sharing is access.
As more systems are developed and purchased, a growing disparity has arisen
regarding who has access to what systems. On the regional level there has
been a tremendous push to provide responders with some form of common
operating picture or a means for information sharing. However when non-
traditional supporting elements enter the response, challenges arise such as
the potential for software or hardware installation requirements in order to
gain access to common operating pictures. Anyone who has worked in government
understands the challenges associated with adding software or new hardware to
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their computers and would surely agree the time to test such protocols lie
well before their required use. Even if such installations were to occur one
is now faced with a training and education issue. What are the expectations
regarding a recently installed system or piece of equipment required to be
utilized with little to no training during a disaster?

In recent months, Federal government entities have established a set of
guidelines that discuss the standards from which common operating pictures
and/or information sharing systems should operate. These standards are
designed to allow disparate systems the ability to share information based
upon a common language. Also there is a noticeable shift towards web-based
information sharing applications that preclude the requirement for software or
hardware installs. Adherence to Federal standards and utilization of web-
based applications could potentially turn what was once a technological
challenge into a more manageable training and education issue.

Recommendation: Utilize collaborative training events to baseline the ability
to electronically share information across responding entities. Begin with a
regional table-top event in which traditional responders (Law Enforcement,
Fire, Emergency Management) are presented with a problem set and must utilize
existing systems to electronically share information. Once a certain level of
comfort is reached, begin to add, one by one, non-traditional responders such
as the DoD, academia, the private sector, and NGOs. Force participating
entities to utilize only systems available at the time of the event and to
make adjustments in real time (that is if they have to add software, how long
would it take to gain permission to do so?). Document gaps and propose
solutions to information sharing challenges. Once a basic ability to share
information across boundaries is established, implement a robust training plan
that includes potential as well as traditional responders to ensure a level of
Proficiency is maintained.

4.12 Item:   Intelligence Training

Discussion: One of the desires of Golden Phoenix planners was to provide a
training opportunity in which the scenario ran from inception through
execution and covered the preparation, mitigation, and response phases of
emergency management. In order to do so, planners incorporated an
intelligence training component into the event. The focus of the intelligence
portion was to discuss methodologies required to provide first responders whom
do not posses security clearances with information vital to the security of
the San Diego area. Planners held a three-day classified intelligence
workshop in which over 40 personnel representing 14 intelligence entities from
all levels of government participated. Conference discussions surrounding a
scenario in which military medical personnel, operating overseas, discovered a
lab in which it was believed a biological agent was being produced.
Conference attendees discussed how such information would be shared and which
intelligence agencies would be involved. Once a credible threat was realized
the focus of discussion shifted towards how highly classified information
could be “sanitized” to provide advanced warning to local civilian leadership
and emergency services personnel. The end result of the classified workshop
was an unclassified information report produced and disseminated by the local
FBI. The unclassified report was the impetus for the GP field event.

As a follow-on to the classified workshop, an unclassified workshop was held
at the local FBI field office. Over 50 personnel from various local, State,
Federal, DoD, and private sector entities attended the unclassified workshop.
GP planners utilized this timeframe to familiarize participants with recent
developments such as the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Project,
and the capabilities of the Director of National Intelligence’s Open Source
Center. A FBI intelligence analyst provided the unclassified results from the
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classified workshop and set the stage for functional training, which began the
following week.

More information can be provided on the classified workshop for those
interested who have the appropriate clearances. The greatest takeaway from
the intelligence workshops was the undeniable need for continued education and
training regarding capabilities and protocols associated with the various
Intelligence Agencies.

Recommendation: Incorporate intelligence training both at the classified and
unclassified levels into future collaborative training events to the greatest
extent possible. At any given time throughout the nation there are table-
tops, drills, and functional exercises that involve a weapon of mass
destruction scenario. Few such events address the issue of how the weapon
arrived or was detonated/dispersed and tend to focus on the response phase
versus the prevention or mitigation phase. With little effort and without
detracting from the responder training, intelligence personnel can easily be
incorporated into such scenarios. Opportunities must be present at all levels
of government for intelligence personnel to hone their skills and address the
challenges of sharing information across government boundaries.

4.13 Item:   Incident Command System (ICS)

Discussion: Great strides have been made in recent years to implement the ICS
structure and protocols into the emergency management arena. The most notable
of these is the education of non-traditional partners in manners pertaining to
the incident command system and its implementation and use. The DoD, NGO’s,
industry, and academia are all afforded (some mandated) the opportunity to
gain valuable knowledge through online classes and cost- free instruction
provided by DHS. Those who capitalize on such opportunities are poised to
seamlessly integrate into the response structure when needed. As valuable as
the ICS classes are, taking an online period of instruction or a three-day
course does not make one an expert in the field. Unless afforded the
opportunity to put the valuable lessons learned into action, skills sets
created soon atrophy and information gained is lost.

Recommendation: Encourage potentially supporting elements to take full
advantage of ICS classes and periods of instruction. Augment knowledge gained
online and in a classroom setting with practical applications in the form of
table-tops or functional events. Encourage liaison officers to seek every
opportunity to witness the Incident Command System in action. When planning
collaborative training events, ensure that the scenario supports full ICS
implementation in order to provide participants with a realistic training
opportunity to apply pertinent knowledge gained. Incorporate ICS training
into planning conferences. (Note: one of the major after action items for GP
08 was the scenario did not lend itself to full incorporation of the ICS
structure as much as the GP 07 earthquake scenario did).

4.14 Item:   MAG-46/CBP Training

Discussion: One of the greatest benefits derived from Golden Phoenix for MAG-
46/CBP was the exceptional relationship established between a local DoD and
DHS entity. Similarities in cultural mindsets and the desire to improve
readiness for all agencies across the spectrum were the driving forces behind
the success of MAG/CBP interaction. Each entity possesses unique capabilities
and expertise that when placed together are not only complementary but
mutually beneficial. For example, CBP desired to exercise communications
support in an austere environment. Lacking heavy lift capabilities, CBP
requested fixed-wing aviation support from MAG-46/4th Marine Aircraft Wing. A
USMCR KC-130 aircraft was provided to move CBP assets from El Paso TX to Yuma,
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AZ. Within minutes of the KC-130 landing at an unimproved airfield south of
Yuma, CBP personnel had established communication links for a 50-person
training site. Objectives satisfied during this single event included:
understanding of the Federal RFA process; increased awareness of USMC tactics,
techniques, and procedures by CBP personnel and increased awareness of
potential supporting/supported elements’ equipment capabilities and
compatibilities.

At Brown Field MAG-46 personnel requested training support from CBP’s Office
of Field Operations (OFO) regarding personnel and vehicle inspections. CBP
personnel created a four-hour period of instruction followed by several hours
of practical application during the security scenario at Brown Field.
Personnel and vehicle checkpoints were jointly manned by USMC and CBP
personnel with the CBP personnel providing subject matter expertise. To a
Marine, all MAG-46 personnel involved in the checkpoint training stated the
CBP instructors provided invaluable information that could potentially save
Marines lives when operating overseas.

The MAG and CBP also established a joint operations center, collaborated on
aviation operations and addressed select interoperable communications
challenges. One objective that the MAG/CBP was unable to satisfy was the
“tunneling” of MAG-46 computer assets through CBP Internet “pipelines.”
Challenges with existing policies, security concerns, and misunderstandings
regarding precise requirements needed to lawfully execute such a request all
precluded the completion of this objective.

Recommendation: Encourage future non-traditional interaction between DoD and
CBP assets whenever available and build upon the exceptional working
relationship enjoyed by the DoD and their CBP counterparts. Several times
throughout the year, DoD assets provide aviation and other support to CBP in
the form of Joint Task Force Support. However, more often than not,
opportunities to train together in non real-world missions are few and far
between.

Capitalize on the incredible experience of CBP OFO personnel and utilize them
to train DoD personnel in preparation for operations outside the continental
United States. One would be hard pressed to find personnel with a greater
knowledge of vehicle/personnel searches than those who inspect thousands of
vehicles/individuals a day at America’s border crossings. Lessons learned
during such training are immediately applicable when DoD personnel deploy
overseas and man checkpoints and entry points in areas such as Iraq and
Afghanistan.

4.15 Item:   Integration of Non-Government Organizations

Discussion: The importance of NGOs in disaster preparation and response cannot
be understated. Be they large formal organizations such as the American Red
Cross, local faith based organizations, or community volunteer groups, NGO’s
have provided invaluable services to the citizens of our nation in times of
need.

Civil authorities throughout the nation have excellent working relationships
with both large and small, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and volunteer
groups. Golden Phoenix planners were very sensitive to the governance
associated with NGO involvement and at no time attempted to set precedents
regarding the role of NGOs in disaster response. As with all participants,
NGOs were simply offered the opportunity to train to core competencies in a
collaborative environment. While elements of large organizations, such as the
American Red Cross, did participate in Golden Phoenix, smaller organizations

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and volunteer groups seemed to gain the greatest benefit from their
participation.

As discussed previously in this document, large-scale exercises understandably
tend to focus on major entities involved in disaster response. This, at
times, leaves an opportunity gap for smaller organizations to test
methodologies pertinent to disaster response. NGOs that participated in
Golden Phoenix were very grateful for the opportunity to not only be included
in an event of such scope but also remarked on the invaluable information
gained from their participation. As with all participants, NGO
representatives were afforded the opportunity to attend briefs on ICS, Mutual
Aid, DSCA, and the RFA process to name a few. For many of the smaller
organizations, briefs attended during Golden Phoenix were their first formal
exposure to many of the policies and procedures that govern emergency
response. Armed with this knowledge, many gained an appreciation of the
intricacies involved during a multi-agency response.

The “field environment” offered to participants further allowed NGOs to test
policies and protocols pertinent to emergency response. For many of the
smaller NGOs, GP provided the first opportunity to train in a realistic
environment while simultaneously gaining exposure to the wide spectrum of
response entities.

Perhaps the greatest benefit to NGO involvement in GP was the discourse
created by bringing together entities from various backgrounds under a common
theme. GP provided participants with an opportunity to discuss the challenges
of NGO integration in an open, no-fault forum. Discussions surrounded topics
such as interoperable communications, information sharing methods and
technologies, logistical support and capabilities of various NGOs, which could
potentially augment civil authorities’ response. Relationships made and
knowledge gained during the event will certainly have a positive impact upon
future responses.

Unfortunately several of the   objectives surrounding NGO involvement in GP were
not reached due to shortages   of planning personnel. However the fact that
several NGOs did participate   and were able to accomplish their individual
objectives is a testament to   the benefit of such events.

Recommendation: During collaborative training events, involve NGO
representatives from the onset of the planning cycle. Utilize lead NGOs such
as the local chapter of the American Red Cross to inform local NGOs of the
opportunity to participate in such events and solicit support from lead NGOs
during the planning and execution phases. Establish and fund an NGO liaison
team comprised of a lead representative and functional area representatives
(i.e. communications, logistics, etc.). Solicit NGO input and incorporate NGO
needs to the greatest extent possible without undermining traditional
responder objectives. If select NGO needs cannot be met, utilize the liaison
cell and volunteers to create break-out scenarios that satisfy stated
requirements. Incorporate a simulation cell into the event to ensure an
uninterrupted flow of training opportunities are presented. As in GP 08,
offer multiple environments and venues to maximize the types of NGOs and
capabilities applicable to the event.

4.16 Item:   Industry Participation

Discussion: During GP 07 industry participation was limited to static displays
of technologies and equipment. Representatives were physically separated from
first responders, National Guard, and DoD personnel and, for the most part,
not allowed to actively participate nor demonstrate their capabilities within
the context of the scenario. MAG planners were concerned that industry
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representatives would interfere with responder training by trying to “push”
their solutions upon participants and encourage a trade-show mentality.
Shortly after the completion of GP 07, MAG planners quickly realized the
significant error of not directly incorporating industry into the field
Scenario and set out to correct the misjudgment for GP 08.

Direct industry participation in collaborative training events is critical to
ensure that maximum benefit is derived. Industry not only designs and
constructs the equipment utilized by responding agencies but has been, and
will continue to be, called upon to provide essential services and support in
times of crisis. Just as traditional responders are afforded the opportunity
to train for potential disasters, industry must be afforded similar chances to
hone and improve their skills in the disaster response arena.

GP type events present an operational test opportunity for industry to
utilize/test their equipment in the actual environment in which it was
designed to be used. Also, by training with the personnel for whom they
design, construct, and support equipment, industry representatives gain a
greater appreciation for the challenges faced by operators in a disaster
response scenario. Increased awareness of issues faced by responders, directly
impacts the functionality of current and future technologies. Several GP
industry participants remarked they were adjusting existing equipment and/or
equipment in development based upon feedback by responders during the event.

Industry participants were offered multiple avenues and environments to
explore and satisfy their objectives during GP 08. Those possessing emergency
operations center types of technologies chose SDSU as the location for their
experiments and training. Partners who possessed unmanned aerial vehicle,
sensor and communications technologies designed to operate “in the field,”
selected to participate in the Yuma, AZ and Brown Field, San Diego portion of
the training. While feedback from industry partners was overwhelmingly
positive, there were several areas noted where improvements can be certainly
made.

Most industry partners were brought into the fold well into the planning
cycle. Lack of planning personnel, coupled with uncertainly surrounding how
best to incorporate industry needs into the event, had a detrimental impact on
their training objectives and goals.

While industry was encouraged to actively participate in GP 08, they were
never fully integrated into the scenario. An exception was the Yuma, AZ,
piece that was purposely designed to fully integrate industry. Once again,
lack of planning personnel was the major contributing factor to this issue.
Also, in order to provide realistic training and mitigate concerns regarding
perceived endorsement of technologies, industry partners were told all
responders would only use technologies and equipment they currently possess or
funding for development in direct support of their training objectives. While
industry partners certainly understood and appreciated responder concerns,
more effective coordination, on a not to interfere basis, could have been
emplaced to facilitate industry training in conjunction with or at the
completion of traditional responder training.

Feedback from many of the traditional responder entities noted that while
there is tremendous value in incorporating industry into the event, a more
robust de-confliction policy is required to mitigate potential conflicts. At
several of the training venues, space was limited and the desire to
incorporate all potential players into the scenario detracted from traditional
responder training. At no time did industry participants intentionally
interfere with responder training, the fault lay with Golden Phoenix planners
rather than participants.
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Recommendation: Involve industry representatives from the onset of the
planning cycle. Utilize trade associations and business organizations to
inform industry of the opportunity to participate in such events and solicit
support from such organizations during the planning and execution phases.
Establish and fund an industry liaison team comprised of a lead representative
and functional area representatives (i.e., communications, logistics, etc.).
Solicit industry input and incorporate industry needs to the greatest extent
possible without undermining traditional responder objectives. If select
industry needs cannot be met, utilize the liaison cell and industry volunteers
to create break-out scenarios that satisfy stated requirements. Incorporate
an industry simulation cell into the event to ensure that an uninterrupted
flow of training opportunities is available. As in GP 08, offer multiple
environments and venues to maximize the types of industries and technologies
applicable to the event. Utilize academic institutions such as San Diego
State and, in particular, the Visualization Center, as a focal point for
industry involvement. Depending on the time of year, such institutions have
the infrastructure and space required to support the personnel, bandwidth, and
other requirements of emergency operations center types of technologies.

4.17 Item:   Benefits of operating in San Diego, CA for collaborative training
events

Discussion: The San Diego, CA region, for a variety of reasons, offers an
exceptionally unique environment for multi-agency collaborative training
events. The area is ripe with both traditional and non-traditional first
responder entities, from all levels of government as well as academia,
industry, and NGOs.

As the home to 1st Marine Expeditionary Force/Marine Forces Reserve personnel
and the United States Navy’s 3rd Fleet, San Diego is the locale of one of the
nation’s largest populations of DoD personnel. In fact, many Federal agencies
have a robust presence in San Diego. Thousands of Customs and Border
Protection personnel are detailed to the area in order to man the border and
ports of entry, one of which is the busiest land border crossing in the world.
The FBI and DEA have Field Offices located in San Diego. The international
airport is manned by personnel from the TSA and the Port/Harbor is guarded by
members of the USGC. Health and Human Services, Fish and Wildlife, Bureau of
Indian Affairs, ATF, and ICE, to name a few; all have representatives who call
San Diego their home.

San Diego is home to thousands of Law Enforcement, Fire-Rescue, HAZMAT, Public
Health and emergency management personnel. There are three major
Universities, a vigorous industrial base/tourism industry, countless NGOs and
multiple Tribal Nations located in the area as well.

The need for collaborative training events in San Diego can be manifested by
the constant threat of natural disasters be they wildfires, mudslides, or
earthquakes, which all demand seamless integration by responding personnel.
The proximity of the border, Federal/DoD presence, population and popularity
as a tourist destination make San Diego a prime target for man made disasters
as well. Its location, called by one Fire Chief during the 07 fires “the cul-
de-sac of California,” minimal ingress and egress routes for evacuation and
support (two major North/South and one major West/East Interstate), requires
residents to look inward rather than outward for assistance during the
critical 24-72 hours after an incident.

All the factors in the preceding paragraphs constitute a strong argument for
making San Diego the focal point for formalizing the collaborative training
approach. Most importantly, members of the aforementioned agencies whom
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reside in San Diego have demonstrated the willingness to participate in
collaborative training and recognize the intrinsic benefit of doing so.

Recommendation: Establish operational test beds and collaborative training
venues in the San Diego area. Fund such events appropriately and utilize them
To form a template for such venues than can be utilized throughout the nation.

4.18 Item:   Future Events

Discussion: A question on the minds of many GP 08 participants and observers
is “what happens in 2009?” At the time of this document no agency or
individual has come forward to assume the responsibility of planning another
collaborative training event in the 2009 timeframe. In 2006/7 the driving
force behind GP was MAG-46 and in 2008, MAG-46 and CBP San Diego Sector. In
the fall of 2008 the two primary planners for MAG-46 will come off their
active duty orders and return to their civilian careers/duties as a USMC
Reservists. MAG-46 as a whole will decommission in the summer of 2009 and
cease to exist thereafter. As stated in the “purpose” section of this
document, MAG-46/4th Marine Aircraft Wing/Marine Forces Reserve will no longer
plan nor participate in a future Golden Phoenix event. MAG planners will
continue to be available to any party interested in the collaborative training
concept and provide any documentation/assistance requested. In summary…

      Despite zero funding outside of operational/training funds, a
      compressed planning cycle and minimal dedicated staff, GP 08
      personnel managed to amass over 150 agencies and 800 people
      while executing a dynamic and robust training event. From 2006
      to 2008 over 210 agencies and 1500 personnel have come together
      to participate in GP events, all dedicating their own time and
      resources with the knowledge they would not be compensated for
      costs incurred. GP planners and participants have unequivocally
      proven not only the need for collaborative training but also the
      methodologies required for successful evolutions.    Considering
      the millions upon millions of dollars a year spent on exercises
      and training across the country, the value gained during Golden
      Phoenix events compared to the costs incurred is truly
      astonishing.

Recommendation:   Examine the potential   of   loosely   formalizing   the
collaborative training concept.

5. Point of contact information;
LtCol John Persano III, john.persano1@usmc.mil, 760-445-2375.




                                    J. Persano III
                                    LtCol    USMCR




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                                            Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                          ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


D.1.2    Data Communications in Support of Tactical Level Emergency
         Response Collaborative Training – Coby Leuschke AAR




December 2008                                                                        D-7
Executive Summary - Data Communications in Support of
Tactical Level Emergency Response Collaborative Training
Tactical level collaborative training provides a unique opportunity to develop social
networks surrounding communities of interest from all levels of government and across
a full spectrum of possible responders. However, this same opportunity creates a
unique challenge in building and maintaining these relationships outside of in-person
meetings and conferences. This challenge is easily met through the development and
support of web-based social networking and collaboration tools. These tools can allow
easy access to the information surrounding the training, as well as provide a method for
participants to create and continue conversation threads regardless of time or location.
And since one of the biggest benefits of this type of training is the development of inter-
personal and inter-organizational relationships, between often non-traditional partners,
web-based tools that act as enablers to this process are key to continued success.

Tactical level collaborative training also provides a unique opportunity to explore both
new and existing technologies in an interoperable framework. And, perhaps more
importantly, it provides a controlled environment to test the policies that guide the use of
these same technologies. By encouraging the use of new and existing technologies
within policy guidance often exposes weaknesses in both the technologies and/or
policies, and perhaps most importantly allows developers and policy makers to become
more familiar with how tactical level expedient fixes impact their technology or product.

And finally tactical level collaborative training supports the use of technology in context.
And by using the technology to support the training the full spectrum of technical and
logistics support requirements are required to be addresses in order to execute. While
the use of table-top exercises is no doubt constructive to general training requirements,
they are not able to generate the same type of detailed lessons learned as actually
deploying and employing the equipment in support of field training.

This after action discusses these issues and some of the solutions employed as well as
problems encountered during Golden Phoenix 2008, a tactical level collaborative
training event held in San Diego, CA.


Item: Use of web-based social networking and content management tools to support               Comment [1]:
                                                                                               *********Memes**************
collaborative training planning/execution/debrief/after action cycle.                           Social networking, collaboration,
                                                                                               content management tools
                                                                                               Linking people, institutions, and
Discussion: CivMil.org was created as a result of after action requirements from the           enterprise
2006 MAGMA Training Event. The requirements identified the need for a                          Civilian reporting
                                                                                               Synchronous vs asynchronous needs
method/service that would allow cross-domain non-classified information sharing                open source information fusion
between all partners involved during the entire cycle of content creation -                    non-obvious relationships
                                                                                               signal to noise
planning/execution/debrief/archives. Since the partners involved included agencies from        use patterns
multiple domains - civil and military, a web based system was considered the best              google analytics
                                                                                               *******************************
solution. Several existing information sharing sites/services were considered, but all
lacked the primary requirement of having direct contact between end-users and
developers in order to meet emergent requirements. This user-centric design/support
requirement drove the decision to implement a new site hosted at civmil.org. The site
used to support Golden Phoenix 2007 was a based on an open source, light weight
content management system (CMS)/framework called SiteFrame. SiteFrame was
modified to support basic requirements for 2007, but the after actions for that event
included requests for more features than the framework could easily handle. Options to
build more custom code for SiteFrame , as well as larger more robust open source
frameworks such as Joomla and Drupal were considered. In the end, the decision was
made to move to Drupal based on the following factors: It was easy to deploy using
limited resources (one developer and a small server); It supported most requirements
either out of the box, or with the use of third party modules; and it was already in use for
other projects within the simlar communities of interest (see Partnership for Peace,
Regional International Outreach, ShareInfoForPeople.org).
 Social networking tools available on the internet have blossomed since 2006 (see Web
2.0). The use of tools such as Twitter, Flickr, and YouTube are becoming a regular part
of new media (see New Media) and popular culture in general. The Drupal community
continues to grow and the code base is being used to develop everything from basic
content management system to multimedia mash-ups (see Drupal Use Cases
http://drupal.org/cases). It should be noted here that the move to Drupal has been
positive in regards to support for Golden Phoenix, but Drupal is not the only framework
that may meet these requirements. A more detailed analysis of general social
networking and content management requirements is provided in a separate item.

Recommendation: One of the primary benefits of bottom-up collaborative training
events such as Golden Phoenix is the development of a social network based on face-
to-face interactions between traditional and non-traditional partners alike. The use of
web-based social networking tools provide a means to enhance and continue building
these social networks from a distance, and in both a synchronous and asynchronous
fashion. A proper CMS also allows for information sharing in a more powerful and
manageable way than email distribution lists , which was a key requirement given the
distributed nature of the partners involved. (see
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/aug/28/email.addiction ;
http://blogs.techrepublic.com.com/tech-manager/?p=576 ;
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/14/technology/14email.html?r=1&pagewanted=1&ref=
business&oref=slogin)

 Given the general positive feedback for CivMil.org, and the fact that in nine months the
site saw approximately 8000 visits, over 61,000 page views and 450 registered Golden
Phoenix Group Members (Figure CGL-1), it is recommended to fund cross-domain,
web-based social networking and content management tools to support training events
around the nation.
                                                                                    Comment [2]:
                                                                                    ******Memes***************
                                                                                    SN and CMS architectural
                                                                                    requirements
                                                                                    Notifications
                                                                                    Messaging
                                                                                    Multi-pathway user driven
                                                                                    requirements
                                                                                    Mobile clients
                                                                                    Desktop clients
                                                                                    Email
                                                                                    SMS
                                                                                    IM
                                                                                    Mail to web
                                                                                    Event Based Architecture
                                                                                    Rules and workflow
                                                                                    User Level Organization
                                                                                    Groups
                                                                                    Contact Resource Management
                                                                                    (CRM)
                                                                                    Taxonomy Framework
                                                                                    Structured
                                                                                    Organic
                                                                                    Tags
                                                                                    Folksonomy
                                                                                    Mash-ups
                                                                                    Feed aggregation
                                                                                    User Interface
                                                                                    Faceted browsing to enable dynamic
                                                                                    visualizations of filtered data sets
                                                                                    AJAX
                                                                                    Client restrictions
                                                                                    Geospatial framework
                                                                                    layers
                                                                                    OpenGIS
                                   Figure CGL-1                                     open standards
                                                                                    KML
                                                                                    GeoRSS
                                                                                    Temporal Framework
                                                                                    Date/Time
Item: General Web-Based Social Networking and Content Management Requirements       Timelines
                                                                                    Calendar
                                                                                    File Framework
Discussion: As mentioned in a separate item, the use of web-based tools to extend   Images
social networking and content management during all phases of the training was a    Videos
                                                                                    Docs
value add to the event. Drupal, an open source content management framework, was    SPIME - Open Internet of Things
                                                                                    Chat
selected to support this particular task, but this solution can be abstracted to provide a
basic information architecture from which to build.

Recommendation: Figure CGL-2 shows a framework that can support social
networking and content management needs. Some features may be omitted depending
on exact requirements. Each of these items will be discussed in more detail below along
with two possible use cases.




                                      Figure CGL-2

I. General Requirements
    A. Easy to access
       1.     Platform independent
          a) Browser based only
          b) No client install
          c) Only standard ports
             (1)      http:80
             (2)      https:443
       2.     Defense in depth
          a) Well defined and realistic account/password requirements
          b) Role-based access
          c) Code review and upgrades
       3.     Ability to process account requests quickly
    B. Easy to use
           1.     No/little time to train
           2.     Support tools currently in use rather than replace by default
              a) Includes desktop and mobile clients
              b) Includes internet via cloud services
           3.     Helps adoption rate
      C.    Easy to maintain
           1.     Limited support
              a) Open Source helps mitigate
      D.   Easy to develop
           1.     Limited number of developers
              a) Open Source helps mitigate
           2.     Support emergent requirements
II.        Specific Requirements
      A.    Support open standards
           1.     Maximize use of web services/data
              a) Feed aggregation
              b) Personal streams
              c) Output/synchronize with cloud services
           2.     Mash-ups of external data, visualizations, media
              a) Maps with layers
              b) Calendars and timelines
              c) Support images, video, audio
              d) Basic sensor support such as GPS phones
      B.    Provide taxonomy across content types
           1.     System-wide
              a) Keywords
           2.     User defined
              a) Tags
      C.   Provide ability to group users around common interests/themes
      D.   Provide service oriented architecture
           1.     XML-RPC
           2.     ReST API’s
           3.     SOAP/WSDL
           4.     Open standards based end points
      E.    Provide integrated multi-modal views with filters/facets
           1.     Temporal
           2.     Geospatial
           3.     Lists
           4.     Tables
           5.     Media
      F.   Provide notifications via multiple pathways with comment reply option
           1.     Email
           2.     IM/XMPP
           3.     SMS
      G.    Provide messaging between users via multiple pathways
           1.     Email
       2.     IM/XMPP
       3.     SMS
   H. Provide basic contact management
       1.     Buddy list with presence
       2.     Integrate with messaging framework
   I. Support upload and management of files via multiple pathways
       1.     HTTP, WebDav, FTP, Email
       2.     Popular file formats
          a) Word, PowerPoint, Excel, PDF
       3.     On the fly
          a) Image conversions
             (1)    Thumbs, preview, full page
          b) Video conversions
             (1)     Transcode as required

*Please note that real time collaboration (RTC) tools such as virtual white boarding and
screen sharing were not included in this framework, but could also be integrated as
needed.

Use case: Announcement of a planning conference.

Workflow: The planner posts the event to the site. The submission triggers an event that
causes a notification of new content to be sent to registered users who are subscribed
to such postings. The notification is sent to each user a an email, IM , SMS or a
combination of methods, depending on user preferences. The user can respond to the
event and register for attendance at the same time using their preferred pathway. The
list of registered attendees can be viewed, printed and/or exported for use at the
conference. Documents, notes, images and micro-blogs are posted from the conference
and monitored by those who could not attend. Also, the conference is recorded and
posted to the site as a video.

Use Case: Coordinating observation team during execution

Workflow: An observer team needs to coordinate movement and coverage during
execution of the training. The team has created an Observer Group on the site; they
have GPS enabled cell phones running a client that reports their location to Fire Eagle -
Yahoo’s hosted location based service; the GPS location of each member is pulled from
Fire Eagle and placed on a layer on Google Maps along with current feeds from several
other feeds tracking the progress of execution; the team members use SMS to help
maintain communication; they email photos from their phones; they have also enabled a
Jott client and are posting voice notes with transcriptions. The Team Leader is in a
central location monitoring the flow of execution as well as the aggregated
communication streams from team members, and is able to redirect observers as
required based on near real time information from multiple sources. The flow of texts,
micro-blogs, images, and locative information is aggregated in the site’s Observer
Group and available for later reconstruction of the event.
For a social networking case study in Drupal see here: http://drupal.org/node/300255


Item: Use of CivMil.org Playground to support operational experimentation

Discussion: As not all social networking tools were implemented during the design and
planning phase of GP 08 a separate group was created on the site to support
operational experimentation; the group was call GP Playground. While basic social
networking and content management needs were met prior to execution, there were
some requirements that went unfulfilled either because the tools were experimantel/beta
quality or there was simply no time to test and implement them into the main site.
Therefore a the Playground was created to support testing of these tools. Experiments
included

1. The use of sStitch client on iPhones to support dynamic/predictive tagging of images.
These images were then overlaid on a Google Map in the Playground using a GeoRSS
feed retrieved form the SStitch service. Although this service was in beta at time of
testing, the developer came to Golden Phoenix to allow his developers to interact and
test in a field environment.
2. GPS phone tracking using OpenDMTP and it’s reference platform, OpenGTS, in
conjunction with BoostMobile phones running the Mologogo client. The GPS enabled
phones used the Mologogo client to report position information to the OpenGTS server,
which in turn fed a KML feed to an overlay on a Playground Google Map. This
experiment was considered a success, but due to the technical complexity of the
solution coupled with the low reliability of the phone’s GPS other options are being
considered. However, for a low cost and open source tracking solution this does work.
3. SMS notifications and reporting. Using the Clickatell commercial gateway users were
able to send SMS messages from CivMil.org containing links to posts. It was desired to
have two-way SMS capabilities for this test, but receiving bulk SMS messages in the US
requires leasing a short code. The cost of leasing the code, about $1200 US/month, and
lack of time to complete the receive framework, prevented SMS receive for this test.
Notifications worked well. The value of using low-bandwidth SMS as a way to
communicate with essentially anyone who owns a mobile phone is very high. Two-way
SMS should be a key part of any web notification/messaging framework.
4. Voice to web using Jott. Jott.com offers free and premium paid voice to text
transcription services that also allow a user to post to supported platforms. The Jott
Drupal module was installed and tested. The ability to complete a handsfree post using
a mobile phone was considered to be a viable use case, however this functionality was
not thoroughly tested for GP 09. The Jott Module does not currently support Drupal’s
Organic Groups, so posting was limited to a few tests to personal blogs. With proper
group integration and further testing this could be a valuable tool.
5. Figure CGL-3 list the basic architecture that was developed to support CivMil.org and
the Playground. Please note there were no formal test plans and therefor no scientific
results for any of these tests. The Playground was created help identify technologies of
interest for future development and expose participants and observers to some of the
current and upcoming web based tools.

Recommendation: Allow for the Playground concept in future training events. This
non-critical path technology incubator enabled innovation and experimentation while
allowing developers to interact with end users under field conditions. This type of
experiment could be applied to any product being developed as part of an iterative
process with potentially great gains at minimum risk. (See “Item: Technical support




requirements for multi-agency training event” for more details)
                                     Figure CGL-3




Item: Development and support of service oriented architecture (SOA) Sandbox

Discussion: One of the primary objectives of the Final Planning Conference (FPC) was
to develop the foundation of a data sandbox that would allow the various systems
integrators to define end points for data production/consumption. This was an emergent
requirement that stemmed from the participation of industry partners, and was
considered key to developing an interoperable data infrastructure to support informatin
sharing during training execution. Figure CGL-4 shows the results of the FPC in regards
to constructing a SOA Sandbox. This was a conceptual draft and it was left to the
individual vendors and participants to collaborate on further detailed implementation.




                                      Figure CGL-4


Recommendation: This concept is very similar to that of the Playground and could be
combined. Perhaps a data/technology Playground could be implemented with multiple
sandboxes to support different requirements. E.g. Sandbox Alpha to support highly
experimental ideas/technology and Sandbox Beta to support release quality technology
in a non-critical path SOA environment. Regardless of the details of implementation, this
is another important tool to allow vendors and participants the ability to test integration
among non-traditional partners in a no fault multi-domain training event. And similar to
the Playground concept it is a low risk high reward activity. However, it is a concept that
has a support overhead and must be properly managed by someone who has the
requisite skills to perform education and outreach. (See “Item: Technical support
requirements for multi-agency training event” for more details)



Item: Technical support requirements for multi-agency training event                          Comment [3]:
                                                                                              missing links in chain of command
                                                                                              create voids in communications
                                                                                              during training. need provisions to
                                                                                              simulate missing links.
Discussion: The use of web based and other technical tools to plan and execute a
training event requires technical support. The nature, size and scope of that support will
depend on the size and complexity of the event and technology involved. Golden
Phoenix 2008 needed more people with technical skills to support planned and
emergent requirements. The original plan to support most data sharing requirements via
civmil.org was supportable by one or two people. However, with the addition of the SOA
Sandbox, Video Architecture, and Playground requirements the support system was
often overwhelmed. Since all of these requirements and associated events were loosely
coupled with other requirements and events the failure of one did not effect the others.
Since the nature of the training is to bring loosely coupled events together under a
common theme there were no major issues. But, had any of these been a critical node
in the training there may have not been enough resources to ensure success.

Recommendation: Technical support overhead must be considered going into the
event. Just as successful execution of a real world event depends on solid
communication, so does a training event. Technology will touch each cycle of a training
event, which needs to be staffed/supported in order to prevent the tools in use from
creating an unnecessary distraction or possibly bringing things to a complete halt. A
loosely coupled and modular training architecture does help mitigate the risk of a chain
of failures, but may not provide the integrated communications desired to test
interoperability across domains. The technology needed to support a loosely coupled
training event must still consider the requirements to develop a complete command and
control system in order to maintain consistent information flow between events. Golden
Phoenix enjoyed participation from many levels of government, industry and volunteer
organizations but still had gaps in the chain of command that prevented a more realistic
flow of information between the separate training events. To facilitate execution of even
loosely coupled events will require information flow between the agencies providing
command, coordination and field operators. This can be supported/simulated with the
proper technical support but must be considered while developing the training plan in
order to identify the true technical support requirements.


Item: Training and education of open standards to support data interoperability.             Comment [4]:
                                                                                             open standards
                                                                                             implementation, education, funding
Discussion: The use of open standards to share data met with some success during
the training. Some of this was due to the fact that sharing items such as RSS feeds has
become very easy to do, and often default behavior in many web-based systems.
However, we continue to see limited understanding of DHS approved standards such as
CAP and EDXL at the practitioner level. While this certainly does not hinder technical
implementation of the standards, it may lead to adoption problems. And to paraphrase -
a standard is not a standard if nobody uses it.

Recommendation: Develop practitioner level training, education and outreach on
currently approved standards and future work that will support data interoperability.
Make it short and easy to understand by leveraging real world use cases that clearly
explain the benefits of designing, developing and purchasing systems that support
these standards. This is paramount to help prevent the continued proliferation of closed,
proprietary systems that do not support data interoperability.

Item: Streaming video architecture and network requirements                                  Comment [5]:
                                                                                             Video as a sensor
                                                                                             operational vs intelligence
Discussion: Video continues to be both a priority request by incident command                distribution
                                                                                             bandwidth requirements
personnel and a top draw on network bandwidth requirements. Supporting video on a            cost-benefit
ad-hoc field network can be done, but does create trade-offs in the performance and          primary sensor
possible support of other services on the network. A typical 320 pixel by 240 pixel video
stream may use about 60-80K bits/sec of network bandwidth depending on
compression/quality. And while this is not a large amount of bandwidth by itself, without
a proper streaming video architecture the load on the network will quickly exceed
capacity. There are several potential problems at play here:

1. The number of total video sensors needed to cover an area and the overall size,
  frame rate, compression (codec) and audio requirements associated with each video
  stream.
2. The total number of client connections to any given stream and whether the stream
  is unicast or multicast.
3. The location of the sensor relative to location the client is connecting from - whether
  it be via the local or wide are network

These issues all have an impact on the network and therefore the architectural
requirements to support proper video streaming. During the training the two remote
sites at Brown Field and Yuma both had video streaming requirements. Yuma and
Brown Field both had video streams they needed to deliver to multiple clients that may
or may not be coming from within their respective local area networks. In essence, they
needed to be able to provide on demand video service to possibly hundreds of client
connections coming from the internet, as well as provide a service end point to systems
integrators using the feeds in their respective visualization products. This met with very
limited success for Golden Phoenix 2008.
 A solution was researched and discussed during the planning phase but not
implemented due to lack of time and equipment needed to build a dedicated distributed
video architecture. Figure CGL-4 shows the proposed architecture. This type of
approach is considered a fairly standard approach to allow for distributed streaming
video. This particular solution was intended for use with Quicktime Broadcaster and
Darwin Streaming Server, but could be achieved using a variety of CoTs and open
source software/hardware. Using streaming servers at each location allows the stream
to be both multicast on the local area network and unicast to other relay servers at
strategic points on the wide area network, which can then multicast the same stream on
their respective local area networks. This solution ensures that the video stream is only
sent once across the satellite backhaul and also minimizes bandwidth requirements on
the LAN.
 And this is not a “nice to have” when backhaul bandwidth is provided by mobile satellite
communication. The satellite services in use at both locations had limited upstream
bandwidth and were not capable of supporting the number of clients expected to
connect to each video stream - possibly 100+ viewers. Even a system that supports 1M
bit/sec on the uplink would be saturated serving ten unicast clients viewing a very small
100K bit/sec video feed. As a work-around to some of these network limitations Yuma
was able to use a free web-based streaming service at ustream.tv, and Brown Field
limited video to it’s local area network. And while this worked well for limited viewing
requirements it should only be considered a field expedient fix to very real problem:
Satellite bandwidth is limited, and if a proper video architecture is not employed, the
bandwidth may be better used supporting low bandwidth, high value applications.




                                     Figure CGL-5



Recommendations: Develop training, education and outreach that involves best
practices for 1) Making best use of available network assets 2) Cost/benefit of video in
incident command 3) Building a network to support video if required. Over the last three
years of Golden Phoenix training events we have witnessed a tendency to favor video
as quick way to build a Common Operating Picture. And, in some sense, this may be
true at some level, it is not a solution that scales very well to support multiple feeds
across networks. These same resources may be better used in building prioritized low
bandwidth solutions such as federated chat and other text based shared web services,
followed by more progressively complex and often bandwidth intensive solutions such
as video.

Item: Common operational picture (COP) issues                                                  Comment [6]:
                                                                                               Common Operational Pictures
                                                                                               tools to support daily operations that
Discussion: The issues surrounding development and use of a COP are many, ranging              scale to support emergency response
from technical issues such as usability and use of open standards, to policy issues such       webeoc sme’s
as credentials and authentication. This is a more general view of the issues surrounding       Comment [7]:
COP’s and why they are in many instances not common operating pictures, but limited            something better here
operating pictures.

Recommendations:
1. Tools that are used every day. Given limited time and training budgets the use of
   specialty hardware and software tools will struggle to see an acceptable adoption
   rate. And when compounded with the effects of stresses found in any emergency
   response, asking responders to pick up and use new and largely untrained skills/tools
   is just not a good idea. For a COP to be used it must be part of a tool set that is used
   to support daily operations that will scale to support response. Daily use of the
   required tools is one of the surest ways to breed the familiarity and level of skill
   necessary to properly employ the tool when one is tired, hungry, wet, cold and just
   generally pissed-off.
2. People-centric development (aka bottom-up). These tools are meant to be employed
   and supported in the field. Therefore, to ensure a truly useful product, at least some
   of the development in an iterative process should occur at the same level as the
   response occurs, and under similar conditions. A spiral model may work if properly
   managed, but too long of a time between iterations and user testing/feedback may
   lead to lack of support of emergent requirements in the final product. This is
   especially true of technology as it is subject to rapid advancements compared to
   typical procurement cycles. Golden Phoenix type training events and operational
   experiments offer an exceptional test venue to incorporate into an iterative
   development process.
3. Allow for open source information fusion. The proliferation of mobile devices and the
   popularity of social networking tools has lead to a constant stream of information on
   the internet. It is true that much of this information can be considered noise, but there
   are methods of reducing the noise and increasing the signal. There are many more
   citizens than there are first responders and they are communicating. It only makes
   sense to make use of this information to help build a COP. Following Twitter hashtags
   or using the new Twitter search API would perhaps be the easiest way to experiment
   with this type of information. Los Angeles Fire Department is a good example of the
   use of this kind of open technology (see http://twitter.com/lafd) The information from
   this type of service can be easily integrated a COP. (see hashtags in Twitter and
   Flickr for SD Fires http://factoryjoe.com/blog/2007/10/22/twitter-hashtags-for-
   emergency-coordination-and-disaster-relief/)
Item: Building scalable ad hoc networks to support response                                    Comment [8]:
                                                                                               networking issues
                                                                                               time/duration/scale
Discussion: The proliferation of Mobile Command Posts with satellite data                      wired when able - who strings cables
                                                                                               wireless - unlicensed spectrum
communications is a good thing. However, it also means that when these assets come             link aggregation
together to scale from something like an Incident Command Post to a Unified Area               multi-wan routers
                                                                                               mesh protocols
Command there are several issues that need to managed.                                         authentication/security
1. Data communication over satellite has it’s own unique set of capabilities and               satcom issues
                                                                                               double hop vs single hop
   limitations. As noted in a separate AAR item the uplink bandwidth is limited and must       VPN and encryption
   be used wisely. VPN connections are also noteworthy. Satellite modems compress              ssl
   and encrypt each packet sent in order to maximize performance. This is not possible
   if the client is attempting to connect via a secure VPN connection as the packet is
   already encrypted; therefore the satellite modem no longer has access to the
   contents of the packet to determine the best way to compress the information. So, the
   VPN packet is sent in the same form it left the client, which is to say not optimized for
   satellite transmission. There are hardware devices that will allow VPN connections in
   conjunction with satellite modems.
2. Streaming services such as video may create issues in several ways. First, streaming
   video may be a violation of terms of service. Because bandwidth is very valuable on a
   satellite based network use of streaming packets such as video is tightly controlled.
   To have access to this kind of level of service typically requires additional cost to
   acquire a committed information rate (CIR) from the service provider. Streaming
   services such as video and VoIP can also be susceptible to errors caused by packets
   being delivered out of order. Even on a good day satellite based communication can
   not guarantee the same rate of ordered packet delivery as a terrestrial network. It is
   highly encouraged for people responsible for acquiring and supporting these systems
   to understand requirements and associated capabilities.
3. Each active satellite system typically creates it’s own local area network. This makes
   sense in the case of supporting a small Incident Command Post. In fact, in an
   infrastructure collapsed environment satellite based data communications is
   essential. But issues may arrise when attempting to scale to leverage several satellite
   systems to create a Unified Command Post with a unified local area network. Figure
   CGL-6 shows the approximate distance a packet must travel, with associated delay,
   on a satellite based network. These distances are acceptable if the ground terminals
   are geographically distant. However, when two systems are sitting side-by-side, as
   they would to form a “Command U” in a typical Unified Command Post layout, the
   prospect that every packet must travel ~90,000 miles to communicate between two
   clients 50 feet away is not acceptable. There are a few ways to mitigate this problem:
     a. The first is to deploy mesh nodes at each of the vehicles/locations with a satellite
        system. These mesh nodes could then be configured to advertise as an internet
        gateway. This would effectively aggregate the available backhaul over the
        wireless mesh. More work and equipment would be required to make this
        available on wired connections and there is no guarantee that the gateways are
        load balanced as access to the gateways would most likely be based on closest
        gateway to the client. This would perhaps be the simplest and most dynamic fix if
        all systems involved deploy with mesh gear running the same mesh software.
      There are many variables to this method working with zero configuration in the
      field and would need to be thoroughly tested.
   b. The second method would be to deploy a load balancing multi-wan router. There
      are several on the market capable of handling the needs of even large
      deployments (see http://www.peplink.com/ and http://www.pfsense.com/). In this
      scenario a cable would need to run from each of the satellite systems to one or
      two of these routers (depending on fail-over set-up). This router would then act to
      aggregate all of the satellite connections. The end result would be a unified LAN
      (wired and or wireless) and a load balanced and fault tolerant WAN. There are
      many policy issues to be investigated to implement this solution, but technically it
      can be achieved in the field at relatively low cost.




                                      Figure CGL-6

Recommendation: Design, develop and fund multi-agency regional training events
designed to address the issue of building interoperable data infrastructure using
currently fielded equipment. This is a problem with many layers and should rate it’s own
level of detailed training. By bringing equipment together in the field around scenarios
designed to identify these types of issues, solutions can be tested that will help           Comment [9]:
                                                                                             infrastructure collapsed issues
responders be better prepared to support larger and more complex response.                   time/duration
                                                                                             logistics
                                                                                             trades in the field - e.g. generator: 20
                                                                                             amp twist locks, functional ground
                                                                                             (earth ground); wiring
                                                                                             techs in field
Item: Power requirements for technology in an infrastructure collapsed environment.
Discussion: Every piece of technology that is brought to the field adds to support
requirements. This item focuses on some simple problems that occurred at Brown Field
but are representative of the kind of detailed lessons learned during Golden Phoenix
type training events. This particular issue revolves around the use of a commercial
generator that was used to support about 80% of the equipment on the Industry/Partner
area of Brown Field. The generator itself was a donated rental unit. And here are some
of the detailed lessons learned:
1. We had not generator mechanic on hand to maintain/fix the unit. Fine for relatively
   short duration operations, but had the generator failed we would have had serious
   power issues as there were no back-up that could make-up for all of the power
   requirements.
2. Since it was a commercial grade generator it came with a power distribution point
   (spider) that had 20 amp twist lock receptacles. (Figure CGL-7) A commercial
   contractor will likely have 20 amp twist lock extension cords, but this ay not be the
   case for response units. This resulted in the need for adapters purchased at a local
   home improvement store in order to use the extension cords that everyone brought to




  Brown Field.
                                       Figure CGL-7

Recommendation: Only by going to the field and attempting to execute The Plan will
this level of detail emerge. This may have been a simple issue, but had this been in a
place with no home improvement store nearby, 80% of the site would have remained
without power. This clearly illustrates the need for more of this type of training. Embrace
it, fund it. It’s worth every penny.
                                         Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                       ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.1.3    Human Dimensions Research Team AAR, Operation Golden Phoenix
         (20-25 July 2008), San Diego, California




December 2008                                                                     D-9
                       UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ON




REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF


 NDU-CTNSP                                                                      21 August, 2008

 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

 SUBJECT: After Action Report of the HDRT - Human Dimensions Research Team,
 Operation Golden Phoenix (20-25 July 2008), San Diego, California


 1. PURPOSE: As part of the STAR-TIDES project, CTNSP (Center for Technology and
 National Security Policy) provided a “Human Dimensions Research Team” for Operation
 Golden Phoenix 2008, a 4-day CIVMIL multi-agency response exercise. The purpose was to
 conduct exploratory research on the human interactions, role of social networks, and factors
 influencing trust in these kinds of operations.

 2. BACKGROUND: A key goal of the STAR-TIDES project is to understand the underlying
 processes that influence building trust and social networks in multi-agency operations. This
 knowledge will lead to new approaches and strategies for how to rapidly establish and build trust
 in such operations, assuring better cooperation and unity of effort across diverse groups. To
 address this goal, CTNSP dispatched a Human Dimensions Research Team (HDRT) to study
 trust and social network building in the Operation Golden Phoenix 2008 exercise, 20-24 July in
 San Diego, California. Operation Golden Phoenix (OGP) began in 2006 as a collaborative
 training event that takes place in southern California over four days in July. For OGP 2008, over
 400 people from 150+ different agencies participated in a complex crisis scenario that included a
 mock pandemic flu outbreak, illegal border crossings, an earthquake with multiple casualties
 requiring medical evacuation and treatment, and a potential bioterrorism attack near the Mexican
 border. Participants included US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the US Marine Corps
 (Marine Air Group - MAG-46), local fire, police and emergency responders, the California
 National Guard, the American Red Cross, National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue
 (NIUSR) and other non-governmental organization, the San Diego State University, and a range
 of private sector firms working in information technology, communications and imagery
 collection sectors. The main STAR-TIDES activity was a transportable infrastructure
 demonstration showing several low-cost emergency shelters and solar power solutions. STAR-
 TIDES members also met with event leaders and attended OGP planning and information-
 sharing sessions.

 3. RESEARCH GOALS AND METHODS: The goal of the Human Dimensions Research Team
 (HDRT) was to conduct a focused, unobtrusive, exploratory research effort aimed at clarifying
 the role of trust and social networks in such operations, while also identifying factors that
 support or impede trust building. The HDRT consisted of myself (Dr. Paul T. Bartone), CAPT
 (Ret.) Brian Scott of the Department of Homeland Security (Infrastructure Protection), and Mr.
Alexis Ward, a freelance videographer. Dr. Dave Warner of San Diego State University also
served as advisor to the HDRT. Multiple methods were applied, including observations,
interviews, and a brief survey administered after the exercise. The HDRT members met prior to
the exercise to calibrate on study goals and methods, including observation and interview
approaches. Observations and interviews were conducted on site over the entire course of the
exercise from Sunday July 20 through Friday July 25. Information was recorded in notebooks
and also videotaped where possible. A paper version of the brief survey was administered at the
general “After Action Review” (“hot wash”) on Friday, and a computerized on-line version was
also created and made available to respondents. Questions covered attitudes about trust at the
personal and organizational levels, stress resilience, and experiences in OGP related to
cooperative and trusting behaviors, as well as any factors diminishing trust (attachment 1). It
was very much an exploratory study, beginning with the assumption that at this stage in our
knowledge we don’t have a good understanding of what factors influence the formation of trust
in multi-agency operations.

4. RESULTS: Approximately 120 hours of observations and 32 interviews were completed,
covering four OGP locations: CBP station at Imperial Beach; Brown Field; San Diego State
University (Visualization lab); and Miramar Station. Post-OGP surveys were completed by
N=152 respondents. Several interviews were video-taped. While the full video-taped
interviews and survey data are not yet available for systematic analysis, some preliminary
“lessons learned” are based upon observations and partial survey / interview analyses completed
to date.

Lessons Learned:

 a. Trust matters: Based on a review of relevant literature, interpersonal trust involves
    attributions or expectations that others can be relied upon in three main areas: (1)honesty –
    tell the truth; (2)altruism – care for others, not put selfish interests first; and (3)reliability-
    competence – know your job, and do it well. Interviews and survey responses confirmed
    that trust is important for cooperation to accomplish goals in complex operations involving
    multiple groups and agencies. Survey responses revealed that in the context of emergency
    operations such as OGP, the reliability-competence aspect of trust is especially important.
    Honesty and unselfishness also emerged as important aspects of trust.

 b. Trust and cooperation levels generally high in OGP: The majority of survey respondents
    reported high levels of trust and cooperation across agencies in OGP. Observations and
    interviews at Imperial Beach (CBP station), Brown Field and SDSU confirm this. Often
    mentioned were the excellent coordination, planning and cooperation between MAG-46 and
    CBP. Information and details regarding OGP were disseminated freely and often (mainly by
    email) in the weeks leading up to the event. This helped to create a sense of inclusion and
    cooperation among participants. In addition, the NIUSR (National Institute for Urban
    Search and Rescue) was frequently mentioned as playing a pivotal role in sharing
    information across agencies participating in OGP, contributing to a sense of trust and unified
    effort.




                                                    2
c. Previous relationships foster quick trust: Having some previous contact or existing working
   relationships was frequently mentioned in interviews and surveys as an important factor
   influencing the rapid establishment of trust in multi-agency operations. Relationships could
   be based on past telephone conversations, but having some previous face-to-face was
   emphasized. When feasible, gathering participants together informally for a social event of
   some kind prior to the operation may pay high dividends in terms of establishing the
   interpersonal contact that is important for cooperative effort during crisis operations. This is
   precisely what was done by NIUSR on Sunday afternoon before the exercise, with a
   barbecue – picnic staged in the parking lot outside of the San Diego State University
   “Visualization Lab” location. Although attended mainly by NIUSR members, it was open to
   all OGP participants and provided an opportunity for people to meet and discuss informally
   their roles and interests, prior to the actual event. These contacts were reported to have
   helped in multiple situations during the exercise, especially in communicating across
   different locations

d. Non-evaluative activities/exercises increase interaction and trust: OGP was a cooperative
   training exercise in which the clear and stated goal was to collaborate across agencies in
   order to build knowledge and identify ways to improve joint response capabilities for future
   crisis events. Unlike many “certification” exercises, no agencies or individuals were being
   evaluated or graded on their performance. This created a context in which there was greater
   freedom to experiment, innovate, and possibly fail. The resulting social climate served to
   reduce mutual suspicion and anxiety that often marks evaluative activities. At the same
   time, the OGP organizers paid explicit and substantial attention to open discussion of what
   occurred during the exercise, in the interest of capturing useful “lessons learned” for the
   future. The post OGP “Hot Wash” was a good example of this. All OGP participants were
   given the opportunity to review their experiences in the exercise and discuss what worked
   and what didn’t work, in a non-evaluative environment, without fear of being blamed for
   errors, mistakes or failures.

e. “Trust-busters:” In addition to the items mentioned above, a number of factors appeared to
   impede or damage trust (“Trust-busters”). Several “territorial” behaviors were observed, as
   when some individuals or groups marked their areas and restricted access, or encroached on
   others’ allocated space and refused to adjust or accommodate. Territorial behaviors like this
   were taken as an indicator of non-coopertiveness and un-trustworthiness. In some cases,
   access restrictions appeared to be driven by legitimate concerns about maintaining security
   or safety in certain locations. For example, at Brown Field the Marine group established a
   security perimeter around their area, and requested that civilian OGP participants not enter
   without an escort. While there were probably good reasons for this, most civilian players at
   Brown Field were confused and somewhat surprised by these strict access restrictions. In
   the absence of any clear communication from the Marines, people sought their own
   explanations as to why they were restricting access to their areas. Some speculations that we
   heard were: “they have their own exercise and training activities underway, and can’t afford
   to have those disrupted by observers;” “they have secure communications and equipment
   inside their areas, so anyone without a security clearance should not enter;” and “they just
   like to keep to themselves.”


                                                3
       Safety concerns may also have led to some access restrictions. For example, as part of
   the Marine / CBP prisoner movement scenario on Tuesday afternoon, a large helicopter
   landed at Brown Field and a number of Marines in battle dress uniforms were moving
   around the aircraft. This was a noisy and somewhat exciting event, and many of the civilian
   and NGO personnel at Brown Field crawled to the top of a surrounding dirt berm in order to
   get a better view and take pictures. Within 5 minutes, a Marine NCO approached this group
   and ordered everyone off the berm. Given that the berm was about 8 feet tall, this meant that
   activities around the helicopter were no longer visible to observers. Again, no explanation
   was provided, and so people developed their own. Some assumed the Marines’ action was
   motivated by safety concerns (small rocks, dust and debris blown by the helicopter blades
   might cause an eye injury), while others thought the Marines didn’t want their activities
   observed for security reasons.

       Whatever the case, both incidents point out what happens on a human level when access
   restrictions are placed on mission partners, without any explanation as to the underlying
   purpose: people will generate their own explanations, and these explanations often
   contribute to mutual suspicion and social-distancing. While access restrictions may be
   necessary and justified in some conditions, it should be recognized that a likely impact will
   be reduced trust with mission partners. Leaders may be able to minimize these negative
   effects by taking extra care to explain the reasons behind such restrictions. Also, any selfish
   behaviors can work as trust-busters, such as attempts to monopolize media attention, which
   happened more than once at OGP. Also, some individuals / groups at OGP continued to
   place high demands on the limited available internet bandwidth, despite the field network
   manager’s request to reduce demand. Other observed “trust busters” were self-group
   isolationism – groups sticking to themselves and not interacting with others in the exercise,
   and any indicators of unreliability, such as failure to show up on time for agreed upon events
   or meetings, and failure to comply with basic rules or standards of conduct in the exercise
   environment. As an example, some participants failed to follow the recommended 5 mph
   speed limit around Brown Field, creating a danger as well as excessive amounts of airborne
   dust. These behaviors led other participants to generalize, questioning the reliability and
   “trustworthiness” of the scofflaws.

f. “Trust-boosters:” A number of additional factors were identified as “trust-boosters,” serving
   to enhance or encourage trust in multi-agency operations. Examples include free and open
   sharing of information and plans, regular information meetings / briefings, and a central
   gathering point (at Brown Field, this was the NIUSR trailer) where participants know they
   can come with questions or problems. Easy and open access to the NIUSR area was
   emphasized throughout the exercise in a number of ways. The NIUSR station was a
   relatively comfortable area, with tables, chairs, an awning providing shade, and usually
   snacks, water and coffee available. Also, there was always an NIUSR representative present
   to greet passersby and invite them to stay. Another example of open access was the SDSU
   Vis-lab. Anyone was welcome to go inside and look around, and ask questions. It appears
   that open access to key areas throughout the exercise not only fostered much direct
   information exchange, but also carried a powerful symbolic message of trust and cooperation
   wherever it occurred.


                                                4
       Pre-existing relationships or contacts was also frequently mentioned as a positive factor
   influencing trust and cooperation. Opportunities to meet socially, with food and drink,
   provide valuable personal contacts that can then be called upon to support operational
   activities. This happened several times before and during OGP. Courtesy and respect in
   communications seem to be especially important when strangers are required to work
   together. Simple expressions of courtesy serve to reassure people that their views and needs
   will be respected, and encourage greater openness and cooperation. One notable example of
   this occurred on the morning of the first day at Brown Field. The NIUSR leaders had
   announced an information briefing to occur at 9:00 am, and everyone was invited to attend.
   In a relaxed environment with ample refreshments, attendees had the opportunity to speak
   briefly about their organizations and roles in OGP. Every speaker received a round of
   applause. I learned in a later interview with NIUSR’s director that this was a deliberate
   attempt to communicate respect and appreciation to all participants. This positive
   recognition was all the more powerful as a “trust-booster” when it was done publicly.

       A final point on “trust-boosting” concerns leadership. OGP leaders and organizers
   conveyed a consistent message that (1) their goal was to support OGP participants and help
   them meet their training goals for the exercise, and (2) they were not directing or
   commanding, but rather coordinating. In particular, leaders in the key organizations of CBP
   – Customs & Border Protection, and the MAG-46 Marine Air Group-46 made such
   statements multiple times in the planning and execution of OGP. This helped establish an
   overall tone of altruistic, cooperative effort. As well, NIUSR leaders were especially
   proactive in periodically approaching groups that appeared to be isolated, encouraging them
   to participate in joint tasks and cross-briefs. This was often the “icebreaker” that got
   different groups to actively communicate and work together.




5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

        The 2008 Operation Golden Phoenix (OGP) cooperative training event afforded an
excellent opportunity for multiple agencies and groups to practice working together to respond
more effectively to multiple disaster and crisis scenarios. OGP 2008 served as a successful trust-
building activity in and of itself, bringing together many likely co-responders to future events
and giving them a chance to learn about each others’ systems and procedures, while also
establishing more personal relationships. A Human Dimensions Research Team (HDRT) from
CTNSP (Center for Technology and National Security Policy) attended OGP as observers, and
applied multiple methods to examine the question of how trust is formed in such multi-agency
operations, identify factors that support or impede it, and evaluate how trust (or lack of trust)
might impact on operational performance. The study generated a rich set of observational,
interview, and survey data, demonstrating that this kind of research can be done in a way that is
both cost-effective and unobtrusive as regards the main activity of the exercise.




                                                5
       These results confirm the importance of trust for cooperative, efficient activity in multi-
agency operations. Factors that appear to deter or facilitate the formation of trust are
summarized as Trust Busters and Trust Boosters.

        The key Trust Busters are: (a)an evaluative or testing orientation and social context -
raises anxiety and reduces openness; (b)isolationism – tendency of some individuals to stick with
their own group, who they know, and not interface with others; (c)withholding of information
about activities, capabilities etc, arouses suspicion; (d)territorialism and access restrictions,
preventing others from entering your areas (physical and virtual); (e)selfish or greedy behaviors
(“pushing own agenda”), as well as unreliability – failing to meet basic requirements, follow
rules, show up on time etc; and (f)leaders who attempt to direct and control activities and other
agencies excessively.

         The key Trust Boosters identified in this research to date are: (a)a non-evaluative,
learning orientation and context; (b)pre-existing relationships, and social events to foster quick
formation of personal relationships among strangers; (c)free and open sharing of information,
plans, capabilities, and resources; (d)granting others open access to your areas; (e)courtesy and
respect, including “pitching in” to help those outside of your own group – communicates
reliability and altruistic tendencies; and (f)leaders who present themselves as coordinators, not
directors. Future analyses will examine these factors in greater detail, evaluate the potential
influence of individual attitudes and mental models on cooperative behaviors, and provide policy
recommendations for establishing speedy trust in multi-agency operations.




Enclosure:                                    PAUL T. BARTONE, Ph.D.
OGP - Trust Survey                            COL, USA
                                              Senior Research Fellow
                                              Center for Technology and National Security Policy




                                                 6
                                           Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                         ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


D.1.4    DHS Science and Technology Information Sharing Project and
         Controlled Unclassified Information AAR




December 2008                                                                      D-11
DHS S&T Information Sharing Project and Controlled Unclassified Information

Executive Summary

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology
Directorate’s (S&T) Information Sharing Project participated in Golden Phoenix to test
and evaluate the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) framework. CUI is a new
designation and associated policy for safeguarding and disseminating critical information
within our Nation’s network of defenders and emergency responders. Golden Phoenix
provided the Project with an excellent opportunity to observe and evaluate how people at
all levels of government and those within the private sector share information during a
serious crisis situation. Among the key lessons learned from the Project are that
awareness of the Presidential memorandum instituting the CUI policy is currently very
limited, and, that without timely training and publicity, members of the emergency
response community are likely to misunderstand or misapply the policy. Furthermore,
the Project illustrated that with a proper introduction, the CUI framework is easy for most
people to understand and that CUI safeguarding procedures and dissemination controls
are simple and rational.

Introduction

The purpose of the DHS S&T Information Sharing Project is to deliver products that will
create a clear understanding of information sharing capabilities required within and
among the various DHS operational components. At Golden Phoenix, the focus of the
Project was on testing and evaluating the new CUI framework’s ability to safeguard and
disseminate critical information.


The DHS S&T Information Sharing Project’s role in Golden Phoenix was to observe,
record, and analyze how participants safeguarded and disseminated information that
could be categorized as CUI. Project team members Karyn Smith-Higa and Marcus
Erlandson participated in the unclassified workshop and delivered a presentation on CUI
and the objectives of the Project in relation to Golden Phoenix. During Phase III (Field
Events) of Golden Phoenix, two members of the team focused their attention on Brown
Field while three others targeted the Visualization Lab at San Diego State University.
Project team members who participated in Phase III are support contractors from Alion
Science and Technology and Eastport Analytics. Swan Island Networks, Inc., also part
of the project team, implemented the CUI framework within the Trusted Information
Exchange Service Common Operating Picture application; these efforts contributed key
information to the evaluation plan that was developed for the Project. Swan Island
contributed to this report and also is submitting a separate after action report on the role
of TIES in Golden Phoenix.

The DHS S&T Information Sharing Project’s objectives for Golden Phoenix were as
follows:
   •   Assess the capabilities of CUI producers and consumers to meet all of the
       safeguarding requirements and estimated costs involved in addressing any
       safeguarding shortfalls.

   •   Evaluate the commercial and government information sharing technology
       capability to process and safeguard CUI in real-world conditions.

   •   Evaluate the CUI framework and the applicability and clarity of specified
       dissemination instructions across multiple types of CUI.

   •   Develop lessons learned and best practices for implementing CUI policy across
       local, tribal, state, Federal, and private entities.


Golden Phoenix Lessons Learned

   •   Awareness of the Presidential memorandum instituting the CUI policy is currently
       very limited. Training and publishing information about CUI for the homeland
       security community should begin now. Creating a general awareness of CUI
       policy and its benefits before the detailed procedures are developed and
       promulgated will generate support for this initiative and facilitate implementation.

   •   When emergency response personnel first learn about the CUI policy, they
       typically assume that it means that information that previously had to be
       unrestricted will now be designated as CUI and therefore be more tightly
       controlled. In publicizing the CUI policy, particular care must be given to ensure
       the understanding that CUI is a new categorical designation that replaces most
       current systems for marking, safeguarding, and disseminating information
       heretofore referred to as “Sensitive But Unclassified.” It is intended to
       standardize practices and thereby improve the sharing of information; CUI policy
       is not meant to restrict access to additional information.

   •   The CUI framework is easy for most people to understand. The three
       combinations of safeguarding procedures and dissemination controls are simple
       and rational.

   •   Implementation of CUI Specialized Dissemination will be a significant challenge
       in terms of both registered instructions and a system for confirming the identity
       and credentials of authorized CUI recipients.

Recommendations

   •   Continue the Golden Phoenix series. Golden Phoenix is an excellent annual
       collaborative training event. It provides a beneficial opportunity for emergency
       response agencies at all levels of government and the private sector to accomplish
       key training objectives under realistic conditions.
   •   Make the establishment and continuous operation of an incident command
       structure a key objective in future iterations of Golden Phoenix. The benefits of a
       collaborative training event where participating agencies report their activities
       thorough their own chains of command are considerable, but the opportunity for
       learning about the challenges establishing and operating within a Unified
       Command structure is missed if this is not a key feature of Golden Phoenix.

Nuggets for the Abstract

CUI is a key, new designation with associated policy and implementation rules that will
enhance the sharing and safeguarding of critical information within our Nation’s network
of defenders and emergency responders. Efforts to develop training programs and to
publish information about CUI should begin now.
                                                        Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                                      ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


D.1.5      Customs and Border Protection San Diego, California Operation Golden
           Phoenix 2008 AAR
The inclusion of the CBP San Diego Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR input is pending CBP approval.




December 2008                                                                                   D-13
                                        Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                      ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


D.1.6    CBP AMOC GP08 AAR Submission




December 2008                                                                   D-15
Introduction/Executive Summary

CBP Air and Marine Operation Center’s (AMOC) involvement in Golden Phoenix was
two-fold. First AMOC coordinated and tracked the operation of a CBP UH60 from San
Diego Air and Marine Branch at North Island along with a USMCR CH46 into Brown
Field just south of San Diego then onto an LZ approximately 4.4 nautical miles east of
the airport to pick up “smuggling suspects” and transport them to Ream Field near
Imperial Beach, California. AMOC also coordinated and tracked a CBP UH1 to operate
as a filming platform for the event. At approximately the same time AMOC coordinated,
tracked and controlled the participation of a CBP Predator UAS from Fort Huachuca,
Arizona to operate in Restricted Area 2301W (R2301W) near Yuma, AZ and transfer
video imagery to ground based field units.

Best Practices/Lessons Learned

AMOC received an Air Operations Plan from the San Diego Air and Marine Branch the
day before the event thus ensuring a smooth running undertaking.

AMOC was able to track CBP assets throughout the entire event using airborne/ground
based radar units and/or satellite tracking. AMOC was able to track the CH46 into Brown
Field but because the LZ was surrounded by high terrain radar contact was lost while it
was operating there. The CH46 did not have a satellite tracking device.

Coordination was made on the day of the event to use AMOC’s Blue 1 or Blue 2 UHF
frequencies for communications with the facility. AMOC discovered that Blue 3 was in
use and re-coordinated with San Diego Air and Marine Branch to have the air assets to
use Blue 3.

Mode 3 transponder codes for the CBP assets were coordinated just prior to departure.
AMOC did not receive a call requesting a Mode 3 code for the CH46; however, AMOC
was able to use the aircraft’s Mode 2 except as annotated above.

The CBP Predator’s operation in R2301W set a precedent for departing from inside a
restricted area (R2303A); exiting the restricted area, flying in controlled airspace parallel
to the US/Mexico border; entering into a different restricted area; performing a 3 hour
plus mission and returning safely. Feedback from those agencies receiving transferred
data/imagery was all positive.

Several individuals had expressed interest in coming to the AMOC facility and
overseeing (and perhaps coordinating) the operation first hand. Sadly no one was able to
come and see AMOC’s one-of-a-kind operation and its countless capabilities.

Experience with real world disasters (ie: Hurricanes Katrina and Rita etc) has shown that
the involvement of an airborne communications and radar/satellite tracking platform (P3,
E3, E2 etc) has been unparalleled for coordinating and de-conflicting air and ground
based assets and personnel.
                                           Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                         ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


D.1.7    Homeland Security Science and Technology Transfer Team Golden
         Phoenix Observations 21–23 July




December 2008                                                                      D-17
Golden Phoenix Exercise Observations
            21-23 July
            Compiled From Notes Submitted by Members of HSSTT Team



INDEX
1.   Customs and Border Protection (CBP) facility, Imperial Beach, CA .....................................1

2.   Brown Field 21 July...............................................................................................................2

3.   Miramar Airfield (32-51-50N/117-7-39W) Monday, 21 July 2008..........................................3

4.   San Diego State University, 22 July Morning........................................................................4

5.   Qualcomm Stadium, 22 July Afternoon.................................................................................5

6.   San Diego City Emergency Operations Center, 22 July .......................................................6

7.   County Emergency Operations Center 23 July...................................................................10

8.   Scripps La Jolla Hospital 23 July, SDPD’s Incident Command Van ...................................12

9.   Acronyms ............................................................................................................................17




1.      Customs and Border Protection (CBP) facility, Imperial Beach, CA
Notes in this section submitted by Dave Walsh
This section is a synopsis of events at the CBP facility in Imperial Beach, CA.

Time         Event

0835         Walsh & Guerra arrive at CBP Imperial Beach

             Sensor Process Manager (SPM) brief; IP-based application that works across
0910
             standards (DHS & DOD)

0940         Helo reported inbound

0945         SPM rep gets text message about positive test


                                                               Page 1
          Guerra and Walsh discussion with ICTAP reps (Jennifer Hendry & Tom Lawless) with
0955
          respect to what the CBP watch knows and when

1019      Helo reported landed and '6 or so' interrogatees

1042      Begin prisoner interrogation outside hard cells

1108      Preliminary Interrogation complete

1119      Isolation of interrogatees in holding room 3

1128      DEA determination of hazardous material

1305      SDFD turns scene control back to CBP

1347      FBI interrogates prisoners

1354      Personal decontamination

1358      SD County HAZMAT departs

1407      DEA turns case over to FBI


Comment 1: The times are approximate and there are key events in the sequence that were
missed by the observer; see comment 2 for the reason.

The ICTAP observers (attached to the CBP watch leader) will have captured the correct
chronology.

Comment 2: the CBP IP training occurred in what could be considered the dispatch and
interrogation area. This area was not designed nor outfitted such that many command and
control functions could be easily observed and tracked.

The passing of the control functions (who had the control of the scene, etc) was made on a one-
to-one discussion basis, and, although the watch leader might know who had control of the
scene, it was not clear that the whole team did and nowhere was it made clearly visible. There
are clearly NIMS-related issues with this.


2.     Brown Field 21 July
Notes in this section submitted by James Rhode
Arrived at Brown Field around 0730 and it was quite obvious that we were early. Marines and
equipment started to arrive slowly and started setting up. At 0850 3 busses of Marines arrived
and started setting up the base camp. These forces were interesting to observe setting up using
front loaders to off-load equipment. Most of the Marines appeared to be reservists on their
annual active duty period.

                                             Page 2
Vendors started trickling in at around 1000 and started setting up their demos. Lots of individual
technologies were represented, including lots of wireless communications technologies. Many of
the technologies were individual components which could be part of an overall field Emergency
Operations Center, but they were not well coordinated. The plan was to employ ad-hoc
coordination/integration of these technologies and the vendors needed to explore and
coordinate with each other to make these connections. Many of the technologies displayed use
standard interfaces so it was possible to interconnect them as opportunities presented
themselves.

Coby Leuschke was lead at Brown Field and facilitated identifying technologies for integration.
He developed and distributed the Brown Field Operations Site manual which was very useful.
Observations later in the exercise period would have shown more integration of technologies. It
was apparent that there were lots of behind scene activities that were not apparent to
observers.

Selected Pictures




  Brown Field Setup Activity            Brown Field JOC              Brown Field Vendor Area




3.     Miramar Airfield (32-51-50N/117-7-39W) Monday, 21 July 2008
Notes in this section submitted by Jeff Chilton
The scenario was fairly tightly scripted and offered no real opportunities to observe
interoperability, as expected. The Civil Support Team (102nd CST) knew that the inbound helo
contained suspects who had been picked up with a white powder. They were informed that
although the suspects had been handcuffed and belted in, one of them was able to slip his
bindings and scatter approximately ten vials of an unknown substance around the aft of the
aircraft.

In an actual event, an incident command center would have been established with local LE,
HAZMAT, or FBI. These entities were not present, and the CST had not brought its integrated
command suite with them. They did have an SUV equipped with INMARSAT, phone, and

                                             Page 3
internet. Col. Ferrell (US Army) of the CST acted as a de facto incident commander. I observed
a couple instances of cell phone use to inform MAJ Persano of the progress.

The CST’s Survey Team suited up and collected the vials from the helo. Because the exercise
was well scripted and straightforward, there wasn’t need for tracking assets or providing much in
the way of situational awareness. A whiteboard in the Survey Team trailer listed the ranked set
of objectives for the team, as determined by the Col. Ferrell. Other local communication was
carried out by radios, for example to announce status briefings and issue orders. The comms
SUV provided a loudspeaker so that personnel without radios could be informed of important
events.

The vials were collected and some distributed to the Navy team, which had a van set up to test
the material. The Navy Medical Research Team (Silver Spring, MD) puts all their equipment into
8 Pelican boxes for transport. They had a portable glove box that used for conducting tests on
the samples.

For future exercises, I would recommend attempting to involve other Federal (FBI) and local LE
agencies in a similar vignette, in order that an actual IC Center can be established.

Selected Pictures




     Miramar Status Board            Miramar Survey Team              Miramar Decon Station




4.     San Diego State University, 22 July Morning
Notes in this section submitted by James Rhode
The SDSU Viz Lab was not a direct participant in Golden Phoenix. They were observers of
some of the information flowing between sources and consumers.

One interesting technology was an On-line Interactive Virtual Environment (OLIVE) by Forterra
Systems, INC. This system allowed geographically dispersed players to participate in an
exercise in a virtual world. Each participant has his/her own avatar which is controlled by the
participant to perform as he/she would during the exercise.

                                            Page 4
Lockheed Martin provided a demonstration of their Desert Hawk III mini-unmanned aircraft
system which was being flown at Yuma. Swan Island Networks, Inc. demonstrated their TIES
system which provides a Common Operating Picture.

It would have been interesting to have decision makers at Viz Lab using the capabilities present
there. As it was, the Viz Lab was a passive observer.


5.     Qualcomm Stadium, 22 July Afternoon
Notes in this section submitted by James Rhode
The exercise at Qualcomm Stadium was a training exercise for San Diego Police Department
(SDPD) and the FBI. The scenario included an SDPD motor unit observing a van driven by
suspects. The van was being driven East of Friars Road. It turned into Qualcomm Stadium and
shots were fired on the motor unit which then discontinued following the suspect van. During
this period there were frequent radio exchanges with SDPD Dispatch 1.

The suspect van continued down the West side of the stadium and came to a locked gate. At
this point they were engaged by a SWAT team, shots were exchanged, suspects were taken
into custody, and the hostage was rescued.

There were three evolutions of this scenario. The first was with a SWAT team from SDPD and
the second and third were with FBI SWAT personnel. Flash/bang grenades, automatic
weapons, and snipers were employed.

Observation: The exercise was interesting to watch but it appeared that all the coordination
was conventional.



Selected Pictures




        Suspect Van                    Shots Exchanged                  Hostage Rescued




                                            Page 5
6.          San Diego City Emergency Operations Center, 22 July
The following notes submitted by Neil Hoff:
Observed Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) Training in San Diego City EOC

Key Contacts

     •      Jill Olen, Deputy Chief Operating Officer for Public Safety, City of San Diego
     •      Donna Faller, Program Manager, Office of Homeland Security, City of San Diego
     •      John Valencia, Office of Homeland Security, City of San Diego


EOC Training on Civil Requests for Support from Department of Defense

DSCA Training was given by John Hemmerling and Mark Coast. Both serve as reservists in the
Marine Corp. John Hemmerling is also a City Attorney in San Diego. Mark Coast is also a DEA
agent.

There are three mechanisms for civil authorities to request DoD assistance when necessary to
save lives, prevent human suffering & mitigate great property damage:

     i)        Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA)
     ii)       Immediate Request Authority (IRA)
     iii)      Mutual Aid Agreement


It is important to understand that there are regulations and considerations that impact the ability
of DoD to provide assistance during emergencies. For example, use of DoD assets may affect
troop readiness, deployments, etc. DoD assets may also not be the most cost effective
solution.

Federal Laws affecting use of DoD resources:

     •      Stafford Act
                o President has authority to activate FEMA if the Stafford Act is invoked.
                o Governor must invoke the Stafford Act before the Feds can get involved (It was
                    noted that during the first week of Katrina, the governor did not invoke this act).
     •      Posse Comitatus Act
                o Prevents Federal troops from doing law enforcement
                o Law enforcement cannot be performed by active duty military personnel unless in
                    times of insurrection
     •      Insurrection Act
                o In times of insurrection, martial law is imposed
                o It is imperative that civil authorities understand what they are asking for if military
                    assistance under the Insurrection Act is invoked. “May get results you did not
                    expect.” Under Insurrection Act, military comes in and takes over; local law
                    enforcement is pushed aside.



                                                  Page 6
It is also important to understand difficulties of police and military coordination. Example: to the
military, “cover me” means to shoot your weapon so that the adversaries shield themselves. To
a police officer, “cover me” means to be at the ready to shoot, if necessary.

   i)      Defense Support for Civil Authorities (DSCA)
           a. DSCA takes time. If civil authorities want military support, there is a process to
              be followed. The request has to go up the chain from county to state to FEMA or
              the Federal government. Laws restrict flexibility in order to prevent the military
              from being involved inappropriately.
           b. Under DSCA, there will be a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) that will
              interface with the civilian Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). DCO’s are
              stationed locally with the regional FEMA offices.
           c. DCO Functions:
                    i. Liaison with FEMA
                   ii. Establish relationships with regional leaders, state leaders, national guard
                       and other civil agencies in the assigned area of operation
                  iii. Determine best military resources to meet requirements
                  iv. Exercise operational command of all DoD resources supporting the
                       assigned area of operation
                   v. Is the DoD single point of contact in the Joint Field Office during the
                       emergency; represents DoD in the disaster area
                  vi. Establish disengagement criteria
                 vii. Submit a daily situation reports
                 viii. Maintain accountability of DoD resources
           d. In addition to going into affect when requested by the state, DSCA can go into
              effect when the state and local response is overwhelmed, when a significant
              percentage of the population is at risk or when critical infrastructure is at risk. For
              example, during a nuclear event.
           e. When DSCA is requested, the request must be reviewed for the following:
                    i. Legality
                   ii. Lethality (potential for use of lethal force by or against DoD forces)
                  iii. Risk (health/safety risks to DoD forces)
                  iv. Cost (who will pay or reimburse DoD)
                   v. Appropriateness
                  vi. Readiness (will the assistance adversely affect the units primary mission
                       to prevent war and protect the security of the U.S.?)
           f. DSCA requests are approved at a very high level. The only two people who can
              approve DSCA requests are the President and the Secretary of Defense.
           g. DSCA requests can have high costs. Use of military assets are not cheap. Civil
              authorities should only use military assets as a last resort when no other options
              exist.

   ii)     Immediate Request Authority
           a. Any commander with authority over troops and equipment can direct resources
              to support civil authorities in an emergency if the situation does not allow time to
              formally request prior approval through their chain of command.
           b. Requirements for using Immediate Request Authority:
                   i. There has to be an official written or oral request from civil authorities for
                      assistance during a civil emergency or attack (if a oral request, the
                      request should later be provided in writing).


                                              Page 7
                     ii. The request has to save lives, prevent human suffering and/or mitigate
                         great property damage.
                    iii. The support should not exceed three days – otherwise, DSCA should be
                         used.
             c. The commander is responsible for directing resources within their own budget. It
                is very rare for IRA support to be reimbursed.
             d. The National Military Command Center must be notified.

   iii)      Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
             a. Civil authorities can establish advanced MOAs for support from DoD
             b. Requests must still meet a high threshold necessary to save lives, prevent
                human suffering, etc.
             c. To underscore that DoD assets are only used under critical conditions, an
                example was provided where the Navy transported fire equipment to Catalina
                during an emergency, but refused to transport the equipment back because the
                emergency was over and it was no longer critical to have their involvement.
                Local government had to find another means to bring the equipment back from
                the island.

When making requests for DoD assets, the request should be very specific. For example, what
is needed, how long needed for, what specific times needed. A justification must also be
provided.

Other challenges for making requests for military support:

   i)        Terminology. Example: for aerial imagery, one city representative did not know what
             was meant by ground sample resolution (3 meter, 1 meter, centimeter).
   ii)       City uses addresses. Military uses a grid reference system or latitude/longitude.
             Aircraft need a lat/long to get to their required location.


EOC Emergency Operation Action Planning

Training on Emergency Operation Action Planning was provided by John Valencia. A
presentation was given and then city employees had hands-on training using WebEOC “task
tracker” to create and manage tasks for the exercise.

Within WebEOC there are status boards for teams to manage their aspect of the incident.
Information that needs to be widely disseminated can be posted on a “Regional Significant
Events” status board.

In addition to the status boards, WebEOC has the following:

   •      Tracking of sign-in/sign-out
   •      Situational reports
   •      EOC checklists
   •      Management Objectives report

During the training, the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) was referenced. This is a Center for
Disease Control initiative to prepare cities for large scale bioterrorism attack or a nuclear

                                             Page 8
incident. The initiative establishes a capability to dispense antibiotics within 48 hours to the
entire affected population. San Diego County Public Health Officials initiate CRI. Dispensing
takes place through “Mega POD” sites. Within the first 12 hours, the objective is to medicate 1st
wave city employees (those trained to dispense drugs to other city employees). This is done
through home medical kits and pre-staged supplies. The second wave involves dispensing
prophylaxis to remaining city employees through workforce PODs staffed by “Critical Access
Employees” and first responders. Within the first 48 hours, the city staff will set up Mega POD
sites. These sites offer medical supplies only, no triage.



The following notes submitted by Dave Walsh:
Part 1 started with an introduction to WebEOC

Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA)

2-hour presentation and practicum by 2 USMC O-5s (Mark & John); USMC has 24 of these
specialists nationwide

Practicum centered on articulation of imagery requirements and included examples of cost
charged for military units/capability

Attendees included Jill Olen; Donna Faller; Ron Lane

Key word is 'Support'

National Response Framework (changed from 'Plan') plus NIMS

Immediate response (able to be completed in less than 72 hours) is OK for a military
commander to do. But very rarely reimbursed

Transition back out from 'Immediate Response" is critical step

Stafford Act

Requires Presidential Declaration

FEMA/DOD executes DSCA through Mission Assignments

"Federal laws Drive" the character of the response

A Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), an O-6, is assigned to FEMA by region

Oakland is HQ for FEMA Region IX

In-Place MOUs with the military are probably the most efficient way to have known access to
military capability

Example: Navy hovercraft transporting fire equipment to Catalina Island

                                              Page 9
Observation: It seems that WebEOC as currently constituted could have improved practical
utility if there was a DSCA decision aid module within it, such that the operator could have
access to some of the pre-defined data that would need to part of the DSCA request, i.e.
relevant ESF, Assistance Requested, Statement of Work, Total Estimated Cost, etc.


7.       County Emergency Operations Center 23 July
The following notes submitted by Neil Hoff:
Activities at the County EOC were limited to checking WebEOC computer terminal
configurations and conducting hands-on WebEOC training for county employees supporting
Joint Information Center (JIC) activity. There were no exercise activities to be observed;
however, discussions with County employees shed light on how jurisdictions collaborate during
emergencies and coordinate release of information to the public. WebEOC is the primary
coordination environment.

While at the EOC, Sonja Schmidt (County of SD Media Specialist) and Ron Lane (Director,
Office of Emergency Services) provided background on the activities of public relations
representatives during emergencies:

     •   Ron Lane: In a disaster, people do not purposefully not share information, but many
         people are busy dealing with the incident. Media Relations Officers need to embed
         liaison officers down to key incident management locations to gather information and
         feed it back to their organizations. Each organization should have a liaison officer at the
         other organization to ensure two-way communications. The official reports generated by
         the Incident Command are too infrequent in today’s environment.
     •   In San Diego’s 2007 fires, both the City and County of San Diego co-located their Public
         Information Officers. Joint press conferences were held that included both the City
         Mayor and the head of the County Board of Supervisors. There were pre-arranged calls
         with the incident commanders before the press conferences to ensure that the latest
         information was known. The County and the City collaborated to ensure the statements
         of top officials were consistent and not duplicative.
     •   During San Diego’s 2007 fires, press conferences were held at set times.
     •   As the Office of Emergency Services Director, Ron Lane signs off on every press
         release during the emergency. Whoever is heading the Joint Information Center also
         signs off on the press releases. In a Homeland Security event, the County would work
         with Federal agencies, such as the FBI, to coordinate press releases and decide what
         information should be released.
     •   A topic that has been of interest around the country is that of “pre-notification,” which
         refers to how public relations teams can put out a message effectively that there is a
         major problem, when the actual problem has not yet been made public. The term “pre-
         messaging” was used.
     •   Ron Lane noted that the County has a Sheriff Lt. as their Terrorism Liaison Officer at the
         Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (RTTAC). This provides the County
         direct representation at the fusion center where they have access to the same
         information on threats and homeland security status as the FBI. Again, there is the
         issue of when information should leave the intelligence community and be shared with


                                              Page 10
      public policy representatives (elected officials, Public Information Officers). This is a
      judgment call and has been the subject of ongoing debate.
  •   Ron Lane has a secret clearance. County employees go through the FBI to get security
      clearances.
  •   Ron Lane is head of the Unified Disaster Council, which technically has the lead for
      regional emergencies.
  •   Draft Press Releases during emergencies are created and posted in WebEOC. For a
      multi-jurisdiction press release, each jurisdiction has a PIO to sign off on the release. In
      some cases there are other stakeholders that sign off on these.
  •   The Joint Information Center has its own status board within WebEOC. Before
      WebEOC, the County was previously using “E-Team” software, which was more
      sophisticated, but required a steep learning curve. It was difficult to use for those team
      members that had only infrequent requirements to use the software.
  •   Three positions within the Joint Information Center have controller status, with the ability
      to edit and approve press releases. The three positions are the Chief PIO, the Assistant
      Chief PIO and the Web Content Editor. Once approved, the press releases are posted
      on the “Final News Release” status board within WebEOC. This allows approved press
      releases to be viewed within WebEOC. Reports can also be deleted or re-posted with
      corrections. What is sent out to the media also gets posted to the County website
      (www.sdcountyemergency.com)
  •   During the recent fires, the time pressures were intense. Sometimes press releases
      were approved and sent out without updating WebEOC.
  •   It was noted by one county employee (“Holly”) that having a separate messaging
      capability in WebEOC was good because she knew that all messages in WebEOC
      related to the emergency. This employee noted that she paid more attention to
      WebEOC than her Blackberry during the fires.
  •   www.sdcountyemergency.com is the county website where all emergency information is
      posted. Care is taken to ensure the information on this website is confirmed.
  •   2-1-1 is a 24 hour community health & disaster information line staffed by volunteers.
      Callers are asked their zip code and general need. Operators have a database of 2,000
      – 3,000 agencies and organizations that can serve the public for various needs. San
      Diego is somewhat unique in that 2-1-1 is used as a conduit for public information during
      disasters. The County works closely with 2-1-1 organization to coordinate information.

Selected Pictures




  EOC Operations Room               Public Relations Room             Public Relations Room




                                           Page 11
8.     Scripps La Jolla Hospital 23 July, SDPD’s Incident Command
       Van
The following notes submitted by Jeff Chilton:
Originally, they had planned to use the van as IC, and a tent next door as UC. However, the fire
department didn’t have any personnel at that site. As a result, the tent went unused.

Inside the van, personnel had access to radio comms (built-in radios at each station as well as
handhelds, allowing them to easily deal with two channels at once), the internet, and the SDPD
intranet.



The figure shows the layout of the van. On the left side were two workstations (desk, radio,
computer). One was used by the UCSD police liaison and one aft of it manned by a SDPD
officer whose job was to keep WebEOC updated. On the right side, there were four workstations
(A through D) in a row. A was unused, B was used by the incident commander, C was used by
an SDPD officer to run the main display (E), and D was unused. A, B, and D were connected to
the SDPD intranet, while B had internet access. A projector sent C’s display onto a Smart Board
(E). This was used to show a picture of the hospital area from Google Earth. The Smart Board
allowed the officers to sketch directly on the picture. The result could be saved or printed.

Aft of the workstations was a server rack that included a camera and controller for the exterior
camera. This was used to observe the helo landing. The video was recorded onto disc.

Next to the Smart Board was a large LED clock that was 125 seconds slow.

Until 0747, the IC was not active, as the action hadn’t come to Scripps yet. The incident
commander (a SDPD Captain) was not in the van (he was briefing Scripps staff), and no orders
were issued. Radio comms were monitored, and information fed to WebEOC. Here’s a history
(“[R]” indicates radio comm.):

Time      Event

0708      [R] The initial radio call—suspects at hospital refusing to leave.

          [R] Announcement that about a dozen more people have shown up demanding
0710
          treatment.

          [R] Other hospitals are advising that people are starting to show up and crowds are
0711
          getting rowdy.

          [R] Only emergency cases should be let past the checkpoints; turn others away.
0719
          Triage area is secured.




                                             Page 12
       0721: Two Marines show up at the van to coordinate radio comms for the incoming
       helicopter. They want a single frequency so they can keep the police in the loop.
       Unfortunately, the van’s radios aren’t compatible with the MAGs frequencies. After
0721   looking at the frequency plan for the department, they suggest that maybe 168.625
       MHz would work, since the Marines have access to a Border Patrol XTS radio, but
       the police can’t tune this in on their radio. The final solution is to lend the Marines a
       handheld radio…

       [R] Numerous people are trying to get in. No decon issues yet. Situation is under
0723
       control.

       Marines depart. They now have a handheld set to SE Dispatch 2. The police will relay
0726
       this information over SE Dispatch 1.

0727   [R] A contaminated person is at the triage area.

0736   [R] If you’re on the perimeter and have contact with the public, wear PPE.

       [R] Call noting that two people have arrived at a hospital displaying signs of anthrax
0738
       but claiming they’ve been through decon. Can anyone confirm this?

0747   The incident commander returns to the van.

0748   [R] There’s 1000 people arriving at Scripps, and a fight has broken out in the ER.

       The IC issues order (orally) to continue to pre-stage the Mobile Field Forces for
0749   Scripps. This gets misinterpreted by the WebEOC operator, who puts out a note
       indicating that MFF has been activated for Scripps.

       0750: The IC asks the WebEOC operator to have the EOC issue a Department
0750
       callback.

       The mistake from 0749 is realized and corrected. A new WebEOC note is issued that
0752
       says it’s not an actual activation, just a heads-up.

0754   Part of the MFF is activated to Scripps.

0755   [R] Gridlocked traffic everywhere.

       IC orders that since traffic is gridlocked, need to put up a checkpoint @ Genesee by
0756
       Scripps.

0757   IC: Need to secure hospital against contamination. Activate MFF level C for Scripps.

0758   IC: Need mutual aid in order to get additional PD help to Thornton.

       IC: Contact EOC via WebEOC to get personnel to Thornton. EOC notified of request
       for military transport and mutual aid. The IC notes to the other personnel in the van
0759
       that these sorts of request need to go through the EOC because there’s a particular
       protocol for requesting mutual aid.


                                            Page 13
          IC: Until now, there’s been no Scripps representation in the van. They realize they
0801
          really need some and make a request.

0803      The UCSD guy in the van will be the liaison for Thornton issues.

          A Scripps liaison shows up in the van. For the rest of the operation he will stand next
0805
          to station D, communicating with the hospital via his own mobile radio.

          The IC asks the Scripps liaison if Scripps needs the decontamination station set up.
0808
          Scripps determines they do.

          Second helicopter has landed. [R] Scripps will set up a triage area. Scripps asks for
0810
          help to ensure a real-world ambulance can get through.

0822      [R] Scripps opening triage area, requesting security.

0823      IC: Maintain level C containment until the decontamination area is set up.

          The IC notes to his personnel that in a real situation, with that many people showing
0832      up at the hospital, you’d need some Red Cross involvement to bring in bathroom
          facilities and water.

0839      DEA helo has brought meds in

          [R] A radiation alarm has gone off at the checkpoint. IC tells them to reject any such
0849
          vehicles.

0857      IC orders checkpoints to go down.


Live tracking notes

There was no attempt to track resources. In my opinion, the ability to do this would have added
very little. Note, however, that if a live source of data could be produced as a feed for Google
Earth, displaying such information on the main screen would be trivial. I noted one instance
where the IC asked how many personnel were at a particular checkpoint, but nobody knew. He
looked through his personal logbook to find the answer. Certainly, live tracking would have
helped him answer the question, but it isn’t clear that it would have been faster, and it’s unlikely
that the few seconds saved would have significantly affected anything, since it wasn’t a time
critical query.

Note too that most of the vertical surfaces in the van are whiteboards. Each station kept their
own useful information either on the whiteboard, or written on paper next to their station. For
example, the officer at station C had a sheet of paper listing the designators for each unit.



Overall impression



                                             Page 14
There was little to observe from a human interoperability standpoint. There were only a few
interactions between the PD and the Scripps liaison. The tight scripting of the exercise meant
that there were few surprises, and the various actions could occur unrealistically fast. Although
there were technical difficulties in getting the Marines and the PD on the same radio channel, in
the end there wasn’t any information that needed to be passed, so there was no effect on the
outcome of the event. The personnel were very enthused about WebEOC. The operator in the
van was very new to it, but picked it up immediately, and found it to be a superior method to
keeping a paper log of what was going on and relying on radio. “This is great!” he said. It did
appear that WebEOC was used as a one-way comms method from the IC to the EOC. I didn’t
observe any instances of information traveling back the other way.



Selected Pictures




     SDPD Command Vehicle          Inside Command Vehicle           Inside Command Vehicle




The following notes submitted by Chuck Webb:
The following information was observed at the Golden Phoenix Operation at Scripps Hospital
from inside the SDPD IC motor home setup prior to the training exercise. Information was also
gathered from conversations or actions observed outside of the scope of this immediate six hour
window.

Equipment noted:

1.     External 30’ comm. Tower with PTZ low-light camera mounted at the top. The tower
       included several directional 800 MHz antenna arrays

2.     DVD-R and VHS recorder.



                                            Page 15
3.    Six stations inside, with laptops and LMR equipment at each location.

4.    LCD projector, 4x5 smartboard.

5.    Two printers, one Intranet and one Internet.

6.    Conference room with one LCD monitor and one LCD HD TV with Direct-TV dish.

7.    Connectivity consisted of 4 AirLink ‘s 3-for VoIP telephony and one for data. Three mobile
      broadband cards 2 for Intranet and 1 for Internet.

8.    LMR equipment 7- 800MHz Trunked and conventional and one VHF conventional. Not
      observed - UHF, HF, Military, or aircraft radios.

9.     An ACU-1000 was not located in the vehicle. (May be located at the EOC.)



Operations:

1.      LRT was not observed, however questions were raised as to where some assets were
located. Around 0833 the IC was attempting to determine how many officers were located at
several checkpoints. The SDPD Capitan reviewed his notes then contacted radio the assist in
locating officers to redeploy.

2.     The Google map (sat view) was used to place check-points and view routes, static or
planning only.

3.     USMC (air ops) attempted to establish communications with the IC, walked over to the
physical IC location; however the IC was not equipped with any military radio equipment. A
SDPD 800 MHz handheld was checked out to the marines.

4.       Communications were coordinated by central dispatch, which would not normally occur
in this type of incident. Usually the IC would handle the incident radio traffic.

5.     Cell phones were routinely used throughout the exercise.

6.     Communications were established with the UCSD police, and a Lt. with the UCSD police
occupied a station in the IC post.

7.     Radio communications with Scripps Hospital was not established until the hospital staff
required logistical information and sent hospital staff to the IC. The staff member stood in the
doorway with their own handheld radio and relayed information between the IC staff and the
hospital.


9.     Acronyms
CBP         Customs and Border Protection

                                            Page 16
CRI     Cities Readiness Initiative

CST     Civil Support Team

DCO     Defense Coordinating Officer

DEA     Drug Enforcement Agency

DHS     Department of Homeland Security

DoD     Department of Defense

DSCA    Defense Support for Civil Authorities

EOC     Emergency Operations Center

ER      Emergency Room

ESF     Emergency Support Function

FCO     Federal Coordinating Officer

FEMA    Federal Emergency Management Agency

HD      High Definition

HF      High Frequency

HQ      Headquarters

IC      Incident Commander

ICTAP   Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program

IRA     Immediate Request Authority

LCD     Liquid Crystal Display

LE      Law Enforcement

LMR     Land Mobile Radio

LRT     Live Resource Tracking

MAG     Marine Aircraft Group

MFF     Mobile Field Force

MOA     Memorandum of Agreement

NIMS    National Incident Management System


                                        Page 17
PD      Police Department

PIO     Public Information Officer

PPE     Personal Protective Equipment

PTZ     Pan-Tilt-Zoom

RTTAC   Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center

SD      San Diego

SDFD    San Diego Fire Department

SDPD    San Diego Police Department

SDSU    San Diego State University

SPM     Sensor Process Manager

SWAT    Special Weapons and Tactics

UCSD    University of California at San Diego

UC      Unified Command

UHF     Ultra High Frequency

USMC    United States Marine Corps

VHF     Very High Frequency

VoIP    Voice over Internet Protocol




                                        Page 18
                                                        Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                                      ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


D.1.8      DEA AAR Bullets
The inclusion of the DEA Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR input is pending DEA approval.




December 2008                                                                                   D-19
                                             Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                           ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.1.9    Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern California Agency AAR




December 2008                                                                        D-21
                  Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern California Agency
                                  After Action Report
                                     July 25, 2008


Executive Summary:
The training event was a bio-hazard emergency that could potentially threaten not only a
major city or county but also nearby Indian reservations. Communication and emergency
aid would have to be available to the tribal governments as it would be for non-
reservation communities; using the local Bureau of Indian Affairs agency would be an
essential component to bridge the communication gap. The part our agency played was
to work with California Border Patrol in a Unified Command setting as a point of contact
or communication coordinator for the tribal governments in the Southern California
region.

We planned to accomplish during the Golden Phoenix 2008 training event was to be a
point of contact in Unified Command for communication to tribal governments and to
help bring tribal participation to the exercise.

Communication during the exercise with the tribal governments was successful and tribal
participation was accomplished by having the Rincon Fire Department participant in drill
with the National Institute of Urban Search and Rescue (NIUSR). Rincon fire was able
to utilize the Pauma Valley airport with permission and NIUSR was able to send a
Cessna 182 airplane with a box of medications. The medication was then delivered by
the Rincon Fire department to the local Indian Heath clinic. The clinic staff would then
administer the medication to the residents in Rincon, Pauma Valley, Valley Center, Pala,
and La Jolla communities.

What was learned in this exercise was that tribal governments are able to work with city,
county and state agencies in the event of an emergency. Using the local Bureau of Indian
Affairs agency was helpful to establish a point of contact for the tribes in the exercise.
Another lesson learned was that tribes do have first responders available, who are trained
and certified, to help in an emergency. In order to make use of the resources mutual aid
agreements are needed, so relationships need to be made by the city, county and state
agencies. The best recommendation would be to remember to include tribal governments
in the planning of any emergency plan and to make a conscious effort to communicate
with the tribes either by using the local Bureau of Indians Affairs agency or contacting
the tribal governments directly.


Introduction:
The Bureau of Indian Affairs, Southern California agency was first approached by the
San Manuel Disaster Services representative, Chris Walters, to participant in the training
event as a Tribal Commanding Officer or TCO in a Unified Command. The Bureau of
Indian Affairs saw that there was a need for tribal representation this type of emergency
event. The point of contact for the training exercise was Roberta Larvingo, who is an
employee at the agency.

Our role in Golden Phoenix 2008 was to be a point of contact for the tribes and to relay
any information to the tribes regarding Golden Phoenix 2008 and to help make the
connections for tribal participation in the event. We were source to be used to connect
city, county, and state agencies to the tribes, so that relationships can be formed and
continued in the future.

The assets used in the exercise were the contact information the agency already had for
the tribes and the relationships already established. The primary communications device
used during the event itself was the cell phones. During the planning stages, we used e-
mail, fax, and the telephone to offer information to the tribes.

The agency’s training objectives were to: test communication from Unified incident
Command to the tribal governments, establish to importance of having a tribal
representative in the Unified incident Command, and test the Bureau of Indian Affairs
capabilities’ as the contact for the tribal governments and BIA, Southern California
Agency in the Unified Command.

Golden Phoenix 2008 – Best Practices and Lessons Learned:
A best practice would be to have tribal representation from the initial planning stages. In
planning training events like this it would be better to contact the tribal fire departments
with the initial information so that they can review and make the request to be able
involved. One lesson learned was to keep the players the same throughout the exercise or
possibly have more than one person, so in the event one person is not able to participant
there is a back up person.

Recommendation:
An emergency preparedness contact person is needed at the agency for coordinating
events like this and also who is able to be the contact person in an emergency event.
Utilize the agency’s Safety Officer or COOP coordinators as the emergency preparedness
coordinators also. Tribes should be contacted right away, so that their participation is
equivalent to other city, county, and state agencies participation.
                                       Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                     ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.2   State and Local Organizations and Agencies




December 2008                                                                  D-23
                                          Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                        ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


D.2.1    9th Civil Support Team WMD AAR




December 2008                                                                     D-25
9th CST WMD After Action Report Submission
Executive Summary.

The 9th CST planned to integrate with DHS, USCG, FBI San Diego, LE/Fire, Navy, USMC and the
Local Hazmat agencies in a WMD related response event during the Golden Phoenix 2008
training event, while concurrently working with our Oregon Team Partner agency (102nd CST
WMD). The primary goals were to develop ties with agencies we have not worked together in any
significant capacity prior to this training event in order to create a greater understanding of
capabilities, develop contacts and, of course train on a Bio terror nexus event. We also wanted to
be evaluated by our Army North Command Observer Control Team.

Training Objectives and Quick assessment:

    -   Integrated response with joint city agencies: accomplished, but needs improvement
    -   Integrated joint response with the 102nd CST WMD: fully accomplished and beyond
        expectations
    -   Integrated communications plan: not accomplished with local agencies in terms of what
        could be achieved with the level of technical expertise and equipment that is available
    -   Bio monitoring and sampling missions: accomplished and highly effective
    -   Incident Command Integration: accomplished and all objectives met
    -    AR NORTH Evaluation: fully accomplished and overall successful
    -   Organizational relationship building: accomplished and continuing to build on the
        momentum of the exercise
    -   Laboratory sample analysis and hazard identification: mission fully accomplished
    -   Joint Services integration: mission fully accomplished

Introduction

Our agency rationale for participating in Golden Phoenix 2008 (GP08) was that it makes perfect
sense for our mission scope and response area (OES Regions 1, 5, and 6). Our primary agency
GP08 point of contact was CPT Haviland with MAJ Persano and Mr. George Bressler.

Our agency had Bio response at three locations during the exercise: 1) USCG Imperial Beach 2)
Alvarado Rehab Hospital, San Diego 3) US Naval Base, San Diego. My specific role was
exercise coordinator for the 9th CST WMD and Operations Officer.

Agency’s assets included our 20 soldiers that participated and 8 vehicle platforms with two
trailers.

Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Identify best practices you observed during GP08. Best Practices are defined as “Exemplary,
peer-validated techniques, procedures, good ideas, or solutions that work and are solidly
grounded in actual operations, training, and training event experience.”:

    -   Validated the new Decon trailer we have just recently fielded
    -   Exemplary laboratory analysis of Bio Products by our NMSO MAJ Sato (on loan courtesy
        of the 93rd CST WMD, HI)
    -   Good ideas were developed with Air Insertion techniques to a Naval Vessel and Maritime
        Tactics
    -   Basket insertion method using USCG and Aviation assets was an excellent training
        experience

Recommendations

There were many opportunities that incident commanders had to use joint communications, but
passed on it to save time. In the future, that should be a known requirement for the exercise ICs.

There should be no vendors at the training sites. It was confusing to the participants, and did not
enhance the training in any meaningful way.

Nuggets for the Abstract/Executive Summary

Submit one admission of “What went wrong? Why? How could it be avoided or resolved in the
future?” This will be uncomfortable submission to be sure, but could provide good insight for all
leaders.
                                          Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                        ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.2.2    San Diego Fire-Rescue Golden Phoenix AAR




December 2008                                                                     D-27
                                                                              July 30, 2008

                    Golden Phoenix After Action Items
                         San Diego Fire-Rescue

Executive Summary

San Diego Fire-Rescue was invited to participate in the design of this full-scale exercise
in September of 2007. Represented at the initial meeting were Marine Aircraft Group 46,
Customs and Border Protection, Drug Enforcement Agency, County Emergency Medical
Services, San Diego Police Department, and San Diego Fire-Rescue. It was determined
that each agency would develop their own objectives to derive maximum benefit from
this training opportunity. Fire-Rescue’s objectives are as follows:

   •   Demonstrate the ability of first response personnel to analyze incident
       information, prioritize resource needs, communicate across disciplines the
       existence and location of an expanding HazMat condition, and take necessary
       action to mitigate the situation.

   •   Exercise and evaluate command and control associated with the establishment of
       a Unified Command Post.

The objectives were met over the three day exercise series. The greatest benefit for
SDFD in participating was the networking. Solidifying relationships with the Marines,
CBP, FBI, DEA, and other participating organizations will greatly enhance future
operations.

It was the intent to stress and demonstrate the importance of having a decision making
liaison from each participating agency assigned to the Unified Command Post. Once this
happened and joint incident objectives were determined, everyone present had a clear
understanding of what was taking place.

San Diego Fire-Rescue commends the time, energy, and effort put forth by the lead
exercise planners from the Marine Aircraft Group 46, Customs and Border Protection,
and the San Diego Police Department. This was a collateral assignment for all involved
that directly competed with time for normal daily operations. This core group displayed
a high degree of flexibility and openness, but was firm with holding the line when the
situation warranted.


Introduction

The Senior Staff of the Fire-Rescue Department determined the time and resource
commitment associated with this exercise would mutually benefit participating agencies
and this organization. It would afford the opportunity to interface with our partners in the
first response community, further building and solidifying working relationships that are
critical to the overall success of emergency operations. Primary points of contact for
SDFD were Battalion Chief Dave Williams, Captain Chris Webber, and Emergency
Management Coordinator Chris Bach. Respective cellular telephone numbers are (619)
980-8132, (619) 980-2442, and (619) 980-0463.

The role for San Diego Fire-Rescue in this exercise was to assist in structuring an
effective unified command element and providing a Hazardous Materials Team to
conduct entry, identification, mitigation, and decontamination operations.

To accomplish this, the following personnel and resources were assigned.

Day 1 – Imperial Beach Customs and Border Protection Station:

   •   Battalion 6
   •   Battalion 39
   •   Special Ops 6
   •   Haz Mat 1
   •   Engine 30
   •   Engine 31
   •   MDU 102

Day 2 – Alvarado Convalescent and Rehabilitation Hospital:

   •   Battalion 4
   •   Battalion 39
   •   Special Ops 6
   •   Haz Mat 1
   •   Engine 10
   •   Engine 31
   •   MDU 102

Day 3 – Scripps La Jolla Hospital:

   •   Deputy 7
   •   Battalion 39
   •   Special Ops 6
   •   Haz Mat 1
   •   Engine 38


An internal and informal after action review was conducted after each session. Each
Firefighter, Company Officer, and Chief Officer was asked to provide feedback on an
aspect of the exercise that went well and an area for improvement. The majority of the
positive comments were related to working with outside agencies and having the
opportunity to better understanding their roles and responsibilities. Most of the areas for
improvement revolved around deficiencies, both real and perceived, in the internal
scenario writing specific to Fire-Rescue.

All SDFD exercise participants concurred that the training objectives listed in the
Executive Summary were met.


Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned

The CivMil website was a useful tool. Staff from this organization was on the site early
and often. It was user friendly and the information was kept current. The Web Master
did an outstanding job throughout the process.

All the technology that is available to the first response community is a great benefit and
its value is appreciated by members of this department everyday. We have command
vehicles with high tech capabilities such as advanced radio systems, networked computer
systems, wireless internet, streaming video downlink from Police and Fire helicopters,
and video teleconferencing from different command locations. This is all used on a daily
basis to enhance emergency operations. When we train on these systems, we also train
for the eventuality of not having any of it. It is the opinion of this author that SDFD does
some of our best work off the hood of a Suburban with dry erase markers and a
whiteboard.


Nuggets for the Abstract

Casual observers are often surprised to learn how much time is involved in effecting a
Hazardous Materials entry. It takes a calculated response to fully prepare, suit up, make
entry, evaluate the situation, and exit to a waiting fully functional decontamination set up.
It is a paradigm shift for a profession that is generally equated with hasty response
strategies.
                                   Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                 ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.2.3    UCSD Medical Center AAR




December 2008                                                              D-29
Executive Summary:
University of California San Diego Medical Center, Hillcrest and La Jolla (Thornton
Hospital) participated in the Golden Phoenix 2008 to partner with federal, state and local
agencies to response to a mock bioterrorism attack. The event focused on toward patient
and surge management as well as the securing of the facilities. Event participants
practiced securing the accessibility to the hospital with the help of the San Diego Police
Department and while security and movement of pharmaceuticals was practiced with the
DEA. The majority of objectives were met.

Successes included achievements in patient flow, with security decontamination and
pharmaceutical movements with agency support. Areas of improvement include intra-
operational communications, perimeter control and increased situational awareness.


Introduction:
University of California San Diego Medical Center, Hillcrest and La Jolla participated in
Golden Phoenix, partnering with federal, state and local agencies practicing in response
to a mock bioterrorism attack. Elements of patient and surge management and security of
the facilities, and decontamaiton were practiced. The event allowed practice securing the
accessibility to the hospital and pharmaceutical movement with local and Federal
Security agencies. The primary point of contact (POC) was Thérèse E. Rymer, Director,
Emergency Preparedness & Response.

The role of UCSD Medical Center in Golden Phoenix 2008 was participation as 2 of 3
local civilian hospitals that interfaced with authorities in the security of critical hospital
infrastructures, management of victim surge and decontamination procedures.

Participating UCSD Medical Center assets included the Hospital Command Centers,
Security Department, UCSD Campus Police Department, Medical Center
Decontamination Team, Telecommunication and Information Services, Facilities/ Plant
Operations, and aspects of key clinical (Emergency Department, Trauma Service,
Nursing, etc.) and ancillary support departments, inclusive of an extensive Admissions /
Registration component.

The UCSD Medical Center training objectives included:
  1) Practice Web charting capability at triage and in a bioterrorism and security
     challenged environment.
    2) Establish element of a joint command with Law Enforcement
    3) Test communication capability with multiple methods, inclusive of the
       community in pre-event period and with Law Enforcement during event.
    4) Practice a security plan for the hospital with response from Law Enforcement,
       establishing a security perimeter.
   5) Request support and practice with the DEA in the security and movement of
      pharmaceuticals.
   6) Prepare, activate team and decontaminate victims using appropriate procedures
      (Hillcrest)
   7) Identify victims who would require decontamination and simulate for select
      victims (Thornton)


Best Practices:
The use of Admissions/Registration systems to manage incoming patients through
Triage.
Incorporating electronic WebCharts at Triage
Joint security management with response from law enforcement.
Joint practice between hospitals and DEA in the security and movement of
pharmaceuticals.

Lessons Learned:
Incorporated a medical presence in perimeter control sites.
Require a wider berth with perimeter control.
Communication with radio control requires improved maintenance and interoperability.
Develop more fluid means of communication between security and law enforcement.
Contingency plans needed for traffic flow and additional patient/employee vehicles.
Optimizing situational awareness to a greater extent with key specialty resources
(Infection Control and Veterinarian Services).

Recommendations:
Incresase joint exercises with Federal, state and local partners in response to hospital
challenges in disasters.
                                     Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                   ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.2.4    Beauchamp Observer Report




December 2008                                                                D-31
OBSERVER REPORT
Submitted by: Intern/volunteer Ruth Beauchamp
Date prepared: August 1, 2008
Unit Leader: Jack Walsh from County EMS/Public Health
Operational Period March 2008-July 2008
Home Base: San Diego State University Graduate School of Public Health originally, then
continued in a volunteer capacity from May to July 2008
SDSU-GSPHExecutive Summary
          This is the report of one observer/student from San Diego State University Graduate
School of Public Health SDSU-GSPH who learned that Jack Walsh from County EMS/Public
Health was facilitating the participation of some GSPH students in this exercise. This was an
opportunity to see how multi-agency disaster exercise is planned and executed. I was able to
attend the pre-planning sessions and was invited observe several events as well as the final ‘hot
wash’ summary day. The collaboration between civilian and military entities was impressive as
was the extent of the range of participants and activities from radio technology to air support and
hospital involvement. The web-link /group: ‘civmil.org’ kept everyone connected throughout the
planning and final stages.
In summary, serious students need exposure to field activities, from health care, public health,
emergency related careers, and this afforded such an opportunity.
Introduction
          My rational for participation was to learn about disaster planning and response. This
multi-agency exercise was a good opportunity to do that while being guided from someone
involved in the Golden Phoenix 2008 (GP08). The role of the student or intern was to observe by
attending assigned sessions, keep informed through the civmil.org postings and take some on-
line courses offered by Homeland Security such as IC-00120A. for example.
The assets of the students was their graduate level education in the area of public health and
epidemiology, striving to apply their specialty to better understand prevention/mitigation strategies
and after analysis of large events that would require collaborative support such as an epidemic or
disaster.
Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned
          The best practices were the group attendance in open activities. It was expected that
some activities would not be open for student observation, but there were enough activities to
provide a good experience. I was able to participate in the UCSD-Hillcrest response due to my
affiliation as an RN there. The direction of patients seeking care (walking wounded, for example)
was quick and organized. Subsequent assignment to de-con then triage and placement according
to level of acuity was smooth. The flow of patients was easily understood and handed off to
another responder with minimal explaination. Many police were right next to the nurses and
doctors, or directing people, it was great to have their presence so medical staff could focus on
medical care not crowd control.
Recommendations:
          This is a good field experience for students and should be offered whenever possible.
Since it goes through the summer, it can be an optional summer internship after the
seminar/class is completed. Others interested, should be allowed to participate if there is
someone from within the GP08 who is agreeable to having students or volunteers shadow them.
This was an excellent example of a gold standard for muli-disciplinary exercises.
Nuggets for Abstract/Executive Summary
          Inclusion: no one who wanted to have exposure to this experience i.e. ‘play in the
sandbox’ was excluded’. Guidelines for ‘playing’ were clear and easy to access. Observers or
others unfamiliar with a typical drill or exercise were given a voice and a means to communicate
at open meetings and/or a web group site for this purpose at civmil.org. Future: Any organization
in a position to refer the ‘willing’ should be encouraged to put aside competing concerns to allow
the meeting of those who aspire to learn with those who aspire to train them.
Thank You RB.
                                      Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                    ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.3   Nongovernmental Organizations




December 2008                                                                 D-33
                                            Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                          ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.3.1    National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue AAR




December 2008                                                                       D-35
Operation Golden Phoenix




  National Institute for
Urban Search and Rescue




  After Action Report
                         Operation Golden Phoenix
                                  NIUSR
                   Operational Exercise After Action Report
                         Operation Golden Phoenix, July 22-24, 2008

Executive Summary

 The objective of Operation Golden Phoenix is to be a method for the USMC and Customs and
Border Protection to fulfill their exercise requirements. As an addendum, they are using the
opportunity as a platform to explore technologies and interface options with civilian capabilities.
The National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue (NIUSR) was designated as the civil
coordinator for the exercise.

This was not a traditional exercise as much as it is a developmental research endeavor for the
civil side. We were looking for concepts and ideas that will help expand the entire emergency
response capacity. We sought ideas that work, both old and new, in unison to support the
response. We attempted think outside of the box methods while not losing sight of the
successful tools that the box contains.

The NIUSR involvement in the Golden Phoenix Operation was twofold. First was a
communications center located at San Diego State University. The second aspect was
responsibility for a portion of the Brown Field Operational site. This after action report
addresses the NIUSR participation in the exercise. NIUSR understands this is a best practice
development consideration that should be part of every mass scale exercise, because the larger
the event the more critical is citizen involvement and response.

The National Institute for Urban Rescue (NIUSR) participated in Operation Golden Phoenix at
the SDSU site to ensure that Federal, State, and Local Governments factor-in the citizen’s
capabilities. This, in essence, was a communications operation. The objectives were to monitor
how well agencies play together, how well citizens were informed of the incident, and how
effectively citizens with a desire to help were permitted to assist.

Brown Field consisted of two camps, one was Military/ Customs Border Protection and the other
was Industry and NGOs. The Military/ Customs group performed a majority of their scheduled
exercise tasks without interfacing with the NGO/Industry (civil) sector. Military personnel
visited the Industry/NGO camp developing person to person contacts. This opened up a dialogue
and the development of appreciation by both camps for the other’s needs. By the end of the
exercise the Military/Customs group worked to assist Industry and NGOs with some of their
intended joint exercise tasks.
NIUSR’s role at Brown Field was to facilitate/assist industry and NGOs, as well as provide
logistical support. NIUSR was to act as the liaison between the two sectors and the other
exercise locations. NIUSR prepared and marked the site for Industry and NGOs, provided a
generator for power, provided mobile communications, a central location for check-in and
information updates, hydration as well as snacks & coffee. NIUSR performed its role as liaison
between the two camps exceeding expectations.

NIUSR fell short on establishing communications as defined in the communications objectives
with the other exercise site locations. Most of the time was spent establishing mobile
communications at Brown Field. Industry, NGO and NIUSR participation roles in the exercise
were not manifestly defined due to Golden Phoenix being a developmental exercise. An
expectation existed that they would be an integral part of the exercise and would be engaged by
the Military to provide support, as they would in a real situation.

Overall, NIUSR accomplished their priority task and developed a number of procedures that
could be described as best practice models as follows:
1.     A civil/technology coordinator is necessary to interface this group into an exercise or
       operation.
2.     A “Can Do” attitude will accomplish much more than a strict procedure.
3.     The civil/technologies need one location/source to get their information. Update
       meetings, military briefings and any collaborative meetings were held at the NIUSR
       coordination center. It presented a “one stop shopping” location for the participants.
4.     Training directed at the civil/technology sector would facilitate the efficient flow of an
       exercise or real event. Although an important part of the overall response, this sector has
       had no experience or training in participating in a developmental operation such as
       Golden Phoenix. I foresee this type of collaborative exercise becoming increasingly
       important as the civil and technological resources develop to a more refined degree.
5.     Best practices need to be developed as to how well citizens are informed of the incident,
       and how effectively citizens with a desire to help are permitted to assist.

Introduction

The NIUSR is an organization that provides guidance, support and developmental assistance to
 first responders. Its goal is to enhance the overall response to emergencies and disasters. To
this end, it has been active in previous exercises and responder events. NIUSR’s point of contact
at SDSU was John Clay and for the Brown Field site it was Dan Papp.

NIUSR’s role in Golden Phoenix at SDSU was to positively influence Federal, State, and Local
Government leaders to do three things:
1.    Play Well Together: make timely and correct decision for the majority effected
2.    Keep Citizens Informed: of potential dangers and actions to avoid
3.    Use Citizen Assets and Information: receive citizen information and offers to help, and
      effectively utilize same
At Brown Field, NIUSR accepted the task of coordinating the civil and technologies
(NGOs/Industry) integration aspect of the Brown Field Operation. This was to include
communications as well as overall coordination of logistics at the site. Additional
communications objectives were selected to explore communications interface with the Marine
Corps and Customs and Border Protection exercise groups.

Priority was placed on the coordination and logistical task at the site. In this developmental
collaborative operation it was clear from the beginning that we were breaking new ground in
exercise operations by mixing the civil (NGOs/Industry), Military and Federal agencies in order
to develop best practices on integration. NIUSR addressed the issues with a “make it work”
attitude.

A secondary priority was to act as a Simulation Cell to generate injects that would support the
civil/technology interface with the structured portion of the exercise. This was a collaborative
effort to add realism, demand and solution to evolving events during the operation.

Although much of the Brown Field Operation had been planned, experience had prepared us to
be ready to make changes as the event commenced. This attitude prevailed throughout the
exercise and was an important aspect leading to great success in this area. A clear effort was
made to personalize all contacts with the civilian and commercial participants at the site. Clearly
relationships are extremely important in an actual event and we wanted to capitalize on that
concept at the site. Again this approach was successful. The process validated the importance of
relationships in accomplishing task during an exercise or actual disaster.

The communications objectives spanned a wide scope mainly dealing with connectivity and
information flow. We were only 50% successful in attaining all of the goals projected. This was
due to the higher operational priority at the site as well as an under staffing issue. There were
four NIUSR personnel assigned at the Brown Field site. Obviously this was insufficient to
accomplish the total objectives assigned.

In total fifteen NIUSR members participated in Operation Golden Phoenix providing 2
Recreational Vehicles as coordination center operations facilities and various C4ISR capabilities.

Additionally, NIUSR provided on site the following:

1.     One 25 KW generator and connections
2.     One command vehicle (trailer) and covered meeting area
3.     Hydration and snacks

During the exercise NIUSR provided logistical support exceeding expectations. The Simulation
Cell arranged air support from Angel Flight (NGO), aerial surveillance from an Ultralite aircraft,
American Red Cross multi county operations, armature radio support, technology interface, and
initiated collaborative efforts. During the exercise the NIUSR Coordinator at Brown Field held
meetings of all civil (Industry/NGOs) participants to facilitate developing scenarios to be
injected into the exercise.

Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and lessons Learned

Overall, NIUSR accomplished the priority task and developed a number of procedures that could
be described as best practice models as follows:
1.     A civil/technology coordinator is necessary to interface this group into an exercise or
       operation.
2.     A “Can Do” attitude will accomplish much more than a strict procedure.
3.     The civil/technologies need one location/source to get their information. Update
       meetings, military briefings and any collaborative meetings were held at the NIUSR
       coordination center. It presented a “one stop shopping” location for the participants.
4.     Training directed at the civil/technology (Industry/NGOs) sector would facilitate the
       efficient flow of an exercise or real event. Although an important part of the overall
       response, this sector has had no experience or training in participating in a developmental
       operation such as Golden Phoenix. I foresee this type of collaborative exercise becoming
       increasingly important as the civil and technological resources develop to a more refined
       degree.
5.     Best practices need to be developed as to how well citizens are informed of the incident,
       and how effectively citizens with a desire to help are permitted to assist.

Recommendations

Recommendations for an exercise of this sort are difficult to define with respect to a structured
evaluation event. What stood out the most was the lack of understanding and knowledge by both
NGOs and the technology sectors (Industry) of how to integrate into an exercise. This leads one
to believe that there has been no training directed at this deficiency. One could also logically
assume that if this deficiency exists for exercises it would hold true for real life events. Our
recommendation would be to evaluate the development of training aimed at closing this obvious
gap.

Following the ICS is a best practice and NIUSR has some work to do to catch up with Federal,
State, and Local Governments in this regard. We need to bring our own simple and reliable
C4ISR and C2 systems.
Nuggets for the Abstract/Executive Summary

Overall, NIUSR accomplished the priority task and developed a number of procedures that could
be described as best practice models as follows:
1.     A civil/technology coordinator is necessary to interface this group into an exercise or
       operation.
2.     A “Can Do” attitude will accomplish much more than a strict procedure.
3.     The civil/technologies (NGOs/Industry) need one location/source to get their information.
       Update meetings, military briefings and any collaborative meetings were held at the
       NIUSR coordination center. It presented a “one stop shopping” location for the
       participants.
4.     Training directed at the civil/technology (NGOs/Industry) sector would facilitate the
       efficient flow of an exercise or real event. Although an important part of the overall
       response, this sector has had no experience or training in participating in a developmental
       operation such as Golden Phoenix. I foresee this type of collaborative exercise becoming
       increasingly important as the civil and technological resources develop to a more refined
       degree.
5.     Best practices need to be developed as to how well citizens are informed of the incident,
       and how effectively citizens with a desire to help are permitted to assist.

NIUSR Golden Phoenix After Action Review Committee

This after action report is the product of the NIUSR Golden Phoenix After Action Review
Committee, composed of the following NIUSR members:
Lois Clark McCoy
John Clay
Cynthia Pacheco
Dan Papp
                                 Release Statement

The National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue (NIUSR) authorizes the
release of the attached after action report and accompanying information. The
information is unclassified and cleared for general public release. SSC SD, as the
executive agent, is authorized to use the material in the 2008 Golden Phoenix After
Action Report.




Dan Papp, NIUSR Advisory Board

Date: August 6, 2008
                                             Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                           ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.3.2    Project K.I.D Operation Golden Phoenix-HoldSafe 2008 Collaborative
         Training Event AAR




December 2008                                                                        D-37
Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 1/35
                   [THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 2/35
                                  RELEASE STATEMENT

 Project K.I.D., Inc. authorizes the release of the attached after action report and
accompanying information. The information is unclassified and cleared for general
public release. SSC SD, as the executive agent, is authorized to use the material in
                   the 2008 Golden Phoenix After Action Report.




                                       Signed:




                                                                 Lenore T. Ealy, Ph.D.
                                                           Chairman, Project K.I.D., Inc.

                                                       August 3, 2008
                                                                                    Date




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 3/35
                                  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background. Operation Golden Phoenix-HoldSafe 08 (July 21-23, 2008) consisted
of a collaborative training event and observation opportunities for testing Project
K.I.D.’s “PlayCare” model for community-based disaster child care capabilities
and for assessing the gaps that continue to exist in first-response systems for
children in disaster stress. OGP-HoldSafe 08 was a component of Operation
Golden Phoenix 2008 (OGP), a collaborative training event led by U. S. Marine
Aircraft Group 46 and U. S. Customs and Border Patrol and joined by numerous
additional civil, military, and civilian agencies. The activities conducted were
designed to help develop plans, policies, procedures, protocols, strategies,
and/or systems that may guide civilian volunteers, first responders, and other
child-focused response organizations through disasters of all kinds.

While most exercises are a culmination of training toward a collective level of
preparedness, OGP-HoldSafe 08, as the second iteration of Project K.I.D.’s
HoldSafe Exercise and Training Program, represented a continuing step in
understanding and demonstrating the special needs presented by children in a
disaster event and in exploring how civilians may take protective and productive
steps to address these needs in coordination with official civil and military first
responders.

Goals and Objectives. The overarching goal of the HoldSafe exercises and
training events is to raise awareness of the issues surrounding children in disasters
with the general public and first responders. Injecting PlayCare capabilities
(including civilian volunteers and children as participants) and child-focused
scenarios into exercise and training events serves to make real the human needs
that arise in disasters and helps to remind all participants that these human
needs must be a central focus of disaster response planning and resource
development.

Design objectives for OGP-HoldSafe 08 included:

   1. Strengthening planning and integration of civilian preparedness
      capabilities for meeting the needs of children in disasters, including:
          • Introducing children’s emergency issues into a significant multi-
            agency field training event.
          • Augmenting official response activities with private sector resources
            and capabilities.
          • Exploring interfaces for civilian communications with both non-
            governmental response organizations and civil/military first
            responders and the Incident Command System (ICS).
          • Exploring volunteer and donations management practices and
            integrating civilian resources with incident command and incident
            management system resources.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 4/35
   2. Demonstrating and developing best practices in humanitarian assistance
      for children, including:
          • Deploying and refining Project K.I.D.’s PlayCare materials and
            processes,
          • Staffing PlayCare with credentialed volunteers, including
            conducting background checks,
          • Providing for wellbeing of children in a respite care and/or shelter-in-
            place environment.
          • Addressing critical issues of unaccompanied minors, including need
            for identification and reunification.

Evaluation. OGP-HoldSafe 08 proved to very successful, bringing together
representatives from voluntary, Federal, State and local agencies as well as
spontaneous volunteers to demonstrate and refine Project K.I.D.’s PlayCare
capability for providing care for children in disasters. Additionally,
communications capabilities and both “low-tech” and “high tech” solutions for
the tagging, tracking, screening, and security of children and volunteers were
demonstrated by Retriever Software, a Project K.I.D. HoldSafe partner.

The event provided significant lessons learned to help move concern for
children’s resilience during times of disaster from the discussion phase to a set of
strategies and plans which can be backed by policymakers and implemented
by government agencies, voluntary organizations, and civilians. Ultimately
comprehensive policies, capabilities, and resources for addressing the needs of
children in disasters should be developed and put into action by civilians, public
and private community organizations, official government emergency
management agencies at all levels (civil and military), and other voluntary
disaster response organizations.

This report addresses the major findings of the OGP-HoldSafe 08 training event
and aims to improve policy, process, and procedures by analyzing exercise
results to:

   •   Document lessons learned;
   •   Identify best practices; and
   •   Recommend follow-up actions.

The suggested actions in this report should be viewed as recommendations only.
In some cases, agencies may determine that the benefits of implementation are
insufficient to outweigh the costs. In other cases, agencies may identify
alternative solutions that are more effective or efficient. Each agency should
review the recommendations and determine the most appropriate action and
the resources needed (time, staff, funds) for implementation. A summary of the
top observed lessons learned, best practices, and recommendations follows.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 5/35
Key Lessons Learned, Best Practices, And Recommendations.


  The care of children in disasters is a critical area of need that can be largely
   addressed by intentional coordination of civilian volunteers and donations.
 Project K.I.D.’s PlayCare solution, incorporating ongoing refinements based on
 research and lessons learned, continues to provide a model for best practices
   and an adaptable resource that can be easily deployed by volunteers with
                                  minimal training.

Project K.I.D.’s PlayCare kit is a civilian-friendly resource that provides valuable
support for first responders (dependent care) and victims. Local and state
emergency resource lists should recognize resources such as the PlayCare kit
and develop protocols for mobilizing them with trained civilian volunteers.
Having these resources and capabilities pre-identified will enable effective and
rapid response to needs of children as they emerge in disasters.

Current uses of the PlayCare kit, with various modifications for local
circumstances, include but are not limited to:

• The provision of essential dependent care for first responders and essential
  personnel.
• The provision of essential dependent care for public health workers at PODs.
• The provision of emergency care for children in state or voluntary agency
  custodial care while awaiting reunification with parents/guardians.
• The provision of activities for children in shelter-in-place scenarios involving
  children at schools, childcare centers, and a variety of other venues.
• The provision of respite care for children of families seeking aid at shelters,
  disaster recovery centers, aid distribution sites, checkpoint for access to
  disaster sites, etc.
• The provision of supplies for the establishment of temporary child care at
  industrial and commercial facilities to support for workers and economic
  recovery.

During OGP-HoldSafe 2008 Project K.I.D. volunteers and partners sought to refine
the PlayCare solution by testing new types of shelter (Morrow-Mobiles trailer,
Shelter-Systems’ relief dome), fencing materials, communications tools, child
identification and tracking systems, volunteer registration and credentialing
systems, and child protection guidelines and protocols.

Post-training needs identified included:

• The development of formal site operations manuals and training manuals
  and distribution of same online.
• The development of more standardized “kitting” for the PlayCare materials.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 6/35
• Continuing cultivation of social networks and facilitation of special projects
  (e.g., the HoldSafe volunteer registry) to promote and enhance disaster child
  care capabilities nationwide.
• Investigation of state-by-state policies and legal requirements to ensure the
  safety of unaccompanied minors in emergencies and the development of
  appropriate child protection guidelines for implementation by all agencies,
  including first responders, working with children in disasters.


   Holding children safe in disasters requires establishing identification, intake,
  tracking, and reunification policies and systems for children, especially those
    who have been or must be separated from their parents/guardians during
   disasters. All communities should include family reunification guidelines and
                      procedures in their emergency plans.

Our current systems for addressing the needs of children in disaster are largely
based on societal assumptions that often no longer hold true. Provision for mass
care still largely assumes that children will be in the company of responsible
guardians during an emergency. While this is true for most children, many will be
dislocated from families both by circumstances of the disaster (on school/work
days most children will need to be reunified with their families) or by chaos
and/or faulty controls at schools, child care facilities, shelters and evacuation
points.

Further challenges to the safety of children in emergencies arise from the ill
intentions of a few people who take advantage of the chaos. During the
Hurricane Katrina response, non-custodial parents sought children’s aid
allocations, and there were many credible reports of predatory behavior toward
children, whether by relatives or strangers.

Holding children safe in disasters requires establishing identification and tracking
policies and systems for children, especially those in mass care environments as
well as those who have been or will be separated from their parents/guardians
even for a short time during disasters. All organizations coming into contact with
children during disasters should have adequate child protection policies as well
as child identification and tracking procedures in place and should train for
emergency situations.

Child protection guidelines should include protocols for volunteer access to and
interaction with children. In most cases, provision should be made requiring
appropriate credentialing for child care volunteers that includes a criminal
background check. In addition, legally defensible protocols should be
established for validating custodial rights and the identity of parents and
guardians.

During OGP-HoldSafe 08, Project K.I.D. conducted three activities to
demonstrate and test best practices in these areas: child identification and



Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 7/35
tracking, volunteer registration and credentialing, and a family reunification
activity.

Child identification and tracking and adult identification and credentialing
systems should involve low-tech and high-tech procedures. In real emergencies,
low-tech solutions will be more immediately viable, but effort should be made to
develop redundant systems as well as ways for low-tech registration procedures
to be interoperable with high-tech tracking systems and databases when
communications capabilities are restored. Detailed discussion of these
experiments and demonstrations is included in this report.

On the issues of identification and credentialing, whether of children, parents, or
volunteers, there is no substitute for preparedness. All organizations coming into
contact with children during disasters should have child protection guidelines
and emergency protection procedures in place. Systems for volunteer
credentialing for disaster child care should be developed in each community,
and these systems should be designed for interoperability and scalability by
providing for voluntary inclusion in a national volunteer registry (e.g. the HoldSafe
Registry proposed by Project K.I.D.) or access through mutual aid compacts
among jurisdictions and agencies.

During OGP 08, Project K.I.D. tested the feasibility of conducting on demand
background checks from a disaster site utilizing an online provider. We utilized
the wireless access point capability established by other teams on the field to
access our provider, Infocheckusa.com, which had agreed to initiate checks by
phone during the training event if necessary. There needs to be continued
exploration of how these checks can be conducted in the event no internet or
phone access is available. (During the 2007 exercise local law enforcement
worked with us on this need.)


Civilian participation in formal disaster response exercise and training activities
  can and should be more routine. Exercise design can best incorporate and
educate civilians when they are engaged appropriately around specific design
 objectives. Exercise and training activities should be distinguished from social
 networking opportunities, though there is clearly overlap between the two and
               both serve to raise trust and improve preparedness.

During a typical incident, the majority of resources required for disaster response
and recovery will ultimately come from the private sector. Response and
recovery will thus become more effective as communities devise ways ahead of
emergencies to identify and integrate private sector assets more efficiently to
augment government resources and to promote self-care so that problems can
be resolved at the civilian level before they need attention and resources from
Incident Command.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 8/35
When there is a will to do so, civilians and civilian organizations, both commercial
and not-for-profit, can be respectfully and effectively integrated with civil and
military incident commands. This integration is facilitated when adequate
attention and resources are allocated to acquaint civilians with the role of
ICS/NIMS and the associated vocabulary, processes, and protocols. Disaster
exercises and trainings are ideal venues around which to offer civilian training
and to develop tools and processes for coordinating volunteers and donations in
emergencies.

In both 2007 and 2008 the Operation Golden Phoenix training event has
provided an excellent venue for exploring the parameters for civilian
involvement in full scale civil-military exercises and training events. During both
events Project K.I.D.’s team has successfully utilized ICS principles in organizing
our teams for exercise play by assigning personnel to cover most of the roles in
the Command Staff structure (including Incident Commander, Communications
Officer, Liaison Officer, Public Information Officer, Safety Officer) as well as
critical roles in the General Staff structure (especially Operations and Logistics
Section Chiefs). Assumption of ICS roles at the agency level enabled volunteers
to gain first-hand knowledge of the operation of ICS, enhanced Project K.I.D.’s
overall execution of operations plans in the field, and facilitated communication
with other agencies.

The effectiveness of Project K.I.D.’s exercise play during our “shadow operation”
to OGP 2007 led to formal integration of Project K.I.D.’s capabilities in OGP 2008.
This was a tremendous advance from OGP 2007, when, for example, a simple
request by Project K.I.D.’s liaison to the event’s Unified Command for a medical
stretcher for an injured child was met with resistance, and the requested
stretcher took more than five hours to obtain, despite the availability of this
resource within several hundred yards of Project K.I.D.’s location.

During OGP 2008, Project K.I.D. personnel were involved in OGP planning
meetings and were treated with professionalism, respect, and trust. We took
pride in the comment by OGP lead Major John Persano that we were “low
maintenance.” Project K.I.D.’s experimentation with ICS principles and protocols
also led to effective integration with the Brown Field Incident Command
provided by NIUSR. Project K.I.D.’s Liaison Officer reported to Brown Field
Incident Command and the communication established between the IC and
Project K.I.D. worked smoothly, with requests to and from Project K.I.D. issued and
received in a respectful manner and acted upon with due diligence by both
parties.

The involvement of civilians and civilian organizations in disaster response
exercise and training events helps build the stock mutual trust, one of the most
critical elements of community resilience, response, and recovery. As our
colleagues at Star-Tides1 put it, “Trust can’t be surged.” Civil and military

1 STAR-TIDES is a research project focused on information sharing, low cost logistics and social networks in

support of populations in stressed environments, such as post-disaster, post-war, and economic under-



Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 9/35
authorities should welcome and reach out in pro-active ways to engage private
sector organizations (industry and not-for-profit) and civilians in a variety of ways
during official disaster preparedness and response exercises and trainings.

In preparation for OFR-HoldSafe 2007, Project K.I.D. received the benefit of
extensive training in exercise design and documentation in conformity with
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidelines. Building
upon the experience and knowledge gleaned from this preparation and
execution, Project K.I.D. developed a formal exercise plan (EXPLAN) to guide our
training objectives and activities during OGP 2008. Project K.I.D. seemed to be
one of the only groups (industry or nonprofit) participating at Brown Field who
had been so thoroughly trained to conduct exercise activities in this manner,
and this preparation seemed to pay off in terms of our visibility and success on
the field.

The events at Brown Field were highly successful from a social networking
perspective, but without common objectives stemming from realistic simulations
of real-world scenarios, something was lost in fully assessing the capabilities
present and the ability of various groups to achieve significant coordination,
cooperation, and interoperability.

In future exercises of this type, we would like to see Project K.I.D. and other
civilian groups and humanitarian organizations generate more real-world
scenarios and injects that would invite and necessitate interagency
collaboration and cooperation on real-world problems. Through our HoldSafe
Exercise and Training Program, Project K.I.D. is developing scenarios and training
activities to highlight the needs of children in disasters and engage people in
developing new plans, policies, procedures, protocols, strategies and/or systems
for addressing these needs. We believe more would be learned and more
solutions catalyzed if industry and nonprofit players were asked to play out real
scenarios that involved protecting, sheltering, identifying and tracking children
as well as obtaining necessary attention for children’s needs through official and
unofficial channels.




development. It encourages reach-back support to those with line responsibilities and those doing work in the
field.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 10/35
                                        INTRODUCTION

           RATIONALE FOR AGENCY PARTICIPATION IN GOLDEN PHOENIX 2008
The 9/11 and Katrina disasters have challenged civilians to become more
involved in disaster preparedness and response, not only to promote self-care
but also to augment official government response capabilities. One of the
critical areas where civilians and private organizations can make a difference is
in working alongside first responders to prepare to better meet the unique and
specific needs of children in disasters.

During Operation Golden Phoenix 2007, Project K.I.D.2, in partnership with select
participants in the Highlands Forum3 network, MindTel, and other like-minded
organizations, conducted Operation Freedom’s Ring—HoldSafe to raise
awareness of the needs of children in disasters and to demonstrate and test a
variety of disaster response capabilities for addressing these needs. OFR-
HoldSafe created a venue for civilian orientation to ICS/NIMS protocols and also
explored how civilians might use off-the-shelf communications devices to obtain
emergency assistance. The success of OFR-HoldSafe 07 validated the need for
the incorporation in all-hazards emergency planning, trainings and exercises of
activities that address the emergency needs of children.

Following OFR-HoldSafe 07, Project K.I.D. formalized the HoldSafe Exercise and
Training Program, a collaborative effort led by Project K.I.D. to improve outcomes
for children in disasters by developing and implementing exercise and training
activities that highlight and address the needs of children in emergencies.
Project K.I.D. welcomed the opportunity to participate in Operation Golden
Phoenix 2008 as the second major HoldSafe event. The OGP training evolution
has provided a unique opportunity for Project K.I.D. and its volunteers and
partners to come alongside civil authorities, military personnel, and private sector
organizations (industry and non-profit) to develop new protocols and capabilities
for improving the care of children in disasters.




2
  Project K.I.D., Inc. is a 501(c)(3) public charity that promotes intentional and coordinated
emergency preparedness and response activities that address the specific needs of children in
times of disaster and devastation. Based on our experiences in Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana
following Hurricane Katrina, Project K.I.D. seeks to facilitate the development of local, regional, and
nation-wide systems of preparation and response that can improve outcomes for children in
disasters by supporting first responders, families in distress, and community organizations charged
with responsibility for children’s welfare.
3
  The Highlands Forum is an informal, cross-disciplinary network, chaired by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Networks and Information Integration), with an interest in information, science, and
technology and their impact on global and societal activities. Industry, academia, government,
and professionals from a variety of fields share their knowledge and insights about the
development and effects of technologies in the information realm.


Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 11/35
                               AGENCY POINT OF CONTACT

                                Lenore T. Ealy, Ph.D.
                                   Project K.I.D., Inc.
                                    P. O. Box 3218
                                   Carmel, IN 46033
                                    Phone: (317) 502-2735
                             Email: lenoree@thinkitecture.com



                             ROLE IN GOLDEN PHOENIX 2008
OGP-HoldSafe 08 sought to build upon the lessons learned in OFR-HoldSafe 07 to
evolve the integration of children’s issues into a multi-agency, multi-jurisdiction
collaborative training event.

Activities were conducted to refine Project K.I.D.’s “PlayCare” model for
community-based disaster child care capabilities and to assess and address the
gaps that exist in first-response systems for children in disaster stress. These
activities were designed to help develop plans, policies, procedures, protocols,
strategies and/or systems that may guide civilian volunteers, first responders and
other child-focused response organizations through disasters of all kinds.


                       AGENCY ASSETS IN GOLDEN PHOENIX 2008
Project K.I.D. was joined for this exercise by 15 civilian volunteers, including
independent civilians as well as representatives from Retriever Software, Toucan
Ed, and Morrow-Mobiles. Our team included two minors, ages 14 and 8.

Key physical assets brought to Golden Phoenix included:

• A modified PlayCare™ kit to demonstrate disaster child care resources and
  capabilities.
• A 17-foot pop-up trailer provided by Morrow-Mobiles.
• An 18-foot dome shelter (Shelter-Systems).
• Wireless satellite internet access (provided by Retriever Software).
• Stand-alone power supply for communications technology (provided by
  Retriever Software).
• Identification, badging, and tracking technology (provided by Retriever
  Software)
• A Sprint/Nextel Go-Kit with 8 -phone/radio/walkie-talkie combinations (on
  loan from Hamilton County (Indiana) Department of Public Health).
• Civilian technology, including cell phones, laptop computers, cameras, etc.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 12/35
                   TRAINING OBJECTIVES FOR GOLDEN PHOENIX 2008

The scope of play for the exercise engaged a multi-agency team to simulate
response to the needs of children in the disaster. Co-located at Brown Field with
OGP training exercises, OGP-HoldSafe 08 consisted primarily of a set of activities
and experiments to realize the following design objectives:

1) STRENGTHEN PLANNING AND INTEGRATION OF CIVILIAN PREPAREDNESS
CAPABILITIES

•     Introduce children’s emergency issues into a large-scale collaborative multi-
    agency training venue.
•    Augment official response activities with private sector resources and
    capabilities.
•    As appropriate, determine the best interfaces for civilian communications,
    video and information equipment with both non-governmental response
    organizations (e.g. Project K.I.D., American Red Cross) as well as civil/military
    first responders and ICS.
•    Secure access for civilian communications to civil/military Incident Command
    communications networks so that critical needs and information can be
    integrated into the common operating picture and resources made
    available.
•    Implement tracking card system for disaster child care volunteer responders
    and integrate with incident resource management system.

2) DEVELOP BEST PRACTICES IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR CHILDREN

• Refine materials, processes, and procedures for the deployment of PlayCare
  disaster child care capability by local community:
           o Deploy PlayCare materials to location through civilian and non-
              civilian means.
           o Staff PlayCare with credentialed volunteers. Conduct background
              checks in the field on at least 3 spontaneous volunteers and train
              them for PlayCare work.
           o Provide for wellbeing (food, water, shelter, activity) of children
              assuming that they cannot be evacuated from the scene for up to
              72 hours post-event.
• Address critical issues of unaccompanied minors, including need for
  identification and reunification.
           o Demonstrate Retriever Software pre-registration and emergency
              tracking system for schools (Project My Kid).
           o Conduct reunification of unaccompanied minor with parents with
              appropriate validation of parents’ identities and custodial rights.
              Engage civil, military and civilian agencies in this process as




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 13/35
               appropriate. (including National Center for Missing and Exploited
               Children, Angel Flight, etc.)
           o   If opportunity emerged, transmit data on critical medical needs of
               at least 1 child to responding medical personnel and/or tele-
               medical resources.

3) PROVIDE PEDIATRIC MEDICAL SURGE AND PUBLIC HEALTH SUPPORT (not tested
during the exercise)

• Upon request, deploy PlayCare capability to site of public health/hospital
  security event for care of children of essential personnel and/or care of
  children during decontamination/prophylaxis.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 14/35
                    BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

Exercise Activity 1: Physical Set-Up of PlayCare site

                                      BEST PRACTICE

    Project K.I.D.’s PlayCare kit is a civilian-friendly resource that provides valuable
       support for first responders (dependent care) and victims. Local and state
       emergency resource lists should include a few such kits and protocols for
      mobilizing them with trained civilian volunteers. Having these resources and
    capabilities pre-identified will enable effective and rapid response to needs of
                            children as they emerge in disasters.

Project K.I.D. demonstrated the physical set-up of a PlayCare disaster child care
site, experimenting with various forms of shelter, fencing, and PlayCare kit
supplies to improve the overall capabilities of Project K.I.D.’s PlayCare solution.
We arrived at Brown Field at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, July 21, and our site was fully
operational by noon of that day. The efficiency of our site set-up by a team of 15
volunteers, many of whom met for the first time at Brown Field, testifies to the
simplicity and intuitiveness of the PlayCare model as well as to the success of
Project K.I.D.’s exercise planning process.

Lessons Learned: The Morrow-Mobiles trailer is an effective shelter solution that
could be incorporated in the PlayCare model.

A Morrow-Mobiles trailer (www.morrow-mobiles.com) was donated for the
exercise and was positioned at the Brown Field exercise site on the morning of
July 21 by Morrow-Mobiles personnel. It was determined that it provided an
excellent site for PlayCare and all of its furnishings and children’s playthings. With
two doors, the unit offers fire egress safety and when supplied with a built-in
generator would supply climate control and power for many other needs. It
provided a comfortable environment for rest from the sun for volunteers, formal
and informal meetings, and storage of snacks, beverages and all provisions. In
the event of an emergency, it would likely not be practical to have volunteers
and children share the same small space, except for those volunteers working
with the children.

With few mobile assets currently available for responding to children’s needs in
disasters, the Morrow-Mobiles unit could be a valuable asset for long-term
“respite care” deployments such as Project K.I.D. experienced after Hurricane
Katrina, for providing “emergency child shelter” facilities, or for providing facilities
for “temporary child care” at numerous locations.4 The Morrow-Mobiles unit can


4Project K.I.D. defines “respite care” as the disaster child care capability of providing a
short respite from childcare demands for parents and child-centered stress relief for
children (our original “PlayCare” model). This drop-in, multi-age care is suitable for
victims as well as for dependent care for first responders. “Emergency Child Care” is the
capability that addresses the emergency medical, evacuation, and legal protection


Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 15/35
be readily transported to a disaster scene by any vehicle with a 1-ton towing
capability and because it is easily transported, this solution is scalable to the
demands of each response. Volunteers could be readily trained in transport and
setup of the unit.

Lessons Learned: Perimeter fencing for PlayCare continues to be an essential part
of the PlayCare set-up, but continued attention is needed to developing an all-
surface, portable solution.

Volunteers brought tools and materials to erect flexible, bright orange, plastic
perimeter fencing. 200’ of Volm fencing (www.volmbag.com/ezfence.html) was
donated for testing during the exercise. The Volm fence proved to be an
excellent choice of materials and a great improvement over the orange plastic
construction fencing used by Project K.I.D. during our Hurricane Katrina response
and duringr OFR-HoldSafe 2007. It is an excellent solution because it can be
made to be the appropriate size for the need. It also enables gates to be
established in desired positions.

A perimeter fence was erected for demonstration and testing purposes on only
one side of the PlayCare site. In a real event, fencing would be erected around
all open sides of a PlayCare site. The fence was easy to set up, with the
appropriate tools. Two volunteers brought the equipment and fencing and
erected it in about an hour. The equipment used included metal chain-link fence
posts and a post driver. These materials are readily available in existing supply-
chains and could be utilized effectively in the future for a long-term outdoor
PlayCare set-up on bare ground. Cost of the tested fencing was under $200.

A drawback of the fencing posts tested at Brown Field was that these materials
are not viable solutions for inclusion in a quickly deployed and erected PlayCare
response. They are also not applicable for indoor or asphalt surfaces. Project
K.I.D. will continue to work on development of a versatile and packable fence
post design to be used with this fencing material on both hard and soft surfaces,
indoor and out.

Lessons Learned: The set-up of PlayCare infrastructure and activity centers is
straightforward, but can be facilitated by provision of a detailed site operations
and training manual with numerous pictures

The PlayCare activity areas were set-up in limited configuration for
demonstration purposes only. Project K.I.D. maintains a complete kit inventory for
PlayCare that includes site infrastructure materials as well as items promoting
play in a variety of domains for a multi-age grouping of children. The existing

needs of children in disasters, especially including temporary and/or custodial care for
unaccompanied minors. “Temporary Child Care” is the capability of providing post-
disaster child care that restores children to stable childcare environments, enabling
parents to return to work. Temporary child care will closely resemble regular child care,
but will likely be in temporary facilities and may utilize volunteer responders alongside
regular employees.


Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 16/35
PlayCare inventory can provide activities for about 25 children at a time. All the
materials in the PlayCare kit are readily available in existing supply chains and
should be accessible in every community even in emergencies. This is important
to allow sites to scale-up to accommodate the number of children as well as to
allow for the development of sites without pre-existing kits in place.

Project K.I.D. has determined that the PlayCare solution can be readily deployed
by most civilian volunteers with minimal instruction. We are working to pre-
position PlayCare kits in communities so that volunteers can be trained and
credentialed as part of ongoing community emergency preparedness and
response activities. Training can be enhanced as we better document best
practices through site operations manuals and volunteer training materials. These
materials will be included with PlayCare kits and will be made available online.

Lessons Learned: Shelter included with the PlayCare kit must be easily deployed
and erected by untrained volunteers.

Volunteers tested the utility of an 18-foot Shelter-Systems relief dome for PlayCare
usage. The relief dome did not prove appropriate for the PlayCare solution and
will not be used in the future. Rather than a quick job that could be easily
completed by one or two volunteers, it took a group of several men almost an
hour to erect. The dome was also was too hot without its shield, which was left off
due to logistics. By comparison, the hexayurts constructed by Star-Tides during
the exercise proved much more comfortable in terms of temperature and
provided UV protection appropriate for children. Project K.I.D. will continue to
experiment with various forms of emergency shelter.



Exercise Activity 2: On-site organization of civilians and civilian
communications integrated with OGP Command.

                                   BEST PRACTICE

 Civilian participation in formal disaster response exercise and training activities
  should be more routine. Civilians and civilian organizations, both commercial
 and not-for-profit, can be integrated with civil and military incident commands.
This integration is facilitated when adequate attention and resources are given to
   acquaint civilians with the role of ICS/NIMS and the associated vocabulary,
                               processes, and protocols.

Lessons Learned: Integration with Incident Command can help civilian
organizations obtain resources as well as contribute their capabilities to effective
incident response

Upon arrival at Brown Field, Project K.I.D.’s liaison reported to the Incident
Command Post staffed by personnel from the National Institute for Urban Search
and Rescue and received directions about site set-up, volunteer registration,


Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 17/35
safety, etc. In addition, Project K.I.D. worked through the Incident Command
Post to coordinate the unaccompanied minor reunification activity, which
involved cooperation among several agencies, including Project K.I.D., U. S.
Customs and Border Patrol, the American Red Cross, and Angel Flight, as well as
Lake Riverside Estates and Brown Field airports.

During the set-up of our 18-foot relief dome, the Project K.I.D. liaison put a
request in to the Incident Commander for assistance from Base-X and Marine
personnel. This request was relayed to the military command at Brown Field in a
timely and effective manner, and the requested personnel arrived on location to
assist Project K.I.D. volunteers in less than an hour.

Lessons Learned: Civilians will typically prefer their own communications
equipment, but if these are non-operable or there are other reasons to adopt
other systems they can quickly learn to utilize a variety of communications
devices and follow basic communications protocols.

Project K.I.D. volunteers each learned how to use a Motorola hand held radio
provided as part of a Sprint/Nextel Go-Kit pre-set for radio group usage. Most
volunteers seemed to enjoy testing this equipment. It was determined that the
radios were useful for communication up to at least a 1.5 mile radius, and that
the technology was easily used by the youngest and oldest of our volunteers.

Communication with OGP Command with these devices was not tested.

We were aware that Microsoft personnel at Brown Field were experimenting with
putting radio groups into a common group, but time did not permit us to seek
them out to let them try to integrate our equipment.

Lessons Learned: There is no substitute for face-to-face interactions for trust-
building.

Civilian communication was also accomplished in person. Project K.I.D.’s liaison
and other incident command staff attended prescribed meetings, and the
entire Project K.I.D. volunteer group attended an all-hands meeting on day two
of the exercise. Throughout the exercise, team members visited other sites and
responded to the needs of other participants.

Continuously during the exercise, various individuals and groups also exercising
at Brown Field introduced themselves and received a tour of the premises, an
overview of the program, and a press kit, if relevant.

In addition, mutual assistance among exercise players was achieved. Star-Tides,
for example, joined Project K.I.D.’s efforts by contributing some of their assets to
the PlayCare compound. Two laptop computers from “One Laptop Per Child”
were set up and demonstrated, and two solar cooking units were set up and the
food cooked was offered to compound visitors. Project K.I.D. volunteers provided
relief and hydration to three participants from other groups who were suffering



Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 18/35
from heat stress. Another Brown Field participant (Dr. Jack Thorpe) volunteered
to film the family reunification activity for Project K.I.D. when the Customs and
Border Patrol public affairs team was unavailable.

In the conduct of the family reunification exercise, Project K.I.D. met American
Red Cross personnel for the first time at Brown Field. We had not previously
known that they were participating in the scenario. Initially, there was some
confusion about who was doing what. The face-to-face opportunities to talk,
compare processes and protocols, and coordinate activities were essential to
resolving confusion, building mutual respect, and successfully accomplishing the
activity.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 19/35
Exercise Activity 3: Volunteer Credentialing, Management & Tracking

                                   BEST PRACTICE

   Volunteer management for children poses special challenges requiring site
 security, careful validation of volunteer identity and credentialing. Protocols for
volunteer management for disaster child care must balance the needs to protect
  children with the need to welcome spontaneous volunteers to provide surge
    needs. Communities should establish programs for pre-training and pre-
    credentialing volunteers for these roles as well as develop processes for
              engaging and credentialing spontaneous volunteers.

Lessons Learned:     Civilian organizations can effectively augment official
response by providing volunteer and donations management services.

During the Hurricane Katrina response it became apparent to Project K.I.D. that
there were no readily scalable means available for managing spontaneous
volunteers (or donations) for direct response to children. Pre-existing disaster child
care capabilities such as the Church of the Brethren’s Children’s Disaster Services
were effective when deployed but extremely limited in scope and depth. Since
2005, Project K.I.D. has focused on helping communities develop awareness and
solutions to address volunteer and donations management in these areas. We
have also worked to cultivate a growing national network to ensure that
resource scalability through formal mutual aid agreements and informal social
networks can be achieved in large-scale disasters.

Both OFR-HoldSafe 07 and OGP-HoldSafe 08 have demonstrated that civilian
groups can effectively align with civil and military commands to deliver
volunteers and donations to address the needs of children during exercise and
training events. This is a critical step to preparing such organizations, which will
ideally be rooted in the local community and recognized by local and state
emergency management personnel, to respond effectively in real emergencies.

Lessons Learned: Low-cost and low-technology ways of identifying and
credentialing spontaneous volunteers can be developed. Background checking
continues to be a critical—and the most technology-dependent—component of
this process.

To keep children safe, it is mandatory that all adults entering the PlayCare area
be identified. With the assistance of our technology partner, Retriever Software,
Project K.I.D. set up a spontaneous volunteer credentialing process that
advanced the process we tested during OFR-HoldSafe 2007.

Utilizing the services of Retriever Software, intake and badging of approximately
10 adult personnel (volunteers) was done. This went smoothly but was not done
at the beginning of the exercise as had been planned due to interaction with



Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 20/35
other participants at Brown Field. In a real emergency it would be necessary to
identify and badge all adults before allowing them entry to the fenced
perimeter of the PlayCare compound.

Volunteers completed a volunteer registration form and signed an
indemnification, waiver, and authorization for background check. Retriever
Software verified that each adult matched his or her driver’s license photo. Adult
badges, which slipped over the neck on a lanyard, included each person’s
driver’s license, protected in plastic. The plastic was sealed with a sticker pre-
printed with the agency logo and a unique bar code. A duplicate of this unique
bar code was attached to the volunteer’s registration form for later ease of entry
into a volunteer database.

This system allowed for quick creation of a picture ID/badge without having to
have badge printing equipment in the field. The downside of this method was
that since the ID was worn loosely over the neck, the driver’s license could
become lost in a real emergency, and the loss of the driver’s license creates
complicated issues for the volunteer. Furthermore, in an emergency it is possible
individuals will come to the site without a driver’s license and require a different
type of identification.

Project K.I.D. completed background checks on two volunteers using
InfoCheckUSA.com (http://www.infocheckusa.com/). InfoCheckUSA provides a
product they call Safety1st which is designed especially for social organizations
seeking information on employees and volunteers who will work with youth. The
check includes a Social Security Number verification and address check as well
as a nationwide criminal database search including information from the
following sources: Multi–State Sex Offender Database, AppALERT, the FBI Terrorist
List and Federal/State/Local Wanted Fugitive Lists. The background check
seemed to work smoothly, with both results coming in within about 5 minutes.

Further investigation of the efficacy and thoroughness of the InfoCheckUSA
search system is warranted, whether for pre-screening or on-site screening of
volunteers. If the process proves acceptable, Project K.I.D. might pursue a
Memorandum of Understanding with the company to allow for low-cost
volunteer screening prior to and during emergencies.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 21/35
Exercise Activity 4: Child Intake and Tracking demonstration

                                   BEST PRACTICE

  Predatory behavior toward children, whether by relatives or strangers, during
      disasters is not uncommon. Holding children safe in disasters requires
    establishing identification and tracking policies and systems for children,
 especially those in mass care environments as well as those who have been or
   will be separated from their parents/guardians even for a short time during
  disasters. All organizations coming into contact with children during disasters
  should have adequate child protection policies as well as child identification
  and tracking procedures in place and should train for emergency situations.


Lessons Learned: Both low-tech and high-tech identification procedures can be
developed for identifying and tracking children. In real emergencies, low-tech
solutions will be more viable, but effort should be made to developing redundant
systems as well as ways for low-tech registration procedures to be interoperable
with high-tech tracking systems and databases when communications
capabilities are restored.

In a real emergency, every child entering a PlayCare site would be identified,
appropriately registered, and badged under proper supervision. Also in a real
emergency it would be ideal to secure “permanent” identification on client
children, i.e., writing on the child with a permanent marker, taping identity
information to a child’s back, or using a hospital-type wrist band that cannot be
lost or torn off, to ensure that identification is not lost. Each of these systems was
tested during OFR-HoldSafe in 2007 and each provides some layer of security.

Appropriate means of identifying custodial adults must also be implemented,
such as using photos of adults and children upon registration, requiring signatures
upon sign-in and sign-out and validating signature match, validating identity with
driver’s licenses or other forms of government-issued ID. Ideally, at least two
redundant systems will be utilized for parent/guardian identification as well as
child identification.

This year two children (simulating unaccompanied minors) were given badges
with lanyards by Retriever Software. These badges had been prepared before
the exercise to demonstrate Retriever Software’s Project My Kid program, which
was developed in response to lessons learned during OFR-HoldSafe 2007. This
program would enable parents to pre-register their children during school or
daycare enrollment, at which time the parent would provide information on
custodial rights, medical needs, and provide other special instructions and
permissions so that a child’s information could be accessed by first responders in
the event of an emergency. Student ID cards would be provided to each
student, and these cards would allow access to a database repository as well as




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 22/35
contain all the needed information on the card, encoded into a 2-dimensional
bar code.

The Project My Kids badges would facilitate child registration (especially for
unaccompanied minors) but should not substitute for appropriate site-based
registration and identification security measures. Redundancy is desirable when
dealing with children, who may lose an ID in a pocket or lanyard, tear off a
taped identification in play, etc.

Project K.I.D. will continue to work with Retriever Software to refine child
identification and tracking procedures and to develop systems for ensuring the
safety and tracking of each child, whether or not computer technology and
databases are available. Continued investigation is needed to find a more
secure means than a lanyard system of attaching the ID information to the child.

Lessons Learned: Many organizations that work with children and youth on a
normal basis have neglected to implement child protection policies and
guidelines. Many organizations that have attended to the development of these
policies have not included emergency policies and procedures. Education and
model policies must be disseminated to assist organizations in contemplating
and making provision for child security in emergencies.

In discussing child protection policies with other organizations, Project K.I.D. has
learned that many organizations do not have such policies in place. Project
K.I.D. has developed internal child protection policies and guidelines that we will
review and begin to make available for other organizations to consult.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 23/35
Exercise Activity 5: Family Reunification

                                   Best Practice

 Our current systems for addressing the needs of children in disaster are largely
  based on societal assumptions that are no longer true. Provision for mass care
  largely assumes that children will be in the company of responsible guardians
during an emergency. While this is true for most children, many will be dislocated
 from families both by circumstances of the disaster (on school/work days most
  children will need to be reunified with their families) or by chaos and/or faulty
    controls at shelters and evacuation points. Holding children safe in disasters
   requires establishing identification, intake, tracking, and reunification policies
and systems for children, especially those who have been or must be separated
   from their parents/guardians during disasters. All communities should include
      family reunification guidelines and procedures in their emergency plans.


Lessons Learned: Systems that enable the pre-capture of identification and
emergency medical and custodial information for children in a form that can be
attached to the child during an emergency by parents and/or caregivers
(schools, daycares, youth organizations) can help facilitate emergency care
and reunification.

This activity was the most complex attempted during the exercise. It was
designed to demonstrate the complex legal and tracking issues surrounding
unaccompanied minors in disasters and to highlight some tools and capabilities
that address these issues. The activity tested the ability of civilian volunteers to
utilize Retriever Software’s Project My Kid emergency information system to
facilitate coordination with OGP incident Command to effect a family
reunification.

This exercise further tested the ability of private sector organizations to augment
official response in a way that achieves a critical humanitarian end with minimal
official resources deployed. In this exercise, Project K.I.D. simulated the provision
of shelter and care for an unaccompanied minor who required rapid
reunification with parents because of medical needs. Retriever Software, working
with Project K.I.D., simulated the identification of the child, the request to
Incident Command for location of the parents, and the identify verification of
the parents once they arrived at the site to be reunified with the child. OGP
Incident Command and American Red Cross staff effectively worked with
private sector organizations in a coordinating/dispatch capacity. Angel Flight
West provided the volunteer flight to bring the parents from Riverside County to
the child. Customs and Border Patrol performed the law enforcement function of
citizen protection by being on hand to escort the parents from the airport to the
Project K.I.D. site and observing the identification verification and reunification.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 24/35
The child in the scenario was an unaccompanied minor who was on a school
field trip when they were diverted by local authorities to temporary humanitarian
aid station at Brown Field. The child had in his possession a Retriever Software-
generated emergency identification card issued by his school. The information
accessed through the system indicated that the child had a medical condition
that necessitated rapid reunification with his legal guardians.

Two volunteers simulated the role of parents of the unaccompanied minor that
was secured at the PlayCare site. They were flown in from a private airport in
Riverside, CA, by Angel Flight West. The OGP Incident Command informed
Project K.I.D. of the approximate time of the reunification and asked Project
K.I.D. to work in cooperation with the Red Cross, which had also been invited to
participate in this exercise inject.

The parents arrived at Brown Field, were escorted to the Project K.I.D. site by
Customs and Border Patrol. At the security gate they showed their ID to Retriever
Software for verification, and were visually identified by the minor child. When all
was determined to be validated, the child was reunited with his parents.

This event went well. The Parents were cooperative and simulated the
reunification. The child, who in addition to his ID, wore a vest indicating he was
an unaccompanied minor, complied with the role playing. The pilot and Border
Patrol representatives also came to the compound fence and introduced
themselves.

In the future, Project K.I.D. would like to be involved as the lead planning agency
for exercise injects of this type so that the systems, protocols, and processes we
are developing can be fully exercised. In this instance, the San Diego Red Cross,
seeking to test mutual aid with its Riverside County counterpart, stepped in to
coordinate the Angel Flight before exercise play actually began. A more realistic
exercise would allow for the events to unfold in a more natural way, with the Red
Cross responding to a request from Incident Command after the presence of the
unaccompanied minor had been reported by Project K.I.D. (or another group
providing shelter-in-place for the child). This would prevent confusion and dual
scenarios running. (Our volunteer parents, for instance, arrived expecting to
collect a girl child, when what we had was a boy!)

During the Hurricane Katrina evacuation, over 5,000 children were separated
from their parents. Some of these children were not reunified with parents until 6
months after the disaster. Few processes exist to quickly and effectively address
the needs of this population of children in a disaster. Our conversations with
partners in this exercise activity confirmed a need for all organizations to have in
place formal Child Protection Guidelines and custodial verification procedures in
order to hold children safe and protect them from predatory behavior during a
disaster.

While Congress has tapped the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children to serve as a national emergency child locator center in the event of


Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 25/35
another major national disaster, Project K.I.D. was unable to engage NCMEC in
exercise play this year. (NCMEC did send two volunteers to participate in OFR-
HoldSafe 07, but the organization failed to provide us any after action
feedback.) With activation of the NCMEC capabilities dependent upon Federal
action, state and local authorities should be developing their own policies and
procedures to address the needs of unaccompanied minors in the wake of a
disaster.

Indeed, all agencies who may be responsible for a child during a real
emergency should implement child protection policies and protocols for
handling the needs of unaccompanied minors.

Project K.I.D. will continue to work to raise awareness and to promote the
implementation of effective Child Protection Guidelines by our organization and
others.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 26/35
                                   RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for improvement of policies, procedures, and protocols for
disaster child care capabilities are largely captured in the preceding section on
Best Practices and Lessons Learned. The following recommendations are
primarily directed toward the exercise design and implementation facets of
Operation Golden Phoenix.

1) Industry and NGO participants in future exercises should be engaged more
creatively in exercise play with structured objectives.

In preparation for OFR-HoldSafe 2007, Project K.I.D. received the benefit of
extensive training in exercise design and documentation in conformity with
HSEEP guidelines. Building upon the experience and knowledge gleaned from
this preparation and execution, Project K.I.D. developed a formal exercise plan
(EXPLAN) to guide our training objectives and activities during OGP 2008.
Unfortunately, we were one of the only groups (industry or nonprofit)
participating at Brown Field who had been so thoroughly trained to conduct
exercise activities in this manner.

The events at Brown Field were highly successful from a social networking
perspective, but without common objectives stemming from realistic simulations
of real-world scenarios, something was lost in fully assessing the capabilities
present and the ability of various groups to achieve significant coordination,
cooperation, and interoperability.

In future exercises of this type, we would like to generate more real-world
scenarios and injects that would invite and necessitate interagency
collaboration and cooperation on real-world problems. Through our HoldSafe
Exercise and Training Program, Project K.I.D. is developing scenarios and training
activities to highlight the needs of children in disasters and engage people in
developing new plans, policies, procedures, protocols, strategies and/or systems
for addressing the needs of children. We believe more would be learned and
more solutions catalyzed if industry and nonprofit players were asked to play out
real scenarios that involved protecting, sheltering, identifying and tracking
children as well as obtaining necessary attention for children’s needs through
official and unofficial channels.

Table Top Exercises (TTX) and/or formal pre-exercise briefings can serve to orient
diverse players and catalyze greater collaboration around both structured
objectives and improvised activities once the FSE begins.

The “buzz” seems to be out about Operation Golden Phoenix, and at times OGP
activities at Brown Field seemed as much a trade show as an exercise and
training event. Many participants arrived without adequate understanding of
how to conduct actual exercise and training activities and many left without
having taken part in any exercise or training.



Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 27/35
2) Social networking opportunities and exercise/training activities should be
designed as distinct but complementary activities.

Informal social networking is one of the primary benefits of OGP, and on this
front, OGP 2008 was a huge success. The social networking dimensions at Brown
Field were welcomed by Project K.I.D., and we gleaned tremendous benefit.
Nevertheless at times the social networking environment disrupted our ability to
pursue our own exercise objectives. Several of our proposed activities (learning
how to use T-cards for volunteer management, civilian-military logistics
integration, and hospital surge support) required creating requests to the
Incident Command Post for support and vice-versa. These activities were lost in
the overall exercise because so much time was consumed by all of our
volunteers simply networking with people stopping by our site to learn more
about our response capabilities.

It was our observation that NIUSR, serving as primary Incident Command
(Facilitation) for the industry and civilian components of OGP, found some of its
exercise objectives similarly forestalled by the volume of non-scenario related
interaction among participants on the field. These are not bad problems to
have, and we look forward to working with NIUSR and others to creatively
leverage the abundance of interest in OGP as a networking opportunity.

Whether a more formal opportunity for social networking is created prior to the
field exercise, after the field exercise, or both, setting aside a dedicated space
and time for these activities is desirable in order that time in the field can be
primarily devoted to fulfillment of exercise and training activities around
common scenarios.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 28/35
                       CONSOLIDATED AAR SUBMISSIONS



  Please see our executive summary and blue shaded boxes throughout
   this AAR. In addition, please review Appendix I, to highlight the wide
           variety of Target Capabilities relevant to this exercise.




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 29/35
                                APPENDIX I
                       TARGET CAPABILITIES ADDRESSED

ACTIVITY 1: SITE SET-UP AND MATERIALS TESTING

COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION
            Integrate Public Outreach and Non-Governmental Resources into
 Activity
            Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises
            Incorporate in all plans, procedures and protocols (including
  ComF
            outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities),
   2.1.4
            consideration for age-related issues and concerns.
            Integrate non-governmental entities, volunteers, and the general
            public in exercise planning, implementation, and review of all levels
  ComF
            (national/ international, regional, State, tribal, urban, local) and
   2.3.1
            types of exercises (all hazards, terrorism, bioterrorism, natural
            disasters)
 Activity   Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas
            Provide continuing education and training for the public on:
            prevention, protection and mitigation measures, community
            emergency response plans, alerts and warnings (including threat
  ComF
            levels), evacuation/in-place protection plans and exercises,
   3.1.2
            participating in government sponsored emergency exercises,
            volunteer opportunities and training for year round volunteer role or
            surge capacity role in response and recovery.
  ComF      Develop and provide community preparedness public education
   3.3.2    program and materials for at risk Populations.
 Activity   Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations
            Develop and implement training and exercise programs to enable
ComF 4.3
            citizens to support emergency response and recovery operations
 Activity   Incident Response
            Implement public, volunteers, and non-governmental entity roles in
ComF 5.1
            emergency operations plans
CRITICAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND LOGISTICS
 Activity   Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
            Establish plans and procedures for coordinating with non-
 Res.B1d
            governmental and private sector organizations for obtaining
    1.6
            resources




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 30/35
ACTIVITY 2: ORGANIZE AND INTEGRATE CIVILIAN COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS
 Activity Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
          Develop procedures for the exchange of voice and data with
 ComC
          Federal, regional, State, local, and tribal agencies, as well as
  1.2.1
          voluntary agencies
ComC 1.3 Establish and maintain information systems across response entities
 Activity Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs
          Develop exercises/drills of sufficient intensity to challenge
 ComC     management and operations and to test the knowledge, skills, and
  2.1.2   abilities   of  individuals  and    organizations    for  response
          communications
 ComC     Develop and conduct training to improve all-hazard incident
  2.2.1   management capability for response communications
          Conduct an after action review to determine strengths and
 ComC
          shortfalls and develop a corrective plan accordingly for response
  2.2.2
          communications




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 31/35
ACTIVITY 3: VOLUNTEER CREDENTIALING, MANAGEMENT, & TRACKING

CRITICAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND LOGISTICS
  Activity  Respond to Needs Assessment and Inventory
 Res.B1d    Determine additional human and material resources needed to
    5.1     support response
            Identify and inventory by type and category all resources available
 Res.B1d
            to support emergency operations, including facilities, equipment,
    5.2
            personnel, and systems
  Activity  Activate Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
 Res.B1d    Implement a resource-tracking system
    4.3
VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT AND DONATIONS
  Activity  Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
 Res.B1e    Develop NIMS-compatible plans, policies, and protocols for
    1.1     coordinating the management of Volunteers
 Res.B1e    Identify potential volunteer opportunities to expedite community
   1.1.7    involvement
 Res.B.1.e  Develop system or process for ensuring credentialing/accreditation
   1.1.9    of skilled volunteers
            Develop outreach plan designed to educate the preparedness
 Res.B1e
            and response community about the functions of the volunteers and
   1.4.3
            donations management capability
  Activity  Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs
 Res.B1e    Participate in training exercises with government agencies and
   2.1.5    other nongovernmental organizations, as appropriate
  Activity  Organize Volunteers and Assign Them to Disaster Relief Efforts
 Res.B1e    Implement system to check credentialing/accreditation of skilled
   5.2.3    volunteers if necessary
 Res.B1e    Support response operations using volunteer resources and
    5.6     volunteered technical capabilities
COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION
            Integrate Public Outreach and Non-Governmental Resources into
  Activity
            Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises
            Incorporate in all plans, procedures and protocols (including
  ComF
            outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities),
   2.1.4
            consideration for age-related issues and concerns.
            Integrate non-governmental entities, volunteers, and the general
            public in exercise planning, implementation, and review of all levels
  ComF
            (national/ international, regional, State, tribal, urban, local) and
   2.3.1
            types of exercises (all hazards, terrorism, bioterrorism, natural
            disasters)
  Activity  Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas
            Provide continuing education and training for the public on:
  ComF      prevention, protection and mitigation measures, community
   3.1.2    emergency response plans, alerts and warnings (including threat
            levels), evacuation/in-place protection plans and exercises,


Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 32/35
               participating in government sponsored emergency exercises,
               volunteer opportunities and training for year round volunteer role or
               surge capacity role in response and recovery.
  ComF         Develop and provide community preparedness public education
   3.3.2       program and materials for at risk Populations.
  Activity     Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations
               Develop and implement training and exercise programs to enable
ComF 4.3
               citizens to support emergency response and recovery operations
  Activity     Incident Response
               Implement public, volunteers, and non-governmental entity roles in
ComF 5.1
               emergency operations plans




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 33/35
ACTIVITY 4: CHILD IDENTIFICATION & TRACKING

CITIZEN EVACUATION AND SHELTER-IN-PLACE
 Activity   Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
 Res.B3a    Establish registry of populations requiring assistance during
  1.3.1.1   evacuation/sheltering-in-place
 Activity   Activate Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection
 Res.B3a    Implement systems for tracking evacuees and those who shelter in
    4.5     place
 Activity   Operate Evacuation Staging/Reception Area
 Res.B3a    Coordinate with appropriate agencies to address needs of those
   7.2.4    requiring assistance
 Res.B3a    Provide voluntary registration/tracking system for general
   7.3.2    population to support reunification
COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION
            Integrate Public Outreach and Non-Governmental Resources into
 Activity
            Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises
            Incorporate in all plans, procedures and protocols (including
  ComF
            outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities),
   2.1.4
            consideration for age-related issues and concerns.
 Activity   Incident Response
            Implement public, volunteers, and non-governmental entity roles in
ComF 5.1
            emergency operations plans
MASS CARE
 Activity   Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
            Develop plans, procedures, and protocols for coordination of mass
 Res.C3a    care services with agencies providing human services and housing,
   1.3.2    (e.g., welfare inquiry, transitional/interim housing services, other
            individual/family assistance programs), and family reunification
 Activity   Shelter General Population
 Res.C3a    Establish processes to address issues identified in the assessment of
   6.1.2    shelter registrants




Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 34/35
ACTIVITY 5: FAMILY REUNIFICATION

COMMUNICATIONS
  Activity  Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
            Develop procedures for the exchange of voice and data with
  ComC
            Federal, regional, State, local, and tribal agencies, as well as
   1.2.1
            voluntary agencies
ComC 1.3 Establish and maintain information systems across response entities
  Activity  Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs
            Develop exercises/drills of sufficient intensity to challenge
  ComC      management and operations and to test the knowledge, skills, and
   2.1.2    abilities   of    individuals and     organizations   for   response
            communications
CITIZEN EVACUATION AND SHELTER-IN-PLACE
  Activity  Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
 Res.B3a    Establish registry of populations requiring assistance during
  1.3.1.1   evacuation/sheltering-in-place
  Activity  Activate Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection
 Res.B3a    Implement systems for tracking evacuees and those who shelter in
    4.5     place
  Activity  Operate Evacuation Staging/Reception Area
 Res.B3a    Coordinate with appropriate agencies to address needs of those
   7.2.4    requiring assistance
 Res.B3a    Provide voluntary registration/tracking system for general
   7.3.2    population to support reunification
 ACTIVITY   Collect and Evacuate Population Requiring Assistance
            Provide appropriate specialized transportation services for those
 Res.B3a
            requiring additional support
   6.2.3
            during evacuation
VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT AND DONATIONS
  Activity  Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
 Res.B.1.e  Develop system or process for ensuring credentialing/accreditation
   1.1.9    of skilled volunteers
  Activity  Organize Volunteers and Assign Them to Disaster Relief Efforts
 Res.B1e    Support response operations using volunteer resources and
    5.6     volunteered technical capabilities
MASS CARE
  Activity  Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems
            Develop plans, procedures, and protocols for coordination of mass
 Res.C3a    care services with agencies providing human services and housing,
   1.3.2    (e.g., welfare inquiry, transitional/interim housing services, other
            individual/family assistance programs), and family reunification
CRITICAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION AND LOGISTICS
  Activity  Respond to Needs Assessment and Inventory
 Res.B1d    Determine additional human and material resources needed to
    5.1     support response



Project KID OGP08 AAR Page 35/35
                                           Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                         ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.3.3    SDSU Visualization Center and Regional Technology Center Golden
         Phoenix 2008 AAR




December 2008                                                                      D-39
Golden Phoenix 2008 – After Action Report submission 

                                       San Diego State University: 
                           Visualization Center & Regional Technology Center 
 
Executive Summary: 
     San Diego State University (SDSU) was host to over twenty of the industry participants during 
Golden Phoenix 2008.  Typically, products with a common operational picture capability set up in the 
Visualization Center to display their product. SDSU had several goals during the exercise: 
     1. Host select industry partners who planned to participate in this effort.  
     2. Capture as much information about each product to better understand the full capability of the 
          technology.  This met our mission for the San Diego County as a technology clearinghouse and 
          as feed back to the vendors who would be able to understand how their capability was viewed 
          by a non‐expert contingency.  To assist in this effort we used students within the SDSU 
          Homeland Security master’s program as well as interns assigned to SPAWAR.  
     3. Test our newly installed communication system and interact with the San Diego county and city 
          EOC by 3Cs, Web EOC and radio using the RIOS gateway. 
Introduction 
          SDSU’s role was in providing industry a place to demonstrate their technology in a “shadow” 
environment where they could consume data feeds from the exercise and showcase capability without 
being directly tied into the training environment. This effort was embraced as an opportunity to create 
capability for the emergency responder. It gave industry a chance to collaborate with each other, to 
partner and show how together problems could be better and more quickly solved. It was to promote 
innovative and inexpensive solutions and display them at the Visualization Center. 
          SDSU is in the process of becoming an alternate location for emergency operations. As such, the 
need to test our communications system and ensure connectivity with County and City EOC’s was a key 
part of the exercise to validate what until this exercise was a proof of concept. 
 
Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned 
          Golden Phoenix 2008, from an industry standpoint, appeared to be an attempt to mix industry 
technology experiments with a structured training environment.  The lesson at SDSU was that there was 
not enough structure to allow for ad‐hoc experimentation.  Much of the feeds, data streams, Etc. were 
not available to industry and as the training changed due to real‐time issues, the data was not broadcast 
to the industry participants.  In the future, data feed requirements will need to be planned in advance to 
enhance lab participation. 
          Engagement and structure from the initial planning efforts needed to be given to the industry 
and rules of engagement needed to be more explicit. An exercise controller with contact information 
needed to be on‐location at the visualization laboratory to assist with real‐time events and industry 
injects. 
          From a communications perspective, SDSU was able to connect via 3C’s, radio and WebEOC on 
all experimental efforts. Some additional enhancements for volume and effectiveness were identified 
and will be installed. 
                Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                              ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4   Vendors




December 2008                                           D-41
                                         Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                       ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.1    AC3 Systems Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR




December 2008                                                                    D-43
                                           OPERATION
                                           GOLDEN PHOENIX
                                           2008
           08/08/2008                       After Action Report



The IC4U Incident Commanders Command Control Communications Unit (trailer version for civilian
response) demonstrated that rapid response of integrated voice/data/video communications
combined with team effort - is the winning combination
Success at Operation Golden Phoenix 2008 was demonstrated by the AC3 team. The AC3 team integrated
the best of breed of people and technology which proved to be the winning combination. The team consisted
of people from Information Processing Systems of CA Inc., AC3, Embedded Technologies Corporation, Frontier
Data Communications, BW Solutions, MedWeb, Balfour Technologies, and Mesh City.
OVERVIEW
The primary objective of the IC4U trailer was to demonstrate the power and flexibility of a (HFN) Hastily
Formed Network with interoperable communications using standards to connect voice, data, and video devices
to local and remote responders in a time of a disaster.
RAPID RESPONSE
The IC4U vehicle acts as an incident command center that can easily be towed to an emergency area and set
up with minimal effort in approximately 10 minutes. Each IC4U Incident Command center can easily
interoperate with other incident command centers/vehicles creating a unified area command – acting as a
force multiplier. Each vehicle is designed to be completely self sufficient by bringing its own generator,
heating/air conditioning, multiple communication systems and space for food water and other essentials. The
IC4U has been designed so that a member of the public (volunteers) can be trained to operate the entire
system by just the touch a few buttons, a user friendly platform. This was demonstrated by bringing the IC4U
vehicle to Brown Field at Operation Golden Phoenix.
When an agency or community rapidly deploys an IC4U mobile vehicle to a disaster, the IC4U deploys
Hastily Formed Networks which integrate communications protocols with international communications
standards. These Hastily Formed Networks were used at Operation Golden Phoenix to provide interagency,
interoperability for voice, data and video communication applications between civilian and military
emergency responders. Our technology plan uses the ICS/NIMS guidelines as the model for our strategy.
                                                                                  Operation Golden Phoenix 2008




INTEROPERABILITY LAN
The IC4U vehicle successfully demonstrated several innovative technologies. One example of the Hastily
Formed Network was the use of portable radio communications from Low-VHF (35-50 MHz), VHF (136-174
MHz), UHF (450-512 MHz) and 800 MHz with VOIP and cellular technologies. This allows any voice network
to talk with any other voice network in a multipoint or conference configuration at the touch of a button in the
IC4U vehicle. It should be noted that the IC4U vehicle also provided a high power public address system
which could switch to any audio or voice network, as well as provide a microphone for ad hoc messages to be
addresses to all of the participants at Brown Field. This demonstrated technology being used effectively at
the lowest common denominator.
INTEROPERABILITY WAN
Another example of Hastily Formed Network was created with interoperable wireless broadband local area
network (LAN) at brown Field. Here the IC4U vehicle used a Bridge/Router (Brouter) between the phased
array Wi-Fi networks/wireless mesh networks. The integration of these broadband wireless networks used a
satellite backhaul via the VSAT and multiple redundant EVDO networks to create a Wide Area Network
(WAN) solution. The VSAT was aggregated with another VSAT system (MedWeb) to create a more reliable
backhaul for the entire wireless network.
OPERATOR TOOLS USE STANDARDS
While the interoperable broadband networks were in place at Brown Field the IC4U team used several
wireless cameras from Fortified Communications. Some of these cameras were ruggedized, handheld
cameras – while others were integrated into Pelican cases with remote PTZ capabilities. The IC4U vehicle
also had a camera mounted on a telescoping pole with RPTZ. These cameras transmitted through the wired
and wireless LAN to the GPAC server in the IC4U vehicle and connected to the WAN.
GLOBAL C4 PARTICIPATION
The General Programmable Automation Server (GPAC) server allowed participants from other Golden
Phoenix sites, as well as people around the world, to log into the secure server in the IC4U vehicle and watch
the hand-held camera as they took tours of Brown Field and talked with the camera operator on the cell
phone. Also people from around the world were able to log into the GPAC server and look at the static
camera in the Pelican case and use far end camera controls (PTZ) to look around Brown Field.
OPEN ARCHITECTURE SOLUTIONS
The GPAC server is an open architecture server web based system. At Golden Phoenix, The video from the
GPAC server was integrated with another open architecture server from Bal4 Technologies, Inc. called
fourDscape which managed the entire county of SanDiego in six inch resolution. This is a modular system
conceptually similar to internet browsers/servers, except that websites exist in 2D space, whereas 4D Portals
utilize the entire expanse of 4D time and space. FourDscape® 4D browser users can navigate into the 3D
virtual reality of a 4D Portal AND move back and forth through the fourth dimension of time to effectively
analyze many correlated geospatial-temporal datasets, such as high resolution aerial photography, 3D
feature models, and moving objects extracted from video and other tracking sensor feeds and locator
devices, fused together by the 4D Portal into powerful, interactive 4D Landscapes that change over time.



                                                                                                         Page 1
                                                                              Operation Golden Phoenix 2008




CLOSING
The IPS team accomplished all of its objectives at Operation Golden Phoenix 2008 by providing a rapid
response vehicle to deploy LAN/WAN interoperable, converged C4 communications of voice/data/video to
participants throughout the world.


NOTES
   1. VSAT Aggregation
   On the first day of the exercise (7/22/08) there were multiple networks that had VSAT uplink capabilities
   but none of them were joined together to provide a unified controlled network. Coby Leuschke suggested
   that we use a software load balancing router in lieu of the hardware router. As he just learned about the
   software the previous night and none of us had any experience in setting up the WooWeb-pro software
   router. Using WooWeb-pro we were able to aggregate available bandwidths from our VSAT connection
   with MedWeb’s connection. He managed to configure it in about an hour or so. By10:30AM Tuesday,
   we had a complete system on line with MeshCity which provided the Wi-Fi service then IPS and WebMed
   provided the backhaul to the Internet.
   2. Network Management
   The problem we found with an event like Golden Phoenix is that there are too many unmanaged Mesh
   network access points (APs) whose frequencies or channels interfere with one another. We ended up
   shutting down our own mesh APs because they were practically useless as connections get dropped
   intermittently even when you are just a few feet from your own mesh AP. Coby (the IT/mesh ‘Czar’ at
   GP08) had tried to manage the mesh spectrum usage but some participants appeared to ignore the rules.




                                                                                                     Page 2
                                          Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                        ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.2    Alion Science and Technology Team AAR




December 2008                                                                     D-45
Logo provided just in case you didn’t have it.

Executive Summary

The Alion Science and Technology team brought a suite of exercise control tools to manage key
exercise events, and collaboration tools to monitor event status and share Situational Awareness
(SA) among distributed Golden Phoenix event sites. Our objective was to help plan and manage the
tracking and progress of key events in a Golden Phoenix and to assess the efficacy of our tools by
comparing Situational Awareness (SA) between SDSU and Brown Field.
Alion gained valuable insight regarding hastily formed emergency response and ad-hoc
organizations. This experience will allow us to improve or ability to manage key events in future
exercises. Unfortunately, we were unable to establish volunteer collaborators at each site, for a
variety of reasons addressed in our lessons learned. This precluded our collaboration and SA
assessment objectives.
Best practices:
The exercise construct offered an open and supportive environment for a wide variety of
initiatives. The flexibility of MAG-46 and their willingness to allow industry participation was
very positive.
SDSU Vision Facility was fully equipped and staffed to support a variety of technologies and
network needs. The SDSU team resolved issues, and suggested optimum solutions.
Brown Field provided an appropriately austere, yet safe environment well suited for the exercise.
The NIUSR team did an outstanding job in coordinating activities.
Observations:
There were only a few volunteers that joined our collaborative conferences and then only briefly
prior to the operation. There was effectively no voluntary collaboration using the tool suite
during the exercise. As a result, situational awareness of key event status was isolated and not
shared with SDSU.
There was no EOC staff at SDSU, and so there was no real need to keep SDSU apprised of
exercise activities, nor was there incentive for remote participants to contribute to and help
maintain a common operational picture.
Technology products provided excellent examples of state-of-the-art capabilities, but they were
stand-alone and did not provide fusion for actionable decision-making. An EOC staff, had there
been one, would likely have mitigated this problem on the first day of the exercise.
Our lessons learned:

Asking for volunteers on a collaborative website was not very effective. Face-to-face
discussions and pressure is needed just prior to and during the event to ensure effective
collaboration. I will bring our big intimidating person next time.

A user cadre in advance of the exercise must define the specific information needed, so that
collaborators will understand what is required and how it will benefit their site.

Recommendations:
Establish an EOC Staff (Actual people, actors, graduate students, etc…) who emulate the staff
responsibilities. This will encourage communications to the EOC and provide an opportunity to
explore many other emergency response collaboration issues (systems, procedures, decision
processes, etc…).
Arrange to have one or two people at each of the key locations who are responsible for observing
the status of exercise events and providing feedback and changes to a Key Event Manager.
Establish a Key Event Manager in the Emergency Ops Center (EOC) who serves as the single
person to update the shared event status and help synchronize the time when events occur. This
person coordinates with all the key locations to manage activities and arrange any changes to the
event list.
Establish a Key Event Team early in the prep-stage of an exercise to work with the exercise
planners to help record and manage the planned and evolving events, with the Key Event
Manager as the lead.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Introduction
In preparation, the Alion team uploaded all of the GP events listed in Major Persano’s execution
matrix into the Alion Experimentation & Event Tool Suite (EETS). One week before the
exercise, Alion announced the availability of two collaborative websites on CivMil/Golden
Phoenix website, and requested volunteers to join in. The sites were open throughout the exercise
preparations and during Golden Phoenix operations. Our team of two people spent most of our
time at SDSU and a small part of our time at Brown Field.
We learned a great deal about hastily formed emergency response ad-hoc organizations and how
to help manage key events in future exercises. Since there were only a few volunteers that joined
the collaborative conferences (only briefly prior to the operation), there was effectively no
collaboration using out tools during the exercise, thus, very little situational awareness to assess.
Best Practices

The exercise construct offered an open and supportive environment for a wide variety of
initiatives. The flexibility of MAG-46 and their willingness to allow industry participation was
very positive.

SDSU Vision Facility was fully equipped to support a variety of technologies and network
requirements. The SDSU team helped with any issues, and was responsive in suggesting
solutions.

Brown Field provided an appropriately austere, yet safe environment well suited for the
exercise. The NIUSR team did an outstanding job of providing essentials and coordinating
activities.

Lessons learned

Asking for volunteers on a collaborative website was not very effective. Face-to-face
discussions and arm-twisting is needed just prior to and during the event to ensure effective
collaboration.

The specific information and scope of information to be shared during exercises needs to be
defined by a user cadre in advance of the exercise, so that collaborators will understand the
benefit of dedicating their time to collaboration using the websites.
Recommendations (Optional)

Establish an EOC Staff (Actual people, actors, graduate students, etc…) who emulate the staff
responsibilities. This will encourage communications to the EOC and provide an opportunity to
explore many other emergency response collaboration issues (systems, procedures, decision
processes, etc…).
Arrange to have one or two people at each of the key locations who are responsible for observing
the status of exercise events and providing feedback and changes to a Key Event Manager.
Establish a Key Event Manager in the Emergency Ops Center (EOC) who serves as the single
person to update the shared event status and help synchronize the time when events occur. This
person coordinates with all the key locations to manage activities and arrange any changes to the
event list.
Establish a Key Event Team early in the prep-stage of an exercise to work with the exercise
planners to help record and manage the planned and evolving events, with the Key Event
Manager as the lead.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuggets for the Abstract/Executive Summary

Observations:
There was very little collaboration between key Golden Phoenix sites and SDSU. Situational
awareness regarding the status of key exercise events at remote sites was isolated and not shared
with SDSU.
Without an EOC staff at SDSU, there was no real need to keep SDSU apprised of exercise
activities, nor was there incentive for remote participants to contribute to and maintain a common
operational picture.
Technology products provided stimulating examples of state-of-the-art capabilities, but they were
stand-alone and did not provide fusion for actionable decision-making. An EOC staff, had there
been one, would likely have mitigated this problem on the first day of the exercise.
Our lessons learned:

The specific information and scope of information to be shared during exercises needs to be
defined by a user cadre in advance of the exercise, so that collaborators will understand the
benefit of dedicating their time to collaboration using the websites.

Recommendations:
Establish an EOC Staff (Actual people, actors, graduate students, etc…) who emulate the staff
responsibilities. This will encourage communications to the EOC and provide an opportunity to
explore many other emergency response collaboration issues (systems, procedures, decision
processes, etc…).
Arrange to have one or two people at each of the key locations who are responsible for observing
the status of exercise events and providing feedback and changes to a Key Event Manager.
Establish a Key Event Manager in the Emergency Ops Center (EOC) who serves as the single
person to update the shared event status and help synchronize the time when events occur. This
person coordinates with all the key locations to manage activities and arrange any changes to the
event list.
Establish a Key Event Team early in the prep-stage of an exercise to work with the exercise
planners to help record and manage the planned and evolving events, with the Key Event
Manager as the lead.


Alion Science and Technology authorizes the release of this after action report. The
information is unclassified and cleared for general public release. SSC SD, as the
executive agent, is authorized to use the material in the 2008 Golden Phoenix After
Action Report."
                                            Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                          ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.3    Balfour Technologies Automated Situational Awareness Portal Golden
         Phoenix 2008 AAR




December 2008                                                                       D-47
Executive Summary



Balfour Technologies patented fourDscape® is a four-dimensional browser that
enables automated situational awareness for human interaction, analysis and
response through a fully integrated single 4 dimensional landscape.

The fourDscape® solution integrates data from disparate sources, including live
smart sensors, into actionable information. The information can be displayed in a
fourDscape® browser that effectively presents the data in a single visual scene or
common operating picture, providing automated situational awareness for Incident
Commanders, First Responders, Law Enforcement, Security Personnel and anyone
else that is responsible for Securing and Protecting Infrastructure and/or Human
Assets. During Golden Phoenix fourDscape® was deployed at Brown Field.

Introduction

The reason for participating in Golden Phoenix was to forward deploy fourDscape®
to provide situation awareness and a common operating environment that could be
observed at Brown Field as well as streamed over the internet/intranet to remote
locations (SDSU Viz Lab, Balfour’s New York Office, DHS...Etc.)



Balfour Technologies

George Davis

Senior Applications Engineer

george@fourDscape.com

516-513-0030

Balfour Technologies role in Golden Phoenix rose out of our Small Business
Innovative Research Contract (SBIR) with the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security to provide an Automated Situation Awareness portal based on our
patented fourDscape® Technology.



                                        1
BALFOUR Technologies LLC                           960 S. Broadway, Hicksville NY 11801
                                                   516.513.0030 www.fourDscape.com
fourDscape® browser displays embedded images of Brown Field Observation Posts over a high
resolution Aerial Photo Mosaic of San Diego County,California.

We became aware of Golden Phoenix through our previous work with the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s Operation Luprecale that coincided with the
DHS Stakeholders West Conference in January 2008.

During Golden Phoenix we deployed:

   •   Two Dell Precision Laptop Computers
   •   Four Port Power Over Ethernet Switch
   •   Four Pole Mounted Mobotix Ethernet Powered Cameras
   •   One NCAST Video Streaming Network Device

Our objective during our time at Brown Field was to deploy an operating
environment that could be field deployed and be presented remotely via the
streaming capabilities we brought to the site. Our further objective was to work
with our business partners Mesh City (www.meshcity.com) to provide a wireless
network to deploy our cameras and other sensors on.


                                               2
BALFOUR Technologies LLC                                    960 S. Broadway, Hicksville NY 11801
                                                            516.513.0030 www.fourDscape.com
The IC4U Incident Commanders Command Control Communications Unit provided
by IPS (www.ac3systems.com) provided us with their Satellite Bandwidth as well as
provided a Static IP address for us to test our streaming capability. The IPS trailer
also enabled us to connect to the GPAC System provided by ETCorp
(www.etcorp.com) that was integrated into their trailer as well as a server that was
hosted at the San Diego State University Viz Lab (www.citi.sdsu.edu). The Satellite
Bandwidth that was available was not robust enough to provide a reliable
continuous stream. With the help of Major Coby Leuschke we were able to bond the
IPS-IC4U with a Satellite Truck provided by MedWeb (www.medweb.com) and
somewhat successfully stream live video over the Web, however the signal was
intermittent as we had our New York Office access the URL that we provided.

Balfour also interfaced with other technology providers at Brown Field and we look
forward to continuing the momentum we achieved and look forward to participating
again in the not too distant future.
Special thanks to:
   • www.compassenergysolutions.com
   • www.fortifieddatacom.com
   • www.fourwindstech.com

Balfour Technologies is a Resident Research Partner of the New York State Applied
Science Center of Innovation and Excellence in Homeland Security in Bethpage,
New York, scheduled to open in mid 2009.




                                         3
BALFOUR Technologies LLC                             960 S. Broadway, Hicksville NY 11801
                                                     516.513.0030 www.fourDscape.com
                                          Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                        ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.4    Compass Energy Solutions Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR




December 2008                                                                     D-49
                                                                       28 July, 2008

Subj.: Golden Phoenix 2008 AAR


Executive Summary

A disaster could take the form of natural disaster or a terrorist attack or perhaps
they could even occur one after the other. Regardless, the effects will be much
the same, that is, much of the infrastructure we take for granted will be either
entirely or at least partially gone. Depending on the magnitude of the disaster,
safe drinking water, electricity, fuel, transportation, and food sources will be
either scarce or not available and the effects could last beyond the initial 72 to 96
hours going into several weeks.

Compass Energy Solutions provides portable solar and solar/wind generators
and related accessories. Our Solar Generators range from man-portable solar
power packs (36 amp hour Power Pack with foldable solar panels) to a mobile
solar and solar/wind solution (50, 100 and 160 amp hour Power Packs) ideal for
operating small appliances or emergency operations centers. Our systems
operate 12VDC, 24VDC and 120VAC equipment and are ideally suited for
Military, humanitarian, emergency response, and disaster relief operations.

We also displayed a portable solar powered video surveillance unit, capable of
supporting up to 16 cameras and operating both on AC and DC power; and a
solar powered wireless access point, which provided us with the capability to set
up a wireless network. Both of these systems were powered by our solar and
solar/wind generators.

We participated in both Yuma, Arizona and in Brown Field; the intent at both
locations was the same; provide solar and solar/wind power as a primary source
of power thereby reducing battery use and reliance on fossil fuel generators.

Many of the groups attending GP08 are involved in data, networking, security,
satellite communications, humanitarian relief, Search and Rescue, and both
medical and medical consultation rely heavily on electrical power to do their
jobs. During a disaster, with a disruption of roads and highways, the priorities of
air delivered fuel may take days before a relief center can get additional fuel for
generators. Operation Golden Phoenix provided a venue for Compass Energy
Solutions to demonstrate the importance of having portable non-fossil fueled
energy available and proved that solar and solar/wind generators can, in many
cases, replace the fossil fuel generator as the primary source of constant
power.

Having portable alternative energy resources played an important role at Golden
Phoenix. Solar & wind energy generators powered data initiatives, mesh network
nodes, satellite communications and telemedicine equipment. Our solar
generators powered a variety of equipment, from recharging UAV batteries, to
charging laptops, cell phones, digital cameras and other critical equipment. Our
systems contributed to the success of the operation.

We accomplished our primary goal, which was to introduce portable solar and
solar wind generators as a viable and primary source of power for an emergency
situation. To accomplish this objective we made a point to team up with as many
users as possible and not only demo our products but actually conducted tests
proving the versatility of our systems. We fell a bit short and did not have an
opportunity to interact with everyone participating in the exercise; better
coordination prior to the exercise could have increased our interaction with other
organizations.

Our top best practice was proving that, when applicable, portable solar and
solar/wind power generators can and should be used as a primary source of
power.


Introduction

Our company’s rationale for participating in GP08 was that the exercise gave us
an opportunity to not only show our products but more importantly, to actually
demonstrate their use in the field. Additionally, we wanted to validate the
capabilities of our systems and contribute to the overall success of the exercise.

Our primary points of contact were Maj John Persano, Maj Fernandez and Coby
Leuschke.

Our company’s role was to provide a portable source of solar and wind power as
an option to fossil fuel generators and validating their place as a primary source
of power.

Our company took the following assets:
  1. Solar Generator with 100 amp hour and 160 amp hour battery packs.
  2. Solar/Wind Generator with 100 amp hour battery pack and 100 amp hour
      reserve battery pack for a total of 200 amp hours.
  3. Man-Portable solar generator with 36 and 50 amp hour battery packs with
      foldable solar panels.
   4. Solar powered wireless access point (SWAP) with POE, 12VDC, and 36
      amp hour battery pack. Giving us the ability to set up a wireless network
      in the field.
   5. Portable solar powered on site video surveillance with cameras.
   6. Solar Powered LED lights
   7. Foldable solar panels

Training Objectives:
   1. Introduce solar and solar/wind powered generators as a viable alternative
      to fossil fuel generators.
   2. Validate the capabilities of our systems by interacting with as many other
      agencies as possible and operate their equipment while powering it with
      our solar and solar/wind generators.


Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned

We validated the use of our solar generators with various different types of
equipment.


Respectfully Submitted,

Alex Echeverria
                               Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                             ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.5    Desert Hawk III AAR




December 2008                                                          D-51
Desert Hawk III Executive Summary

Lockheed Martin provided airborne surveillance at Yuma Aux II site with its Desert
Hawk III UAS. Desert Hawk III flew 11 sorties between 20-22 July. Our goal was to
provide actionable live Electo-optical, Low Light imager, and Infrared imagery feeds to
the San Diego State University Visualization Lab for further distribution to Operation
Golden Phoenix participants. Flights were flown day and night, and two sorties were
added real time, including one at the request of CBP to support a test of their ability to
view live UAS imagery from their remote command and control van while on the move.
CBP and USMC provided targets of opportunity (vehicles and personnel) at remote
desert locations and tasked DHIII to locate, identify and track those targets. Lockheed
Martin personnel on site coordinated all flight operations with the MACCS-1 (Marine Air
Command & Control System) MMT (Marine Air Traffic Control Mobile Team) to ensure
our operations were safely deconflicted with helicopter flights and other UAS activities.
    • Imagery from all 11 sorties was successfully received at the Desert Hawk III
        Ground Control Station on site AUX II and provided live to the San Diego State
        University Vis Lab via satellite by other OGP participants tasked with
        communications connectivity at AUX II.
    • Desert Hawk III was successfully tasked in flight to locate and track ground
        targets as well as targets of opportunity, imagery of which was fed to the SDSU
        Vis Lab.
    • Desert Hawk III responded real time to MACCS-1 direction to ensure aircraft
        deconfliction.

OGP Best Practices and Lessons Learned
  • Lockheed Martin gained several points of contact within Federal, State and local
     law enforcement and first responder agencies to reference as we further develop
     all of our corporation’s tools and technologies that would be useful to public
     safety, not just the UAS. LM intends to grow are participation in OGP 09 to
     include communications capabilities.
  • The remote location of AUX II and R-2301W provided a valuable opportunity to
     integrate UAS operations into civil first responder training and CONOPS
     development without significant concern of impacting civil flight operations.
  • Integration of MACCS-1 MMT for operational deconfliction and safety of flight
     was a valuable presence at AUX II.
  • Although video feeds were being received at our AUX II Ground Control Station
     at normal rates, Lockheed Martin personnel on site at the SDSU Vis Lab reported
     that video feeds from all participating UASs appeared to be updating at only one
     frame every one or two seconds, thus imagery appeared more like a series of still
     shots vice flowing video. We suspect this was a bandwidth issue as data was
     being sent to SDSU.
  • Use of live ground targets to track was valuable. CBP and USMC personnel and
     vehicles on the move provided valuable training for real world operations.
     Further, the CBP off road dune buggy, which operated in the open desert, was a
     challenging target to find, but once located, provided valuable operator training
     because you couldn’t rely on roads as landmarks to track the target.
Executive Summary/Recommendations

  •   OGP is a valuable training and CONOPS development exercise and should be
      conducted again in 2009. Another military coordinator should be identified
      early as MAG-46 disestablishes.
  •   Ensure a Restricted Airspace range (such as R-2301W) is again made
      available for future OGP exercises as FAA Certificates of Authority (COA) to
      operate in the National Airspace will preclude non-military UAS assets from
      participating.
  •   Investigate options available regarding bandwidth management that would
      allow UAS video feeds to be received at SDSU at update rates supporting
      video motion.
                                            Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                          ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.6    Fortified Data Communications, Inc. AAR Submission




December 2008                                                                       D-53
After Action Report Submission
Fortified Data Communications, Inc.
Jake Dwinell
jdwinell@fortifieddatacom.com
703-966-7673
August 7, 2008


Fortified Data Communications participated as part of the NIUSR team at Brown Field
simulating the coordination of NGOs, Civilians and Private Organizations into the response
efforts managed by the State, Local and Federal officials. Fortified Data Communications and its
team of communications, information sharing, and hardware partners consisting of MSPX
(Xentrak Resource Management), Defense Group Inc (COBRA –CBRNE decision toolset),
Immarsat (Satellite infrastructure), Stratos (Satellite technology integrator including airtime) and
Digital Globe (Satellite Imagery Web Services) demonstrated the use of man-portable
communications and situational awareness hardware and software products incorporated into a
pair of man-portable ruggedized cases. Fortified and its team worked with other Brown Field
participants to integrate these solutions with those of the other participants to create a more
robust system of systems to support a disaster or relief effort. The capabilities demonstrated
included the NOMAD Incident Command Platform, Inmarsat & Stratos BGAN satellite services,
NOMAD wireless mesh networking, Land Mobile Radio Interoperability, Deployable GSM
Cellular service, deployable surveillance cameras, GPS based personnel tracking, Xentrak
Resource Management Software, Cobra All Hazards Management Software and the Fortified
VanategPoint mapping application with access to the Digital Globe Web Mapping Service.

Fortified Data Communications participated in Golden Phoenix and also invited key partners so
that the team’s continued solution development could better reflect requirements in the field. The
team is better equipped as a result of Golden Phoenix to produce solutions that easily deploy in a
disaster environment with the required flexibility to adjust to issues and events and to adjust to
the ongoing nature of a disaster in terms of communications interoperability, collaborative
resource management and on the fly incident command flexible enough to operate quickly at
Brown Field.
.

Fortified’s role was too provide the NOMAD C4 XSB system and associated capabilities for
mobile communications and situational awareness in remote areas where communication
infrastructure has been compromised or destroyed.


Fortified Data Communications and its Team members brought the following equipment and
software to Brown Field:

   •   NOMAD Incident Command Platforms – C4XSB
   •   Mobile Mesh Networking
   •   Radio Interoperability device
   •   Deployable GSM Cellular Service
   •   Xentrak Software for Resource Management
   •   Cobra Software for All Hazards management
   •   BGAN Satellite Terminals and Service from Stratos Government Systems Inc. and
       Inmarsat.
   •   VantagePoint software and Imagery Services from Digital Globe

Fortified and its team planned to accomplish the following at Brown Field:

   1. Capture all Brown Field Participants, Skill Sets and Assets using the Xentrak Software.
      Deliver a report to the NIUSR leadership at Brown Field for submission to the Marine
      Corps and CBP.

   2. Deploy mobile Video Surveillance assets to capture the activities at Brown Field and
      make available to participants at the San Diego VizLab and other locations.

   3. Demonstrate the capabilities of Radio Interoperability by bridging UHF and VHF radio
      groups.

   4. Demonstrate the capabilities of a Deployable man-portable GSM cellular network.
      Simulate providing GSM cellular service as a means of allowing people at the scene of
      the incident to communicate using standard GSM phones for communication with
      organizing officials.

   5. Demonstrate the Bridging of the Mesh City mesh network with the Fortified Mesh
      network.

   6. Include the BGAN satellite antennas in the effort to aggregate the bandwidth from all
      available satellite connections.

   7. Demonstrate the use of mobile hand held mapping and location tracking capabilities on a
      windows mobile phone.

   8. Demonstrate the remote access capabilities to the Digital Globe Commercial Satellite
      Imagery Web Mapping Services to simulate the ability to rapidly request and access
      relevant imagery and remote sensing data to the scene of an incident over a cellular and
      satellite network.

   9. Integrate as much as possible with the TIES Common Operational Picture environment
      and any other participants at Brown Field that may present them selves.

Fortified Accomplished the following at Brown Field:

   1. Xentrak Software was used to capture Brown Field Participants, Skill Sets and Assets.
      This was done by issuing a paper form to one representative of each company and
      organization participating at Brown Field. These were then collected by visiting each
      location and then entering the responses into Xentrak. Once entered, the report formats
   were shared with NIUSR leadership who requested minor formatting changes to ensure
   the report could be of value to the incident commanders.

2. Fortified deploy two mobile Video Surveillance assets that captured the activities at
   Brown Field and made those video streams available to participants at the San Diego
   VizLab and other locations. This was accomplished in two ways. The first was by
   configuring the router on the NOMAD and the settings on the hand-held mobile camera
   to allow its broadcast directly from the camera through the router to a URL on the
   internet. The second method of broadcasting the video streams was though the on-the-fly
   integration with ETC Corp’s GPAC Server at Brown Field. http://www.etcorp.com. This
   integration allowed for the re-broadcasting of the video streams through the GPAC
   server. The benefit of this configuration was to increase the number of simultaneous
   users that could access the video streams.

3. During Golden Phoenix, these cameras were viewed by people in Washington, DC, New
   Canaan, CT, Western Australia and the San Diego Visualization Lab.

4. Fortified Demonstrated the Radio Interoperability solution by bridging UHF and VHF
   radio groups. Both a VHF and UHF radio were used to communicate as one individual
   walked around Brown Field with the hand held video camera and the other monitored the
   video stream from the NOMAD.

5. Fortified demonstrated the Deployable Man-Portable GSM cellular network. Only one
   GSM phone was connected because the GSM phones available were operating on their
   home networks and were not able to switch over to the roaming mode to associate to the
   deployable GSM network. This is what was expected given the configuration of the
   domestic GSM phone services.

6. An attempt was made on the final day at Brown field to include the BGAN satellite
   antennas into the effort to aggregate the bandwidth from all available satellite
   connections. This effort was given limited time and due to the time of day, the effort was
   not completed. With more time, it was belived that this would have been successful.

7. Fortified demonstrated the use of mobile hand held mapping and location tracking
   capabilities on a windows mobile phone. The pictures below represent two examples of
   the tracking of Sean Stevenson of Fortified Data Communications.
8. Demonstrate the remote access capabilities to the Digital Globe Commercial Satellite
   Imagery Web Mapping Services to simulate the ability to rapidly request and access
   relevant imagery and remote sensing data to the scene of an incident over a cellular and
   satellite network.
   9. Fortified was able to integrate with the TIES Common Operational Picture environment
      by sending a Common Alerting Protocol message from the VantagePoint Mobile
      Application to the TIES system.

   10. Fortified Data Communications and its Partner Stratos Government Services Inc.
       demonstrated the use of the Mobile BGAN terminal mounted on the top of a rental
       vehicle and a NOMAD in the vehicle to demonstrate the ability to deploy a scout team
       away from Brown Field while maintaining communications. This was done in
       conjunction with a representative of the American Red Cross.

   11. While maintaining a connection to the BGAN satellite, dual communications were
       established via SIP Service phone connected wirelessly to the NOMAD network and the
       use of a POTS phone connected directly to the BGAN antenna.


Fortified Data Communications and its team departed from Brown Field with the following best
practices, lessons learned, and recommendations:

   1. Knowing what people, skill sets and assets are on the scene and available for the incident
      commander is a key first step to organizing the chaos that will unfold during a real
      disaster at a location such as Brown Field. Without a process like this in place, there is no
      way to efficiently organize the people and make the most of their skill sets and assets.
      Xentrak was used to capture names, skill sets and assets and then deliver a report to the
      NIUSR leadership for review and then presentation to the Government Officials on the
      scene. The lesson learned was that a “check-in” process needs to be instituted for people
      arriving to a location like Brown Field. This process will generate what was termed a
      “Resource Availability Triage Report” that can then be issued to the Incident
      Commander. A tool like Xentrak could then be used to manage the people and assets by
      assigning them to certain tasks and accounting for their location, use and any financial
      reimbursements. To accommodate the accurate capture of information, a hand held data
      entry tool such as a hand held computer should be used to allow a person capturing the
      data to walk around from location to location capturing and entering the data.

   2. There were limited efforts to coordinate the participants into a cohesive team that had a
      set of specific technology integration objectives to accomplish over a period of time. The
      result of this was a field full of companies each with technical capabilities that primarily
      stayed in silos rather than forming a coordinated set of capabilities that leveraged one
      another to form something much greater than the individual components. In essence, a
      system of systems was not really formed at Brown Field to the degree all may have
      hoped.

       Fortified would like to suggest that NIUSR compile a prioritized action list of standard
       milestones that should be addressed right from the start of a response effort. The list
below is just an example. However, NIUSR may want to consider the creation of a
formal list that it can issue as recommended guidance.

   a. Conduct the Human and Physical Resource Availability Triage Report data
      capture. This should be done rapidly and first before other efforts are initiated.

   b. Establish a wireless local area network. This should not be the job of one
      company, but rather, all players that have wireless networking technologies
      should become part of group that meets to inventory what equipment each has and
      to map out on a white board how the integration is going to take place, where the
      central point will be, where the access points will go and what channel plan will
      be used to ensure wireless access points do not interfere with one another.

   c. Establish Wide Area Network communications. The effort to aggregate the wide
      area network assets should be done as soon as possible at the beginning of the
      event. This was done with the VSAT assets. Unfortunately there was limited time
      at the end of the 3rd day to bring the BGAN assets into the configuration.

   d. Identify the video and audio solutions at the location and determine how they will
      connect to the wireless network and where it makes the most sense to deploy
      those cameras. At Brown Field, there was no effort to coordinate the placement
      and use of the video assets. If it is possible to employ a software application like
      the GPAC server to aggregate the video and re-project it over the Wide Area
      Network to outside sources.
                                             Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                           ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0


D.4.7    Latitude Engineering, Golden Phoenix After Action Report




December 2008                                                                        D-55
                                                                      Latitude Engineering
                                                            www.latitudeengineering.com
                                                                 Jason Douglas, President
                                                    jason.douglas.latitudeengineering.com
                                                                            (520) 792-2006


AFTER ACTION REPORT: GOLDEN PHOENIX
JULY 20-22, 2008 Yuma, AZ



Executive Summary

Latitude Engineering demonstrated the use of a small
aerostat with their ParasightTM payload as a simple
and portable surveillance system for use in integrated emergency
management operations. The 2-person team displayed the ease of
use of the camera payload with two different balloon
configurations during the days of 21 and 22 July, 2008. The small
ground station was positioned inside one of the GP2008 project
tents. Camera pointing was controlled by simply clicking the
location on an area map. Video was successfully streamed to L3’s
VideoScout, Global Mesh Technologies network, and the SDSU
VISLAB communications network.

   1. Excellent surveillance tool - produced stabilized imagery to
      remote ground station. Target tracking operational.
   2. Successful demonstration of video streaming to the L3
      Video Scout, Global Mesh Technologies network, and
      VISLAB’s network. System is easily integrated.
   3. Persistence surveillance provided for up to 10 hours before
      swapping rechargeable battery.
   4. Both aerostat platforms tested provided adequate stability
      and acceptable performance for surveillance capabilities.



Introduction

Latitude Engineering demonstrated the capabilities of the ParasightTM utilizing an
aerostat platform as a persistent surveillance tool. The primary point of contact for
Latitude Engineering is Mr. Jason Douglas, President (520)792-2006.

By demonstrating the capabilities of the ParasightTM as a persistent surveillance tool, we
were also able to show that minimal training/skill is needed to operate this gimbaled and
image-stabilized aerial system. The system was able to produce stabilized video, simple
gimbal control (aimed by mouse-click on an area map and directly on the video), and
object tracking. We were also able to evaluate two different balloon configurations. The
second objective was to demonstrate that the video produced by the system could be
streamed directly into other networks that were present at GP2008.

Assets for the event included the ParasightTM payload and ground station, laptop
computer, two different aerostats, hitch-mounted winch (connected to pickup truck),
locally rented tanks of helium, and miscellaneous parts (such as extra ropes and computer
cables).

                                 Assets used in GP2008




The aerostat loiters at       The Parasight by Latitude is    The small black box is the
altitudes up to 500 ft        a fully self-contained          ground station. A laptop is
without requiring FAA         gimbaled camera payload         the only additional
notification.                 system.                         equipment needed.




Latitude’s training/testing objectives included hardware and software evaluations in an
operational environment and to evaluate capabilities to integrate to outside networks.
                              Latitude’s training objectives
1      Evaluate remote video link and video quality                           successful
2      Evaluate gimbal aim controls, zoom, and stabilization                  successful
3      Evaluate target tracking                                               successful
4      Evaluate video persistence and battery life                            successful
5      Evaluate performance of different aerostats                            successful
6      Connect to outside networks including L3 VideoScout, SDSU
                                                                              successful
       VISLAB, and Global Mesh Technologies
7      Evaluate system as part of a integrated emergency management
                                                                              successful
       operation
 Imagery from the aerostat using the zoom function. The image on the left is a wide-
 angle view with the intersection circled in red. The right image shows the intersection
 using the zoom function.



Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned

   •   The aerostat with Parasight payload was able to provide persistent aerial
       surveillance for up to 10 hours before battery needed to be exchanged. Battery
       change out was a 5 minute procedure. With minor maintenance the aerostat
       system could provide 24/7 surveillance for indefinite periods.
   •   Evaluation of the two different balloons indicates that though their aerodynamic
       behavior differed, they both were stable enough for the software stabilization to
       be effective in low to moderate winds (0-10kts).
   •   The system easily streams video to other networks.


Corrective action: Unfortunately we did not coordinate correctly resulting in the off-site
reviews of the video steam not having the software to enable them to view the stabilized
video. Off-site viewers only saw the raw video; the map-view was not visible to them
either which indicated the aim of the gimbal. Pre-coordination between the remote video
viewers and aerostat video providers would allow metadata to be viewed and utilized at
the remote video receiving locations.

Recommendations

No recommendations


Nuggets for the Abstract/Executive Summary


   1. Excellent surveillance tool - produced stabilized imagery to remote ground
      station. Target tracking operational.
2. Successful demonstration of video streaming to the L3 Video Scout, Global Mesh
   Technologies network, VISLAB’s network. System is easily integrated.
3. Persistence surveillance provided for up to 10 hours without changing battery.
4. Both aerostat platforms tested provided adequate stability and acceptable
   performance for surveillance capabilities.
                                           Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                         ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.8    Microsoft and Partners JEPRS Demonstration Golden Phoenix 2008
         AAR




December 2008                                                                      D-57
Executive Summary:

In July of 2008, Microsoft (www.microsoft.com) and partners Twisted Pair (www. twistpair.com)
and Infusion Development (www.infusion.com) participated in Golden Phoenix 2008 (GP08) to
demonstrate the critical role that unified communications platform and a Joint Emergency
Planning & Response System (JEPRS) can play in supporting emergency response scenarios
using affordable, reliable commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies.

Unified communications provides the ability to link disparate communications platforms used by
federal, state, and local agencies during a disaster response. The Microsoft-led team was able
to show how different types of communications devices and networks – such as land mobile
radio, telephone, satellite, and IP-based communications systems – can be better linked to
improve collaboration and enhance situational awareness.

The JEPRS technology showcase the role that can be played by real-time communication of
data using geographic information systems (GIS) and digital mapping technologies to enhance
collaboration in highly intensity situations. It illustrated how over-the-map collaboration for
incident reporting, logging, and information sharing resources can be optimized.

The technologies that were deployed by the Microsoft team during the GP08 exercise can help
ensure that disaster response leaders and their personnel can communicate directly with each
using existing communications gear, regardless of location. The result is better planning, better
use of resources, and better care of first responders during dangerous response operations.

GP08 Accomplishments:

The Microsoft team demonstrated seamless integration of land mobile radio, mobile cellular
telephone, landline telephone, satellite, and IP-based communications.

Microsoft and its partners showed that disaster response leaders – whether at headquarter
facilities, in the field, or in transit – can use unified communications platforms to communicate
directly with front-line response personnel equipped with existing communications gear.

   •   Microsoft and Twisted Pair demonstrated the role of technology in fielding a unified
       platform links diverse communications platforms used in disaster response, such as land
       mobile radio, telephone, satellite, and IP-based communications to ensure that disaster
       response leaders and their personnel can communicate directly using existing
       communications gear, regardless of location.

   •   Microsoft and Infusion Development showcased the how digital mapping technologies
       can be integrated with existing investments in data and content management systems to
       dramatically improve the ability to capture accurate, situational awareness in real time.
       This significantly improves the ability of emergency response leaders to make better
       tactical decisions and protect and coordinate the lives of first responders from multiple
       jurisdictions.

   •   Microsoft, Twisted Pair and Infusion Development unified confirmed at GP08 that COTS
       technologies can be rapidly deployed in large-scale incident response scenario.

   •   Microsoft, Twisted Pair and Infusion Development, that collaboration among multi-
       jurisdictional (federal, state and local) agencies with expertise in multiple disciplines
       (military, law enforcement, fire fighting, emergency response) can be quickly established
       by using familiar technologies that are commonly used for day-to-day operations.

The joint Microsoft/Twisted Pair/Infusion Dev team welcomes the opportunity to test the solution
in a more demanding environment and integrate it into actual exercise operations in future
iterations of GP08.

                                    The Microsoft team’s primary agency GP08 point of contact:

                                                                        Major John Persano
                                                  Marine Aircraft Group-46 (USMC-Reserve)
                                         MCAS Miramar, PO Box 452024 San Diego, CA 92145
                                                                     Phone: (504) 258-5723
                                                            Email: john.persano1@usmc.mil

Introduction

Microsoft and partners Twisted Pair and Infusion Development participated in Golden Phoenix
2008 (GP08) to demonstrate how federal, state, and local disaster response agencies can
become more agile and effective by establishing collaborative frameworks around unified
communications. The Microsoft team’s goal was to show how COTS applications and
technologies can support to disaster response operations without extensive customized
development processes or logistics resources.

The GP08 exercise is designed to test how federal, state, and local government agencies to
understand their own capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses during intense disaster response
conditions. However, it is also important to for the public sector to partner with the private
sector organizations to enhance response capabilities, improve agility and deliver critical
services during a major incident.

The Microsoft team demonstrated how COTS technologies can shorten deployment times and
rapidly customize computing and communications capabilities to respond to bio-terrorism and
many other disaster response requirements.

   •   The team demonstrated that readily available technology can seamlessly integrate
       disparate communications platforms used throughout the exercise, such as voice radio,
       mobile cellular telephone, landline telephone, satellite, and IP-based data, video, and
       voice communications.

   •   The team also showed how data feeds from different devices and networks can be
       consolidated, analyzed, displayed and shared to improve situational awareness and
       accelerate effective planning and execution.

Local fire, paramedic, and utility personnel in the field using Land Mobile Radios can, in fact,
communicate with military and federal units using IP- and cellular-based radios in the field to
facilitate close cooperation. The Microsoft team also demonstrated how available technologies
and service offerings can enhance current practices and capabilities in the specific areas of:

   •   Real-time Communication, Situational Awareness and Land Mobile Radio (LMR)
       integration with IP data.
   •   Common operating picture, situational awareness, real-time collaboration and
       communications.
   •   Mission readiness, data integration and visualization in 3D.

Key Assets Featured at GP08:

The Microsoft Team’s deployed an Office Communications 2007 Server (OCS) to GP08, which
provided presence (the ability to know where first responders are and what devices they are
using), secure instant messaging, remote application sharing.

   •   Integration of Twisted Pair’s WAVE technology solution provided a vital link between
       Land Mobile Radio (LMR) communications networks and other communications and
       data networks. WAVE allows communications with LMR users from computers,
       between users of disparate or incompatible LMR networks, as well as LMR recording
       and playback. By adding a RoundTable video conferencing device, the OCS was also
       able to support ad hoc video conferencing/video conference capabilities.

   •   Microsoft also deployed Infusion Development’s low-cost Joint Emergency Planning and
       Response System (JEPRS), a crisis and consequence management collaboration portal.
       JEPRS is a software solution that integrates communications and geographic data to
       facilitate the planning, response and recovery of emergency events. JEPRS can be
       used by a variety of emergency response personnel and agencies. It requires minimal
       training and enables online, real-time collaboration using a browser-based solution.
       Another visualization tool deployed by the Microsoft team was the Falcon Eye business
       intelligence system, which displays and analyzes data using 3D data and camera video
       feeds.

Microsoft, Twisted Pair, and Infusion Development personnel were able to transport all of the
equipment required for its GP08 demonstration as personal luggage via commercial airline
travel.

Exercise Objectives

The overall objective of Microsoft, Twisted Pair, and Infusion Development was to test the
compatibility and flexibility of both OCS/WAVE based unified communications solution and the
JEPRS technology under stressful conditions and in a complex multi-vendor technology
environment. This was done by:

   •   Deploying OCS to the field while integrated with WAVE LMR technology.

   •   Testing interoperability of disparate and otherwise incompatible LMR systems as well as
       WAVE’s compatibility with Radio-Over-IP solutions from multiple manufacturers.

   •   Establishing interoperability among various communications computer systems from
       multiple vendors that were brought to the exercise by GP08 participants.

   •   Deploying JEPRS to provide a common visual representation based on input from
       multiple sources of mission critical data.

Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned

The Microsoft team reports that one of the most prominent lessons learned from its participation
in GP08 was that network services designed to maximize communications interoperability work
best when they are hosted “in the cloud.” In other words, network services that support disaster
response should be redundant and not exclusively dependent on local resources that are often
stovepiped and hinder, rather than help, collaboration. There were times during the exercise
when the Microsoft team did in fact experience occasional degradations in access to Internet
service. However, by applying the “cloud-based” hosting strategy the Microsoft team
demonstrated that it was possible to optimize the management of these degradations. As a
result, the team was able to maintain uninterrupted – though at times lower-speed access –
data, voice and low-resolution video services throughout the exercise.

This was achieved by using available resources, such as LMR, satellite, Internet, and mobile
networks, to complement and backfill one another. The “cloud-based” approach to hosting
service delivery allowed the network infrastructures to coexist and complement each other
throughout the exercise.

As an addendum to this point, the team found that secondary communications accounts—rather
than primary accounts—provided more reliable service for connectivity with other disparate
elements. By combining secondary accounts with “cloud-based” access to resources,
interoperability was achieved without violating the security policies of the various agencies
involved in the exercise.

Recommendations (Optional)

The demonstration of unified communications and collaborative platforms from Microsoft,
Twisted Pair and Infusion Development was a success. The team would welcome the
opportunity to test the solution in more demanding environments.

Microsoft team recommends that future iterations of Golden Phoenix – and similar exercises –
include specific scenarios that integrate industry solutions – such as the JEPRS and WAVE
systems – into actual military and other disaster response scenarios.

Nuggets for the Abstract/Executive Summary

Commercial-off-the-shelf solutions from Microsoft, Twisted Pair and Infusion Development
demonstrated that available collaboration and unified communications technologies can play a
crucial role in managing disaster response situations.

   •   Unified communications solutions can integrate multiple devices and networks -- such as
       land mobile radio, telephone, satellite, and IP-based communications – that are often
       quickly established in an emergency response. This integration provides the basis for
       ensuring that disaster response leaders and their personnel can communicate directly
       using existing communications gear, regardless of location.

   •   Crisis and consequence management collaboration portals based on COTS
       technologies offer flexible, rapidly deployable and scalable situational awareness for
       emergency response operations. The result is an easy to use and intuitive operational
       dashboard that centralizes information for access and sharing with all stakeholders to
       better prepare, sense, warn, respond and recover from all forms of crisis.
                             Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                           ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.9    Ready2Protect AAR




December 2008                                                        D-59
The exercise scenario was constructed by Ready2Protect as follows in conjunction with
Defentech:

Two terrorists attempted entry into the Main Gate of Brown Field.
 Rad sensors, deployed by Defentech, were set off from the vehicle. Upon sensor activity, the
R2P deployable shield was deployed as a defensive shield by Marines/Border Agent for personal
protection against ballistic/explosive protection.
 Identification was requested of driver. A portable ultra Violet (UV) detection device was used to
scan the passport presented as ID. It indicated a questionable document. Driver and passenger
were detained and placed in custody and escorted to the command center.
Forensic quality UV devices were then used to quickly check the personal contents of the
terrorists. It was determined that they also had counterfeit currency in their possession;
It confirmed the value of UV devices, as a quick detection method in field conditions for
validating currency, identification cards, and detection of questionable documents.

Operation Phoenix was an excellent exercise demonstrating cooperation between governmental
agencies and private civilian businesses developing new innovative technologies for Homeland
Security.
Two strengths were evident.
1) Willingness to work together by private companies and share ideas
2) Willingness to discuss non classified needs in a changing environment

Areas of improvement:

The exercise was designed to take a possible Bio-terrorism event with unknown consequences,
take multiple agencies and form a cohesive group with multiple solutions.

Two weaknesses were perceived by me.
1) There were Point of Contacts (POC) appointed for each site. One for the control center and one
for Brown Field. However, as situations unfolded, we were asked to participate in the exercise
and present possible solutions, yet as civilian companies, we did not have another point of contact
that could interject our possible solutions into the proposed program exercise.

 Solution: a POC intermediary/overseer to cross talk between multiple sites with the authority to
make last minute changes/solutions or make entry into the established software management
program, be the official contact to communicate between agencies, and make changes which they
may determine is important to the exercise.

2) Build a database of participant civilians, which we could access through Civ/Mil to work
together with our Congressional contacts for funding of these exercises.
 Many of the people/companies that we interacted with have differing degrees of input to key
congressional people. They would be more than willing to use these professional/personal
contacts to further the goals of these missions and exercises

Respectfully Submitted

Richard H. “Rick” Norris
Chairman
Ready2Protect
                                            Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                          ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.10   RP Flight Systems, Inc. AAR – Golden Phoenix 2008




December 2008                                                                       D-61
RPFlightSystems, Inc.
After Action Report – Golden Phoenix 2008

Executive Summary
RPFlightSystems, Inc goal was two fold for GP08. 1) To utilize small unmanned aircraft
system (SUAS) in data collection concurrently with full scale aircraft. 2) Collect high
resolution digital imagery (as versus low resolution video) and transmit to the Emergency
Operation Centers (EOC) from a remote location.

Both objectives were successfully achieved to a degree greater than expected.

For SUAS to coexist with full scale aircraft, an accomplished command and control
situation should be established. Communication with all air assets should be established
along with common nomenclature being utilized. In flight operations should be well
planned with safety contingencies for all assets.

To effectively utilize digital imagery (large bit sized images) the highest bandwidth
satellite links should be utilized.

Introduction
RPFlightSystems, Inc. has been working with the San Diego State University (SDSU)
Visualization Lab for over a year to develop best practices and uses for SUAS in
civil/crisis situations. An identified limitation has been the fact that full scale aircraft
pilots are oftentimes unfamiliar with the existing safety practices of SUAS applications.
The need to accumulate, test and confirm that SUAS application data for the three “D’s”
of dull, dirty, and dangerous work can coexist with full scale aircraft and is paramount to
the acceptance of UA in the national airspace (NAS). It is important to collect data that
either supports or refutes their safety in these situations. GP08 allowed us to confirm the
clear ability to coexist under fairly controlled but realistic scenarios.

Original Scope of Work

RPFlight Systems, Inc. had originally intended to provide the high resolution digital
imagery utilizing SUAS. The necessary bandwidth to transmit the data to multiple
EOC’s from remote locations was to be provided by other agencies. With the introduction
of full scale aircraft, the scope was expanded to include the testing of coexistence within
the same airspace.
Assets Provided

RPFS provided four Spectra class SUAS for use in the operation. To support these
operations, RPFS also drove a mobile command unit (MCU) bus from Texas that
included 3 computer work stations, full meteorology station, and large screen TV for
image analysis. The unit was fully self contained and provided its’ own power with a 7kw
generator and on board water system.

Training Objectives

The final overriding objective of mingling full scale and SUAS operations was essentially
a “last minute” objective but planning of this type is typical under a crisis situation.

Fully autonomous and remotely controlled missions were flown using an RPFS Spectra
SUAS carrying both digital imaging capabilities and standard electro-optical video feeds.
Concurrent missions were planned and flown with the arrival of Marine Huey and Cobra
helicopters assigned to missions planned for GP08. All flights were conducted under the
supervision of the Marine Mobile Air Traffic Control Team (MMT) of Gunnery Sergeant
Garland. Missions were planned and coordinated before launch with both vertical and
area separation being planned for by MMT. Missions were launched without incident.
At one point, the Huey encroached upon the grid flown by an RPFS Spectra SUAS.
Gunny Garland advised the Huey that secondary vertical separation was required and
with direction by Gunny Garland the pilot identified the SUAS and confirmed that
separation had been maintained. In another case, Gunny Garland ordered the SUAS to
abort to observe its ability to clear airspace immediately. Both the full scale and the
SUAS missions were successfully completed without incident.

High Resolution Digital Imaging

The actual accumulation of high resolution digital imaging has been performed for some
years by RPFS in search and rescue/recovery operations. These images have been
utilized in a near real time situation by recovering from the SUAS after the mission is
complete and transfer to a local computer. To date, electronic transfer of images has
been time consuming and slow. The utilization of high speed satellite uplinks has now
made the use of high megapixel images a reality.

Best Practices

It was unequivocally proven that effective communication and coordination were keys to
the use of SUAS and full scale aircraft in this operation. The use of the MMT as forward
air traffic control produced a manageable and effective solution of using air assets to the
full extent of their capability.
Recommendation

Under current NIMS protocols, the air assets fall under the control of an “air boss” whose
primary mission has been the direction of full scale aircraft. National air control
practices and procedures should include SUAS (tactical/close in) for deployment with
manned assets. A training program similar that utilized by the MMT for the management
of both those assets should implemented into the NIMS architecture.


Submitted by:

Gene Robinson
President
RPFlightSystems, Inc.
www.rpflightsystems.com
                                              Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                            ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.11   sStitch.com AAR for Golden Phoenix




December 2008                                                                         D-63
sStitch.com After Action Report
Todd Huffman -- HuffmanTM@gmail.com

Executive Summary

At Golden Phoenix we field tested our ‘sStitch’ software currently under development,
which enables field reporting through geospatial and linguistic tagging of information
collected on mobile devices. Our plan was to observe complex events and organize
them with our system to gain design feedback to improve the software. We successfully
deployed the software, in particular the real-time organizing, uploading and distributing
photos of the brush fire that broke out near Brown field.

Best Practices
-Prioritize data outputs from widely adopted to specialized (i.e. RSS, geoRSS, XMPP)
-Utilize COTS technology wherever possible, if only because of user interface familiarity

Lessons Learned
-Minimize network reliance by local pre-caching data
-Design for low-bandwidth networks
-Create multiple flexible data inputs and outputs

Recommendations
-Have software people bring example data to training meetings
-Have a redundant network connection plan
-Prioritize network access (low, med, and high bandwidth needs)

Introduction

As designers for mobile data organization systems we need to see the needs of field
users, which we, as computer geeks, are rarely exposed to. Our rationale for
participating in GP ’08 was to put our designers closer to the kinds of people who will
potentially use our tools - first responders, humanitarian aid workers, et cetera. Our
primary point of contact was through STAR-TIDES.

Our role during GP08 was to run a shadow operation taking pictures of the event and
organizing them in real time, and using the data to build a common operating picture.

Our team comprised five individuals involved in the design and implementation of our
software, as well as a host of technology including GPS enabled cell phones, servers,
and displays.

Our training objectives were as follows:
-To determine to what extent our technology improves over current methods.
-To identify areas of further optimization.
-To evaluate how well the technology performs in sun, dust, and sweat.
Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned
As a data-moving organization the network reliability was an excellent reality check in
terms of how our technology will work in the field. In the past we’d conceptualized
environments with no network connections and had designed for it, but we’d not
particularly thought of what to do in sporadic network connection settings. The two
situations are somewhat different and require different approaches, i.e. aggressive data-
caching can make a sporadic connection more fluid where it might not in a persistent
lack of connectivity.

One of our design philosophies was to prefer COTS technology and low-bandwidth
communication where necessary, which was reinforced by our experiences in Golden
Phoenix. We started out using a custom GIS system which was rather bandwidth
intensive, and due to internet problems we moved over to Google Maps, which we could
run over a cell phone connection. The lower bandwidth needs of the Google Maps
mashup allowed us to complete our system rather than focusing on what we didn’t have
(fast internet connection).

Moreover by moving into a Google Maps display of our data we were able to easily
import it into the CivMil.org site with the help of Coby Leuschke, since the underlying
Drupal framework ties into Google Maps. We were also able stream data into the Swan
Island Networks TIES framework and the I2 Group’s analytical software. Further
integration into other Common Operating Picture systems will be a major focus of ours
in the future, as it dramatically increases the utility of our system. We’ll be creating a
host of data output formats, such as geoRSS, XMPP, EDXL, and CAP, so other COP
systems can take advantage of our data.

Nugget for AAR Executive Summary

Best Practice
-Be prepared for network connectivity issues, especially in emergency situations

Lesson Learned
-Anticipate needing flexibility in data inputs and outputs

Recommendations
-Have participants bring sample data sets to training meetings
                                          Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                        ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.12   Swan Island Networks AAR Input




December 2008                                                                     D-65
                "Pete O'Dell"                                        <hathaway@spawar.navy.mil>,
                                                               To
                <pete.odell@swanisland.net>                          <montesa@spawar.navy.mil>
                07/24/2008 06:54 PM                            cc
                                                              bcc
                                                         Subject after action......
    History:                  This message has been replied to.



Can’t figure out the logic on the form – we didn’t utilize ICS, etc…here is what I sent George and 
John…..
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Accomplishments:
          1.       Integrated with 10‐15 participants into Common Operating Picture using CAP, 
          KML, RSS, and GeoRSS
          2.      Had over 200 separate logins to view the COP, several over 800 minutes long – in 
          addition to local area; viewers from DHS NOC, CBP NOC, ORNG JOC, DOD, DHS, NCTC 
          and NARA, UK, and multiple private sector companies
          3.      Integrated Oregon CST Team with USMC and CBP for sensitive, non‐shared SITREPS
          4.      LTG (Ret) Tom Waskow keynoted the Unclassified Briefing focusing on information 
          sharing and importance of CUI
 
Lessons Learned:
          1.      Interoperable data standards work!  CAP, RSS and other standards allowed very 
          rapid integration and sharing of information
          2.      Common Operating Picture very useful:  We received a plethora of comments 
          about the usefulness of the Common Operating Picture.
          3.      Team effort viable response mechanism:  The self‐organizing nature of Golden 
          Phoenix stimulated excellent creativity, sharing, and cooperation.
 
Recommendations for future events:
                     1.       More automatic data feeds – sensors, cameras 
                     2.      Utilize CUI Framework to insure standardized, sensitive information sharing 
                     between the responders
                     3.      Look at drone based IP Cloud backhauled to terrestrial high speed link 
                     versus satellite reliance
                     4.      Link to Open Source Intelligence Center database for situational video and 
                     other information for the government participants
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peter O'Dell
Founder/Director
Swan Island Networks
904 Slaters Lane
Alexandria, VA 22314
Phone:  202‐460‐9207
www.swanisland.net
www.sisaalliance.com
 
                                            Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                          ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.13   Team Epsilon Systems’ Rapid Deployment of an Integrated Security and
         Surveillance Solution in Support of Golden Phoenix 2008 – July 21–24,
         2008




December 2008                                                                       D-67
                       AFTER ACTION REPORT
TEAM EPSILON SYSTEMS’ RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF AN INTEGRATED SECURITY
    AND SURVEILLANCE SOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF GOLDEN PHOENIX
           TERRORISM TRAINING EXERCISES JULY 21-24, 2008

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overall objective of Operation Golden Phoenix 08 was to be a method for the US
Customs and Border Protection, USMC Marine Aircraft Group - 46, the County of San
Diego, City of San Diego and participating agencies to cooperatively practice command,
communication and logistical skills used in response to natural and man-made disasters
and other emergencies. In addition, they used this exercise opportunity as a platform to
explore the interfacing of technologies and deployment of civilian capabilities. The
National Institute for Urban Search and Rescue (NIUSR) was designated as the civil
coordinator for this nontraditional exercise designed as a developmental research
endeavor for the emergency response community.

Epsilon Systems Solutions, Inc. (Epsilon Systems), a San Diego-based veteran-owned
business, is a diversified professional and technical services company. Founded in
1998, Epsilon Systems has been providing high-quality solutions, products and services
to customers since its inception. Epsilon Systems has an international presence, with
over 650 employees in 22 locations throughout the world supporting the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and the
Department of the Interior. Epsilon Systems’ has 4 sectors and 2 business units. The
Security Technology Business Unit is a Security and Surveillance Integrator and was the
participating entity in the Golden Phoenix 2008 training exercises.

Team Epsilon Systems is comprised of Epsilon Systems and our Team of cutting edge
integrated technology partners. Together we designed a rapidly deployable, multi
layered, multi-mission capable situational management system solution, EpicenterSM
specifically to support the various training exercises at Brown Field and Scripps
Memorial Hospital La Jolla.

Our goal for the integration of this solution was to logistically support the multiple
emergency responding agencies with a truly interoperable communication and sensor
system that could be rapidly deployed regardless of terrain and availability of
infrastructure. Our solution was to provide fusion of video, sensors and data via the
wireless mesh, enable interagency communication, create situational awareness at a
local, regional and/or national level to manage resources, and allow first responders and
others to share incident specific information for response coordination.

At each site, Brown Field and Scripps Memorial Hospital, different configurations of the
total solution were used based on the training event requirements. Epsilon Systems’
efforts were designed to provide the necessary tools to first responders, military and
homeland security teams for quick positioning, rapid response, and optimal effectiveness
of resources in response and recovery efforts for emergency and/or natural disaster
events.




                                           1
   Operational Locations of Team Epsilon Systems for Golden Phoenix 2008

The rapidly deployable integrated solution developed for participation in the Golden
Phoenix Training efforts included functions and features developed using COTS
technologies from Epsilon Systems’ partners including:

   •   Radiation Detection Sensors; both fixed point and belt mounted with messaging
       capabilities
   •   Long Range Intelligent Video Analytics with day and night detection capabilities
   •   Visual and Thermal Imaging Cameras and a Heavy Duty Tripod and Equipment
   •   Command and Control for a Common Operating Picture of all sensors for
       situational awareness and response and recovery measures based on pre-
       defined SOPs
   •   Tracking of Targets from Sensor Inputs to a Geo-referenced Map
   •   Connectivity with a Wireless Mesh Network Infrastructure
   •   Rapidly Deployable Mobile Sensor Platform


Team Epsilon Systems Participation

Epsilon Systems Solutions, Inc. (Epsilon Systems) who provides DOD/DHS/DOE, State
and Local Law Enforcement Security Technology Integration Solutions selected best in
breed technology providers that would support Operation Golden Phoenix as our
integration partners. This support would provide for rapidly deployable technology that
would augment military exercise scenarios at Brown Field as well as the joint military
and local emergency response exercise at Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla.


                                          2
Objectives Team Epsilon Systems
   • Demonstrate commercially available software and hardware that is rapidly
       deployable as a fully integrated system
          o EpicenterSM - Situational Management Software for overall Situational
              Awareness
                     Orsus Situator Software
          o Security Sensor Integration
                     Intelligent Video Analytics
                              SightLogix, Inc.
                     Radiation Detection Sensors
                              Defentect
                              Polimatrix, Inc.
                     Pan/Tilt/Zoom EO/IR Integration
                              QuickSet International, a Moog Company
                     Network Video Recording (NVR)
                              Genetec
                     Wireless Mesh Infrastructure
                              Global Mesh Technologies
                     Deployable Mobile Sensor Platform
                              TW Mobile Engineering
   • Demonstrate fusion of video, sensors and data via wireless/satellite infrastructure
          o Local level (Brown Field)
          o Regional/National level (SDSU Vizlab)


Team Members Participation Objectives

Epsilon Systems Participation Overview – EpicenterSM (powered by Orsus
Situator)

EpicenterSM is Epsilon Systems’ integrated solution which includes Situator, the
Situational Management Software (SMS) provided by Orsus for participation in this
event. Situator provides the ability to integrate disparate sensors and communication
devices into a common operating display for overall situational awareness, management
of resources and response to alert inputs from sensors based on standard operating
procedures (SOP) on a geo-referenced map.

1. EpicenterSM Objectives/Assessments

Situational Management Software for Overall Situational Awareness
Orsus was selected by Epsilon Systems to provide the overall situational awareness of
the rapidly deployable sensors activated during the training exercises at Brown Field.
This entailed developing gateways for the Radiation Detection sensors, the Intelligent
Video Analytics sensors and the EO/IR camera feeds and then providing geo-referenced
tracking of targets on a map of the Brown Field area. Pre-defined SOPs for response to
radiation detection and perimeter intrusion alerts were entered into Situator so when a
sensor alerted, the operator monitoring the rapidly deployable system had access to the
SOPs for proper response to the event. Pre-defined contact information was also
entered into Situator so that as a specific alert displayed the appropriate personnel



                                           3
would be alerted with a message via various end user devices for real time response
efforts.


   •   Demonstrate fusion of video, sensors and data via wireless/satellite
       infrastructure
            o Local level (Brown Field)
       Epsilon Systems set up the EpicenterSM Solution at Brown Field. The Situator
       server and client workstation was set up at the field in the Epsilon Systems
       Mobile Command and Control trailer to act as the local level EOC situational
       awareness software. The tripod for the checkpoint activities with the radiation
       detection sensors and the EO/IR camera was rapidly deployed at the Brown
       Field checkpoint location. The SightLogix sensors, both thermal and visible were
       affixed to tripods and placed on the roof of Epsilon Systems’ Mobile Command
       and Control trailer parked at the northeastern corner of the operations area at
       Brown Field.

       Epsilon Systems established the connectivity from the radiation detection
       sensors, the EO/IR camera and the thermal and visible sensors to Situator via a
       wireless mesh connection. During the checkpoint training event and the
       perimeter intrusion events, Epsilon Systems was able to pass live video feeds
       and sensor alarms to Situator at the Epsilon Systems mobile trailer for geo-
       referenced display on the map. Based on the alert types sent, the operator was
       given a video feed of the area in question and was presented with SOPs for the
       alert type to follow for response and recovery. The objective of having a rapidly
       deployable situational awareness of all sensor related activities presented in the
       training exercises was successfully met with the EpicenterSM solution. We were
       able to display alerts on a map with video streams, we were able to track geo-
       referenced targets on the map and we were able to demonstrate the ability to
       follow SOPs as they related to the response to the alerts and multiple people
       were alerted through their personal end user devices when certain pre-defined
       alerts occurred.

          o   Regional/National level (SDSU Vizlab)

       Epsilon Systems also had a client of the Orsus’ Situator running in a command
       and control environment back at the SDSU Vizlab to simulate the ability of a
       regional and/or national level EOC having the ability to have access to situational
       awareness of activities happening in a remote location. The software was set up
       to show how we can allow for viewing, monitoring and/or even controlling
       situations remotely as agencies SOPs require. For purposes of these training
       exercises, the plan was to provide the same information available at Brown Field
       to SDSU to simulate a civilian or government EOC situational awareness at a
       remote location from the area of activity. This activity was to occur via satellite
       connectivity from Brown Field. Unfortunately, this objective was not met because
       the satellite feed to SDSU was not available. This issue affected the majority of
       industry participants at the field and was an identified problem not specific to any
       one vendor’s inability to provide the connectivity.




                                            4
2. Intelligent Video Analytics
SightLogix Participation Overview
SightLogix was selected by Epsilon Systems to provide long range perimeter detection
through use of its site sensors. The sensors would be integrated as part of the
EpicenterSM solution passing live video feeds and alarms to the command and control
software at Brown Field in the Epsilon Systems Mobile Command and Control trailer.
This feed along the overarching situational awareness components would then be
passed off to a wireless mesh network and SAT Com for live broadcast at San Diego
State University’s VizLab.




SightLogix Participation Objectives/Accomplishments

   •    Enable checkpoint team to have tripod generated information at checkpoint
        prior to vehicles arrival (Long Range)
The SightLogix sensors, both thermal and visible were affixed to tripods and placed on
the roof of Epsilon Systems’ Command and Control trailer parked at the northeastern
corner of the operations area at Brown Field. The height of these sensors was 15 feet
overlooking an established fence-line on both sides of a dirt access road. The IR sensor
was placed facing East with the visible facing west. The distance being monitored by
the IR sensor (east) was approximately 440 yards in length which was intersected by the
main paved roadway, La Media Road. A military and Border Patrol checkpoint was
located approximately 130 yards from the sensor location.        The access road (west)
being monitored was approximately 110 yards, although the access road continued for
nearly one mile where the Border Patrol’s Air-wing was located, monitoring was primarily
limited to this area.

The activities related to the checkpoint exercise being conducted took place using the IR
sensor facing east on the access road. Detections were made at the checkpoint of
persons and vehicles. In addition, vehicles entering the access road at 440 yards were
detected as well as vehicles operating on La Media Road. Due to the nature of the


                                           5
exercise the vehicles traveling north and south of La Media Road were “masked” utilizing
SightLogix analytics. Detections were made at approximately 350 yards of vehicles on
the access road providing early detection for approaching vehicles. Persons were
detected at approximately 200 yards although no personnel exceeded this distance.




             SightLogix Day/Night IVA detection of a person at 1,000 yards


On July 24th the IR and Visible sensors were placed on the 5th floor of San Diego State
University’s VizLab facing east. The SightLogix visible sensor was zoomed to a 5
degree field of view and was detecting and alarming on persons moving on and around
a building under construction at approximately 1,000 yards. The SightLogix analytics
was utilized to mask out several arterial roadways and multilane freeways carrying
heavy vehicular traffic.

The IR sensor was positioned northeasterly overlooking a railroad overpass and parking
lots. The longest detection zone was approximately 320 yards with both vehicles and
persons being detected.

In an effort to demonstrate multiple alarming capabilities a “to/from” zone was created to
detect westbound trains only. This detection was made at approximately 270 yards with
all other background movements (freeway traffic) being masked so as to avoid false
positives. Eastbound trains were not detected indicating that the “to/from” rule



                                            6
performed as applied. In addition, a “Left Object” rule was created in the parking lot
which alarmed on the two vehicles that were parked after the rule creation, indicating
that the analytics software performed accordingly.




                SightLogix Thermal Imaging IVA detection at 270 yards

Two anomalies were detected during Golden Phoenix. The first occurred at Brown Field
where a vehicle traveling on the access road was detected and alarmed at which time it
created a very heavy trailing dust cloud that elongated the bounding alarm box on the
vehicle approximately 5 feet from the rear. This was distinguishable when viewing the
live feed video and took place within 75 yards. The second anomaly took place while
detecting a person at approximately 1,000 yards during construction. The alarmed
person was tracked for approximately 15 seconds walking from the building and down
an embankment. Upon disappearing behind palm type shrubs (large leaf) it appeared
that the individual being tracked brushed or shook the large leaf transferring the box onto
the leaf. Although this was difficult to observe due to distance, the video was reviewed
and this detection was determined to meet the anomaly criteria established for this
exercise.

   •     Provide rapidly deployable remote checkpoint monitoring (Rapid
         Deployment)
In all cases where the SightLogix sensors were deployed the setting up of the equipment
took under 20 minutes. Configuration and integration with Orsus’ Situator initially took


                                            7
longer, however, once integrated; the system was deployed sub 20 minutes. Most
notably was the exercise on July 23rd at La Jolla Scripps Memorial Hospital where
SightLogix was not scheduled to deploy. Upon arrival at the scene it was determined
that a SightLogix sensor could be field deployed in a 3 story building that had a large
window in a stairwell. With 30 minutes of arriving at scene a location was identified and
all equipment was deployed and providing checkpoint coverage. Although the detection
area was approximately 50 x 120 yards, the SightLogix sensor was utilized to record
video from above the scene, providing valuable footage for future usage.

   •  Demonstrate ability to transmit alarm/sensor data via mesh to a mobile
      deployment of SMS for control and monitoring (Interoperability)
The ability to transmit alarm/sensor data via the mesh to a mobile deployment of the
SMS software was successfully displayed at Brown Field along with appropriate
response SOPs.

   •   Utilize Orsus’ Situator to generate real time situational overview (Software
       Integration)
During the exercise SightLogix sensors were able to integrate and transmit alarm and
GPS data to Situator, displaying SightLogix alarms on the SMS map.

    • Demonstrate the ability to record video for forensics (VSM Integration)
During the exercise, the NVR we selected for the exercise did not work as expected
through Orsus Situator. However, SightLogix personnel were able to use our backup,
Genetec’s Omnicast Video Management System, to record video data and that did
perform to capture video recordings.

3. Radiation Detection Sensors
Defentect and Polimatrix Participation Overview

Defentect was selected by Epsilon Systems as part of the integrated solution due to their
exceptional CBRNE software sensor application and unique messaging functionality.
Defentect’s Gammatect and Gammatect-Plus gamma radiation sensors were used as
fixed point sensors for purposes of supporting these training exercises. These sensors
have the ability to detect and identify the type of radiation source and its level.

Polimatrix, Inc. was chosen by Epsilon Systems as part of the integrated solution for
their extremely sensitive, small and power safe gamma personal portable radiological
and nuclear materials detection solutions. These portable devices also identify and
measure the source and were selected to demonstrate the ability to provide personal
detection sensors that can be used as belt mounted portable devices. In addition,
Defentect and Polimatrix are integrated so that the individual personal Polimatrix units
can receive messaging from the Defentect software as well. The primary difference of
the units we deployed is the Gammatect family of sensors are deployed to a fixed point
while the Polimatrix are belt mounted portable devices. Together they provide excellent
coverage.

The operational task for this implementation included the management of radiation
detection along with isotopic identification of the source to alert interested parties to the
presence of radiation while not causing alarm for relatively harmless low energy or
medical isotopes.


                                             8
                          Brown Field at Otay Mesa, San Diego

For purposes of this exercise, the fixed position omni directional radiation detection
sensor was deployed on a QuickSet tripod using the QuickSet GeminEye EO/IR camera
for visual identification of a sensor alert for use at the checkpoint activity at both Brown
Field and at Scripps Memorial Hospital mock bio-terrorism attack. A directional
Defentect sensor was also deployed alongside the omni directional sensor to test
different deployment protocols for the sensors. In addition, Polimatrix supplied personal
radiation detection sensors to the trainees so as to demonstrate the ability of an
individual to be able to detect radiation sources as a mobile unit.

Once radiation was detected our concept of operations (CONOPS) was to capture the
alert in the Defentect control panel and subsequently execute the alert messaging as
defined in the control panel. These alerts consisted of SMS messages to individual cell
phones, XML messages to other systems including the Orsus SMS and email messages
to additional interested parties. In addition, the system captured all of the alerts in the
local database for reporting.

   Defentect Participation Objectives/Accomplishments

   • Provide Dirty Bomb Tactical Checkpoint Sensors
   At Brown Field, Epsilon Systems integrated a Defentect fixed point radiation
   detection sensor to the QuickSet Tripod. A QuickSet GeminEye camera was also
   affixed on the tripod to be activated once the sensor detected a source of radiation
   so the operator of Situator deployed in the Epsilon Systems Mobile Command and
   Control unit could receive a visual output of the event as it was occurring.

   At Scripps Memorial Hospital, a tactical mobile command kit from TW Mobile
   Engineering was successfully utilized as the central control for the Defentect
   radiation sensor output that was deployed at the hospital entrance checkpoint.



                                             9
• Demonstrate functionality by providing advanced threat warning
• Demonstrate isotope classification for threat identification and assessment
Operationally, the Defentect M3 Control panel provides for the support of inbound
messages from a variety of sensors, in this case radiation sensors. One the biggest
differentiators of the Defentect and Polimatrix sensors are their abilities to identify an
isotope and its level and send that data to the appropriate sources such as handheld
end user devices and Orsus Situator for response SOPs.

At both Brown Field and Scripps Memorial Hospital checkpoints, a radiation source
was used to trigger the radiation sensors. The Gammatect Plus controller received
the input from the Gammatect sensors. The controller then interpreted the data and
determined the isotope to be C-137 at various levels based on distance from the
sensor and in each case forwarded a message with this data to the control panel.
This in turn activated the logging of the event and execution of the pre-defined rules
for notification. (Note: the notification rules were changed many times over the
course of testing to include more and more people that showed interest in receiving
notifications from the sensors.) Through the application of pre-defined rules,
messaging of the results of the sensor alerts were sent to the staff assigned to react
in these training exercises at both Brown Field and Scripps Memorial Hospital.
These notification events were presented real time during the training exercises.

• Evaluate performance under various environmental conditions
Brown Field was hot, windy and dust was constantly being blown on and into the
equipment. None of these conditions adversely affected the sensors in any way.

•   Demonstrate interoperability with other Golden Phoenix participant’s
    solutions including EpicenterSM Situational Management Software solution.
In addition to the individual notifications that were executed at Brown Field, the
Defentect M3 Control Panel successfully notified the Situational Management
System, via pre-programmed XML, at the Epsilon Systems local Command and
Control mobile unit. By providing the alert, the M3 Control Panel was able to pass
along the type of alert, the type of Radiation, as well as the Isotope and GPS
coordinates.      Once received by Situator, the appropriate camera (QuickSet
GeminEye and/or the SightLogix thermal), was put into alarm status and was able to
provide video, audio, and operational cues to the operator controlling the system. A
set of SOPs pre-defined for this type of radiation, C-137, was presented
automatically to the operator for proper response and recovery. In addition, first
responder personnel entered into the predefined response matrix received
notification of the alert, radiation type and level as well.




                                         10
    Defentect Control Panel on TW Mobile Engineering’s Mobile Tactical Kit at Scripps
    Memorial Hospital checkpoint with officers wearing Polimatrix, Inc. radiation sensors.
              Defentect sensor is between the vehicle and Mobile Tactical Kit.

   Polimatrix Objectives

   •   Demonstrate effective response to terrorist or border crossing threats
   •   Mitigate threats by using technology supporting emergency response
       teams in the field
   At Brown Field, Polimatrix trained the USMC and Border Patrol on the use of the
   Polimatrix portable detection devices. At the checkpoint, the tripod set up with the
   radiation detection sensors from Defentect identified a source of radiation and
   alerted the portable units the personnel staffing the checkpoint activity that a source,
   what type of source and the level had been identified in a vehicle approaching the
   checkpoint. This information allowed the checkpoint staff to immediately take the
   proper measures in handling the vehicle that had been identified as carrying the
   source. Once the individuals in the vehicle had been properly detained, the
   checkpoint staff was able to identify the source location within the vehicle through the
   use of the portable devices. In all instances where a sensor had set off an alert, the
   pre-defined notifications were made to all individuals tasked with receiving those
   notifications and the messages were also sent to Situator where the appropriate
   video was displayed to the operator as well as the alerts registered on the map and
   the appropriate SOPs attached to the type of alert for response measures.


At Scripps Memorial Hospital, the Polimatrix portable devices were also used. This time
the Defentect M3 Control Panel was operational via utilizing a rapidly deployable mobile
tactical kit designed and built by TW Mobile Engineering. The Defentect M3 Control



                                           11
Panel Controller was activated as a radiation source in a vehicle drove by the sensor
placed 50 feet from the checkpoint at the entrance of the hospital. The checkpoint
personnel were instantly alerted via the Polimatrix portable devices and were able to
take quick action as the vehicle approached and have the vehicle directed into a pre-
defined area for further investigation. In addition, all those who had received training
and portable detection devices prior to the activity were also instantaneously notified as
to the source identification, isotope type and level for the ability of immediate response
to the situation.

4. QuickSet International, a Moog Company Participation Overview

As a proven DoD/DHS Security Technology provider, Epsilon Systems selected
QuickSet to provide their heavy duty tripod and equipment stands for the attachment of
the GeminEye EO/IR Pan/Tilt/Zoom (PTZ) camera and the Defentect Radiation
Detection Sensor for the checkpoint activity at Brown Field and Scripps Memorial
Hospital. Quickset also provided the GeminEye EO/IR camera that was used in the
training exercises for demonstration of the ability to provide custom modular sensor
nodes and video distribution and processing in conjunction with the radiation detection
sensors.

QuickSet Participation Objectives/Accomplishments

   • Demonstrate integrated Tactical Checkpoint System
   The heavy duty tripod provided an excellent platform that was able to handle
   radiation sensor and processor unit, GeminEye EO/IR PTZ, mesh radio and
   networking accessories and a License Plate Recognition System (LPR) that was not
   tested.

   • Demonstrate Modular Sensor Node
   The EO/IR PTZ camera was attached to the sensor platform which was mounted on
   the heavy duty tripod.

   • Demonstrate Tactical Situational Awareness
   Video data from the GeminEye was streamed to Orsus’ Situator whenever Defentect
   or Polimatrix radiation sensors alarmed. The ability to view the scene of an alert
   provided an excellent visual situational awareness to the command center.


5. Global Mesh Technologies and TW Mobile Engineering Participation Overview

The Epsilon Systems Team took advantage of TW Mobile Engineering’s capability to
manufacture a sensor platform that can be quickly mounted on a tripod where all our
fixed sensors were mounted. This platform allowed the team to quickly connect and
disconnect the sensors and deploy the sensors quickly at the checkpoint at Brown Field.
TW Mobile Engineering also provided a Portable Tactical Command Kit which served as
the local display station for Defentect’s sensors deployed on the mobile sensor platform
and for the belt-worn Polimatrix sensors.
We also took advantage of Global Mesh’s long range point to point networking capability
which allowed us to deploy the sensors ¼ mile away from Orsus’s Situator.




                                           12
Global Mesh and TW Mobile Engineering Participation
Objectives/Accomplishments

   • Demonstrate Modular Sensor Platform
   Fabricated the modular platform for the sensors; sensors were installed and
   uninstalled within minutes.

   • Demonstrate Point to Point and Mesh Networking Infrastructure
   The mesh networking infrastructure worked as planned; the point to point radios
   worked as planned from the checkpoint to the Epsilon Systems Command Center.

Best Practices and Lessons Learned

1. Plan often, plan in person with teammates, and plan for emergencies and then test
   and practice with what you have developed.
           a. Put plans/strategies on paper.
           b. Make sure all team members understand their roles.
           c. Put procedures and schedule on paper; publish and get teammates to
              commit as early as possible.
           d. Allow time to fully test everything especially connectivity in the lab and in
              the field.
           e. Get involved with the Golden Phoenix staff from the beginning.
2. It is always best to have a Plan B or a backup plan should one or several
   components of an integrated solution not work exactly as planned. For the Golden
   Phoenix exercise we did have backup plans and we did have to initiate one of them.
   The VMS software that we had planned to use was not working in the field for some
   reason but we had alternative VMS software as a backup and with some
   configuration changes on the fly we were able to switch out the software and record
   the video as we had planned.
3. Having not been involved in Golden Phoenix from the beginning, we had many
   technologies to integrate and implement to support the training exercises we felt we
   could contribute to effectively in a very short period of time. Since we came in late,
   it was difficult to completely identify the expectations of the training events. We
   would have welcomed the opportunity to have more time to plan with the various
   agencies and with our own Team we pulled together prior to the training events.
4. In addition, we would also have welcomed the opportunity to have more time in the
   field to test connectivity.

Overall, Team Epsilon Systems met our objectives as an integrated solution designed to
support the selected training activities presented at Golden Phoenix. Not only were we
able to test our integrated solutions in the field and make adjustments as necessary on
the fly to successfully emulate rapid deployment, we had the opportunity to actually use
our solutions to successfully support real time training exercises.




                                            13
Recommendations

From an industry partner perspective and as a security and surveillance solution
integrator we share the following recommendations:

Early planning of industry partner’s participation in support of the training exercises is
critical. If participating agencies are able to state their types of technology objectives
and requirements for their specific training exercises early on, this would allow industry
partners to work with selected agencies we feel we could support. As a result, our
efforts would be better focused on specific training exercises to ensure that the solutions
provided meet their requirements and therefore support the actual goals of the training
exercises.

Early on in the planning stages, participating facilities need to publish their connectivity
requirements and ability to support external connectivity. Since these are mock training
events, using real facilities, industry needs to know what our parameters are for entering
into the internal infrastructure for connectivity. Although industry submitted our
requirements for power and connectivity, we had no prior knowledge of what was
actually available for us to be able to connect. One recommendation would be to set up
a separate network so as to not have any issues with industry partners compromising
the integrity of the participating facilities internal network infrastructure by having access.

Team Epsilon Systems appreciated the opportunity to support US Custom and Border
Patrol, USMC Mag-46, the County of San Diego, the City of San Diego and NIUSR with
a rapidly deployable communication and sensor platform with common operating display
and pre-defined SOP’s for response and recovery efforts during the Golden Phoenix
2008 training events.




                                              14
Operation Golden Phoenix 2008 Participating Team Partners




                             15
                                          Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                        ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.14   TW Mobile Engineering GP08 AAR




December 2008                                                                     D-69
Golden Phoenix 2008
After-Action Report
TW Mobile Engineering                                                                           INC.
                                                               M BILE ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGIES, INC.



TW Mobile Engineering Corporate Overview

TW Mobile Engineering is a public safety mobile platform engineering company utilizing
organic systems design and technology integration techniques. TW Mobile Engineering Inc.
is proud to be serving the Public Safety and Homeland Security agencies within the San
Diego County region and beyond. We provide turn-key, integrated vehicles, trailers and
tactical kits ranging from basic patrol vehicles to sophisticated C4ISR vehicles, nimble tactical
command kits, and a wide range of mobile solutions.

During the critical design and fabrication process, our team works closely with clients and
regional academic institutions making certain our product and service offerings meet the
needs and critical mission requirements of our clients. With our clients and alliance vendors,
our collaborative engineering processes give TW Mobile Engineering a unique ability to assist
agencies in the deployment of mission critical and industry best solutions addressing the
demanding range of operational requirements.

TW Mobile Engineering Inc. operates with a mission dedication focused in providing world
class cost effective solutions capable of operations within a varied theatre of operations.
Utilizing COTS technology integration, our modular configurations enable mission operators
on the ground to get their job done, communicating effectively and reliably with functional
teams involved within incident operations command. OGP was a perfect test bed for these
types of vehicles and technologies.

Executive Summary

TW Mobile Engineering has enjoyed the opportunity to interface with a diverse range of
Public Safety, Homeland Security and Department of Defense agencies. This exposure
provides TW Mobile Engineering and alliance partners the ability to witness the level of
technological preparedness and capabilities our clients require during mission critical
planning events. We are deeply involved in the areas of communication interoperability,
common operational picture, situational management solutions and C4ISR technologies; all
of which came into play at Operation Golden Phoenix.
In addition to vehicle deployment to the Middle East supporting our war fighters, TW Mobile
Engineering Inc. has supported several regional planning exercises such as Strong Angel III
and live regional situations including the Cedar and Witch Fires. These unique experiences
have provided TW Mobile Engineering Inc. the opportunity to identify many commonalities in
mission requirements and process effectiveness utilizing advanced mobile technologies.
These lessons learned have yielded many improvements in the areas of mobile systems
performance, ease of use and deployment cost effectiveness.




                                          Page 1 of 5
OGP was a very effective test and evaluation environment for TW and many of our
alliance vendors and client agencies. The diverse range of mission requirements and
environmental extremes provided valuable information supporting our team’s
continuing lessons learned processes and product development in the area of Public
Safety.


TW Mobile Engineering’s role in OGP at the Aux II location was focused in very specific
areas of support. The establishment of a tactical mesh network in the austere environment of
Aux II site was a primary area of focus. This environment was designed to simulate similar
challenges to a region impacted by natural disaster or acts of terrorism affecting a lack of
fundamental infrastructures. Within 2 hours of arriving at the Aux II site, our team had
established this network including the following components.

   •   Rapidly deployed command van with in-motion VSAT uplink, satellite TV and RF
       communication interoperability. This vehicle could reach the outside world via the web
       and a range of RF frequencies as well as provide a conduit for video and data streams
   •   Command trailer with large LCD monitors for viewing the UAV feeds, mapping
       software and incident command information required by incident commanders.
   •   Tactically deployed pan tilt zoom wireless cameras for situational awareness and
       perimeter security
   •   Through pre-distribution of laptops to the CBP HQ in Washington DC and the CBP
       Special Operations Group HQ in El Paso, teams were able to connect to this mesh
       network via the web allowing interface with teams on the ground.
   •   Large monitor viewing stations were utilized inside a command trailer at Aux II to
       provide effective UAV and video imagery viewing.
   •   SDSU Vislab was connected to this network providing capability of interaction with
       others on the network, viewing imagery, file sharing, video conference and collaborate
       on common whiteboards. This emulated the ability to reach back to a regional or
       national command center.
   •   Within the secondary shelter at Aux II, our team had a large dual touch table monitor
       connected to the mesh network.
   •   GPS tracking units operated over the wireless mesh network and satellite links were
       utilized in asset and resource tracking, supporting both ground and air operations
       deployment via Marine Corps helicopter.
   •   One of the most powerful experiments we completed involved the Desert Hawk UAV
       and one of the Border Patrol vans. The van was equipped with an in motion VSAT
       system enabling it to receive encoded video streams from the ground control station
       via the web. The UAV flew over the van while the van was in route. Operators inside
       the van were able to log onto this video stream and have a real time visual overview of
       the environment they were driving into. This would prove very effective for force
       protection as well as providing operators with insight into routes and hazards, and to
       those needing help in disaster stricken areas. This entire process could be utilized with
       no land based infrastructure.




                                          Page 2 of 5
Our Brown Field technology trials and deployment included working with a consortium of
technology partners demonstrating capabilities of providing a multi-tiered command
technology solution. Trials included industry best vendors within the disciplines of C4ISR,
mesh technologies and software, Situational Management Software, intelligent video
analytics and camera systems and CBRNE sensors and detection.

Within 1 hour of arrival at the Brown Field site we had a tactical mesh network established
that included the following elements:

   •   Digital C4ISR van equipped with team protection cameras, long range periscope, and
       Common Operational software system
   •   Rapidly deployed command van with in-motion VSAT uplink, satellite TV and RF
       communication interoperability. This vehicle could reach the outside world via the web
       and a range of RF frequencies as well as provide a conduit for video and data streams
   •   Tactical Command System with radio interoperability, EVDO based web access, WAP
   •   SDSU Vislab was connected to this network and able to interact with the others on the
       network and view imagery, share files, video conference and collaborate on common
       whiteboards.
   •   Tactical Controlled Access Checkpoint System equipped with radiological sensor, PTZ
       CCTV/IR camera, License plate recognition system, all devices connected wirelessly
       via remotely deployable field mesh node.
   •   Tactically deployed pan tilt zoom wireless cameras for situational awareness and
       perimeter security

Training objectives for our team involved the following focus areas:
   • Rapidly deploying a multi-node network in a completely collapsed infrastructure
      providing all involved elements the ability to access all sensors and agencies on the
      network to provide situational awareness, force protection, and reach back to remote
      locations via multiple methodologies (VSAT, EVDO, RF)
   • Evaluating the effectiveness of the tactical mesh network in this type of scenario
   • Bringing situational awareness, the ability to collaborate and video conference, and
      share imagery between disparate organizations and assets on an ad hoc basis
      emulating real world scenarios
   • Testing all components in the extreme heat and sand environment
   • Utilization of the in-motion VSAT unit for transfer of video and photo imagery
   • Analyze best method for deploying these types of technologies in a modular manner to
      enable scaling of incident, reallocation of resources in real time
   • Analyze technical support requirements during field deployments
   • Determine operator skill levels and training requirements to support field deployments
   • Demonstrate ability and value of integrating existing resources, (cameras, computers,
      sensors, etc.) into common operational picture and network.
   • Evaluate this type of information network for field telemedicine and disaster response




                                         Page 3 of 5
Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Our involvement with OGP at the Aux II site was intensely productive and resulted in many
lessons learned and best practices detailed within the following highlights:

   •   SPARE PARTS are essential in extreme, isolated conditions
   •   Preventive maintenance is a very critical part of field deployments. Cans of contact
       cleaner, dust spray to clean camera lens and keyboards are money well spent.
   •   Pre-planning and testing/training along with very specific documentation of these
       events is essential. The ability to pull out operational checklists and turn on procedures
       is a requirement.
   •   There is a significant need for Technical Specialists within agencies to understand and
       operate the equipment. Agencies are deploying more sophisticated technology
       platforms and oftentimes operators are unfamiliar with how to operate, troubleshoot
       and support these systems.
   •   Simplicity of component setup and system operations is an imperative. Complicated
       technical capabilities are rarely used because of the demands and complexity faced by
       the user in the field.
   •   Mission flexibility requires systems and technologies to provide baseline operational
       levels resulting in increased skills of operators who must be more familiar with the
       equipment.
   •   Systems designers must be very sensitive to logistical issues facing vehicles
       transported via air mobility operations. Logistics designs must guarantee asset
       protection during loading, in-flight and deployment operations.

Our involvement with OGP at the Brown Field location resulted in the following highlights:

   •   Integrated C4ISR tactical systems can be a very effective foundation for a wide range
       of critical incident response teams; providing fire camp communication and data
       dissemination to providing the moving security and situational awareness required by
       NGO and DOD teams in potentially hostile environments.
   •   The most expensive solutions are not necessarily the most effective solutions.
   •   Onboard air compressors with blow nozzles are effective in dusty environments to
       keep equipment and workspaces cleaner.
   •   More focus needs to be placed on power and telecommunication infrastructure
       independence in times of critical incidents. The ability to provide basic C3 and force
       protection when fuel is not available and cellular systems are down is critical.
   •   Asset tracking in infrastructure collapsed environments is essential. As resources
       arrive on scene, commanders and teams travel out into remote areas and forward
       command areas are established, the ability to track these when the cellular and RF
       systems are down is even more critical.




                                          Page 4 of 5
Recommendations

Planning and coordination of a voluntary exercise of the scale of OGP is considerable work.
We feel like it was adequately organized considering that all involved have regular day jobs
and responsibilities outside of the event. Several thoughts for future similar events:

       •   Early in the process, a multi agency meeting to roundtable the types of technical
           objectives, capabilities and desired solutions tested would make it easier to make
           sure these specifics are met.
       •   Examine the existing technical resources leveraged with new technologies to
           increase effectiveness. Examples would include getting data from existing
           infrastructure camera systems into the tactical, pre and post incident environments.
       •   Create small working groups early in the process to handle specific exercises and
           manage technologies might be worth looking at.
       •   Coordination between the event locations was fractured at best. This is an
           example of the need for better common operational picture technology and
           systems that can be rapidly deployed across agency lines.

Nuggets for the Abstract

   •   With the increase of multi agency joint operations, the escalation of natural disaster
       intensity, and the ongoing threat of terrorism and social disorder, the need to rapidly
       disseminate information and connect disparate agencies together is critical.
   •   The development and administration of ongoing education for Public Safety and
       Homeland Security professionals in the use and support of advanced technologies
       needs to be addressed. Countless dollars are spent in the acquisition of these
       technologies without making sure that the end users have the ability to optimize their
       performance.
   •   Compact, rapidly deployable platforms provide considerable capabilities at significantly
       lower cost to acquire and operate than the large command units.
   •   As DOD, DHS, Fire and Police entities continue to increase their joint operations, the
       need for effective resource awareness and liaison becomes even more critical.

Our entire team is grateful for the opportunity of involvement with this exciting exercise and in
the relationships created during the event. We look forward to the prospect of continuing
efforts supporting our region and our nation in the critical mission of incident preparedness
and response planning.

Allen Johnston
Director of Business Development
TW Mobile Engineering
10729 Wheatlands Ave.
Santee, CA 92071
(619) 596-1925 Office
(619) 933-3232 Mobile
allen@thunderworks.net
www.thunderworks.net

                                          Page 5 of 5
                                          Golden Phoenix 2008 After Action Report—FINAL
                                                        ICTAP-OEC-AFTACTRPT-002-R0



D.4.15   URS Washington Division, Red Team AAR: Operation Golden Phoenix




December 2008                                                                     D-71
To: Mr. Preston Hathaway, SPAWAR
From: URS, Washington Division, Red Team
Date: 06 August 2008
Re: After Action Report: Operation Golden Phoenix

                   After Action Report: Operation Golden Phoenix

Executive Summary

The URS Red Team (URSRT) attended Golden Phoenix (GP) with a two-fold mission.
(1) Unit Operations & Cyber Analysis (focus = adversary/elemental potential for
disruption of continuity operations) and the (2) fielding of a new unit tracking technology
called “Global Tracker.” A secondary, but additional objective for the team was to work
along side of several of our teaming partners in the real-world and to evaluate the
effective deployment of their integrated solutions. The event provided verification of
work completed prior to the event, a solidification of the alliance and discovery of sensor
technologies to integrate with “Global Tracker.”

The URS Team also introduced the Global Tracker (prototype) technology for situational
awareness, tracking of multiple assets and sensor integration. These tests were successful
times 100%. Additionally, deployment knowledge was gained, whereas Op Golden
Phoenix provided a rugged, disparate and austere “substrate” for evaluation criteria. The
tests resulted in a PROOF of CONCEPT and the ability to field and monitor units that
provided value to the operator in the field, field command, regional operations
monitoring and even real-time monitoring from a locations CONUS and OCONUS.

Global Tracker elements were sent to various locations and monitored real-time with
multiple visual GIS mapping. Tracking was successful on specialized vehicles
(BORSTAR), deployed Hummer H3’s, dismounted personnel, tactical mounted vehicle
deployed in the desert and in the pack of a marine deployed airborne (UH-1 Huey) 2000’
off the deck and over the mountain range and back between AUXII and Area 50. Signal
was not lost and “ping” tracked while airborne – and on the ground.

Sensor data was also consistently pushed back, monitored and logged. This test provided
proof of concept for the additional, but not limited to sensors including radiological, bio-
chemical, seismic, accelerometer and cardio/respiration data, surveillance and optical
data and other forms of data.

Lessons were learned regarding the type of service used and how this related to the
accuracy of the operational picture as well as accurate situational awareness. Adaptation



                                            -1-
noted and modifications have already been made in the prototype development. Based on
the successful deployment results documented at Operation Golden Phoenix, units will
now be fielded in real-world deployments by several agencies that were on stand-by for
the first generation Global Tracker field results.

Introduction

The URS Red Team (URSRT) attended the event with a two-fold mission. (1)Unit
Operations & Cyber Analysis (focus = adversary potential for disruption of continuity
operations) and the (2) fielding of a new unit tracking technology called “Global
Tracker.” A secondary, but additional objective for the team was to work along side of
several of our teaming partners in the real-world.

URS POC:
David W. Henderman
Sr. Security / Law Enforcement Specialist

Red Team / Black Hat Operations
Adversary Combat Element (ACE)
Electronic & Cyber Operations Group(EChO)
Security and Threat Management Services

URS - Washington Division
2131 South Centennial Avenue
Aiken, SC 29803-7680

(803) 522-1902 Mobile // (803) 502-9798 Office // (803) 502-9820 Fax
david.henderman@wsms.com

Golden Phoenix provided an open environment that allowed for the URS, Washington
Division Red Team to observe many levels of companies and government agencies in
action. Observations were primarily related to the deployment of ad-hoc networks,
observation (surveillance & awareness) and communications platforms, and other
miscellaneous disaster response and mitigation related technologies.

From the vantage point of an adversary (various methods of operations), there were
numerous opportunities to manipulate, disrupt or destroy personnel, technology and/or
cyber systems. While the environment was designed to be that of an open test-bed, it
remains consistent that not much has changed or evolved over the last few years, and
particularly since hurricane Katrina.

It appeared that significant corporate intelligence efforts were underway during the
exercise. This may also be patterned representing the potential for adversary collection
efforts and methods and should be considered by all developers and government
agencies.




                                            -2-
It is the conclusion of this team that more effort must be given to the development of
protocols, standard operating procedures and the security of both operations and
personnel. Segregation of security (both cyber & physical) from research and
development lays a foundation for critical incidents and unnecessary vulnerability in the
field.

Given the successful execution of tracking technology deployed by the URS Red Team
during Golden Phoenix, we also conclude that real-time tracking of personnel, assets and
vehicles may be one key element to operational success during crisis and in emergency,
intelligence and battlefield operations. Additionally, the successful integration of various
levels of sensors can additionally expand situational awareness from the field level to
command and control and from current operations analysis to forensic reconstruction.

Generally, not a lot has changed since hurricane Katrina and the technologies that have
surfaced since 9/11 have remained the same with minor modifications. Few of these
modifications have to do with secure operations (OPSEC) or the security of the
information that must travel on rapidly deployed networks (INFOSEC/COMSEC).

Deployed Assets:

(4) Red Team Personnel
(3) Technical Personnel – Global Tracker
(8) Global Tracker Units
       4- Vehicle (V-Trak)
       4- Personnel (P-Trak)


Training objectives: Our unit did not have training objectives per se. Because of the
scope of deployment within various government sectors, concern and attention were
given specifically to areas of security, and asset management.

Golden Phoenix provided an exceptional platform from which to observe numerous
levels of operational activities, developed and developing technologies and a forum in
which to field our own developing technology. The environment and the leadership that
provided this opportunity were exceptional.

Therefore, many of the lessons learned will not be published, but used to assist our
government clients, some of which were represented at the event.


Golden Phoenix 2008 Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Many of the solution sets demonstrated at Golden Phoenix and other similar events have
not changed much over the last few years. Perhaps one observation that this team comes
away with, is that those who seem to be working in a spirit of teaming and cooperation
are the ones who have begun to emerge with successful methods and technologies.



                                            -3-
Having observed numerous levels of concerns related to security, it may be of importance
to future planners of this event and other similar events to include a red team (and black
hat) observation team to formally evaluate the participants and to assist them in
developing both operational and cyber security protocols.

While this is part of the scope and mission of this team, it seems that an event like
Golden Phoenix can provide for a spirit of cooperation and teaming, even among those
who may compete for space in the market.

Attention should be given to actually driving information through networks in similar
conditions that may actually be found during times of emergency or on the battlefield. An
example of this might be the configuration of satellite up and down-links. Who is allowed
access and how are these assets protected from outside elements and manipulation. This
becomes important, as systems and personnel under stress will not perform to the same
level as demonstrated without the stimulus.

It is hardly fair to government agencies to demonstrate field internet connectivity systems
that run in an open architecture, when encryption and security that is a requirement in the
field may prohibit the sending of the same images or data.

In one case, we tested an open satellite access pipe that was being used by numerous
participants. We found that a cell (CDMA) connection at Area 50 provided greater
bandwidth, than a satellite connection that claimed to be much higher in bandwidth. That
said, we recognize the need for redundant communications platforms. The design of the
Global Tracker has been specifically designed to use four different communications
protocols, to include riding on existing RF networks.

This feedback is only for evaluation and not meant as criticism. There were many
considerations regarding physical and cyber security that should be evaluated. This team
very much appreciated the opportunity to evaluate these matters and to have the ability to
evaluate and collect data that we will use to assist our government and law enforcement
clients.

Nuggets for Abstract/Executive Summary

Assets that can not be found may become a liability during operational deployment.

Security should be planned into operations and emerging technology deployments.

Where security is not important to an indigenous operation, technology should be
developed with an architecture and deployment framework that is consistent with secure
applications and operational methodologies. In other words, security should exist in a
scalable fashion for all networking and continuity operations. Some operations may not
require deliberate secure protocol, via software, hardware or operations methods. At
times, getting the information out “in time” plays a more significant role that secure



                                           -4-
information routing. Therefore, we conclude that many of the technologies and solutions
available for deployment in disparate or austere conditions for a wide spectrum of
reasons must be evaluated not only with respect to security implications, but deployment
requirements. In short, mission objectives will drive the development of appropriate
protocols, training and doctrine for the next generation of rapidly deployable networks,
communications and continuity programs.

Operational and situational awareness should be consistent from the operator in the field
to the field commander - to the observer – and no less important, to the forensic
evaluation of data and detail – post event.

Concluding Remarks:

This report is submitted with great respect and gratitude for GP leadership and the many
support personnel who made Operation Golden Phoenix possible. Please accept the
sincere thanks of the URS, Washington Division team. It was our honor to participate and
observe in this event.

With kindest regards & respectfully submitted,

David W. Henderman
Sr. Security / Law Enforcement Specialist

Red Team / Black Hat Operations
Adversary Combat Element (ACE)
Electronic & Cyber Operations Group(EChO)
Security and Threat Management Services




                                            -5-

				
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