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					“States of Concern”


War, Revolution, and Development
 I. Are some states worse than others?
A. Possible threats to international order
  1.   “Rogue states” -- States that ignore international
       norms and international law
  2.   “Revisionist states” -- States that seek to upset
       the status quo
  3.   “Failed states” -- States characterized by
       anarchy, poverty, and civil war
  4.   “Least developed states” -- States that suffer
       from severe poverty
  5.   “Outposts of Tyranny” -- States that have failed
       to democratize
B. Alleged Characteristics of
“Rogue States”
1. Ignore international law
2. Build “weapons of mass destruction”
3. Sponsor terrorism
4. Violate the human rights of their own people
C. The US View: Compare 1998,
2002, 2005 speeches
 1998: “Rogue States” -- Iran, Iraq, Libya (85%
  of mentions)
      Other mentions: Sudan, North Korea, Serbia,
       Cuba
 2002: “Axis of Evil” -- Iran, Iraq, North Korea
      “Beyond the Axis of Evil” Speech (2002):
       Libya, Syria, Cuba
 2005: “Outposts of Tyranny“ – Cuba, Iran,
  North Korea, Belarus, Zimbabwe, Myanmar
1. Who ignores international law?
 What is the only country which managed to
  violate the Chemical Weapons Convention,
  the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Biological
  Weapons Convention all at the same time?

     North Korea, but…
     Iran is trying
1. Who ignores international law?
 What is the only state opposing inspections
  under the Biological Weapons Convention?

     United States
1. Who ignores international law?
 Which two states have not ratified “the most
  widely and rapidly ratified human rights treaty
  in history,” the UN Convention on the Rights
  of the Child?

     Somalia and
     United States
2. Who has WMD?
Suspected Arsenals: 9 Nuke, 5 Biological, 10 Chemical
3. Who sponsors terrorism?
 Which state sponsored the following act?
     After it finds out that an environmental group is
      planning to conduct a peaceful but illegal
      protest, a government secretly plants a bomb
      on the group’s ship while it is docked in a
      neutral, peaceful country. The blast sinks the
      ship, killing the group’s photographer.
          France (attack on Greenpeace)
3. Who sponsors terrorism?
 Which state sponsored the following group?
     An Islamic fundamentalist group fighting a civil
      war has the nasty habit of tying down prisoners,
      pouring gunpowder on their eyeballs and setting it
      alight. However, when it isn’t killing other groups
      in the civil war, it targets the military forces of a
      hated enemy. Its state sponsor gives it tons of
      weapons, including portable missiles for shooting
      down aircraft. It continues this aid even after the
      group targets a civilian airliner.
          United States (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar)
3. Who sponsors terrorism?
 Israel (Lebanese Phalange in the 1980s)
 Pakistan (Kashmiri insurgents)
 India (Tamil insurgents, Hindu fundamentalists)
 Iran (Hezbollah)
 Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea
 DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Namibia,
  Congo Republic, etc.
    Let’s just say Africa…
 Wait a minute: Central America too
    …and Asia, North America, South America,
      Australia (!), and Europe…
 Problem: Just about everyone has provided some aid
  to “terrorists” / “freedom fighters”
 4. Which states violate human rights?
 Autocracies: Repress dissent, rig elections,
  imprison or murder opponents (more on “outposts
  of tyranny” later)
 Notable democracies:
     Israel, US, India: Detention without trial, prisoner
      abuse
     Europe: Migrants, ethnic minorities, religious
      freedom
     Japan: Racial discrimination, secret executions
5. Conclusions
a. Many states ignore international law, including
     prominent democracies such as the US
b.   Even more states sponsor terror in some form
c.   Similarly, most states violate human rights
d.   Only WMD narrows the field substantially – and
     this field also includes prominent democracies
e.   Conclusion: “Rogue state” is not a useful
     concept for predicting differences between
     states
II. Are some states more aggressive?
War initiators since 1980
 Three times: USA (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq)
 Twice: Iraq (Iran, Kuwait), Israel (Lebanon 1980
  and 1982)
 Once:
     Argentina (1982 occupation of Falklands)
     China (1987 attack on Vietnam)
     Armenia (1991 war with Azerbaijan, depending
      on definition)
     Rwanda and perhaps Uganda (1998 war with the
      DRC)
     Eritrea (1998 war with Ethiopia)
A. Power
  Great powers fight more – but also
  cooperate more (foreign aid, support for
  IGOs, etc)
     B. Regime: Democracy makes a
     difference
1.  War initiation. Democracies:
   a. May be slightly less likely to wage war in general
   b. Are less likely to initiate war
2. Warfighting. Democracies at war:
   a. Win battles and wars more frequently
   b. Suffer fewer casualties
   c. Undermine enemy morale by taking prisoners
   d. Are not notably better at extracting resources to fight
      wars
3. Does Democratization  Peace?
a. Raw evidence suggests democratization is
  dangerous
b. Democratization may be more
dangerous in multi-ethnic societies
c. Counter-evidence: The 1989-1995
Transitions in Europe
 Interpretation: Stalled transitions are
  dangerous but quick ones are not
d. Increased democracy decreases war risk –
but is this always “democratization?”
e. Possible explanation: Regime
change is the real danger
After controlling for regime change….
C. Conclusions
1. Watch out for powerful countries
2. Regime type does little to predict likelihood
   of war, but does reduce likelihood of
   aggression
3. Democratization is to be welcomed – if
   regime change is unavoidable
4. Limitations: Intangibles like “nationalism” are
   difficult to measure and evaluate
III. Failed States: Sovereignty without
authority
 III. Failed States: Sovereignty without
 authority
A. Routes to state failure
  1.   Catastrophe: Something overwhelms state’s
       ability to provide even minimal protection or
       enforce law.
  2.   Sovereignty without institutionalization: State is
       created which lacks de-personalized institutions or
       capacity to extract taxes and monopolize force
       (de-colonization in Congo)
  3.   Poverty trap: State is so poor than virtually no
       surplus exists to support political institutions (like
       catastrophe, but long-standing)
B. Predicting catastrophic failure
1. Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially
   determined by wealth and efficient
   governance (GDP, Corruption)
Corruption Perceptions Index
B. Predicting “natural” catastrophic
failure
1. Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially
   determined by wealth and efficient
   governance (GDP, Corruption)
2. Predicting catastrophe
  i.   Disease – Compare Prevalence to
       Resources
HIV Cases
TB Cases
Malaria Deaths
Cholera Deaths
Polio Cases
Per-Capita Health Spending
B. Predicting “natural” catastrophic
failure
1. Capacity to absorb catastrophe: essentially
   determined by wealth and efficient
   governance (GDP, Corruption)
2. Predicting catastrophe
  i.    Disease – Compare Prevalence to
        Resources
  ii.   Natural disasters – Tend to recur in same
        places
Affected by Disasters, 1975-2004 (UNEP)
Killed by Disasters, 1975-2004 (UNEP)
 C. Predicting de-institutionalization
1. Recent decolonization/independence -- “New”
   states at risk
2. State “birth” type and institutional
strength
a. Hypothesis: States born in revolution,
   secession, or nonviolent struggle for
   independence should be stronger than
   those granted independence without
   struggle (examples: Congo, Uzbekistan)
b. IV = Better birth experience (requiring
   organization and solution of collective action
   problems)
c. Tests using both GDP and Rotberg’s (2004)
   index of state failure as DVs reveal…
d. The puzzle of state birth
 Good births increase later GDP and decrease
  odds of state failure but…
     Relationship disappears when war
      participation is also included as a (control) IV.
      Why?
     Theory: War produces state strength.
          Interstate war increases later growth!
          Civil war decreases later growth
 Another finding: States with imposed borders
  different from pre-colonization ones have
  lower growth, higher rates of failure
D. Predicting civil war
1. Causes of civil war – Weak States and
   Opportunism
  a.   Weak States: Low GDP and…
D. Predicting civil war
1. Geographic Factors
  a.   Land Area: Bigger countries more
       prone to secessionism
  b.   Terrain: Mountains increase war risk
       (less evidence for jungles or forests)
  c.   Resources: Oil increases risk (less
       evidence for metals and diamonds)
  d.   Neighborhood: Contagion effects
2. Economic Factors
a. Per-capita GDP: Both level and growth rate
   reduce war risk, but “vertical” inequality has
   no effect (few studies of “horizontal”
   inequality)
b. Primary commodity exports: Countries
   dependent on raw material exports are war-
   prone
c. Social welfare: Low infant mortality and high
   secondary school enrollment reduce war risk
d. Agriculture: Soil degradation increases war
   risk
3. Political Factors
a. History: Recent wars increase risk (effect
   lasts for more than 10 years)
b. Regime type: Anocracy is dangerous
Anocracy and State Failure
3. Political Factors
a. History: Recent wars increase risk (effect
   lasts for more than 10 years)
b. Regime type: Anocracy is dangerous (and
   strong democracy is better than autocracy)
c. Regime change: Political instability
   increases war risk
4. Demographics
a. Population: More people = higher risk (but
   evidence on population density is mixed)
b. Diversity: Results are mixed, but some
   studies find ethnic heterogeneity increases
   risk (no real evidence for linguistic, religious,
   or social diversity)
Relationship: Diversity and
Income
Relationship: Diversity and
Freedom
5. Civil War Risk is Declining
IV. The Poverty Trap: Development
   Combined National Poverty Estimates
A. Modernization Theory
…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics
1. Western-centric “stages of development”
A. Modernization Theory
…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics
1. Western-centric “stages of development”
2. Implications
  a. S-Shaped Growth Curve
                 Predicted Growth Over Time
                 Diminishing Returns to Capital



                 Capital-Fueled Growth
Per Capita GDP




                 Lack of Capital

                      TIME
A. Modernization Theory
…aka Neoclassical or Development Economics
1. Western-centric “stages of development”
2. Implications
   a. S-Shaped Growth Curve
   b. Convergence – Size of national economies will
      eventually be determined only by population (more or
      less equal GDP per capita)
3. Recommendations: Agricultural surpluses, resource
   extraction, foreign investment, loans and aid, free
   capital markets, political stability (possibly
   authoritarianism)
4. Problems with modernization theory

a. Authoritarian regimes often renege on
   promises of development, become corrupt
b. West used state intervention to develop:
   Germany and France needed industrial
   banks, Russia and Japan needed massive
   state involvement and protectionism
c. Capital not reinvested in industry
4. Problems with modernization theory

a. Authoritarian regimes often renege on
   promises of development, become corrupt
b. West used state intervention to develop:
   Germany and France needed industrial
   banks, Russia and Japan needed massive
   state involvement and protectionism
c. Capital not reinvested in industry
d. Developed countries refused to lower barriers
   on textiles and other goods
4. Problems with modernization theory

a. Authoritarian regimes often renege on
   promises of development, become corrupt
b. West used state intervention to develop:
   Germany and France needed industrial
   banks, Russia and Japan needed massive
   state involvement and protectionism
c. Capital not reinvested in industry
d. Developed countries refused to lower barriers
   on textiles and other goods
e. Debt crisis: Terms of trade worsened
Commodity prices stall while the cost
of living rises….
 B. Neoliberalism:
 An update to
 modernization theory
1. New
  Institutionalism:
  Institutions must
  create incentives
  for investment
  (transparency,
  prevent corruption,
  prevent rent-
  seeking) 
  embrace
  democracy and
  limited government
 B. Neoliberalism: An update to
 modernization theory
1. New Institutionalism: Institutions must create
   incentives for investment (transparency, prevent
   corruption, prevent rent-seeking)  embrace
   democracy and limited government
2. Embrace export-led development: invest in
   infrastructure relevant to modern industries
3. Structural Adjustment: Austerity programs to
   reduce government spending and tax burden
   (increasing private investment, preventing debt
   spiral)
4. Focus on “micro” incentives to individuals/firms
   rather than “macro” national development
   projects (dams, power plants, railroads, etc.)
 5. Evidence against Neoliberalism
1. Sill cannot explain NICs: autocracy “worked” in
   Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong
  a. “Developmental State” – government picked
     winners and losers
  b. Export-led industrialization did not emerge
     “naturally”
2. Difficult to sustain free market and democracy in
   poor states
3. Self-serving: All recommendations tend to help
   foreign investors, but many harm domestic poor
C. Dependency theory
1. Capitalism creates dependence by poor
   “peripheral” states on commodity exports to
   “core” states, which impose unfair terms of
   trade (foreign investment and loans  strings
   attached)
Core – Periphery: 2000
 FOREIGN AID, DEBT, AND INTEREST
 PAYMENTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
 1992 AND 1997 (IN $US BILLIONS)

 $US Billions
                                                                           2361.6
2400
                     aid
                     interest (estimated at 7%)
2000                 debt
                                   1666.8
1600


1200
       Aid as percent                               Aid as percent
       of interest: 55.7%                           of interest: 32.5%
800


400
                          116.7                                    165.3
                65                                        53.7
  0
                          1992                                     1997
                                             Year
C. Dependency theory
1. Capitalism creates dependence by poor
   “peripheral” states on commodity exports to
   “core” states, which impose unfair terms of
   trade (foreign investment and loans  strings
   attached)
2. Profits are used to buy imports rather than
   re-invest in the country
3. The “Iron Triangle” of dependency theory:
   MNCs, Civilian Elites, Military conspire to
   generate profits (must analyze at lower level
   of analysis)
4. Policy Recommendations
a. Radical Variant: De-Linking (Autarky) and
    South-South Links. Example = Maoism
     Emphasize industrialization at expense of
      agriculture (esp. Great Leap Forward)
b. Moderate variant: Import-Substituting
    Industrialization (ISI)
     Tariffs and Subsidies directed to replacing
      imports with domestically-produced goods
     Shift from primary to manufactured products
5. Evidence for Dependency Theory
a. Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs)
   protected some Latin American states from
   Great Depression
Latin America: Exporters relying on
foreign investment performed poorly
5. Evidence for Dependency Theory
a. Mild de-linking (devaluation and tariffs)
   protected some Latin American states from
   Great Depression
b. Recent development programs have had
   mixed results
      Performance: Maoism in China
        CHINA: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

20

15

10

 5

 0

 -5

-10

-15

-20
   53

   56

   59

   62

   65

   68

   71

   74

   77

   80

   83

   86

   89

   92

   95

   98

   01
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20
                           Year
      Performance: Neoliberalism in China
        CHINA: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

20

15

10

 5

 0

 -5

-10

-15

-20
   53

   56

   59

   62

   65

   68

   71

   74

   77

   80

   83

   86

   89

   92

   95

   98

   01
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

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19

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19

19

19

19

20
                           Year
      Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

20

15

10

 5
                                         China
 0
                                         USA
 -5

-10

-15

-20
   53

   57

   61

   65

   69

   73

   77

   81

   85

   89

   93

   97

   01
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20
                 Year
      Performance: State-led development
      in Mexico
         MEXICO: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

12
10
 8
 6
 4
 2
 0
 -2
 -4
 -6
 -8
-10
   53

   56

   59

   62

   65

   68

   71

   74

   77

   80

   83

   86

   89

   92

   95

   98

   01
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20
                             Year
      Performance: Neoliberal development in
      Mexico
          MEXICO: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

12
10
 8
 6
 4
 2
 0
 -2
 -4
 -6
 -8
-10
   53

   56

   59

   62

   65

   68

   71

   74

   77

   80

   83

   86

   89

   92

   95

   98

   01
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20
                              Year
     Performance: State-led development in
     Brazil
       BRAZIL: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
   53

   56

   59

   62

   65

   68

   71

   74

   77

   80

   83

   86

   89

   92

   95

   98

   01
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20
                           Year
     Performance: Neoliberal development
     in Brazil
       BRAZIL: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1953-2003

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
   53

   56

   59

   62

   65

   68

   71

   74

   77

   80

   83

   86

   89

   92

   95

   98

   01
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20
                           Year
6. Shortcomings of Dependency Theory
a. ISI = inefficiency. Worse products,
   subsidies undermine incentives to expand
   size of domestic market
b. Consumers rejected protectionism -- Even
   dependency theorist Cardoso governed as a
   neoliberal!
c. Urban focus undermines farming: All those
   city workers need cheap food….  price
   controls and perverse incentives
d. The problem of the NICs… Investment
   increased growth!
Dependency in Taiwan: Investment
increased during “take-off” period
           D. Conclusions: The puzzle of poverty
           1. Overview:
                  Modernization          Neoliberalism           Dependency
Core           Economies naturally Free markets in free       Structure of world
Assumption     progress through    societies generate         economy prevents
               stages              growth                     peripheral
                                                              development
Economic       Borrow money and      Free trade: Privatize,   Reduce
policies       sell commodities to   reduce social            dependence
               finance               spending, balance        (autarky or ISI)
               industrialization     budget
Politics       Insulate economic     Libertarian              Prevent foreign-
               policy from public    democracy: Low           domestic alliances
               (autocracy or         taxes, low spending,     and empower
               independence)         minimal state            urban workers
2. No Panaceas
a. No theory completely explains NICs:
   Autocracy and Protection  Export-led
   growth
b. “Path dependence” – existing investments
   and coalitions limit policy flexibility (history
   matters)
c. Is development even a state-level process?
   We must revisit the issue at the sub-state
   level!
IV. Can we fix them?
A. Does foreign aid work?
1. Aid and corruption: No overall correlation,
       positive or negative
  a.    More corrupt countries tend to attract US aid
  b.    Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from
        Australia and Scandinavia
2. Aid and growth
  a. “Good policies” -- Aid may have positive effect
  b. “Bad policies” -- Aid has no effect
  c. Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on
     growth. Why?
B. Regime Imposition
1. Can Regime Be Imposed?
 Clear answer = Yes. Plenty of examples of
  long-term regime change imposed from
  outside (Germany and Japan after World War
  II)
 Most wars and interventions do not result in
  regime change
     2. When does regime type imposition
     occur?
a.    Great power politics – Most regime changes imposed
      by great powers
b.    Government type defines coalitions – World politics is
      ordered around domestic institutional choices: Catholic
      vs. Protestant, Monarchy vs. Republic, Democracy vs.
      Fascism, Capitalism vs. Communism
c.    Democratization requires decision of conqueror and
      successful implementation. Example: US military
      intervention
d. War Losses  Transformation
(Perhaps Internal…)
The Fate of Leaders Who Fail
e. Membership in IOs Increases
Democratization. Why?
C. Why do civil wars end?
1. Most Common Outcome:
     Civil War Outcomes, 1816-1997
                                                Percentage
                                                               Percentage      Average      Percentage
                     # of      Percentage of    Ending With
Outcome              Wars        All Wars         Formal
                                                               Followed By     Duration       Won By
                                                                Massacre       in Years     Government
                                                Agreement


Complete
Defeat               101         51.27             7.92          57.43          2.27          66.34
Surrender
With Amnesty          22         11.17           45.45            9.09          2.17          72.73
Cosmetic
Concessions           38         19.29           65.79            5.26          3.43          71.05
Genuine
Compromise            31         15.74           90.32            3.23          5.19           N/A

Stalemate              5          2.54           20.00            0.00          5.57           N/A
Governmental advantage has been much less pronounced recently – while governments won about 65% of civil
wars from 1816 to 1949, they won 54% of wars between 1950 and 1974 and only 37% of wars terminated since
then.
C. Why do civil wars end?
1. Most Common Outcome: Government Wins
2. Reason:
Government Advantage
Government Advantage
C. Why do civil wars end?
1. Most Common Outcome: Government Wins
2. Reason: Government is usually stronger
3. Does parity produce a stalemate or
   compromise?
Strong Government = Rebel Defeat –
but Strong Rebels = Compromise!
C. Why do civil wars end?
1. Most Common Outcome: Government Wins
2. Reason: Government is usually stronger
3. Does parity produce a stalemate or
   compromise? No!
  a.   Strong Government = Government Wins
  b.   Strong Rebels = Rebels Win OR Compromise
4. Reason:
C. Why do civil wars end?
1. Most Common Outcome: Government Wins
2. Reason: Government is usually stronger
3. Does parity produce a stalemate or
   compromise? No!
  a.   Strong Government = Government Wins
  b.   Strong Rebels = Rebels Win OR Compromise
4. Reason: Asymmetry
  a.   Government has recognition: credibility
  b.   Government has institutions: spokesperson
 5. What about outside intervention?

                    No Pro-Rebel   Pro-Rebel
                    Intervention   Intervention

No Pro-Government   119            24
Intervention        (60.41%)       (12.18%)

Pro-Government      29             25
Intervention        (14.72%)       (12.69%)
5. What about outside intervention?
a. Does intervention lead to compromise?
5. What about outside intervention?
  Probability of Compromise, 1816-1997


                   Intervention for government




                     No intervention
5. What about outside intervention?
a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
b. Does intervention prolong wars?
5. What about outside intervention?
a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
b. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes
c. Is intervention getting more common?
                      Intervention Over Time
               1825 to   1850 to   1875 to   1900 to   1925 to   1950 to   1975 to
                1849      1874      1899      1924      1949      1974      1997

Number of
                 22        28        16        23        21        39        43
Civil Wars
Intervention
                36%       25%       31%       35%       24%       49%       51%
Frequency
5. What about outside intervention?
a. Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes
b. Does intervention prolong wars? Yes
c. Is intervention getting more common? Yes
  6. Conclusions
a. Civil wars are different from interstate wars: they
   are asymmetric and are rarely resolved by
   compromise
b. The intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs.
   Justice
   i.    Want to end the war quickly? Let the strong crush
         the weak
   ii.   Want to find a compromise? Write off another
         10,000 people
  V. Conclusions: Are some states worse
  than others?
A. “Rogue states” – Concept isn’t useful
B. “Revisionist states” – Power and regime type,
   not status, seem to be key. Beware strong
   autocracies!
C. “Failed states” – Beware new, poor, states with
   lootable resources.
D. “Least developed states” – No panaceas: Need
   a sub-state theory of state performance. Good
   policies make aid more effective.
E. “Outposts of Tyranny” – Regime change is
   dangerous, but we should promote democracy
   when transitions are inevitable

				
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