6 This Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) White Paper synthesizes the results of a broad set of
7 experimentation and analytical efforts within the Department of Defense (DOD), academia, and
8 other partners to describe a future warfighting concept. It provides a framework to guide further
9 experimental efforts, an opportunity for intellectual exchange, and a way to focus DOD
10 transformation activities.
12 The RDO concept describes how a joint force commander, acting in conjunction with other
13 instruments of national power, can determine and employ the right force in a focused, non-linear
14 campaign to achieve desired political/military outcomes. For the purposes of experimentation,
15 RDO is focused at the operational level in a smaller-scale contingency. However, the principles
16 of RDO may be applied across the range of military operations.
18 I challenge you to examine and apply the RDO concept while keeping in mind that we are
19 deciding how America’s sons and daughters will fight in the future. It is important that we apply
20 our best effort, regardless of military service or warfighting discipline to create the
21 transformation of our nation’s military that they deserve.
23 Points of Contact
25 Questions or comments related to the RDO concept development effort should be directed to
26 Captain Justin Sherin, Head, Concept Development Department, (757-836-3990, DSN; 836-
27 3990), email@example.com or LTC Kevin M. Woods, Chief, RDO Integrated Product Team,
28 (757-836-2873), firstname.lastname@example.org.
32 DEAN W. CASH
33 Major General, U. S. Army
34 Director, Joint Experimentation
37 Executive Summary
39 Guidance. The April 2000 Defense Planning Guidance tasked US Joint Forces Command
40 (USJFCOM) to develop ―…new joint warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the
41 ability of future joint force commander's (JFC) to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly
42 challenging and important operational missions, such as…coercing an adversary to undertake
43 certain actions or deny the adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbors…‖
45 Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) is an evolving concept for conducting such challenging
46 missions in the next decade. It is the USJFCOM experimentation vehicle for transforming
47 jointness and provides a joint context for Service experimentation efforts. Oriented at a high
48 end, smaller-scale contingency, the RDO concept integrates other emerging joint concepts.
49 While focused at the operational level of war, the RDO concept has strategic and tactical
50 implications as well.
52 The Strategic Requirement
54 The United States now faces a world in which adversaries have the ability to threaten our
55 interests or attack us or our allies with little or no warning. Our ability to deploy major forces to
56 a theater in crisis will be constrained by politics, geography, adversary anti-access capabilities,
57 and weapons of mass effects. Legacy warfighting concepts, and to some extent the forces
58 created to support them, are ill-suited to deal with this new security environment. We can no
59 longer plan on having months or even weeks to deploy massive theater forces into a region rich
60 in unthreatened infrastructure, while delaying offensive action until favorable force ratios have
61 been achieved. Instead, we must plan to engage in the first hours of a crisis with those
62 capabilities that can be brought to bear quickly, informed by intimate knowledge of the
63 adversary and focused on those objectives most likely to produce the desired effects. This new
64 American way of war, especially when enabled by forces optimized to its requirements, will
65 enhance our national security in the 21st century.
67 The strategic requirement is to be ready to transition from a relatively peaceful process to intense
68 combat operations rapidly and decisively to achieve the strategic objectives. Our challenge, in
69 conjunction with other instruments of national power, is to build the capability to respond
70 quickly and bring regional contingencies to a rapid and decisive close. We must do this while
71 not losing our ability to prevail in the event of a major regional contingency.
73 Operational Environment. The emergence of a number of regional powers able to develop
74 military capability by accessing sophisticated military and commercial technology available in
75 the global marketplace present a likely and dangerous future threat to US interests. Potential
76 adversaries are adaptive and may have a numerically superior combined arms force, as well as a
77 regional "home field" advantage with an area-denial capability. Future adversaries will employ
78 asymmetrical approaches, and may be willing to inflict and sustain significant military and
79 civilian casualties.
84 Characteristics of US Future Joint Operations. The United States will stress four key
85 characteristics applicable across the spectrum of future joint operations. Operations will be
86 knowledge-centric. Creating and leveraging superior knowledge in the battlespace will enable
87 decision superiority, reduce operational risk, and increase the pace, coherence, and effectiveness
88 of operations. Operations will be effects based. Our assessments, planning, and execution, will
89 focus on understanding and creating the desired effect against the adversary’s complex and
90 adaptive national war-making capability. Operations will be coherently joint. Our future force
91 capabilities must be born joint, while at the same time our legacy systems must be made
92 interoperable. We will fight as a networked force, which allows us to plan, decide, and act
93 collaboratively and concurrently to accomplish many tasks simultaneously.
95 Concept Definition
Rapid Decisive Operations is a joint operational concept for future
operations. A rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge,
command and control, and effects-based operations to achieve the
desired political/military effect. In preparing for and conducting a
rapid decisive operation, the military acts in concert with and
leverages the other instruments of national power to understand and
reduce the adversary’s critical capabilities and coherence. The
United States and its allies asymmetrically assault the adversary
from directions and in dimensions against which he has no counter,
dictating the terms and tempo of the operation. The adversary,
suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his
objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against US interests or
has his capabilities defeated.
97 Figure 2 RDO Definition
99 The preparation for RDO is deliberate and continuous, focusing on actions to influence and deter
100 an adversary and including detailed pre-crisis development of knowledge about the adversary
101 and contingency planning for combat operations. If deterrence fails, RDO provide the capability
102 to rapidly and decisively coerce, compel, or defeat the enemy in order to accomplish our
103 strategic objectives without a lengthy campaign or an extensive buildup of forces. RDO may be
104 successful in themselves or, if necessary, will set the conditions for transition to security and
105 sustainment operations or a major regional conflict.
107 The Elements of Rapid Decisive Operations
109 The concepts and capabilities to achieve RDO can be broadly categorized under knowledge,
110 command and control, and operations. Although concept elements are discussed in one
111 category, all are linked closely to concepts and ideas in other categories.
113 Knowledge. The creation and sharing of superior knowledge are critical to RDO. The more we
114 know about the enemy, the operational environment, and ourselves, the more precisely we can
115 focus our capabilities to produce desired effects. Key knowledge concepts are Operational Net
116 Assessment (ONA), Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP), and Joint Intelligence,
117 Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR).
119 Command and Control. Greater coherence of C2 and more rapid and effective execution is
120 enabled by a standing joint force command and control element in each geographic CINC’s
121 headquarters. The Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2), Joint Interactive Planning
122 (JIP), Interagency Collaboration, and Multinational Operations concepts provide improvements
123 to our command and control.
125 Operations. RDO are predicated on the warfighting philosophy of effects-based operations that
126 employs the integrated application and mutual exploitation of Dominant Maneuver (DM),
127 Precision Engagement (PE), and Information Operations (IO). Operations are enabled by
128 Assured Access (AA), Rapid Force Deployment, Agile Sustainment Operations, and Full
129 Dimensional Protection (FDP).
131 The Way Ahead
133 US Joint Forces Command analytical wargames and major experiments will help define, refine,
134 and assess new ideas, organizational structures, and technologies related to RDO. These events
135 include MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002, a major field event that will employ several of the
136 Services’ new concepts in a coherently joint operation focused on this decade. In 2004,
137 OLYMPIC CHALLENGE will examine RDO in the next decade to explore the full package of
138 capabilities to conduct RDO in the context of Joint Vision 2020. Other limited objective
139 experiments and events will further refine functional and supporting concepts that enable RDO.
154 INTENTIONALLY BLANK
155 TABLE OF CONTENTS
157 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
159 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
161 1.1 Tasking
162 1.2 Background
163 1.3 Organization
165 CHAPTER 2. THE JOINT OPERATIONAL CONTEXT
167 2.1. Emerging Security Environment: The Strategic Requirement
168 2.2. Adaptive Adversaries: The Operational Conditions
169 2.3. Future Joint Operations: The Solution
170 2.3.1. Knowledge Centric
171 2.3.2. Effects Based
172 2.3.3. Coherently Joint
173 2.3.4. Fully Networked
175 CHAPTER 3. THE CONCEPT OF RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS
177 3.1. Concept Definition
178 3.2. Concept Description
179 3.2.1. Knowledge
180 3.2.2. Command and Control
181 3.2.3. Operations
182 3.3. Applying Rapid Decisive Operations
183 3.4. Service Concepts for Future Operations
185 CHAPTER 4. ELEMENTS OF THE RDO CONCEPT
187 4.1. Knowledge
188 4.1.1. Operational Net Assessment
189 4.1.2. Common Relevant Operational Picture
190 4.1.3. Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
191 4.2. Command and Control
192 4.2.1. Adaptive Joint Command and Control
193 18.104.22.168. Standing Joint Force Headquarters Element (SJFHQ)
194 22.214.171.124. Alternative Command Arrangements for the SJFHQ
195 126.96.36.199. Task Organizing the Joint Force
196 4.2.2. Joint Interactive Planning
197 4.2.3. Interagency Operations: Leveraging All Instruments of National Power
198 4.2.4. Multinational Operations
199 4.3. Operations
200 4.3.1. Effects Based Operations
201 188.8.131.52. Dominant Maneuver
202 184.108.40.206. Precision Engagement
203 220.127.116.11. Information Operations
204 4.3.2. Operational Enablers
205 18.104.22.168. Assured Access
206 22.214.171.124. Rapid Force Deployment
207 126.96.36.199. Agile Sustainment Operations
208 188.8.131.52. Full Dimensional Protection
210 CHAPTER 5. THE WAY AHEAD
212 5.1. RDO Concept Experimentation Strategy
213 5.1.1. Background
214 5.1.2. Strategy
215 5.2. Complementary Efforts
216 5.3. Desired Operational Capabilities
217 5.4. The Initial Adversary and Vulnerability Assessment
218 5.5. Conclusion
222 A. Glossary and Acronyms
223 B Service Future Concepts
224 C Initial Adversary and Vulnerability Assessment
226 CHAPTER ONE
230 This chapter identifies the Defense Planning Guidance tasking to develop a concept for rapid
231 decisive operations. It provides the background and purpose of the concept and describes the
232 organization of the document.
234 1.1 Tasking
236 The April 2000 Defense Planning Guidance tasked US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to
237 develop "...new joint warfighting concepts and capabilities that will improve the ability of future
238 joint force commanders (JFCs) to rapidly and decisively conduct particularly challenging and
239 important operational missions, such as...coercing an adversary to undertake certain actions or
240 deny the adversary the ability to coerce or attack its neighbors..." This paper describes an
241 evolving construct for such Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) in the future. While we have
242 chosen to focus on a high-end smaller-scale contingency as our scenario, RDO principles and
243 capabilities will apply to a range of engagement options that span the entire spectrum of military
246 1.2. Background
248 The RDO concept is the USJFCOM experimentation vehicle for transformation and
249 operationalizing Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020). This concept provides a construct for future joint
250 operations and a framework for USJFCOM experimentation to develop a set of
251 recommendations for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, people, and
252 facilities (DOTMLPF), as well as policy implications. It provides joint context for Service
253 experimentation. It is based on the JV2020 operational capabilities, dominant maneuver,
254 precision engagement, focused logistics, full-dimensional protection, and the key enabler,
255 information superiority. It draws on the previous USJFCOM RDO concept framework paper and
256 incorporates operational elements that demonstrated the greatest promise during FY-00 concept
257 exploration and the analysis and insights gained from the JFCOM RDO Analytic Wargame 2000
258 series and Unified Vision 2001. A broad range of ideas extracted from the works by Institute for
259 Defense Analysis, Defense Group, Inc., Service concepts for future operations, and other sources
260 also inform the RDO concept.
262 As an integrating concept, the RDO concept provides context for and incorporates appropriate
263 elements from a number of co-evolving USJFCOM functional concepts including: Adaptive
264 Joint Command and Control (AJC2), Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP), Joint
265 Interactive Planning (JIP), and Focused Logistics (FL). The RDO concept also includes
266 emerging concepts and ideas such as Effects-based Operations (EBO), Operational Net
267 Assessment (ONA), Interagency Operations, Multinational Operations (MNO), Dominant
268 Maneuver (DM), Precision Engagement (PE), Information Operations (IO), Assured Access
269 (AA), Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, (JISR), Full Dimension Protection,
270 (FDP), Rapid Force Deployment, and Agile Sustainment Operations. The last two are based on
271 elements of the Focused Logistics Concept. The RDO related functional concepts will be further
272 developed in supporting concept papers, concepts of operations, and tactics, techniques, and
273 procedures (TTP) as necessary to support experimentation and to further develop DOTMLPF
274 and policy recommendations.
276 1.3. Organization
278 This chapter provides tasking and background, and describes the organization of the document.
279 Chapter 2 provides context for the Rapid Decisive Operations concept. It describes the strategic
280 requirement, the operational conditions, and the envisioned characteristics of future US
281 operations. Chapter 3 defines and describes the operational concept. Chapter 4 provides a
282 further description of the RDO concept elements organized under the categories of knowledge,
283 command and control, and operations. Chapter 5 summarizes the concept experimentation
284 strategy and other complementary experimentation efforts as they relate to RDO. It also
285 discusses desired operational capabilities and their DOTMLPF implications, and provides a
286 description of an Initial Adversary Vulnerability Assessment (IAVA).
288 CHAPTER TWO
290 THE JOINT OPERATIONAL CONTEXT
292 This Chapter provides the context for this paper. It describes the future environment and the
293 potential adversaries that may challenge US interest. It also describes the proposed solution in
294 terms of envisioned characteristics of future operations.
296 2.1. The Emerging Security Environment: The Strategic Requirement
298 The United States now faces a world in which adversaries will attack with little or no warning,
299 and in which our ability to deploy major forces to a theater in crisis will be constrained by
300 politics, geography and adversary employment of anti-access capabilities--ballistic and land-
301 attack cruise missiles, terrorism, diesel submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles, sea mines, and
302 weapons of mass effects. Legacy warfighting concepts, and to some extent the forces created to
303 support them, are ill suited to deal with this new security environment. We can no longer plan
304 on having months or even weeks to deploy massive theater forces into a region rich in
305 unthreatened infrastructure, while delaying offensive action until favorable force ratios have
306 been achieved. Instead, we must plan to engage in the first hours of a crisis with those
307 capabilities that can be brought to bear quickly, informed by intimate knowledge of the
308 adversary and focused on those objectives most likely to produce the desired effects. This new
309 American way of war, especially when enabled by forces optimized to its requirements, will
310 enhance our national security in the 21st century.
312 In the decade since the end of the Cold War the United States has encountered a dramatic change
313 in the nature of the security environment. Throughout most of the 20th century, the coordinated
314 application of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and
315 economic) remained at the level of national strategic planners and decision makers. At the
316 operational level, there were clear distinctions between the instruments of national power and the
317 application of those elements in support of our national interests. During the 1990s, the
318 distinctions between the strategic and operational levels began to blur while domestic and
319 international expectations about the application of national power shifted as seen in operations in
320 portions of the Gulf War (1990-91), Haiti (1994), and Kosovo (1999). In response to the shifting
321 conditions, the U.S. military has changed in such ways as formalizing Theater Engagement
322 Plans, increased emphasis on non-traditional missions and relationships, expanded contacts with
323 the wider Interagency Community, and developed robust concepts in the area of Information
326 The new range of threats our nation faces extends beyond the traditional rivalries of nation-
327 states, and now a new set of entities that includes non-state, transnational, and other ill-defined
328 adversaries has begun to gain the capability to present significant threats to our interests.
329 Demographic developments and growing disparities in global wealth and resource distribution
330 will create additional pressures. International drug trafficking will remain a source of instability,
331 as will ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions. Even among traditional state actors, the
332 difference between hostility and non-hostility has blurred, as new capabilities such as computer
333 network attack make it difficult to recognize when the line into hostility has been crossed. The
334 proliferation of advanced weapons systems and technologies, such as theater missiles, has
335 eliminated the traditional time between warning and attack that framed many of our operational
338 Dramatic technological developments in the information, biological, and space sciences offer
339 significant opportunities for the advancement of military science. The emergence of new threats,
340 enabled by these technologies, may be difficult for our legacy forces and technologies to address.
341 We are entering an era in which there may be no clear lines between hostile and nonhostile or
342 political and military action. Actions by an adversary will extend beyond hostile military action
343 and can include terrorist attacks and cyber warfare. The perpetrators of these actions may be
344 harder to identify and even when identified they may immerse themselves among the innocent,
345 making it harder for us to strike against them. We will operate in a continuum of activity in a
346 political-military-economic-social-infrastructure-informational environment in which the
347 objectives and the intensity of our relationships with potential adversaries may change rapidly.
349 Our current joint force, with its overwhelming capabilities for conventional conflict with a
350 military peer competitor, might not provide the tools we need to dominate this new environment.
351 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, we have re-sized the Cold War force into a smaller version of
352 itself. Most of our Cold War doctrine, principles of operations, force design, and programming
353 and acquisition processes remain unchanged. We have infused our smaller legacy force with the
354 emerging advantages of the ―Revolution in Military Affairs‖ and in many ways have improved
355 the efficiency of elements of the force but not necessarily the overall effectiveness of the force.
357 Limitations of our legacy forces include reduced forward based forces and bases, fewer forces to
358 meet increasing requirements, insufficient strategic lift to rapidly deploy our powerful but
359 ponderous legacy forces, insufficient long range attack platforms, and dependence on low
360 density/high value ISR platforms. We have an unmatched ability to gather information on the
361 environment, the adversary, and ourselves but lack the collaborative planning and command and
362 control systems to use this information to enable decision superiority. We have precision
363 weapons that can hit an aim point with great accuracy, but we lack the ability to consistently
364 produce the desired operational effect. Our Services bring great capabilities to each domain, but
365 continuing interoperability problems, insufficient joint training, and the lack of a fully coherent
366 joint C2 system limit their ability to perform routinely and effectively in integrated joint action.
368 We also face an emerging international environment characterized by pervasive knowledge, and
369 an increased expectation of rapid results at minimal cost. In addition, pressure increases to limit
370 damage to the adversary’s national infrastructure and carnage on the civilian population. These
371 geo-strategic changes and the proliferation of advanced technologies have reshaped the 21st
372 century battlespace.
374 The strategic requirement is to be ready to transition from a relatively peaceful process to intense
375 combat operations rapidly and decisively to achieve the strategic objectives. Our challenge, in
376 conjunction with other instruments of national power, is to build the capability to respond
377 quickly and bring regional contingencies to a rapid and decisive close. We must do this while
378 not losing our ability to prevail in the event of a major regional contingency.
380 2.2. Adaptive Adversaries: The Operational Conditions
382 In spite of our significant technological, economic, and military edge, a number of regional
383 powers and transnational coalitions have the potential to place our national interests at risk. Such
384 adversaries could achieve, within an acceptable cost and in a very near timeframe, a level of
385 military capacity that could give them the ability to exploit the current limitations of our legacy
388 Potential adversaries have learned from our recent operations and adapted to pose increasingly
389 dangerous threats that may include a numerically superior combined arms force. They might not
390 be constrained by time and, using the "home field" advantage, will have the ability to
391 demonstrate a threatening posture or act of defiance and then back away at will. Adversaries
392 will seek opportunities to achieve their objectives before the US can respond and present us with
393 a fait accompli. If we choose to engage, our adversaries will adapt and innovate to overcome our
394 capabilities. Most will not attempt to defeat our forces in symmetric confrontation, but rather
395 will attempt to defeat our will by using asymmetric attacks, denying us access, and, if necessary,
396 drawing us into a prolonged, slow, and indecisive operation.
398 Asymmetric attacks may employ long-range missiles with WME or terrorist attacks against our
399 intermediate bases, deployment infrastructure, allies, and even targets in CONUS. Adversaries
400 may target our increased dependence on commercial assets while at the same time capitalizing
401 on our hesitancy to target third nation commercial assets that the adversary might be using. They
402 will attempt to deny us access to the theater of operations by using widely available modern anti-
403 access systems and emerging commercially available technologies. These might include theater
404 missiles, integrated and mobile air defenses, weapons of mass destruction, mines, submarines,
405 and sophisticated forms of coastal defense. Failing to deny us access, they will draw us into
406 costly attrition operations, where they can manage to win by not losing. Their objective will be
407 to cause us to doubt our ability to win at an acceptable cost by inflicting major casualties on our
408 forces. They may also be willing to accept significant military and civilian casualties. They will
409 attempt to counter our high technology capabilities by camouflage, cover, deception, and
410 dispersion. They will employ sophisticated information operations to attack our national and
411 coalition will to fight.
413 Our operations in Serbia and Kosovo, while successful, presented us with challenges we may see
414 more of in the future: ethnic cleansing, dispersed operations by small units, pervasive anti air
415 defenses, and extensive use of cover, camouflage, and concealment. We were constrained to less
416 than optimal methods of attack in an effort to minimize friendly casualties. Information
417 operations were targeted against our will and the coherence of the coalition. Had we the ability
418 to rapidly deploy and employ the full range of joint capabilities and not present Serbia with a
419 one-dimensional threat, we may have been able to bring operations there to a more rapid and
420 decisive conclusion.
426 2.3. Future Joint Operations: The Solution
428 To respond to the environment and threats of the future, we must transform the way in which we
429 conduct joint operations. We must learn how to conduct our operations in conjunction with the
430 other instruments of national power. There are four conceptual characteristics that, if achieved,
431 describe the fundamental differences between ―future‖ joint operations, and today’s joint
432 operations. Some of the characteristic of future joint operations are, to a degree, in place now,
433 others are being developed, and still others are becoming well understood but required time to
434 move from concept to doctrine. As a minimum, future operations will embody the mutually
435 supporting characteristics of: knowledge-centric, effects-based, coherently joint, and fully
438 2.3.1. Knowledge-centric
440 Possession of superior knowledge will enable us to change future joint operations. The power of
441 sophisticated future information systems will provide the opportunity for the unprecedented
442 creation and sharing of knowledge and understanding of the enemy, our own capabilities, the
443 environment, and the battlespace. Enhanced situational understanding will enable decision
444 superiority (better decisions quicker), reduced operational risk, and dramatically increased pace,
445 coherence, and effectiveness of operations. The more we know about the enemy, the operational
446 environment, and ourselves, the more precisely we can focus our capabilities to produce desired
447 effects with the right amount of force. This may enable us to better balance effectiveness and
448 efficiency better than we have in the past. The results would be both an increase in both the
449 rapidity of our operation and the degree of decisiveness we can obtain.
451 2.3.2. Effects-based
453 Effects-based operations is a philosophy that focuses on obtaining a desired strategic outcome or
454 ―effect‖ on the enemy, through the application of the full range of military and non-military
455 capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. An ―effect‖ is the physical,
456 functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from a selected action or
457 set of actions. EBO are designed to apply the right mix of precision fires, dominant maneuver,
458 and information operations capabilities throughout the battlespace to create effects. A
459 continuously updated understanding of the adversary as a complex adaptive system will allow us
460 to more precisely coordinate the application of the full range of our national capabilities.
461 Desired effects are created with the goal of bringing about a change in the behavior of the
462 adversary. This understanding will also facilitate the timely assessment and adaptation of our
463 actions, quickly and efficiently achieving the commander’s desired outcome.
465 In order to conduct EBO, we must harness the capabilities of the departments of the interagency
466 and international communities to create the knowledge and actions necessary for future joint
467 operations. Rather than direct actions of the wider interagency community, the intent is that
468 military actions be coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the simultaneous actions of
469 the interagency community in both planning and execution. This teamwork will develop an
470 unparalleled ability to determine a wider set of first-, second-, and third-order effects that will
471 collapse the enemy leader’s will and the coherence of the enemy’s war-making capabilities.
473 2.3.3. Coherently Joint
475 At the operational level our force and its capabilities must be born joint, allowing us to invest up
476 front in true joint capabilities rather than fixing DOTMLPF interoperability problems after the
477 fact. For the foreseeable future significant portions of the legacy force will require retrofit of
478 necessary interoperability capabilities. Successful joint action will rely on fully integrated joint
479 command and control systems, interoperable combat systems, and a coherence of thought and
480 action enabled by increased joint training and leader development. For full coherence in the
481 strategic, operational, and tactical domains, greater coordination and collaboration must also
482 extend to interagency and multinational operations. Coherently joint operations will require
483 further expansion of the ―joint space‖ that exists today at the combatant command level down to
484 operational level execution (JTF and/or component force headquarters).
486 2.3.4. Fully Networked
488 Fully networked forces enable us to create and share knowledge, plan, decide, and act
489 collaboratively and concurrently to accomplish many tasks simultaneously. Networked forces
490 allow us to compress and change the nature of the sequential, echeloned way we plan and
491 conduct operations today. They leverage shared situational knowledge among all elements of the
492 joint force, which increases the speed and precision in planning and application of power.
493 Habitual relationships, based on standing joint and component operational staffs, identification
494 of specific organizations against specific contingencies, collaborative planning, frequent
495 exercises and other opportunities to work together, serve to further increase the speed and
496 effectiveness of planning and execution. Fully networked forces eliminate ―stovepiped‖
497 processes, enhance the effectiveness of current joint capabilities, and expand the definition of
498 what is a joint capability. They allow streamlined joint dynamic processes for ISR management,
499 logistics, fire control, and maneuver processes and tactics. Our fully networked team must
500 include the interagency and multinational partners as well.
513 INTENTIONALLY BLANK
515 CHAPTER THREE
517 THE CONCEPT OF RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS
519 This chapter provides the definition of Rapid Decisive Operations and describes the elements of
520 the RDO concept in three interrelated categories: Knowledge, Command and control, and
521 operations. It also describes the application of the RDO concept in an operational setting and
522 introduces the Service concepts for future operations.
524 3.1. Concept Definition
526 Rapid Decisive Operations is a joint operational concept for future operations. A rapid decisive
527 operation will integrate knowledge, command and control, and effects-based operations to
528 achieve the desired political/military effect. In preparing for and conducting a rapid decisive
529 operation, the military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments of national power
530 to understand and reduce the adversary’s critical capabilities and coherence. The United States
531 and its allies asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions and in dimensions against
532 which he has no counter, dictating the terms and tempo of the operation. The adversary,
533 suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his objectives, chooses to cease
534 actions that are against US interests or has his capabilities defeated.
536 3.2. Concept Description
538 The Rapid Decisive Operations concept presents a paradigm for combat operations in which we,
539 not our adversaries, dictate the terms by which we will fight. Our intent is to asymmetrically
540 assault the enemy with all the instruments of national power, from dimensions and directions
541 against which he has no counter. Precluding his options, RDO seize the operational and strategic
542 initiatives, deny the adversary the opportunity to achieve his objectives, and generate in the
543 enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat.
545 The preparation for RDO is deliberate and continuous, and includes detailed contingency
546 planning and development of knowledge about the adversary. At the national and theater
547 strategic level, the United States will attempt to influence and deter an adversary by using
548 diplomatic, economic, and information operations, supported by relevant military flexible
549 deterrent options. If deterrence fails, RDO provides the capability to rapidly and decisively
550 coerce, compel, or defeat the enemy to accomplish our strategic objectives without a lengthy
551 campaign or an extensive buildup of forces. RDO will also set the conditions for transition to
552 either post-conflict operations or extended combat operations if necessary.
554 To be successful we must create a capability to be both rapid and decisive. Our forces have
555 demonstrated the capability to be decisive, given sufficient time to build overwhelming combat
556 power in the area of operations. And we have forces that are rapidly deployable, but which may
557 lack sufficient combat power to deter or defeat an adversary’s hostile intentions. RDO include
558 several elements that will allow us to be both rapid and decisive. By better integrating the most
559 responsive elements of the joint
Rapid 560 force, using the characteristics
561 of future joint operations, we
Rapid = Accomplishing the objectives of the campaign 562 can initiate combat operations
as rapidly as possible. Speed must be both 563 and rapidly produce effects
absolute and relative to the adversary.
564 while completing deployment
To be rapid we need:
565 of the remaining elements of the
Knowledge: Detailed understanding of enemy and ourselves
Early start to planning, timely decisions 566 joint force.
A compressed decision process 567
A ready, responsive joint C2 Capability 568 Rapidity is both absolute and
Forward presence and rapid movement 569 relative. Rapidity of movement
Tailored forces and sustainment
570 may be absolute in that the
Intense high tempo of operations
Responsive C2 Systems, established joint headquarters 571 NCA, the geographic combatant
element, and compressed decision process 572 commander (hereafter referred
573 to as CINC) or the commander
Figure 5. Rapid 574 of a JTF may require the ability
575 to create a credible US military
576 presence in a crisis or contingency in a matter of hours or days. In the case of operational
577 mobility, rapidity may be relative in that the joint force commander wants the joint force to be
578 capable of creating or reacting to situations faster than the adversary. Rapid resolution is
579 accomplished by intense, unrelenting combat operations or the threat thereof.
581 Decisiveness is enabled by
582 knowledge capabilities that
583 precisely identify adversary Decisive
584 centers of gravity, critical
585 vulnerabilities, and key links Decisive = Imposing our will on the enemy by breaking
his coherence and defeating his will and
586 and nodes. Future command ability to resist
587 and control systems will
To be decisive we need:
588 enable the ability to leverage
Knowledge: Identify and affect what is most valuable to enemy
589 our national capabilities to
Effects-based operations employing the full range of national
590 destroy the coherence of the capabilities
591 adversary’s will and ability to Info superiority, dominant maneuver,and precision
592 fight by striking his critical engagement to apply synchronized precision effects to
generate overwhelming shock
593 functions from dimensions
Responsive C2 Systems and Shortened response cycle
594 and directions against which
595 he has no counter. RDO
596 coerce or compel the Figure 6. Decisiveness
597 adversary not to use military
598 force by disrupting the coherence of his efforts in such a way that he becomes convinced that he
599 cannot achieve his objectives and that he will ultimately lose what he values most. To that end,
600 we will clearly display the intent and capability to deploy and employ additional joint forces if
601 required. Also, RDO can, if necessary, simultaneously defeat his ability to conduct effective
602 operations by destroying the forces are the source of the adversary’s power. While achieving
603 effects is our primary method of influencing the enemy, in some cases the attrition of his forces
604 may in fact be a primary means of producing the desired effect.
606 The basic elements of the Rapid Decisive Operations concept are a series of functional and
607 enabling concepts that are grouped into three broad categories: knowledge, command and
608 control, and operations. These concepts embody the characteristics of future operations—
609 knowledge-centric, coherently joint, fully networked, and effects-based.
611 3.2.1. Knowledge
613 The more we know about the enemy, the operational environment, and ourselves, and the
614 interrelationship of each, the more precisely we can focus our capabilities to produce the desired
615 effect. This will enable us to accomplish the mission with smaller deploying forces which can be
616 employed more rapidly than in the past. The operational net assessment ONA) is the primary
617 means for developing knowledge about an adversary, ourselves, and likely actions to create our
618 desired effects. The ONA is an operational support tool based on a system-of-systems analysis
619 of a potential adversary's political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
620 (PMESI2) war-making capabilities. The ONA makes knowledge superiority possible.
622 The Common Relevant Operational Picture is a presentation of timely, fused, accurate, assured,
623 and relevant information, which supports the development of knowledge and situational
624 understanding. The CROP can be tailored to meet the requirements of individual users in the
625 joint force and is common to every organization and individual involved in a joint operation. It
626 is a ―virtual warehouse‖ of required data/information for the joint force. The CROP, in concert
627 with a robust collaborative planning environment, enables the joint force to achieve the high
628 level of situational understanding necessary to RDO.
630 Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance RDO uses a network approach to the
631 management of ISR assets to integrate data from multiple sources into a fused information
632 picture to support the quick-paced demands of effects-based operations. System of systems
633 architecture enables the ISR community to be fully integrated into the operational plan, and will
634 allow dynamic control of sensors and platforms. Planners and operators will share information
635 in a collaborative environment.
637 3.2.2. Command and Control
639 RDO command and control (C2) leverages the significant investment and ongoing improvements
640 in information technology, such as the Global Information Grid. Practiced collaboration,
641 habitual relationships, and shared situational understanding will enable greater coherence of C2
642 and more rapid and effective execution. The foundation for improved C2 will be a standing joint
643 force command and control element in each CINC headquarters (titled as Standing Joint Force
644 Headquarters (SJFHQ)). The Adaptive Joint Command and Control concept describes the
645 SJFHQ. It will have the equipment, training, and authority to become a core around which the
646 staff of a JTF, when established, will operate. Rapidly deployable, an augmented C2 element
647 will be capable of operating alone for a small JTF contingency or operating with another larger
648 headquarters or the CINC’s staff, depending on nature of the command relationships. This C2
649 element uses the ONA to develop plans for a priority set of selected missions.
651 Joint Interactive Planning enables a transition from hierarchical serial planning to parallel
652 collaborative planning to reduced decision cycle times and increase tempo. A refined
653 interagency collaboration process that allows all partners to ―inform and be informed by‖ the
654 others. This enables the coordinated application of national power. Reducing or eliminating the
655 ad hoc nature of the Interagency Community involvement in political/military coordination will
656 be a key element in successful RDO. Future operations will be conducted in a multinational
657 environment. Understanding this, we will work with our multinational partners to properly
658 employ the key assets, legitimacy, and political support they provide RDO. Peacetime
659 engagement, training, and shared tools for planning will mitigate the challenges of policy,
660 dissimilar training, equipment, technology, doctrine, culture, and language.
662 3.2.3. Operations
664 Effects-based Operations is a warfighting philosophy that has implications for knowledge,
665 planning, and operations. The focus of EBO is on obtaining the desired strategic outcome or
666 effect through the application of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the strategic,
667 operational, and tactical levels. RDO are predicated on effects-based operations and require the
668 integrated application of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and information operations.
669 Dominant maneuver is characterized by maneuver of joint forces in relentless, distributed,
670 noncontiguous operations throughout the depth and breadth of the battlespace to create the
671 desired effect. Precision engagement is characterized by joint force engagement of the right
672 target, at the right time, with the right means to produce the desired effect. Information
673 operations are the equivalent of fire and maneuver in the information realm. They influence the
674 perception of adversary decision makers to support the creation of the desired effect.
675 RDO are enabled by an interrelated set of operational enablers. This set includes concepts and
676 processes for assured access, rapid force deployment, agile sustainment operations, and full
677 dimension protection. Assured access is the ability to set and sustain for the time necessary the
678 battlespace conditions necessary to bring the joint force within operational reach of the decisive
679 points affecting an adversary’s centers of gravity. Rapid Force Deployment includes both
680 strategic deployment and operational movement within the theater. Rapid force deployment uses
681 the knowledge and command and control capabilities described above to select, sequence, and
682 deploy the right combination of joint force capability to accomplish the assigned mission. Rapid
683 force deployment relies on both improved deployment processes and enhanced transportation
684 capabilities to deploy and rapidly employ a tailored force. The focus is not just on rapidly
685 deploying forces, but rather how to rapidly project sufficient combat power to execute the joint
686 concept of operations. This must allow for a deliberate flow of forces designed to match JFC
687 timelines for operations. Agile sustainment operations envision distributed basing, both afloat
688 and ashore, with the capability to sustain the forces with mission-configured loads delivered
689 directly to distributed forces in the battlespace. Full dimension protection relies on knowledge
690 and command and control capabilities to integrate our greater ability to see the battlespace and
691 quickly disseminate threat information to anticipate and counter enemy action.
What’s Different About RDO ?
Today's Operations are: Tomorrow’s RDO’s will be:
• Deconflicted • Integrated
• Sequential • Simultaneous
Deploy, Lodge, Build-up……. Understand, Access, Strike , Sustain
• Progressive • Parallel
Plan before moving…… Move while planning
• Linear • Distributed
LOCs, FSCLs, FLOTS…… Sanctuaries, Nodes, Networks
• Attrition-based • Effects-based
Achieve numerical superiority Achieve qualitative superiority
Attack the enemy’s forces Attack the enemy’s capabilities
Dominate terrain Dominate the will
• Symmetrical • Asymmetrical
Match capability with capability Attack vulnerability with capability
Mutually supporting elements Networked supported elements
• Terrain oriented • Time definite orientation
Seize and hold terrain Control terrain when necessary
• Force-oriented • Coherency-oriented
Defeat the enemy’s forces Incapacitate enemy’s capabilities
• Enabled by IPB and situational • Enabled by dynamic battlespace understanding
development and exploitation
Figure 8. Legacy Tomorrow
693 3.3. Applying Rapid Decisive Operations
695 The capability to execute an RDO must be viewed in the context of the theater CINC’s range of
696 actions to influence, deter, coerce, compel, and defeat an adversary. This range of actions is
697 enabled and supported by other than military elements of national power as well as allied and
698 coalition capabilities. The characteristics of future joint operations and the increased capability
699 afforded a CINC by a RDO capable force will change the nature of CINC theater engagement. A
700 greater emphasis on creating effects in the influence and deter phase increases the rapidity and
701 decisiveness of joint combat operations.
703 The preparation to execute an RDO begins well before current-day crisis-action planning. A
704 theater CINC prioritizes areas and issues of concern within the theater. These priorities focus the
705 efforts of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters to focus and refine the theater Operational Net
706 Assessment. The knowledge provided by the SJFHQ and the ONA permit the CINC to provide
707 informed recommendations to the NCA. An early NCA decision, a clear articulation of the
708 desired strategic end state, and the capability to begin execution almost immediately of a range
709 of operations are necessary to create the rapidity and decisiveness of this concept.
711 A robust, networked joint command and control system is key to establishing the conditions for
712 RDO. This joint command and control capability shifts from theater strategic to an operational
713 warfighting focus while informing and being informed by all national capabilities (Diplomatic,
714 Information, Military, and Economic (DIME)). Establishing the conditions for creating
715 decisive effects includes balancing the mix and priorities of national through tactical ISR
716 capabilities. It also includes tailoring and supervising the execution of ongoing information
717 operations, activating the rastructure for the rapid deployment and sustainment
718 of a military force, and providing an enhanced situational understanding to the larger interagency
721 Viewed from the perspective of the United States and its allies, the execution of an RDO is a
722 rapid series of relentless vigorous multidimensional and distributed actions, raids, and strikes.
723 The flow of the operations does not follow the traditional sequential pattern of prehostilities,
724 lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities and
725 redeployment, but rather is a continuous cycle of operations from long range precision strikes, to
726 distributed seizure or destruction of key surface objectives, to the sophisticated application of
727 information operations. The purpose of these actions, raids, and strikes is to create desired
728 operational and strategic effects. The need to be both rapid and decisive demands that every
729 action be linked to the strategic objective. Operations will focus on achieving what is required,
730 when it is required, where it is required, and how long it is required to produce the desired effect.
731 In some cases missions and tasks will support requirements to achieve access, enable
732 sustainment, or conduct full dimension protection, but in all cases the end result of the actions is
733 the desired effect.
735 Viewed from the perspective of the adversary, an RDO is continuous, unrelenting, and begins
736 under conditions determined by the United States and its coalition partners. The nature of the
737 distributed, multi-dimensional military attacks, when combined with the acute and chronic
738 results of coordinated diplomatic, information, and economic effects, will rapidly erode an
739 adversary’s operational coherence and capability to fight. The rapid unfolding of operations and
740 the actual and perceived loss of coherent capability will combine to break the will of the
743 One of the fundamental characteristics of RDO is the focus on rapid resolution.
744 RDO are not designed for long-term commitment or to resolve long-standing problems. A rapid
745 decisive operation creates the desired outcome itself or it establishes the conditions to transition
746 to a higher (e. g., major regional contingency) or lower (e. g., security and stability operation)
747 level of commitment.
749 3.4. Service Concepts for Future Operations
751 The Services, in partnership with US Joint Forces Command, are developing advanced concepts
752 for the rapidly deployable, knowledge-based, precision forces necessary to meet the future
753 operational challenges. These include the Army Objective Force, Air Force Aerospace
754 Expeditionary Operations, Navy Network Centric Operations, Marine Corps Ship to Objective
755 Maneuver, and the SOF 2020 Vision. Recent experiments have demonstrated that key elements
756 of Service future concepts, organizations, and equipment support RDO and contribute to
757 realizing JV2020. These efforts must be developed in a manner that will ensure fully
758 interoperable technology and operations. Appendix B describes key RDO-related elements of
759 future Service concepts, organizations, and technologies.
773 INTENTIONALLY BLANK
774 CHAPTER FOUR
776 ELEMENTS OF THE RDO CONCEPT
778 This chapter discusses key elements of
779 the basic RDO concept. These elements Concept Elements
780 constitute a broad array of functional Knowledge
781 and enabling concepts. Although some • Operational Net Assessment
• Operational Net Assessment
• Common Relevant Operational Picture
782 concepts may apply to more than one • Common Relevant Operational Picture
• Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance
• Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance
783 category, for ease of discussion, separate Command and Control
Command and Control
784 concepts are presented here under the • Adaptive Joint Command & Control
• Adaptive Joint Command & Control
• Joint Interactive Planning
785 one of the broad categories of • Joint Interactive Planning
• Interagency Operations
• Interagency Operations
786 knowledge, command and control, or •
• Multinational Operations
787 operations. Operations
• Effects-based Operations
788 • Effects-based Operations
789 Current joint and Service doctrine, Precision Engagement
790 organizations, and systems provide a Information Operations
• Operations Enablers
• Operations Enablers
791 solid foundation for successful joint Assured Access
792 operations. Fundamentals, such as Rapid Force Deployment
Rapid Force Deployment
Agile Sustainment Operations
793 principles of war and elements of the Agile Sustainment Operations
Full Dimension Protection
Full Dimension Protection
794 operational art, will likely change little
795 in the next 20 years. Many of our Figure 11. RDO Concept Elements
796 present and emerging capabilities will be
797 relevant to the requirements of RDO in the next decade with only incremental technology
798 improvements. However, new technologies and conceptual development offer the potential for
799 transformational changes in how we employ our forces and use our capabilities. Significant
800 changes will be necessary to realize the full potential of RDO as envisioned by this concept.
801 Experimentation and study will illuminate these changes and provide the understanding and
802 justification to undertake enabling DOTMLPF initiatives.
804 4.1. Knowledge
806 Knowledge-centric operations postulate that the more knowledge we can create and share about
807 the adversary, the operational environment, and ourselves, the more we can focus our capabilities
808 to produce desired effects with less risk of unintended consequences and more efficient
809 expenditure of national resources. Knowledge becomes a hedge against uncertainty, allowing
810 deployment of more precisely tailored capabilities and enabling increased speed and degree of
811 decisiveness of action. The Operational Net Assessment and the power of sophisticated future
812 information systems, such as the Common Relevant Operational Picture, will improve our
813 ability to create and share knowledge of the enemy, our own forces, and the environment.
814 Advancements in Joint ISR capabilities, tactics, and procedures will improve the quality of
815 information. This enhanced situational understanding will reduce operational risk, improve
816 decision-making, and dramatically increase the pace, coherence, and effectiveness of operations.
818 Knowledge is the key to decision superiority. Processed and fused data become information.
819 Decision makers, enabled by study, judgment, and experience, convert information into
820 knowledge and situational understanding, which is the key to decision superiority – the ability to
821 make better decisions faster than the adversary.
823 Decision superiority requires more than a relative advantage in information. History provides
824 many examples of an opponent with a significant advantage in information being beaten by a
825 less well-informed opponent who made better decisions. In this concept, decision aids, joint
826 interactive planning, information sharing, and more effective planning and executing processes
827 as envisioned by the ideas presented in the various concepts will enable the JFC to make better
830 4.1.1. Operational Net Assessment
832 The ONA is a critical enabler for achieving RDO. It is an operational support tool process based
833 on a systems analysis of a potential adversary's national power (as a complex adaptive system) to
834 include PMESI elements. It also includes a detailed analysis of our own national capabilities to
835 implement potential courses of action. The ONA informs decision-makers from strategic to
836 tactical levels regarding the complementary and supporting missions and tasks. The intent is to
837 create an environment where all elements can inform and be informed by the full range of
838 diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) actions available to achieve specific
839 effects on an adversary's will and capability in support of national objectives. The ONA
840 provides the supported unified commander, JTF commander, and components visibility of
841 strategic objective-to-task linkages necessary to create desired effects.
843 By analyzing the adversary’s political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
844 systems and their inter-relations, we can make judgments on a range of potential friendly actions.
845 Analysis includes key links and nodes within systems and proposes methods that will influence,
846 neutralize, or destroy them to achieve a desired effect. By analyzing our own national
847 capabilities to implement and support potential courses of action we can eliminate, early in the
848 planning process, those activities or actions that will not provide the intended effects and focus
849 only on those actions that are possible given the assumed situation and circumstances. The ONA
850 is an integrated, collaborative product of DoD and other appropriate government and non-
851 government organizations. The ONA provides an operational product (Blue desired effects and a
852 range of options to produce that effect)) used to develop friendly courses of action and the effects
853 tasking order (ETO) (described in paragraph 4.1.1 below). Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
854 Battlespace (JIPB) focuses on the adversary’s known or postulated strategic- and operational-
855 level multi-force components and their strategy. ONA, by comparison, requires earlier analysis
856 of a broader scope of the potential adversary’s capabilities and our own national capabilities to
857 respond when required.
859 ONA Components. The ONA development process consists of four components: framework, a
860 knowledge map, effects models, and a collaboration process.
862 Framework. Our own national foreign policy goals and objectives provide the context for
863 the ONA. The political/military plans produced by the Interagency Policy Coordinating
864 Committees provide the strategic context based on the National Security Strategy. The
865 CINC’s Theater Engagement Plan, the Department of State (DoS) Mission Performance
866 Plans, and the CINC’s campaign plan provide the operational context. Just as important,
867 the ONA includes the context of the adversary’s objectives and security concerns as a
868 means to understand what is important to the adversary, the degree of importance, and
871 Knowledge Map. The ONA provides knowledge maps of the adversary based on the
872 PMESI systems analyses. It displays critical nodes and vulnerabilities in each sub-
873 system and the recommended means and logistics to achieve desired effects. Other
874 detailed data, such as individual target packages, or other supporting databases can link to
875 the ONA knowledge map to provide increased depth of understanding.
877 Effects Model. Modeling and simulation tools refine the ONA systems analyses. They
878 also help decision-makers select and prioritize means, courses of action, and predict
879 second- and third-order effects.
881 Collaboration. The ONA integrates the capabilities of numerous individuals,
882 organizations, and agencies. It captures the collective knowledge and analytical
883 capabilities of interagency, intelligence, non-government, and academic experts in a
884 collaborative environment. These participants create the knowledge which operations
885 planners and logisticians use to determine effective means and logistics options.
887 Figure 13 depicts the ONA production process. Information providers collaborate with strategic
888 and operational customers to form a common knowledge base. The ONA contains potential
889 strategic and operational objectives, a PMESI2 systems analysis, and has access to an effects
890 modeling capability. The process supports cohesiveness between policy formulation, campaign
891 planning, and tactical implementation. The SJFHQ uses the ONA to identify the adversary’s
892 critical nodes and vulnerabilities and the national means and logistics required to achieve desired
893 effects. The result is an integrated intelligence, operations and logistics planning, and execution
896 Applying the ONA Process. The ONA development process evaluates the adversary’s critical
897 vulnerabilities, capabilities, and limitations in relation to National/CINC objectives, regional
898 goals, and security concerns. This includes an evaluation of doctrine and tactics employed by
899 the adversary within the constraints of the environment and the potential situation being
900 examined. Models and simulations predict a range of possible outcomes if the adversary’s
901 critical nodes or vulnerabilities are neutralized. Models and simulations aid the assessment of
902 our means to implement potential courses of action through evaluation of the time and resource
903 costs associated with executing these actions. Modeling process also helps predict second and
904 third order effects, unintended outcomes, and the effectiveness of simultaneous application of
905 multiple means. The CINCs and subordinate commanders use this information to coordinate
906 with the interagency community on actions that may be brought to bear on the adversary.
907 Multinational partners may also be engaged.
909 The ONA process is continuous and provides a high level of situational understanding well in
910 advance of military action. As a result, the ONA supports crisis-action planning and production
911 of the JIPB. Analysis down to the target level supports a wide range of possible candidate
912 actions. Some targets may not be appropriate to military means and require other national
913 actions (e.g., space and information weapons, diplomatic actions).
915 The ONA systems analysis provides an understanding of each battlespace dimension. Analysis
916 of these characteristics determines their effects on both friendly and adversary capabilities and
917 possible COAs. The ONA may include products such as the effects of geography and weather;
918 network diagrams of the communications, transportation, and power distribution infrastructures;
919 link-analysis diagrams of political leadership, financial institutions, key industrial sectors;
920 cyberspace vulnerability charts; and psychological profiles on key military, political, economic
921 and social personalities.
923 The ONA synthesizes our knowledge of the adversary’s critical nodes and vulnerabilities and
924 pair the appropriate means and logistics required to exploit them into a single integrated product.
925 The result is an integrated operations-intelligence-logistics database that supports EBO and rapid
926 decisive actions.
928 4.1.2. Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP)
930 Access to the right information, at the right place, at the right time, in the right presentation
931 format compresses the warfighter’s decision-to-action operations tempo. The CROP presents
932 timely, fused, accurate, assured, and relevant information that can be tailored to meet the
933 requirements of the joint force. The information is common to every organization and individual
934 involved in a joint operation. The CROP, operating within a robust collaborative information
935 environment, enables the Joint Force to achieve the high level of knowledge necessary to support
936 RDO. Information available in the CROP amplifies the ONA and supports development of JIPB.
937 Each of these products, built largely from knowledge derived from the CROP, become products
938 themselves in the CROP. Essential to the CROP is the construct of a virtual warehouse of
939 information – tracks, friendly and enemy force dispositions (aerospace, land, sea); intelligence,
940 maps, and imagery; environment, logistics, and planning data; weather, socio-economic, and
941 cultural information. Users access the virtual warehouse to extract the set of timely, fused,
942 assured, and relevant information they need to accomplish their mission. It is access to the
943 CROP combined with collaboration that enables commanders and staffs to achieve a high degree
944 of shared battlespace awareness.
946 The Global Information Grid (GIG) enables the CROP. The GIG is a globally interconnected,
947 end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel. It collects,
948 processes, stores, manages, and provides information on demand to policy makers, warfighters,
949 and support personnel. The GIG provides the ―superset‖ of capabilities required to ensure that
950 the necessary information is continually available to the joint force.
952 Access to the CROP permits the dynamic, flexible sharing of requirements for warfighter
953 information both vertically (across echelons) and horizontally (across functions). The CROP
954 will use web-based technologies, artificial intelligence, and sophisticated information
955 management and dissemination tools to enable near real-time access to both raw (if desired) and
956 fused, actionable information. The CROP will support multi-level security partitioning to enable
957 the participation of allied and coalition forces in accordance with policy and information-sharing
958 agreements. Advanced human-systems technologies (both input and presentation) support user
959 interaction with the CROP. These include conversational speech recognition, virtual reality and
960 three-dimensional graphics, integration of personal handheld input-output devices with other
961 workstations, and new interaction techniques that facilitate collaborative work on shared
964 A range of ISR resources, operational resources, and other DoD-assured resources populate the
965 databases that comprise the virtual warehouse from which is the CROP presentations are drawn..
966 Figure 16 depicts the typical assured sources of information provided by the CROP. The figure
967 also illustrates the fact that the user community spans the strategic to tactical levels and includes
968 all of the Services, the joint community, and non-DoD organizations. Open-source data (e.g.,
969 from the internet, other non-DoD government agencies, and centers of excellence) and non-
970 assured coalition-source information augment these data as shown in Figure 17. The information
971 from which the enhanced knowledge necessary to enable RDO is derived, comes primarily from
972 the supporting collaborative information environment in which the Joint Force operates. This
973 environment, enabled by high-speed bandwidth connectivity and electronic collaborative tools,
974 facilitates the exchange of information among members of the Joint Force and those
975 organizations supporting or being supported by the Joint Force. While the goal of the CROP is
976 to provide the full set of information that might be required by all members of the collaborative
977 information environment, the reality is that some information requirements will fall outside the
978 CROP’s bounds. Satisfaction of these information requirements will be achieved within the
979 collaborative information environment.
981 The CROP provides for comparison of information from disparate sources and resolves
982 inconsistencies and ambiguities before the information is passed to users. The CROP relies on a
983 sophisticated and effective combination of information ―push‖ and ―pull.‖ Information is pushed
984 to the user in accordance with user-defined information profiles (pulled) and the CINC’s
985 published information policy. Access to the right information, at the right place, at the right
986 time, over the right and in the right presentation format are essential to compression of the
987 warfighter’s decision-to-action operations tempo. The supporting networks must be capable of
988 automatically choosing the best route to deliver high priority information in a timely manner.
989 The CROP must disseminate both planning and time sensitive information to the appropriate
990 users in as close to real-time as technically possible to meet the needs of the operational
993 By operating within the collaborative information environment shown in Figure 17, commanders
994 and staffs are able to accelerate the decision to action tempo by significantly improving and
995 sharing their situational awareness.
997 4.1.3. Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
999 JISR for RDO uses a network approach to the management of ISR assets to support the quick-
1000 paced demands of effects-based operations. A system of systems architecture enables the ISR
1001 community to control sensors and platforms dynamically and to integrate data from multiple
1002 sources into a fused information picture. JISR provides critical input to the CROP and
1003 emphasizes collaboration between intelligence producers and users. Planners and operators will
1004 share information in the collaborative environment. The following themes describe JISR
1007 Information Infrastructure. The CROP, JIP, and the collaborative information
1008 environment provide the necessary information infrastructure to enable ISR support
1009 within an integrated information processing and distribution environment.
1010 Operations/ISR Integration. Enhances overall ISR support by integrating it into
1011 operational community processes the development of military strategy, operations
1012 planning, and execution and combat assessment.
1013 Cross-Domain Integration. Unites ISR requirements management, collection tasking,
1014 processing and exploitation, and product delivery to provide a capability that outperforms
1015 spaceborne, airborne, maritime, and terrestrial systems operating separately.
1016 I-S-R Integration. Brings available ISR information and application methods together in
1017 a synergistic fashion that clarifies target status, target movement, and enemy intent in a
1018 common relevant operational picture.
1019 Interactive Collection Management. Provides predictive, dynamic, and responsive ISR
1020 across intelligence disciplines through battlespace and asset visualization, integration
1021 with real-time operations, and sharing of operations/intelligence information.
1022 Collectors and New Capabilities. Respond to collection challenges with sound
1023 investment strategies and migration plans to achieve a balanced, integrated, cost-effective
1024 force mix of spaceborne, airborne, maritime, and terrestrial sensors and platforms.
1025 Multi-INT Collaboration. Provides near real-time, collaborative tasking, processing,
1026 exploitation, and dissemination in national, theater, and tactical facilities regardless of
1027 geographic location.
1029 Rapid response to future crises will require new ISR capabilities and inter-active management
1030 methods. Multiple sensor cross-cueing and the synchronization of ISR assets with operations
1031 will be the norm. The CROP and JIP decision-support tools enable JISR to provide substantially
1032 increased situational awareness. Since the SJFHQ is so heavily dependent upon linked and
1033 networked architectures for support, advanced collaborative tools and procedures must leverage
1034 the full spectrum of capabilities of the geographically separated commands, agencies, and
1035 centers-of excellence.
1037 JISR collaborative planning aligns ISR sensor coverage with specific desired effects. This
1038 synchronization is critical to achieving and maintaining decision superiority. It ensures that the
1039 ISR coverage is executed as planned. This synchronization becomes a part of the Effects
1040 Tasking Order. JISR battle management is also critical to ensure that the ISR coverage initially
1041 assigned is available and executed as planned; hence maintaining critical inputs to the CROP,
1042 JIP, and collaborative environment.
1044 4.2. Command and Control (C2)
1046 The JFC synchronizes activities in time space, and purpose--taking actions that lead to desired
1047 effects to support his objectives. Expanding that process to include interagency, and
1048 multinational C2 and collaboration involves changes to both planning and execution. Adaptive
1049 Joint Command and Control takes advantage of information technologies and the capabilities
1050 provided by the CROP. Joint Interactive Planning enables a transition from hierarchical serial
1051 planning to parallel collaborative planning to reduced decision cycle times and increase tempo.
1052 A refined collaboration process with the Interagency Community will enable the coordinated
1053 application of all instruments of national power. Multinational Operations presents special
1054 challenges and benefits to RDO. Our multinational partners provide key assets, legitimacy, and
1055 political support that enable RDO.
1060 4.2.1. Adaptive Joint Command and Control
1062 RDO require more advanced and responsive planning and quicker use of capabilities than can be
1063 accomplished by an ad hoc JTF headquarters or ad hoc augmentation of a Service headquarters.
1065 Currently, the crisis often has already involved combat operations or overt hostile action by the
1066 adversary before a Joint Task Force (JTF) is established. There is a danger that the coherency of
1067 plans and in-process actions may be lost as crisis management passes from the CINC to a JTF
1068 Commander. During this critical time the JTF commander must not only establish situational
1069 awareness, while organizing a staff and establishing processes that the new team has not
1070 practiced. During time when small actions can make large differences in the outcome, the C2
1071 may be the most dysfunctional.
1073 Adaptive Joint Command and Control (AJC2) addresses these issues. It postulates a Standing
1074 Joint Force Headquarters of 50 or more people under the daily control of a dedicated flag or
1075 general officer. This group is assigned to the theater CINC and is embedded in the CINC’s staff.
1076 When a contingency requires the establishment of a JTF, the SJFHQ becomes the core of the
1077 joint force command structure. The SJFHQ flag or general officer could be designated the
1078 commander of a small JTF or be assigned as deputy commander, chief of staff, or other key
1079 position for a JTF commanded by a more senior officer. The SJFHQ will practice processes
1080 critical to crisis management and JTF stand-up and execution. It will be prepared to respond
1081 near on short notice with full situational awareness, practiced teamwork, and embedded
1082 collaborative processes and tools. Figure 19 shows a projected comparison of C2 effectiveness
1083 of an ad hoc JTF headquarters and one based on the SJFHQ.
1085 The SJFHQ design provides key advantages that contribute to the increased C2 effectiveness.
1087 Possesses pre-crisis knowledge and understanding (as part of the ONA).
1088 Is a high performance, well-trained team that understands the C2 processes and tools of
1089 joint force command. The SJFHQ would have its own deployable capability to access
1090 the CROP, conduct collaborative analysis, and employ decision support tools to enable
1091 rapid decision making.
1092 Takes advantage of habitual relationships formed with the CINC staff, subordinate
1093 commanders, and interagency participants. The SJFHQ will maintain important ―reach-
1094 back‖ links to U.S. planning and intelligence organizations, non-DoD agencies and allies
1095 relevant to potential RDO contingencies.
1096 Activates (deploying if necessary) within hours of alert with a package that can sustain
1097 operations for a period of days or weeks. Battle-rostered ―plugs‖ augment SJFHQ
1098 functional capabilities in certain areas.
1099 Links seamlessly to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters within one hour of alert
1100 Conducts distributed C2 through collaborative networks that are enabled by the assured,
1101 reliable connectivity envisioned by the GIG.
1103 A robust GIG and the capabilities provided by the CROP and JIP concepts permits the SJFHQ
1104 commander to locate anywhere. This allows the commander to position himself at the location
1105 where he believes he can best direct the planning and execution of the joint force.
1107 The CINC J4 will exercise an important role in synchronizing, prioritizing, and cross-leveling
1108 assets and capabilities to optimize support to the JTF commander. Centralized management of
1109 limited theater infrastructure and support agreements (e. g., host nation, other nation, etc.)
1110 enables RDO. Additionally the CINC will prioritize the use of intra-theater and inter-theater lift
1111 assets in support of an RDO.
1113 184.108.40.206. SJFHQ Element Organization.
1115 Rather than organizing along traditional lines (such as personnel, intelligence, and operations),
1116 the SJFHQ element organizes functionally to support coherent and integrated joint force
1117 operations. Figure 20 depicts the organizational option under consideration.
1119 The SJFHQ uses collaborative teams, currently thought to be plans, operations, information
1120 management, and information superiority, to support the development of pre-crisis contingency
1121 plans. These teams work inside an information/ knowledge environment that reinforces the
1122 concept that no formal or informal barriers exist that limit full cross-team functionality. Part of
1123 the JFC’s personnel support, provided out of the SJFHQ, will be a robust effects assessment cell
1124 that will determine if the desired effects were achieved, what unintended and unexpected effects
1125 occurred, their overall impact to the joint effort.
1131 220.127.116.11. Alternative Command Arrangements for the SJFHQ.
1133 The AJC2 concept is adaptive in its composition and in the ways the SJFHQ could transition
1134 from a peacetime posture to operations. Figure 21 illustrates three alternative command
1135 arrangements considered by the AJC2 concept.
1137 Case 1 – The SJFHQ is designated as the JTF HQ is augmented with additional
1138 capabilities as required by the contingency.
1140 Case 2 - The CINC designates a Service component headquarters as the JTF HQ. This
1141 staff organizes as a JTF command staff around the capability provided by the SJFHQ.
1143 Case 3 – The CINC is the JFC and his headquarters serves as the joint force HQ. The
1144 SJFHQ augments the Joint Force HQ or may serve as the forward element of the CINC’s
JFHQ Design Concept
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
COE COE COE
JFHQ Staff Staff SJFHQ Staff
Augmentation SJFHQ Augmentation
fwd as required Red Cell
& SJFHQ +
JTF HQ JTF HQ JF HQ
Functional Components Multiple JTFs
-- An “Adaptive C2 Concept” --
JFHQ operates as a standing extension of CINC Staff.
Figure 21. SJFHQ Design Options
1146 When the CINC identifies a specific contingency for ONA development, he would also identify
1147 the likely command structure (case 1, 2, or 3 above) to include elements of the joint force. This
1148 will enable the building of the necessary habitual relationships and situational understanding to
1149 enable rapid standup of a joint force headquarters. In each case extensive reachback and reach
1150 out to the CINC staff and other supporting agencies will support the SJFHQ. Reach-back is
1151 capability and support provided by the CINC staff located at home station or a rear area. Reach-
1152 out is capability and support provided by other supporting agencies not located on site.
1153 Designated, dedicated, trained, and exercised ―plugs‖ will augment the SJFHQ as necessary,
1154 based on the duration or complexity of the operation. Typical augmentation plugs might provide
1155 offensive IO, joint fires, time-sensitive targeting, rear area protection, red cell, public affairs,
1156 deployment, civil-military affairs, medical, and technical targeting expertise. The SJFHQ will
1157 routinely train with assigned ―plugs‖ and designated reachback elements.
1159 18.104.22.168. Task Organizing the Joint Force. As the SJFHQ develops the ONA and CONPLANs
1160 for potential contingencies, it also weighs the relative merits of force package options. The
1161 ability to rapidly form, deploy, and employ the joint force early in a contingency is critical as the
1162 NCA attempts to influence or deter an adversary before combat operations begin. Habitual
1163 relationships, including peacetime training, between the SJFHQ and designated components and
1164 agencies will facilitate efficient planning and rapid execution. Contingency plans will typically
1165 designate Service and functional organizations as core elements of the joint force. The actual
1166 contingency could require additional capabilities from forward presence and transiting forces,
1167 other rapidly deployable elements, and long-range strike forces from the continental United
1168 States (CONUS) and other AORs. In place, continuous C4I capabilities will facilitate quick
1169 modifications to the task organization to meet emerging requirements even as the joint force
1170 deploys. This would be a common core C2 system that can be tailored to unique theater
1171 requirements, but with standardized hardware and software so that SJFHQ staff members and
1172 others with experience in one theater don’t have to be completely retrained when they transfer to
1175 4.2.2. Joint Interactive Planning (JIP)
1177 The JIP concept addresses the Changing the Way We Plan
1178 transition from the traditional
1179 hierarchical serial planning and Legacy - Sequential JIP – Parallel Collaborative
1180 execution processes to a parallel Interagency
1181 concurrent planning process.
1182 Figure 22 shows this transition in
1183 terms of observe-orient-decide-act
CINC HQ CINC HQ
(OODA) loops. The figure
1185 illustrates the major benefit of the
1186 transition – reduced decision cycle JTF HQ JTF HQ
1187 times and increased tempo of
1188 information to actions. This will Component HQ Functional HQ
1189 allow the RDO forces to operate Time 1
1190 inside the adversary’s decision
Figure 22. Collaborative Planning
1191 cycle. This is the essence of
1192 JV2020’s extension of the notion of information superiority to decision superiority.
1194 Collaborative Planning. JIP makes generous use of distributive collaborative planning tools to
1195 allow supporting staffs and other resources, separated by geography, time and organizational
1196 boundaries, to interact and to coordinate concurrently in the development of plans and
1197 operations. Virtual collaboration capability will allow a smaller command and control
1198 ―footprint‖ in forward areas of operation. It will also allow the simultaneous involvement of
1199 CINC headquarters, SJFHQ, components, and other organizations to be in planning activities.
1200 This will result in better and quicker understanding of the commander’s intent and better unity of
1203 Decision Support. The JIP leverages new information technologies, decision support systems,
1204 and processes to accomplish dynamic joint planning and execution for the joint forces. The JIP
1205 concept envisions that software intelligent agents will search databases (provided by the CROP)
1206 to find the information needed to support planning and execution and will extract, fuse, and
1207 translate the data to make it useful for decision makers. The software agents will alert decision
1208 makers when new relevant information is available.
1210 Automated decision support tools will allow planners to analyze many alternatives rapidly.
1211 Modeling and simulation tools will allow decision makers to analyze these alternatives by
1212 simulating mission execution, indicating not only main effects, but also second or higher-order
1213 effects, faster than real time. The command and control systems will automatically extract the
1214 scenario and databases required to support the simulations.
1216 Dynamic Planning. The responsive, accurate application of overwhelming effects requires that
1217 constantly updated mission information be provided to the core planning team and extended
1218 partners in other commands. In peacetime, this will allow planners to refine and amplify the
1219 ONA and to produce up-to-date contingency plans including joint force structure and
1220 deployment planning. Information systems ―push‖ planning information electronically to higher,
1221 lower, adjacent, and supporting organizations so that the corresponding plans update
1222 automatically. This will facilitate a common shared awareness among the elements of the joint
1223 force and supporting organizations. The automated analysis capabilities will allow dynamic,
1224 continuous plan modification, and mission rehearsals during execution.
1226 4.2.3. Interagency Operations: Leveraging All Instruments of National Power
1228 RDO requires cohesive, rational, timely, and synergistic collaboration of the US interagency
1229 community to apply instruments of national power to achieve national objectives. JFCs
1230 conducting RDO in the next decade must be able to call upon certain information and capabilities
1231 resident in the US interagency community, non-military agencies, and other organizations to assist
1232 in ONA of potential adversaries and crisis-action and deliberate planning. These same
1233 organizations may be involved in pre-hostility operations, warfighting, and transitioning to post-
1234 hostility activities. Productive interagency coordinating mechanisms and planning tools will help
1235 ensure unity of effort among U.S. government agencies and international organizations
1236 participating in RDO.
1238 The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), provides the following definition of interagency
1241 The integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as
1242 to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to
1243 cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
1245 A series of conceptual and physical mechanisms enable this integration to provide a focus
1246 and method for collaboration and action.
1248 Interagency Enablers. Successful RDO will result from the integration of diplomatic,
1249 information, military, and economic objectives and their subsequent translation into actions.
1250 Productive interagency coordinating mechanisms and planning tools, or interagency enablers,
1251 will also help ensure unity of effort among U.S. government agencies and international
1252 organizations participating in RDO. The following are required to accomplish this.
1254 A coherent interagency planning mechanism under the oversight of the National
1255 Security Council. Supported by appropriate agencies, this planning process will produce a
1256 broad range of options to assert diplomatic, informational, economic, and military
1257 instruments of national power.
1259 A secure and fluid collaborative process that integrates the strategic and regional /
1260 operational levels for planning, execution, and transition operations. Regional and
1261 functional CINC’s will participate in the development of political-military plans for crisis
1262 response. Information will flow from the operational level as readily as it flows to it. This
1263 process must be supported by appropriate collaborative planning tools.
1265 A comprehensive, operational net assessment for selected adversaries. With these
1266 ONAs, we will generate a wide range of feasible and innovative, ways and means to
1267 resolve a crisis.
1269 A virtual or actual interagency staff element to collaborate with agencies at the strategic
1270 and regional / operational levels assigned to each regional CINC. Non-military agencies
1271 will collaborate with the warfighter to develop plans to produce desired effects.
1273 Interagency Operational Support Directorate (“J-X”). The efficacy of RDO depends, in part,
1274 upon a regional CINC or subordinate JFC having information resident in governmental,
1275 international, and non-governmental organizations. An interagency operational support element,
1276 notionally titled the ―J-X‖ directorate, and a political-military planner will support the CINC.
1277 The ―J-X‖ Directorate will inform the CINC of actions and decisions of the interagency
1278 community. Figure 23 shows RDO links to interagency operations. It shows how a regional
1279 CINC supported by a J-X staff element, could share information and situational understanding
1280 collaboratively with the US interagency community. A subordinate JFC or standing joint force
1281 headquarters element would have an interagency operational support staff officer assigned and
1282 would be prepared to accept appropriate interagency augmentation, plugs, or reachback support
1283 as required by a specific contingency.
1285 The CINC’s J-X staff will conduct political-military coordination within the CINC staff. It will
1286 establish habitual operational links to develop strategic guidance and political-military plans
1287 focused on future operations and EBO. It will integrate these plans with current operations and
1288 will serve as staff proponent for the theater engagement plan.
1290 4.2.4. Multinational Operations.
1292 Multinational operations occur within the structure of an alliance or coalition and will be a key
1293 strategic feature of future operations. This presents special challenges and benefits to RDO. Our
1294 partners may provide key assets, legitimacy, and political support that enable RDO. However,
1295 dissimilar training, equipment, technology, doctrine, culture, and language will challenge
1296 multinational efforts. Peacetime engagement and the CINC’s theater engagement plans should
1297 facilitate multinational participation in RDO by including potential partners in the ONA process
1298 where possible, proposing security assistance efforts to increase key capabilities, and conducting
1299 relevant multinational training.
1301 The desired end state is that a multinational force commander will be able to conduct Rapid
1302 Decisive Operations in the next decade. Potential multinational partners will be fully integrated
1303 and able to support the functional concepts and activities that support RDO. The supporting
1304 doctrine, agreements, and requirement for consensus will take time and impact operational speed
1305 and flexibility, but multinational involvement will be a prerequisite to achieving the desired
1308 There are several capabilities needed to set the conditions for successful multinational RDO.
1310 An integrated interagency process. This is most critical.
1312 Access to and sharing of information and collaboration tools by the SJFHQ with a
1313 multinational coordination element. Multinational partners could also be provided
1314 liaison elements equipped with the advanced technology necessary to facilitate
1315 collaboration and interoperability.
1317 Robust multi-level security procedures. These are critical to integrating multinational
1318 forces into an RDO.
1324 4.3. Operations
1326 RDO are predicated on effects-based operations and require the integrated application of
1327 dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and information operations. They are also supported
1328 by an interrelated set of operational enablers that includes concepts and processes for assured
1329 access, rapid force deployment, agile sustainment operations, and full dimension protection.
1331 4.3.1. Effects-Based Operations
1333 Effects-based Operations is a warfighting philosophy that has implications for knowledge,
1334 planning, and operations. The focus of EBO is on obtaining the desired strategic outcome or
1335 ―effect‖ on the enemy, through the application of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the
1336 tactical, operational, and strategic levels. An ―effect‖ is the physical, functional, or
1337 psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from a specific military or non-
1338 military action. EBO are a key enabler of RDO.
1340 Based on a more comprehensive understanding of a situation provided by the ONA, CROP and
1341 JIP, commanders and their staffs will be able to better identify the effects required to create the
1342 change in adversary behavior that meets the US national interests. This will be enabled by those
1343 knowledge capabilities that will help them discover adversary centers of gravity, critical
1344 vulnerabilities, and causal links. The center of gravity provides the adversary a source of power
1345 that supports his ability to act. The critical vulnerabilities are those things that support the center
1346 of gravity and are linked to it via causal links. That is, destroying, degrading, or making
1347 unusable a critical vulnerability will to substantially degrade the adversary’s center of gravity.
1348 Similarly, there is a causal link between the application of means and producing a desired effect.
1349 This increased understanding will enable a commander (at any level) to express his intent and the
1350 desired effect with a significantly increased level of clarity. Since subordinate commanders will
1351 share the same information base as he does, they too will be able to perceive the causal links the
1352 same way. As operations are planned and executed, commanders will be able to employ US
1353 military capabilities against critical vulnerabilities and be able to determine clearly the causal
1354 linkage between it and the adversary’s centers of gravity. This clearer understanding of the
1355 causal linkages supports both acting in ways that produce the desired effects and avoiding those
1356 that create undesired outcomes.
1358 At the operational level, the US will use its military capabilities of dominant maneuver,
1359 precision engagement, and information operations in conjunction with other instruments of
1360 national power to affect these critical vulnerabilities. Each capability will be used in an
1361 integrated fashion that creates opportunities for the other capabilities and reinforces the impact
1362 on critical vulnerabilities. It is by applying these capabilities in an integrated fashion against
1363 critical vulnerabilities, which are linked to the adversary’s centers of gravity, that operations will
1364 be decisive more rapidly than previous efforts.
1366 22.214.171.124. Dominant Maneuver
1368 Future operations will continue to combine and balance maneuver, fires, and information
1369 operations to produce desired effects. Maneuver and fires provide the joint force commander a
1370 comprehensive arsenal of decisive capabilities with which to support an effects-based operation.
1372 Operational maneuver distributed across the entire theater and executed by tailored tactical
1373 elements will characterize future operations. These joint forces will move without boundaries
1374 throughout the depth and breath of the JOA in distributed non-contiguous operations. Greater
1375 situational awareness will allow us to replace uncertainty-based operations with operations keyed
1376 to exploiting the enemy’s known critical vulnerabilities. Today uncertainty is mitigated though
1377 tightly structured, formation-based, and boundary-controlled forces. Knowledge will change this
1378 paradigm. The new construct of dominant maneuver will be the capability to move anywhere in
1379 the battlespace guided by the operational net assessment, operational planning, and robust joint
1380 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. In this fashion, maneuver will be used to created
1381 desired effects, and create opportunities to apply precision engagement.
1383 Forces will use speed and surprise to seize the initiative and control the tempo of operations.
1384 This characteristic will create engagements with ambush-like qualities to catch the enemy off-
1385 guard and cause him to fight without preparation. This style of maneuver will emphasize the
1386 necessity of not presenting an obvious pattern to the adversary, denying him an easily
1387 discernable blueprint to which he can adapt.
1389 Distributed maneuver increases the joint combined arms potential by providing opportunities to
1390 engage the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities, from all domains with overwhelming force. This
1391 advantage will render the enemy’s strength irrelevant by virtue of such factors as poor
1392 positioning, incorrect orientation, or bad terrain. With increased decision superiority, this
1393 advantage will also accrue from such factors as timing, function, and morale—all of which seek
1394 to attack the enemy when and where he is least prepared.
1396 126.96.36.199. Precision Engagement.
1398 Precision engagement destroys, degrades, or renders unusable adversary capabilities in order to
1399 create effects or enable maneuver. Its success depends on the same knowledge capabilities,
1400 operational net assessment, operational planning, and robust joint intelligence, surveillance, and
1401 reconnaissance that are key to dominant maneuver.
1403 The concept of precision engagement extends beyond precisely striking a target with explosive
1404 ordnance. In RDO, precision engagement refers to the joint force’s ability to engage targets
1405 anywhere in the battlespace to create desired effects. Information provided in the ONA and
1406 developed in operational planning, guides target selection. These targets may be engaged within
1407 minutes or hours of decision, depending on the JFC’s guidance and intent. Aerospace, ground,
1408 or seaborne capabilities could be the choice to attack the target. Alternatively, a special
1409 operations team could attack the target, or psychological operations could be the method of
1410 engagement. The commander may also employ information means when the targets are key
1411 enemy leaders, troop formations, or the opinion of an adversary population. Regardless of its
1412 application, the capability to engage precisely in a timely manner allows the commander to shape
1413 the situation or battle space to achieve the desired effects while minimizing risk to friendly
1414 forces and effectively using resources.
1416 Confronting an adversary who employs asymmetric means will require an expanded array of
1417 non-lethal system. Nonlethal technologies offer great potential for precision engagement. They
1418 can incapacitate personnel or render materiel useless while minimizing fatalities, permanent
1419 injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. Non-lethal systems
1420 have the potential to provide the joint force commander a greater capacity to work within
1421 restricted ROE, attack enemy weapons containing high-risk contaminates, and deliver effects
1422 that are time-definite.
1424 188.8.131.52. Information Operations (IO)
1426 IO are the information equivalent of maneuver and fires. IO can be effective when used in its
1427 single domain, or can be used to support other fires and maneuver in other domains. IO supports
1428 RDO through two primary areas of information effects: electronic effects and influence effects.
1429 Electronic effects are executed primarily through electronic warfare and computer network
1430 attack activities. Influence effects are accomplished through psychological operations,
1431 deception, public affairs, civil affairs, operational security, and special information operations.
1432 IO possesses unique characteristics desirable for use in peace and crisis. These characteristics
1433 includes low collateral damage, little or no deployment requirements, little or no in-theater
1434 presence, relatively rapid response to tasking, low risk to personnel, potentially large effect(s) for
1435 a small effort, and target specificity (means of precise engagement). Its success depends on the
1436 same knowledge capabilities, operational net assessment, operational planning, and robust joint
1437 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, which are key to dominant maneuver and precision
1440 Integration of Joint Actions. Integrated command and control systems, interoperable combat
1441 systems, and a coherence of action enabled by increased joint training will provide forces from
1442 each component the capability to routinely collaborate and task organize to generate desired
1443 effects to a much greater degree than is the norm today. The objective of such joint tactical
1444 action is to achieve desired effects by using the best mix of capabilities across the disciplines of
1445 dominant maneuver, precision engagement, and information operations. This approach will be
1446 more effective than today’s joint by deconfliction solution.
1448 Component commanders, through collaboration and the CROP, will be able to plan and employ
1449 dispersed joint tactical forces to create desired effects anywhere in the JOA. Their ability to
1450 rapidly form, deploy, employ, and redeploy the integrated joint teams in response to rapidly
1451 developing situations will be critical. Joint tactical action will be enabled by greater access to
1452 information, which will support decision making at lower levels.
1454 Distributed operations will provide RDO an essential flexibility for fighting an adversary who
1455 will disperse, employ guerilla tactics, and exploit our rules of engagement. To counter this, joint
1456 forces, guided by effects-based planning, will be able to adapt its actions to continue to achieve
1457 the desired effect.
1459 Implications of Effects-based Operations on Joint Force Processes. In order to create an
1460 environment for effects based operations, joint force processes must possess several interrelated
1461 characteristics. Each is based upon a comprehensive understanding of the adversary.
1463 Planning. In planning for effects-based operations, knowledge is paramount. System of
1464 systems analysis provided by ONA is the foundation for this knowledge. It provides an analysis
1465 of the adversary’s centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, and causal linkages, along with his
1466 warfighting capabilities and the range of potential strategic and operational capabilities that an
1467 adversary could use to pursue actions counter to our strategic interests.
1469 Analysis of the adversary as a complex system requires that planners consider critical factors in
1470 order to anticipate and later assess the degree of success, collateral damage, re-build cost, and the
1471 unintended consequences of a particular action. Planners and analysts must calculate the value
1472 and cost of conducting actions based on the physical or functional effect. This analysis, in turn,
1473 will help planners recommend courses of action that effectively balance capabilities and the
1474 ways and means (including non-lethal) to achieve desired effects. This may provide leaders with
1475 options, short of combat, to preclude or deter an adversary. It may also provide options to
1476 compel or defeat him.
1478 The product of planning will be an Effects Tasking Order. The ETO will capture the results of
1479 collaborative planning, and delineate for the components and other agencies, the missions and
1480 effects that must be accomplished to achieve the desired results. Although the ETO will
1481 primarily task military actions, it will identify all ongoing effects-producing actions undertaken
1482 by other US and allied departments and agencies. This will ensure awareness by both military
1483 and other agencies of ongoing plans and operations. The effects required by the ETO are most
1484 often expressed in terms of mission, commander’s intent and desired effect, leaving the details of
1485 execution to the designated component commander or subordinate who is best able to determine
1486 appropriate action. Infrequently the ETO will specify a task in detail to ensure all participants
1487 are informed. These tasks will normally be fully coordinated through the collaborative planning
1488 process prior to issuing the ETO.
1490 Strategic Objective to Task Linkage. Every tactical action must be linked to the strategic
1491 objective of affecting the specified adversary center of gravity. At the national level, the NCA
1492 identifies strategic policies and objectives. The CINC provides strategic/operational guidance,
1493 intent, desired effects, and objectives that support national policies and objectives. The JFC
1494 determines operational level effects. Components receive and execute tactical tasks and
1495 missions that include the commander’s intent and a statement of desired effect. The precise
1496 application of means achieve the desired effects. The means may be kinetic or non-kinetic
1497 means capable of creating desired lethal and nonlethal effects, information operations, or joint
1500 Broader Range of Ways and Means. Effects-based operations require the commander to have
1501 a broad view of the capabilities available to an RDO. The "means" may be lethal or nonlethal,
1502 from heavy weapons to leaflets In addition to considering the lethal and non-lethal military
1503 options at his disposal, commanders consider the non-military instruments of power that can be
1504 brought to bear, perhaps more effectively, in the complex conflicts of the future. An inherent
1505 strength of identifying an array of alternatives for attacking critical vulnerabilities in pre-crisis
1506 planning is that some of the actions can be applied to influence or deter an adversary as a crisis
1507 develops, potentially averting the crisis.
1509 The JFC must consider multiple actions in multiple dimensions, and he must prepare to target
1510 both the will and the ability of the adversary. The JFC need not ―own‖ an asset to exploit its
1511 employment, but the effects must be closely coordinated to ensure maximum support to national
1514 Continuous Assessment. Effects-based operations require continuous assessment to quickly
1515 measure the level of success achieved. This assessment must also examine secondary effects and
1516 unintended consequences to allow commanders to determine whether or not to adjust the course
1517 of action. This approach provides a means to dynamically adapt the JFC’s plan based on
1518 changes in the battlespace. The ability to adjust while maintaining continuity of effort and
1519 purpose is key to creating the desired effect when engaging a complex enemy.
1521 The effects based operations warfighting philosophy provides the framework in which the joint
1522 force, guided by superior knowledge, can employ its unique capabilities in dominant maneuver,
1523 precision engagement and information operations with a higher degree of certainty that its efforts
1524 will achieve the strategic objectives.
1526 4.3.2. Operational Enablers.
1528 An interrelated set of concepts and supporting ideas for assured access, rapid force deployment,
1529 agile sustainment operations, and full dimension protection enable EBO.
1533 184.108.40.206. Assured Access.
1535 For RDO Assured Access is the ability to set battlespace conditions necessary to bring the joint
1536 force within operational reach of the critical vulnerabilities leading to an adversary’s center(s) of
1537 gravity. The CINC sets the objectives of these ―shaping efforts‖ to seize and exploit the
1538 initiative, posture the right mix of forces, establish the nature of the fight on our terms, and set
1539 the conditions for decisive operations. Land, sea, aerospace, and information superiority are
1540 essential to the JFC’s ability to set the conditions for decisive operations, maintain access, and
1541 move, sustain, and protect our forces. The joint force requires dimensional superiority only for
1542 the duration and at locations required to support mission accomplishment (temporal). The joint
1543 force and supporting organizations conduct a variety of concurrent actions involving all elements
1544 of national power to employing elements of shaping operations including: building strong
1545 alliances to isolate the adversary, gaining and maintaining access, and achieving ―temporal‖
1546 dimensional superiority.
1548 Build Strong Alliances and Isolate the Enemy. Interagency collaboration will provide the
1549 diplomatic, informational, and economic engagement alternatives early in the crisis to persuade,
1550 deter, or coerce the adversary’s allies to remain clear of the conflict. Coherent involvement of
1551 the interagency and multinational communities, non-government organizations, private volunteer
1552 organizations, and other participating organizations can build strong alliances and coalitions.
1553 Forward basing and support agreements, exercises, and other combined activities, build regional
1554 trust, gain logistic support, and security. Information operations also offer great potential to
1555 inhibit outside sources of support by means that entail no apparent destructive effects.
1557 Gaining Access. Future adversaries are expected to employ anti-access or area-denial
1558 capabilities such as long-range surface missiles, undersea minefields and salvoes of anti-ship
1559 missiles; robust, widely distributed surveillance and targeting against air and sea forces;
1560 unconventional forces; integrated air defense systems; long-range strike aircraft; and WME.
1561 Area-denial capabilities also include information warfare and degradation of space-based
1562 platforms. Access to the battlespace from all dimensions, including space and
1563 electromagnetic/information, by US forces and allies contributes to the JFC’s freedom of action
1564 essential to RDO. The JFC requires sufficient air and sea lines of communication for movement
1565 of tailored forces and sustainment packages protected from interdiction. Dimensional
1566 superioritymay be localized in time and space (temporal)is a necessary condition for
1567 maintaining friendly access. The JFC must have at his disposal the right mix of joint capabilities
1568 in order to neutralize anti-access obstacles, at the time to provide RDO forces freedom to
1569 maneuver, fire and obtain positional advantage.
1571 Access through Dimensional Superiority. Greater knowledge and mobility will enable
1572 noncontiguous operations by separate elements of the joint force throughout the battlespace.
1573 Once access is gained, the JFC has increased options to deter, halt, and neutralize the enemy's
1574 most valued and critical forces and nodes. Options enabled by dimensional superiority include
1575 defeating the adversary’s capability to establish his operations tempo. As necessary, RDO will
1576 exploit access and dimensional superiority to threaten force or to apply force selectively at the
1577 right time and place to achieve the desired effect. Mission-tailored forces must gain and
1578 maintain access to the AOR rapidly; they must also be capable of immediate and relentless
1579 action to dominate the selected points for the period of time required to produce desired effects.
1580 Dimensional superiority is supported by multi-layered sensors (space-based and airborne) and
1581 C4ISR that provide the JFC with battlespace awareness through the networked force. With this
1582 knowledge RDO forces will have the ability to fight asymmetrically, to initially go where the
1583 enemy isn’t, and employ precision engagement to destroy enemy forces. Friendly dimensional
1584 superiority also limits the adversary’s flexibility and freedom of action, denies outside sources of
1585 support, and greatly increases risk. The combination of access and dimensional superiority
1586 provides the JFC with robust employment options at an acceptable level of risk for the joint
1589 220.127.116.11. Rapid Force Deployment
1591 Rapid force deployment supports rapid power projection. The focus is not just on rapidly
1592 deploying forces, but rather how to rapidly project sufficient combat power to support the JFC’s
1593 concept of operations. While we have capability for rapid power projection in the form of long
1594 range strike aircraft and forward deployed and forward based forces, we require a rapid force
1595 deployment capability in order to be able to rapidly deploy and employ others elements that may
1596 be required to provide a full multidimensional capability to execute RDO.
1598 Rapid force deployment begins with the ONA, which provides the operational information to
1599 select, sequence, and deploy the proper combination of joint force capabilities to produce desired
1600 effects. While we generally desire to accomplish our strategic objectives without a lengthy
1601 campaign or an extensive buildup of forces, in fact, forces must deploy on a schedule to match
1602 the JFC’s operational concept and begin to produce effects even before completion of
1603 deployment. This may require that certain forces be deployed rapidly or it may allow for a
1604 deliberate flow of forces designed to match JFC timelines for setting the conditions under which
1605 those forces can effectively be introduced into the area of operations with an acceptable degree
1606 of risk. The following are elements that will enhance the rapid force deployment of future
1609 Reengineering the Joint Deployment Process. Joint deployment process improvements must
1610 focus on reengineering joint deployment planning and execution, using CROP, JIP, and AJC2 to
1611 improve the overall flexibility, efficiency, and responsiveness of the process to meet the
1612 operational requirements envisioned for RDO. Fundamentally, the joint deployment process will
1613 continue to use the strategic mobility ―triad‖ (airlift, sealift, and prepositioning) to move the joint
1614 force over the links and nodes of the global distribution system through lines of communications
1615 to support the concept of operations. Improvement hinges on collapsing the sequence of
1616 activities and decisions associated with the joint planning and execution process and improving
1617 the systems supporting these process activities and decision nodes resulting in:
1619 Greater precision, speed, and flexibility in joint deployment process execution;
1621 Concurrent collaboration and improved parallel planning during joint deployment
1624 Less dependence on fixed infrastructure in the operational area to support joint
1625 deployment operations;
1627 Improved effectiveness, efficiency, and speed of the transportation capabilities and
1628 enablers in supporting joint deployment operations.
1630 Joint Deployment Planning and Execution. The RDO concept implies a prioritized stream of
1631 joint force capability packaged to perform combat and combat support missions based on the
1632 supported JFC’s operational concept. Unlike our current warfighting concept, which involves
1633 building forces in the theater until favorable force ratios are achieved, RDO envisions using
1634 those capabilities that can be brought to bear quickly, whether from home station or deployed, to
1635 reduce adversary capabilities and produce desired effects while creating the conditions to
1636 effectively deploy the rest of the joint force.
1638 To meet the deployment timelines envisioned for RDO, joint force planners must understand the
1639 deployment constraints involved in employing selected joint force capabilities and have
1640 immediate access to the deployment planning information and logistics data required to move
1641 those capabilities being employed for the mission. The future joint operation planning and
1642 execution system must provide joint force planners the capability to access current force
1643 readiness and deployment data, package that information for use during deployment planning
1644 and execution, track the movement of relative combat power, and manage change during mission
1647 This improved joint operation planning and execution system must enable joint force planners to
1648 provide the JFC with operational risk assessments and trade-off analysis to overcome
1649 deployment constraints and improve the speed, efficiency, and effectiveness of employment to
1650 meet the JFC’s priorities. JFCs may need to ―tailor‖ the tactical footprint of the joint force
1651 through reduction of duplicative movement requirements to optimize the deployment flow to
1652 meet the mission timeline for a given operation. Optimization will be a function of the
1653 deployment concept to support the employment of forces, throughput provided by the lines of
1654 communication, the lift assets available, and the time available to position the force. Planners
1655 will need to collaborate to develop employment and deployment concepts and plans to ensure
1656 that the available strategic and theater lift will accommodate the requirements of the JFC.
1658 In the future, execution of the joint deployment process in support of RDO will be less linear.
1659 Joint deployment concepts supporting RDO must enable the building of combat power of joint
1660 forces before inserting of those forces in the objective area. For instance, the joint reception,
1661 staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) phase of the joint deployment process may
1662 occur at the ports of embarkation (POE) prior to strategic movement or at an intermediate
1663 staging base (ISB). Based on the concept of operations, there may be a requirement to tactically
1664 configure and combat-load elements of the joint force for immediate employment upon insertion
1665 into the objective area (―ready off the ramp‖). Because of the flexibility of the reengineered joint
1666 deployment process, deployment concepts can be crafted and rapidly modified to accommodate
1667 any RDO operational requirements.
1669 Joint operation planners will rely on concurrent collaborative planning procedures to work
1670 closely with USTRANSCOM to expeditiously match available lift capacity, port throughput
1671 capacity, and tailored RDO force capability to achieve the effects desired by the JFC. JIP
1672 capabilities, such as the Joint Force Capabilities Register, as well as improved JOPES will
1673 provide the tools to ―right size‖ the required joint force capability. They will also allow the JFC
1674 to assess the ―lift cost‖ of deploying that joint force capability, and rapidly time-phase and
1675 sequence the arrival of joint force capability in the JOA to meet mission requirements.
1677 Transportation Capabilities and Enablers. Development of infrastructure-independent
1678 transportation will support the effort to speed joint deployment process planning and execution.
1679 Future deployment platforms supporting RDO must land fully combat-ready early entry forces
1680 over the shore or on austere airfields or other unimproved locations to defeat enemy anti-access
1681 strategies and speed employment of the joint force. In such circumstances the use potential
1682 future systems such as of shallow draft, high speed surface effect vessels (SDHSS) and super
1683 short take off and landing (SSTOL) aircraft to transport units and initial sustainment into the
1684 objective area in a ―ready-off-the-ramp‖ configuration may increase the speed of force closure.
1685 In this circumstance, more conventional lift would be used to deploy joint forces to an
1686 intermediate staging and support base (ISSB) in or near the JOA. These efforts would be
1687 supported by new vertical lift and intra-theater sealift, such as the Army’s Theater Support
1688 Vessel (TSV), the Navy’s High Speed Vessel (HSV), or ultra large airships (ULA), to rapidly
1689 reposition prepositioned equipment, expedite the build-up of forces and sustainment, and the
1690 onward movement of forces within the theater from the ISB to the objective area.
1692 Forward presence. Overseas basing of Army, Air Force, and Naval forces and through routine
1693 global deployments has been a key tenet of our National Security Strategy to ensure our access to
1694 the world’s regions. This policy of forward presence has protected our national interests abroad
1695 and has also projected our influence in crisis situations, often preventing crisis. When prevention
1696 failed, forward presence has allowed rapid access of U.S. forces into a region. Forward presence
1697 is today’s principal enabler for the rapid projection of military capability and the buildup of
1698 combat power. Although we will have fewer forward deployed force and fewer forward
1699 operating locations, some degree of forward presence will remain a cornerstone of our force
1700 projection capability, enhanced by the daily activities of the theater engagement plans of the
1701 unified commands.
1703 Prepositioning. Prepositioned equipment and supplies outside the continental United States,
1704 combined with forward presence, will enable rapid force deployment and, in the near- to mid-
1705 term, and enhance the amount of potential combat power and rapid lift available to the JFC.
1706 Improved airlift and sealift capabilities will speed the rapid deployment of light and medium
1707 weight forces. There may be a favorable economic trade-off between the development and the
1708 use of high-speed sealift compared to the cost of prepositioning and maintaining unit sets of
1709 equipment. However, this does not negate the advantage of prepositioning, either ashore or
1710 afloat, airlift intensive supplies, such as munitions and POL, or legacy equipment for heavy
1713 Tailored Forces and Logistics. Reduction of the size and number of things to be deployed will
1714 contribute to rapid deployment. The ONA and effects-based planning will help identify the
1715 capabilities required to produce the effects necessary for operational success. Increased lethality,
1716 mobility, and networked C4ISR integration of weapons systems will allow us to provide much
1717 greater combat power with fewer systems. Additionally, by 2020 many systems should be
1718 engineered to consume less fuel and munitions and require less supply, repair parts, and
1719 maintenance support than legacy systems. Finally, greater visibility of Service assets and greater
1720 direction and mission definition by the JFC will identify and reduce unnecessary redundancy
1721 within the joint force. This may require greater reliance by the Service components on jointly
1722 managed non-organic support to meet their warfighting requirements.
1724 The lighter, more deployable forces under development by the Services will further increase our
1725 capability for rapid deployment. Forces that have greater lethality per pound will provide
1726 combat capability equal or greater to today’s forces at significantly reduced deployment costs.
1728 18.104.22.168. Agile Sustainment Operations
1730 Sustainment Support. The operational requirement for sustainment support for RDO forces is
1731 the capability to provide support to forces distant from the support locations in noncontiguous
1732 operating areas. Operations will be effectively and efficiently sustained through distributed,
1733 transportation-based, globally networked, and reachback-supported logistic capabilities. The
1734 sustainment concept envisions a series of intermediate support bases, both ashore and afloat, for
1735 force beddown, insertion, and sustainment. Surface or fixed/rotary-wing lift aircraft will deliver
1736 materiel and service support in mission-configured loads directly to forces in the objective area.
1737 Joint and Service supply systems must be interoperable, reducing unnecessary duplication.
1738 Because local shore logistic facilities may well be threatened or denied, temporary operating
1739 bases, ISBs, and sea-based logistics will be used.
1741 Joint total asset visibility systems will permit greater precision and efficiency in sustainment
1742 operations. Sustainment information will be included in the CROP. Host nation or multinational
1743 support may relieve some portion of the logistic burden; however, support agreements must be
1744 in-place before execution of RDO. In-place agreements will be a priority effort by CINC staffs
1745 and interagency country teams.
1747 Distributed Basing. Increased anti-access threat and potentially austere infrastructure may
1748 preclude rapid direct insertion of forces into the objective area using strategic lift. The greater
1749 capability to use standoff weapons, rather than forces, to produce effects will decrease in-theater
1750 infrastructure requirements. The ability to sea-base many joint fire support, sensor, C2, full
1751 dimensional protection capabilities, and information and logistic capabilities also reduces
1752 infrastructures requirements. Ground-based elements in the objective area will likely involve
1753 smaller ground units and special operations elements supported by joint fire support from theater
1754 air forces, long-range bomber support from CONUS, space-based force application, and tactical
1755 air and gunfire support from maritime forces. Occupation of territory, in the classical sense, may
1756 not be the norm. These factors will significantly change the number and size of local logistic
1757 bases and allow us to use different basing philosophies.
1759 One basic philosophy is to use a light and lean variation of the traditional intermediate staging
1760 base for both force insertion and support – an intermediate staging and support. Whether land-
1761 based or sea-based, the ISB provides the opportunity to stage and integrate units in a relatively
1762 safe location and still have the ability to insert and support the units using mobility assets. The
1763 CROP will enable the ability to track and manipulate material and delivery assets.
1765 After attaining the requisite force protection capability within the JOA, an alternative or
1766 complement to land-based ISBs is mission-designed ships, both naval and commercial, coupled
1767 with vertical lift aircraft (including UAVs for sustainment). This will enable us to form sea
1768 bases for ground force insertion and sustainment. Seabasing will enable reduction of fixed
1769 logistics bases in those areas where shore basing is infeasible. Positioning of sustainment at sea
1770 will reduce vulnerability while providing mobility and flexibility. The Marine Corps concept of
1771 a Maritime Prepositioned Force (Future) seems aligned with this variation of distributed basing
1772 for a brigade-sized unit. In addition the nature of sea basing will allow for use of sealift to
1773 replenish sustainment stocks. It is within the realm of possibility to use sea basing to support
1774 Army units in the JOA.
1776 The concepts to deliver sustainment to units in the objective area will likely change current
1777 doctrine. Highly mobile temporary delivery points, similar to forward operating bases and
1778 forward arming and refueling points may become commonplace. Time-sensitive delivery,
1779 enabled by the CROP and decision support tools and the use of surface or fixed/or rotary-wing
1780 lift, can be achieved.
1782 Asset Visibility. Commanders will pinpoint the location of their materiel needs and track
1783 movement to destinations through joint total asset visibility (JTAV) and in-transit visibility
1784 (ITV) systems, both of which will be visible in the CROP. This will be critical for several
1785 reasons. The military materiel mountains of prior years are expensive, vulnerable, and tactically
1786 inconsistent with the mobile and flexible RDO ground force concept. Knowledge of the location
1787 and quantities of assets and the ability of decision-support tools to synchronize their delivery to
1788 units in the objective area will enable the delivery of sustainment from ISBs and seabases. In
1789 addition, information systems will track unit consumption and compute re-supply tailored to
1790 usage and upcoming operations.
1792 Logistics Information. Agile Sustainment Operations requires a high degree of situational
1793 understanding and asset visibility. The CROP will provide for the information needs of the
1794 logistician from a variety of sources. It provides commanders and logistics decision makers the
1795 tailored execution-oriented information necessary to support distributed combat operations
1796 throughout the theater.
1798 Joint Theater Logistics Management. The Joint Theater Logistics Management (JTLM)
1799 concept enables the theater CINC to streamline logistic processes such as reviewing
1800 requirements, establishing priorities allocating critical resources, coordinating supply support,
1801 establishing buildup rates, and stating theater stockage levels. This will permit control over
1802 those logistics resources that are most critical to the success of the rapid decisive operation. This
1803 does not require direct control over all logistics resources nor does it require a joint theater
1804 logistics support command. The CROP and JIP enable processes at the CINC HQ,
1805 TRANSCOM, and the Defense Logistics Agency to coordinate lift and supply actions.
1807 Force Health Protection. The operational challenges for Force Health Protection (FHP) mirror
1808 those presented to the deployment, sustainment, and basing functions; that is how to move the
1809 right medical capabilities into the JOA and how to provide necessary medical support to service
1810 members in units operating non-contiguously in the JOA. FHP support to RDO represents a
1811 significant change over past health service support concepts. Technology serves as an enabler
1812 for opportunities such as enroute care; global monitoring to improve commanders' awareness of
1813 medical threats and conditions; and support services that are transformed by technology to
1814 become more responsive, lighter, more mobile and less costly. FHP uses CROP and JIP to
1815 identify and implement improved preventive measures, speed evacuation, and reduce the
1816 battlefield footprint of the medical force. It uses key deployment and sustainment concepts to
1817 provide necessary speed and agility required for RDO forces.
1819 22.214.171.124. Full Dimension Protection
1821 Full dimension protection (FDP) exists when the joint force can achieve a decisive outcome with
1822 an acceptable degree of risk in both the physical and information domains. FDP incorporates a
1823 complete array of combat and noncombat actions in offensive and defensive operations,
1824 including information operations enabled by information superiority. CROP and JIP will
1825 enhance our ability to see the battlespace, to anticipate enemy action, quickly disseminate threat
1826 information to all forces, and counter enemy actions by calling on the tailored selection and
1827 application of multi-layered active and passive measures, within the domains of air, land, sea,
1828 space, and information. This does not relieve the tactical commander of the traditional
1829 responsibility for force protection in his immediate environment. Tactical force protection will
1830 also be enhanced by CROP and JIP. .
1832 Considerations for protecting the force apply to military operations and must extend beyond the
1833 immediate battlespace. Our military forces must be able to conduct decisive operations despite
1834 our adversaries’ use of a wide range of weapons, conduct of information operations or terrorist
1835 attacks, or the presence of asymmetric threats during any phase of these operations. Dominant
1836 maneuver operations in non-contiguous areas by elements of the joint force, including operations
1837 within the enemy’s battlespace, will present special challenges to force protection. Dispersed
1838 units must receive high-fidelity tactical information from multiple sensors, not necessarily under
1839 their direct control. Precision engagement and maneuver, in conjunction with defensive counter-
1840 measures, will provide tactical commanders the ability to disrupt the enemy’s ability to attack the
1841 joint or multinational forces throughout the campaign. Information operations support this effort
1842 by protecting our information systems and processes while denying these capabilities to the
1845 Joint requirements for a deployable missile defense provided by deployable JTAMD,
1846 suppression of enemy air defense, and mine countermeasures align with tactical and individual
1847 protection measures. Provisions for rear area security and anti-terrorist measures are required,
1848 no matter how far from the employment area. This also includes the protection of civilian and
1849 commercial infrastructure. The final aspect of force protection considers the growing cyber
1850 threat and defense of computer networks upon which our information-based operations depend.
1861 INTENTIONALLY BLANK
1862 CHAPTER FIVE
1864 THE WAY AHEAD
1866 This chapter describes the USJFCOM experimentation strategy and identifies complementary
1867 experimentation efforts. It also describes Joint Staff-developed desired operational capacities
1868 and discusses how they help shape the RDO concept. It also describes a ―red team‖ assessment
1869 of adversary capabilities that could challenge the RDO concept.
1871 5.1. RDO Concept Experimentation Strategy
1873 5.1.1. Background.
1875 Joint Vision 2020, the conceptual template of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identifies
1876 the concepts of Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and
1877 Focused Logistics, and the key enabler, Information Superiority. The Joint Futures Lab (JFL) of
1878 the U.S. Joint Forces Command supports the implementation of JV 2020 as one of its tasks. The
1879 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Strategy: Road to RDO Next Decade dated 21
1880 June 2001, published by the JFL, presents the four-year experimentation strategy (Fiscal Year 01
1881 through 04). This strategy will refine the concepts and develop the DOTMLPF Change
1882 Recommendation packages that support RDO experimentation in the next decade and to help
1883 focus experimentation efforts to achieve the conceptual objectives. This strategy identifies the
1884 DOTMLPF Change Recommendation objectives, issues, and questions and matches them with a
1885 set of experiments planned for execution as part of the Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan.
1886 Two major joint integrating experiments are planned. Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC-02), to
1887 be conducted in June-July 2002, will focus on our ability to conduct RDO in this decade.
1888 Olympic Challenge 2004 (OC-04) will occur in May-June 2004 to demonstrate the ability to
1889 conduct an RDO in the next decade. Additional workshops, seminars, limited objective
1890 experiments (LOE) and other experimentation events, such as the Olympic Vision (OV) series,
1891 will further refine functional concept elements and associated DOTPLMF change
1892 recommendation packages.
1894 As lessons from ongoing experiments and research emerge, experimentation reports identify
1895 DOTMLPF implications. From these, the DOTMLPF Change Recommendation packages and
1896 the experimentation strategy will be reviewed and updated when necessary. USJFCOM will
1897 report continuous collective assessment of findings from internal and external experiments and
1898 findings from outside research in the Congressional Report on Joint Experimentation. The JFL
1899 will maintain the Concept Experimentation Strategy, and publish updates biannually.
1901 5.1.2. Strategy
1903 USJFCOM Joint Futures Lab defines an experimentation strategy as a systematic and detailed
1904 plan of action encompassing methods to be adopted from beginning to end for evaluating
1905 concepts. This contrasts with experimental design, which is a plan for the process of data
1906 collection during a particular event to ensure capture of the information necessary to describe
1907 interrelationships within the data. Thus, an experimentation strategy is a plan to investigate
1908 concepts and DOTMLPF Change Recommendation packages across a number of events, while
1909 an experimental design is a plan for a single experimental event. Using this definition, the
1910 Concept Experimentation Strategy presents the roadmap of how the JFL plans to address the
1911 investigation of the concepts and DOTMLPF capabilities packages, centered on the RDO
1912 integrating concept. Its elements are the RDO integrating concept, the supporting concepts that
1913 underpin it, the DOTMLPF Change Recommendation packages, a set of experimentation
1914 objectives, issues and questions, and the experimentation events.
1916 5.2. Complementary Efforts
1918 USJFCOM will continue to collaborate and partner with CINC, Service, and independent
1919 experimentation efforts related to RDO including Advanced Concept Technology
1920 Demonstrations (ACTD), Joint Warfighting Integrating Demonstrations (JWID), and others.
1921 These efforts will include shared and integrated events and an effort to evolve and refine the joint
1922 operational context and environment in which emerging capabilities will be assessed and
1925 In addition to Service experimentation efforts that support RDO, there are two additional parallel
1926 efforts associated with attaining RDO from a joint construct. One is the Joint Mission Force
1927 (JMF) being developed by US Pacific Command, and another is Joint Strike Force (JSF) being
1928 developed by the Institute for Defense Analyses’ Joint Advanced Warfighting Program. In
1929 addition, USCENTCOM is supporting an Advance Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)
1930 involving a deployable JTF HQ and the Joint Staff is developing a concept for Dominant
1931 Maneuver and other functional concepts in support of JV 2020. These efforts differ somewhat in
1932 mission, scope, and targeted timeframe from USJFCOM’s FY00 concept exploration effort. All
1933 will provide valuable insights into organizational, collaborative, and future warfighting issues.
1935 5.3. Desired Operational Capabilities.
1937 Joint operations in the 2010 - 2020 timeframe will depend on a wide range of capabilities to
1938 enable dominant maneuver and precision engagement. The original 21st Century Challenges
1939 identified in the Joint Vision Master Plan contained 21 challenges, of which eleven pose relevant
1940 challenges for RDO. They serve as compelling rationale for investigating the initial set of
1941 desired operational capabilities (DOC) discussed in the following paragraphs. As USJFCOM
1942 continues joint experimentation subsequent versions of this concept paper refine this list. The
1943 following initiatives are among the most important to RDO:
1945 Provide Real-time Battlespace Awareness. This provides real-time or near real-time
1946 battlespace awareness to the JFC, subordinate commanders, and staffs at all levels. It includes
1947 DOCs necessary to achieve the CROP and those associated with defensive IO.
1949 Achieve Unity of Effort. The JFC will regulate forces and functions to focus, integrate, and
1950 synchronize actions throughout the battlespace. It includes DOCs related to organizing the joint
1951 force headquarters and task organizing the joint force.
1953 Achieve and Preserve Battlespace Control. This is required to ensure freedom of friendly
1954 action. It includes DOCs that relate to achieving air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic
1957 Generate Overmatching Lethal and Non-lethal Effects. This provides decisive advantages in
1958 range, probabilities of hit and kill, efficiency of effects, and relative combat power. It includes
1959 DOCs associated with precision engagement, combat identification, and offensive information
1962 Synchronize Employment of Forces to Achieve Desired Effects. This describes the capability
1963 to synchronize joint operations of widely dispersed forces against multiple centers of gravity.
1965 Conduct Short-notice Global Maneuver and Attack. This describes the capability to deploy,
1966 maneuver, and attack with forces sufficient to accomplish the mission. It includes Focused
1967 Logistics DOCs that relate to strategic deployment as well as inter- and intra-theater mobility.
1969 Protect Forces, Facilities, and Capabilities. This is a relatively broad category that includes
1970 full-dimensional protection DOCs related to early detection and engagement of those threats that
1971 are most dangerous to mission accomplishment (such as WME-capable air and missile threats).
1972 It also includes DOCs related to precision engagement, defensive information operations, and
1973 combat identification.
1975 Affect Adversary Ability to Observe the Battlespace. This increases the information
1976 differential in the JFC’s favor, thus contributing to information superiority and creating
1977 confusion for the adversary.
1979 Affect Adversary Ability to Command and Control Forces. This disrupts, destroys, or
1980 otherwise affects an adversary’s C2 systems, to weaken his planning and execution processes.
1982 5.4. Initial Adversary and Vulnerability Assessment
1984 The classified Initial Adversary and Vulnerability Assessment (IAVA) for RDO, and it’s
1985 unclassified Threat Abstract (Appendix C), is an intelligence analysis leading to a more
1986 comprehensive risk assessment of adversary capabilities that could challenge the RDO concept.
1987 The IAVA is an interim assessment that provides concept and experiment developers preliminary
1988 information regarding those adversary capabilities that have the potential to counter the concept
1989 objective. The IAVA is among the many sources of information that will support the
1990 development of the ONA.
1992 5.5 Conclusion
1994 Dramatic technological developments in the information, biological, and space sciences offer
1995 significant opportunities to advance military science and, equally significant, pose dangers to our
1996 security. Together, this geo-strategic change and the proliferation of advanced technologies have
1997 reshaped the 21st century battlespace.
1999 Although focused on a smaller-scale contingency, the RDO concept is a smart way to think about
2000 joint warfare regardless of the threat we face or the strategic environment in which we operate.
2001 The concept described in this paper is an evolving construct for conducting RDO in the next
2002 decade. It is the USJFCOM experimentation vehicle for transforming jointness and provides a
2003 joint context for Service experimentation efforts. The RDO Concept is the JFCOM vehicle for
2004 realizing the JV 2020 vision and transforming jointness. The ideas identified in this document
2005 span doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities. Concepts
2006 and doctrine drive organization, which should, in turn, drive the development and acquisition of
2007 combat, support, and lift systems and platforms. Our experimentation strategy will refine the
2008 concepts and develop the DOTMLPF Change Recommendation packages that support RDO in
2009 the next decade and to help focus experimentation efforts into a strategy to achieve concept
2012 The development of an effective RDO capability is a journey rather than a discrete objective.
2013 There is currently a limited capability to conduct RDO and improvements in doctrine, training,
2014 and organizations will further improve the speed and effectiveness of RDO and expand the
2015 scenario sets in which it can be achieved. The establishment of an experimental joint force
2016 headquarters under USJFCOM to test RDO issues is an early initiative. Development of
2017 collaborative planning tools and a functional CROP, as well as enhanced ISR and a truly
2018 integrated and accessible intelligence system, will significantly enhance decision superiority.
2019 Strategic mobility concepts such as ―ready off the ramp‖ and new deployment means can
2020 enhance rapid force deployment. Other joint and Service technologies and forces will enhance
2021 RDO as they come on line.
2023 The objective is to accomplish the strategic requirement is to be ready to transition from a
2024 relatively peaceful process to intense combat operations to rapidly and decisively achieve
2025 strategic objectives. Our challenge, in conjunction with other instruments of national power, is
2026 to build the capability to respond quickly and bring regional contingencies to a rapid and
2027 decisive close. We must do this while not losing our ability to prevail in the event of a major
2028 regional contingency.
2029 APPENDIX A
2031 Glossary and Acronyms
2035 adaptive joint command and control: The ability to adjust to a given situation and exercise
2036 authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached joint
2037 forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
2039 asymmetric warfare: The waging of unbalanced or un-proportioned armed or unarmed war
2040 against an enemy.
2042 commander’s intent: The stated purpose or desired end state of a commander in the
2043 accomplishment of the assigned mission.
2045 common operating picture: The integrated capability to receive, correlate, and display a
2046 Common Tactical Picture including planning applications and theater generated
2047 overlays/projections (i.e., Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC), battle plans, force
2048 position projections). Overlays and projections may include location of friendly, hostile, and
2049 neutral units, assets, and reference points. The COP may include information relevant to the
2050 tactical and strategic level of command. This includes, but is not limited to, geographically
2051 oriented data, planning data from JOPES, reconnaissance data from the Global Reconnaissance
2052 Information System (GRIS), weather from METOC, predictions of nuclear, biological, and
2053 chemical (NBC) fallout, and Air Tasking Order (ATO) data.
2055 common relevant operational picture: A presentation of timely, fused, accurate, assured, and
2056 relevant information that can be tailored to meet the requirements of the joint force commander
2057 and the joint force and is common to every organization and individual involved in a joint
2060 decision superiority: The ability of the commander, based upon information superiority and
2061 situational understanding, to make effective decisions more rapidly than the adversary, thereby
2062 allowing him to dramatically increase the pace, coherence, and effectiveness of operations.
2064 decisive operations: Those operations assigned to or undertaken by the US Military in which
2065 there is a firm or conclusive resolution.
2067 defeat mechanisms: the best arrangement of ways and means to destroy the adversary's
2068 coherency and achieve our RDO campaign objectives
2070 desired operational capability (DOC): A concept based statement of the ways and means to
2071 satisfy a JFCs capabilities requirements. A fully articulated DOC identifies subordinate tasks,
2072 associated conditions, and criteria for measurement.
2074 dominant maneuver: The ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive
2075 speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks.
2076 Widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, amphibious, special operations and space forces, capable of
2077 scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of fires as required for either combat or
2078 noncombat operations, will secure advantage across the range of military operations through the
2079 application of information, deception, engagement, mobility and counter-mobility capabilities.
2082 effects-based operations: A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or ―effect‖ on the
2083 enemy, through the application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at the
2084 tactical, operational, and strategic levels. An ―effect‖ is the physical, functional, or
2085 psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from a specific action or actions.
2087 effects tasking order: An order developed by the Effects Cell of the SJFHQ that expresses the
2088 intent of the JFC in terms of specific responsibilities for effects accomplishment assigned to an
2089 appropriate functional component commander.
2091 expeditionary aerospace force: The US Air Force concept of an expeditionary force capable of
2092 carrying out assigned air missions from forward deployed bases or long-range missions from
2093 home bases.
2095 family of interoperable pictures (FIOP): An all-source picture of the battlespace to provide
2096 warfighters real-time operational relevant picture with actionable decision quality information by
2097 fusing existing databases and current displays currently available into one interactive web-based
2100 focused logistics: The ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and
2101 supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of
2102 military operations. JV 2020
2104 force health protection: The health and medical portion of agile sustainment operations
2105 (focused logistics).
2107 full spectrum dominance: 1. The ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination
2108 with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation
2109 across the full range of military operations. 2. The interdependent application of dominant
2110 maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection utilized in
2111 order for the joint force to accomplish its mission. JV 2020
2113 global information grid: The worldwide information network currently being developed by the
2114 US that will link all data and communications networks together in a seamless environment. The
2115 globally interconnected, end to end set of information capabilities, associated processes and
2116 personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on
2117 demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The GIG includes all owned and
2118 leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications),
2119 data, security services and other associated services necessary to achieve Information
2120 Superiority. It also includes National Security Systems as defined in Section 5142 of the
2121 Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. The GIG supports all Department of Defense, National Security and
2122 related Intelligence Community missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical and
2123 business), in war and in peace. The GIG provides capabilities from all operating locations
2124 (bases, posts, camps, stations, facilities, mobile platforms, and deployed sites). The GIG
2125 provides interfaces to coalition, allied and non-DOD users and systems. ASD (C3I) Memo dtd
2126 22 Sep 99
2128 indirect effects: Delayed and/or displaced second- and third-order consequences of military and
2129 non-military actions. They are often accentuated by intermediate events or mechanism to
2130 produce desired outcomes that may be physical or psychological in nature. Indirect effects also
2131 tend to be difficult to recognize and are often a cumulative or cascading result of many combined
2132 direct effects.
2134 information dominance: The degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use
2135 information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to
2136 control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary.
2138 information system: The organized collection, processing, transmission, and dissemination of
2139 information, in accordance with defined procedures, whether automated or manual. In
2140 information warfare, this includes the entire infrastructure, organization, and components that
2141 collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information.
2143 intermediate staging and support base: A temporary location used to both stage forces and to
2144 locate sustainment and maintenance support when anti-access conditions and/or infrastructure in
2145 the JOA preclude early entry. Also called ISSB (new term).
2147 joint interactive planning: Planning between the different Service commanders in a joint
2148 environment that takes place through the utilization of multiple electronic or communications
2149 systems in which responses are direct and continual.
2151 joint mission force: That military force that shares a common mission or goal that will allow
2152 for the overall attainment or success in completion of the assigned task.
2154 key enabler: That crucial element that supplies the means, knowledge, or opportunity that
2155 allows for the success of an assigned task or mission. American Heritage College Dictionary
2157 knowledge: 1. Familiarity, awareness, or understanding, gained through experience or study.
2158 2. The sum or range of what has been perceived, discovered, or learned. American Heritage
2159 College Dictionary
2161 new operational concepts: Those thoughts or ideas that are proposed to bring the joint military
2162 of the future into being to include new technologies and/or processes.
2164 objective force: The strategically responsive force that will result from the Army’s
2165 transformation process. The objective force, capable of dominating at every point on the
2166 spectrum of conflict, will be characterized by its responsiveness, deployability, agility,
2167 versatility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability.
2169 operational net assessment (ONA): An operational support tool based on a system-of-systems
2170 analysis of a potential adversary’s political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and
2171 information (PMESI2) war-making capabilities. It informs decision-makers from strategic to
2172 tactical levels regarding the complementary effects and supporting missions and tasks that can be
2173 considered when applying the full range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic
2174 (DIME) actions to achieve specific effects on an adversary’s will and capability in support of
2175 national objectives. The ONA provides the JTF commander and components visibility of
2176 effects-to-task linkages supporting Effects Based Operations (EBO).
2178 operational-level effects: Operational effects influence activities at the operational level of war
2179 and focus on campaigns and operational objectives.
2181 rapid decisive operations: Rapid Decisive Operations is a future joint operational concept. A
2182 rapid decisive operation will integrate knowledge, command and control, and effects based
2183 operations to achieve the desired political/military effect. In preparing for and conducting a rapid
2184 decisive operation, the military acts in concert with and leverages the other instruments of
2185 national power to understand and reduce the regional adversary’s critical capabilities and
2186 coherence. The United States and its allies asymmetrically assault the adversary from directions
2187 and in dimensions against which he has no counter, dictating the terms and tempo of the
2188 operation. The adversary, suffering from the loss of coherence and unable to achieve his
2189 objectives, chooses to cease actions that are against US interests or has his capabilities defeated.
2190 relevant information: The full range of necessary information about friendly forces, the enemy,
2191 the battlespace, and anything else that affects operational decision-making.
2193 ship-to-objective-maneuver: The concept of maneuvering landing forces directly to objectives
2194 ashore in order to avoid the necessity of establishing a beachhead and avoiding enemy defensive
2195 efforts. USMC Concepts and Issues 2000
2197 technologies: 1. The application of science, especially to industrial or commercial objectives.
2198 2. The scientific method and material used to achieve a commercial or industrial objective.
2199 American Heritage College Dictionary
2203 AJC2: adaptive joint command and control
2204 AOF: Army Objective Force
2205 AOR: area of responsibility
2206 C2: command and control
2207 C4ISR: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and surveillance,
2209 CINC: commander in chief
2210 COA: course of action
2211 COE: center of excellence
2212 CONUS: Continental United States
2213 COP: common operational picture
2214 CROP: common relevant operational picture
2215 DIME: diplomatic, information, military, and economic
2216 DM: dominant maneuver
2217 DOC: desired operational capabilities
2218 DOTMLPF: doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, people, and facilities
2219 DOTMLPF-P: doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, people, facilities, and
2221 DST: decision support tool
2222 EBO: effects based operations
2223 EMW: expeditionary maneuver warfare
2224 ETO: effects tasking order
2225 FARP: forward arming and refueling point
2226 FDO: force deterrent option
2227 FHP: force health protection
2228 FIOP: family of interoperable pictures
2229 FOB: forward operating base
2230 FDP: full dimensional protection
2231 GCCS: global command and control system
2232 GCSS: global combat support system
2233 GIG: global information grid
2234 GPS: global positioning system
2235 GRIS: global reconnaissance information system
2236 HSV: high speed vessel
2237 IADS: integrated air defense system
2238 IAC: interagency community
2239 IO: information operations
2240 IPB: intelligence preparation of the battlespace
2241 ISB: intermediate staging base
2242 ISSB: intermediate staging and support base
2243 ITV: in-transit visibility
2244 JFACC: joint forces air component commander
2245 JFC: joint force commander
2246 JFCR: Joint Force Capabilities Register
2247 JFL: joint futures lab
2248 JFLCC: joint force land component commander
2249 JFMCC: joint force maritime component commander
2250 JFSOCC: joint force special operations component commander
2251 JIP: joint interactive planning
2252 JIPB: joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
2253 JMF: joint mission force
2254 JISR: joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
2255 JOA: joint operations area
2256 JRSOI: joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
2257 JSF: joint strike force
2258 JTAMD: joint theater air and missile defense
2259 JTAV: joint total asset visibility
2260 JTF: joint task force
2261 JTLM: joint theater logistics management
2262 JV2010: Joint Vision 2010
2263 JV2020: Joint Vision 2020
2264 LCAC: landing craft air cushion
2265 LOC: line of communication
2266 LPI: low probability of intercept
2267 MANPADS: man-potable air defense system
2268 MLS: multilevel security
2269 MNFC: multinational force commander
2270 MNO: multinational operations
2271 MOOTW: military operations other than war
2272 MOE: measure of effectiveness
2273 MOP: measure of performance
2274 MPF: maritime prepositioning force
2275 MPF(F): maritime prepositioning force (future)
2276 MPP: mission performance plans
2277 NBC: nuclear biological chemical
2278 NCA: national command authorities
2279 NGO: nongovernmental organization
2280 OMFTS: operational maneuver from the sea
2281 ONA: operational net assessment
2282 OTH: over the horizon
2283 OPSEC: operations security
2284 PCC: Policy Coordinating Committee
2285 PE: precision engagement
2286 PMESI2: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
2287 POD: port of debarkation
2288 POE: port of embarkation
2289 PVO: private voluntary organizations
2290 RDO: rapid decisive operation
2291 ROE: rules of engagement
2292 SD: strategic deployment
2293 SDHSS: shallow draft high-speed shipping
2294 SJFHQ: standing joint force headquarters
2295 SOF: special operations forces
2296 SSTOL: super short take off and landing
2297 STOL: short takeoff and landing
2298 STOM: ship-to-objective-maneuver
2299 TEP: Theater Engagement Plan
2300 TSV: theater support vessel
2301 TTP: tactics, techniques, and procedures
2302 ULA: ultra large airship
2303 VSTOL: vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft
2304 WMD: weapons of mass destruction
2305 WME: weapons of mass effect
2318 INTENTIONALLY BLANK
2319 APPENDIX B
2321 Service Concepts for Future Operations
2323 The Services, in partnership with US Joint Forces Command, are developing advanced concepts
2324 for the rapidly deployable, knowledge-based, precision forces necessary to conduct an RDO.
2325 Recent experimentation has demonstrated that key elements of Service future concepts,
2326 organizations, and equipment support RDO and contribute to the operationalization of JV2020.
2327 These efforts must be developed in a manner that will ensure fully technological and operational
2332 The future Army Objective Force (AOF) will provide the JFC with the essential elements of
2333 land power necessary to the achievement of strategic dominance across the range of military
2334 operations. The AOF will provide properly equipped and trained general purpose land forces to
2335 joint, combined, and multi-national formations for missions across the spectrum of humanitarian
2336 assistance and disaster relief, to peace operations, to major theater wars, including conflicts
2337 involving the potential use of WMD. The AOF will be responsive and dominant at every point
2338 on that spectrum. The AOF will be strategically responsive through forward-deployed forces,
2339 forward positioned capabilities, engagement, and force projection from CONUS. It will be
2340 rapidly deployable to any place in the world—with the goal of deploying one ready to fight
2341 brigade combat team in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. More
2342 importantly, the AOF will provide the JFC with the means and forces needed to seize the
2343 initiative and then maintain operational momentum once engaged. The AOF will be
2344 strategically, operationally, and tactically agile, able to seamlessly transition from stability and
2345 support to defensive and offensive war fighting operations, on the move. It will be a versatile
2346 organization capable of generating mission tailored force packages that can dominate land
2347 operations at any point on the spectrum of conflict with minimum adjustments and in minimum
2348 time. AOF will generate decisive combat power (lethality, mobility, leadership, protection, and
2349 information) through technologically enabled overmatch. The AOF will be survivable anywhere
2350 in the expanded battlespace by combining low observability, ballistic protection, long-range
2351 acquisition and targeting, early attack, and higher first round hit/kill technologies. The AOF will
2352 be sustainable within a small logistic ―footprint‖ created by major reductions in replenishment
2353 (fuel, ammunition and spare parts) demand. The AOF will provide the JTF commander with a
2354 dominant land warfare capability that is integral to achieving rapid, decisive outcomes in all
2355 future integrated, coherent joint operations.
2357 Air Force
2359 The future Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) commander will rapidly deliver and sustain effects to
2360 dominate the battlespace from within the atmosphere, from beyond the atmosphere, and
2361 throughout cyberspace. Aerospace forces will capitalize on improved stealth, speed, standoff,
2362 and precision. Smaller, lighter, and more effective munitions and systems will enable agile
2363 combat support to lay the foundation for persistent, full spectrum, effects-based operations.
2364 Rapid global airlift will enable unprecedented responsiveness for the joint force. The EAF will
2365 deploy into austere contingency areas anywhere in the world within hours or days with minimum
2366 amounts of strategic airlift and sealift, and will have a reduced forward footprint. The EAF will
2367 provide the JFC with more responsive and immediate access to space in the form of readily
2368 available launch platforms and payloads, including intelligence collection devices. These space
2369 capabilities will be horizontally and vertically integrated with air breathing surveillance and
2370 reconnaissance capabilities, manned and unmanned, providing fused battlespace awareness.
2371 EAF global attack capabilities will hold any adversary at risk. Predictive battlespace awareness
2372 will generate focused target sets to create specific operational and strategic effects while greatly
2373 reducing undesired and unexpected effects. Precision engagement will deny the adversary
2374 sanctuary and pause since the EAF will be able to attack hidden, hardened, deeply buried, time
2375 sensitive, and moving targets in all weather conditions. The EAF will be capable of applying
2376 levels of force and effect that are orders of magnitude greater than current capabilities, while
2377 requiring fewer sorties and less force to attain the effect. Highly refined, dynamic command and
2378 control of aerospace operations, with distributed reachback to EAF, joint, government, and
2379 coalition organizations, using networked and integrated information operations, including
2380 computer network defense, will enable commanders to make better decisions and execute them
2381 at a pace faster than an adversary can react. The EAF of the future will be adept in planning and
2382 executing aerospace campaigns at the operational and strategic levels. It will rapidly gain
2383 aerospace superiority, halt the adversary short of its objective, gain battlespace access for follow-
2384 on joint forces, control the battlespace, and rapidly set the conditions that ensure joint aerospace
2385 and land forces have the freedom to engage the adversary from a position of significant
2390 The Navy's Network Centric Operations A Capstone Concept for Naval Operations in the
2391 Information Age and the four major supporting concepts: Information and Knowledge
2392 Advantage, Assured Access, Effects-Based Operations, and Forward Sea Based Forces were
2393 developed to operationalize JV2020. These concepts provide substantial support to RDO in the
2394 context of joint operations. Forward presence of naval forces provides real-time shared
2395 battlespace awareness and immediate employment of capabilities for Flexible Deterrent Options
2396 (FDOs), Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), command and control, fires, and force
2397 protection. These forward naval forces will maintain or gain access to a crisis area and provide
2398 interoperable C2 and sensing in preparation for deployment of additional joint forces. This
2399 capability will become increasingly important as global trends indicate decreasing access to
2400 regional infrastructure and potential adversaries’ increasing capability to employ readily
2401 available technologies to create sophisticated and overlapping area denial systems. These area
2402 denial systems will include mines, tactical aircraft, submarines, costal defense cruise missiles,
2403 Theater Ballistic Missiles, Integrated Air Defenses, and information warfare as elements of an
2404 anti-access strategy in the contested littorals. Emerging technologies will allow future Navy
2405 forces to provide and sustain an expeditionary sensing capability to create real-time, shared
2406 battlespace awareness. These forces will employ miniaturization, robotics, and off-board
2407 autonomous platforms to perform many repetitive and inherently dangerous missions. They will
2408 provide some of the capabilities to protect the Air Ports Of Debarkation and Sea Ports Of
2409 Debarkation, including Theater Air Missile Defense coverage, to ensure the safe flow of forces
2410 into the Area Of Responsibility. They will allow the Navy to employ a distributed, fully netted
2411 force to provide concentrated, high volumes of precision fires in support of joint land forces.
2412 The synergy of these capabilities will enable effects based operations that can substantially
2413 contribute to the JTF commander’s ability to create an overwhelming tempo of operations to
2414 which the enemy is unable to effectively respond.
2416 Marine Corps
2418 Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) envisions Marine Corps application of the philosophy
2419 of maneuver warfare as America’s expeditionary force-in-readiness to fight and win the nation’s
2420 battles enabling future Joint Force Commander’s to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance. Marine
2421 forces will continue to provide Joint Force Commanders with a single, integrated, combined
2422 arms force relevant across the spectrum of conflict. The emerging concept of Expeditionary
2423 Maneuver Warfare will capitalize on the supporting employment concepts to include Operational
2424 Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), and Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM) to support RDO.
2425 The Marine Corps’ organizational structure, multi-dimensional deployment character, and
2426 operational methods are uniquely tailored to provide Joint Force Commanders with a wide range
2427 of options, from indefinite forward presence to forcible entry and sustained operations ashore –
2428 with or without host nation infrastructure or support. The enhancement envisioned in Maritime
2429 Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) will provide for the at sea arrival and assembly of the
2430 maritime Prepositioning force, eliminating the requirement for access to secure ports and
2431 airfields. Institutionally, the Marine Corps strategic agility is its ability to deploy forces world
2432 wide to a theater of operations through any combination of lift (sea, air, land) and employ them
2433 without an ―operational pause‖ to equip, organize, or train for a particular situation. The highly
2434 flexible MAGTF organization allows for the rapid and efficient building of a combined arms task
2435 force specially tailored for a specific mission, yet capable of performing a wide variety of
2436 unrelated tasks if necessary. This force possessing enhanced capabilities in operational reach and
2437 tactical flexibility provides the JFC with a relevant force available for employment. MAGTFs
2438 will deploy by a mixture of amphibious lift, fast sealift, strategic airlift, as well as over land.
2439 These MAGTFs, will conduct collaborative planning, conduct virtual rehearsals, and carry out
2440 well-coordinated battle space shaping activities supported by strategic reachback while enroute
2441 to the objective area. At the same time, future MAGTFs will retain the ability to shift from high
2442 intensity combat operations to a full range of other missions should the situation dictate. The
2443 forward presence posture and rapid response time of sustainable Marine forces provides
2444 unmatched enabling capabilities for the Joint Force Commander.
2446 Special Operations Forces
2448 SOF Vision 2020 is the United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) framework
2449 for building and maintaining the necessary operational capabilities of future special operations
2450 forces (SOF). The vision incorporates two fundamental strengths—quality people with
2451 unequaled skills and a broad-based technological edge-to ensure tomorrow’s SOF are structured,
2452 trained, and equipped to counter diverse threats to national security. SOF Vision 2020 is
2453 underpinned by a rigorous assessment of the future geo-political landscape and attendant threats
2454 and outlines three parallel paths—professional development, technological innovation, and
2455 proactive acquisition.
2457 SOF’s role in peacetime engagement will continue; however when threats escalate, SOF will
2458 deter, defend, or enable follow-on forces to halt aggression using their rapid mobility and
2459 surgical strike capabilities to achieve strategic and operational objectives. In a world of
2460 increased global interaction, SOF can extend U.S. influence, ideals, and values providing access
2461 and promoting stability with affordable yet effective forward presence and engagement posture
2462 that defines SOCOM as the world’s premier SOF–already their or first to deploy—in a volatile
2463 and uncertain world. These capabilities enable the U.S. to devise and execute innovative
2464 solutions to crisis in an uncertain world.
2468 APPENDIX C
2470 Rapid Decisive Operations
2471 Initial Adversary and Vulnerability Assessment (IAVA)
2474 1. This is an unclassified abstract of on-going intelligence analysis leading to a more
2475 comprehensive intelligence estimate of adversary capabilities relating to the RDO operational
2476 concept. There is a classified version, available upon request that is a detailed 900-page RDO
2477 Vulnerability Assessment. It is an interim assessment that provides concept and experiment
2478 developers preliminary information regarding those adversary capabilities that have the potential
2479 to threaten the achievement of concept objectives. The Initial Adversary and Vulnerability
2480 Assessment is a much more comprehensive portrayal of the adversary and relates information to
2481 the system and sub-system levels.
2483 2. Analysis, conducted within the context of a Southwest Asia scenario (2015), reveals
2484 significant vulnerabilities to the RDO concept. Singularly and collectively, the following
2485 capabilities present highly effective asymmetric and in some cases symmetric threat
2486 countermeasures to this concept.
2488 Ground Air Defense
2489 Information Operations
2490 Public Affairs
2491 Civil Affairs
2492 Physical Destruction (Terrorism)
2493 Psychological Operations
2494 Computer Network Attack (Civilian Infrastructure)
2496 Weapons of Mass Effects
2497 Undetectable Surveillance Radars
2498 Smart Munitions Countermeasures
2499 Radar Countermeasures
2500 Over the Horizon Radars
2501 Proliferation of Cruise Missiles
2502 Naval Mines
2503 Digitally Enhanced Performance
2504 Global Positioning System
2505 Space-Based Systems
2506 Space Control Systems
2508 The most serious and farthest-reaching threats are ground air defense and information operations.
2510 3. Ground Air Defense.
2512 May be able to stand-off in-theater ISR assets to excessive ranges diminishing situational
2513 awareness, targeting and C2 to such a degree that decision cycles, operational tempos,
2514 maneuver, effects based operations, establishing conditions for joint operations, force
2515 protection, logistics, and precision engagements may suffer to the point of attrition
2517 The ability to move forces ―over and around‖ will be vulnerable, to ground air defenses,
2518 at large, but especially to MANPADS and AAA controlled and guided by undetectable
2519 surveillance and control radars.
2520 Potential source of numerically high and high visibility casualties.
2521 Fully capable of protecting critical high value assets, in point defenses, from air attack by
2522 any means regardless of the radar cross section or altitude.
2523 Modern systems can fulfill both strategic and tactical roles.
2524 The more modern systems are practically impervious to ARM munitions and smart
2525 munition countermeasures will be commonplace.
2526 They will enable the effective employment of WME capable ballistic missiles exploiting
2527 a force protection vulnerability.
2528 They are difficult to target because of their high mobility and short set-up times.
2529 They will affect sea-based operations because they can detect and fire on aircraft at
2530 considerable ranges.
2532 4. The second major threat is information operations. Although much of these operations are
2533 outside the control of the military domain, the effects to that same domain could be profound.
2534 The adversary clearly has the intent, capability, and experience to conduct intense campaigns in
2535 public affairs, psychological operations, computer network attack (civilian infrastructure),
2536 deception, and physical attack by means of terrorism. Computer Network Attack will not
2537 necessarily be against military operational systems alone, but rather the highly vulnerable
2538 civilian infrastructure systems such as finance, transportation, power distribution, utilities,
2539 telecommunications, air traffic control, business management, and commodity distribution
2540 systems. The intent of which is to create an environment where military operations are governed
2541 by public opinion polls.
2543 5. Terrorism is clearly a central issue and the adversary has the intent, means, and experience to
2544 employ it at unprecedented levels reaching far beyond the boundaries of the military theater,
2545 creating effects that may be beyond calculation, especially if WME are employed.
2547 6. Bi-static and multi-static radars.
2549 Effectively counters many of the concept’s maneuver, C2, and logistic desired
2551 The adversary has an undetectable means of situational awareness enabling surveillance
2552 of large areas.
2553 They can be used for target acquisition and guidance detecting even low observable
2555 Targeting of these assets is not possible.
2556 Adversary decision cycles may be shortened considerably.
2557 Effects based operations might be much more difficult because it relies heavily on the
2558 lack of adversary situational awareness.
2559 The ability to take away the adversary’s initiative also becomes much more difficult.
2561 7. Effective countermeasures to paramount military functions such as C2, maneuver, situational
2562 awareness, maneuver, targeting, and attack are proliferating. These countermeasures are
2563 relatively inexpensive and offer excellent low-cost alternatives to traditional approaches
2564 (procurement of high cost end-items). In many cases, they represent significant performance
2565 improvements to existing capabilities.
2567 Smart weapon countermeasures are particularly problematic in that they complement the
2568 countermeasures and capabilities found in modern ground air defense systems making attack
2569 solutions much more hazardous with a much lower level of effectiveness.
2571 Radar countermeasures. Aircraft would be vulnerable to low probability of intercept (LPI) radar
2572 systems, since these radars would degrade an aircraft's ability to know it is being targeted, and
2573 also seriously degrade radar countermeasures or make them significantly more difficult.
2575 8. Over the Horizon (OTH) Radar. OTH radars will allow air corridor monitoring, aircraft and
2576 ship deployment observation, and extended cruise missile attack capability against sea-based
2577 operations with a much higher level of effectiveness.
2579 9. The proliferation of inexpensive cruise missiles on mobile launchers, supported by
2580 undetectable and OTH radars, seriously threatens force protection, sea based operations,
2581 logistics, effects based operations, and dominant maneuver. They enable an adversary to extend
2582 their influence without the absolute need of force mobility either in offensive or defensive
2583 operations. It is an effective countermeasure to many of the desired RDO capabilities.
2585 10. Naval Mine Technology. Denial operations will be significantly enhanced through the use of
2586 technologies such as propelled-warhead mines, wireless remote control, multiple influence
2587 sensors, and stealth components.
2589 11. The disruption or denial of global positioning systems (GPS), either in navigation or
2590 guidance, will have an immediate and disproportionate effect on maneuver, C2, effects based
2591 operations, targeting, establishing conditions for joint operations, force protection, and logistics.
2593 12. It is the era of information technology but it is also the age of digitally based equipment.
2594 Once equipment is either upgraded to digital or initially developed as digital, profound
2595 performance enhancements are possible very quickly and relatively inexpensively. This is
2596 especially true for air defense weapons, radars, smart munitions countermeasures, and electronic
2597 warfare countermeasures.
2599 13. The above adversary capabilities, especially ground air defense and information operations,
2600 present serious vulnerabilities to the RDO operational concept. The adversary probably can:
2602 maintain their situational awareness while impeding the JTF’s;
2603 shorten their decision cycle while extending the JTF’s;
2604 slow the operational tempo to unacceptable levels;
2605 conduct effective, focused denial operations;
2606 inhibit high-speed, over and around, maneuver;
2607 frustrate early entry operations;
2608 effectively protect high value assets;
2609 inflict unacceptable casualties;
2610 decelerate force projection operations;
2611 jeopardize sea-based operations;
2612 prolong the conflict beyond acceptable limits; and,
2613 influence US and world opinion against the US.
2615 14. As necessary, the adversary of 2015 on which we conduct an RDO will employ some
2616 excellent technologies, capabilities, and tactics to mitigate, and possibly negate our numerical,
2617 informational and technological advantages. As we employ assured access, dimensional
2618 superiority, and attempt to contain his land forces, he will employ anti-access and asymmetric
2619 counters to cloud our ONA, deceive our EBO and prevent us from selectively applying force to
2620 achieve the desired RDO effects. The question is not whether we can destroy/win against a
2621 regional threat in 2015. The question truly is whether we can do so in a rapid and decisive
2622 manner? For the next fifteen years, our adversaries will watch, learn and develop counters to
2623 significant portions of the RDO concept. They watch, they learn, and, within the constraints of
2624 national budgets, they will execute counter-Effects Based Operations to defeat our RDO.