Bing Guo by wuxiangyu


									                                                         Placement Director of IDEA Program: Hugo Rodriguez
                                                                                       Phone: +34 935806612

                                                 Bing Guo

                                  Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona                                   Office:            +34 935811810
Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica                       Mobile:            +34 650268936
Edifici B, Bellaterra, 08193, Barcelona, Spain                      Fax:               +34 935813767                                                     Citizenship:       Chinese                                             Gender:            Female
                                                                    Revised:           October 14th , 2009

1998 – 2002                              B.A. in Finance, Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade (SIFT), China
2002 – 2004                              Master in Finance, Stockholm School of Economics (SSE), Sweden
2005 – 2010(expected)                    Ph.D. in Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain
                                         Thesis Title: The Impact of Corporate Governance on Firms’ Strategy

Teaching and Research Fields
Microeconomics, Corporate Governance, Industrial Organization, Contract Theory, Applied Microeconomics

Visiting Position
04/2009 – 06/2009                        London Business School & University College London

Research Papers
Lobbying or Contributing? (Job-Market Paper)
This paper theoretically and empirically studies the impact of corporate governance level on firms’
choice in two political strategies: lobbying and making political contributions. The theoretical model
implies that managers, who care more about personal interests in short run, prefer making political
contributions; while shareholders, caring more about firms’ long-term success, are more willing to do
informational lobbying. At equilibrium, the efficiency of the decision making process is increasing in the
governance level. Using lobbying and contribution data from U.S. in the 1998-2006 period, I confirm
the main theoretical predictions: (1) Firms only doing lobbying outperform those only making
contributions in the corporate governance level. (2) Firms with higher shareholder power do more
lobbying. (3) Fewer firms with high shareholder power would make contributions than those with high
manager power. However, once they do, they contribute more than the latter. Therefore, if corporate
governance level is improved, fewer contributions will be made by firms.

Manager Replacement, Employee Protesting & Corporate Control
When faced with replacement threat, incumbent managers can look for support from employees to keep
their position, by investing in an employee-friendly relationship. Enjoying such relationship, employees
will help managers to preserve their job by protesting against shareholders. Interestingly, I find that
when the benefits from the close relationship are large enough compared with the loss in managers'
efficiency, shareholders' welfare increases with the investment in relationship and they prefer to share
part of their power on the firm with employees. Moreover, shareholders, from industries where human
capital is more important than physical assets, are more willing to share the power and managers are
more willing to invest in the employee close relationship than those from the industries with less human
capital importance.

Research in Process                      Do Banks Control U.S. Policy? (joint with Yun Lou)
                                                      Placement Director of IDEA Program: Hugo Rodriguez
                                                                                    Phone: +34 935806612
Teaching Experience
02/2005 – 07/2005         Lecturer, SIFT, Management Accounting
09/2006 – 01/2007         T. A. for Prof. P. Courtois, UAB, Microeconomics (undergraduate)
                          T. A. for Prof. J. Caballe, UAB, Statistics I (undergraduate)
01/2007 – 06/2008         T. A. for Prof. M. Farell, UAB, Statistics II (undergraduate)
09/2008 – 01/2009         T. A. for Prof. S. Barberà, UAB, Microeconomics (Master Program IDEA)
09/2009 – Present         T. A. for Prof. F. Obiols and Prof. I. Rico, UAB, Introduction to Economics
                          (undergraduate)(in Spanish)
                          T. A. for Prof. D. Fillpovich, UAB, Microeconomics (undergraduate) (in Spanish)

Professional Activities
02/2008                   Discussant, “Enter Jamboree”, Madrid, Spain
05/2008                   Presenter, Microeconomics Workshop at UAB, Spain
06/2008                   Attendant, “Summer School of Corporate Governance”, London Business School, U.K.
09/2008                   Presenter, “XXIII Jornadas de Economia Industrial”, Reus, Spain
12/2008                   Presenter, “XXXIII Symposium of Economic Analysis”, Zaragoza, Spain
02/2009                   Presenter, “Enter Jamboree”, London, U.K.
05/2009                   Presenter, Microeconomics Workshop at UAB, Spain
09/2009                   Presenter & discussant, “XXXIV Jornadas de Economia Industrial”, Vigo, Spain

Research Contracts        “Innovation Economics and Health Economics: Market Performance and Mechanism Design”
                           Reference: ECO2009-07616ECON,        Project leader: Inés Macho-Stadler

09/2002 – 12/2003         Scholarship from STINT, Sweden
09/2005 – 12/2005         Doctoral Scholarship from Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
01/2006 – Present         FI-AGUAR fellowship from Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain

Language                  Chinese (native), English (fluent),   Spanish (fluent)
Computer Skills           Stata, Eviews, Gretl

Professor Inés Macho-Stadler                                    Professor Paolo Volpin
Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica                   Finance Department
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona ,                             London Business School
Edifici B, Bellaterra, 08193, Barcelona, Spain                  Regent’s Park London, NW1 4SA, U.K.
Tel: +34 93 5811812                                             Tel: +44 (0)2070008217
Email:                                        Email:

Professor Pedro Rey-Biel
Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Edifici B, Bellaterra, 08193, Barcelona, Spain
Tel: +34 93 5812113

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