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C H A P T E R O N E
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS
Global Political Trends:
Integration or
Disintegration?
oday’s international system is in tran-
Key Trends
T sition, a process that began a decade
ago and likely will take several years
until a new pattern congeals. A sense
of perspective is needed. Compared to the Cold
War and earlier periods during this century, the
An Amorphous Political
System and Greater Uncertainty
The current international system remains
world today is less endangered and more peace- dominated by many nation-states. They act pri-
ful. Democracy and capitalism have emerged as marily on their own interests, albeit within mul-
admired values and serve as a beacon for others tilateral institutions and transnational trends.
to follow. Today, a strong market economy is a These limit their sovereignty in important ways.
better means of gaining national power and As countless scholars state, the nation-state sys-
prestige than military power and aggression. tem has its own disorder. The Cold War created
Current challengers to market democracy are a sense of order. Much of the world was divided
few, disunited, and weak. Above all, no organ- into two competing blocs—democratic and com-
ized global coalition challenges the security of munist. This bipolar order has now disappeared,
the Western democratic core states. For the leaving the still-united Western bloc peering
United States and its close democratic allies, outward at several critical regions that have no
these are undeniably good times. apparent order of their own. How these amor-
Less clear is whether this favorable strategic phous, often-troubled regions will evolve is the
situation is temporary or permanent. The nega- looming issue of the coming two decades.
tive events of the past months are worrisome be- The future is clouded in part because the
cause they may foretell more dangerous devel- global community lacks consensus regarding po-
opments. Historically, periods of tranquility have litical values and ideology. Liberal democracy
proven ephemeral. Much depends on future and market capitalism remain the West’s domi-
major power relations, regional developments, nant values, and their spread is the principal
and cross-regional trends in such areas as eco- hope for a peaceful 21 st century. Although
nomics and security affairs. prospects are good in many areas, their adoption
everywhere is less certain. Many cultures neither
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accept Western values nor benefit from the un- agendas, much less the turbulent regional envi-
derlying conditions that allow these values to ronment around them. For some, change prom-
develop. In many places, authoritarianism per- ises progress. But for others it brings uncomfort-
sists, even though it lacks a compelling rationale. able uncertainties and new dangers.
Some fear that raw-boned statism, abusive na- Regardless of change or continuity, instabil-
tionalism, corporate fascism, and anti-Western ity has a variety of origins. Failing states can
cultures are gaining strength. The underlying re- collapse into ethnic warfare that spreads to
ality is that, for many countries, pursuit of na- neighboring countries, as occurred in the
tional interests is the primary way to define their Balkans. Ambitious rogues can aggressively
identities. Yet, the global community lacks an attack neighbors, such as Iraq’s invasion of
identity of its own. Kuwait in 1990. Geopolitical competition unin-
How should national interests be inter- tentionally triggered World War I. No major
preted? Some observers judge that, in today’s country wanted war, but short-sighted policies
world, economic agendas dominate. They as- led to it.
sume that peace and cooperation will emerge, Today’s world has seen the first two kinds
because prosperity in today’s global economy of instability, but not the third. Some claim that
depends on countries seeking both. This is a key major geopolitical rivalry will never occur in an
trend, but whether it is a compelling one is an- information-age world economy, where military
other matter. History shows that economics have power and diplomatic maneuvering are obsolete.
caused countries to wage war, not embrace The validity of this judgment has yet to be
peace. More fundamentally, human beings are demonstrated. Geopolitical competition tends to
influenced by the full range of emotions and unfold slowly over decades. Although times
pathologies. A vibrant world economy does not have changed, the major powers still occupy the
resolve many countries’ strategic dilemmas that same geostrategic positions that produced past
are the result of their geography and neighbors. rivalries.
Indeed, economic progress can exacerbate prob- The consequence is a mixed setting. The po-
lems if it enables rogues and troublemakers to tential for cooperation exists in some places but
gain power. As a result, traditional security inter- is lacking in others. Areas are still experiencing
ests remain valid. ongoing deep-seated conflicts or have the poten-
For many countries, the pursuit of tradi- tial for new ones. This checkered pattern, in a
tional security interests is not inimical to peace. fast-changing world that lacks sound security re-
The Western community lationships, contributes to a murky international
discovered that coopera- system and uncertain future.
tion is the best way to en-
hance individual as well Clearer Strategic Identities
as collective interests. In Complicating World Affairs
the future, other countries
in amorphous regions Principal countries are acquiring clearer
may discover the same. strategic identities that will complicate interna-
Yet, cooperation and inte- tional affairs. Four years ago, Strategic Assess-
gration are achievable ment 1995 portrayed the global system as di-
only when countries over- vided into four groups of countries: the Western
come age-old disputes. democratic core, transition states, rogue states,
In many of today’s and failing states. Although this concept re-
amorphous regions, such mains valid, its simplicity is being challenged.
favorable conditions do Several countries are defining their identities in
not exist. Historical dis- ways that defy categorization. This can been
putes linger and some- seen within the Western democratic community.
times flare. In some places, By one count, 118 countries have democratic
Marines enroute to Puerto
Rico to provide humanitar- genuine rogues exist, and their conduct fosters governments. Democracy’s rapid expansion in
ian relief in the wake of war rather than peace. In other places, suspicion recent years has resulted in a highly differenti-
Hurricane Georges prevails rather than trust. Many countries fear ated community. The Western industrial coun-
that multilateral cooperation means that rival tries—roughly twenty in North America, Eu-
neighbors will gain advantage. rope, and Asia—are the “core.” As a result of
Many countries reside in fast-changing re-
gions. They are hard pressed to handle domestic
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Global Trends
Europe:
Growing Unification Russia and CIS:
Deteriorating Conditions
Asia-Pacific:
Murky Future
India-Pakistan:
Nuclear Geopolitics
Western Hemisphere:
Democratic Transition
and Consolidation Mideast and Africa:
Mounting Danger
close security and economic ties during the Cold while cooperating on others. The same applies to
War, these countries are bonded in cooperative many other countries undergoing transition. The
relations today, even though they do not always rise of genuinely neutral but internationally ac-
agree on new-era security issues. tive states, capable of moving in one direction or
By contrast, the “outer core” is composed of the other, may become a feature on the interna-
the remaining democracies. They have varying tional terrain.
degrees of closeness with the core states and The category of “rogues” seems clear and
show varying degrees of constitutional practice. enduring. While the definition of a rogue state is
Some countries may join the democratic core in difficult to pin down, it correlates closely to
the near to long term. Others may not join at all, those states that support aggression and terror-
cooperating with the democratic core only in ism. A rogue state is an outlaw country capable
limited circumstances. Still others distrust the of instigating conflict with the United States and
democratic core and may oppose it. This does its allies. Iraq and North Korea are examples.
not reduce the importance of democracy’s en- Just as common criminals vary in degree of un-
largement, but it does mean that some states will lawful conduct, rogues do also. Serbia seems to
not easily support cooperative efforts regarding be a part-time rogue, and Iran may be moving
global security and economic issues. from full-time to part-time rogue. The future
A similar trend is occurring in the “transition may witness more gray-area rogues, making
states”—Russia, China, and India. A few years them harder to deal with.
ago, these were seen as moving toward market A similar conclusion applies to “failing
democracies and participating in the Western states.” A few years ago, many worried that
community. This category also included a number other countries might go the way of Bosnia and
of other countries. They were not democracies, Rwanda, consumed by ethnic violence that weak
but they were not rogues or failing states, either. governments cannot control. This fear has not
Today, the strategic identities of the three been fully realized, although many candidates
key transition countries have become clearer exist. Yet, many countries clearly fall into a new
than before. Russia is a struggling democracy. category of “troubled and not succeeding.” They
India is a full democracy. China still has an au- have weak governments and societies and can-
thoritarian regime. However, each pursues for- not compete in the global economy. They are vul-
eign policies anchored in national interests. None nerable to the kind of internal disorders that
is a rogue, but none seems likely to join the West- could have a destabilizing impact on regional se-
ern democratic core anytime soon. All three seem curity affairs.
willing to oppose some U.S. policies occasionally,
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These clearer but more diverse strategic and environmental erosion gives many countries
identities are contributing to a more complicated a reason to work together. But the growing men-
world. This prospect could mean an interna- ace posed by transnational terrorism, drugs, and
tional security environment that is less reassur- organized crime enhances the dangers and tur-
ing than today and harder to manage. bulence of the modern era.
Key functional trends are both integrative Today’s multilateral institutions produce
and disintegrative, and, while international insti- stabilizing and integrative effects, but they do
tutions can moderate global political strife, they not fully eliminate the anarchy of the nation-
cannot eliminate it. state system. Multilateral institutions, such as the
A “functional trend” cuts across several re- European Union, the North Atlantic Free Trade
gions, affecting all of them. Two such trends are Agreement, the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
the spread of information technology and the tion organization, and the ASEAN Regional
growth of the world economy. They reflect grow- Forum, help countries coordinate their economic
ing globalization, whereby all regions and coun- policies, but do not forestall conflicts when reces-
tries are being drawn into closer relations and in- sions occur or trade barriers cannot be elimi-
terdependency. Previously, the principal hope nated. Today’s arms control accords, like the
was that these functional trends would lead to Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Missile Technology
closer cooperation among countries. Recent ex- Control Regime, and the Strategic Arms Reduc-
perience suggests a more guarded appraisal. In tion Treaty, have a moderating effect but are not
some ways, these trends are having an integra- producing global disarmament or denying
tive effect. But many of the same trends are also rogues the weapons they seek.
having disintegrative effects.
The countervailing effects of functional Accelerating WMD Proliferation
trends are already evident. The information era The proliferation of WMD has always been
makes communications global and nearly instan- a threat, but for a long time it occurred more
taneous. Consequently, cultures and regions are slowly than many expected. Now it is accelerat-
more aware of each other, but local crises can ing. India and Pakistan’s nuclear detonations
quickly become global in this environment. were the most dramatic events. North Korea has
Modern communications speed global finances, launched extended-range missiles. Iraq may be
but they can quickly exacerbate the impact of hiding WMD systems, and Iran is assembling
local bank failures and loan defaults. Economic weapons and delivery vehicles. Previously, many
globalization can increase trade and produce believed that rogues would acquire WMD sys-
greater prosperity for countries, but as the Asian tems and delivery vehicles after 2010. Now this
economic crisis shows, globalization can quickly seems likely within the coming decade.
transmit economic troubles from a few countries The Western community is attempting to
to many. The dynamic world economy creates stem the tide and may succeed. But if it fails, the
losers as well as winners in ways that can moti- consequences could be incalculable. Rogues with
vate the losers to act disruptively in security af- WMD systems will be emboldened, perhaps
fairs. Likewise, the need for access to oil, gas, committing aggression under the guise of deter-
and other resources creates reasons for countries ring a Western response. Endangered countries
to cooperate in order to gain adequate supplies may seek their own WMD systems. The United
for all. But it can also give rise to serious conflicts States and its key allies will face pressures to
when resources are scarce, or when a few coun- protect themselves, along with other countries
tries control supplies and are unwilling to share and regions. Regional affairs will become less
them fairly with other users. stable, and a climate of fear and uncertainty will
Global military trends are similarly compli- emerge. South Asia is one obvious example, but
cated. Widespread military downsizing is en- other regions may be affected as well.
hancing stability. So are existing multilateral
arms control agreements. Yet, the proliferation of Evolving Key Regions
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is having
the opposite effect. Conventional force modern- The key regions are evolving in different
ization may give rogues broader latitude for ag- ways, and the interrelations between them are be-
gression. Transnational trends have the same coming more pronounced. Europe is headed to-
dual effect. The need to control global warming ward stability and unity. NATO and the EU are
enlarging eastward, while Russia struggles to in-
fluence the process in ways reflecting its interests.
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The greatest dangers to Europe likely will come from Southeast Asia to Japan. This negative de-
from the south, in the Balkans and the geostrate- velopment may not be likely, but it is possible, if
gic arc stretching from North Africa, through security affairs are mishandled. Today, Asia is ca-
Turkey, to the Persian Gulf. The central question pable of moving in several directions.
facing Europe is whether it will focus only on its The most explosive region is the vast zone
consolidation, or look outward to regions where encompassing the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and
common Western interests are endangered. South Asia. The principal democracies are Israel
In Eurasia, the struggle to build democracy and Turkey in the Middle East, and India and
and market economies continues toward an un- Pakistan in South Asia. Elsewhere, democracy is
clear destination. Despite the gains since 1992, not developing, nor are market economies taking
progress has slowed and Russia seems to be los- hold. Danger lies in polarized politics, rampant
ing its grip on its own evolution. Whether Russia poverty, fundamentalism, terrorism, WMD pro-
is finished as a great power is yet to be seen, but liferation, and the potential vulnerability of pro-
it is unlikely to regain its major power status in Western governments, like Saudi Arabia and
the coming years. A weak Russia poses no major Egypt. The region contains three dangerous
conventional military threat to Europe. However, rogue states: Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Iran shows
Russian power has always held much of Eurasia signs of diplomatic moderation. Iraq remains de-
together. Russia and the Commonwealth of Inde- fiant to the West, which continues to have vital
pendent States could become a geopolitical interests at stake in the Persian Gulf, including
ghetto marked by economic turmoil, weak gov- access to 40 percent of the world’s oil supplies.
ernments, organized crime, social instability, and If WMD proliferation accelerates, Iraq and
residual military power. Such regional chaos Iran could be more troublesome. Israel and other
may be a new menace to Europe, as it would be a pro-Western countries would be less secure than
natural breeding ground for authoritarianism, now. India and Pakistan could move closer to
even fascism. nuclear confrontation. What occurs in this region
In Asia, the only near-term threat of war is will depend heavily on three issues: the Arab-Is-
on the Korean peninsula. Elsewhere, Asia’s raeli peace process, Gulf security affairs, and the
strength is growing, even though its economic India-Pakistan standoff. Most seasoned ob-
prospects are cloudy. Democracy has a firmer servers are more pessimistic than hopeful.
foothold in Asia owing to changes in such key Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have
countries as South Korea and Taiwan. The cur- been regarded as the backwaters of global secu-
rent economic crisis could mean more democracy rity affairs, yet both are large and important re-
and market economies in Southeast Asia. What gions, and Western interests are at stake in both
Asia lacks is collective security mechanisms. regions. Sub-Saharan Africa is progressing to-
Today, security is achieved through a network of ward democracy and economic improvement.
bilateral ties between Asian countries and the Yet, some governments behave as rogues,
United States. The Asian countries themselves are poverty dominates, and the potential for savage
cooperating in economic but not security affairs. ethnic violence exists. Africa will make slow
Asia is a classic multipolar system, but does progress, but with numerous setbacks. Central
not appear to mirror the traditionally troubled and South America are advancing toward
history of such systems. The Korean peninsula democracy and multinational cooperation. But,
aside, Asia lacks the inflamed animosities and some countries are vulnerable to political insta-
widespread rivalries that create imminent explo- bility and social strife. Mexico and Cuba are es-
siveness. Although many countries distrust each pecially important to U.S. interests.
other, they are not preparing for war, and their Recent experience suggests that these key
information-age economies are slowly drawing regions are affecting each other. For example,
them together. In the future, China’s evolution Europe’s enlargement closer to Russia and Eura-
will be key. Its power grows even as it clings to sia will eliminate the “neutral” zone between
authoritarian rule. If China becomes a coopera- them. Europe and the Greater Middle East are
tive partner of the West, Asia’s future will likely interacting in ways suggesting that that they are
be stable. If it emerges as an intimidating country becoming closely connected. Russia and China
with assertive geopolitical aims, growing instabil- are pursuing cooperation. Both are asserting
ity could be the result. China and Japan could be-
come rivals, making Northeast Asia more tense.
A struggle could ensue over control of critical sea
lines of communication along the Asian crescent
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President Clinton issuing
a warning to Saddam
Hussein, flanked by Vice
themselves in Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf Middle East. Such an outcome is not foreor-
President Al Gore, Secre-
tary of Defense William affairs to counter U.S. policies. Oil and gas in the dained, and it may no longer be probable. The
Cohen, and Chairman of Caspian basin are entangling the interests of central challenge lies in getting it to take hold
the Joint Chiefs of Staff many powerful actors—Russia, China, Turkey, and grow in a troubled setting.
General Henry Shelton Iran, India, Europe, and the United States. Big Unfavorable scenarios should also be con-
power relations in Asia are being influenced by sidered. A highly unlikely one is a new super-
the political climate in other regions, including power challenging a unified military alliance in
the Greater Middle East. Asia will influence the the West. The second possible scenario might be
political climate in Europe, Eurasia, and the more failed states, local violence, and organized
Middle East. crime. It could also include the emergence of
A new global geostrategic dynamic is more regional rogue states armed with WMD. A
emerging. It suggests the need for a global focus third possible scenario would be geopolitical
in U.S strategy, rather than maintaining a re- conflict with Russia and/or China. These scenar-
gional focus. After all, globalization is making ios are not mutually exclusive and could alter-
the world a single entity. nate over time.
The world could become more stable and A major concern would be coalitions com-
peaceful, if today’s integrative trends succeed. posed of disaffected groups, regional rogues, and
This does not mean that conflict and strife will major power rivals united by common interests
disappear everywhere. It does mean that the rather than ideology. Previously, such a coalition
level of danger will decline appreciably. For ex- seemed improbable. Signs indicate it may be
ample, Europe may unify, Eurasia may become emerging. Some big powers have already sup-
fully democratic, and Asia may become stable. ported regional rogues. This trend could gain
The West’s strategic dilemmas would be eased,
allowing it to focus on a still-troubled Greater
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momentum, as recalcitrant groups and states re- increase. The world economy would become
alize that they can better advance common inter- less prosperous. Democracy would become en-
ests through a cooperative effort, rather than dangered in many places.
separately. This also may be a natural geostrate- Effective engagement requires policies
gic dynamic. Historically, international security aimed at promoting integration and peaceful co-
systems typically began as loose, amorphous, operation. It also requires policies aimed at pre-
and multipolar. But they often have coalesced venting disintegration, conflict, and other nega-
into two opposing camps that become suscepti- tive trends. Both are equally important. Negative
ble to war and other political conflicts. events over the past few months underscore the
Today’s global security structure could fol- importance of preventive measures. If this trend
low this trend. It is characterized by a large U.S- continues, the United States and its allies will
led Western community facing numerous regions have compelling reasons to forge integrated
lacking order and structure. It may enlarge, incor- strategies to prevent them. In fact, preventing
porating more countries and isolating others. negative trends may be a prerequisite for pro-
Those countries that do not join the Western com- moting integration and cooperation. More specif-
munity could form an opposing order. This devel- ically, maintaining a climate of stability and secu-
opment is far from inevitable, but its occurrence rity will be needed, if the Western allies are to
would not defy history or logic. continue spreading democracy, building a pros-
Probabilities cannot be assigned to these fu- perous world economy and encouraging peace-
tures. They will be the result of multiple, inter- ful multilateralism. As a result, emerging condi-
acting events that include the choices of key tions support the judgment that realism and
countries and how they decide to interact with idealism are becoming two sides of the same
each other. The question is, how will these coin, rather than opposing approaches for mak-
countries decide to act? ing policies.
Preventive measures must consider those
Potential Dangers and Threats developments that could have destabilizing ef-
Previously, popular opinion held that the fects. The following is a list of potential threats
leading democracies control the future shape of and dangers:
the international system. However, the world is s Aggression by current rogues, and emergence
stubbornly resistant to any overall design. Yet of new rogues
s Increasing ethnic warfare and violence from
the opposite conclusion—of Western impotency failed states
and irrelevancy—is equally wrong. The United s Accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass
States and its allies are not canoeists caught in a destruction and missiles
raging global torrent, with only tiny paddles to s Spreading terrorism, organized crime, and drug
keep them from capsizing and drowning. Their trafficking
s Military developments that erode U.S. superior-
democratic values and strategic assets can sub- ity and encourage regional aggression
stantially influence economic and security s Authoritarian rule in Russia or other major
trends. They cannot dictate how the world countries, coupled with militarism and imperialism
evolves, but they can steer themselves in the s An anti-Western global coalition of rogues and
right directions, in ways that support their eco- malcontents
s Clashes over resources, or a global economic
nomic and security interests. collapse that produces widespread frustration and less
Influencing the future requires sustained political cooperation
allied and U.S. engagement. Although the s Geopolitical rivalry with Russia and/or China
United States is a superpower, it is not capable s Emergence of a strong Islamic alliance in the
of managing all the security requirements for Greater Middle East that seriously challenges Western
interests
the major regions. However, the task becomes s Disintegration of the Western Alliance system
more manageable with allied participation. The and renewed nationalism.
likely consequences of U.S. and allied isolation-
How serious are these dangers and threats?
ism illustrate the importance of engagement.
The first five already exist and may be intensify-
Rogues would have greater latitude to commit
ing. The remainder are not imminent, but they
aggression. Threatened countries would feel
would be likely if global events take a downturn.
compelled to build military forces and be more
The past century has demonstrated that the
assertive of their interests. The spirit of coopera-
United States has interests that demand sus-
tion that is prevalent among many nations
tained peacetime engagement. In the first half of
today would diminish. Global tensions would
the century, the United States remained aloof
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The World Order
basic collective security structure that had brought a degree of peace to
A
decade after the Berlin Wall was torn down and a new international
system was born, the nature of that new system is not yet clear. It Europe in the early 19th century. Instead of an informal Concert system with
is a fluid and complex system in evolution. But evolution toward a semi-independent balancer, they created a League of Nations under
what? History shows that the fluidity in today’s world has precedents in which states agreed to provide for collective security by aligning them-
the early stages of each of the past five international systems. Each of selves against a potential aggressor. The point is that a fluid arrangement
those previous systems had a life cycle: there was a tendency for fluidity was created which sought to provide security without rigid alliances. The
and multipolarity to turn into rigidity and bipolarity, with that bipolarity in League experiment with collective security failed because countries like the
turn resulting in large-scale conflict (or a Cold War) and the demise of the United States, the Soviet Union, and, until 1926, Germany were not mem-
existing international system. There are signs that history may repeat itself bers, and because strict enforcement measures proposed by the French
and that our current international system may be moving into a more bipo- were not adopted. During the 1930s, the world polarized into two rigid
lar and more dangerous stage. It is the role of the statesman to recognize camps of Axis dictatorships and Allied democracies. Weakness in the Allied
this potential danger and deal with it in a timely fashion. camp plus a shift in the bipolar balance due to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggres-
sion Pact were enough to convince Hitler that achieving victory through ag-
Five Previous International Systems
gression would work. World War II ended the fourth system.
• The international system of 1776 had been multipolar for decades, • The postwar security system, formed in part at the Dumbarton
but the American Revolution was part of a broader process that eventually Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, was the creation of the United States
formed loose bipolar arrangements focused on Great Britain and France. and its Allies, who were determined to use their “second chance” to get it
As Napoleon’s power grew at the turn of the century, he was still right. They created a new global collective security system embodied in the
able to form fluid alliances on the Continent to isolate and defeat his United Nations that once again relied for the maintenance of security not on
enemies. The system became tightly bipolar when Britain, Russia, and rigid alliances but on the fluid alignment of nations in the Security Council.
their allies united against an aggressive and republican France. This clash Its failing was the requirement for Big Five unanimity for any military action,
culminated in the battles of Borodino, Leipzig, and Waterloo, where the and its saving grace was Article 51 of the Charter, which reinforced the
first system ended. right to individual and collective self-defense. The early multipolarity of this
• A new Concert of Europe was born in Vienna in 1815 ushering in fifth system lasted only a few years as the United States moved to counter
the second international system, which was based upon a balance of power Soviet aggression. By April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
designed to prevent a hegemon from arising again on the continent. Great (NATO) was created consistent with Article 51. Bipolarity was formalized in
Britain acted independently as the balancer, contributing to the fluidity of 1955 with West Germany’s incorporation into NATO and the formation of
the system. The Concert system kept the peace for much of the first half of the Warsaw Pact. It lasted until 1989.
the 19th century, with most of the conflict recorded between Russia and
Turkey on the periphery. The Revolutions of 1848, however, began to erode Lessons from this History
legitimacy and the antihegemonic cohesion that made the system work. Some lessons from this history may provide guidance for diplomacy
Conservative Russia’s interference in the internal affairs of Balkan states today. International systems tend to last two to three generations. They are
proved unacceptable to liberal Britain and France. The second system thus both created and destroyed by large-scale conflict. Like complex biological
ended with the Crimean War. systems, international systems appear to go through life cycles with birth,
• The period between the Crimean War and World War I best illus- flexibility in youth, more rigidity as the system matures, and demise. Each of
trates the turn toward bipolarity in the evolution of an international system. these five systems was initially multipolar rather than bipolar. Multipolarity
This third system also began in a multipolar and very fluid fashion. Prus- made them more complex; movement in the system was relatively fluid, and
sia’s Otto von Bismarck was a master manipulator and used the diplomatic state diplomacy could be flexible. As each of the five previous systems ma-
freedom allowed by the new system to unify Germany. In preparing for war tured, a degree of bipolarity set in. This was most prominent in the 20th cen-
with Denmark over Schleswig and Holstein, Bismarck first secured the sup- tury, with the rigid sets of alignments that eventually resulted in World Wars I
port of Austria. In preparing for war with Austria, he secured France’s neu- and II and with the bipolarity of the Cold War. But a similar phenomenon oc-
trality. In preparing for war with France, he convinced Russia to deploy curred when major powers aligned against France early in the 19th century
forces in such a way as to insure Austria’s neutrality. Bismarck’s successful and again against Russia at midcentury.
“realpolitik” continued until 1890, when Kaiser Wilhelm II replaced him. In at least four of the five systems, bipolarity had ideological underpin-
Without Bismarck, Germany was unable to manage the informal and com- nings. Common interests and common fears bound the parties in all cases.
plex alliance system. The formation of the Triple Entente and the Central The systems became more rigid either as a result of political turmoil or be-
Powers Alliance in the early 1900s created a more rigid bipolar system, in cause of the use of force by either alliance.
which each cluster of allies drew closer together for fear of isolation. Com- In some cases, the rigidly bipolar phase occurred late in the sys-
mitments were reinforced, armies were strengthened, war plans were tem’s life cycle. That was particularly true for the first two historical sys-
made more automatic, and conflict became almost inevitable. tems. In the case of the Cold War, it occurred early and lasted for
• World War I and the collapse of monarchies throughout much of decades. In every case it led to confrontation, and in all but the last it re-
Europe led the Allies to create in 1919 a more formal, global version of a sulted in a system-changing war. Bipolarity was not the only factor that
8 I N ST IT U T E FO R NAT ION AL STRATEGI C STUDI ES
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produced major conflict, but it provided a structure for it and appears to a phenomenon found nearly everywhere in the world today, but it has a
have made conflict more likely. very different impact on different actors. In market democracies, it has led
to generally positive outcomes, such as greater power sharing with state
Back to Bipolarity?
governments in the United States and the concept of “subsidiarity” (deci-
The first decade of the sixth system repeats the early pattern in sions made at the lowest possible level) in the European Union. In some
which relations among the major actors are once again more fluid. Its market democracies with particularly difficult ethnic balances—Canada,
characteristics have been difficult to describe simply, and so far it still Belgium, and Spain—the democratic process has provided safeguards for
bears the title “post-Cold War era.” Indeed, it will be difficult to give our minorities and the means to resolve disputes. However, in the most impor-
current system a proper title until the system matures and its longer term tant transition states—Russia, China, and India—fragmentation has led to
characteristics become evident. armed conflict, as in Chechnya, Xinjiang, and Kashmir. These conflicts
This sixth system has had five categories of actors and at least four have in turn led to additional political problems between these transition
dominant trends, with each trend affecting these actors in different ways. states and the market democracies. Fragmentation along ethnic lines is
This accounts for much of the complexity apparent in the new system. The now the leading cause of state failure. It provides new opportunities for
most dominant actors are the market democracies. Their ideology has be- transnational criminal and terrorist organizations.
come the global model, and by the end of the decade more than half the Preventing and countering the fourth trend, proliferation of weapons
world’s nations are characterized as democracies. States in transition con- of mass destruction, has been a national priority for the United States
stitute a second group that hopefully are moving toward market democra- throughout the early years of this sixth international system. Many of the
cies. The most important of these transition states are China, Russia, and other market democracies are only now awakening to its serious dangers.
India. Their ultimate orientation may be the most important determinant of Proliferation gives rogue states and even some non-governmental groups
how the more mature system will look. the potential to threaten and undermine U.S. policies. It is no surprise that
The third category of states consists of the so-called rogues or rejec- the issue has dominated U.S. relations with North Korea and Iraq. The im-
tionist states: notably Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, the Sudan, Cuba, and pact of proliferation on the large transition states has been mixed, because
now Serbia. Containing their activities became the prime focus of U.S. de- China and Russia both supply technology and are also threatened by it.
fense policy for most of the sixth system’s first decade, and defeating two of A look at recent relations among the major powers tends to confirm a
them nearly simultaneously became the sizing function for U.S. military trend toward bipolarity.
forces. A fourth category includes the failing states: Bosnia, Rwanda, Cam- The United States is successfully adapting and reinforcing its security
bodia, Algeria, Somalia, and Haiti, to name just a few. Managing humanitar- alliances with Europe and Japan. At the same time, U.S. security relations
ian disasters inherent in their failure has occupied most of America’s foreign with both Russia and China have been badly frayed during the past year.
policy attention during the decade. Finally, nonstate actors have begun to There are major differences with Russia over NATO enlargement, missile
take on many state characteristics. Some support the market democracies, defense, WMD proliferation, and Caspian Sea oil. There are also major dif-
such as global companies; some prey on them, like international crime syn- ferences with China over Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, theater missile de-
dicates; and some seek to bring the market democracies down, for example fense, espionage, and economic policy. The war between NATO and Serbia,
terrorist organizations. The last two might be called transnational outlaws. the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the con-
Four worldwide trends have had both positive and negative effects on cept of “humanitarian intervention” significantly increased these tensions
these five categories of actors. The effect has been to pull some together earlier this year.
and push others apart. The net result has been increasing polarization in As a result, China and Russia are strengthening their security relation-
international politics, which is leading to a degree of systemic bipolarity. ship with each other in spite of strong countervailing factors which might
Rapid globalization, the first of these worldwide trends, is based on otherwise prevent a closer collaboration. The attraction of globalization that
new information technology and has increased the pace of events in eco- draws both states to the West risks being overwhelmed by policy differences
nomics, politics, military affairs, and communications. Economic globaliza- with the West. Strengthened Sino-Russian ties are based on growing suspi-
tion has brought unprecedented wealth to most market democracies (the cions of the West, increasingly common interests, a natural arms sales rela-
Asian downturn notwithstanding). It attracts the transition states and can tionship, and resolution of most of their Cold War ideological and border dif-
empower transnational outlaws. Rogue states tend to reject the political, ferences. Former Russian Prime Minister Primakov even conceived of a
cultural, and some economic aspects of globalization, while the failing somewhat fanciful Russian-Chinese-Indian alliance directed against Western
states are not reaping its benefits at all and are falling further behind. dominance. At the same time, rogue states like Iraq, Serbia, Iran, and North
Democratization, the second trend, has had a similar effect. It can pro- Korea are cooperating with each other through technology transfers and tac-
vide for peaceful transfers of power and attracts transition states, such as tics that try to thwart the market democracies. There are also indications of
India, Russia, and South Africa. But it has deepened fissures within many fail- increased Russian and Chinese cooperation with the rogue states.
ing states as ethnic, tribal, or religious groups simply vote with their group. The concern is that nations that have strong policy differences with
The third trend, fragmentation, ironically has been stimulated by the West will form informal cooperative relationships that eventually will
globalization as groups seek to differentiate themselves in a globalized lead to a new and dangerous bipolarity.
world and to maximize power at the local level. This devolution of power is
See also Hans Binnendijk, “Back to Bipolarity?” Washington Quarterly, 22, no. 4.
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from international affairs. In its absence, the
world degenerated into global conflicts that
U.S. Interests
eventually involved the United States. During Only a few years ago, U.S. overseas interests
the Cold War, the United States became engaged seemed largely intact. Many believed that global
on the world scene. As a result, Western interests security affairs had stabilized, and dangers and
were protected, global war was avoided, and threats were mostly peripheral to order. This sit-
democracy emerged triumphant. Since then, the uation appears to be changing. Although disinte-
United States has remained engaged, containing grative trends are not yet overcoming integrative
new dangers while promoting peace, prosperity, trends, they are no longer marginal. They di-
and democracy. rectly threaten global stability and security,
Continued engagement is imperative in the today and tomorrow.
future. U.S. interests are being affected by the in- Recent negative events have challenged U.S.
tegrative and disintegrative trends abroad. En- policies. In a period of only a few months, they
gagement is especially needed to keep emerging dealt setbacks to all three key U.S. strategic
threats and dangers under control. goals—democratic enlargement, economic pros-
perity, and global stability. To date, the setbacks
Globalization—Enlarging are not severe, and some are being corrected. The
U.S. Interests and greater concern is that they may be forerunners of
more serious things to come. Building a peaceful
Complicating U.S. Policies security environment will likely be more difficult
During the Cold War, the United States had than was previously expected.
interests in the defense of Western Europe, North- As the world’s sole superpower, the United
east Asia, and the Greater Middle East. The rest of States has great assets, but it also has global in-
the Eurasian landmass lay beyond Western influ- volvements, including those in new places that
ence. Globalization is changing that. It is com- stretch it thin. While it leads large alliances in
pelling the United States and its allies to look be- Europe and Asia, it continually must exert lead-
yond old geostrategic perimeters. The spread of ership to energize them, further stressing its
democracy, the information age, and the global resources. Additionally, a growing number of
economy are expanding Western interests into countries outside its alliances are showing re-
new regions. sentment of the United States for its superpower
Today, the United States and its allies have status, especially when it asserts power for hu-
critical interests in Eastern Europe, Russia and its manitarian intervention. This makes it harder for
neighbors, and the Asian mainland, especially the United States to protect its interests and
China. Their interests in the Greater Middle East, leaves them more vulnerable to the menacing
Persian Gulf, and South Asia are also enlarging. trends now underway.
The menace of WMD proliferation requires them
to deter rogues. The dynamic world economy Rogues
also requires a broad perspective. Economic cri- Previously, many hoped that rogues would
sis in Asia affects not only global prosperity, but become weaker, and more isolated. However,
also U.S. and Western economies. Such transna- they are showing surprising endurance. Iraq,
tional threats as terrorism, organized crime, drug North Korea, and Serbia have demonstrated an
trafficking, and environmental erosion cross all ability to manipulate Western policy and achieve
international boundaries. their ends. Iraq and North Korea will gain
Protecting Western interests and achieving greater advantage if they succeed at developing
goals is more complicated than before. Although weapons of mass destruction and delivery vehi-
it required great resources, protecting Western cles. The internal stability of all three countries is
interests during the Cold War was a straightfor- uncertain. However, as long as they are led by
ward task that required persistence rather than aggressive and militarized regimes, they will be
strategic agility. This simplicity is gone. The problematic for the United States and its allies.
challenge now is how to effectively pursue mul- Current rogues could become more active
tiple goals. Although the world is now less dan- and menacing. In recent years, Iran and Syria
gerous than during the Cold War, devising a have refrained from asserting their military power
U.S. national security strategy for it has become
more complicated.
10 I NST IT UT E F O R NATI ON AL STRATEGI C STUDI ES
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own economic and security agendas and will
focus primarily on its surrounding regions.
Sometimes their agendas will serve U.S. inter-
ests, but not always. If U.S. interests are to be ad-
vanced, it will require interacting with these
countries on equitable terms.
Failed States and
Transnational Threats
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda will not be the
last failing states; the conditions exist for more.
These include growing populations, immigra-
tion, and economic stagnation. Likewise,
transnational threats can be expected to con-
tinue. Terrorism, organized crime, and drug traf-
ficking may even grow.
Failed states and transnational threats will
menace U.S. and Western interests. This will be
the case even if they remain confined to their
local regions and functional areas. If they be-
The amphibious assault
ship U.S.S. Belleau Wood come instruments of rogue states, they could be
(foreground) and the even greater threats.
in the Greater Middle East. If they become
aircraft carrier U.S.S. Carl
stronger militarily, their conduct could become
Vinson in the Persian Gulf
more aggressive. They will be a key variable in
Democracy and
how the Greater Middle East evolves. Other Economic Prosperity
rogues may not directly confront Western inter- Democratic enlargement and a prosperous
ests militarily, but they might seek to engage in world economy represent the principal hopes for
terrorism, organized crime, and related activities. a stable, peaceful world in the long term. But the
Also, they may receive help from other countries, near term is another matter. Democratic enlarge-
thereby making them more difficult to manage. ment appears to be slowing and encountering
difficulty in places where it already has been at-
WMD Proliferation tempted. Likewise, the world economy has suf-
Various conditions are enabling the accelera- fered at least a temporary setback, and recovery
tion of WMD proliferation. Even though Western may require time. In the Middle East and other
policies seek to prevent it, the outcome remains turbulent regions, democratization and eco-
uncertain. If WMD proliferation accelerates, it nomic globalization are not even taking hold.
will pose serious threats to U.S. and Western in- Consequently, unstable internal situations
terests, directly endangering U.S. and allied and precarious external relations dictate the situ-
homelands. Additionally, key regions where U.S. ation in many countries and regions. The secu-
and allied interests are at stake could become rity issues will have to be resolved before
more unstable. democracy and economic prosperity can be pur-
WMD proliferation could be racing demo- sued. Additionally, energetic security policies
cratic integration. Many observers had hoped will be required to protect U.S. and allied inter-
that by 2010 democratization and integration ests in the years ahead.
would have spread and reduced the likelihood
of proliferation and its risks. However, prolifera-
tion in an unstable political setting is likely to
Key Regions
have grave consequences. Key regions are evolving in ways that pose
differing implications for U.S. and Western
Key Transition States interests.
The quest for democratic unity in Europe
Transition countries are unlikely to advance
serves U.S. interests. The situation in Russia and
U.S. interests and goals in the coming years. Rus-
sia, China, and India are unlikely to become ad-
versaries of the United States. Each will have its
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Eurasia is precarious in the near for an uncertain future. The overall strategy re-
Current U.S. National term, albeit hopeful in the long term. lies on military forces, as well as diplomacy, eco-
Security Strategy In Asia, basic U.S. and Western inter- nomic assistance, alliances, and other instru-
ests are currently being safeguarded, ments. It maintains a global network of
Current U.S. strategy has these features:
but the future is murky. Even though institutions and arrangements that advance U.S.
Strategy’s Title: Engagement—To Handle market democracy is gaining hold, interests and goals, and an integrated strategy
Challenges and Capitalize on core security relationships have not tailored to each region is employed. For exam-
Opportunities yet been stabilized. In the Greater ple, U.S. strategy relies on NATO enlargement in
Middle East, U.S. and Western inter- Europe, dual containment of Iraq and Iran in the
Core Goals: Promoting Security, Prosperity,
ests are seriously endangered, and Persian Gulf, and engagement plus bilateral al-
Spread of Democracy
may be even more so in the future. liances in Asia.
Key Security Concepts: Shape the These regions have varying im- This framework reflects the maturing of U.S.
International Environment, Respond pacts on U.S. and Western interests. strategy in recent years. As this strategy ma-
to Threats and Crises, Prepare Now In some areas, U.S. interests are tured, it has become more sophisticated. Al-
for an Uncertain Future being significantly advanced while though its guiding theme is global engagement,
Regional Policies: Integrated Regional undergoing damage in others. This it is a combination of multiple goals, multiple in-
Approaches Composed of Multiple differs sharply from only a decade struments, for multiple regions. Yet, its strategic
Policy Instruments ago, when all three regions faced purpose is clear: to consolidate democracy’s vic-
major military threats. If the past tory in the Cold War by creating a peaceful and
Defense Dimension: Overseas Presence
decade could produce changes of prosperous global environment in which U.S.
and Power Projection, plus Alliances,
such startling magnitude, the coming and allied interests are fully safeguarded.
Coalitions, and Partnerships
decade could produce other sur- Overall, the emerging international trends
Defense Program: Balanced prises as well. Regardless of the out- do not make this strategy invalid. In many ways,
Transformation that Preserves come, these regions will likely con- they reaffirm it. Yet, these trends affect how this
Readiness While Modernizing With tinue affecting U.S. and Western strategy will be implemented in the coming
New Doctrine interests in dissimilar ways. Specially years. They demand continued evolution of the
tailored policies and priorities will be strategy to meet the near- and long-term effects
required for each. of these trends.
This section further analyzes how newly
Constraints on the emerging U.S. strategy challenges can be ap-
Democratic Core proached. Its intent is not to be critical. Several of
its proposals are already being contemplated or
The democratic core could possibly weaken, carried out. Nor does it try to create a fixed blue-
with negative consequences for the international print for future policies. Instead, its aim is to
security environment. This development is identify broad issues and alternatives that likely
highly improbable, but could occur with flawed will shape U.S. strategy in the coming era of in-
policies. Any decision by Germany and Japan to ternational change and turbulence.
break loose from alliance frameworks could re-
sult in a multipolar system and geopolitical ma- Portraying Engagement
neuvering that destroyed global order early in
the 20th century. The more realistic concern is that U.S. strategy continues to be one of “engage-
the democratic core states might not muster the ment.” It implies a rejection of isolationism. This
consensus and combined policies needed to meet concept is now almost commonplace. However,
the dangerous security problems outside their the term alone does not indicate how this strat-
borders, especially in the Greater Middle East. egy will be conducted. A “U.S. engagement strat-
egy of leadership and multilateral response”
might be more illuminating. This suggests that
Consequences the United States intends to continue engaging as
for U.S. Policy a superpower leader and work closely with other
countries and institutions, whenever possible.
The current U.S. national security strategy The question is not whether to stay engaged
pursues three strategic goals: international secu- but how to do so effectively. As the engagement
rity and stability, U.S. economic prosperity an- strategy matures, it must address this issue in
chored in a growing world economy, and demo- ways that respond to the changing environment.
cratic enlargement. The security component of
this strategy seeks to shape the global environ-
ment, respond to crises and wars, and prepare
12 I NST IT UT E F O R NATI ON AL STRATEGI C STUDI ES
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Today, the United States is required to exercise level of resources devoted to other policy instru-
its leadership and power, not only to ensure that ments. Determining the proper response—
U.S. interests and goals are served, but also to whether more resources, or different priorities,
mobilize cooperation from allies, partners, and or a combination of the two—lies beyond the
friends. U.S. leadership must also be inclusive. scope of this analysis. The point here is that the
The most effective policies will be the ones that issue will have to be addressed.
enjoy wide support. Superpower leadership and
multilateralism work in tandem in U.S. strategy. Preparing for Several Futures
The United States cannot assume that inter-
Establishing Strategic Priorities national affairs are heading in only one direction.
Of the three U.S. strategic goals—security, The future’s uncertainty requires a strategic focus
economic prosperity, and democracy—the last that can influence determinants of several scenar-
two have received considerable emphasis in re- ios. U.S. policy should address the challenges and
cent years. This pattern reflects a belief that opportunities posed by the current global system,
global security affairs have been stable enough to while preparing to handle likely changes. It should
permit an emphasis on the world economy and encourage factors contributing to a favorable sce-
democratic enlargement. Dangerous interna- nario, while not assuming that it is a predestined
tional trends now suggest that managing secu- outcome. Likewise, it should endeavor to prevent
rity affairs will need to be given attention and unfavorable outcomes from evolving, especially a
priority in the coming years. Pursuing economic steep descent into chaos and instability.
progress and democracy will be difficult, unless The emerging dangers of today’s world em-
security goals are first attained. phasize the need for prevention. Promoting a
These international trends call for new ap- prosperous world economy and democratic en-
proaches to shaping, responding, and preparing. largement is important, but it mostly capitalizes
While “environment shaping” properly focuses on the opportunities ahead, rather than directly
on achieving favorable outcomes, emerging counters dangers and threats.
trends create reasons for preventing and deter-
ring unfavorable outcomes. Whereas the “re- Shaping the Environment
spond” component focuses on likely near-term In U.S. strategy, environment shaping in-
missions and crises, emerging trends suggest volves three activities: (1) promoting stability, in-
U.S. strategy must focus on a wide range of con- tegration, and cooperation; (2) preventing insta-
tingencies in the long term. While the “prepare” bility, geopolitical competition, coercion, and
concept primarily means military modernization conflict; and (3) deterring aggressive behavior.
and related force developments, emerging trends During periods of regional stability, environment
imply preparing all U.S. policy instruments for a shaping can focus primarily on the first activity.
different strategic environment. These trends For example, today’s situation in Europe permits
also imply that that U.S. forces and other assets U.S. policy to emphasize such integrative meas-
should have the flexibility and adaptiveness to ures as NATO enlargement, Partnership for
react swiftly to fast-moving global changes. Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,
If a stronger U.S. security effort proves nec- and the Permanent Joint Council relationship
essary, determining the level of resources needed with Russia. These steps are aimed at promoting
would be a critical issue. Already, near-term peaceful unification rather than containing dan-
readiness and long-term modernization are gerous conflicts. But when key regions are unsta-
stretching the U.S. defense budget, and as mod- ble, policy emphasis shifts to preventing conflict
ernization intensifies, the budget will be and deterring aggression. Such is the case in the
stretched even more. A more dangerous world Persian Gulf, where U.S. policy is mostly focused
could create added pressures, increasing the on preventing conflict and deterring rogues from
need for readiness, high operational tempo, and committing aggression.
regular crisis missions in the coming years. The If dangerous trends intensify, U.S. policy
same applies to areas of U.S. diplomacy that are must shift toward preventing and deterring in
underfunded and face serious shortfalls if global affected regions. Such activities are aimed at
conditions worsen. The U.S. defense budget al- rogues, but they can also be aimed at controlling
ready is rising, but how far is uncertain, as is the regional rivalries between countries intent on
protecting themselves and intimidating neigh-
bors through military buildups. When China
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Theoretically, U.S. forces can handle a wide
Role of Overseas Military Presence in U.S. spectrum of future operations. Yet, the need to
National Security Strategy perform multiple peacekeeping operations and
low-level crises, while remaining prepared for
T
he military component of U.S. national security strategy is carried out through a two major theater wars, is already straining our
combination of power projection forces based in the continental United States and force level of 1.3 million active-duty personnel.
overseas military presence. Today’s overseas presence totals about 230,000 troops, Demands on U.S. forces will intensify if low-
plus additional forces that rotate overseas temporarily. This amounts roughly to 17 per- level operations increase.
cent of the active U.S. force posture. The various U.S. regional postures are about as fol-
lows: 109,000 troops in Europe; 93,000 in Asia; 15,000 in the Persian Gulf; and 12,000 in Broadening the “Prepare”
the Western Hemisphere.
In all three major theaters, the United States maintains a joint posture of ground, air,
Concept
and naval forces. Maritime assets in each theater routinely include a carrier battle group Compared to shaping and responding, the
and an amphibious ready group. In Europe, U.S. forces include 4 brigades and 2.3 fighter “prepare” concept has received less attention. It
wing equivalents (FWEs). In Asia, U.S. forces include 4 brigades and 3.2 FWEs. In addition has been defined mostly in terms of moderniza-
to these combat forces, the U.S. overseas presence also includes important C4I units, lo- tion, the revolution in military affairs, and Joint
gistic support assets, bases and facilities, and pre-positioned stocks. Security assistance Vision 2010. If dangerous trends intensify, they
and foreign military interactions (FMI, including training, visitations, and partnership activi- will create greater emphasis on elaborating this
ties), also are important parts of overseas presence. concept.
During the Cold War, the primary mission of overseas forces was defense against Preparing for greater and more diverse dan-
major threats. Today, U.S. forces still defend in places where threats remain, such as gers will require more than military moderniza-
Korea. But they also are performing the new missions of shaping the peacetime environ- tion. The full spectrum of policy instruments
ment and responding to a wide spectrum of contingencies short of major war, including will require revision; this includes the intera-
peacekeeping and crisis interventions. The importance of these missions seems likely to gency process, the conduct of diplomacy, the
grow in future years and to create new challenges for the U.S. overseas presence. In each pursuit of economic goals, the distribution of se-
theater, accordingly, the Department of Defense is developing a “theater engagement curity assistance, and the formation of alliances.
plan” to determine how assets can best be employed to help attain U.S. objectives. It will also require new approaches to integrated
regional strategies.
U.S. forces and other assets must be as flexi-
ble and adaptive as possible so that they can
handle ever-changing challenges and opportuni-
launched missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan in
ties. U.S. military forces are already flexible and
1996, U.S. naval forces were deployed to the re-
adaptive. However, future defense requirements
gion. This was an exercise in traditional U.S. de-
may necessitate a more modular posture, capable
fense diplomacy aimed at stabilizing a delicate
of being assembled and reassembled to respond
geopolitical situation. The future may witness
to changing situations.
more activities aimed at deterring rogues and
preventing regional rivalries. Doctrines for WMD
A Widening Range Proliferation
of Military Operations Rogue states, coupled with accelerating pro-
liferation of WMD, could produce a very danger-
In recent years, U.S. defense strategy has
ous future for the United States and its allies.
emphasized preparing for a broad spectrum of
Within a few years, the United States may face
conflicts. It warrants added emphasis because of
the worrisome dilemma of rogue states armed
emerging international trends. If these trends in-
with conventional forces and WMD, plus a will-
tensify, conflicts at the low end of the spectrum
ingness to use them.
may multiply. Peacekeeping operations and in-
Preventing this development will remain a
terventions in low-level crises are likely to in-
top strategic priority, but how will the United
crease. Rogue states may cause regional crises
States and its allies respond if it occurs? Will old
more often. Enemies may employ asymmetric
doctrines of nuclear containment, extended de-
strategies aimed at disrupting U.S. military oper-
terrence, forward defense, and flexible response
ations. The risk of major theater wars overlap-
work in dealing with rogue regimes as compared
ping will increase. Some conflicts may involve
to the Soviet Union during the Cold War? Should
weapons of mass destruction.
the United States and its allies militarily inter-
vene before aspiring rogues actually acquire
14 I NST IT UT E F O R NATI ON AL STRATEGI C STUDI ES
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Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright at
Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia
Role of Alliances and Partnerships in U.S. National
Security Strategy
A
s was true during the Cold War, alliances continue to play an important role in U.S. These questions must be addressed in forg-
national security strategy. They are instrumental not only in providing local defense ing U.S. strategy for the future. They already are
against aggression, but also in shaping the peacetime environment. Without them, being addressed regarding North Korea and Iraq.
the United States would be hard pressed to achieve its core security goals. Sooner or later, broadening their scope may be
In Europe, NATO has existed since 1949, and it recently has been enlarged to 19 necessary. The problem of proliferation may be
countries by adding Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The Washington Summit of here to stay. Irrespective of specific policy choices
1999 not only marked enlargement, but also adopted a new strategic concept and de- for each proliferating rogue, the United States
fense capability initiative aimed at improving NATO forces for new missions. In Asia, the will need a coherent overall doctrine for the full
United States has major security alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea, plus bi- spectrum of situations. Without such a doctrine,
lateral security treaties with other countries, including Australia, the Philippines, and Thai- the United States will rely on ad hoc approaches
land. In the Persian Gulf, the United States primarily relies on coalition arrangements with in situations where improvisation may be the
such friendly countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. biggest danger of all.
Recent years have seen the rapid growth of partnership activities with new nations.
This trend is true especially in Europe, where the NATO “Partnership for Peace” includes a Russia, China, and Democratic
large number of countries not belonging to NATO. U.S. forces carry on important partner-
ship activities with Russia, Ukraine, and China. This is also true across Asia, the Middle
Enlargement
East, and the Persian Gulf, where bilateral military relations with numerous countries are In these arenas, recent U.S. policy has been
key to pursuing U.S. security goals. The coming years likely will witness growing roles for influenced by a large dose of idealism. Many
partnerships and coalition activities in U.S. strategy. hoped that Russia and China could become
close partners of the United States, and that
democratic enlargement would sweep away se-
curity problems in turbulent regions. This may
be achievable in the long term, but recent events
weapons of mass destruction? Or should diplo-
suggest that pragmatic approaches may be
matic engagement be attempted with these coun-
needed in the near term.
tries? Is engagement possible without sacrificing
U.S. and allied interests? Should a combination
of these measures be employed as U.S. doctrine?
I N S T I T UT E FOR N AT I ON AL S T R AT E G IC S T U D IES 15
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Russia and China present different strategic Developing a coherent southern strategy for
challenges and opportunities. Russia’s strategic this arc promises to be challenging for reasons
power is declining, while China’s is growing. In- that go beyond the complexity of the problems
evitably, the two countries will act differently. A being encountered. In contrast to Europe and
democratizing Russia will seek to prevent de- Northeast Asia, the United States does not have
cline. A still authoritarian China may seek to ex- large military forces stationed there, nor does it
pand its influence beyond its borders. The United benefit from established military alliances. Local
States has pragmatic reasons for establishing lim- political conditions, coupled with the absence of
ited partnerships with these countries in areas of large resources for diplomacy and aid, limit the
mutual interest, while using diplomacy to ensure instruments at the disposal of U.S. policy.
their legitimate interests are respected. Such en- Preserving maritime control of the seas
gagement will help reduce the risks of these clearly will be a key feature of future U.S. military
countries becoming adversaries. At the same strategy for the southern arc. Maritime control
time, the United States must safeguard the inter- will be needed not only to defend U.S. interests,
ests of allies and friends that feel threatened by but also to ensure speedy access to troubled
Russia and China. Striking this balance will be a zones. Provided this is the case, future U.S. strat-
principal challenge confronting U.S. policy. egy likely will continue being one of power
A similar pragmatism will be needed in projection while working with coalitions of the
democratic enlargement. Democratic enlarge- willing. Perhaps improved capabilities can be de-
ment may be slowing as it confronts tougher veloped by transforming U.S. bases in Europe and
challenges. Some recently created democracies Northeast Asia into hubs for southward power
are faltering and may suffer temporary reversals. projection, while encouraging Alliance partners to
Other democracies are demonstrating illiberal in- develop similar assets of their own. Meanwhile,
ternal and external conduct. Still others are not diplomacy and other instruments can be em-
enthused about joining the Western democratic ployed to build better partnership relations with
core states and supporting U.S. policies. These friendly countries in the southern arc, while ame-
developments do not mean that the United States liorating troubled conditions there. Changes like
should abandon democratic enlargement. They these can help, but even so, handling southern
do mean that democratic enlargement should be dangers promises to be a difficult task. The out-
seen as producing important but checkered come will heavily determine the stability, or insta-
progress that does not immediately cure all inter- bility, of the coming era.
national security problems.
Developing a Global Strategy
Creating a “Southern Strategy” U.S. policy already pursues integrated re-
One of the principal challenges facing the gional strategies tailored to Europe, Asia, and the
United States will be to create a “southern strat- Greater Middle East. Recent trends indicate that
egy” for handling the mounting global dangers all three regions will likely experience great
ahead. During the Cold War and immediately af- change, and the differences between regions may
terward, U.S. strategy had a “northern” empha- widen. If so, the challenge will be to forge new
sis largely focused on the geostrategic arc integrated strategies.
stretching from Central Europe, across Russia, A decade from now, U.S. policy in Europe
and into Northeast Asia. Korea aside, this arc is may be faced with orchestrating a united Eu-
now becoming more stable and is now no longer rope’s relationship with a decaying Eurasia and
threatened by major war. By contrast, new dan- an unstable Middle East. In Asia, U.S. policy may
gers are arising in the vast southern arc stretch- no longer be fixated on Korean defense issues,
ing from the Balkans, across the Middle East and but on establishing regional security frameworks
the Persian Gulf, through South Asia, and along for all of Asia, including protecting vital sea lines
the Asian crescent from Southeast Asia to Japan. of communication. In the Greater Middle East
The dangers in this arc are multiple, interactive, and Persian Gulf, U.S. policy may be contending
and growing. If unchecked, they have the poten- with hostile fundamentalist regimes and rogues
tial to cause great global instability and to inflict armed with WMD, while protecting friends and
serious damage on Western interests. its own access to Gulf oil. If these or other
changes occur, they will demand different U.S.
regional policies, as well as different approaches
in implementation.
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S T R A T E G I C A S S E S S M E N T 1 9 9 9
A global perspective will be needed. Previ- using military forces in the coming era. The sec-
ously, many believed that with the Cold War ond tier would involve allied forces capable of
over, U.S. strategy should adopt a more regional rapid power projection and working closely with
focus. To a degree, this still holds true. No global U.S. forces in decisive operations, including strike
threat to U.S. interests is on the horizon. Yet, in a missions. The third tier would ensure that U.S.
period of globalization, a purely regional strategy and allied forces acquire the sophisticated infor-
could cause the United States to view the world mation systems, sensors, and munitions needed
in segments rather than as a whole. The emerging in future combined operations. The fourth tier
reality is that the whole will be greater than the would require the government and defense in-
sum of its parts. These regions will be interacting. dustry, to include the information industry, to co-
Developments within one region will affect the ordinate the development of these capabilities.
other regions. Additionally, the United States will These four tiers would be a demanding but
have global interests and involvements. Policies feasible strategic agenda for alliance reform.
in one region will be affected by policies in oth- Most allies already possess the necessary combat
ers. The United States will be unable to establish forces. This strategy does not require quantity
priorities in any single region without an overall but rather quality in such areas as mobility, logis-
sense of priorities for all. Even though a global tic support, communications systems, sensors,
military threat no longer exists, the need for a and smart munitions. Most allied budgets are
global U.S. strategy has not gone away. Indeed, it large enough to afford qualitative improvements,
is growing stronger because of globalization. if savings are generated by eliminating unneces-
sary forces. The Western Alliance system has
Greater Contributions overcome more demanding challenges. The
from Allies question is, can it do so in the absence of military
threats to common borders, but when threats to
The need to reform U.S. military alliances common interests are emerging? To some degree,
was identified in the President’s strategy report the future of U.S. strategy and allied interests
for 1998. It points out the U.S. efforts to encour- hangs in the balance.
age NATO to develop new military capabilities
for new missions, and also to adjust the U.S.- Organizing for National
Japanese alliance for new responsibilities in Asia.
Efforts also are underway to develop new part-
Security
ners in Europe and elsewhere that can contribute Because the international system is already
to common missions. The process of alliance re- in the midst of a fast-paced transition whose
form thus has begun. The question is, where outcome could produce growing instability and
should it be headed and how fast? conflict, the United States may have a short win-
Emerging international trends provide an dow of opportunity to make a difference in the
answer. The central strategic challenge ahead will ultimate outcome. Creating effective response
be to protect common interests against threats be- mechanisms within the U.S. Government, espe-
yond the borders of allies and friends and in dis- cially in the executive branch, will be key. The
tant regions. Alliance reform should consider de- future will require strategic vision and sound as-
veloping better power projection capabilities. sessments, coupled with an interagency process
Threats are developing faster than expected. that can implement these policies effectively.
Alliance efforts should be accelerated so that new Moreover, many U.S. policy actions will need to
capabilities and effective strategies can meet new be merged with those of other countries and in-
threats, which include stronger conventional ternational institutions.
forces and WMD. Additionally, allied forces must Whether the current policymaking process
remain interoperable with U.S. forces, which are is capable of handling the future is an issue mer-
pursuing the revolution in military affairs and iting careful thought. This process was originally
Joint Vision 2010. created to handle the Cold War and has been al-
A case can be made for a multitiered U.S. tered only marginally since then. The danger
strategy. The first tier involves creating common ahead lies not only in the adverse international
strategic motives and operational visions for trends that are unfolding, but also in the risk that
the U.S. Government may not understand them.
It might not be able to perceive them or react fast
enough to make a difference.
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S T R A T E G I C A S S E S S M E N T 1 9 9 9
The coming challenges will be too complex
and interconnected to be separated into different
Net Assessment
clusters that can be handled by individual gov- The future is “up for grabs.” Recent negative
ernment agencies acting on their own. For exam- events are warning of future possibilities. They
ple, international economic policy and security do not necessarily presage a steep slide into
policy will be too intertwined to be separated global chaos, yet they do indicate how the un-
into different domains. Regional military threats derlying international structure is being buffeted
will merge with destabilizing transnational by integrative and disintegrative forces. These
trends and larger global changes in hardware dynamics threaten not only stability and
and doctrine. Individual nation-states will act in progress, but ultimately U.S. and allied interests.
fluid settings that affect their priorities and free- They validate the current U.S. strategy of en-
dom of choice. Their challenges will mandate a gagement, but they also create reasons for new,
greater degree of governmentwide policy coordi- strong policies that will ensure effective contin-
nation than in the past, and they may also re- ued engagement. Meeting this challenge will
quire new kinds of people, with new skills. Pre- likely dominate the U.S. national security agenda
scribing a solution lies beyond the scope this in the coming years.
analysis, but recognizing the problem can be the
first step toward creating a solution.
18 I NST IT UT E F O R NATI ON AL STRATEGI C STUDI ES
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