Philosophy of Religion V
Phil1000-02 10/13 Lecture Fall, 2006
the problem of evil
The problem of evil is considered the most powerful argument for atheism. Many think that it establishes that God doesn‟t exist. Others consider it a problem, but not proof for atheism -- nevertheless, they say, it‟s at least proof that theology is a lot harder than most people think. Either way, the problem of evil is something that no theist can rationally ignore.
Definitions
Natural evil: Pain and suffering caused by natural forces that aren‟t within the control of a moral agent. Moral evil: Pain and suffering caused by a moral agent. Necessary evil: the existence and degree of the pain is needed to serve an overall good purpose. Unnecessary evil: the existence and degree of the pain is not needed to serve an overall good purpose.
Theistic Hypothesis: There exists an all-good, all-powerful, allknowing being (God). Problem: An all-good being would want to do away with any unnecessary evil (be it moral or natural), an all-knowing being would know how to do so, and an all-powerful being would be able to do so. So, God‟s existence and the existence of any unnecessary evil seem incompatible. That is, the following two statements appear to be logically inconsistent:
(A) God exists. (B) (Unnecessary) evil exists.
The Argument from Evil (Logical Problem)
P1) If (A) and (B) are logically inconsistent, then we cannot accept both. P2) We must accept (B), since it‟s fairly obvious that (unnecessary) evil exists. P3) So, we must reject (A). C) Therefore, God does not exist.
Theistic Responses
This is easily done, typically in one of the following ways:
Reject (2): claim either evil doesn‟t exist or if it does, it is not unnecessary. Claim that the atheist has not shown that (A) and (B) are logically inconsistent.
If this isn‟t established, then the argument fails (for its validity depends on their logical inconsistency). E.g., Leibniz.
Prove that (A) and (B) are in fact logically consistent.
The Argument from Evil (Evidential Problem)
P1) If God existed, he would prevent unnecessary pain and suffering. P2) Probably, there exists unnecessary pain and suffering (that is, we have good reason to suppose that at least some of the pain and suffering that exists is unnecessary). C) Therefore, (probably) God does not exist (that is, we have good reason to suppose that God does not exist).
In short, if there exists pain and suffering, and if the existence or degree of the pain and suffering is unnecessary, then the existence or degree of that pain and suffering is evidence that God does not exist.
There exists intense pain and suffering (at least some of which seems unnecessary), and thus there is reason to think that God does not exist. (P2) says “probably”. So, its goal is not to show that God doesn‟t exist. Rather, its goal is simply to show that we are not justified in believing that God exists, and that we are justified in believing that God doesn‟t exist.
Notice that this is not a proof.
In any event, the argument from evil is valid. Is it sound? We turn now to the premises:
(P1) If God existed, he would prevent unnecessary pain and suffering.
This is just a commonsense assumption about moral goodness.
Recall Singer‟s drowning child case -- you would be good only if you saved the child, so long as you had it in your power to do so. So, if God really is all-good, all-powerful and allknowing, then it must be the case that He prevents unnecessary evil.
So, does He?
(P2) says “no, God doesn‟t prevent all unnecessary evil.”
The reason given for this negative answer is simple. Consider the Holocaust. Consider Rwanda. Consider the very, very long list of other atrocities that have occurred and/or are occurring around the world. Perhaps we‟ll admit, in order to make sense of God‟s permitting these things to happen, that these events were necessary
Of course, this by itself seems dubious, but let‟s assume it just for the sake of argument.
So, we assume, for the sake of the argument, that certain atrocious events were necessary: But imagine the 6 millionth Holocaust victim. Or the 800,000th Tutsi.
Was his/her pain and suffering really necessary? How could we possibly be justified in believing that 5,999,999 Holocaust victims (or 799,999 Rwandan victims) wasn‟t enough for God‟s purposes? It seems that we have no evidence that the 6 millionth (or 800,000th) victim was, in fact, necessary.
The question to consider here is important: Are we really justified in believing that every single act of evil that has occurred, is occurring, or will occur in the future is necessary: is consistent with some divine purpose? It seems we have no good reason to believe this. And so, we have good reason to accept (P2).
Theistic Responses
Almost all theistic responses to the evidential problem consist in the rejection of (P2). However, some reject (P1) instead. Here are the four main types of theistic responses:
1. Deny the existence of evil in the world. 2. Claim that the existence of evil can be explained in a way that is compatible with God‟s existence. 3. Lower (or alter) the attributes of God.
This usually amounts to putting limits on God‟s power, and less usually requires putting limits on his goodness or wisdom.
4. Claim that the amount of evil present is the minimum amount possible.
1. Augustinianism
Evil is simply nothing (an illusion). As Hick points out, this position flies in the face of Biblical accounts of human evil (the pinnacle of which is the crucifixion of Jesus) – the Bible talks about evil as being unambiguously evil. Evil simply comes from a sort of sickness of thought. In that case, evil seems something real. If you say evil just is sick thinking, the medical metaphor seems overstretched. Further, sick thinking won‟t account for natural evil. But above all, what‟s wrong with sick thinking? Why should we prefer non-sick thinking -unless we are (illegitimately) assuming that sick thinking is bad!
Natural evil is not really evil. Because „evil‟ refers only to a deliberate choice of an intelligent being: “Bad cat!” is anthropomorphizing. Yet, natural evil provides a sort of evil that is unmistakably real and seems to have no dependence on human thought. And besides, what is at issue is intense pain and suffering -- that is surely a form of evil. And clearly natural forces cause suffering.
2. Mysterion Defense
God has a reason for everything. But since God‟s ways are mysterious, we may not always know these reasons. Nevertheless, we can be sure that all evil is necessary. To see the problem with this defense, consider how this appeal might go over in a court of law! It seems that the problem is that even though God may have a reason for permitting all of the evil that he permits, it is not clear what that reason is (as the theist admits). So, until we have such a reason, even if there is one (and even the atheist admits that there could be one), we‟re not justified in simply assuming that there is one. We have to go with the evidence before us: so, until God‟s reasons become clear, the problem of evil remains.
2. Free Will Defense
God must allow human beings free will in order to make this the best possible world. In other words, free will leads to the existence of evil, but having free will is a greater good than any and all of those goods that would result from a lack of free will. So, in order to create a world with the maximum amount of good, God had to permit human beings to use their free will to cause evil. The problem with this defense is that (at most) it only justifies God in permitting moral evil. It doesn‟t justify God in permitting the natural evil that exists. So, the problem remains. And besides, it isn‟t clear that the argument justifies moral evil either. After all, couldn‟t God have created people in such a way as to freely choose only to do good things? That is, to freely choose not to commit evil acts?
2. Soul-Building Defense
The presence of evil is necessary for building character (soul). If the world was a hedonistic paradise, human beings could not build moral backbone, so to speak. Suffering, hardship, and so on are required to become “spiritual beings” living in the image of God (and eventually to get to heaven). The main objection to the “soul-building defense” is that it assumes that evil is an all-or-nothing affair. The problem is that although some evil may be necessary to build souls, the argument does not by itself show that all of the evil that exists is necessary to build souls -- it seems that there could have been just a little less evil and still soul-building could occur. Destroying so many innocent human beings does not seem necessary. Another worry is this: If war, famine, and disease are “virtue building” then does that mean that we should stop trying to eliminate them? And what happens if we did – do we really think that future generations, in the absence of war, famine, and disease, would fail to develop virtue? Do we really think that such terrible hardships are the only way to build virtue?
2. Fate Defense
God only allows those evil acts that are necessary – that is, that he knows will bring about an ultimate good or otherwise serve his overall (good) purpose. This means that God knows ahead of time which evil acts to allow to happen and which not to. So, anyone can go around doing evil acts (burning down houses, killing people, etc) and we know that if they are successful at it, this means that God intended it to happen because it was going to bring about an ultimate good. But, how can we hold people morally responsible for their evil actions (or even consider them evil actions) if this is the case? In addition, how can we justify getting involved and “interfering” with (i.e., trying to prevent) evil from happening? Shouldn‟t we eliminate those systems (e.g., firemen, policemen, etc) whose duty it is to stop bad things from happening?
2. Natural Laws Defense
At one point, Hick appears to be defending the presence of evil in the world because in order to prevent evil, God would have to constantly interfere with the laws of nature: e.g., turning knives about to stab people to paper, get bullets to drop out of the air, etc. He argues that it would be ridiculous for us to require of God that he do this: the laws exist in an “objective environment with its own laws”. Problem: doesn‟t this place the laws of nature outside of God‟s province? And why suppose that this is the only way God could handle the problem?
3. Theism lite
God is in control of the universe: however, he is less than all-powerful, or else less than allgood, or else less than all-knowing. Problem: This amounts, as Hick points out, to a rejection of the Hebrew-Christian God, for it amounts to a rejection of God‟s infinity and sovereignty.
3. Manichaeanism
There are two independent supernatural powers -one good, one bad. Evils of all kinds result from the bad power, while goods of all kinds stem from the good power. The two powers are in constant battle with one another, and neither has prevailed over the other yet. Problem: Again, this limits the powers of God and is inconsistent with the attributes commonly assigned to him.
3. Naturalism
Natural evils and natural goods are the sole result of natural forces acting in accordance with descriptive laws. There is no supernatural creature in a position to prevent natural evils or goods, nor is there a supernatural creature in a position to forestall moral evils or goods. Thus, for naturalism, there is no problem of evil to be solved. But there also is no God.
3. Demonism
The universe is under the control of a very wise, very powerful, and very evil demon. Note that demonism raises the problem of good, just as traditional theism raises the problem of evil. Johnson points out that there are three possibilities concerning God‟s moral character:
(1) God is more likely to be all evil than to be all good. (2) God is less likely to be all evil than to be all good. (3) God is equally likely to be all evil as to be all good.
Given our existing evidence, we have the most reason to go with (1). (2) simply cannot be not true: the belief that God is all evil can be justified to precisely the same extent that the belief that God is all good. (3) leaves us with no reasonable excuses for a good God to permit evil. To see this, consider Johnson‟s “running over the pedestrian” example. Thus, our most reasonable conclusion is that God is more likely to be all evil than all good.
4. Leibniz’s theism
God exists and is able to act in the world. However, avoiding or preventing natural evils is either impossible or would lead to an overall worse result; likewise, forestalling moral evils is either impossible or would lead to an overall worse result. This is the “best of all possible worlds”. Problems?
Responses in the face of evil
Given the evidence – and given the apparent failure of the above arguments to reconcile God‟s goodness with the presence of evil in the world, philosophers (e.g., Dostoevsky, Johnson, Fales) have argued that there seem only three justified positions we can take with respect to God‟s existence: Atheism: Assume that God doesn‟t exist. Agnosticism: Abstain from judgment about God‟s existence (or God‟s nature). Rebellion: Assume that God does exist – and, because he is such a being as to allow such evils to take place, reject him.
That is we should, as Johnson states it “most respectfully return Him the ticket” (p. 114).