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					ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE
          (EVM)
     MALFUNCTIONING-HACKING IN EVM?


Presentation for Improved, Fool-proof Ballot/EVM
                     System



              Dr. Kirit Somaiya – Ex Member of Parliament
                  All India Convenor – BJP Committee on EVM
                                                22 July 2009
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)

Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) has become a issue of
national debate. Experts have been continuously
expressing their concern about the malfunctioning of EVM
since Lok Sabha 2004 results. Satinath Choudhary
approached the Supreme Court in 2004.

Development has taken place in the developed countries
since last couple of years and the issue of malfunctioning
demands healthy debate and corrective measures.
Leaders belonging to all major political parties – BJP,
Congress, CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK,
Trinamool Congress –have expressed concern about the
malfunctioning of EVM.
                                                             2
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)

Activists, NGOs, experts, authorities have expressed
concern about the present EVM system in India. Several
examples have also been put forward regarding unusual /
abnormality and also mal-functioning.
Developed countries like USA, Germany, Netherlands,
Finland, Ireland, Brazil have either disposed of EVM or
have come out with fool-proof system.
We feel there is a necessity of national debate on “Fool-
proof Ballot/EVM System” in India.
Here is the Presentation on the same.

                                 Dr. Kirit Somaiya – Ex MP
                        All India Convenor – BJP Committee on EVM 3
    ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
                 History of EVM in India
• Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) used / introduced in the
  world since 1970s. During the 70s, Election Commission of
  India consider to use EVM in India. An Expert Committee
  was appointed in 1990 to review the designs, etc. An expert
  moved the Supreme Court in 2005 about the mal-functioning
  of EVM system in India. It was referred to the Election
  Commission of India.

•   The Election Commission appointed the Expert Committee
    on 29th December 2005, which submitted Report in 2006. The
    Committee suggested major “measures” for security,
    protection, upgradation. It also emphasized to use EVM only
    after providing security measures suggested by the
    Committee.


                                                                4
Introduction, Progress of EVM in India


Introduction of the concept in India      1970
First use in 11 constituencies            1982-84
First Expert Committee                    1990
Use of EVM in few Lok Sabha Constituencies 2004
Appointment of another Expert Committee   2005
Committee‟s Report with emphasis on       2006
protection
100% use of EVM                           Lok Sabha
                                          2009

                                                    5
                    India concern

Lok Sabha 2009 elections
• Dr. Subramanian Swamy, former Law Minister, alleged in
  April 2009 that a group of people who had been convicted in
  the US for hacking bank accounts and credit cards had been
  recruited by a certain political party to possibly rig the
  elections
• The Shiv Sena alleged that EVM malfunction caused its
  candidate Mohan Rawale to lose in South Mumbai. Said
  Rawale: “I wonder how I got only five votes from an area that
  is a Shiv Sena stronghold.”
• Journalist Cho Ramaswamy discussed how in MDMK leader
  Vaiko‟s constituency, Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu, “while
  counting, the votes increased by 23,000 more than the polled
  votes”.

                                                              6
         POLITICAL PARTIES & EVM

• BJP – L.K. Advaniji demanded transparent fool-proof
  ballot/EVM system
• L.K. Advaniji demanded EVM with Paper Backup in
  future elections
• CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK of Vaiko,
  Trinamool Congress have raised issues about
  malfunctioning of EVM
• Mr. Gulam Nabi Azad, Union Minister has charged EVM
  malfunctioning in the recently held Orissa elections. He
  made the statement before the Press at Bhubaneshwar
  in JuneJuly 2009
• Mr. Amrinder Singh, Punjab Congress President has
  made public demonstration with EVM and charged
  malfunctioning of EVM

                                                             7
  FORMER BUREAUCRATS / EXPERTS
         RAISE CONCERN
• Omesh Saigal – ex-Chief Secretary, Delhi Govt. & ex-
  Secretary, Govt. of India – has submitted representation
  to the Election Commission
• Issue raised is malfunctioning of EVM.
• Other former bureaucrats – Dr. Krishan Saigal – ex-Chief
  Secretary, Assam, Ravi Kathpalia –Ex Controller
  General of Accounts, GOI, Ms Asha Das – Ex Secretary,
  GOI, K.P. Fabian – former Ambassador, S.K. Agnihotri –
  ex-Chief Secretary, Assam, A.R. Lall – Advocate,
  Supreme Court have also raised this issue.



                                                         8
 Observations, objections regarding the
     present EVM system in India
• 2005 – An IT Expert filed a Petition on EVM
• Supreme Court sent the Petition to the Election
  Commission
• 2006 – Expert Committee appointed by the Election
  Commission submitted report with several
  recommendations to plug loopholes on manipulation,
  mal-functioning
• BEL and ECIL were asked to make corrections
• EC has not implemented the recommendations, security
  measures



                                                         9
 Observations, objections regarding the
  present EVM system in India (Contd…)
• Several instances found in Lok Sabha 2009 about mal-
  functioning of EVM
• Various petitions in High Courts and Supreme Court
  about mal-functioning of EVM
• Various technocrats, IT experts have expressed doubt
  about the fool-proof EVM system in India
• Concern expressed by the experts and authority about
  the mal-functioning of EVM used in India




                                                         10
 EVM MALFUNCTIONING OBSERVED IN
     LOK SABHA 2009 ELECTION
• Any button pressed, light/vote registered to one
  particular candidate
• EVM could not be opened on the counting
• Seal found open
• EVM malfunctioning on polling day




                                                     11
 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
  FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
• Malfunctioning of EVM seen during the Lok Sabha 2009
  elections
• EVM could not start
• EVM got jammed and did not open on counting day
• EVM stopped functioning during the poll/in between the
  polling process
• When button of one candidate pressed, light on another
  candidate got flashed
• Polling staff was not at all updated or aware about the
  security measures
• EVMs lying/ was used in previous elections in a
  particular district were used in the same district in the
  Lok Sabha 2009

                                                          12
 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
  FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
• In a EVM, an independent candidate with no base/logic,
  got/shown 500+ votes and major political parties
  candidate got 0 or 1 vote
• EVM result in many booths shows 100% votes against
  one candidate (more than 200 votes polled in that area)
• Differences between the polling figures declared by the
  Election Commission in the booths and the outcome /
  result shown in EVM in those booths
• State Election officials/Election Commission for reasons
  known to them, have not collected all such information /
  data, process, study, research them
• No special follow up undertaken of EVM till todate.

                                                         13
 EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL/UNUSUAL
 FUNCTIONING / BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
Chandrapur – Maharashtra

• EVM in Booth No.176 – Nutan School – Votes
  given/button pressed for Candidate No.1 but vote/light
  flashed against another candidate
• EVM replaced around 2.30 pm in between the polling
  process on 16th April 2009
• No further study, action till today




                                                           14
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
 FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY
• An Independent candidate got 415 votes in Booth No.61.
  He got 0 to 1 in other booths
• How it is possible for an Independent who has no
  connection, concern with that area?
• Sector 25 – Jalvayu Vihar, Noida In this area, main
  contest observed between BJP, Congress
• In Booth 61, BJP and Congress got one vote each and
  BSP 7 votes
• Is it not EVM mal-functioning?

                                                      15
     ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL BEHAVIOUR
       OF EVM 61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY
Boot    Name of the       BJP   BSP   Congres   SP   Others   No. of
h No.   Area                             s                    votes
                                                              polled
60      Sector 25         282    7      145     2       1      437

61      Sector 25           1    0        0     1     415      417
        Jalvayu Vihar
        Block M
62      Sector 25         264   19      158     3       5      449
        Jalvayu Vihar
        Block L,K,M,N
63      Sector 25 Block   247   27      125     1       1      401
        N,K,L,K,QJ

64      Sector 25 Block   241   24      102     3       9      379
        N


                                                                     16
    EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
     FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
GHAZIABAD – UP
•   Abnormality observed in Muradnagar segment of Ghaziabad
•   Contest was mainly between BJP, Congress, BSP
•   Rajnath Singh won by 80,000+ votes
•   Mr. Satish, an independent candidate, who has no base, no
    background, in all got 2719 votes
•   Mr. Satish secured 998 votes in 24 rounds. He got 507 votes in
    Round No.19 in Muradnagar Vidhan Sabha
•   Mr. Satish has no locus standee in Booth No.247
•   All 507 votes were given/allotted/counted by EVM in Polling
    Booth No.247 alone
•   In Booth No.247, BJP Candidate Rajnath Singh and Congress
    Candidate got 0 votes each and BSP candidate Amar Pal Sharma
    got 1 vote.

                                                                     17
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
 FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
Cuttack – Orissa

• EVM Booth No.160 – Any button pressed, light/vote
  flashed against BJD
• Congress, BJP people in Nimasahi Booth of Cuttack
  drew the attention of the Polling Officer
• Presiding Officer/polling officials have no explanation
  for the same
• Election Commission had to accept the manipulation /
  malfunctioning of EVM
• Repolling was held in Nimasahi Booth No.160.

                                                            18
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT
Few facts –

• Voting pattern in Parliament and Assembly elections in
  Rellivalasa village is worth noting. Voting pattern shows
  vast difference

• Voting not recorded by the Electronic Voting Machine
  accurately to which candidate voters voted.




                                                         19
        INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
               REVIEW REPORT
        VOTING PATTERN – PARLIAMENT – RELLIVALASA VILLAGE

Booth   Village       TDP   BS   INC    BJP   PRP     Pyramid   Lok     BS    Indep    Total
No.                         P                         Party     Satta   SP    enden    votes
                                                                              t        polled

70      Rellivasala   320   06    140    08     57       04       01     14       09    559


71      Do            289   14    169    16     50       09       07     08       07    569


72      Do            313   10    223    14     90       05       07     27       12    701


73      Do            133   07    11    319     71       07       02     03       03    556


74      Do            369   10    288    21     68       11       07     24       15    813



For the same booth, voting for Assembly is total contradiction (see next Table)         20
        INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
               REVIEW REPORT
         VOTING PATTERN – ASSEMBLY – RELLIVALASA VILLAGE

Boot    INC   BJP   BS    TDP   PRP   Pyrami    Lok     Ind.   Ind. II   Ind   Ind.   Total
h No.               P                 d Party   Satta   I                III   IV     votes
                                                                                      polled
70      129    7     5    332   79       4        2      0       1        0      0      559


71      170    10    8    308   41       9        6      1       4        4      8      569


72      227    23   16    326   77       9        3      3       4        6      6      700


73      332    3    115    10   71       4        3      15      3        0      0      556


74      276    31    8    370   91       7        6      2       7        6     11      815



                                                                                               21
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT
• In Khammam Constituency, Polling Station 198,
  Electronic Voting Machine could not read data and the
  voters were discounted by the EC officer. As per booth
  data collected from the Dist. Collector office, this
  particular booth data is missing
• Manipulated Electronic Voting Machines can
  misbehaveand corrupt the entire memory as well as
  hang the Control Unit and rendering E2PROM
  unreadable




                                                           22
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT
• In Pedakurapadu (Guntur Dist) Constituency Booth
  No.2, 122 votes were polled in the First Electronic
  Voting Machine. As the EVM malfunctioned and was
  replaced by a second EVM
• Electronic Voting Machines are not stable

      S.NO.             PARTY             VOTES

      1                  INC                186
      2                  TDP                176
      3                  PRP                34
      4                  IND                18
                         Total              414
                                                        23
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM – REVIEW REPORT
         List of Booths where the machines could not read data
 Assembly Code   Booth Code   Assembly Name     Booth Name
 23              60           Ramagundam        Medipalli
 23              61           Ramagundam        Medipalli
 70              197          Secunderabad      Osmania University
 80              60           Alampur (SC)      Leeza
 80              69           Alampur (SC)      Leeza
 84              128          Shadnagar         Kesampet
 104             185          Parkal            Katrapally
 104             197          Parkal            Nallabelly Yelugur
 104             209          Parkal            Semgem
 104             212          Parkal            Gavicharla
 104             221          Parkal            Bollikunta
 104             224          Parkal            Ramachandrapuram
 112             198          Khammam           Kothagudem
 198             142          Vijayawada West   Mallikarjuna Petta
 231             31           Giddalur          Kandulapuram
 240             250          Sullurpeta (SC)   MPP School Ramapuram
                                                Kuppam
 257             44           Panyam            Bollavaram             24
 257             45           Panyam            Bollavaram
      INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM – REVIEW REPORT
       Table showing polling booths where there was particular pattern of voting
SNo    Assembly            Mandal             Panchayath          Booth   TOL   TDP    %      INC    %

1      Rajam (SC)          Vangara            Vangara             30      11    0      0      11     100
2      Yerragondapalem     Dornala            Dornala             135     27    0      0      27     100

3      Jammalamadugu       Jammalamadugu      Gandikota           120     555   0      0      555    100
4          do                  do             Goriganur           75      712   0      0      712    100
5          do                  do             Dharmapuram         74      458   0      0      457    99.8
6          do                  do             Devagudi            69      776   0      0      774    99.7
7           do                  do            K. Sirigepalli      119     782   0      0      780    99.7
8           do                  do            Devagudi            70      920   0      0      917    99.7
9           do                  do            Peddandlur          118     822   0      0      818    99.5
10          do                  do            Jammalmadugu        73      398   0      0      396    99.5
11          do                  do            P.Sugumanchipalle   72      391   0      0      389    99.5
12     Mydukur             Khajipet           Khajipet            144     776   0      0      772    99.5
13     Punganur            Sadam              Yarrathivaripalle   166     640   0      0      635    99.2
14     Jammalamadugu       Jammalamadugu      Goriganur           76      695   0      0      685    98.6
15     Kamalapuram         Kamalapuram        Kokatam             3       445   0      0      437    98.2

The data suggests EVMs used in these booths have been manipulated.). Congress candidate got         25
almost 100% votes in various booths
 INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM – REVIEW REPORT
Table showing difference between actual votes polled and votes counted by EVM
11 – BHANDARA GONDIA LOK SABHA

LAC              Total Voters    Total Votes   Votes counted    Difference
                                   polled         on EVM

60-Tumsar           251813          177786         177116           670

61-Bhandara         294139          201173         201171             2

62-Sakoli           265588          198450         198343           107

63-                 199932          154757         155037           280
Arjuni/Morgaon
64-Tiroda           195340          141411         141299           112

65-Gondi            241090          155496         155698           202

TOTAL              1447902        1029073         1028664          1373

                                                                             26
               PETITIONS IN INDIA

• Retired computer science professor Satinath Choudhary,
  “producing doctored EVMs is child‟s play”, as early as
  2004
• Banwarilal B. Purohit vs. Election Commission of India
  filed in 2004
• Shailendra Pradhan filed a PIL in 2009 in the Madhya
  Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur
• The PMK, which suffered a shock defeat in Virudhunagar
  constituency in 2009 Parliamentary election, has filed an
  appeal to the Election Commission
• The MDMK has filed a PIL in Madras High Court against
  EVMs.


                                                         27
                 PETITIONS IN INDIA

• Various PILs have been filed at High Courts and Supreme
  Court
• Supreme Court – Jana Chaitanya Vedika (NGO) has moved the
  Apex Court regarding authenticity and credibility of EVM
  system.
  In the Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution the
  Petitioners are seeking directions from the Hon‟ble Court to
  ensure that the votes cast by the voters, which are part of their
  constitutional right of free expression under Article 19(1)(a), are
  registered properly and without any tampering/manipulation of
  the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) which are used in the
  election
• Supreme Court - NetIndia, renowned Company in EVM
  technology, has submitted an affidavit in the Supreme Court
  regarding lack of security measures, transparency and hacking
  of EVM in India

                                                                 28
              PETITIONS IN INDIA

• Supreme Court – Mr. Mohan Rawale – 5-time Shiv Sena
  MP – has filed a Petition in the Supreme Court on EVM
  malfunctioning
• Mumbai High Court – Dr. Jagtap and Dr. Jadhav have
  moved the Mumbai High Court regarding malfunctioning
  of EVM
• Orissa High Court – Activists have moved the Orissa
  High Court regarding malfunctioning of EVM
• Hyderabad – Issues raised at Andhra Pradesh High
  Court
• Tamil Nadu – EVM malfunctioning issues raised at the
  High Court


                                                      29
           IT SECURITY
EXPERT VIJAY MUKHI’S SUGGESTIONS
• After spending years in the security industry, we believe
  that in principle all technology can be tampered with.
• There is no such thing as 100%.
• As a EVM is a technology machine it can be tampered with
  in principle.
• The world has realized that there is only one way to
  prevent misuse of technology and that is by having a open
  process where the whole world can participate in trying to
  break security.
• What we recommend to the Government and the Election
  Commission is to make public the entire EVM eco-system,
  which includes the hardware schematics and the software
  that control the EVM.

                                                               30
           IT SECURITY
EXPERT VIJAY MUKHI’S SUGGESTIONS
                         (contd….)

• Today, we cannot say that the EVM is safe or unsafe from
  being tampered with because like the rest of the country,
  as we have no information whatever on the EVM. The
  entire EVM ecosystem is a state secretary inaccessible to
  just a few.
• The GSM world introduced a SIM card that had a
  password stored within it. Years ago, it would take hours
  to clone a SIM card, today it takes about 15 minutes max.
  There is no way to undo the damage as there are over a
  billion users of GSM today.
• We want EC/Government to follow international best
  practices in securing the technology used to public
  governance and welfare.
                                                          31
           IT SECURITY
EXPERT VIJAY MUKHI’S SUGGESTIONS
                        (contd….)


• We recommend that in the din of politics a reason
  edvoice will not be heard at all and hence to put an
  end to this controversy it would be better to have a
  paper trail of the vote caused. As people do not
  understand technology, tempers get frayed and by
  introducing paper, something that people understand,
  would put an end to a controversy.




                                                         32
             EVM around the world

• There is a veritable tsunami of negative reports about
  Electronic Voting Machines from all over the world.
  There is no country in which EVMs have been welcomed
  so enthusiastically as they have been in India, and
  perhaps this is with good reason.

• Hardly any major developed country uses EVMs to any
  extent; indeed, despite the fuss over “hanging chads”
  and other arcana in their 2000 elections, even
  Americans who are partial to technological solutions
  have resisted the siren-song of voting machines after
  due consideration.




                                                          33
        EVM around the world (Contd…)

United States (California)
• In April 2004, California banned 14,000 EVMs because the
  manufacturer (Diebold Election Systems) had installed
  uncertified software that had never been tested and then lied
  to state officials about the machines. The machines were
  decertified and criminal prosecution initiated against the
  manufacturer.
• EVM gadbad in US 2004 Presidential elections. In Gahanna,
  Ohio, only 638 votes were cast, but EVM result declared Bush
  received 4,258 votes to Kerry‟s 260.
• A study by UC Berkeley‟s Quantitative Methods Research
  Team reported that irregularities associated with EVMs may
  have awarded 130,000-260,000 votes to Bush in Florida in
  2004.

                                                             34
       EVM around the world (Contd…)

United States

• Various bills proposed in House/Senate –
    HR 550: Voter Confidence and Increased
     Accessibility Act of 2005
    HR 774 and S 330: Voting Integrity and Verification
     Act of 2005
    HR 939 and S 450: Count Every Vote Act of 2005
    HR 533 and S 17: Voting Opportunity and Technology
     Enhancement Rights Act of 2005
    HR 278: Know Your Vote Counts Act of 2005
    HR 5036: Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections
     Act of 2008
                                                      35
        EVM around the world               (Contd…)


Germany (2009)
• The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany declared EVMs
  unconstitutional.


The Netherlands ( 2006)
• The Interior Ministry withdrew the licences of 1,187 voting
  machines because it was proven that one could eavesdrop on
  voting from up to 40 metres away. The suit was brought by a
  Dutch citizen‟s group named „We Do Not Trust Voting
  Machines‟. This group demonstrated that in five minutes, they
  could hack into the machines with neither voters nor election
  officials being aware of it.

                                                            36
         EVM around the world (Contd…)

Finland (2009)
• The Supreme Court declared invalid the result of a pilot
  electronic vote in three municipalities.


United Kingdom (2007)
• The Open Rights Group declared it could not express
  confidence in the results for the areas that it observed.
  Their report cites “problems with the procurement,
  planning, management and implementation of the
  systems concerned”.


                                                              37
        EVM around the world            (Contd…)


Ireland (2006)
• Ireland embarked on an ambitious e-voting scheme, but
  abandoned it due to public pressure.


Brazil (2006)
• There were serious discrepancies in the Diebold
  systems predominantly used in Brazil‟s 2006 elections.




                                                       38
                       EVM STORY

• We understand very clearly the complete process of
  development, manufacturing and rollout of EVMs across
  India. ECIL & BEL have done the research and development
  in-house and shipped the software to their vendors Renesas
  in Japan, Microchip in US respectively for the software to be
  fused into the Chips. The mode of shipment goes through
  many layers before it reaches the vendor and similarly back to
  the manufacturers. The security adopted in the transfer of the
  software is not known, as well there is ambiguity on the Prof.
  Indiresan Expert Committee review report 2006 on whether
  an OTP or a Masked ROM chips are used. As a layman
  wecan consider OTP to be a Blank CD in which you can write
  what you want at your location and Masked ROM is like
  buying a Movie CD which is pre-written.




                                                              39
                     EVM STORY

• A chance but still there exists the opportunity to swap the
  chips while shipment and the manufac-turers have no method
  of verification. The only way to verify the EVMs is putting
  them to a Mock Poll, and we have already demonstrated how
  properly functioning EVM while in Mock Poll can be
  manipulated to favour a candidate in the actual poll.
• Further as there is no precise verification tool to check
  whether the EVM is manipulated opens up several different
  opportunities of tampering the EVM.




                                                            40
   CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROM
     THE ELECTION COMMISSION
Is it true –
•      EVM in the same area is repeatedly used in the same
       area/periphery
•      2006 Indiresan Expert Committee Report
       implemented partially
•      Expert measures about security remain unaddressed
•      Election Commission itself does not know what is
       inside the EVM, chip, hardware, software
•      Expert Committee of 1990 and 2006 had Prof.
       Indiresan as member and Chairman
•      No consultation with any other bright IT experts done

                                                          41
    CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROM
      THE ELECTION COMMISSION
•   90% of the Report of 1990 and 2006 is same including the
    language
•   EVM used in India – hardware, software is same since 1990
•   EC refused to share any information on software, hardware,
    etc., with any political party, candidate or anybody else
•   Non-transparency creates suspicion
•   EC has never studied the issue of malfunctioning
•   EC refused to accept modern technology, i.e. EVM with
    paper back up
•   No audit pre-poll, during poll, post poll of EVM has been
    done till today



                                                            42
    CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROM
      THE ELECTION COMMISSION
•   No records of when, how what about the failure of EVM
    machines maintained, checked, studied
•   Repairs, maintenance, storage, transportation to be
    foolproof
•   The polling staff is purely temporary, on deputation for the
    election day and counting day, has no knowledge and
    concern or trained about the EVM technology, security
    measures, etc.
•   No standard guideline, programme, procedure implemented
    by EC
•   EVM code is installed by a private company/MNC of a
    foreign country and not at a Government PSU, i.e.
    BEL/ECIL



                                                              43
        Observations about EVM –
          Manufacturing faults
Manufacturing faults in the hardware may result in
malfunctions. More sinister issues arise from malicious
and intentional tampering. The programs used are
proprietary and not open for inspection, unlike, say, open
source programs which any individual can test out.




                                                        44
         Fraudulant way of tampering

• Tampering with the software to add malicious code to
  alter vote totals or favour any candidate
• Tampering with the hardware of the machine to alter
  vote totals or favour any candidate
• Intentional mis-configuration of the ballot design to
  misidentify a candidate‟s party
• Abusing the administrative access to the machine by
  election officials might also allow individuals to vote
  multiple times.




                                                            45
                TROJAN HORSE

• In-built Trojan Horse in software
• Programming code available to few selected
• No provision for checking, inspection of software,
  hardware by anybody including the Election Commission
• Leakage, corruption can make hacking feasible
• New EVMs purchases in January 2009 – 182,000 from
  BEL and 78,000 from ECIL
• Coding, decoding of these new machines
• Imported chips are used
• No transparency about the chips, hardware, software




                                                      46
            TROJAN HORSE            (Contd…)


• No political party or candidate taken into confidence
  about the software, hardware, etc.
• Even the Election Commission do not have any system
  to check the transparency and security
• Chips can be corrupted
• EVM used can be corrupted
• Hacking, etc., can take place during transportation,
  handling, Polling Station, storing places, repair,
  maintenance
• So many individuals, private persons involved in EVM
  handling

                                                          47
    Technical details about the EVMs
              used in India
• 2 PSUs – BEL and ECIL are the suppliers of EVM in India
• Chip used in EVM imported from Japanese company
• Software designed in India and sent to Japanese company
• Transportation of EVMs, chips are handled by private
  contractors/sub-contractors
• Repairs and maintenance done by BEL/ECIL engineers
• BEL, ECIL is also outsourcing the work to private
  people/contractors
• No system of control, security measures about
  transportation, delivery, handling by private people /
  contractors, persons involved in repair and maintenance
  and also supervision on the day/eve of polling



                                                            48
EXPERT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE
      ELECTION COMMISSION

     REPORT – OBSERVATIONS &
        RECOMMENDATION
  EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION
      COMMISSION REPORT –
  OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

• 2009 – EC appointed an Expert Committee with reference to
  suggest amendment and additional features
• EC noted EVM of 1990 has become outdated – to be
  replaced
• Committee headed by Prof. P.V. Indiresan with Prof. A.K.
  Agarwala and Prof. D.T. Shahani as Members.




                                                          50
  EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION
      COMMISSION REPORT –
  OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

Observation
• It was agreed by the manufacturers that these could be
  implemented and that it primarily involved some alterations in
  the software, while hardware design would remain the same.
  Once the software was modified by the manufacturers to meet
  the above recommendations, only a detailed check of
  functional working of the modified EVM would be needed,
  which EC as the user could do on its own or get done before
  inducting the upgraded EVMs
• The Committee notes with satisfaction that the entire cable is
  in the public view with all the time, any such tampering
  becomes self-evident. Further, in case any such device
                                                             51
       EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
   ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
   OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

  has been attached to the cable, it will leave telltale punch
  marks which can be recognized easily. Therefore, this
  probability also is ruled out by the Committee

• Altering the results of the polls before, during and after the
  poll duration provided, due security pre-cautions already in
  force and additional modifica-tions suggested by the
  committee are enforced and the sealing at various stages is
  adhered to. In case for any reason the Unit has been
  tampered, it immediately gives an indication that the system
  has malfunctioned and this remain as a permanent record on
  the Machine and this record can be checked at any time later.


                                                                 52
       EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
   ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
   OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

• The Committee recommends that before every election the
  manufacturers may be asked to check (this can be done very
  fast through a very simple exerciser) and ensure that all the
  units are functioning as designed. Incidentally, this method
  will be checked, by what is called „the self test signature of
  Machine‟ and thereby the Manufacturers will be able to certify
  that the Machine is identical to what they have supplied and it
  has not been modified or replaced by any other.




                                                                53
       EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
   ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
   OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
• Election Commission to maintain a register of the voters in the
  sequence of their voting, not only the process of recount is
  possible but also verification of the recount against any
  possible tampering is also possible. Each role and key press
  is time/data stamped
• Further as each key press in EVM units whether valid or
  invalid is date-time stamped and recorded no activation of a
  possible “Trojan Horse” by any specific key press sequence
  on EVM during poll can possibly go unnoticed.




                                                               54
       EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
   ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
   OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
• Any system can be tested randomly by mock poll to prove this
  performance. Further as each key press in EVM units
  whether valid or invalid is date-time stamped and recorded no
  activation of a possible “Trojan Horse” during poll can possibly
  go unnoticed.




                                                                55
      EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
  ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
  OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation

Post-Poll
• Carrying out on a sample basis, recounting of votes in certain
  booths post poll at an appropriate administrative level, to act
  as a deterrent against potential mischief-makers so as to
  generate a climate of confidence about the infallible nature of
  electoral process



                                                               56
       EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
   ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
   OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
 Conclusion
• The Committee after a review of the material presented to it
    has felt it necessary to highlight certain very key conclusions
    and recommendations as below :
(i) The basic Electronic Voting Machine developed by
    M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) and M/s. Electronics
    Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) is a secure system. The
    security emanates from two very important basic factors :
       (a) The fixed program nature of the software which is
            fused into the processor and which is effectively
            unalterable
                                                                  57
       EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
   ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
   OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

       (b) The faithful recording of all events in the processor
           (electronically) and the possibility of recalling the same
           with the added (manual) administrative procedures on
           BU, CU at various stages in public view prescribed by
           the Election Commission which make available the
           sequence of voters voting rendering it possible
           tampering.
(ii) With the provision of non-volatile memory, any physical
    interruption leads to the retention of all voting information till
    that point.


                                                                     58
       EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
   ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
   OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

(iii) With the system as designed by the above agencies having
     built-in security, the Election Commission and the
     Government only need to ensure the security of the
     equipment, to safeguard the sanctity of the electoral process.
     The procedural safeguards as stated in Section 6.0 should be
     implemented

(iv) The Committee wishes to place on record the high level of
    accomplishments of the Engineers and Scientists of M/s.
    Bharat Electronics Ltd and M/s. Electronics Corporation of
    India Ltd. In developing an Electronic Voting Machine using
    the latest technology.
                                                                  59
       EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
   ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
   OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION

(v) The Committee unanimously recommends the use of the
   upgraded EVMs in elections after due modifications stated in
   this report

(vi) Committee also recommends strongly that bio-metric method
    of voter identification is pursued by EC and tested for
    feasibility in large population and integrating this sub-system
    with EVM in future.




                                                                  60
 INDEPENDENT
TECHNICAL TEAM
  REVIEW REPORT
    INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
           REVIEW REPORT
• Independent Technical Committee has studied in depth
  and presented its report/observations
• Experts were requested by activists, NGOS to study
  healthy EVM system in India
• The engineers were involved in developing a simulated
  product in similar lines with the features of the Electronic
  Voting machine with a Control Unit, and a Ballot Unit and
  have performed extensive research to understand how
  vulnerable the Electronic Voting Machines are.




                                                            62
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT

• The following questions are the outcome of the
  Evaluation done.

      Questions – On Process
      Questions – On Expert Committee Report
      Questions – Technical




                                                   63
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report
    All through the executive committee report the major
     issue raised by most of the people i.e. tampering of
     the Electronic Voting Machine has not been
     technically addressed. Further we have noted that
     the answers provided to the abovementioned problem
     are not technical clear
    Source code was not fused in India at the
     manufacturer‟s premises under stringent security but
     it was sent over to the vendor outside the country and
     delivered through various delivery channels to the
     manufacturer and so can be prone to any kind of
     tampering at various stages of the shipment


                                                         64
    INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
           REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
    As the entire lot shall have the same Unique ID and
     this also has to be sent along with the source code to
     the vendor for fusing into the Chip, there is always a
     possibility of Trojan being added into the chip with the
     ID already existing. The E2PROM being replaced
     while polling operations being conducted due to
     E2PROM malfunctioning, this should have made
     EVM inoperative.
    No evidence of how many number of EVMs upgraded
     with modifications suggested by the Experts
     Committee and how many odl EVMs were reused for
     this elections
                                                           65
    INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
           REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
    Software modification not possible due to hardware
     design as the chips used are Masked Chips and
     technically unalterable and require a complete new
     Circuit Board with a new chip mounted on it with
     proposed modifications to the software
    Even if few EVMs were upgraded with Dynamic Key
     Coding, programme is incapable of recording every
     key pressed and key sequence when pressed
     activates the Trojan. Also to test each of the
     Electronic Voting Machines with such a number of
     key sequences would be highly impossible.
                                                          66
    INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
           REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
    None of the Control Unit Circuit Boards were sealed
     and there is no mention of a modification to the
     existing Ballot Units.
    Technically not clear how any embedded device
     without any processor or micro controller or any chip
     transfer data with encryption
    The Committee to the best of its ability has looked
     into all possibilities of tampering with the EVM and
     has come to the conclusion that there is no way of
     altering the results of the polls before, during and
     after the poll duration provide due to security
     precautions already in force and additional
     modifications suggested by the Committee are
     enforced
                                                         67
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
    No evidence to support the fact that the suggestions
     made by the expert committee were followed
     subsequently
    Suggestions are not completely followed by the
     manufacturers leaving enough room for security
     breach, which was the main cause of concern
    Knowing the time of the first voter from the EVM and
     mapping to the register can actually bring out the
     detail of vote cast by every citizen thus putting
     democracy into a major threat

                                                            68
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
    There was no diagnostic check available for
     checking the sanctity of the embedded program
     in the EVM. Neither the technicians, who prepare
     the EVMs for elections, understand the
     recommendations made by the technical
     committee
    No evidence to support the fact that the
     suggestions made the expert committee were
     implemented subsequently

                                                   69
  INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
         REVIEW REPORT

• Possible Manipulations
   Software developed for the EVM locally by the
    manufacture was either uploaded through inernet or sent
    through courier to the concerned distributor of the chip
    vendor in form of CD. No secured methodology adopted
    for the transfer of developed source code/programme
    software to be fused in to the chip
   Chips delivered from warehouse picked by a courier, etc.
    provides grave opportunity of replacing and manipulating
    thus procured chips at various levels of shipment.



                                                               70
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT
• Possible Manipulations (contd)
   No verification program developed to cross check every
    chip for genuine code before mounting on to the circuit
    board of EVM. No manufacturer in a position to define
    whether chips are original due to lack of thorough
    verification tool
   Ballot unit can be swapped at any point of time as there is
    no encrption between Ballot Unit and Control Unit. A new
    Ballot Unit can be attached to the Control Unit throwing
    immense opportunity for running Trojans




                                                              71
   INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
          REVIEW REPORT
• Possible Manipulations (contd)
    Pre-poll – After the withdrawal of candidates for a
     constituency, the allotment of keys on the Ballot Unit is
     done through the Control Unit by pressing the
     “CANDIDATE SELECTION” button. Trojan can be
     activated to favour a particular key by means of adding
     percentage over other key or by deducting a set of votes
     polled for all other keys and adding to the favoured key. It
     cannot be detected.
    While Poll – Trojan can be activated by anybody going in
     as a voter entering the sequential key code on the Ballot
     Unit. This can go absolutely undetected as the buttons
     pressed in that sequence cannot be captured because of
     the functional behaviour of the Trojan.

                                                                72
  INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
         REVIEW REPORT
Remedies proposed
• Standard Verification tool can be developed
• A Printer added to the EVM can give print out of every
  vote to the voter which he/she can verify whether the
  vote was cast properly
• EVM should be part of E-governance of Government of
  India




                                                       73
         Ways to reduce EVM Frauds

No IT technology/software/hardware in the world is
foolproof. According to security experts, in a short
time, “hackers” find out the ways of hacking :
• EVM frauds can be reduced
• Parallel testing to have independent set of results
• EVM with paper back up
• Testing tool made available to all candidates/political parties
• Open, transparent software, hardware system
• Implementation of e-governance policy of India
• Pre-poll, during poll and post-poll fullfledged test, audit test
   of EVM


                                                                74
     Ways to reduce EVM Frauds                   (Contd…)


• All EVMs which found malfunctioning in Lok Sabha 2009
  should be checke, verified and studied by independent
  machinery/experts
• BEL, ECIL and any Government person, staff of election duty
  including the Election Commission should not be allowed to
  touch all these machines
• Reason for malfunctioning should be studied by independent
  experts and should be published
• Logic and accuracy testing before elections
• Independent software verification and certification. Can use
  code signatures to ensure software is identical. Open source
  may also be a good idea.



                                                             75
                         Conclusion

• In light of all the above discussions, it is clear that there is
  reasonable doubt about the reliability of EVMs.

• Given the poor experience with Electronic Voting Machines
  worldwide, it is difficult to believe that India EVMs are
  somehow far superior to those used elsewhere, and somehow
  immune to fraud.

• This has to be demonstrated. A priori, the evidence suggests
  that India‟s EVMs are susceptible to fraud in a number of
  dimensions.




                                                                     76
                    Conclusion (contd…)

• It appears that both technical and procedural measures must
  be put in place to allay the concerns about the reliability, or lack
  thereof, of electronic voting machines.

• It is entirely possible that the election machinery has taken
  every possible step in good faith, but that clever criminals have
  subverted the system for their own ends. Improved
  transparency, and public scrutiny of the system, including an
  analysis of ways in which it can be made more secure, are
  urgent and imperative before any future elections.




                                                                   77

				
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