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					                    III'' ,,                                                                                                VOLUME V, NO. 10, NOVEMBER 1987

 1411 K STREET, N.W. * SUITE 1002 .                                            WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 .                                      (202) 347-5425

             Special                                                    Assessing the INF Agreement
              Issue                                                                             by Stefan H. Leader
     The impending INF                      Ed. Note: Dr. Leader is an arms control        In the best Hollywood tradition the           The same asymmetry will be carried
                                            specialistwith Eagle Research Group, Inc.   story of these negotiations has been filled   over to the SRINF category where the
  agreement between the                     and a member of the JINSA Board of          with hard struggle and the path to accep-     Soviets will remove and dismantle some
                                            Directors. The views expressed here are     tability marked with many twists and          140 SS-23 and SS-12/22 launchers and
 U.S. and the USSR is the                   those of the author and not necessarily     turns, trials and tribulations. From its      their associated missiles. The U.S. has no
                                            those of Eagle Research or any of its       unpropitious beginnings the orphan            missiles in this category but in a parallel
     first to mandate the                   clients.                                    made rapid progress and nearly achieved       arrangement that has been agreed to by
                                                                                        quick success (the "walk in the woods"        both sides but not made part of the treaty
                                               The Reagan Administration is looking     treaty formulation developed by U.S.          per se, the West Germans have said they
 elimination of a category                  forward to signing its first major arms     negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet          would withdraw and dismantle 72 older
                                            control agreement with the Soviet Union     counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky) only to be      Pershing IA missiles which they own.
 of nuclear weapons. The                    at a December summit after six years of     rejected in Moscow and Washington and         The U.S. controls the nuclear warheads
                                            difficult talks. The INF agreement will     forced to start again. There was a near       for these missiles and will return them to
     Editors of "Security                   eliminate substantial numbers of nuclear    disaster (in the form of a Soviet walkout)    the U.S. "In purely military terms," noted
                                            missiles and could well open the way to     and there have been lots of colorful char-    Martin McCusker, Director of the mil-
 Affairs" are devoting this                 other more far-reaching arms control        acters along the way to add dramatic          itary committee of the North Atlantic
                                            agreements.                                 interest and enliven the story.               Assembly, "there is no question that we
         issue to better                       The story of INF might well have been       The plot even has a surprise ending.       gain."
                                            conceived and written by a Hollywood        President Reagan, despite years of de-           The agreement will also ban GLCMs
                                            screenwriter since it has all the melo-     nouncing arms control, branding the           equipped with conventional high explo-
    understanding of the                    drama of a movie classic. When the Rea-     Soviets as the "evil empire", and accus-      sive warheads because of the difficulty of
                                            gan Administration resumed these talks      ing them of violating past agreements,        distinguishing from external inspection
      parameters of the                     (they were actually begun by President      has embraced this agreement as his very       alone the kind of warhead carried by a
                                            Carter) they were an orphan -unloved        own.                                          given missile. However, it will not limit
     proposed treaty and                    and unwanted and.begun quite reluc-
                                            tantly in response to strong European           "The questions are: What nuclear weapons will the
      those factors that                    and American public pressure. Now,
                                                                                            agreement limit? How do the limits on U.S. Systems
                                            after the Soviets have accepted the U.S.
  influence our decision-                   "zero-zero" position and with a com-            compare to those on Soviet systems? How will these
                                            pleted agreement in sight, the "orphan"         limits enhance U.S. and NATO security? Will the
       making process.                      has been adopted and transformed into
                                            the beloved child of Ronald Reagan.             agreement be verifiable?"
                                                                                            But however exciting the plot, arms       sea and air launched cruise missiles.
                                                                                         control agreements are not produced in          It is important to point out here, if you
                                                                                         Hollywood and their merits are judged        haven't already realized it, that this
                                                                                         by different standards than movie scripts.   agreement limits both missile launchers
                                                                                        To understand this agreement and to           and missiles. This includes reload mis-
                                                                                        judge whether it is as good as the Admin-     siles and those on launchers, meaning
                                                                                        istration claims requires that we answer      that hundreds of additional missiles will
                                                                                         several basic questions: What nuclear        be dismantled, although the exact num-
                                                                                         weapons will the agreement limit? How        ber is classified. Previous arms control
                                                                                        do the limits on U.S. systems compare to      agreements limited launchers only. The
                                                                                         those on Soviet systems? How will these      reason for this approach is that the
                                                                                         limits enhance U.S. and NATO security?       launchers for many of the LRINF and all
                                                                                         And finally, will the agreement be           the SRINF missiles (unlike the large
                                                                                        verifiable?                                   easy-to-monitor fixed ICBM launchers
                                                                                                                                      covered by past agreements) are road-
                                                                                                          Limits                      mobile and can be moved from place to
                                                                                           To begin, the agreement will eliminate
                                                                                        two classes of missiles currently in Eur-     place. Mobility imposes unique and
                                                                                        ope - the so called "longer range inter-      demanding verificiation requirements
                                                                                        mediate range missiles (LRINF) with           and as we shall see below, the agreement
                                                                                        ranges between 1800 and 5500 kilome-          contains some significant new on-site
                                                                                        ters and the shorter range INF missiles       inspection arrangements to help assure
                                                                                        (SRINF) with ranges of 400 to 1800            compliance. In addition, the agreement
                                                                                        kilometers. The U.S. will withdraw and        specifies that missiles and launchers may
                                                                                        dismantle 332 Pershing 11 and Ground          not be moved during the period of dis-
                                                                                        Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM)               mantlement.
                                                                                        equipped with a total of 332 nuclear             One of the issues recently resolved is
                                                                                        warheads. The Soviets will withdraw and       the timing of the dismantling process.
                                                                                        dismantle 553 SS-20 and SS-4 missiles         The U.S. proposed three years for the
                                                                                        equipped with a total of some 1590 war-       INF missiles and one year for the SRINF.
                                                                                        heads. (Production and flight testing of      The Soviets preferred five years and two
                                                                                        these missiles would also be banned.) As      years, but have agreed to the U.S.
                                                                                        you can immediately see, the Soviets will     position.
                                                                                        be removing somewhat more LRINF                  At least as important for understand-
                                                                                        missiles than the U.S., and over three        ing the significance of this agreement for
JINSA's Annual Dinner and presentation of the Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service
Award to Ambassador Max M. Kampelman drew nearly 400 people, including Secretary of     times the number of warheads in the           U.S. and NATO security is understand-
Defense designate Frank Carlucci. (See pg. 5.)                                          LRINF class than the U.S.                                                     (Cont. pg. 2)
Page 2                                                                                                                                                                      November 1987

INF Agreement        (Cont. from pg. 1)         that newly installed Soviet SS-20 mis-
ing what it will not limit. The list is long    siles might be used in a first strike to
and therein lies both an opportunity and        destroy NATO nuclear forces in Europe,
a challenge. It will not limit central stra-    breaking the implicit chain of escalation
tegic systems (ICBMs, long-range bom-           and leaving the U.S. with the unpleasant
bers and submarine launched missiles),          choice of retaliating with central stra-
the largest component of both sides'            tegic systems and possibly triggering a
nuclear deterrent forces. At the other          nuclear holocaust or doing nothing. Of
extreme, the INF agreement will not             course, the fear expressed at the time was
limit the short range so-called "battle-        that faced with the choice of sacrificing
field" nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery       Washington to save Bonn, the U.S. would
 and short-range missiles) of' nuclear          be self-deterred. Removing the INF mis-
bombs that would be carried and deli-           siles, some argue, will "delink", or
 vered by fighter bombers or other "tacti-      separate, the U.S. from the defense of
cal" aircraft. And, as noted above, it will     Europe.
 not limit sea and air launched cruise mis-         In response, we should note first that
 siles. Paul Nitze, special arms control        nuclear and conventional forces remain-
 adviser to the President and one of the        ing in Europe after this agreement is
 most knowledgeable and experienced             signed will constitute a substantial deter-
 arms control negotiators in the U.S., has      rent and a substantial token of the U.S.
 described the remaining forces as a            commitment to defend Europe. NATO
 "robust deterrent." Indeed, the agree-         would retain some 4000 nuclear war-
 ment will affect only about 4% of U.S.         heads for delivery by artillery, short
 and Soviet nuclear arms. In another            range missiles and aricraft as well as U.S.
 sense this means that really substantial       SLBMs assigned to NATO. In addition,
 reductions in nuclear weapons must             British and French nuclear forces, which
 await a follow-on agreement if they are        are being modernized, will be untouched
 to be achieved at all.                         by this agreement. Finally, NATO con-
                                                ventional forces have been steadily im-
                                                proved and some military analysts be-           An artist's drawing of a Soviet SS-20 LRINF mobile launcher,
  (The treaty) will make                        lieve NATO could thwart a conventional
                                                                                                event of war and leave Europe vulnera-          Several U.S. Government agencies are
                                                Soviet attack without resort to nuclear
  modest but significant                        weapons. What is most important is that
                                                                                                ble to Soviet nuclear and conventional          worried about just such a possibility.
                                                                                                intimidation. We have already pointed              Under the INF agreement, several dif-
  contributions to U.S. and                     the Soviets could not be certain of a           out however, that substantial NATO              ferent kinds of on-site inspections will
  NATO security.                                quick low-cost victory and this uncer-          nuclear weapons will remain even after          likely he carried out. First, a baseline
                                                tainty may be the most effective deter-
                                                                                                completion ol an INF agreement and              data exchange on numbers of missiles
                                                rent.                                                                                           will take place and inspections will be
                                                                                                there is general consensus within the
                                                     The really tough question is what are      alliance that the next arms control steps       used to verify the data. Inspections of
                   Security                      Soviet intentions? Are the Soviets just        in Europe should be reductions in con-          declared missile-related facilities will be
     Describing the limits contained in the      itching to attack and seize Western Eu-        ventional forces - especially in those          conducted during the period of reduc-
 treaty is easy compared to the question of      rope and are NATO nuclear forces the           categories of weapons where the Soviets         tions to make sure missiles are elimi-
 whether this agreement will enhance             only thing blocking the Soviet jugger-         have a preponderance - and significant          nated as required. And finally, challenge
 U.S. and NATO security. The contro-             naut'? The answer to both questions is         reductions in central strategic systems.        inspections of missile-related facilities
 versy has been intense and although the         probably no. It is widely agreed that the         Finally, one additional benefit should       that could conceal illegal missile produc-
 agreement seems to have broad support           threat of a "bolt from the blue" Soviet        be noted: the agreement will add to the         tion will be conducted. The actual num-
 both in the U.S. and in Europe, there is no     attack on Europe is remote. The real           security of our Asian allies by eliminat-       bers ol such inspections and the details of
 shortage of critics including such lumi-        danger of war in Europe arises not from        ing SS-20 missiles that are now based in        their conduct have not been resolved as
 narics as Henry Kissinger, former NATO          deliberate aggression,but from the inad-       the Soviet Far East and aimed at them.          of this writing (late October) but are
 supreme commander Bernard Rogers,               vertent escalation of a crisis into an                                                         expected to be settled in the next month.
 strategic expert Brent Scowcroft and            unwanted war. In this regard, the INF                         Verification                       Even with these important new arran-
 others. There are two basic issues here:        agreemcnt makes some important con-               Verification is always one of the most       gements, the key to verification will still
 whether removing these missiles will            tributions. First, it reduces political ten-   important elements of any arms control          be the U.S. "national technical means,"
 damage NATO's ability to deter Soviet           sions. Arms control agreements can only        agreement. It is important for assuring         i.e., ground based and satellite monitor-
 aggression and whether this agreement           be negotiated in a favorable political         compliance by the Soviets who, in sev-          ing. Taken together - and the key to
 will start us down the "slippery slope"         climate, but successfully negotiated           eral instances, have exploited ambigui-         effective verification is always the syn-
 toward a denuclearized Europe leaving           agreements also can contribute to the          ties in treaty language, and violated           ergism of multiple methods, not any one
 NATO exposed to Soviet conventional             further improvement of the political cli-      agreements where they thought they              technique alone - our confidence in our
 force advantages. Let me address each in        mate. By itself, this is not sufficient rea-   could get away with it. Obviously, the          ability to detect violations will be quite
 turn.                                           son to support any arms control agree-         purpose of verification is to detect viola-     high.
     For many years, NATO relied on the          ment, but it is a plus. To justify our         tions and make sure they don't get away
 threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation to deter     support, an agreement must meet one            with anything. Effective verification                          Conclusion
 a Soviet attack on Western Europe. As           very important technical criterion: it         provisions make cheating harder and               In an extensive history of arms control
 Soviet nuclear capability has grown to          must contribute to crisis stability.           increase the risk that a violator will get      over the last 30 years prepared by the
 parity with the U.S., that threat has               The INF agreement will contribute to       caught. Last, but by no means least,            Arms Control and Disarmament
 become less and less credible. To over-          crisis stability by removing missiles that    effective verification is essential for         Agency, authors Albert Carnesale and
 come the problem NATO adopted a stra-            cause both sides to worry about disarm-       building political support for an agree-        Richard Haass of Harvard University's
  tegy of flexible response and possible          ing first strikes. The Soviets clearly fear   ment. In fact, the political requirements       Kennedy School concluded that arms
  first use of nuclear weapons. The alli-         the Pershing Ils because of their accu-       for verification have become even more          control has been neither as beneficial as
  ance has also strengthened its conven-          racy and very short flight time (less than    demanding than the security re-                 its enthusiasts have sometimes claimed
  tional forces. Under the flexible response       10 minutes) to vital Soviet targets -        quirements.                                     nor as harmful as its critics have claimed.
  doctrine, NATO would try to meet a              especially command centers. NATO, as             The verification provisions of this          The same conclusion could well be ap-
  conventional attack with conventional           noted above, fears the SS-20s because of      agreement have been among the last              plied to the INF agreement. It will make
  forces but would resort to nuclear weap-        their accuracy and potential to destroy a     elements to be negotiated and will con-         modest but significant contributions to
  ons to avert defeat and prevent the Soviet      large part of NATO's nuclear and con-         tain some significant new on-site inspec-       U.S. and NATO security but in the over-
  conquest of Europe. Fundamentally,              ventional infrastructure. With both sys-      tion provisions. There has been a ten-          all scheme of things it is marginal to the
  NATO and the U.S. are threatening to set        tems gone, crisis stability will be en-       dency in recent years to overemphasize          fundamental issues of nuclear arms con-
  in motion a process of escalation that          hanced.                                       the value of on-site inspection for verifi-     trol. It will prove most valuable only if it
  might lead to the use of central strategic          The possibility that the INF agreement    cation. By itself, on-site inspection is cer-   leads to other agreements that address
  forces, although it would certainly prefer      could set us sliding down the "slippery       tainly not foolproof. Even with the most        these fundamental issues - in particular
  not to do so. Uncertainty is what makes         slope" toward a denuclearized Europe is       intrusive on-site inspection provisions,        long range strategic nuclear weapons.
  this posture effective.                         not to be taken lightly. There is consider-   the Soviets would never permit us to            And INF will lead to more far-reaching
     The INF missiles constitute one rung         able evidence to suggest that the Soviets     catch them "red-handed" in a violation.         agreements only if the alliance strength-
  in the chain of escalation from battlefield     would like nothing better than to en-         At most, such arrangements can make             ens its conventional forces and maintains
  nuclear weapons to U.S. long range              courage this trend. Needless to say, a        cheating harder and serve as a deterrent.       its solidarity in the face of inevitable
  nuclear forces (ICBMs, bombers and              denuclearized Europe would not mean a         But, if not carefully limited, on-site          Soviet efforts to make mischief and drive
  submarine launched missiles). The INF           denuclearized Soviet Union. But a denu-       inspections could compromise intelli-           wedges between the U.S. and its Euro-
  missiles were deployed in Europe be-            clearized Europe would reduce the phys-       gence-related and other sensitive na-           pean allies.
  cause NATO worried in the late 1970s            ical danger to the Soviet Union in the        tional security information in the U.S.
November 1987                                                                                                                                                                        Page 3

                                           The Press & The INF Negotiations:
                                         A New Breed of Commentator Emerges
                                                                   by Harry Zubkoff and Stephen Aubin

Ed. Note: The US-Soviet negotiations on                                                                                                        on dramatic cuts in the superpowers
intermediate nuclearforces are extremely                                                                                                       nuclear arsenals. But that did not happen.
complicated, and the public relies on a                                                                                                           With the summit over, arms control
numberof sources of information in order                                                                                                       enthusiasts busied themselves dissecting
to formulate opinions of the value of the                                                                                                      just what went wrong at Reykjavik and
negotiations and the impending IN'                                                                                                             just what it all really meant. The first line
treaty. The emergence of a new infor-                                                                                                          of attack was directed at the administra-
mation source, "the expert as commen-                                                                                                          tion's lack of preparation for such an
tator," is a phenomenon in need of study,                                                                                                      important occasion as well as its over-
and the role of the media in steering the                                                                                                      reliance on "image" and the drama of
politicaldebate is equally important.                                                                                                          the moment. As John Milligan of the
   Mr. Zubkoff is editor-in-chief of De-                                                                                                        Providence Journal Bulletin reported (10
fense Media Review, a newsletter which                                                                                                         Dec 86), Sen. Claiborne Pell, long-time
analyzes how the media cover national                                                                                                          advocate of arms control, chided the
security affairs. He previously served 36                                                                                                      Reagan administration for its theatrical
years as chief of the Pentagons news                                                                                                           approach, noting that arms control re-
clipping andanalysis service. Mr. Aubin is                                                                                                     quires a "steady course" and that the
managing editor of Defense Media Re-                                                                                                           stalemate should be resolved "not
view and executive director of Potomac                                                                                                         through sudden and dramatic achieve-
Strategies, Inc., a Washington, DC firm       When it is deployed, the rail-mobile SS-X-24 will provide the Soviets with another new, highly    ment," but through "slow, steady work."
specializing in defense policy analysis       survivable ICBM.
   To judge by the animated debate that       as Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirk-                had forfeited an historic opportunity to              Gorbachev's Own Theatrics
has unfolded on the pages of our coun-        patrick are now members of the Los                achieve an arms control agreement more            In spite of such misgivings, "style" and
try's newspapers over the past months,        Angeles Times Syndicate and appear on             far-reaching than any on the Left or           "theatrics" have also become the hall-
the likelihood that the United States and     the pages of large and small papers               Right could ever have imagined. Promi-         mark of the Gorbachev era in the Krem-
the Soviet Union will conclude the first      throughout the country. Other former              nent spokesmen from the arms control           lin. In fact, it was Gorbachev's dramatic
arms control agreement to actually            heavyweights have also been hired by              lobby, such as Cyrus Vance, George Ball,       March 2 proposal aimed at breaking the
reduce their respective nuclear arsenals      publications to provide specialized               Paul Warnke and Sidney Drell, paraded          post-Reykjavik deadlock that made
has galvanized opinion among the natio-       commentary and analysis. Two exam-                their views across the pages of "Time"         most of the arms controllers' analyses
nal security field's cognoscenti. Indeed,     pies are Richard Perle and Harry Sum-             (27 Oct 86) calling Reykjavik a "missed        moot. While reporters, like James
former national security advisers, secre-     mers, Jr., both with "U.S. News and               opportunity," implying (or stating di-         McCartney of the Philadelphia Inquirer
taries of state and defense, past and         World Report."                                    rectly in some cases) that the president       (3 March 87), were describing the sur-
present, special advisers to the president,      These "experts" and "experts-turned-           should have traded away the Strategic          prise offer" by Gorbachev to sign a
retiring generals, and even one former        commentator" have added a new dimen-              Defense Initiative (SDI) for such a "tcr-      separate medium-range treaty without
president have all joined the fray.           sion to media covcragc of national se-            rific deal."                                   delay, articles like the onc by Robert
   Moreover, as each obstacle to final        curity issues. In the case of the negoti-             Other former members of the estab-         McNamara, entitled "Reykjavik: Break-
agreement was surmounted, what was            ations over intermediate-range nuclear            lishment, such as Brent Scowcroft and          through or Blunder?" in "Arms Control
once a rather stale and predictable           forccs (INF) in Europe, an almost sep-            Alexander Haig, contended that the             Today" (March 87) were suddenly ren-
debate over arms control policy became        arate and distinct debate has taken place         Reagan administration did not think            dered irrelevant. Indeed, speculation
a free-for-all - not between liberal and      between the administration and this new           through the consequences of its propos-        about how the administration's hard-line
conservative, but, it would seem, be-         group of "hands-on" commentators as               als at Reykjavik. Scowcroft attributed         stance on SDI might derail any chance
tween those now in power and those            well as other experts flushed out of the          the oversight to "the enthusiasm of the        for a treaty no longer mattered. Without
once in power. What has transpired on         haunts of academia.                               moment." Haig, on the other hand, called       knowing it, the Kremlin's new leader had
the pages of a few major newspapers                                                             it a "near mishap" which could have jeo-       taken the wind out of the sails of the arms
rivals a common practice on televised                    Elbowing Aside the
                                                                                                pardized Western security.                     control lobby.
news programs like ABC's Nightline or                    Arms Control Lobby
                                                 In the exchange that has unfolded over
CNN's International Hour: expert is
pitted against expert and, depending on       INF, moderate to conservative "hard-
your point of view, the public is either
                                              liners" have dominated the stage, choos-               "In the exchange that has unfolded over INF,
                                              ing to fight among themselves, opting
better informed or thoroughly confused.
                                              out of their more traditional pastime of               moderate to conservative 'hardliners' have
   The Transformation of "Expert"             waging war with the arms control lobby.                dominated the stage (fighting) among themselves,
          Into "Commentator"                  This sudden shift can be traced back to
   All of this would not be so unusual        the unforseen chain of events that fol-                opting out of... waging war with the arms control
were it not for a recent and widely           lowed the October 1986 Reykjavik                       lobby."
overlooked phenomenon: the transfor-          summit between President Reagan and
mation of "expert" into "commentator."        General Secretary Gorbachev.
And so, in the national security field,          In the immediate aftermath, the con-               Europeans almost universally                  Gorbachev's surprise move had its
which used to be composed of a rela-          ventional wisdom from the arms control             breathed a sigh of relief - for the           intended effect. It caught the attention of
tively obscure lot, figures of such stature   lobby suggested that President Reagan
                                                                                                 moment. One headline in the Man-              the American public. As the Reagan
                                                                                                 chester Guardian Weekly (2 Nov 86)            administration was bracing itself for an-
                                                                                                 summed up the sentiment in France and         other kind of theater, namely the Iran-
                                  Security Affairs                                               throughout Europe: "No tears at Elysce        Contra investigations and hearings, edi-
                                                                                                 over Reykjavik failure." Another, in the      torial pages around the country found
       JINSA is committed to explaining the link between U.S. national security                  Baltimore Sun (26 October 86), captured       new and interesting arms control devel-
   and Israel's security, and assessing what we can and must do to strengthen                    the irony of it all: "How Europe learned      opments to write about. They did not,
   both.                                                                                         to love the missiles."                        however, completely forget about the
                                                                                                    For the arms control lobby, though,        Iran-contra affair; instead, some linked it
   Officers: President - Lawrence Goldmuntz; Chairman - Herbert A. Fierst;                       the failure of the Reykjavik summit was       to the INF news. The Dayton Daily News
   Vice Presidents - Morris J. Amitay, Elliot H. Cole, Peter Gilbert, Nathan                     a different and more bitter disappoint-       (3 March 87) proclaimed, "Gorbachev
   Golden, Bryan Littlefield; Executive Director - Shoshana Bryen.                               ment. Agreement seemed so close, and          to the resuce with a missile concession."
                                                                                                 yet the intransigence of their old rival,     Others, like the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
                                                                                                 Ronald Reagan, had scuttled the chances       (3 March) were more speculative: "A
   Advisory Board: Senator Rudy Boschwitz, Lt. Gen. Devol Brett (Ret.), Richard                  for real progress in arms control. That       Breakthrough at Geneva?" And still oth-
   Fox, The Hon. Jack Kemp, 1. L. Kenen, The Hon. Jeanc J. Kirkpatrick, Prof.                    the American people supported the pres-       ers, like the Albany Times Union (5
   Walter Laqueur, Prof. Michael Ledeen, Ivan Novick, Nathan Perlmutter, Lt.                     ident in his determination not to bargain     March) simply proffered advice: "Go
   Gen. John Pustay (Ret.), Prof. Eugene V. Rostow, Prof. David Sidorsky, Dr.                    away SDI must have been an even more          slow at Geneva."
   John Silber, Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighc (Ret.), Jacques Torczyner, General John                    bitter pill to swallow. Many of these crit-      News reporters focused their attention
   Vogt (Ret.), Adm. Elmo Zumwalt (Ret.).                                                        ics of administration policy might have       on a range of issues from the political to
                                                                                                 applauded had agreement been reached          the historical implications of the recent
Page 4                                                                                                                                                                  November 1987

events. Charlotte Saikowski of the Chris-        The Great Debate: Things Look
tian Science Monitor (6 March) re-                  Different on the Outside
marked that the Soviet arms offer was a          Rumblings of the debate began in
"life buoy for Reagan." A number of           March as Henry Kissinger had his first
reporters probed the European angle.          skirmish with arms adviser Paul Nitze. In
Steven Erlanger of the Boston Globe (3        an 8 March (1987) column in the Wash-
March) outlined European concerns now         ington Post, Kissinger outlined howt
that some of the obstacles erected at         Soviets negotiate and what the United
Reykjavik were being overcome. The            States needs to do to get what it wants out
New York City Tribune's Albert Weeks          of an arms control agreement. Still suspi-
highlighted the sinister, suggesting that     cious of the Soviet intent to kill SDI, he
the arms offer was all part of a Soviet       advocated early deployment of SDI and
plan to split the allies.                     denied that an accord on medium-range
    As usual, the Wall Street Journal (2      missiles would be useful. Instead, he
March) took a more reflective approach        asserted, "The 'zero option' reduces in no
as John Walcott reviewed how the Soviet       significant way the Soviet nuclear threat
missiles offer could pave the way for the     to Europe. It eliminates the American
first major arms accord in 8 years. Eliza-    means of retaliating from Europe."
beth Pond of the Christian Science Moni-         Nitze, in the Post's "Taking Excep-
tor (4 March) took a similar approach         tion" column, fired back, agreeing with
while colleague Peter Grier looked            Kissinger's analysis of Soviet negotiating
ahead to how limits on Euromissiles           behavior but taking him to task over his       One area of general agreement is that the USSR maintains a tremendous conventional
                                                                                             advantage that will need to be addressed.
would bring attention to the question of
short-range missiles. James Markham of                                                          Next, Henry Kissinger's syndicated           the zero option on the grounds that it was
the New York Times (5 March) was also          Kissinger's warning:                          column, entitled "Forget the Zero Op-           a good asymmetrical reduction.
quick to discern the hints from Soviet         "Be thoughtful about                          tion," again graced the same pages of the          As might be expected, Nitze counter-
spokesmen about future progress on the                                                       Post a few days later (5 April). In a scath-    attacked (Washington Post, 24 April),
touchy issues of the shorter-range mis-        what you propose. The                         ing attack, Kissinger took the adminis-         pointing out that Scowcroit had over-
siles and on-site inspection.                  other side may accept it."                    tration to task for contributing to decou-      looked minor aspect of NATO's 1979
    By mid-April, Robert Toth and Wil-                                                       pling Europe's defense from the United          dual-track decision: the SS-20 missiles
liam Eaton of the Los Angeles Times (I 5                                                     States. He outlined a theory about the          facing NATO. According to Nitze, the
April) could report on yet another new        opposition to the zero option. Nitze con-      genesis of the zero option, ascribing it as     dual-track decision also included the
offer by Gorbachev to dismantle the           tended that the zero option was a "good        the product ol disparate elements within        provision that if the SS-20s were with-
shorter-range missiles. Two weeks later,      asymmetrical reduction" in which the           the administration, from the Pentagon's         drawn, there would be no need to deploy
however, another Times reporter, Wil-         Soviets had to eliminate more than 1300        attempts to derail any agreement by con-        the Pershing 11 and cruise missiles.
liam Tuohy, would write that the United       warheads while the United States elimi-        structing one the Soviets would reject, to         On 26 April, Post editors gladly enter-
States was faced with another impasse,         nated about 200. Moreover, the United         a cabal of "neo-isolationists and military      tained yet anothefrshot across the bow,
this time over the 72 Pershing IA mis-         States still had the means to retaliate       technicians" who preferred U.S. missiles        this time by Henry Kissinger and his old
 siles which West Germany owns but             against a Soviet attack in Europe using       at sea, to those in the White House who,        boss, Richard Nixon, The stakes were
which fall under the joint control of the      the F- 111 nuclear-capable aircraft,          knowing little about strategy, spun it all      mounting. After attributing the produc-
U.S. and West German governments. A            short-range missiles and nuclear artil-       together, believing "nobody could top an        tive arms control climate to restored
 companion article by Toth and Norman         lery, and the 400 SLBM RVs that are            offer to eliminate an entire class of           American military strength and the fact
Kempster outlined why the Reagan ad-          dedicated to NATO.                             missiles."                                      that Gorbachev wanted a deal in order to
 ministration rejected the demand, mak-          Not to be outdone, a combination               While Kissinger did not advocate             pursue "desperately needed" domestic
ing it clear that the administration was      Carter-Ford administration trio, who           abandoning the zero option (because of          reforms, the two pioneers of arms control
beginning to take more seriously warn-        had previously joined forces on other          the potential domestic upheaval within          set two conditions for any acceptance of
 ings that the Soviets were trying to "den-   issues such as the MX, appeared in the         Western governments), he suggested              a medium-range missile agreement: first,
 uclearize" Europe, a move that would          Washington Post on 31 March. John             some modifications: link the zero option        the United States should demand that the
 leave the West facing superior Warsaw         Deutch, Brent Sowcroft, and R. James          to other vital issues, making the last          zero option eliminate all intermediate-
 Pact conventional forces. In the article,    Woolsey also attacked the proposed             increment of the projected withdrawal           range missiles worldwide; second, since
 the reporters noted that Arms Control        treaty. They noted that the removal of         contingent upon "an agreement on                the missile reductions are slated to take
 and Disarmement Agency director Ken-         the INF missiles would accentuate              short-range missiles and progress to-           place over five years, the final phase
 neth Adelman had attacked Richard            NATO conventional weakness, under-             wards a balance of conventional forces."        should be linked to the elimination of the
 Nixon, Henry Kissinger and others who        mine the doctrine of flexible response,        His final warning: "Be thoughtful about         huge Soviet conventional superiority.
 had proposed linking any INF reductions      and cause concern among Europeans              what you propose. The other side may
 to progress on redressing the conven-        since the original deployment was not          accept it."                                         The Conventional Imbalance:
 tional imbalance. Without necessarily        just military but political as well, serving      To further complicate the administra-               A Point of Agreement
 realizing it, these two reporters hap-       to link the defense of Europe "irrevoca-       tion's efforts to fend off the assault by the      Noting the "great debate" taking
 pened upon one of the more telling and       bly" to the United States. Their proposal:     experts, Gen. Bernard Rogers, as he             place on the pages of America's news-
 interesting aspects of the INF media         revise the agreement to allow both sides       neared a retirement which many in the           papers, Helmut Schmidt, another old
 coverage: the debate between the experts     to keep the 100 leftover missiles in           press suggested was forced upon him,            hand, added his two cents. His comments
 in and out of government.                     Europe.                                       launched his own campaign against the           in the New York Times (29 April) ad-
                                                                                             zero option. A spate of interviews ap-          dressed the "great concern" expressed
                                                                                             peared in a number of European publica-         over the proposed INF agreement -
                                                                                             tions and were reported upon in small           "even among long-time advocates of
                                                                                             and large U.S. papers alike. He was             arms control." Giving his endorsement
                                                                                             clearly not convinced that the elimina-         to the administration's position, he said,
                                                                                             tion of Pershing 11 missiles would im-          ". . .1urge my nervous friends in Europe
                                                                                             prove the West's deterrent posture. In-         and American to embrace it." He was not
                                                                                             stead, he suggested that it just might          afraid of the conventional imbalance
                                                                                             make Europe "safe for conventional              because of his faith in the "high capabil-
                                                                                             war."                                           ity and fighting spirit of the West Ger-
                                                                                                As the end of April neared, Brent            man forces" and the other European
                                                                                             Scowcroft weighed in again, this time in        armies, as well as the fully trained re-
                                                                                             a solo appearance in the Post (20 April).       serves. Even while making the argument
                                                                                             His riposte was aimed at points Nitze had       that flexible response could still be main-
                                                                                             made while responding to Kissinger's            tained given the nuclear weapons that
                                                                                             attack. Scowcroft asked why we decided          would remain, he did emphasize the need
                                                                                             to deploy INF in the first place, respond-      for "credible" conventional forces.
                                                                                             ing to himself that it was for the political       Having come out of retirement,
                                                                                             purpose of reassuring Europe of the             Schmidt has also been instrumental in
                                                                                             complete U.S. commitment to its own             recent efforts to forge a truly European
                                                                                             defense. Failing to even mention the            defense, advocating the creation of a
                                                                                             Soviet SS-20s in Europe, Scowcroft went         Franco-German army under a French
                                                                                             on to explain Kissinger's reservations          general. The present chancellor, Helmut
                                                                                             and to accuse Nitze of a "nonconceptual          Kohl, must have been paying attention,
 Nuclear equipped strategic bombers, such as the BEAR H are not included in the proposed     'beancounting' approach to arms con-            for he agreed over the summer to estab-
 treaty.                                                                                     trol" because he had attempted to justify                                      (Cont. pg. 6)
November 1987                                                                                                                                        Page 5

                                     JINSA's ANNUAL DINNER
                                                                Presentation of the
          Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award
                 Ambassador Max M. Kampelman
                               THE WHITE HOUSE

                               November 5, 1987
           Warmest greetings to everyone gathered for the Annual
           Dinner of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs,
           and congratulations to Ambassador Max Kampelman as he
           receives the Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award.

           This tribute is truly well deserved. Like the late Senator
           Scoop Jackson, for whom this award is named. Max
           Kampelman is a champion of Western democratic Ideals who
           recognizes the critical need for a strong U.S. defense and
           security policy. Max has made many vital contributions to
           the formulation of my Administration's national security
           policy and to the development of U.S. strategy in arms
           reduction talks with the Soviet Union. His success as the
           chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on                  The Honorable Richard Perle, the Keynote Speaker, with Ambassador
           Security and Cooperation in Europe during my first term               Richard Schifter.
           made him a natural choice to head the U.S. team for the
           Nuclear and Space Arms talks in Geneva. Our current
           progress in these negotiations owes much to his determined
           efforts and to his deep geopolitical insights and judgment.

           Recent events have vindicated anew the philosophy that Max
           Kampelman has championed throughout a lifelong career of
           advocacy and public service. Freedom requires strength,
           and freedom is truly strong only when those who possess it
           are willing not only to defend it for themselves but also to
           seek it for those who live under' repressive regimes.   Human
           rights, resolution of regional disputes, security, and arms
           reduction are not separate items on the diplomatic agenda,
           but integrated issues which must be addressed in tandem if
           we are to meet our responsibility to the future of peace with

           The members of JINSA have recognized these facts and
           provided unwavering support for a strong national defense.
           I deeply appreciate all you have done to reinforce the
           longstanding friendship between the United States and Israel
           and to help make vital programs a reality.

           You have my warm best wishes on this occasion, and may                Mrs. Henry M. Jackson and JINSA Vice President Nathan Golden.
           every blessing be yours.

                             6W---         If _W
Page 6                                                                                                                                                                      November 1987

lish ajoint West German-French brigade        was "gently rebuked" by the White               designed to push us into an agreement            istration battered by the Iran-contra
as a symbol of European determination         House for describing the Nixon-Kissin-          more favorable to the Soviet Union be-           hearings. But a "major" issue from the
to work together for Europe's defense.        ger article as thoughtful and helpful. Ac-      cause of a desire not to be held responsi-       Soviet standpoint still remained un-
Moreover, the 10-day joint French-West        cording to Michael Gordon of the New            ble for failing to reach an accord. Rowny        solved: what to do about the 72 Pershing
German Bold Sparrow exercise in Sep-          York Times (I 7 May), Secretary Wein-           suggested that we move forward in other           IA missiles in West Germany.
tember, the largest ever, further demon-      berger expressed similar agreement on           areas as well, pointing particularly to the         Curiously enough, by moving to the
strated the new seriousness Europeans         some aspects of the Nixon-Kissinger             imbalance in conventional and chemical           zero option, Gorbachev had addressed
are displaying regarding their own de-        article, especially in light of Soviet unwil-   arms. Apparently, through fancy foot-            one of the major concerns of Nixon, Kis-
fense. The shock produced by Reykjavik        lingness to continue discussions on con-        work, he did not actually contradict             singer and Kirkpatrick.
forced many European leaders to realize       ventional weapons. Since then, Gorba-           administration policy.                              Through August and September,
that they may be too dependent on U.S.        chev has made some overtures aimed at                                                            much of the media focused on a variety
                                              allaying fears arising from the conven-            Defenders of the Administration
decisions concerning their defense.                                                                                                            of issues, from the inevitability that an
   Speaking before the San Diego              tional imbalance. On I June, James Dor-            As the administration continued to
                                                                                              ward off attacks by the horde of experts,        INF agreement would be signed to the
Union's editorial board (2 May), former       sey of the Washington Times reported on                                                          growing European awareness of the
arms control negotiator Ralph Earle ad-       a Warsaw Pact proposal to redress im-           one former national security adviser
                                                                                              came to its aid. Zbigniew Brzezinski             need for greater self-reliance where the
dressed the European concern and pre-         balances on both sides in conventional                                                           defense of Western Europe was con-
                                                                                              joined the fray on the op-ed page of the
                                                                                              Post (13 May) boldly stating that the            cerned. As a result, articles on how an
                                                                                              current agreement was indeed "accepta-           INF agreement would affect the future of
    (Richard Perle) conceded that an INF agreement                                            ble." To those who argued that removal           NATO abounded. By early October,
    would do little to correct the Warsaw Pact's                                              of Pershing Ils created a dangerous gap          Kissinger, to, had zeroed in on "A New
                                                                                                                                               Era for NATO." In an article by that title
    conventional advantage ... (and) that it would do                                         in the escalatory ladder, he argued that         on the pages of "Newsweek" (12 Oct),
                                                                                              just the opposite was true. He suggested
    little to correct the acid-rain problem either. (He                                       that these weapons would have had to be          he spoke of a NATO crisis that resulted
                                                                                                                                               from a shift in doctrine away from nuc-
    wrote) "We and our allies must improve the                                                deployed in the first hours of a conven-
                                                                                              tional war or risk being destroyed by a          lear weapons at a time when budgetary
    conventional balance, and that demands a will to                                          preemptive strike: ". . . to exploit the
                                                                                                                                               constraints do not allow for the devel-
                                                                                                                                               opment of new weapons to compensate
    spend more on defense."                                                                   military potential of the Pershing Ils the
                                                                                                                                               for the loss.
                                                                                              United States would have had to escalate            On the other side, according to Robert
                                                                                              a conventional war almost immediately            J. McCartney of the Washington Post (6
ducted that "if appropriate reassurances      forces, though no specific details were         to the level of a strategic engagement -
are given, I think they'll buy it." He also   revealed.                                                                                         Oct), NATO planners seemed, perhaps
                                                                                              a quantum leap not to be undertaken               reluctantly, to be concluding that the
had harsh words for Nixon and Kissin-            Jeane Kirkpatrick, writing in early          lightly."
ger, calling them "handwringers."             May (Washington Post, 3 May), had also                                                           Soviet Union's military capability would
                                                                                                  Brzezinski, however, was not without          be weakened "at least as much as
Nevertheless, UPI reported (7 May) that       endorsed the Nixon-Kissinger proposed           reservations. He viewed the current INF
one of the "handwringers," former Pres-       changes on the elimination of all inter-                                                          NATO's" as a result of an INF accord.
                                                                                              proposal as an interim step that should
ident Nixon, traveled secretly to the         mediate-range missiles and the linkage          not be given too much significance.               This view, of course, is neither shared by
White House to discuss arms control           to the conventional balance. A few days                                                           "the experts" nor by many European
                                                                                              Many of the issues raised by the experts          leaders, especially the French. In fact,
with President Reagan shortly after the       later (8 May) Gen. Rowny went on                did need to be addressed, as well as other
column he wrote with Kissinger ap-            record in the Christian Science Monitor.                                                          French Defense Minister Andre Giraud
                                                                                              more pressing geopolitical issues, like           has said that France would take steps to
peared.                                       While gingerly walking the Fine line of         Afghanistan and Soviet moves into the
   All the talk about conventional de-        administration policy, he did underscore                                                          upgrade its arsenal of short-range nu-
                                                                                              Persian Gulf, before any summit should            clear weapons to compensate for the loss
fense prompted two administration offi-       the fact that "we need not settle for this      take place.
cial to stray from the fold. Edward           agreement alone." He also stated that we                                                          of U.S. Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. It
                                                                                                  By mid-May, George Shultz presented           has also been reported that France and
Rowny, arms adviser to the president,         must beware of Soviet 11 th-hour moves          his case on the pages of "Time" (18               Grcat Britain may jointly develop a
                                                                                              May), answering directly the criticisms
                                                                                                                                                medium-range nuclearmissile (French Press
                                                                                              leveled by Nixon and Kissinger. His case          Agency, 8 Oct).
                                                                                              embodied many of the same elements ex-               Americans and Europeans alike will
                                                                                              pounded previously by other administra-           continue to speculate about the future of
                                                                                              tion spokesmen. However, a week later,            European defense in a post-INF treaty
                                                                                              on the pages of "U.S. News & World                world. But one fundamental question
                                                                                              Report" (25 May), Richard Perle, ex-              remains: when will such an INF agree-
                                                                                              administration champion of the zero               ment actually be signed? Final details
                                                                                              option, put forth the most eloquent-              must still be worked out at the highest
                                                                                                argument in its defense. He confronted          levels.
                                                                                              the Nixon-Kissinger agenda head-on,                  Gorbachev's recent attempt to delay a
                                                                                              saying they were right in insisting that we       summit and to link such a summit to SDI
                                                                                              eliminate all intermediate-range mis-             and progress on reductions in strategic
                                                                                              siles, but wrong to suggest that NATO             arms may be a tactical move designed to
                                                                                              would be with an inadequate deterrent.            test the political will of a politically wea-
                                                                                               He also conceded the point that an INF           kened Reagan administration. Neverthe-
                                                                                              agreement would do little to correct the          less, it unexpectedly complicates the
                                                                                               Warsaw Pact's conventional advantage.            prospects for the signing of an INF
                                                                                               Perle glibly noted that it would do little to    agreement the experts, journalists and
                                                                                              correct the acid-rain problem either,             government officials almost all took for
                                                                                               admitting that "we and our allies must           granted.
                                                                                               improve the conventional balance, and             An INF agreement is still likely; how-
                                                                       i       i_              that demands a will to spend more on            ever, it will only be a certainty when the
                                                                                               defense."                                       ink is dried on a treaty. At that point, the
                                                                       ~      c
                                                                                                             The Outlook                       new experts-turned-commentator will
                                                                                                 After returning from the Venice sum-          be able to start debating the merits of a
                                                                                              mit, President Reagan addressed the              50% reduction in strategic forces, and
                                                                                              nation on 15 June. During his review of          they will be able to take up questions
                                                                                              what happened at Venice and his expla-           surrounding the future of NATO in
                                                                                              nation of U.S. moves in the Persian Gulf,        earnest.
                                                                                              the President revealed that he had ac-              Even as journalists do their job, they
                                                                                              cepted the Soviet proposal for reducing          will continue to be aided when it comes
                                                                                              nuclear missiles in Europe. Some obsta-          to the toughest national security issues
                                                                                              cles to a treaty, however, still remained.       by the new breed of experts-turned-
                                                                                                 By the end of July, the greatest stum-        commentator and former officials who
                                                                                              bling block to a treaty from the U.S.            refuse to sit quietly back and let current
                                                                                              standpoint - the elimination of the              and future administrations make the
                                                                                              remaining 100 medium-range missiles              same mistakes they themselves made.
                                                                                              on each side     -   had been overcome.          Overall, the regular appearance of more
                                                                                              Gorbachev's sudden unilateral decision           experts on the op-ed pages is a good
                                                                                              to give up those remaining missiles (thus        development, for it enriches and informs
                                                                                              simplifying the whole question of verifi-         the national debate   -   and entertains us
                                                                                              cation) was welcome news to an admin-             as well.

Description: Screenwriter Agreement document sample