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Science and Technology Polices South Korea Reform Measure

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					Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                                                                                     Michigan Institutes ‘10
1/56                                                                                                                                                   7 Week Juniors

                         KOREA AFF & NEG UPDATES V3.0 - 7 WEEK JUNIORS

***DETERRENCE ......................................................................................................................................... 1
A2: N/U – Past Withdrawals ......................................................................................................................................................... 2
2nc Ground Troops Key *** ........................................................................................................................................................... 3
2nc Link Block *** ...........................................................................................................................................................................5
2nc Causes Japan Withdrawal / Rearm *** ................................................................................................................................. 6
2nc Turns China ..............................................................................................................................................................................7
2nc Turns Regionalism *** ............................................................................................................................................................ 8
2nc Turns Regional Economic Growth ......................................................................................................................................... 9
2nc Turns Miscalc *** ...................................................................................................................................................................10
Solves Korean Conflict .................................................................................................................................................................. 11
Troops Key to Stable Reunification .............................................................................................................................................. 13
A2: Heg => Balancing ................................................................................................................................................................... 16

***U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE............................................................................................................................. 16
2nc Link Block / Ground Troops Key *** .................................................................................................................................... 17
2nc Consultation Link ................................................................................................................................................................... 18
Ground Troops Key to Reassure ROK .......................................................................................................................................... 19
A2: Anti-Americanism Turn ........................................................................................................................................................ 20
A2: No Link – Still Defense Commitment *** ............................................................................................................................ 22
Alliance Solve East Asian Prolif / China ..................................................................................................................................... 23
Alliance => ROK military Self-Reliance ..................................................................................................................................... 24
Alliance => ROK Modernization ................................................................................................................................................. 25

***Other DISADS ...................................................................................................................................... 25
ROK Peacekeeping Link............................................................................................................................................................... 26
ROK Economy – 2nc U.S. Economy Internal Link .....................................................................................................................27
ROK Economy – 2nc Defense Spending Link ............................................................................................................................ 28
ROK Economy – Defense Spending LInks ................................................................................................................................. 29
ROK Politics – Plan Unpopular ................................................................................................................................................... 30
ROK Politics – Plan Popular ......................................................................................................................................................... 31

***COUNTERPLANS .................................................................................................................................. 31
Reaffirm Commitment CP – 1nc ................................................................................................................................................. 32
Advantage CP – 1nc ...................................................................................................................................................................... 33
Solves Hegemony ......................................................................................................................................................................... 36

***Advantage ANSWERS .......................................................................................................................... 36
A2: Regionalism Adv .....................................................................................................................................................................37

***AFFIRMATIVE ..................................................................................................................................... 38
A2: CP – Threaten North Korea .................................................................................................................................................. 39
A2: CP – Reaffirm Commitment ................................................................................................................................................. 40
A2: CP – Preemptive Strikes ........................................................................................................................................................ 41
A2: ROK Economy ....................................................................................................................................................................... 42
A2: ROK Economy / Democracy Modeled ................................................................................................................................. 43
A2: U.S.-ROK Relations – Troops Not Key ................................................................................................................................ 44
A2: U.S.-ROK Relations – Withdrawal Increases Relations ..................................................................................................... 45
A2: U.S.-ROK Relations – Alliance Resilient ............................................................................................................................. 46
A2: Alliance – Anti-Americanism Turn ...................................................................................................................................... 47
A2: Alliance – Anti-Americanism Now ....................................................................................................................................... 49
A2: Deterrence – Tripwire N/U ................................................................................................................................................... 51
A2: Deterrence – Umbrella Solves Prolif ................................................................................................................................... 53
Alliance Undermines ROK Soft Power ........................................................................................................................................ 54
Withdrawal => ROK Modernization ............................................................................................................................................55
Withdrawal => Denuclearization ................................................................................................................................................ 56



                                                                              ***DETERRENCE
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                        Michigan Institutes ‘10
2/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                              A2: N/U – PAST WITHDRAWALS
Past withdrawals preserved the tripwire function by leaving ground troops stationed in Korea.
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1 )

The implications of the planned withdrawal of one-third of the 37,000 U.S. troops from South Korea are as
much as political as military. For a half-century USFK troops have played roles as both ―linchpin‖ and the real
―trip-wire.‖ The role of ―linchpin‖ can be maintained and even enhanced by modernization, the improved
maneuverability of USFK, and a reinforcement plan for contingencies, in spite of the force reduction. The role
of the ―symbolic‖ but real ―tripwire,‖ however, seems likely to disappear with the relocation of U.S. forces
south of the Han River. This change will increase the psychological as well as the military instability. Some
American experts regard the trip-wire analogy as a false and anachronistic concept,55 and say the troop
reduction should not be viewed as a weakening of America’s resolve. The American side emphasizes
the fact that the real trip-wire is the Mutual Defense Treaty itself, not the number of U.S. troops in the
Republic of Korea.56 And the fact that 25,000 American forces will remain on the peninsula, and the fact that
tens of thousands of Americans will be in Seoul will be enough to be a pretty compelling trip-wire. They
emphasize that any Korean attack on the ROK would surely result in a full-scale American reinforcement and
combined offensive with the ROK, and having 12,500 fewer troops will not make a major difference in
America‘s ability to respond. Therefore, they think the trip-wire concept remains sound.57
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
3/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                                2NC GROUND TROOPS KEY ***
Ground troops are uniquely key to credible deterrence – navy and air forces aren’t suitable
Singh and Il-Young, 03 - senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul and
president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum [2003, Lakhvinder Singh and Il-Young Kim , ―Time to Keep Going:
The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea,‖ Pacific Focus, Volume 18 Issue 1, Pages 65 – 87,
Center for International Studies, Inha University]

Such intelligence capabilities of the U.S. forces would be a key element of deterrence, and would provide the
capability to swiftly repel enemy attack with minimal casualties in a unified Korea. In particular, the
awareness of Korea's neighbors of such intelligence capabilities would in and of itself, have a substantial
deterrent effect.27 The U.S. forces in a unified Korea, equipped with high-tech equipment, would be capable
of bringing new forms of warfare in the 21st century28 The ROK armed forces has endeavored to acquire and
enhance its intelligence collection and management system during the past ten years. However, considering the
probable future economic status of a unified Korea, it would be hard to expect South Korea to keep an
independent and complete eye on potential enemies. For example, it costs 1 million US dollars per mission for
the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Considering the fact that the U.S. operates an overlapping reconnaissance
aircraft and surveillance system manned 24 hours a day, the total sum of such an operation is astronomical.
These U.S. intelligence forces, thus must constitute the core of U.S. forces in a unified Korea.
In a unified Korea, China and Russia would be the two main countries with which Korea could possibly have a
military conflict.29 Both these countries have modem military technology which makes naval and air forces very
vulnerable. High-tech sensors in their possession would make it difficult for American naval and air forces to
operate because they stand out against the back-ground of air and sea and thus would be easy to locate and
destroy. On the other hand, American ground forces, given the mountainous terrain of Korea, are
less vulnerable to advanced technology and thus could operate more easily.30 Air and naval
forces would have a very limited role to play in any future war in Korea. As the Gulf War should, it
was American tanks which destroyed more Iraqi tanks than the allied air forces, even though the terrain and
the absence of an opposing air force facilitated the task of allied pilots.31 Any possible future military
conflict involving Korea would almost certainly be won or lost on land. Accordingly, infantrymen
and tanks must remain an essential component of the American forces in Korea. What's more,
dependence on air and naval forces for the protection of Korea would weaken traditional
alliances and deterrents as well as American support for the very values and political principles that make
other countries respect and trust the United States.32
As has been shown in the recent military conflicts in Europe and South Asia, almost all military contingencies
still require the use of ground forces to fight or to deter wars, despite the increasingly excessive use of air or
naval force. Thus, even if U.S. air and naval forces remained stationed in Korea, the absence of
U.S. ground forces would seriously undermine the deterrent and fighting power of the United
States in the region. American soldiers have a stronger deterrent value because they represent
the world's only superpower on both a direct and symbolic level. One country fighting another
nation, which is helped only by U.S. air and naval forces, may rethink that it can escape a frontal clash with the
United States; but no rational aggressor would dream of simultaneously fighting U.S. ground forces while
avoiding confrontation with America.33
Though there is no doubt that in this age of supersonic speed, ground forces can be flown or shipped anywhere
in the world in a short span of time in case of some military contingency, they do not have the same deterrent
effect as the advance deployment of forces in places where the chances of military conflict are high. This can be
clearly seen in the context of the Gulf War crisis. Despite the American diplomatic commitment to the region,
Saddam Hussein occupied Kuwait. He underestimated the American resolve because of the absence of
any U.S. troops in the region. American verbal commitment to the region failed to deter him, and,
despite the massive use of highspeed ships and airplanes, it took the U.S. more than 6 months to build up the
forces to where they were strong enough to take on and overcome Saddam Hussein's aggressive actions. In case
of war on the Korea peninsula, the U.S. might not have that much time available. Given the firepower of

[CONTINUED]
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
4/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                                2NC GROUND TROOPS KEY ***
[CONTINUED]

bordering countries, it is commonly accepted among military analysts that Seoul would be completely
destroyed within the first few hours of a war. Thus the situation on the Korean peninsula is very peculiar and
resembles no other situation in the rest of the world. For the protection of Seoul and thus the whole of South
Korea, it would be necessary to push the aggressor back in the first few hours of any conflict and not allow him
to seriously damage Seoul. To accomplish this, the ability to gather massive ground force within the shortest
possible time would be necessary. American air and naval forces alone would not be enough to stop
powerful militaries marching towards Seoul. Though South Korean forces are much better equipped
than ever before, they may not be able to stop the marching forces from bombing Seoul with artillery and short-
range missiles. Only the U.S. forces equipped with state-of-the-art, high-tech weapons, stationed
in Seoul in advance, would the have this ability to defend Seoul. Thus any argument for the
withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea must take this point into account.

Ground forces key to deterrence – navy and air force won’t cut it
Singh and Il-Young, 03 - senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul and
president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum [2003, Lakhvinder Singh and Il-Young Kim , ―Time to Keep Going:
The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea,‖ Pacific Focus, Volume 18 Issue 1, Pages 65 – 87,
Center for International Studies, Inha University]

ABSTRACT
This year Korea and the U.S. celebrate 50 years of their alliance, which has seen many ups and downs since it
came into existence. Today a very intense debate is going on in the USA and Korea about the future role of the
U.S. in both the re-unification process and a post-unified Korea. Anti-Americanism is on the rise in South
Korea, and demand for withdrawal of American forces is gaining ground in Korean society. An American
withdrawal from Korea, however, would be very destabilizing for Korea and the whole of the East Asian region.
Since the Korean war, the factors that have made it possible for South Korea, and other countries in the region,
to economically prosper are the combination of sound economic polices and hard work by the peoples of these
countries, and of the U.S. policies of reopening international markets to the countries of the region. While the
presence of the U.S. forces in a post-unified Korea would be a positive factor, the actual structure of these
forces would depend on the ground realities and threat perceptions at that time. It would be determined by
complex issues of peace and stability inside Korea, its economic situation, and the external situation outside
Korea's borders, including Korea's threat perceptions from China. Despite great improvements in technology in
the Naval and Air forces, almost all military contingencies still require the use of ground forces to fight or to
deter wars. Thus even if U.S. air and naval forces remained stationed in Korea, the absence of the
U.S. ground forces would seriously undermine the deterrent and fighting power of the United
States in the country and the region as whole. Given the terrain of the Korean peninsula, any possible
future military conflict involving Korea would almost certainly be won or lost on land. Accordingly,
infantrymen and tanks must remain an essential component of the American forces in Korea. What is more,
dependence on air and naval forces for the protection of Korea would weaken traditional
alliances and deterrence as well as American support for the very values and political
principles that make other countries respect and trust the United States.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                             Michigan Institutes ‘10
5/56                                                                                           7 Week Juniors

                                         2NC LINK BLOCK ***
Withdrawal will crush US influence in Asia, spark an arms race and forces re-intervention
Kelly, 09 – Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University
[December 18, 2009, Robert E Kelly, Asian Security Blog, ―Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2): No,‖
Foreign Policy, Korea (South), United States, http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-
the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/]

US SecDef Gates recently reaffirmed in very strong language the US commitment to Korean security. This
served as a catalyst to extensive discussions among my colleagues about the value of the US commitment to SK.
This is part 2 of the debate. My own thinking tilts toward the opinions in this post.
So here is why we should stay:
1. If we leave, everyone in Asia will read it as a sign that we are weak and that we are leaving Asia generally. Yes,
this is the credibility argument straight out of the Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan debates. But the world sees
US power today as wavering; we are the tottering giant, especially in Asia. If we leave during the GWoT, that
image will be confirmed, and the Chinese will push hard in Asia. A US departure will touch off an arms race as
regional uncertainty rises. Asia is not where Europe or Latin America are in terms of regional amity. The US
presence is more needed in this region, and it earns the US the friendship of the local democracies. It is hard to
see how a spiraling arms race, as Japan and China openly start competing for regional leadership, plus perhaps
India and China, would help the US. The US could very well be pulled back in later. A US departure from Korea
(and Japan next?) will be read as a clear victory for China in the Sino-US regional competition.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
6/56                                                                                         7 Week Juniors

                  2NC CAUSES JAPAN WITHDRAWAL / REARM ***
U.S. withdrawal will wreck the alliance with Japan and spur rearm
Singh and Il-Young, 03 - senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul and
president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum [2003, Lakhvinder Singh and Il-Young Kim , ―Time to Keep Going:
The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea,‖ Pacific Focus, Volume 18 Issue 1, Pages 65 – 87,
Center for International Studies, Inha University]

American withdrawal from Korea would put the Japan-U.S. alliance under stress, as it could be a prelude to the
departure of American forces from Japan. In the absence of a U.S.-Japanese alliance and the absence of
American forces on Japanese soil, Japan would have no option but to build a strong armed forces of its own to
counter any threat from its neighbors in general, and China in particular. However, a newly and heavily armed
Japan could make many neighboring countries suspicious of Japan and thus create many economic and/or
diplomatic problems within the region. It could also create deep conflict within Japanese society over the
course of Japan's foreign and defense policy.19 The U.S. military presence in Korea, therefore, is needed
to prevent the rearmament of Japan and to maintain a balance of power in Northeast Asia.

Withdrawal from ROK forces withdrawal from Japan and regional apolarity
Cho 2003 -- Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute for International Affairs, Seoul, Korea (Seong
Ryoul, ―The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea.‖ The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 2, Fall 2003. http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/kida0p00000pus.pdf) CMR

This scenario can be an option in consideration of the anti-American sentiment and political activism currently
spreading among the Korean public, and yet, it carries a number of fundamental limitations. Once the forward
deployment of the US forces disappears on the Korean Peninsula after the ―political alliance without USFK‖
materializes, this would have an immediate effect upon the capacity of the US forces in Japan. Because the US-
Japan Security Treaty commits the US Forces Japan not only to the ―safety of Japan‖ but to ―peace and safety
of the Far East Asia,‖ if the US forces are pulled out of South Korea, it is a foregone conclusion that the US 3rd
Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa would be put under pressure of withdrawal. If that ever
happens, a big security issue will emerge as to who would be able to fill the role that has been assumed by
the United States as a balancer and stabilizer in East Asia after the US forces withdraw from the region.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
7/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                                          2NC TURNS CHINA
Withdrawal will embolden Chinese nationalists – spurring more aggression
Kim 6 - M.D.. Education. M.D., John Hopkins University; B.S., Duke University (Stephen J., ―ALTERNATIVE
PROLIFERATION AND ALLIANCE FUTURES IN EAST ASIA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451273&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

But what about alternative futures we do not want to see in 2025? It is easier to be a pessimist because one has
selective recourse to the data of history. One remains anxious as to whether the lure of past glory and regional
predominance tugs at the heart of Chinese or Japanese leaders. In their long histories, China has rarely been
democratic; Japan has rarely been pacifistic; Korea has rarely been unhindered by great power conflicts. The
withdrawal of U.S. forces that would accompany the abrogation of our treaty and alliance commitments in East
Asia would likely harbinger a future reeking with the unpleasantness and chauvinism of East Asia‘s past.
Rather than serving as a rally point for reform and genuine opening of the society, the 2008 Beijing Olympic
games could be used as a bugle for Chinese nationalism. If the United States and China fail to reach a clear
understanding about nuclear proliferation, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and Japan will
only embolden a confident and assertive China. Chinese nationalists will want to throw their weight around
East Asia. In this environment, I believe that as soon as China achieves domestic stability, it will try to
penetrate culturally into neighboring countries. The Chin, Sui, Tang, and Qing dynasties were not exceptions.
As soon as it feels that it has achieved its original target for economic reforms, and buttressed by its confident
nationalistic impulses, China is likely to claim, at a minimum, its regional power hegemony in East Asia.9 The
next generation of Chinese nationalist leaders suffers little in confidence, panache, or assertiveness. On May 7,
1999, during Operation ALLIED FORCE, U.S. forces mistakenly struck the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The
young Chinese vice president condemned the bombing and ―allowed‖ anti-U.S. demonstrations. He argued that
these demonstrations ―fully reflect the Chinese people‘s great fury at the atrocity of the embassy attacks by
NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the Chinese people‘s strong patriotism.‖10 The voice
belonged to none other than Hu Jintao.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
8/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                                2NC TURNS REGIONALISM ***
US leadership preserves deterrence and facilitates regional cooperation
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1 )

Within this framework combining bilateralism and multilateralism, the ROK-U.S. alliance system can be re-
adjusted and re-defined to maintain in the near future regional peace and stability. To achieve this goal, the
United States should re-adjust and re-define the strategic role of U.S. forces in Korea, to act not only from the
perspective of the Korean peninsula but also from the broader framework of maintaining the geopolitical
equilibrium, or balance of power, in Northeast Asia.78 From the Chinese perspective, the ROK-U.S. alliance
is a stabilizing force that restrains South Korea against the North and reassures Japan as well.79 If the
primary goal of the U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia is to achieve regional stability and security, Washington
must strengthen and consolidate its bilateral alliances with South Korea and Japan, so that North Korean
threats can be deterred and the regional peace maintained. The U.S. military presence in South Korea is
therefore closely associated with American strategy for Northeast Asia. Even after the realization of peaceful
coexistence between the two Koreas and eventual national unification, U.S. forces should continue to
maintain themselves on the peninsula as a deterrent to the potential regional hegemony of China or Japan,
and as an effective apparatus for encouraging cooperative efforts to resolve regional issues. This will certainly
benefit Korea.80
Today the U.S. military presence in both South Korea and Japan plays an important role in dampening the
potential for tensions arising from regional armed competition. 81 The strongest mechanism to achieve the
ultimate goal of more permanent regional peace is certainly to institutionalize a more comprehensive regional
collective security organization (i.e., NEATO). But if it is not possible to achieve this end in the immediate
future, it is possible and desirable to expand the positive aspects of the bilateral alliance into a broader
regional framework. If the bilateral networks based upon the United States‘ closer security ties with South
Korea and Japan can be ―quasi-multilateralized,‖ it will help induce other countries, including China, to
participate more actively in regional, multilateral structures, such as ARF and the Northeast Asia Security
Dialogue (NEASED).82 This process of ―quasi-multilateralization‖ of the existing alliance system can be seen
as expanding a ―virtual alliance‖ network of U.S. allies. The creation of a ―virtual alliance‖ can be achieved by
maintaining the U.S. – Japan alliance, the U.S. – South Korean alliance, and strengthening the bilateral
security cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul. Such necessary and achievable steps can contributable to the
interests of preserving the long-term peace and stability of the region.83 In creating an inclusive regional
security community based on the concept of ―cooperative security,‖ the United States will be exercising its
leadership.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
9/56                                                                                         7 Week Juniors

                     2NC TURNS REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
Presence is key to economic growth
Singh and Il-Young, 03 - senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul and
president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum [2003, Lakhvinder Singh and Il-Young Kim , ―Time to Keep Going:
The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea,‖ Pacific Focus, Volume 18 Issue 1, Pages 65 – 87,
Center for International Studies, Inha University]

An American withdrawal from East Asia, however, would seriously destabilize the entire region. Since the
Korean war, the factors that have made it possible for South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and, more recently, for
China to economically prosper are a combination of sound economic polices, hard work by the citizens of these
countries, U.S. policies reopening international markets to Japan, and substantial economic aid to Korea and
Taiwan. None of these, however, would have been possible without the regional security and order maintained
and enforced by the U.S. military presence in the region. The United States‘ presence in the region has
succeeded in creating an environment in which animosities among the neighboring countries have been
lessened to a great extent; this, in turn, has enabled them to cooperate with each other on a wide range of
issues from trade to security to other important multilateral issues concerning the region as a whole.
These preconditions for East Asia's economic progress are as valid today as they were some
decades ago. Moreover, the presence of American forces will become more important after Korean
unification to maintain the status quo so that no neighboring country takes undue advantage of the very fluid
situation on the peninsula after unification. The United States is the only country which has the resources and
political will to prevent this rivalry among the neighboring countries. The United States' ability to perform this
task derives from the combined advantages of its own remoteness, its alliances with the world's most powerful
and richest countries, and also because it is the world's most powerful nation. As a non-Asian country, it is not
suspected of harboring territorial claims. For all the resentment of "Yankee imperialism," there is a growing
concern among Asians about the ambitions of other Asian nations than of the United States. Some countries,
especially China, might prefer to be hegemonic powers, but if they cannot have that role for themselves they
would rather have the United States play it than any other Asian state. American alliances with Japan and
Korean (and informally Taiwan) give the United States political and military ties with the region which are
unequalled by any other nation.12
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
10/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                                     2NC TURNS MISCALC ***
Miscalculation is a negative argument – the Korean war started as a result of perceived U.S.
non-interference
Jackson, No Date - United States Air Force, Director of Operations 5th Reconnaissance Squadron Osan AB,
Republic of Korea [this article was published between 1995 and 1998, Major Richard S. Air & Space Power
Journal, ―Security of the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Continuing Commitment,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/jackson.html]

Conclusion
South Korea can be considered a relatively stable nation, even though it still is participating in the later stages
of an emerging market economy. North Korea, on the other hand, is at the extreme "nation in crisis" end of the
spectrum. North Korea's ability to survive as a nation intact, given its recent economic failure and continuing
questionable government, is the dominant factor in North-South relations and a significant factor in focusing
so much U.S. interest on this region of the world. Stability on the Korean peninsula is vital to the security of
East Asia, and the security of East Asia is, in turn, vital to the security of the United States. The foundation of
relations with a reunified Korea in the next century will be laid in the U.S. actions of this decade. Forward
presence is the linchpin of any Pacific strategy and U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula provide the framework
for engagement and enlargement outlined in the National Security Strategy.
It should be remembered that the incident which precipitated the Korean War was a speech by U.S. Secretary
of State Dean Acheson in January 1950 which diagrammed a U.S. insular defense that excluded Korea, giving
the impression to Kim Il Sung that there would be no interference from Washington in a Korean conflict. There
is no better insurance against a repeat performance and no better way for the United States to demonstrate a
commitment to the security of its Korean ally than forward deployed American forces. An agreement made in
good faith now with the ROK has the best chance of surviving the Korean reunification and will create a solid
foundation for what is sure to be turbulent political and economic times. Fostering a long-term relationship
requires new thinking on the alliance framework between the United States and South Korea to achieve a
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula without conflict.(21)
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                             Michigan Institutes ‘10
11/56                                                                                          7 Week Juniors

                                   SOLVES KOREAN CONFLICT
Forward deployed forces solve Korean conflict – prevents rivalries
Jackson, No Date - United States Air Force, Director of Operations 5th Reconnaissance Squadron Osan AB,
Republic of Korea [this article was published between 1995 and 1998, Major Richard S. Air & Space Power
Journal, ―Security of the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Continuing Commitment,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/jackson.html]

The Value of American Military Presence
There is widespread resistance in nations throughout the world to incurring large costs, military or otherwise,
to deal with threats that do not seem immediately serious to vital national interests (an understandable
position considering that nations act to ensure their own security). Henry Kissinger asserts that a vital national
interest is "a change in the international environment so likely to undermine the national security that it must
be resisted no matter what form the threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears."(7) Relating Kissinger's
definition of vital national interest to U.S. East-Asian security strategy, the uncertainty of a change in the
political environment in Korea is likely to undermine the security of the Asia-Pacific region which is a direct
threat to America's national security. Viewpoints vary, but the general consensus of national security analysts is
that the stability of the East-Asian littoral and western Pacific region is linked to a strong U.S. military presence
which discourages rivalries from escalating or a single power with regional hegemonic desires from asserting
itself.
Notwithstanding a more vibrant multilateral and regional security architecture through collective security
arrangements, an important role remains for the armed forces of the United States forward deployed in Korea.
Today, the DPRK is in the midst of a political, economic, and military decline with little expectation of
recovery. North Korea's deteriorating situation threatens the peace and stability of the peninsula with the
promise of an uncertain future. The North's unremitting decline provides the conditions for three possible
geopolitical scenarios to emerge, each posing a different set of challenges for U.S. strategists: reunification of
the Korean peninsula; a more stable relationship between the two nation-states; or resumption of the Korean
War.(8) Forward deployed forces in Korea ensure a rapid and flexible response capability and enhance
America's ability to influence events across the spectrum of confrontation.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
12/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                                  SOLVES KOREAN CONFLICT
U.S. presence is key to deter aggressive action from both the North and the South
Jackson, No Date - United States Air Force, Director of Operations 5th Reconnaissance Squadron Osan AB,
Republic of Korea [this article was published between 1995 and 1998, Major Richard S. Air & Space Power
Journal, ―Security of the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Continuing Commitment,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/jackson.html]

Maintaining the Status Quo. Although experts believe Korea will eventually unite into a formidable regional
power, the peninsula seems likely to stay politically divided for some time. A more stable relationship between
North and South Korea suits the short term interests of the international economy. Peace on the peninsula, no
matter what form it takes, relieves some of the tension in the region and allows the economic markets to
continue their unprecedented growth. Under the umbrella of U.S. diplomatic agreements and security
promises, North and South can participate in a constructive dialogue that is beneficial for both nations. In the
broader scheme of international relations, the Korean conflict can only be resolved through inter-Korean
cooperation. In order to facilitate a North-South normalization process, North Korea must maintain some
semblance of a viable nation-state.
North Korea's future in the short term depends on whether Pyongyang can achieve a degree of international
recognition. Mimicking the unification rhetoric, Pyongyang finds itself in a position to obtain economic
assistance long enough to stabilize its failing regime, a condition essential to maintaining the current peninsula
balance of power. Establishing economic ties with non-communists nations, similar to the Chinese model,
offers Pyongyang the benefits of foreign capital investment, technology exchange, and exportation of weapons
technology, critical to obtaining needed revenues and rebuilding the DPRK's economy. An important criterion
to prepare the way for normalization is the success of Kim Jong Il's political and economic reforms. Without
some type of reform, it is doubtful that the regime could survive the concessions the international community
would demand in payment for recognition.
The essential ingredient for maintaining the status quo on the Korean Peninsula is the "deterrent value" of
combined U.S.-ROK forces. "This deterrent value of United States and South Korean military forces has
maintained the peace on the Korean Peninsula for four decades and continues to maintain it today."(10)
Without U.S. forces and the promise of an immediate retaliatory response to North Korean aggression, the
ROK leadership would be reluctant to rely on DPRK compliance to any North-South agreement. Currently,
North Korea is presenting itself to the international community as a cooperative and rational player in the
peace process. Political maneuvering like the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Framework Agreement on nuclear
programs makes it appear to the world that Pyongyang is moving toward normalization of relations with Japan
and South Korea. However, with the recent events of failing communist regimes in Eastern Europe as an
indicator, the leadership in Pyongyang has limited choices to secure their position on the peninsula. If
Pyongyang rejects a North-South cooperative strategy, the DPRK will be condemned to continued isolation and
economic hardship. Further international isolation will increase the pressure on an already crippled nation to
the point of collapse, forcing Kim Jong Il's hand. The result would most likely be the worst-case scenario: an
immediate and violent response.
Korean War, Part II. American military power is committed directly against a nation that poses a clear and
present danger of open aggression. Secretary Perry contends that "there can be no doubt that the combined
forces of the Republic of Korea and the United States could decisively defeat any attack from the
North."(11) Nevertheless, a North Korean attack on South Korea is possible at any time in the future. North
Korea has been dedicated to creating a military dominant position, a posture that may not be maintainable
under current economic conditions. In light of a dwindling military capability, it is not inconceivable that a
desperate nation would take drastic measures to create a more favorable balance of power. Pyongyang
recognizes that war is a risky business and is sensitive that a resumption of hostilities could easily lead to the
disintegration of North Korea as a nation-state. However, the unpredictable DPRK leadership could make a
desperate bid for total, or at least partial, control of the peninsula. History has proven, more than once, that
desperate people take desperate measures, often opposite to what international opinion would consider a
"rational" course of action.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                              Michigan Institutes ‘10
13/56                                                                                           7 Week Juniors

                        TROOPS KEY TO STABLE REUNIFICATION
U.S. presence is key to maintaining economic growth, Korean democracy, regional stability,
and relations in a unified Korea
Singh and Il-Young, 03 - senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul and
president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum [2003, Lakhvinder Singh and Il-Young Kim , ―Time to Keep Going:
The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea,‖ Pacific Focus, Volume 18 Issue 1, Pages 65 – 87,
Center for International Studies, Inha University]

U.S. Forces and a Unified Korea
The American military presence in the post-unification era, like its presence during the negotiations with North
Korea and the peace process, may also prove to be a stabilizing factor. Korea can expect the support of the
world's strongest military power and its allies during the difficult transition. Without such support from the
U.S., post-unified Korea would be left to fend for itself and would be forced to look for support from far weaker
nations near its borders. What's more, this support may not come easily and, if it comes at all, it may have
many strings attached. This may ultimately compromise a unified Korea's core national interests. On the other
hand, support from the U.S. and its allies would not compromise Korea's core national interests
and would be most beneficial to a unified Korea in the long run.
The unification of the country would bring serious social, economic and political problems for Korea. For
example, having been socialized under totally different regimes since 1945, North Koreans may fear that they
will not get equal and fair treatment and may be concerned about being treated as second class citizens under a
unified nation. South Koreans may also resent having to pay for the North Koreans' rehabilitation. To avoid
burdening the South Koreans the government may resort to deficit financing, but this in turn can generate
inflation or higher interest rates, causing more economic anxiety in the society.'4
As has been seen from the past experiences of East European countries, the assimilation and adaptation of
citizens of former communist countries into capitalist democracies is an arduous and lengthy process. For
example, four years after unification over 10.8 percent of East Germans voted for the "former" communists in a
federal election.15 In other ex-communists' communities, the influence of communist parties is refusing to go as
well.16 In a unified Korea, the percentage of North Koreans within the total population would be much higher
than the proportion of East Germans in Germany or of Soviet Jews in Israel. This problem becomes more
complex when we recognize the fact that North Koreans have been raised in a far more extreme form of
communism than anywhere else in the world.'7 In this scenario, the social, economic and psychological
integration of former Northern Koreans into ROK society would be much more difficult and would strain
Korean society for decades. This would also have the potential to make Korean politics less stable and more
unpredictable for a long time to come.
Korean democracy, still in its formative years, could come under tremendous pressure through the unification
process. As seen in the East European cases, if the citizens of North Korea can not be successfully assimilated
into the market system, extremism in its worst forms and kinds could emerge. In present-day Korea, regional
loyalties are often at the root of party affiliation and political rivalries. This regional strife could increase many-
fold after unification of the country. If this increasing regionalism should mingle with extremism which would
certainly spread among the losers of the assimilation process, there's no saying what the future of Korean
politics would hold.
How a unified Korea would solve its post-unification problems would depend first and foremost on the Koreans
themselves. Of course, their ability to properly understand and analyze these problems would be crucial in
handling post-unification problems. However, the alliance with U.S. and the presence of its military
could help in preventing a radicalization and polarization of Korean politics and Korean
society. After unification, the alliance with the U.S. would represent a sign of continuity and stability, while
serving as a deterrent to extremists. To moderates the U.S. presence and continuing ROK-U.S. military
cooperation would be a reassuring sign that Korea still enjoys the support of the most powerful nation on earth
and that potential risks and problems of a unified Korea could be solved with fewer difficulties.18

[CONTINUED]
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
14/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                       TROOPS KEY TO STABLE REUNIFICATION
[CONTINUED]

Apart from preserving internal peace and stability in the country, maintaining peace in the region as a whole is
also of paramount importance for Korea's continued economic growth. Since the 2nd World War, the economic
growth of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan would be unthinkable without the economic options-foreign aid and
markets-given by the U.S. This U.S. economic assistance, however, would not been effective without the
regional security and stability gained through the alliances between the U.S. and regional countries. The U.S.
military presence in the region has succeeded in lessening animosities among the neighboring
countries, this, in turn, has enabled them to cooperate with each other on a wide range of issues
from trade to security to other important multilateral issues concerning the region as a whole. At present,
South Korea conducts more than-two thirds of its trade within the region. The amount of current ROK trade
through Asian sea lines of transport represents over 40 percent of its total trade, and about two thirds its
energy supplies flow through the South China sea. These trends would not change substantially in a post-
unification era. Korea would have a substantial stake in the open movement of commerce, communications,
and transport. In the absence of a stable regional security environment, however, Korea would be severely
challenged to gamer sufficient resources for the reconstruction of a stable regional security environment and
enjoy a sustained economic progress thereafter. It would not be easy for Korea to do this alone. Thus a
healthy alliance with the U.S. would be very critical in this regard.
The presence of American forces would also be a deterring factor to neighboring countries that
might try to exploit the unstable situation for their own interests. In the absence of Korea's alliance
with the U.S., maintaining healthy relations with Japan would also be a big problem. Koreans might feel more
nervous dealing with Japan outside of the American alliance system. The Japanese would also be suspicious of
a Korea detached from their American alliance partner. A unified Korea in the absence of American forces
could easily fall into the Chinese orbit. This, in turn, could lead to tensions in Japan-Korea and Japan-China
relations. Japan, which is expected to play the most prominent role in the rebuilding of a unified Korea, might
not come forward with major economic assistance if Korea tilted towards China. The U.S. military presence in
Korea would thus be a crucial factor in Japan's post unification assistance to Korea.

USFK key to peaceful reunification – withdrawal risks violent collapse and reunification
Cho 2003 -- Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute for International Affairs, Seoul, Korea (Seong
Ryoul, ―The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea.‖ The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 2, Fall 2003. http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/kida0p00000pus.pdf) CMR

Another problem inherent in this scenario is that, in an alliance without the USFK, there is no sure method of
securing the biggest support for peace management tasks following the establishment of a peace regime on the
Peninsula, or for the unification process on the Peninsula. The question is raised that when it is indispensable
to secure participation of major powers in an international body for guaranteeing and administrating peace in
the process of building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, will that be achieved properly with the US
forces withdrawn? Furthermore, just as the United States played an essential role in the process of German
unification, the USFK is likely to be requested to play a significant role if a peace process makes progress on the
Peninsula, even if the North‘s military threats diminish in the future as a result of increased reconciliation and
cooperation between North and South Korea.26 However, if a unification process starts off in one way or
another in the absence of the USFK, e.g., due to the collapse of the North Korean regime, it is doubted that
South Korea alone will be able to manage that process in a peaceful manner. For the presence of the USFK
means that it will prevent a situation where a unification process on the Korean Peninsula
develops into international or inter- Korean military conflicts and it remains the biggest supporter
that would assist us throughout the process of a possible Korean unification.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
15/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                       TROOPS KEY TO STABLE REUNIFICATION
Troop presence is key to a stable reunification process
Jackson, No Date - United States Air Force, Director of Operations 5th Reconnaissance Squadron Osan AB,
Republic of Korea [this article was published between 1995 and 1998, Major Richard S. Air & Space Power
Journal, ―Security of the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Continuing Commitment,‖
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/jackson.html]

Reunification. On the surface, a United Korea appears to be the best possible resolution to an armistice that is
approaching its fifth decade. It implies neutralization of the Asia-Pacific region's only major potential armed
conflict. Reunification can take the form of either a rapid, chaotic internal collapse in which the North is
absorbed by the South, or a longer term, peaceful reunification after North Korea has reformed its political
system to an open socialist state and bolstered its declining economy.(9) Rapid, chaotic reunification is the
worst case for the ROK but a more likely possibility under the circumstances. Peaceful reunification depends
on a stable DPRK government with enough vision to make concessions that are beneficial to both parties and a
ROK government that doesn't feel economically threatened. Economic exchange is necessary if North Korea is
to have any hope of recovery and normalization is the only method available to achieve that exchange.
Conservative hardliners may feel that the price for economic benefits (reform) is too much to pay and cause the
North Korean regime to implode. Like their Eastern European counterparts, Pyongyang's leadership does not
want to lose its power base. Internal struggles over economic and political reform may preclude any possibility
of a peaceful unification, resulting in the collapse of the nation-state and forcing an immediate consolidation.
South Korea is well aware of the economic costs of sudden reunification and prefers the long term approach. In
either event, long term transformation or short-term collapse, South Korea's economic growth will bear the
brunt of reunification and the ROK leadership is wary of the potential cost, which is a key factor in future
South-North negotiations.
Korean unification might lead one to conclude that a United States presence on the peninsula will no longer be
necessary. To the contrary, withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula would lead most likely to
increased tensions in the region as North and South transition to a new form of government and create a
potential destabilizing situation in East Asia. If the German experience is any indicator, a united Korea will be
economically focused inward for several years while trying to develop the industrial infrastructure of the
northern half of the country. Feeling vulnerable to external threats during this period, a united Korea's
dormant hostilities and suspicions of traditional adversaries have the potential of resurfacing. Korea would be
suspicious of not only Japan, but particularly of an emerging China with no effective "counterbalance." During
this period of increased economic drain, it is not inconceivable for the new Korea to establish a nuclear
deterrent to offset a diminished military capability, further aggravating international attempts to restrain
nuclear proliferation. The U.S. can mitigate the disruptive consequences of unification as the two current
Koreas recreate a national government by remaining military engaged on the peninsula. Having U.S. forces in
Korea during reunification, whether a rapid or long term transition, provides a sense of security for both
nations from outside distractions and provides an environment conducive to peaceful reconstruction.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
16/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                                     A2: HEG => BALANCING
Heg spurs bandwagoning – not balancing
Kelly, 09 - Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University
[December 10, 2009, Robert E Kelly, Asian Security Blog, ―Is American Global Primacy Just
Too Expensive?‖ Foreign Policy, International Relations Theory, United States,
http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/10/is-american-global-primacy-just-too-expensive/]

Me:
Ferguson is always a good read, although ten years ago he said the US was the ―colossus‖ bestriding the world
as the new Rome. That didn‘t work out too well…
You‘re right that the US military needs to go on a diet. After 9/11, the military got everything they wanted
including lots of c— we don‘t need (F-22s, missile defense, Future Combat System). But the larger point is
correct. The ultimate backstop of the liberal global economy is the US military. The more powerful the US is,
the less it makes sense to compete against it. Unipolarity encourages bandwagoning and hedging at worst, not
open balancing. If the French, Russians and Chinese get their wish for multipolarity, watch security dilemmas
in places like northeast Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia move into defection spirals of arms-racing.
Unipolarity correlates well with systemic peace, and a liberal unipole is even better. Switzerland can claim the
moral highground of neutralism and abdication, and no one cares. If the US does it, the world will change.




                                          ***U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                            Michigan Institutes ‘10
17/56                                                                                         7 Week Juniors

                     2NC LINK BLOCK / GROUND TROOPS KEY ***
Withdrawal of ground forces will deck relations with South Korea
Kelly, 09 - Assistant Professor Department of Political Science & Diplomacy Pusan National University
[December 18, 2009, Robert E Kelly, Asian Security Blog, ―Should the US Pull Out of South Korea (2): No,‖
Foreign Policy, Korea (South), United States, http://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2009/12/18/should-
the-us-pull-out-of-south-korea-2-no/]

2. It also means that the US will lose SK as an ally, because without the troops, they‘ll feel, rightfully, that the
US abandoned them. It would be nice to assure SK security without the ground forces, but US infantry on
the ground (the USFK logo above) sends a much greater signal of commitment than air and sea
power. SK will slide into China‘s orbit if the US leaves. It‘s already edging that way now. If America bails, it
loses them. It is correct that SK no longer needs us to win a second Korean war though. So after unification, US
retrenchment from Asia would be more possible and likely. But if America sticks with the Koreans through
these difficult times, it will have them as good allies long into the future. Consider how loyal Kuwait and
Germany are to the US because of historical goodwill. When Korea finally does unify – and it will happen as the
post-Cold War North is in a permanent economic and legitimacy crisis – the Koreans will be deeply grateful if
the US is here, or deeply resentful, and likely very pro-Chinese, if the US is not.

Ground forces key to credible commitment to South Korea
Wallace 4 – Colonel of the US army (Joseph K., 5/3, ―TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The strong feelings of the young are also tempered by their political leaders‘ understanding that, although the
DPRK arguably may not be an immediate threat, the physical presence and demonstration of a strong U.S.
commitment to the ROK brings great stability in a region where they must compete with an economic power of
Japan and the economic and military power of China. South Korean leaders also understand American history.
Just as President Syngman Rhee aggressively demanded a bi-lateral mutual defense treaty with the U.S. in
1953 in return for his support for the armistice, his successors today fundamentally believe that only a physical
presence of U.S. forces will guarantee continued U.S. interest and engagement in event of attack. South
Koreans understand very clearly the fate of the Kurds and Iraqi Shia in 1992, and the South Vietnamese once
the American troops withdrew.

Withdrawal would undermine all relations
Morgan 2009 -- professor of political science and the Thomas and Elizabeth Tierney Chair in Peace and
Conflict Studies at the University of California, Irvine. (Patrick M., Center for International Studies, Inha
University, Pacific Focus, Volume 24, Issue 1, Pages 22-42, ―American Grand Strategy and the US–ROK
Alliance.‖) CMR

For strengthening the alliance the USA needs to recognize the reality of something its new strategic orientation
neglects. Relocating of US forces in the ROK, and shifting the USFK mission toward nonpeninsular
contingencies will almost certainly reduce the close, regular interactions between the two armed forces that
have made it easy for the ROK to inject its concerns and views into the US decision-making process. Much of
the elaborate interaction has been linked to maintaining the intimacy needed to have US and ROK forces
immediately closely coordinated in another Korean war. The alliance won't go away but the opportunities for such
close cooperation will drop.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
18/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                                   2NC CONSULTATION LINK
Withdrawal absent binding consultation with the ROK destroys relations
Nam 2006 -- Associate Professor of Political Science at Inha Uni- versity, Incheon, South Korea (Chang-hee,
Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 4, pp. 615–631 ―RELOCATING THE U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA: Strained
Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture.‖
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic199080.files/Readings_for_November_6_/Nam.pdf) CMR

The moment Washington acts alone without Seoul’s consent, the robust bi-lateral alliance
based on the combined defense structure will probably collapse. The Korean representatives who
joined the recent negotiations saw the connection between relocation and preemption as a flawed and self-
inflated theory. After the relocation agreement was announced, South Korea‘s Ministry of National Defense
argued that, because completion will require six to seven years, the 2nd ID will not be moving south of the Han
River soon. Thus, con- cluded Lt. Gen. Young-Koo Cha, South Korea‘s chief representative to FOTA, the claim
that the plan is preparation for a preemptive attack on the North is groundless.33
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
19/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                       GROUND TROOPS KEY TO REASSURE ROK
Ground troop presence is key to reassure South Korea
Singh and Il-Young, 03 - senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul and
president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum [2003, Lakhvinder Singh and Il-Young Kim , ―Time to Keep Going:
The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea,‖ Pacific Focus, Volume 18 Issue 1, Pages 65 – 87,
Center for International Studies, Inha University]

There is also a political argument in favor of the continued presence of American ground power on the Korean
peninsula. It is that the political goals of war on the Korean peninsula can only be eventually achieved directly
through the army. Air, space and sea platforms may help control the outcome of the events on the ground and
facilitate the task of the army by providing information, destroying enemy targets, and transporting soldiers,
but only a strong physical army presence on the ground will allow Korea to defeat aggression from the
neighboring countries. The United States managed to impose its will on (West) Germany in 1945 because
Americans occupied the country, executed hostile officials or sent them into exiled retirement (or recruited
some of the most intelligent of them into its own secret programs for training purposes), and dismantled the
armed forces before reshaping them into a U.S.-friendly Bundeswehr. In contrast, because the United States
did not occupy Iraq, its air and naval power were unable to topple Saddam Hussein.
The lack of basing of American ground forces would thus undermine much of the deterrent function of U.S.
forces. Such an arrangement might also undermine the burden-sharing requirement vis. Japan. The time
required for deploying units to Korea or to the region would be extended, making it more difficult for the
United States to reassure its allies and friends that it would meet its security commitments in the region from
remote locations in a timely fashion. The continual stationing of troops, therefore, will ensure maintenance of
the special relationship and competencies forged between the two militaries over many decades, and reassure
Korea that its military will remain at the cutting edge in military training, technology and doctrine.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                        Michigan Institutes ‘10
20/56                                                                                     7 Week Juniors

                               A2: ANTI-AMERICANISM TURN
Anti-Americanism doesn’t affect overall relations
Lee 2005 – Dept. of political science, Korea University (Nae-Young, ―Changing South Korean Public Opinion
on the US and the ROK- US Alliance.‖ Workshop on ―America in Question: Korean Democracy and the
Challenge of Non-Proliferation on the Peninsula,‖ May 10-11, 2005, Seoul Korea.) CMR

In short, the majority of the Korean public is very cautious about dismantling the traditional ROK-U.S.
alliance. They have a sense of hesitation or apprehension toward the fundamental rupture of Korea-U.S.
relations. Survey results show that the recent surge of anti-American sentiment in South Korea has not posed
any real threat to the alliance between Seoul and Washington. With more than 70 percent of the population
favoring maintenance or strengthening of the alliance, it would be difficult to characterize the anti-
Americanism in South Korea as challenging the legitimacy of the alliance.

US troop presence is key to the alliance – strong public support despite anti-Americanism
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1 )

Summing up the results of these public polls it becomes apparent that, despite strong anti-American
sentiments, the majority of South Koreans do not want USFK to leave the Korean peninsula. It also means
that if South Korea and the U.S. make positive efforts through education and common works, anti-American
sentiments can be lessened. For example, education (classroom lectures) on behalf of the ROK-U.S. alliance
had a positive effect on the younger generations.26 Results of one survey indicated that the majority of
Korean leaders who directly or indirectly exert influence on national foreign and security policy still believe
that the ROK- U.S. alliance relationship is the most important security mechanism available and that the U.S.
forward deployment on the Korean peninsula continues to play a critical role in maintaining regional
stability.27
This is a meaningful trend for the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Despite South Korea‘s economic
development and its own significant military modernization, most South Koreans are not confident of their
ability to handle Pyongyang without U.S. assistance. They particularly see themselves at a major disadvantage
against North Korea‘s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). They thus support a continued U.S. military
presence in Korea as indispensable to Korean security.28 Recent opinion polls reflect this view and these
attitudes of the majority of South Koreans. The current situation inside South Korea, therefore, is probably
better than generally portrayed. North Korea‘s ambition to possess WMDs together with the sharp polarization
inside South Korea over appropriate policies toward Pyongyang reinforces general South Korean reluctance to
seek dramatic short-term changes in the ROK-U.S. security relationship. North Korea‘s continuing refusal to
deal with South Korea as a legitimate negotiating partner on security issues further bolsters South Korean
incentives to maintain close security cooperation with the United States.29
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
21/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                               A2: ANTI-AMERICANISM TURN
Despite widespread anti-american sentiments, over 70% of Koreans favor a permanent US
troop presence – talk of withdrawal decreased anti-Americanism in 2003
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1 )

One of interesting findings in public opinion in Korea is that by the spring of 2003, anti-Americanism was
gradually ebbing. The ongoing talks on relocating and reducing USFK troops contributed to quieting the anti-
U.S. protesters and, in fact, seemed to increase public support for maintaining the USFK in South Korea.21 A
survey conducted by the JoongAng Inbo newspaper in June 2003 indicated that Korean attitudes toward the
U.S. had actually improved by mid-December 2002, when candlelight rallies protesting the deaths of two
schoolgirls were in full swing: although 64 percent of the Koreans supported full revision of the U.S.-ROK
SOFA in 2002. The percentage declined to 20 percent in June 2003. Koreans favorable toward the U.S. also
increased from 13.0% to 25.4% and unfavorable views toward the U.S. declined from 36.4% to 27.6%. Korean
support for the USFK presence also increased from 48% (50.9% supported gradual or immediate withdrawal)
to almost 60% (proponents of withdrawal decreased to 40%) over the same period. Support for strengthening
the U.S.-Korean alliance also increased from 20.4% to 32.0%, and the percentage of Koreans seeking
―autonomy‖ from the U.S. decreased from 28.1% to 17.6%.22
As far as the withdrawal of USFK, according to a poll conducted by Gallup Korea on December 14, 2002, the
majority (54.8%) of South Koreans still did not want U.S. troops to leave (62.2%) in 1992, while 31.7% did
(21.3% in 1992 poll).23 One of most recent student polls, a survey of 1,270 college students conducted on
June 2 by the Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful Unification, a presidential advisory body, showed
that 49.1% believed the United States the most antagonistic country toward the possible unification of the two
Koreas, while 38.3% answered that China would have the most favorable view of reunification. A May 19-22
poll also found that 87.1% of the respondents believed that existing South Korea-U.S. relations were unfair, but
73.1% were in favor of stationing U.S. troops in Korea to safeguard security (emphasis added). As for views
about North Korea, 49.8% thought that Seoul should engage and accommodate Pyongyang, but 40.9% said
although the communist country remained the key enemy of the South, its people were their compatriots.24
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                        Michigan Institutes ‘10
22/56                                                                                     7 Week Juniors

                 A2: NO LINK – STILL DEFENSE COMMITMENT ***
Withdrawal of ground troops will undercut the defense commitment to South Korea
Cho 2003 -- Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute for International Affairs, Seoul, Korea (Seong
Ryoul, ―The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea.‖ The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 2, Fall 2003. http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/kida0p00000pus.pdf) CMR

Political Alliance without the US Forces
It is generally accepted that one cannot think of the ROK-US alliance without thinking in terms of the presence
of the USFK and a ROK-US alliance without the presence of the USFK is not even imaginable. Such acceptance
came to take root because of the imperfection of the ROK-US MDT. Contrary to the North Atlantic Treaty or
the US-Japan Security Treaty, the ROK-US MDT does not include a provision on automatic involvement and
that is why the US military‘s automatic involvement has been practically guaranteed by considering the US
ground forces in Korea as playing a ―tripwire‖ role.23 In that sense, the MDT without the presence of the USFK
would be merely an imperfect security guarantee document. Thus, it has been accepted that the essence of the
ROK-US military alliance is the presence of the USFK and the combined command system that the USFK is
maintaining with the ROK military.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                            Michigan Institutes ‘10
23/56                                                                                         7 Week Juniors

                   ALLIANCE SOLVE EAST ASIAN PROLIF / CHINA
Alliance is key to solve East Asian proliferation and Chinese conflicts in East Asia
Kim 6 - M.D.. Education. M.D., John Hopkins University; B.S., Duke University (Stephen J., ―ALTERNATIVE
PROLIFERATION AND ALLIANCE FUTURES IN EAST ASIA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451273&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

A central pillar of U.S. national security strategy is to control the spread of nuclear weapons. In pursuit of
that objective, bilateral alliances emerge more important and pertinent than ever. If the United
States and its East Asian allies can strengthen their existing bilateral relationships, and if the United States and
China can come to a clearer bilateral understanding, nuclear proliferation in East Asia can be curtailed. The
consequence of abandoning such alternatives could potentially be devastating. I believe that if the United
States shies away from existing treaties and alliances due to anti-American sentiments or for fear of appearing
anachronistic, then doomsday exhortations will go past paranoia and become reality.2 Anywhere
from 12 to 20 nuclear powers will emerge in the next 2 decades. Terrorists and nonstate actors will exploit this
worldwide proliferation as a succession of East Asian states go nuclear—North Korea, followed by South Korea,
then Japan, then Taiwan.3 An alarmed China would not sit idly by while being encircled by an island chain of
democratic nuclear powers. In the absence of a strong U.S. presence and influence in East Asia, buttressed by
its existing treaties and alliances, East Asia in 2025 looks bleak. But I believe that if the United States
strengthens, renews, and revamps its existing bilateral treaty alliances with Japan and South Korea, the nuclear
temptation in East Asia could be dampened. That is, if the United States maintains its nuclear deterrence
umbrella over Japan and South Korea, North Korea‘s nuclear breakout will not lead governments in Tokyo and
Seoul to seek an indigenous nuclear option. Concurrent with the strengthening of existing treaties and alliances
in East Asia, the United States will also need to reach a new bilateral understanding with China over the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
24/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                   ALLIANCE => ROK MILITARY SELF-RELIANCE
Security reliance key to ROK military self reliance
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1 )

Therefore, the ROK-U.S. security alliance not only offers protection against a North Korean threat, but also
provides insurance against Korea‘s stronger neighbors. And it facilitates greater ROK military self-reliance,
while enhancing Korea‘s power projection capability and regional military role. Close security ties with the
U.S. also bolster prospects for continued economic growth and political stability, while providing Korea
extensive access to U.S. leaders.46
Given common strategic interests, U.S. bilateral alliance treaties and security partnerships, backed by capable,
forward- stationed and forward-deployed armed forces, remain the indispensable framework for deterring
aggression and promoting peaceful developments in the region. The U.S. has approached security relations in
Asia as a ―hub-and-spoke‖ arrangement with the U.S. at the center of bilateral ties among nations that, in turn,
have limited, if any, bilateral military interactions and security arrangements with each other.47 The U.S. has
played the part of ―balancing wheel‖,48 or ―spoke of a fan‖.49 Overall, current U.S. security arrangements in
Asia provide the support for U.S. forces to maintain a deterrence posture. The U.S. has the capability to be
able to reinforce allies successfully to defeat aggression.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
25/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                           ALLIANCE => ROK MODERNIZATION
ROK modernization impossible absent US security alliance – too expensive and takes 2-3 years
Nam 2006 -- Associate Professor of Political Science at Inha Uni- versity, Incheon, South Korea (Chang-hee,
Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 4, pp. 615–631 ―RELOCATING THE U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA: Strained
Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture.‖
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic199080.files/Readings_for_November_6_/Nam.pdf) CMR

It is questionable whether South Korea can afford to purchase state-of-the- art weaponry (Multiple Launch
Rocket Systems, Apache Longbow attack heli- copters, and artillery fire-finding radars) within two or three
years to make-up for lost American firepower. For this reason, the U.S. promised in 2004 to in- vest in 140
different kinds of enhancements valued at over $11 billion over the next three years to fill the security vacuum
that will result from the realign- ment. The USFK announced that it would consider introducing the SBCT; the
Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles; surveillance and attack UAVs, such as Predators and Shadows;
and new precision-guided bombs (JDAM, GBU-28/37 Bunker Busters) to help bolster military capabilities for
the South. Still, while promising to fill this gap with more advanced weaponry, the U.S. negotiator insisted on
the faster troop relocation. The escalating nuclear crisis with the North could not alter the Pentagon‘s resolve to
go ahead with its initial transformation plan.
One problem lies in the fact that force enhancement depends on continued U.S. commitment to South Korean
security. If the rift widens between Seoul and Washington over their respective perceptions of North Korea,
force en- hancement might not necessarily occur on South Korea‘s terms. Furthermore, a key disagreement
remains over the issue of expanding the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. The South Korean government
is worried about the strategic implications of the USFK‘s missile defense system for South Korea‘s neighborly
relations with China. In particular, President Roh‘s security advis- ers seem to believe that the introduction of
PAC-3 systems to strengthen the air defense capabilities of the ROK-U.S. combined forces might eventually
lead to their synchronization with U.S. Missile Defense which may not be de- sired for fear of South Korea‘s
worsening relations with China. Taking an am- bivalent stance, the Roh government has not yet fully endorsed
the TMD system to be adopted by the South Korean air defense forces.




                                              ***OTHER DISADS
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                        Michigan Institutes ‘10
26/56                                                                                     7 Week Juniors

                                  ROK PEACEKEEPING LINK
ROK dependence on US defense allows it to expand global peacekeeping operations
Bandow 7/14 -- senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, July 14, 2010, ―The
U.S.-South Korea Alliance Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous.” Online PDF) CMR

The ROK remains dependent on the United States today, despite vastly changed circumstances. Aggressive,
hegemonic communism is gone. The North cannot count on support even from China in war, and South Korea
is far stronger economically.
While continuing to rely on Washington for its own defense, South Korea has begun preparing its military,
particularly the navy, for broader regional and even global contingencies. One of its core security objectives
now is ―enhancing competence and status internationally.‖3 The ROK has become an active participant
in international peacekeeping missions. As a result, the South has considered upgrading its current
relationship with the United States to a ―strategic alliance‖ devoted to international problems.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
27/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

             ROK ECONOMY – 2NC U.S. ECONOMY INTERNAL LINK
Access to Asia pacific market generates 700 billion and one millions jobs
Singh and Il-Young, 03 - senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul and
president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum [2003, Lakhvinder Singh and Il-Young Kim , ―Time to Keep Going:
The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea,‖ Pacific Focus, Volume 18 Issue 1, Pages 65 – 87,
Center for International Studies, Inha University]

The U.S. has no history of invading Korea for territorial gains and thus can be more trusted by Korean people
than any other country in the eastern region. This makes America relatively free of Korean suspicion as a
potential foe of the Korean people. America in its role as balancer in the region would be least opposed not only
by the Koreans themselves, but also by the countries surrounding it.
However, Korea is not the only country which benefits from the U.S. presence in the country and region. The
United States has also benefited from the Asia-Pacific region's exceptional economic development over the past
century and, in an era of globalization, the U.S. economy is becoming increasingly integrated with that of East
Asia. Nearly a half million U.S. citizens live, work and study in the Asia Pacific region. U.S. businesses conduct
US$ 700 billion in trade and have invested more than US$ 200 billion in the area, about equal to the amount
of East Asian investment in the United States. More than one third of total U.S. trade is conducted with the
region. More than a million U.S. jobs have a stake in the continued growth and development of the region.
Sustained regional economic growth through the promotion of market economies and open sea lines of
transportation, essential for the free flow of resources and trade into and within the region, remains a core U.S.
national security interest, and would continue to be so in the potential aftermath of Korean unification.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
28/56                                                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                        ROK ECONOMY – 2NC DEFENSE SPENDING LINK
Withdrawal forces increased military spending—collapses economy
Wallace 4 – Colonel of the US army (Joseph K., 5/3, ―TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

                            political leaders understand that a U.S. withdrawal or troop reduction would require
On a very practical level Korean
a significant increase in their own military budget. South Korea has avoided billions of dollars of military
spending because the U.S. has forward deployed high tech weapons and surveillance equipment such as Patriot Air Defense,
Early Warning Aircraft, Apache Attack helicopters and over 225 combat aircraft to Korea. The ROK ranks 57 the among nations with 2.8% of its GNP
devoted to military expenditures.28 Compare that to Israel, another country with an enemy at its border and who is ranked eighth in the world at 8.75%
of GNP devoted to military expenditures. Recovery from the Asian economic slowdown in the late 1990s has been gradual in
South Korea. In a very fragile economy that depends on export of consumer goods and import of virtually all
forms of energy, increases in the military budget to purchase weapons systems from the U.S. and Europe would have a
significant effect on Korean economic growth. South Korea‘s failure to significantly increase military
spending has long been a source of criticism by U.S. officials who look upon a portion of the Korean economic miracle as having
been a free ride on the American taxpayer. Realistically, most acknowledge that a Korean administration that spends billions
of dollars on foreign weapon systems at the expense of social and economic programs would not survive very
long. South Korea‘s failure to increase defense spending is not due to an aversion to spending on defense when it is provided at little
cost by the U.S., but it is an acknowledgement that reductions in domestic program spending are politically
unacceptable to the Korean people. In recent agreements the ROK has purchased both F15/F16 combat aircraft but long promised deals for
Patriot PAC-3 missiles, EWACs and AH64 Attack helicopters have not come though to fruition. In a recent announcement, the U.S. promised over 11
billion dollars of military aid to help soften the blow to the South Korean economy due to a probable reduction in U.S. presence. President Roh was
elected to office in 2003 on a platform of political reform and self reliance of South Korea‘s national defense. Many Koreans and Americans read his self-
reliance defense policy as a call for withdrawal of U.S. military forces. In subsequent statements after his election President Roh stated, ―The role of
USFK will continue to be important in the years to come.‖30 President Roh realizes the economic impact of a U.S. troop withdrawal.
In a regional sense a South Korea without a U.S. presence cannot hope to successfully negotiate on an
economic, political or military basis with a powerful DPRK military threat and will increasingly be subject to
the economic or political demands of a dominant China.

Our link is empirical – causes rapid increases in defense spending
Moon and Lee 2009 -- *political science at Yonsei University AND ** Ph. D. candidate specializing in
North Korean politics at Department of Political Science, Yonsei University (Chung-in and Sankeun,
―MILITARY SPENDING AND THE ARMS RACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.” ASIAN PERSPECTIVE,
Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 69-99. http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-
online/security/0429_Hamm.html) CMR

Alliance effects also appear to have profound impacts on defense spending.42 When there was a strong
U.S. security commitment, South Korea’s defense spending was minimal. But when the United
States showed signs of disengagement or waning security commitment, South Korea proceeded
to increase its defense spending. For example, the reduction of American forces in South Korea through
the withdrawal of its Seventh Infantry division in 1971 prompted the Park government to increase rapidly
its defense budget in the early 1970s. The phenomenal rise in defense spending from 1976 to 1979 can also
be explained by alliance effects, as South Korea allocated six percent of its GNP as part of compliance with
American demands for defense burden-sharing. The unexpected rise in defense spending during the
progressive Roh Moo-hyun government was also closely related to alliance effects. Roh‘s efforts to seek a more
independent military line by reducing dependence on the U.S. led to an increase in the ROK‘s military budget.
Conversely, the conservative Lee government‘s decision to reduce the defense budget is known to have been
predicated on the restoration of strong alliance ties with the United States. Thus, the alliance factor has proven
central to the patterns of defense spending in South Korea.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
29/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                    ROK ECONOMY – DEFENSE SPENDING LINKS
Alliances are crucial to lower levels of defense spending
Moon and Lee 2009 -- *political science at Yonsei University AND ** Ph. D. candidate specializing in
North Korean politics at Department of Political Science, Yonsei University (Chung-in and Sankeun,
―MILITARY SPENDING AND THE ARMS RACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.” ASIAN PERSPECTIVE,
Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, pp. 69-99. http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/policy-forums-
online/security/0429_Hamm.html) CMR

Alliance effects are another critical determinant for those countries participating in security cooperation. An
alliance is an institutional arrangement that produces collective goods called ―security‖ by managing common
threats.7 Thus, members of an alliance normally assume the costs of collective goods. Often, a country with
hegemonic leadership allows its weaker partners to enjoy free riding in exchange for their loyalty. Otherwise,
all members of the alliance are obliged to share the defense burden. In the case of foreign troop presence in an
alliance partner, the beneficiary bears the defense costs. North Atlantic Treaty Orga- nization (NATO)
members, Japan, and South Korea are good examples in this regard. Likewise, alliance ties can also directly
affect the nature and level of defense spending. In addition to alliance arrangements, broader external security
ties can also affect the pattern of defense spending. Military assistance from external sources could mitigate
pressures on domestic defense spending, whereas a sharp reduction or suspension of military
assistance by external security partners could lead to an increase in defense spending.

South Korea fears the US leaving more than North Korea—withdrawal causes large increasing
military spending
Wallace 4 – Colonel of the US army (Joseph K., 5/3, ―TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

On 25 November 2003, President Bush announced the start of a worldwide review of American military
overseas armed forces posture. This review is based on the new requirements of the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) and the improved technology and weapons systems of our transformed military. President Bush‘s
statement has an important impact on the people of the Republic of (south) Korea (ROK). Since the end of
Hostilities in Korea in 1953, Korea and the U.S. have forged a long lasting and unique alliance to deter North
Korea officially titled the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). Today, 37,000 U.S. troops are
forward deployed in Korea with the primary mission of deterrence against a DPRK attack. From the time the
Armistice was signed in July 1953 to today, the ROK has become an economic giant rising to the 12th largest
economy in the world in 2003. In the last 50 years the ROK has undergone dramatic social and political
changes. The ROK military has developed from a poorly trained and led armed force in 1953 to a modernized
and powerful military. The basic mission and footprint of U.S. forces has remained unchanged since the 1953
Armistice. What represented a prudent and responsive deterrent capability in 1953 may not be appropriate in
2004. The nature of the changing North Korean threat and capabilities of both the U.S. and ROK military
underscore the need to re-examine our deterrence posture. The debate in both the ROK and the U.S is ongoing
and very animated. On a daily basis the Korean and international press speculate on options that include
complete U.S. withdrawal to a preemptive attack on the DPRK. The South Koreans do not fear nuclear attack
from the DPRK, but they do fear an uncertain future with a diminished U.S. presence and a powerful nuclear
DPRK that would be able to slowly blackmail a prosperous south. More importantly to Koreans, the perception
or reality of a diminished U.S. presence/commitment would trigger the ROK to initiate a politically
unacceptable agenda of large increases in military spending and military manpower conscription.
Therein lies the delicate balance both the U.S. and the ROK must maintain. This paper will examine the both
the political, cultural and military changes that have taken place on the Korean peninsula that directly
influence that delicate balance.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
30/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                            ROK POLITICS – PLAN UNPOPULAR
Withdrawal would be controversial in the ROK government
Smith 2006 – research fellow in Politics, Governance, and Security in the East-West Center Research
Program and project director of Shifting Terrain. She has done extensive research and writing on the local and
national politics of U.S. military basing in Japan, as well as on U.S. alliances in Asia. (Sheila A., East-West
Center special reports No. 8, ―Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of the U.S. Military Presence in Asia.‖
http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/3529/1/sr008.pdf) CMR

First, it will be very difficult to move forward with force transformation goals in the absence of broad public
support for a shared security agenda. This is clearly what is at stake in the difficulties between the United
States and South Korea. Despite a common interest in resolving the North Korean nuclear problem, there is
still tension between the two countries on how to develop a common security agenda. Many analysts warn that
the alliance is deeply troubled, and that force relocation issues are only bringing to the surface deeper changes
within South Korea regarding the United States. Korean attitudes toward the United States are deeply
ambivalent. As the Pew study of world opinion in 2002 reported, ―In Asia, there is strong support for the
United States in Japan and the Philippines, both long-time allies. Yet South Koreans are much more skeptical
despite that country‘s close military and economic ties with the U.S. More than four in ten South Koreans
(44%) have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S.‖58 President Noh‘s vision of a neutral South Korea, balancing
between the United States and China, has generated enthusiasm within South Korea. But this view obviously
troubles Washington. Divided views within South Korea about the nation’s foreign policy
priorities and its future place in Asia suggest that the debate among the Korean people about
the value of the U.S.–South Korean alliance has yet to reach a conclusion.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
31/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                              ROK POLITICS – PLAN POPULAR
Withdrawal would be popular with Korean voters
Mo 2007 – research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is also a professor of international political economy
at the Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University (Jongryn, hoover institution, ―What Does
South Korea Want?‖ Google Scholar) CMR

Another reason for pessimism is that the current conservative realist pro-American thinking clearly fails to
strike a chord with increasingly independent-minded and idealistic Korean voters. These voters want their
government to offer a vision for national defense in which they can take pride. But not only has this proven
elusive, it has also been undermined by realist pro-American arguments that effectively beseech them to
depend on the United States for the country‘s defense.




                                            ***COUNTERPLANS
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
32/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                            REAFFIRM COMMITMENT CP – 1NC
Text: The United States federal government should promise South Korea that our ground
forces would be used in case of a conflict, reaffirming the United States’ commitment to South
Korea.

That’s key to the US-ROK alliance and makes the deterrence DA unique
Wallace 4 – Colonel of the US army (Joseph K., 5/3, ―TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

In the fall of 2003, in the midst of a nationwide emotional political debate, the South Korean media widely
reported on rumors that the U.S. was threatening the redeployment of the Korea based Second Infantry
Division if Korea did not support Operation Iraqi Freedom with the deployment of a Korean infantry
division.22 Although U.S. commanders quickly denied this story, its extensive publication in Korean media
demonstrated how wary the public is of American intentions. To the Korean public, this was a further example
of the United States prioritizing the GWOT and regional stability ahead of deterring war on the Korean
peninsula. Both the U.S. and ROK officials agree the alliance must evolve. Despite repeated assurances by
senior American officials of our commitment to deterrence, our actions of moving troops farther south send a
very different message. South Korea remains one of our strongest allies and the majority of South Koreans and
President Roh‘s administration support continued U.S. military presence.23 Increasing South Korean
nationalism and pride in their economic and social achievements are manifesting in the younger Korean
peoples‘ demand for an equal partnership with the U.S. The U.S. must recognize this and demonstrate that our
commitment to peace on the peninsula is not in conflict with our current policy towards the DPRK nuclear
proliferation. The U.S. must show that our movement of troops south of the Han and our GWOT strategy does
not pose a threat to maintaining peace in Korea or put their ―Sunshine Policy‖ of engagement at risk. We also
must weigh the wisdom of moving troops further south out of harms way if we cannot effectively convince our
allies of our commitment. Statements made on 19 October 2003 by both President Bush and Secretary Powell
on the television show ―Meet the Press‖ is a hopeful indication. President Bush stated, that in coordination with
our Allies, the U.S. would be willing to state in a written document (not a Treaty) that the U.S. would not
preemptively strike North Korea but would continue negotiations towards a diplomatic solution. By clearly
addressing both North Korea‘s and South Korea‘s greatest concern, the possibilities of a peaceful solution to
the current crisis of DPRK nuclear proliferation are strengthened. Most importantly, it would set the conditions
to move beyond the proliferation issue and the context of the GWOT and evolve the U.S.- Korean alliance in
ways that will support the realignment of U.S. military forces in Korea and the long-term regional stability in
East Asia.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
33/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                                       ADVANTAGE CP – 1NC
The United States federal government, if and only if North Korea dismantles its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs, cooperates to solve the Japanese abductees issue, reduces
conventional forces, and reforms its economy by following China’s example, should provide a
12 month security guarantee, publically announce its support for Kim Jong-Il’s regime, help
normalize relations between North Korea and the United States, South Korea, and Japan, and
provide economic support for North Korea including food and energy assistance and facilitate
North Korea’s access to international financial institutions. The United States federal
government should explain the reasoning behind the package to other countries. The United
States federal government should announce that it has no intention to fully withdraw ground
forces from South Korea.

Solves North Korea nuclearization and aggression and North Korea will say yes
Wallace 4 – Colonel of the US army (Joseph K., 5/3, ―TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The only realistic option is negotiation. A firm and tough strategy matched with concrete incentives is needed
to change Pyongyang. The right incentives are not bribes; they are catalysts to reform.33 To pursue the new
strategy the U.S. needs to reestablish its strategic ends, ways, and means as a first step. Once the U.S. sets up
its new strategic ends, ways, and means, it needs to build a consensus among the other parties (the ROK,
China, Japan, and Russia) and lead them to execute the new strategy collectively in order to persuade North
Korea to accept it. Considering the complexity, requirements, and duration required to solve the North Korea
nuclear issue, it would be prudent to solve this issue in step-by-step manner. REESTABLISH STRATEGIC
ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS The narrowly defined ends brought unintended consequences, thus providing
North Korea a powerful incentive to pursue nuclear weapons. What should be the desired end-state of the U.S.
and its allies ‘ strategy toward North Korea? North Korea has insisted that as long as the U.S. continues its
hostile policy toward North Korea the nuclear question cannot ever be resolved.34 Considering North Korea‘s
insistence and long-term U.S. interests in maintaining regional stability, the desired end-state of the strategy
on North Korea should be to prevent it from acquiring nuclear arms as well as inducing it to become a
responsible member of international society. To accomplish these ends which ways should the U.S. and its
allies adopt? The U.S., in concert with the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia, should propose a conditional
comprehensive 10 package deal to North Korea, including a broad and long-term road map for future relations.
North Korean leaders are not likely to find the vision or courage to make significant changes on their own. If
there is to be progress, Washington has to convince North Korea to change its ways, instead of relying upon
Pyongyang‘s unilateral reform or effective Beijing pressure on the Kim regime. To induce Pyongyang
successfully, the means m ust be attractive enough to convince the North Korean leaders there is an alternative
to their present risky path. The package would also include a number of demands on Pyongyang. DEVELOP
AND NEGOTIATE A CONDITIONAL COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE Based on the reestablished strategic ends,
ways, and means, the U.S., in concert with the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia, would develop a conditional
comprehensive package to negotiate with North Korea. North Korea would: completely, verifiably, and
irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs; dismantle its ballistic missile programs ; cooperate to solve the
Japanese abductees issue successfully; reduce its conventional forces in a step-by-step manner; and reform its
economy by following China‘s example. In return, the five parties would: implement a ―6-to-12 month
provisional security guarantee,‖ which would become more enduring as the process proceeded; state and
demonstrate their willingness to accept the continued existence of the Kim Jong-Il regime; establish
normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the U.S., ROK, and Japan; provide economic
support for North Korea including food and energy assistance through an international consortium; and
facilitate North Korea‘s access to international financial institutions. If the U.S. explains the new conditional
comprehensive package deal to the regional countries, it would most likely receive their support and
cooperation because the idea is basically identical to the regional countries‘ approach. Negotiation with North
Korea will be conditional and executed in a limited period of time (6-12 months) to hedge against North
Korea‘s delaying tactics and to limit its ability to increase its nuclear capabilities while negotiations proceed.
RECIPROCAL STEP-BY-STEP EXECUTION Security Guarantee and Nuclear Freeze North Korea has
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
34/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

demanded a security guarantee as a precondition for solving the North Korea nuclear issue. As the first step,
the U.S., in concert with the ROK, Japan, China, and Russia, would provide a 6~12 month ―provisional
security guarantee‖ as well as immediate energy and food assistance. During this time, under the verification
and supervision of international inspectors, North Korea would freeze its nuclear programs and ship nuclear
weapons as well as nuclear materials to one of the five nuclear-weapons states by following the Ukraine or
Kazakhstan example.35 For political and geographical reasons, either Russia or China might be a good
destination for the North Korean weapons and fissile material. After removing the nuclear weapons, the next
priority is to ship the spent fuel rods out of North Korea. Since it takes a relatively short period of time to
transform spent fuel into weaponusable fissile material, the spent fuel rods provide a powerful means of
blackmail as long as Pyongyang holds them.36 Again, either Russia or China would be a good destination
because both countries have facilities to reprocess spent fuel removed from the graphite-moderated reactors.
Diplomatic Normalization and Nuclear Facility Closure Once the transfer of nuclear weapons and materials to
Russia or China has begun, the U.S. would normalize diplomatic relations, remove North Korea from the list of
state sponsors of terrorism, and lift trade sanctions. Similarly, the ROK and Japan would establish diplomatic
relations with North Korea. Simultaneously, in return, North Korea would close all nuclear facilities under
international supervision. In order to decommission the North‘s graphite-moderated reactors and related
facilities, three stages of decommissioning process can be applied. Stage 1 (safe storage with surveillance)
requires the removal of all spent fuel rods, the blocking and sealing of selected mechanical and hydraulic
systems, and full-time surveillance of the nuclear reactors or facilities. Stage 2 (cocooning) is accomplished by
reinforcing the contamination barrier after dismantling all parts except the core and shields. Stage 3
(unrestricted site use) is completed when all materials, equipments, and parts of the plant are removed and
contamination is reduced to an acceptable level for unrestricted usage of the site.37 Given the enormous costs
and time-consuming nature of the Stage 2 and 3 processes,38 one reasonable option is to store the North‘s
graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with surveillance (i.e., Stage 1) for an extended period. For
nonproliferation purposes alone, Stage 1 is sufficient, and Stage 2 and 3 could be delayed until conditions are
appropriate.39 Technically, North Korea and the U.S., as a leading nation of the United Nations Forces during
the Korean War, are in a state of war.40 To end a state of warfare and normalize 12 relations between two
countries, a peace treaty is the most common method. However, there is a complicating legal issue in that there
was no official declaration of war between the two countries. To address this issue, the U.S. and North Korea
can use the ROK and China normalization example. When South Korea and China normalized relations in
August 1992, China‘s position was that it had battled against the United Nations, not South Korea.41 The ROK
and China ended an implicit state of war between them with a joint statement that the two sides ―agree to
develop a lasting good-neighbor and friendly relationship,‖ thus implying that the state of undeclared war
between South Korea and China was terminated.42 To normalize diplomatic relations between the two Koreas,
a new peace regime which replaces the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement (MAA) would be needed. The ROK
and U.S. governments would jointly propose four-party peace agreement talks among the two Koreas, China,
and the U.S. The two Koreas, as principal parties, would sign the peace treaty and the U.S. and China would
support and endorse it. At the same time, the two Koreas would normalize their relations. Economic Aid and
Conventional Force Reduction Once diplomatic relations have been normalized, the U.S. and its allies would
demand the dismantlement of North Korea‘s ballistic missile programs and reduction of conventional forces on
the peninsula in a step-by-step and reciprocal fashion . Conventional arms control has been an important issue
on the Korean Peninsula for decades. The border between North and South Korea is the most heavily fortified
in the world, with nearly two million troops along both sides of the 155-mile Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). North
Korean forces deployed near the DMZ not only have the potential to cause massive destruction in the event of
war, but also give Pyongyang inordinate bargaining leverage in any crisis or negotiation.43 North Korea is the
most militarized country in the world. Pyongyang has 1.17 million active personnel with a reserve force of over
7.45 million, making it the world‘s fifth-largest military force.44 Although estimates vary, North Korean
military spending equals at least 25 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), higher than any other
country. 45 North Korea‘s high level of military spending is a misallocation of resources that blocks meaningful
economic reform and prevents the regime from meeting the needs of the North Korean people. In order to
reduce tension between the two Koreas, and to correct the misallocation of North Korea‘s resources, the ROK
and U.S. would model the NATO-Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and propose fifty-percent
cuts in heavy weaponry on the Korean Peninsula including missiles and chemical and biological weapons
programs. 13 The U.S. military presence in Korea issue would also be included in the negotiation. North
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
35/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

Korean positions in the conventional arms control area have traditionally called both for reductions in South
and North forces and for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula. However, it is unclear where North
Korea genuinely stands on the question of U.S. military presence in Korea. In a number of private
conversations, including during President Kim Daejung‘s visit to North Korea in June 2000, Kim Jong-il has
indicated that U.S. troops might play a future stabilizing role on the peninsula, even after unification. North
Korea may be willing to accept the presence of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) if there is a fundamental
improvement in U.S.-North Korea relations and if basic changes are made in the size, composition, and role of
those forces.46 Once diplomatic relations are established as the result of the successful execution of this
package deal, and once a USFK reduction plan is explained to North Korea (e.g., reduction to 25,000 by 2008;
12,000 by 2010), the possibility of North Korea‘s acceptance would be raised. As the dismantlement of North
Korea ‘s ballistic missile programs and the reduction of both sides‘ conventional forces begin, the allies would
also begin to provide considerable amounts of economic support. This economic aid should be viewed as a
development program following the example of the U.S.-led effort to help the ROK and Taiwan decades ago.
Annual aid level would be roughly $2 billion (not counting aid for humanitarian purposes, energy projects, or
arms control activities) for a decade.47 The majority of this aid would be provided by Japan, the ROK, China
and, conceivably, other international actors such as the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank,
and some additional countries. During the August 2003 6-party talks in Beijing, Japan expressed its intention
to offer a large-scale economic aid package to compensate for the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula
from 1910 to 1945. When the ROK and Japan normalized its relations in 1965, Japan provided $800 million to
the ROK as a compensation for the damages suffered during colonial era.48 This compensation money greatly
contributed to the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966) as well as the Second Five-Year
Economic Development Plan (1967-1971).49 The ROK Government has been very actively engaged in
expanding economic exchanges with North Korea since the 2000 summit. A groundbreaking ceremony was
held at the Kaesong industrial park on 20 October 2004. The complex is on schedule to open in 2005, with a
pilot project of nineteen South Korean companies.50 Once the investment conditions are set, other similar
industrial projects would be easily expanded throughout North Korea because there is an emerging consensus
that North-South economic cooperation can be mutually beneficial. 14 China‘s help would include not only
materials but also technical support and assistance based upon China‘s experiences in such matters as creating
special economic zones and gradually liberalizing within the context of a command economy and a communist
political system. Even though the majority of the aid would be provided by Japan, the ROK, and China, the U.S.
should also help North Korea largely as a sign of its sincerity. Most of the e conomic aid from the outside
countries would not be provided in the form of cash; additionally, funding would be disbursed annually
according to an economic reform master plan in order to retain leverage over Pyongyang.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
36/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                                        SOLVES HEGEMONY
CP solves hege
Wallace 4 – Colonel of the US army (Joseph K., 5/3, ―TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

The above three risks appear to be acceptable and manageable for the U.S., especially when one considers the
larger risks that are posed by its current strategy. By muddling along on the North Korea nuclear issue, the U.S.
has embarked on a game of ―chicken‖ that has let this deadly problem become increasingly acute. Moreover,
this crisis has contributed to the weakening of an America‘s global leadership that is already in question from
the clumsiness of Operation Iraqi Freedom. With the prosecution of the war in Iraq, the Bush administration
created the perception of an imperialist bully wielding power unilaterally to pursue self-interests, and severely
hurt America‘s long-standing image as a nation that wants to create a better world.51 The U.S. can use the
North Korean nuclear challenge to enhance its credibility as the world‘s leader. If the U.S., in close partnership
with the countries of North East Asia, resolves North Korea issue successfully, it will greatly contribute to the
recovery of its global leadership role.




                                        ***ADVANTAGE ANSWERS
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
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                                      A2: REGIONALISM ADV
Regionalism is at BEST a supplement for the US bilateral alliance system, not a substitute.
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1)

Multilateralism should not be a substitute for bilateralism. Examples of Asia-Pacific regionalism and
multilateralism, such as APEC and ARF, are no more than supplementary mechanisms to the ―hub-and-spoke
approach‖ (emphasis added) of the U.S. that is founded upon bilateral alliance networks. The bilateral
security relationship serves as a pillar for the U.S. alliance system, designed to maintain regional stability and
prevent the rise of regional powers that might threaten neighboring nations.73 Therefore, a bilateral alliance,
as a main mechanism for maintaining a stable peace, should be reinforced, while multilateralism should be
considered as a supplementary mechanism. It is, in the end, necessary to create an inclusive regional
community based on the concept of ―cooperative security.‖
The new framework would not be designed to supplant or even unify U.S. alliances but initially would act as a
confidence- building measure, providing a venue for discussion and information exchanges, and opening the
prospect for more powerful institutional evolution over the long-term. But a strong alliance should be the
basis for this initiative. Otherwise, pursuing a regional community might undermine bilateral ties.74 The
strategic option, therefore, will be the multiplication of bilateralism, moving toward multilateralism. The
process will be one of building upon bilateral security relationships to form a web of regional relationships and
capabilities that reinforce security for individual states, discouraging armed aggression as a way of settling
disputes. Institutionalizing security communities helps develop habits of regional military cooperation and
professional military behavior.

Regionalism is too long timeframe to solve – just fanciful imagination.
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1 )

According to multilateralist perspectives, the main problem is zero-sum, balance-of-power mindsets and
ambiguous intentions, fueled by ethnic and religious zeal and historical fears and grievances. With this in
mind, the Asia-Pacific region must move more from measuring differences to measuring progress.64
Accordingly, a fundamental security challenge in the Asia-Pacific region is to transform the balance-of-power
approach proposed by those who advocate a multicolor global power structure into one that instead aims to
produce ―security communities‖ in which disputes are not resolved by threats or the employment of force.65
In the long-run, there is a proposal for a more comprehensive collective security organization (i.e., ―Northeast
Asian Security Organization, or NEASO‖) which is based upon some combination of modified alignments and
―neutralism‖ as the most promising route for Korea and for the region as a whole.66 Another idea would be
―the Northeast Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO),‖ which would not be organized so much to counter a
threat from the outside, but rather to counter the imagined possibility of a danger from any one or more of its
members against any of its own members. NEATO is more comprehensive than NATO in scope and
functions, and it would go far beyond military matters.67 Projecting into the foreseeable future, these ideas
are desirable, but distant and rather imaginary for the time being.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                             Michigan Institutes ‘10
38/56                                                                                          7 Week Juniors

                                       A2: REGIONALISM ADV
Bilateral alliances are more important than multilateralism—comparative ev
Kim 6 – M.D.. Education. M.D., John Hopkins University; B.S., Duke University (Stephen J., ―ALTERNATIVE
PROLIFERATION AND ALLIANCE FUTURES IN EAST ASIA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451273&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Given our optimistic and pessimistic projections for the next 20 years or so, how does the United States go
about seeking what we want? In other words, what is likely to develop in East Asia by 2025, and how does the
United States mold, shape, and adjust to those anticipated developments? I argue that the strengthening of our
bilateral alliance with South Korea and Japan and the forging of a new understanding with China on nuclear
proliferation are the keys to shaping the East Asian future we want to confront in 2025. 12 At first glance, the
East Asian structure seems an ill fit to tempering nuclear proliferation. Observers are quick to point out the
absence of a NATO-type structure for East Asia. There are no East Asian equivalents of a Monroe Doctrine, the
Rio Pact, the Organization of American States (OAS); no West European Union (WEU) political counterpart. At
best, there is the now defunct South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). But on closer examination, the
United States is ―blessed‖ not to have a NATO-type organization in East Asia.30 Critics who pinned the
mistakes and shortcomings of U.S. policy in East Asia on this absence of multilateral organizational structure
miss the mark. U.S. Forces Korea‘s (USFK) commander General Leon Laporte has more flexibility and leeway
than General Lauris Norstad had at the height of Supreme Allied Command Europe‘s (SACEUR) prestige and
responsibility. Multilateral alliances can fall victim to factionalism and disagreements over ―who‘s turn‖ it is in
rotation assignments and responsibilities. Bilateral alliances and treaties, on the other hand, give the United
States flexibility in offering positive inducements and holding out negative consequences. If the collective sum
of a multilateral alliance is its strength, then the one-on-one nature of bilateral alliances gives the United States
more direct leverage over its ally and lowers the probability of misunderstanding and collusion against it.
Bilateral alliances can be leveraged to pressure third parties with whom its allies have relations. Examples are
not hard to find. Despite Tokyo‘s insistence that the abduction issue is their top priority in negotiations with
North Korea, Japan has agreed that a written security guarantee of North Korea takes precedence. Japan will
―not insist on including the abduction issue‖ in the second round of the 6-nation talks over North Korea‘s
nuclear program.31 Ostensibly, the United States also pressured Japan to not sign a $2 billion contract for
Iran‘s oil. Shoichi Nakagawa, the new minister of economy, trade, and industry stated that Japan would treat
the bilateral agreement for Iran‘s Azadegan oil field ―in its totality,‖ indicating that the ―contract could not be
separated from suspicions over Iran‘s nuclear programme.‖32 Anti-American sentiments reached its apex
during South Korea‘s December 2002 Presidential election. Though hardly at its nadir today, anti-American
sentiments are on the wane, due in large part 13 to the U.S. decision to pull back frontline troops beyond the
Han River, south of Seoul, as well as a well-timed announcement for possible draw down of some of its 37,000
troops stationed in South Korea.33 The calibration of the deployment of U.S. forces will have a palpable effect
on how South Korea defines its national security and decides on its defense policies. The U.S.-ROK alliance
emerges as ever important in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, as any potential strike
operations against selective North Korean facilities would require Seoul‘s approval of the use of its airspace.
The United States can also dangle to Japan and South Korea the prospect of joining the 10 rotating UN Security
Council memberships for their cooperation in keeping East Asia nuclear free. Algeria, the Philippines,
Romania, Brazil, and Benin are to begin their term on January 1, 2004. The 2-year rotation for the other 5-
member group begins on January 1, 2005.34 On a final note, Japan and South Korea are free, democratic,
liberal, capitalistic, and open societies, and have been our allies for over 50 years. Yet the United States still
does not know Japan and South Korea all that well. If we have shortcomings in our understandings of our East
Asian allies, how do we even approach minimal understanding of our East Asian adversaries? As one observer
noted: ―When we confront an opponent with nuclear weapons, we misread cues, signals, threats, and
responses, most of all when the opponent stands outside of Western culture. They will misread us in turn.‖35
Thus, the strengthening of existing bilateral alliances gains more importance for our efforts to curb nuclear
proliferation in East Asia.




                                               ***AFFIRMATIVE
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                       Michigan Institutes ‘10
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                           A2: CP – THREATEN NORTH KOREA
The counterplan to threaten North Korea furthers North Korean proliferation
Jung 5 – Colonel of the South Korean Army (Yeon Bong, 3/18, ―STRATEGY ON STILTS: THE U.S.
RESPONSE TO THE NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR ISSUE‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA434639&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Pyongyang‘s penchant for current nuclear brinkmanship may have been further reinforced after Operation
Iraqi Freedom, in order to convince Washington that North Korea would not be turned into another Iraq . It is
hardly surprising if Pyongyang concluded that it might be next on Washington‘s hit list unless it could
effectively deter an attack. Considering its conventional military would be inadequate to match the U.S.
capabilities, North Korea may have concluded that the most reliable deterrent—perhaps the only reliable
deterrent—is to have nuclear weapons. North Korean officials told a visiting delegation of U.S. congressmen in
June 2003 that they were building nuclear weapons precisely so their country would not suffer the same fate as
had Saddam Hussein‘s Iraq.8 Exactly where Pyongyang is heading remains unclear,9 but North Korean leaders
seem to feel threatened by U.S. talk about regime change and pre-emptive strikes. They seem to have
concluded that nuclear weapons are the only way of guaranteeing their regime‘s survival.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
40/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                            A2: CP – REAFFIRM COMMITMENT
Reinforcing presence is useless – doesn’t provide unique deterrent capabilities
Bandow 7/14 -- senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, July 14, 2010, ―The
U.S.-South Korea Alliance Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous.” Online PDF) CMR

Finally, reinforcing America‘s military posture on the peninsula represents a move in the wrong direction.
Victor Cha of Georgetown University, who was the NSC director for Asian Affairs in the latter years of the Bush
administration, advocates ―reestablishing deterrence on the peninsula.‖31 Exactly when and how deterrence
disappeared he does not detail, but responsibility for any ―reestablishment‖ should lie with Seoul.
Similarly, Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation advocates enhancing U.S. naval forces in the Yellow
Sea.32 However, South Korea already possesses larger, better- equipped, and more modern vessels than does
the North. The sinking of the Cheonan should serve as a wake-up call to Seoul to focus its military build-up on
its own defense rather than regional or global missions.33
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                       Michigan Institutes ‘10
41/56                                                                                    7 Week Juniors

                              A2: CP – PREEMPTIVE STRIKES
Perm solves – plan allows for more flexible DPRK strikes
Nam 2006 -- Associate Professor of Political Science at Inha Uni- versity, Incheon, South Korea (Chang-hee,
Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 4, pp. 615–631 ―RELOCATING THE U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA: Strained
Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture.‖
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic199080.files/Readings_for_November_6_/Nam.pdf) CMR

The backward deployment of the U.S. ground forces currently close to the DMZ is often promoted by military
experts in the Pentagon as well. The U.S. defense secretary has said that America‘s enemies seek to challenge
the U.S. asymmetrically by looking for vulnerabilities and trying to exploit them.31 He further stated that
America’s goal is to close-off avenues of potential nuclear, chemical, and biological attack.
Moving the division out of artillery range would indeed allow the U.S. military more flexibility
to launch a preemptive strike. Some equipment enhancements suggested by the U.S. military are directed
at deploying surveillance and attack Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and new precision-guided bombs for
possible use; such improvements might provoke Pyongyang because they can be seen to aim at strengthening
the capability to strike the North‘s military facilities.32
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                                                              Michigan Institutes ‘10
42/56                                                                                                                           7 Week Juniors

                                                          A2: ROK ECONOMY
Modernization doesn’t kill ROK economy – doesn’t cost too much
Bandow 7/14 -- senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, July 14, 2010, ―The
U.S.-South Korea Alliance Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous.” Online PDF) CMR

The argument that the South would need to undertake an ―astronomical‖ increase in defense spending is,
however, a self-serving exaggeration. Seoul does not need to replicate America‘s military to defeat the North‘s
military. Notes Jae-Jung Suh of Johns Hopkins University‘s School of Advanced International Studies: ―while
the U.S. military adds to the South‘s capability, some of its contribution may be superfluous, especially given
that Seoul is already enjoying military advantages over Pyongyang. The alliance‘s supplementary effect,
therefore, [is] smaller than it seems at first.‖25
The South requires well-trained and equipped armed forces that are better than those of the DPRK, and Seoul
has those already. For the ROK to further upgrade its forces would take money and time, but presumably the
South Korean people believe protecting their nation is worth substantial and sustained effort. If not, the American
people are not responsible for filling any resulting gap. U.S. fiscal obligations start with a nation- al debt exceeding $13 trillion and an annual deficit
running up to almost $1.6 trillion.26 Americans are borrowing money to pay to defend the South so South Koreans can spend their money on other
priorities.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
43/56                                                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                            A2: ROK ECONOMY / DEMOCRACY MODELED
South Korea’s economy and democracy aren’t modeled – China and Japan overshadow
Snyder 2008 -- director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in
the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Scott, ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 32, No. 2,
2008, pp. 93-113. ―THE FUTURE OF U.S.-ROK RELATIONS: THE U.S. APPROACH.‖) CMR

South Korean policy makers are increasingly grappling with the paradoxical implications of South Korea‘s
expanded capacity and its application in a regional and global context. South Korea is the twelfth-largest
economy in the world, a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and a model for developing countries
that aspire to achieve economic and political transitions to secure their own stability and prosperity. But the capacities of South
Korea’s great-power next-door neighbors, China and Japan, overshadow Korea’s
accomplishments.
If South Korea were located in the middle of Europe, it would be an economic power with political influence. But Korea‘s geostrategic position
in Northeast Asia offers challenging dilem- mas and constraints. Ironically, South Korea has greater potential to make its mark in
a global rather than in a regional context, especially given the possibility of South Korea‘s expanding profile in the international business/consumer
products sector, interna- tional peacekeeping, and international development assistance. The selection of Ban Ki-moon from South Korea as the UN
Secre- tary General further enhances South Korea‘s profile as a potential contributor of public goods in the international community. In each of these
spheres, South Korea‘s ability to play a role will involve enhanced cooperation with the United States.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                            Michigan Institutes ‘10
44/56                                                                                         7 Week Juniors

                     A2: U.S.-ROK RELATIONS – TROOPS NOT KEY
Overall relations can be maintained absent USFK
Cho 2003 -- Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute for International Affairs, Seoul, Korea (Seong
Ryoul, ―The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea.‖ The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 2, Fall 2003. http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/kida0p00000pus.pdf) CMR

The presence of US forces in Korea, however, may not always be a precondition for an alliance with the United
States. The United States today maintains bilateral alliances with South Korea, Japan, Australia and Thailand
in the Asia-Pacific region. And yet, it has 110 and 450 personnel stationed in Australia and Thailand,
respectively, as liaison officials, contrary to the way the alliance is being implemented in South Korea and
Japan. Instead, Australia not only participates in the US-led multinational military exercises—including the
RIMPAC and the Team Challenge—but also conducts the Australia-US joint military exercise called Tandem
Thrust on a biennial basis.24 Thailand, too, holds joint military exercise programs with the United States, such
as Cobra Gold and Cope Tiger. As for the NATO member states that are alliances of the United States, the US
forces are not stationed in all of the allied states. As can be understood from those cases, the presence of the US
forces is not a necessary precondition, but a sufficient condition for alliance.
The scenario that redefines the current ROK-US alliance produced in the Cold-War era as a political alliance
without the US forces envisages that the USFK, whether being its ground forces or its air force, will be entirely
pulled out of the Peninsula, while guaranteeing the US forces free access to the facilities within South Korea,
joint military exercises to provide against emergency situations and continued presence of the Military
Advisory Group. If this scenario ever becomes a reality, the ROK-US alliance will evolve into one that will face
no friction with local residents over problems related to military installations or training areas or no burden of
sharing cost for stationing forces. It is what this scenario envisages: Developing into a political alliance without
stationing US forces in Korea.
This scenario of a ―political alliance without USFK‖ may sound very radical, and yet, it does have aspects that
match the modification of the US military strategy, currently under review by the Bush administration.
Washington‘s neo-military strategy is based on the following three conditions: Firstly, regular collective
military exercises with alliances within a bloc to be equipped with joint reaction capability in an emergency;
secondly, smooth cooperation with alliances and friendly nations so that the US forces are guaranteed free
access to local sea ports or airports, with storage of ammunition and military equipment as well as provision of
military supplies being facilitated; and thirdly, reinforcing its swift troop deployment capability and precision
strike capability.25 Thus, an ―alliance without US forces‖ is not impossible to implement, since Washington‘s
neo-military strategy does not presuppose a local presence of the US forces as described above.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
45/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

   A2: U.S.-ROK RELATIONS – WITHDRAWAL INCREASES RELATIONS
Turn – ending the military alliance allows greater international cooperation on other issues
Bandow 7/14 -- senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, July 14, 2010, ―The
U.S.-South Korea Alliance Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous.” Online PDF) CMR

The U.S.-ROK military alliance has lost its purpose. South Korea is not critical to America‘s defense and
America‘s assistance is not—or at least should not be—critical to South Korea‘s defense. Far from improving
regional security, the current relationship makes it harder for both nations to act to protect their own vital
interests. Especially after the financial crash of 2008, Washington should make policy to promote America‘s,
not the ROK‘s, continued economic development.
Doing so would not end the strong relation- ship between the peoples of the United States and the ROK.
Rather, eliminating the alliance would offer a new beginning. The relationship would continue, but now
it would be centered on family, trade, culture, and other nonmilitary ties. Security cooperation
could continue where warranted, but with America and South Korea as equals. After 65 years of dependence on
the United States, the South Korean people should take over responsibility for their own defense.

Withdrawal helps relations – more flexible alliance
Cho 2003 -- Senior Research Fellow at the Research Institute for International Affairs, Seoul, Korea (Seong
Ryoul, ―The ROK-US Alliance and the Future of US Forces in South Korea.‖ The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis, Vol. XV, No. 2, Fall 2003. http://www.kida.re.kr/data/2006/04/13/kida0p00000pus.pdf) CMR

Whereas the United States strengthens alliances worldwide, the Roh government maintains the policy of
promoting a pliable alliance. Given the perspective of the new military strategy that the United States
promotes, it will be no easy task to present a direction of revising the ROK-US alliance. Therefore, in the future,
there will be an inevitable policy clash between two alliance partners. So, at some point of time a big crash
between two streams is inevitable.
But if we can take advantage of a reduction of US forces in Korea, it will be a golden opportunity for the two
alliance partners to develop from the traditionally friendly relationship into a mature and flexible alliance
relationship.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                                                 Michigan Institutes ‘10
46/56                                                                                                              7 Week Juniors

                       A2: U.S.-ROK RELATIONS – ALLIANCE RESILIENT
Alliance is resilient – overcome major hurdles before
Snyder 2008 -- director of the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and senior associate of Washington programs in
the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation (Scott, ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 32, No. 2,
2008, pp. 93-113. ―THE FUTURE OF U.S.-ROK RELATIONS: THE U.S. APPROACH.‖) CMR

Despite having experienced both a change in international power at the end of the cold war and a South Korean
domestic political transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the U.S.-ROK alliance has persisted.
Moreover, some scholars pre-dict that the third condition, the formation of a new outside alliance between
China and South Korea, is only a matter of time.3 Despite the fulfillment of several conditions that normally
lead to alliance termination, the U.S.-ROK alliance has endured and is in the process of adapting to new
circumstances. Changes in the external and internal political context have also necessitated changes in the alliance, and in many cases managing
these challenges has not been easy.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
47/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                      A2: ALLIANCE – ANTI-AMERICANISM TURN
The ONLY thing threatening the alliance is anti-Americanism which is exacerbated by
permanent troop presence in the ROK
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1 )

One of the most significant challenges to the ROK-U.S. alliance is the growing sense of anti-Americanism in
particular and anti-American sentiments in general within Korean society,11 both of which support demands
for the dissolution of the alliance relationship and the withdrawal of U.S. troops in Korea. This is particularly
true for the younger generations in general as they seek a break from the past in foreign and national security
policies. They are xenophobic and nationalistic in group-orientation, even though their personal orientation
tends to be global-internationalistic. Consequently, their foreign policy outlook emphasizes autonomy from
external influences. These anti-American attitudes have also increased in response to North Korea‘s tactics
which seek to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington.
Anti-American sentiments have originated in and been exacerbated by various sources and, in particular, a
series of events related to the U.S. military presence on Korean soil which have heightened demands for the
revision of the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). Among the contributing factors are ―crimes‖ committed by
the U.S. troops during the Korean War, demands by civil activists for closing the U.S. troop bombing range at
Maehyang-ri, the alleged environmental pollution by the USFK, the ―Kim Dong-Sung incident‖ at the 2002
Winter Olympic Games, the F(X) fighter selection issue, the death of two female middle-school students by
American tanks, demands for removing U.S. military bases from downtown Seoul to the outskirts of the capital
city, and demands by civil activists for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from the peninsula. When anti-
American sentiments are exacerbated within South Korea society, it could become a political burden to the
United States as well as South Korea.
As for today, only one serious problem in the ROK-U.S. security relationship stems from younger people‘s
anti-Americanism. The current mood of anti-Americanism is now widespread present and dangerous. A new
rising tide of anti- Americanism is truly a serious problem in the ROK-U.S. alliance, an ―ideological‖ anti-
Americanism rather than the ―sentimental‖ anti-American feelings of earlier times.
The former may be much more dangerous but very limited number (limited to less than 3% of the young
people), while the latter is more widespread but not necessarily a real threat to ROK-U.S. relations.12 The
latter group has simply emphasized national pride, national self-reliance, self- respect, and equal relations on
the basis of ―romantic‖ nationalism. ―Impulsive‖ or ―emotional‖ anti-American feelings are historically
natural, and, therefore, this tide will likely be alleviated sometime in the near future. Ideological anti-
Americanism, by contrast, raises a serous threat and will continue because it is handled by pro-North Korean
radical leftists. Today‘s anti-Americanism in Korea is largely political and led by such left-leaning radical
activist groups such as labor unions, radical student activist organizations, and radical civic groups.

Anti-Americanism hurts USFK capability
Nam 2006 -- Associate Professor of Political Science at Inha Uni- versity, Incheon, South Korea (Chang-hee,
Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 4, pp. 615–631 ―RELOCATING THE U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA: Strained
Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture.‖
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic199080.files/Readings_for_November_6_/Nam.pdf) CMR

This tension, has complicated the environment in which U.S. troops are stationed. Continued conflict and the
failure to harmonize with local communities will hurt training efficiency and U.S. force morale. Thus, the desire
to avoid conflict with local communities may have also prompted the USFK to become more serious about
realignment plans. For example, friction with local residents might have affected, albeit indirectly, the U.S.
decision to move the 2nd ID in Dongducheon and Uijeongbu to less-populated areas. One important factor for
both countries to consider is that the success of planned force realignment may be affected by how the local
public responds to the expansion of existing U.S. bases, which will absorb those being redeployed.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
48/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                      A2: ALLIANCE – ANTI-AMERICANISM TURN
Anti-Americanism destroys the alliance
Lee 2005 – Dept. of political science, Korea University (Nae-Young, ―Changing South Korean Public Opinion
on the US and the ROK- US Alliance.‖ Workshop on ―America in Question: Korean Democracy and the
Challenge of Non-Proliferation on the Peninsula,‖ May 10-11, 2005, Seoul Korea.) CMR

Moreover, a significant erosion of public support for the alliance is considered to further create obstacles for
the alliance. The recent wave of anti-Americanism in South Korea has produced a rift in the ROK-U.S.
alliance.2 Anti-Americanism in Korea has suddenly gained visibility since the ‗candle light protests‘ of
November and December 2002 in Seoul. The surge of anti-Americanism in December 2002 was qualitatively
different in size and duration from previous incidents that manifested the anti-American sentiment. It was by
far, the largest anti-American demonstration ever to be held in South Korea. As anti-Americanism was on the
increase in South Korea, tensions were also rising on the Korean peninsula mainly because North Korea
declared it would renew its nuclear weapons program. In the past, there had been a general pattern of
increased public support for the ROK-U.S. alliance whenever a threat to national security arose. In December
2002, anti-Americanism continued to grow regardless of the nuclear standoff with North Korea.
Many journalists, both in South Korea and the United States, reported that rising anti-Americanism despite
increasing security threats from North Korea inflicted major damage on the ROK-U.S. alliance. They argued
that anti-Americanism in South Korea reflect a negative image of South Korea to the American public and U.S.
government, and could lead to negative consequences such as the withdrawal of the USFK.3
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
49/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                      A2: ALLIANCE – ANTI-AMERICANISM NOW
Anti-Americanism abounds in Korea – multiple reasons
Singh and Il-Young, 03 - senior research fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul and
president of the Indo-Korean Policy Forum [2003, Lakhvinder Singh and Il-Young Kim , ―Time to Keep Going:
The Role and Structure of U.S. Forces in a Unified Korea,‖ Pacific Focus, Volume 18 Issue 1, Pages 65 – 87,
Center for International Studies, Inha University]

As within the U.S., a very intense debate is also going on inside Korea about the future role of the U.S. in both
the re-unification
process and the post-unified Korea. The recent killing of two middle school teen-age girls by an American
military vehicle sparked countrywide protest in South Korea. Once again it brought to the surface the
underlying and everpresent anti-American feelings amongst the Korean people. Earlier, a training accident had
also sparked a similar country-wide protest.8 While many South Koreans still believe that the 37,000 American
troops stationed in their country is the best deterrent against an invasion by North Korea, their presence in the
country is becoming increasingly controversial with incidents like these.
General impressions of U.S. arrogance and a sense of political and economic domination by the United States
throughout their alliance have also led to a degree of resentment and even humiliation among some in Korean
society. Specific incidents such as U.S. unilateral actions during the nuclear crisis of 1994, support for "anti-
democratic" ROK regimes during the Cold War, and George W. Bush's "axis of evil" comment about North
Korea in early 2002, have fed such perceptions. Issues surrounding U.S. bases, including noise and environ-
mental pollution, Yongsan base's location in midtown Seoul, and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), have
rankled Korean pride, and offended notions of sovereignty. U.S. policies toward the peninsula are viewed in
some circles as favoring American rather than Korean interests, in which the United States benefits more from
the relationship than does Korea.
To a much lesser degree, so called "ideological anti-Americanism" has also existed in South Korea among a
small minority of urban leftists and extremists from the academia, the press, labor unions, and churches. In the
1980s and 1990s these groups openly displayed their anger towards the United States through violent street
protests with demands often identical to those of North Korea. They have failed to penetrate the general public
in South Korea, however, and their activities have diminished in recent years following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and the evident failure of the DPRK system over the last decade.9
Koreans also have historical reasons to be ambivalent about America. The U.S. acquiesced to Japan's conquest
of Korea in exchange for Japan's consent to the occupation of the Philippines. American bureaucrats cut Korea
in half in 1945 without consulting the Koreans. U.S. forces made no great effort to apprehend the Japanese
guilty of war crimes against Koreans while war criminals in Europe were punished ruthlessly. Moreover,
because Koreans could not free themselves from the Japanese occupation, the United States unwittingly
wounded Korean pride by defeating Japan while Koreans stood on the sidelines. In 1953, the United States
unilaterally signed an armistice that prolonged the division of Korea despite the opposition of President
Syngman Rhee. In addition, American cultural influence has not necessarily pleased all Koreans, who may not
think that American mores, films and fast food are what young Koreans need. Others blame the United States
for the Kwangju incident, when ROK army troops killed civilians in that city.10 The forced liberalization of
Korea's trade and investment regime, spearheaded by the United States, is also distasteful to some, especially
those who fear that American imports and investors endanger their jobs and livelihoods.
Thus, a host of complex issues are responsible for the anti-American phenomena in Korea. Put together, they
mostly reflect a feeling that many Koreans have that their country is not given the degree of respect that
Americans give to their other hosts in Asia and Europe. For example, they resent that in the past few years
whenever American soldiers have committed rape or certain other crimes in Japan, apologies have come
directly from the top, personally from the U.S. presidents. Meanwhile, rapes and murders committed by

[CONTINUED]
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                        Michigan Institutes ‘10
50/56                                                                                     7 Week Juniors

                      A2: ALLIANCE – ANTI-AMERICANISM NOW
[CONTINUED]

American soldiers in South Korea have received little attention from the American government. They also
believe that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that governs American troops in the country is the most
unequal among all the U.S. allies with whom they have signed a similar agreement. They are clamoring for
equal partnership with the U.S. and are asking for a comprehensive review of the relationship between the two
countries.11
If this anti-American sentiment is allowed to fester, it may damage the Korean-American Alliance beyond
repairs. Any rift between these two allies will certainly be exploited by North Korea in an effort to gain an
advantage over its two capitalist enemies.
Today, in Northeast Asia, there are some strong forces at work which favor the removal of American forces
from the region. Many Koreans may see no need for a U.S.-Korea alliance after Korean unification and might
wish to rid the country of American bases and soldiers once the country is unified. They may also see the
American presence as a hindrance to the growth of their relations with China, which is becoming one of Korea's
largest trading partners. It could also lead to similar thinking in Japanese minds that the end of the North
Korean menace will remove any remaining rationale for the presence of American bases in their country. China
is also likely to see the unification of Korea as an opportunity to push for greater Chinese influence on the
entire peninsula and will definitely support the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea.

Anti-americanism and tensions now
Ryoo, 04 – (Winter 2004, Jae-Kap Ryoo, Kyonggi University, ―U.S.-Korea Security Alliance in Transition: A
ROK Perspective,‖ International Journal of Korean Studies, Fall/Winter 2004, Vol. IIX, No. 1 )

The Anti-Americanism movement has flared up recently in a call for greater democratization since the
Kwangju incident of 1980s. Recently, it has been stimulated under Kim Dae-jung government‘s ―sunshine
policy‖ toward North Korea. The leftist ideological groups have intensified anti-Americanism in their effective
organization and mobilization of the younger generations by combining calls for Korean democratization with
nationalism. Most recently, a tragic traffic accidents in which two teenage girls were killed by a U.S. armored
vehicle on June 13, 2002, while on routine military exercise, gave great momentum to the rapidly expanding
anti-American feelings, and more importantly and decisively, contributed to Roh Moo-hyun's victory in the
presidential election of December 19, 2003. The ideological appeal has been effective with desperate students
and workers. Today this mood has been integrated with ―populist nationalism,‖ particularly since the World
Cup Soccer Game in 2001 and the candlelight protest movement. Therefore, the problem at this time is that
ideological anti-Americanism, though small in numbers, seeks to make coalitions with others holding anti-
American feelings or sentiments. The result is the growth of ―organized anti- Americanism.13
It‘s helpful in understanding Korean attitudes and perspectives regarding the ROK-U.S. alliance to examine
the results of several opinion polls and surveys conducted during the past and current year. The various polls
reveal strong anti-American sentiments. According to a survey conducted by Research & Research in January
2004, 39 percent of the South Korean people (58% of those in their 20s) answered that the most threatening
state to Korean security was the United States. Only 33% cited North Korea, and 20% of those in their 20s
pointed to North Korea). This result of the poll is very shocking when it is comparing with a 1993 Gallup
Korea Poll which showed an opposite trend: 44% saw North Korea as the clearest threat with 15%, Japan; 4%,
China,; and 1%, the United States.14
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                          Michigan Institutes ‘10
51/56                                                                                       7 Week Juniors

                            A2: DETERRENCE – TRIPWIRE N/U
Their trip wire arguments are non-unique because of troop movements south of the Han river
Wallace 4 – Colonel of the US army (Joseph K., 5/3, ―TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

What began in 1999, as a quality of life initiative would become, under the Bush Administration, a shift in
military strategy and the method of deterrence under the context of the GWOT. In June of 2003, the Secretary
of Defense modified the LPP and declared that, in addition to the elements described in the LPP regarding base
closures and return of training areas, that at an undetermined date all U.S. Forces would be withdrawn south of
the Han River.9 Additionally he formed a working group to review the number of troops in the ROK and their
capability with the goal of possibly reducing our troop levels. This addition is a significant change in the ROK
public‘s perception of our military strategy and interpretation of deterrence on the Korean peninsula. No
longer would U.S. forces be automatically involved in a conventional attack by the DPRK. The movement of
U.S. forces south of the Han River effectively puts them out of range of all DPRK conventional artillery strikes.
To many Koreans this eliminated what has become known as the ―Trip Wire‖ effect of automatic involvement
of U.S. forces under any attack by the DPRK.10 The trip wire effect to Koreans is a tangible and irrefutable
affirmation of America‘s commitment. South Koreans perceive that U.S. forces will transform from their
original purpose of DPRK deterrence to a more regional and power projection stance in East Asia. This new
positioning of U.S. forces is destabilizing and is perceived as threatening by both North and South Korea.

Tripwire effect is outdated – wars don’t start with frontal assaults – missile strikes serve the
same deterrent function
Nam 2006 -- Associate Professor of Political Science at Inha Uni- versity, Incheon, South Korea (Chang-hee,
Asian Survey, Vol. 46, Issue 4, pp. 615–631 ―RELOCATING THE U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA: Strained
Alliance, Emerging Partnership in the Changing Defense Posture.‖
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic199080.files/Readings_for_November_6_/Nam.pdf) CMR

Another concern is that the proposed realignment would inevitably compromise the ―tripwire‖ role
traditionally played by the U.S. division. However, advances in modern warfare have downgraded this function.
The need to deploy troops forward along the DMZ is less compelling than it was during the Korean War:
interstate wars today generally begin not with frontal assaults but with bombers and long-range precision-
guided missiles that attack strategic centers and command and control systems in the depths of enemy
territory.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
52/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                            A2: DETERRENCE – TRIPWIRE N/U
Disad is non-unique because of the shift—this is especially true if they win their ground forces
key arguments
Wallace 4 – Colonel of the US army (Joseph K., 5/3, ―TRANSFORMING DETERRENCE ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423758&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Both speeches addressed a continued commitment to deterrence, but Secretary Rumsfeld plainly alludes to the
new environment. These remarks have different meanings to Americans focused on the GWOT and to Koreans
with 7,000 artillery tubes arrayed on their border with the North. To a Korean audience, this is the first step
toward a shift in American focus away from deterrence and confirmation that the ROK is to become another
military power projection platform with an eye towards future threats to stability in the region. In early 2003,
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld initiated a worldwide review of overseas permanent U.S. military deployments
with the goal of reduced presence with a more mobile and flexible force. Repositioning troops in the ROK sends
a strong signal that they are available and destined for deployment elsewhere in the region, potentially to
such GWOT hotspots as Malaysia or the Philippines.20 Former U.S. Commander in Korea, General Gary Luck,
had estimated that a conventional attack by the DPRK would cost one trillion dollars in economic damage and
over one million civilian and military casualties.21 To the older and more conservative Koreans the
cost of a delayed American ground force response, or one that involved solely strategic air and
missile forces, is frightening. In the fall of 2003, in the midst of a nationwide emotional political debate,
the South Korean media widely reported on rumors that the U.S. was threatening the redeployment of the
Korea based Second Infantry Division if Korea did not support Operation Iraqi Freedom with the deployment
of a Korean infantry division.22 Although U.S. commanders quickly denied this story, its extensive publication
in Korean media demonstrated how wary the public is of American intentions. To the Korean public, this was a
further example of the United States prioritizing the GWOT and regional stability ahead of deterring war on the
Korean peninsula. Both the U.S. and ROK officials agree the alliance must evolve. Despite repeated assurances
by senior American officials of our commitment to deterrence, our actions of moving troops farther south send
a very different message. South Korea remains one of our strongest allies and the majority of South
Koreans and President Roh‘s administration support continued U.S. military presence.23 Increasing South
Korean nationalism and pride in their economic and social achievements are manifesting in the younger
Korean peoples‘ demand for an equal partnership with the U.S. The U.S. must recognize this and demonstrate
that our commitment to peace on the peninsula is not in conflict with our current policy towards the DPRK
nuclear proliferation. The U.S. must show that our movement of troops south of the Han and our GWOT
strategy does not pose a threat to maintaining peace in Korea or put their ―Sunshine Policy‖ of engagement at
risk. We also must weigh the wisdom of moving troops further south out of harms way if we cannot effectively
convince our allies of our commitment. Statements made on 19 October 2003 by both President Bush and
Secretary Powell on the television show ―Meet the Press‖ is a hopeful indication. President Bush stated, that in
coordination with our Allies, the U.S. would be willing to state in a written document (not a Treaty) that the
U.S. would not preemptively strike North Korea but would continue negotiations towards a diplomatic
solution. By clearly addressing both North Korea‘s and South Korea‘s greatest concern, the possibilities of a
peaceful solution to the current crisis of DPRK nuclear proliferation are strengthened. Most importantly, it
would set the conditions to move beyond the proliferation issue and the context of the GWOT and evolve the
U.S.- Korean alliance in ways that will support the realignment of U.S. military forces in Korea and the long-
term regional stability in East Asia.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                            Michigan Institutes ‘10
53/56                                                                                         7 Week Juniors

                  A2: DETERRENCE – UMBRELLA SOLVES PROLIF
Nuclear umbrella solves prolif
Kim 6 - M.D.. Education. M.D., John Hopkins University; B.S., Duke University (Stephen J., ―ALTERNATIVE
PROLIFERATION AND ALLIANCE FUTURES IN EAST ASIA‖, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA451273&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

In light of our deep concern about proliferation, we should not be so hasty in revising or replacing these two
key alliance treaties. In short, if the United States continues to provide a nuclear umbrella for the defense of
Japan and South Korea, then the two nations will have a difficult justification for going nuclear.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                         Michigan Institutes ‘10
54/56                                                                                      7 Week Juniors

                     ALLIANCE UNDERMINES ROK SOFT POWER
Security alliance decks ROK soft power and forces wars – drawn into US wars
Bandow 7/14 -- senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, July 14, 2010, ―The
U.S.-South Korea Alliance Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous.” Online PDF) CMR

The unhealthy patron-client relationship that has developed has another insidious impact on the South. The
ROK risks being drawn into conflicts caused by the United States—such as the Clinton administration‘s threat
to attack North Korea in order to destroy the latter‘s nuclear program, the Bush administration‘s pressure for
assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a future administration‘s possible desire to use the ROK as a base of
operations against other nations, most likely China.12 Today Seoul faces painful humiliation at best and
destructive war at worst as a result of decisions made by the U.S. government.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                           Michigan Institutes ‘10
55/56                                                                                        7 Week Juniors

                          WITHDRAWAL => ROK MODERNIZATION
US forces are outdated – withdrawal forces ROK modernization that easily trumps the DPRK in
any conflict
Bandow 7/14 -- senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, July 14, 2010, ―The
U.S.-South Korea Alliance Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous.” Online PDF) CMR

Seoul‘s need for a U.S. security guarantee long ago disappeared. South Korea has upwards of 40 times the GDP
of the North. The ROK also has a vast technological edge, twice the population, and a clearly superior
international position.
Pyongyang is left with only the People‘s Republic of China as a serious ally, and even the PRC is unlikely to
intervene in any conflict now, in contrast to 1950. The ties between the PRC and South Korea have grown at an
extraordinary rate. Today 50 times as many South Korean as North Korean stu-dents are studying in China.
Chinese trade with the South is roughly 70 times the amount of that with the North.18
The DPRK does retain a numerical military edge in personnel and such weapons as tanks and artillery. This
advantage is more menacing in appearance, however, than reality. Notes Larry Niksch, recently retired from
the Congressional Research Service, ―exaggerating the North Korean military threat to South Korea‖ is a
problem in both the United States and the ROK.19
In fact, the South, acting on the defense in favorable terrain, likely could defend itself today—especially if it
boosted its defense capabilities modestly in some key areas.20 The North enjoys some areas of superiority, but,
writes Niksch, it is unlikely ―that these asymmetric capabilities compensate North Korea for the substantial
deterioration of its conventional military forces since the early 1990s—which went largely unacknowledged
until the middle 2000s.‖21
In fact, Seoul‘s military is better equipped and better trained; it rests upon a far stronger industrial and larger
population base. Moreover, the South is capable of spending as much as is necessary to overmatch Pyongyang.
The ROK doesn‘t do so because it doesn‘t have to, since it can rely upon American defense subsidies.22
Some analysts contend that Pyongyang has adjusted its military tactics to fit its force inferiority. For instance,
the North might hope to seize Seoul, located just south of the DMZ, and then negotiate a ceasefire.23 No doubt
South Korea should prepare for such a contingency. But, again, the responsibility for defending Seoul lies with
the ROK, not the United States. The South should develop and deploy the forces and weapons necessary to
thwart such an attempt.
Korea Aff & Neg Updates v3.0                                                        Michigan Institutes ‘10
56/56                                                                                     7 Week Juniors

                        WITHDRAWAL => DENUCLEARIZATION
Withdrawal solves DPRK denuclearization – USFK are nuclear hostages
Bandow 7/14 -- senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing, July 14, 2010, ―The
U.S.-South Korea Alliance Outdated, Unnecessary, and Dangerous.” Online PDF) CMR

Washington still has an interest in de- nuclearizing the Korean peninsula, of course. But the presence of U.S.
conventional forces only complicates an effort already facing extraordinary obstacles. The deployment provides
Kim Jong-il with thousands of convenient American nuclear hostages. It is far better for Washington to
promote nonproliferation in the region from a distance and with greater emphasis on the roles of South Korea,
Japan, and especially China.15

				
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