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COPYRIGHT USAGE

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									                                 COPYRIGHT / USAGE
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..   A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO COURTHOUSE SECURITY
                            I"
     COURTHOUSE REORGANIZATION" RENOVATION PR OGRAM'   C ENTRE STREET SUITE 122   NEW YO R K 10013
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T.,. Counhou .. A"'rv-n1udon and Renovet,on Pragl'Bln -..rnes fun 'apO",ltllIIty tne view. end ffndl,,1P con~.lned In ml,
..riel 0' monogr.pha. Thtl ..,1. . . . not neceaadlv rep'_", the viftVS of plrth::lpetlnll or(lllnizalionl, 'ncludinll those whl .. h
fOllow: T .... l _ Enlo,c.."."" A"'"ance AdmInistration end tria N"'onl' Innlwta of L_ EnforcemenT and Crimi ..", Justlee,
U.S. Depanmanl of Junlctl; Tho Roekef .. n., a,alM", Fun.,: Th. Municipal Services Adml"lnratlon of the City of N.... York;The
Pan of New York AuthoritY: The ApP41itlta 01,';110"5, Firn end SKond Judicia' D~rtm.nu, end the New York County c;ouru.                 -
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I   A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO COURTHOUSE SECURITY

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                TABLE OF CONTENTS

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                Program Background    ..... ...... .. .........................          i
I               What is Courthouse    Security? .......................... ..            2
                Security Problems in Various Courts ..•..•••......••....• 4
                A Security Systems Concept .•......••.•....•.•.....••..•. 13
                Comprehensive Analaysis .. . ............... . ............... 24
                Application of Security     ~1easures   ...••.... • ....•...•..... 29
                Concludin~   Examples •••••. . •...••..• .••. .•••.••••••• • •••• 44
                Tables •..........•.•• . .•••..•......•..•..•••..•.•..•.•.• 51




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    COURTHOUSE AI!:OAGANIZATION .. RENOVATION PROGRAM   111 CENTRE STREET SUITE.22   NEW YORK 10013


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    PROGRAM BACKGROUND
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I   The Courthouse Reorganization and Renovation Program, sponsored by
    the Appellate Divisions. First and Second Judicial Departments, State

I   of New York, was conceived early in 1970 to develop alternative solu-
    tions for critical space and manpower requirements through the year
    2000 for structures within and related to the urban court complex of
I   New York City1s Foley Square. The Program, serving beyond Foley Square
    as a demonstration project with nationwide implications, has resulted
I   in imaginative, low-cost. space use concepts designed to improve the
    efficiency of court administration. It is hoped, that continuing
I   facility improvements based on these concepts will bring the adminis-
    tration of justice closer to its ideal.
         The Program was funded to the end of   ~Iarch.   1972, by the U.S. De-
    partment of Justice through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
    tion (LEAA).   Additional project support has been provided by the
    Rockefeller Brothers Fund and by the   ~~nicipal   Services Administration
    of the City of New York.   The Appellate Divisions and the various courts
    under their jurisdiction provided necessary grantee contributions.
    The Port of New York Authority has contributed substantially to man-
    power planning studies. A supplementary LEAA grant made to the pro-
    ject in April, 1971, has funded a courthouse security study. lhlder
I   terms of the original grant, the program staff is preparing a handbook
    on courthouse planning, reorganization and renovation for national

I   distribution to administrators , architects and planners at the con-
    clusion of the project. The handbook, containing information gathered
    from more than thirty states. will report findings of both the space
I   management and security studies.

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I        Dr. ).tichael Wong, Director of the Courthouse Reorganization and
    Renovation Program, is known widely for his contributions to court-

I   house and la...'-enforccment facilities planning, design and r enovation.
         Dr. Wong was Associate Director of the Court          Facilit~es   Study at

I   the University of   ~tich igan,   1968- 1970 .   Undertaken to establish mini-
    mwn standards for court facilities, this study was sponsored by the
    American Bar Association and the American Institute of Architects.
I        A registered architect from Australia, Dr. Nong holds a Ph.D.
    in Architectural Science and degrees in Architecture and Urban Plan-
I   ning.


I        This series of monographs has been prepared primarily for court
    administrators involved in facility design and renovation projects.

I   It is felt, however, that architects, engineers and others expecting
    to embark on such an undertaking wi 11 benefit from much of the infor·

I   mation contained in the series.
    following topics:
                                            Included in the monograph are the



I        Space t-lanagement Concepts and Applications
         Space f.lanagement t-lethodology

I        Space Standards and Guidelines
         t-mnpower Projection and Planning

I        A Systems Approach to Courthouse Security
         Space ~lanagement and Courthouse Security
         A Comprehensive Information Communication Sys tem
I        Program Administration and Cost Planning


I        General editor for th e se ries is Peter Inserra of the program s taff.
         Comment and criticism on the content and format of the monographs

I   is welcome and will assist the program staff in data updating before
    preparing the final draft of the handbook. Letters should be directed
    to Dr. Michael Wong. Director. Courthouse Reorganization and Renovation
I   Program, Suite 922, III Centre Street, New York, New York 10013.


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    SECURITY IN A COURTHOUSE is an intangible quality most easily de-
I   fined by its breaches: where security is lacking, deficiencies in
    the courthouse are obvious, but where security is good, specific

I   factors can be attributed only with difficulty.    Thus the measure
    of poor security becomes the number and seriousness of incidents

I   -- but the measure of "perfect" security is impossible by those
    means.


I            Despite the imperfections of this definition. a courthouse
    can be designed, operated and administered for the security function
    just as it can for any other function, and guides to good security
I   can be devised. Based on simple principles observed in courthouses
    currently in use, these guides can serve as readily to analyze se-
I   curity effectiveness within existing buildings as to aid in design-
    ing for security in new structures.*

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    • See companion monograph in this series describing the design of
I     security systems for new structures. "Space Management and Court-
      house Security."


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         This monograph draws heavil y on interim results of a contin-
I   uing study of security in the nation's courthouses. an aspect of
    the Courthouse Reorganizati on and Renovation Program conducted
I   from August 1970 through March 1972 in New York City.   Within the
    scope of the study are criminal, civil, sur ro gate's and family
I   courts encompassing functions found in nearly every court in metro-
    politan jurisdictions and some in non-urban areas. The courts

I   studied form an empirical base for a security analysis, the initial
    findings of which are presented in this monogTaph. From these

I   findings. prinCiples and practices of courthouse security design
    have been abstracted for use as guidelin es .
         Concerned specifically with measures of an architectural,
I   technological and operational nature designed to increase court -
    house security, this monograph treats the security function as a
I   system.   What is examined here are interactions between security
    measures, the effects of these measures on other courthouse processes

I   and their propriety. Drawn from a broad cross-section. the guide-
    lines which follow should be free of constraints peculiar t o any
    one court system. Indeed, they should be applicable to many other
    kinds of facilities.
         Clearly, th e specific functions leading to courthouse security
    derive from the goal of better judicial administration. A guide to
    security should provide adminis trator s with useful information to
    improve faciliti es and operations. Drawn from a broad range of
    applications, these guide l ines can be evaluated in accordance with
I   local conditions in arriving at an optimum system.


I   WHAT IS COURTHOUSE SECURITY?


I   In the courthouse, security encompasses deterrence , detection, and
    limitation of damage. Effective security des i gn aims essentially

I   to deter potential threat s to the safety of persons and facilities


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    within the courthouse.     The more effective the deterrence. the lOlo'er
I   the incidence of security problems.        Where deterrence fails -- and
    it will, at least when persons are intent on causing trouble -- it
I   remains for security design to detect threats rapidly and to sig-
    nal the attention of those who can take appropriate action. Ifa
I   bomb were smuggled into a courthouse. the earlier it can he de-
    tected, the more safely the incident can he handled.            Finally,

I   security design seeks to limit damage that may be caused by action
    followin g a threat.    A building with a bomh emplaced, evacuated

I   rapidly, safely and orderly without prisoner escape exemplifies
    damage limitati on .
            One is tempted to envision the fully secure court building as
I   a kind of fortress, bristling with armed guards and all but inaccess-
    ible to the public.     But such a theme is inappropriate to the court-
I   house -- inappropriate to it as the place where justice             is dispensed
    freely and openly. inappropriate to it as a repository         o~   public

I   records -- and most certainly, inappropriate in r e lation to the pre-
    sumption of innocence embodied in our criminal l aw .       A rational basis

I   for comparison of security measures lies within the context of the
    system of judicial administration.
            A strong threat to courthouse security is inherent. in the broad-
I   est sense. among those who harhor      disrc~ard   or contempt for the law
    and its instruments. Threats of this kind. whether ri sing f rom
I   groups or individuals. may take the form of a well-organized. planned
    action or a more spontaneous personal reaction.          A threat may contem-
I   plate action related to a purpose within a courthouse (i.e .• an es-
    cape;     an intimidation of judp,e.   prisoner~   or jury; revenge), or it

I   may embody broader social or political implications (i.e . • a bomh
    threat against "the establishment").        A threat may he directed at a

I   specific courthouse situation (an obstreperous witness, a hullying
    attorney) . or at a simple criminal goa l (theft of personal property
    or office equipment), Whatever the purpose of such threats, counter-
I   actin g securit y measures, unl ess integrated with a courthouse-wide


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I   effort to engender respect for the processes of justice, almost
    certainly will be self-defeating,
         Most security measures discussed here assume the ri ght of
I   certain persons to enter and have use of certain areas of the
    courthouse at certain times (and the denial of that right to
I   others).     Implicit, therefore, in this examination of courthouse
    security is the assumption that the courts have the ri ght and sole
I   authority to determine, implement and enforce their own security
    measures.

I       Aspects of security discussed in this monograph relate di-
    rectly to functions of criminal and civil courthouses , as follows:

I              Security of participants in courthouse processes (judge,
               jury, attorneys, parti es , prisoners, witnesses, court
               staff) from threat by other participants or the public.
I              Security of the puhlic in courthouse processes from
               threat by participants or other members of the public.
I              Security of public areas of courthouses from abuse by any
               persons.
               Security of non-public areas of the courthouse from entry
               by unauthorized persons.
               Security of courthouse records against loss, theft, and
               damage while in short- or lon g-term storage or transit.
               Security of all persons and facilities during emergencies.



I   SECURITY PROBLEMS IN VARIOUS COURTS



I   The kinds of proceedings t aking pl ace within a courthouse are the
    major determinant of the kinds of security problems that can be ex-
    pected. The common division into courts of li~ited, general, and
I   appellate ju'!'"'i~dictions is only partially appropriate;l a more


I   1. American Bar Association, "~Iodel State ' Judicial Article," (1962).


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I   useful classification is criminal, civil, and family courts. In
    the main. these courts differ in specific functions of units and
    departments wi t hin units , administrative procedures, kinds of hu-
I   man problems handled, relati onships between parties, space use and
    impact of penalty. It is to be expected, then, that each of th ese
I   courts will have some unique securit y problems. In defining them,
    it is necessary to analyze the operation and functions of each

I   court •


I   CRIMINAL COURTS

    Although procedures may differ in detail around the country,

I   me tropolit an criminal courts can be describ ed as follows:

    COURTS OF FIRST APPEARANCE

I   The courtroom where an arrested or summoned person first appears
    for a hearing. presentment or arraignment is one of great activity.
I   Complainants, police officers, sheriffs or court officers. relatives
    and friends of defendants, prosecuting attorneys. defense attorneys,
I   prison guards, spec tat ors , and some defendants all may be in th e
    courtroom at one time. t-1any arrive when court opens I as directed,

I   and wait for as long as it takes to hav e called the case in which
    the y are involved . The shee r number of persons present in or near

I   one courtroom represents a security problem.
         Defendants who are brought into court after having been taken
    into custody usuall y are held in police and court detention f aci l-
    ities, or in jail.     Oth ers are appearing in answer to summonses.
    In either si tuation, th e defendant , when his case is called, is es -
    corted to the bench to confront hi s accuser and to have determined
    his immediate future     to be held or released. If he is held,
    bail is usually set , or he may plead to the ori gi nal char ge or to
    a les ser one, and possihl y receive sentence.
         Many of those ca ll ed into court are confused about where and
    when to appear and how to behave in and near the courtroom .     In a

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I   first appearance court, cases follow one another rapidly, formal
    legal phrases are spoken in rapid monotone to satisfy requirements
    of protecting the accused, and court officers give frequent loud
I   order s t o be seated and t o he quiet. In metropolitan areas. where
    not everyone speaks or understands English readily. or 'at all.
I   interpreters and mul ti-lingual signs may be needed',   When defense
    attorneys are present, hurri ed whispered conferences are held with

I   clients and with the prosecution.   Representatives of legal aid
    and social service agencies move through the court calling out

I   names of various persons. Clerks walk in and out of the courtroom.
    Arresting officers enter and leave the courtroom, moving between it
    and the detention pen or other part s of the courthouse. Bailiffs
I   call loudly for defendants and officers to get ready, and bail
    bondsmen come in to be sworn. But at the center of all this activ-
I   ity, there is being conducted only one hearing involving only a
    small number of those present .
I        At the first appearance, a common difficulty is a defend-
    ant's emotional state . particularly in relation to others in court.

I   Remanded prisoners may wish to say goodbye to family, turn over
    valuables for safekeeping . instruct associates on last-minute per-

I   sonal matters, or give what money they have to wives or others.
    Rut the defendant is being rushed back into custody and must clear
    the bench area for the next case on a busy calendar.     It is only a
I   rare courtroom that has faci lities and personnel adequate for the se
    "last-chance" meetings.   In many courtrooms, it is not unusual for
I   a disturbance to follow the denial or abruptness of such meetings .
         One increasingly prevalent condition arises in the arraignment
I   of one or more similarly charged defendants who are the subject of
    intense social or political interest. Large groups of supporters

I   usually attend the proceedings , often with th e aim of influencing
    or disruptin ~ the court. Common tactics in or near th e courtroom

I   are shoutin g, s in ~in~, hissing, booing, standing and commentin~
    loudly. Whether th ese tactics help defendants, they undoubtedly

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    disrupt the orderly flow of cases and influence          p roc ecdi n ~s.     Court
I   appearances are delayed for defendants calendared l ater and                subse~

    quent hearin gs become even more hurried.
I             Tension can build up in th e presence of r ea l or assumed dangers
    inherent in any large group, especiall y one th at is unrul y.               Perilous

I   to safety of participants and to admi ni s tration of justic e, t ension
    can be reduced by emp loying a sufficient number of court officers

I   trained for crowd cont r ol, equipped with appropriate (non- l ethal)
    weapons and communications . and deployed around the courtroom.                 But
    assignin g officers to other duties and courts affects the court pro-
I   cesses they leave.
              Cases not disposed of at first appearance proceed to hearings
I   and, for an es timat ed 5\, to trial. Hearin gs are held in grand jury
    spaces and in courtrooms .
I   CRIMINAL TRIAL COURTS



I   Compared to an arraignment court, a criminal trial court is calmer,
    even for f e lony cases.       Mos t often nearly empt y of spectators with

I   onl y one case
    atmosphere .
                       bein~   heard, the courtroom takes on a reasoned judicia l


              Thi s characterization does not dismiss the fact that attorneys
    may argue f orcefull y and dramatically or that witnesses may vilify
    a defendant' s motives . character. and habi t s.       As the tri a l proceeds.
    a defendant may      ~ecome   desperate and seek to escape, or harm a wit-
    ness or co-defendant .        Or he may attempt to have someone act in his
    behalf to free him or take r evenge upon the judp,e or pros ecutin p,
    attorney.       A defendant may act on impulse or engage in premedi t ated

I   behavior calculated to prejudice th e court in hi s favor. 2
    may act out th eir hostilities to an att orney .
                                                                            Witnesses
                                                            A spectator may direct

I   some uncontrollabl e outburst        a~ainst   a tTial participant.
    definition, a crimina l trial pits individuals against each other and
                                                                                Al most by



I   2.   n. Walsh, "Gorilla Cowed His Keepers," Life, Vol. 70, No.3,
         pp. 42-48, June 25, 19 71, New York , N.Y:----
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I   society and evokes deep emotions of fear and hate.       An effective
    criminal trial court must be designed to cope with these conditions.
         Hearings and trials of an individual defendant or a group in
I   cases of strong sociological or po liti cal overtones may draw wide
    attention because of their notoriety, the sheer number of defendants
I   and. typically. a    lar~e   number of spectators. Press coverage, de-
    fense and prosecution tactics       and the background issues often

I   heighten emotional intensity.       As the number of defendants increases,
    and with it the number of attorneys and court officers, space in

I   courtrooms and ancillary spaces becomes strained, compounding the
    security factor. It is doubtful whether many courtrooms or court-

I   houses have been designed for multi-defendant trials; improvised
    operations and space use are typical solutions for such proceedings .
    Security difficulties have occurred -- notorious ly in California's
I   Marin County Courthouse in August, 1970 -- while other mul ti-defend-
    ant trials have Rone successfully to conclusion and jury verdicts
I   have been rendered without incident. Unquestionably, special se-
    curity measures are necessary, but debate is widespread about wh at

I   form they should take -- a question ' addressed in a later section of
    this monograph.

I        Offices of probation, public defense attorneys and prosecuting
    attorneys involve some contact between defendants, courthouse staff,
    and the public.     Prisoners and defendants on bailor parole some-
I   times are brought to probation offices for interviews or physical
    and mental examinations. Cash or checks for restitution payments
I   may be accepted and held for deposit. Family or friends of dedend-
    ants who come for interviews with probation officers require waiting
I   and reception spaces. Many probation offices remain open at night
    for the benefit of working clients. Record rooms, where storage and

I   is suance can be controlled, usually occupy extensive space (unless
    modern microfilming has been implemented).

I        The prevalent practice of public defense attorneys having to
    conduct initial interviews with defendants in courthouse detention

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    cells is considered unsatisfactory for procedural and security
I   reasons.   If defendants are bailed or paroled, then interviews
    may tak e place preferably in legal aid offices, or in corridors,
I   lobbys, or wherever space can he found.     On a typical day. many
    persons visit the offices of puhlic defense attorneys in 'search of
I   information or assistance.   ~taff   interviewed in the'se l ega l agencies
    express strong opinions on the need for courthouse and courtroom in·

I   tcrview spaces and protected office spaces to ward against those hent
    on crimes such as larceny.

I        Identi fication procedures, including lineups, routinely are con-
    ducted in prosecutinr. attorneys' office spaces, where witnesses and
    complainants may be y:resent with defendants or suspect s. l\'itness
I   interviews a l so may take place in these spaces. Efforts may be made
    to limit public access because private information is on record there
I   and because the nature of the work is sensitive to interference.


I   FAMILY COURTS

    The kinds of persons in th e family court and their reasons for heing

I   there are unique, as are the courtrooms and related spaces, and the
    processes taking place within them. The distinguishing characteris-

I   tic here in comparison to a criminal court is the inclusion of ju-
    veniles in most cases. whether as victims (of ne glec~) or accused
    (of delinquency).   Cases also involve disputes between family mem-
I   bers and include matri~onial matters. The presence of young children,
    typically l ess than ~ 6 years old,* throughout th e courthouse mandates
I   special court procedures, trial practices, courtroom design and de-
    tention and supervision operations.
         The trend in family courts is toward conci li ation. preservation
    of the family unit and treatment of underlying familial difficulties .


    • In New York. boys to 16 and girls to 17 are treated as juveniles in
      Family Court, while older youths to age 19 are eligible for youth-
      ful offender treatment in the Criminal Courts.
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    As a consequence, operations are   hein~   consolidated and extensive
I   use is being made of pre-trial probation and counseling by private
    social service agencies.
I        Juvenile matters and many others comin~ to trial in a family
    court normal l y are conducted without juries and in private before
I   a judge.   As a rule, neith er party retains an attorney. but it is
    not unusual for hoth parties to be represented by public or assigned

I   counsel. Courtrooms, in contrast to those typically used for crim-
    inal procedures, often are smaller and mo r e informal in layout and

I   finishes, with less separati on between parti cipants (including th e
    judge).
         At a time when many jurisdictions are experiencing a peak age
I   of IS years for major property crimes.
                                           3
                                             the function of the fa mily
    court and its special security problems are increasing in signifi-
I   cance .
         Juveniles in difficulty with th e law. who also may be unst ab le.
I   may be prone to violence and escape.   Juvenile victims. rather than
    parties, need protection and insulation from general courthouse

I   atmosphere.   Support cases between cohabitants can open deep wells
    of bitter recrimination and frustration which, in turn. can lead t o

I   verbal and physical disputes in th e courtroom and near it.
         Detention f aciliti es in a cri~inal courthouse include intake
    areas and feeder pens adjacent to the courts. For the treatment of
    juveniles. however. the detention s etting is much more informal.
    probably without hars or ot her obvious trappings of imprisonment.
    Supervision may be by add t counsellors in everyday dress or proba-
    tion officers, rather th an uniformed guards. Family court activities
    do not require extensive adult detention facil ities or the isolation
    of defendan ts; on the contrary, much activity takes place with a ll
    parties present in probation interview offices or standing together



I   3. "Task Force Report: Assessment of Crime . President I s Commission
       on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice," Washington. D.C. 1967.
       p.68 (referred to subequcntly as ''T.F.R.'').




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    before a judge. Even in the case of a group of juveniles charged
I   with homicide, their parents normally will be present in the same
    general part of the courtroom, unl ess the family court waives juris-
I   diction and the case is transferred t o the criminal courts.
         In addition to juvenile victims present in famil y courts, young
I   children and infants of families in court frequently are brought to
    proceedings for l ack of any other place to leave them.   Therefore.

I   some means of supervis in g and caring for children who are not parties
    to proceedings is needed.

I        Family courts collect and disburse support payments and other
    funds. Checks, money orders. and cash are received by mail and in
    person for safekeeping until deposited (usually daily) and checks
I   genera ll y are prepared for payment reCipients. New York Ci t y's
    Family Court, for example, annual l y processes in and out about one
I   million checks. Procedural as well as spatial security clearly i s
    required for the handling of large amounts of money .

I   CIVil COURTS


I   Functions common to the civil courts include appellate matters,
    probate, small claims, landl ord -and-tenant actions. civil disputes
    between individuals and businesses. matrimonia l (civil or family)
I   matters , and claims against government agencies. A great dea l of
    record-keeping is typical of all civil court operations .
I        Civil court matters can be handled by referees, heard by judges
    or panels of judges. or tried before jury pane l s of various sizes.
I   In most civil courts. the recei pt, storage. and creation of records
    is fundamental and provision is made for public accessihility to

I   records. Cash or checks are accepted for filing fees, which in
    large municipal or county courts, may be done at several locations in

I   the courthouse for later consolidation and deposit. Adoptions fr e-
    quently are handled in some part of the civi l court (and sometimes
    in family courts). usually in private proceedings . It is safe to say
I   that security needs in the civil courts can be considered accordin p,

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I   to operational units common to all the courts, rather than in terms
    of the nature of cases handled.

I        In civil as opposed to criminal matters, a major distinction
    in physical security and, to a degree, in operational procedure is
    apparent because persons are not detained (guards, prisoners and
I   weapons are not common to the civil courts). In fact, security
    problems in a large civil court bui l ding are not unlike those of a
I   large modern office huilding -- with a few notable exceptions.
         Civil matters can involve intense emotions for some parties.

I   as in the following cases:
            Where an eviction order is handed down in a contested land-

I           lord-tenant dispute. a defendant f acing the breakup of home
            and family can be easily overcome hy emotion.
            Where one party is represented by counsel but the other is
I           not, tactics and l egal maneuverin g can lead to intense re-
            action on hath sides.
I           Where di sputes of pri nciple are at issue, even more than
            damage settlement claims, parti es can become excited beyond
I           reasonabl e control.
    Decorum in the civil courtroom is as necessary to the proper admin-

I   i stration of justice as in any other court.     l'/hen parties cannot
    control their own behavior, then court officers may be required to

I   quell emotions.
         Civil, fa mily , and cri mina l courts share many similar securi t y
    problems, but implicit in th e function and operation of each kind of
I   are specific differences of emphasis and degree.
         The primary security considerations ·in all courts include:
I           Safe s torage of records
            Privacy of certain records and proceedings
I           Easy access to puhlic records
            Protection of judges and other court personnel f rom unneccessary

I           exposure to risk
            Maintenance of personal safety fo r all persons in the courthouse

I
I
I                                                                            13


I
            Isolation and protection of deliberating juries
I           Safety of wi tnesses
            Safe occupancy of buildi ngs
I        Spaces requiring security analysis include courtrooms. offices
    with puhlic access, record rooms, private offices and chamber spaces,
I   public corridors and pub lic waiti ng rooms.
         The balance of thi s   mono~raph   places emphasis on a method of

I   analyzing specific security prohlems of the several kinds of courts,
    as well as those problems courts experience in common.       The basis of

I   this analysis   forms the concept of a security sys tem.



I   A SECURITY SYSTEMS CONCEPT



I   Courthouse securi ty is achieved by combining specific measures into
    a comprehensive system. Because most security measures overlap onc
    another as alternate choices. they can be implemented with some
I   freedom. The following categories illustrate thi s r ange of choice:
            Renovating existing facil iti es as an alternative to new con-
I           struction
            Increasing staff and modifyi ng their duties as operational

I           altern atives to architectural modifications
            Implementing technical systems and devices as alternatives

I           to staff increases
         The eventual choice will be subject t o constraints such as
    initial operating costs, propriety, l egality , effectiveness of re-
    sponse, adaptability t o change, administrative control and time l iness,
         It i s the goa l of thi s monograph to d'e scrihe for the administra-
    tor a typical range of choices for securi ty systems . To accomp li sh
    thi s goal, thi s di scussion examines the background of th e courthouse
    security prob l em. explores measures to imp l emen t securi t y. explains
    a methodology of security sy~tcms analysis. and present s in a usefu l
    format some securi ty "do ' sf! and "don' t' s, II
I                                                                        14


I
I        Security should be an important determinant of courthouse de-
    sign and operation.   Although different types of courts and court

I   functions have correspondiny, security needs, the methodology of
    security system design for all can be similar. By selecting archi-
    tectural, operational and technological procedures appropriate to
I   the function and security needs of all spaces within a courthouse,
    the desired level of security can be shaped.   Constraints upon thi s
I   model will include factors of:
            Legalit y and propriety
I           Capability of current technology
            Availability of trained manpower

I           Feasibility of architectural methods
            Comprehensive costs of construction and operation

I   GROUND RULES FOR SECURITY SYSTEMS

    To examine how space planning, technology and operations affect
I   security, it is well to state first some general relationships and
    their applications:
I        1. The purpose of a security system is to provide desired
            levels of security, as previously defined, for people,
I           functions and facilities.
         2. Threats to the security of a courthouse can be directed

I           against persons (disruptive behavior in the courtroom), at
            spaces (a bomb in a closet or washroom), or at facilities

I           (theft of dictating machines).
         3. Analyses of security problems are based on courthouse
            functions, the persons performing them, facilities used
I           and the spaces occupied. Because each of these factors can
            change over a period of time, measures relating to th em
I           should be flexible.
         4. Some security problems are predictable and can be countered
I           by particular measures; others can be anticipated only as
            contingencies, and countered with adaptive measures.

I
I
I                                                                              IS


I
I        5, Security measures involving space use are directed at the
            location and si ze of spaces in which functions are perfonned
I           and through ,,,hich people move.   Space planning measures have
            in the main, a deterrent effect; secondarily, they affect
I           detection of threats and li mit~tion of damage.
         6. Technolo~ical security measures, such as a larms , cormnunica-

I           tion s systems and weapon detectors, have a primary effect on
            detection of threats. Their mere presence can he a deterrent,

I           and they may indirectly limit damage.
         7. Operational measures, including the number and use of secur-
            ity personnel, have a more or less across-the-board effect on
I           the level of security.


I   INTERACTION OF SECURITY MEASURES

    Most security measures interact with one another.     A private corridor
I   for moving prisoners securely between courtroom and detention spaces
    may add to construction costs but requires a smaller number of guards

I   than to secure movement through public corridors.    The addition of
    private corridors -- in fact, any architectural feature of privacy
    may add to huilding size; but cost and difficulty of maintaining an
    increased force of security personnel fo r an adequate level of secur-
    ity over the lifetime of a courthouse may be excessive.     Many design
    "tradeoffs" of this kind contribute to a final security design;
    they become resolved in an economic bargain, subject to relevant con-
I   straints.
         Designing for security must account for at least one intangible
I   factor. Architectural measures are usually permanent, whereas spa-
    tial functions change. When architectural design is not easily a-

I   daptable to changing spatial functions, future problems may be set
    in motion. Changes in spatial functions reflect as well as cause

I   changes in security problems -- and spa tial functions in courthouses



I
I
I                                                                        16


I   do change as judicial processes are modified to accommodate acceler-
    ~ing changes in the life style of modern society.4 Procedural
I   safeguards, rights to jury and multi-judge trials in a wider number

I   of cases, an increasing number of multi-defendant tri3Is, jury size,
    numbers and types of criminal hearings and proceedings, and the im-
    portance of ne~otiated pleas are all recent procedural changes which
I   are   influencin~ courthouse spatial considerations.
           It is clear that security is not an isolated design factor but
I   a highly integrated and interactive design component. It can be
    isolated for purposes of analysis but not for purposes of synthesis.

I   PROPRIETY OF SECURITY MEASURES


I   An important constraint ruling out the implementation of many simple
    security measures is their inconsistency with the principles of ju-
    dicial administration. If the purpose of security ultimately must
I   be to ensure the safety of persons in a courthouse, then certain
    common approaches must be rejected as not meeting these require-
I   ments. Design of a criminal courtroom , for instance, that allows
    jurors to view a detention pen from the jury box generally might he
I   construed as prejudicing jury deliberations.
         Each security measure must be capable of withstanding challenge

I   on the grounds of prejudice to individual rights. Operational mea-
    sures such as the indiscriminate search of all persons entering a

I   courthouse or courtroom may be challenged unless such procedures
    are properly authorized and conform to constitutional safeguards.
    Successful challenges might be mounted against the use of weapons-
I   detection dev.ices on the grounds that they radiate ener.'!y fields
    into the bodies of persons bein r, scanned : A strong force of opinion
I   holds that the public and the press do not have the absolute ri~ht
    to witness all trials; certain court proceedings forbid it absolutely
I
    4. Tentative Draft. "Standards Relatinr. to the Judge's Role in Deal-
I      ing With Trial Disruptions," American Rar Association, May, 1971,
       p. 17.


I
I
I                                                                             17

I
I   (juvenile and family matters, adoptions); but it is apparent that
    measures to limit public and press attendance must he subject to

I   proper safeguards for the rights of all concerned individuals, in-
    cluding those rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.
         A concept frequently advanced for multi-courtroom huildings is
I   that of providing in one courtroom an increased number of security
    measures.   This "secure" courtroom, it is argued, would have special
I   provisions for the safety of   p~rticipants   and would limit the capa-
    bility of spectators to influence proceedings.      In this regard, a

I   number of suggestions have been made to provide:
            A high, bullet-proof, transparent partition at th e har to

I           separate spectators from the trial spaces.
            A transp arent compartment to isolate defendants.

I           Closed circuit television cameras and monitors in the court
            and detention spaces to transmit the proceedings to a de-
            fendant bein~ tried in absenti a.
I           "'eapons-detection devices locat ed in a soundlock at puhli c
            courtroom entrances to scan all entering persons for con-
I           cealed weapons.
         The "secure" courtroom would be used when a large number of

I   spectators \<"as expected or when spectator or participant hehavior
    problems were antiCipated. Few juri sdictions. however. could afford

I   to activate such a courtroom only in special instances, hut would
    have to assign routine cases to it as well. The use of such a court-
    room does raise a significant legal question: Is such a courtroom, by
I   virtue of its design and appearance. inherently prejudicial to the
    presumed innocence of a defendant?   There has been at least one    le ~al

I   challenge along these lines , S Architectural and technical design
    could compensate -- one might say, camoufla~e -- an admittedly hi gh-
I   security courtroom to avoid charges of hias, as follows:


I   5. Earl Caldwell, "3 Inmates Trial Delayed on Coast," The New York Times,
       New York, N.Y., Aug. 101971.

I
I
I                                                                             18

I
I           A defendant isolation compartment could he located on an
            elevator platform which descends to a detention space di-
            rectly below the court. In routine cases, the compartment
I           would be completely out of sight. its top flush with the
            courtroom floor; but. when a judge ordered a defendant re-
I           strained, the compartment could be raised up to the court-
            room.
I           Armor-plate on
            wood veneer.
                             jud~es'   benches could easily he covered with


I           Protective glass or plastic barriers CQuid he treated as
            an integral part of design to reduce psycho logical objections.

I           Weapons scanners, relatively inconspicuous pipe-like devices.
            also can be incorporated unobtrus.! vely in a facility desi gn.
        After all this is said, however, it would appear that extensive
I   camouflage accomplishes little more than to increase security costs
    out of proportion to effe ctiveness. Certainly, to enhance the ad-
I   ministration of justice, all security measures within a courtroom
    should be carried out in the least visually ohjectionable way.      But
I   it is unlikely that the existence of unusual security measures can
    be kept from all parties. Legal challenges can be expected on the

I   grounds of courtroom environmental differences compared to other
    spaces in the same buildinr.. The temptation might also he great to

I   rely solely on these measures which would not ensure anyone's safety
    absolutely, and could weaken the use of fundamental security prac-
    tices, such as good spatial design and adequate, trained staff.
I   PUBLIC ACCESS

I   In general, security is more effective when puhlic access to a court-
                                         el.,
    house is limited. In Baltimore and N York City, for example, more
I   or less regular searches of people enterin g courthouses or courtrooms
    durinr, the last few months have turned up quantities of potential

I
I
I
I                                                                             19

I
                        .     6
    weapons, mainly kn1ves.       This is not to say that indiscriminate
I   fri sking or preventing the public from entering a courthouse is
    desirahle; but it appears reasonable that public access should he
I   subject to some form of control. Limiting the number of public
    entrances will expedite observation or surveillance to detect and
I   deter suspicious persons.
         After courthouse functions are analyzed     accordin~   to whether

I   public access is a requirement. provision for public movement can
    be designed for an appropriate security l eve l .   Considerations may

I   include procedures to:
            Discourage the wanderer and pilferer by locating private
             spaces in proximity to each other~ separated vertically
I            and horizontally from public spaces .
             Deter the casual visitor and determined thief alike by:
I            1.   Limiting the number of unlocked access doors.
             2.   Limiting the access to interfloor staircases by locking

I                 them from the stairwell sirie, possibly connected
                  to an alamo

I            3.
             4.
                  Prohibiting stairwell openings onto detention floors.
                  Preventing public elevators from stopping at private

I            5.
                  floors.
                  Allocating those spaces most remote from pub lic entrance
                  to functions which, thou~h perhaps not conveniently made
I                 private, need l east public contact.


I   COMMON OFFENSES

    A persistent annoyance in many courthouses is petty theft of personal
I   and office property -- a prob lem shared hy administrators in many
    kinds of bui l dings. The simplest means of discouraging visitors who

I   6.   Based on staff interviews conducted by Courthouse Reor~anization
         and Renovation Program with supervising court officers of Superior
I        Bench of Baltimore and New York Coun t y 5tate Supreme Court.


I
I
 I                                                                           20


 I
 I   would    co~mit   these offenses is to prevent unidentified persons
     from moving freely through the courthouse.       Basic to this end is

 I   to cluster spaces where unidentified visitors may be expected in
     units separate from more private spaces. Access to non-puhlic
     spaces can be restricted by locked doors and by planning re-
 I   ception areas so that visitors can be easily detected, even
     though staff moving through the building may have to be slightly
 I   inconvenienced. The thief, knowing that his presence in certain
     parts of the building is li ke ly to be noticed and challenged

 I   (whether he is i mprovising an action or following a plan), prohahly
     will be deterred or slowed in committing an act .

 I        Very little traffic should be expected or permitted to base-
     ment or upper-story me chanical or electrical equipment spaces .
     By locking entrances to such spaces, an unsupervised resting place
 I   is denied to the vagrant, the drunk, or the addict whose presence
     may be a hazard to hi mse lf and to the building's legitimate occu-
I    pants. Fire hazard is reduced and an attractive bombing target is
     denied. Because only maintenance and cus t odial personnel are the
I    routine users of these spaces, effective key control and locking
     procedures are feasible.

I            In any courthO\:se, casual visitors are not desirable in a
     judge's chambers -- in essence, his private office.       Making chambers

I    eas ily accessible only encourages public intrusion. The need for
     privacy is not dictated so much by the function of the court as by
     the adjudicative function of the chambers. Aspects of this pri-
I    vacy include:
             Locatin r, chambers spaces in as few as possible different
I            parts of a courthouse. separated from all other spaces by
             walls and locked doors
I            Planning receptionists' areas on chambers floors
               I mp l ementing priv ate, guarded street entrances and private

I              elevators



I
I
I                                                                                   21

I
I           After-hours circulation is yet another security prohlem.
    wide open court building is an invitation that ne ed not be extended
                                                                                A


    to potential troub lemake r5. Night courts and night operations of
I   small clains courts and prohation departments do not require keep-
    ing open an entire     bu ildin ~.   Better use of   spac ~   Nou )d clus ter
I   ni ght activities near the public entrance, well separated from
    other floors. Procedural safeguards such as locked doors and

I   closed elevators (and others previously mentioned) would effectively
    close off the parts of a building unrelated to ni gh t activities,

I   saving maintenance costs as well. In any event, routine building
    patrols probably should include closed-off areas as an added measure
    of security.
I
    THE BOMB THREAT

I   ~1any   security problems in the courthouse are related to specific
    proceedinp,s or individuals but another can he quite non-specific in
I   application     the bomb . Combining the effects of real danger and
    fear with a rel ative ease of use, explosive and incendiary bomb in-

I   cident s have become
    houses.
                            si~ nificant   in security planning for many court-


I        Although courthouses his torically have not been prime bomb
    targets ,7 they are believed to be attractive objects for threatened
    bombings or hoaxes. In the courthouse, particularly. where ongoin~
I   processes are so sensitive to external influence, the disruptive
    effect of bOMb hoa xes can be severe. Bombs placed in courthouses
    more frequently are found lodged in washrooms and public corridors
    rather th an in courtrooms, judges' chambers, or privat e offices --
    although, given the minimum leve l of security in some courthouses,
    these spaces cannot be considered off-limits to a WOUld-be bomher.
    It is generally agreed that most bombings to date have heen


    7.   't~ix Months Summary Report," National Bomh Damage Data Center,
         Gaithersburg , Md., Dec. 31, 1970 , Tahle F.




I
I                                                                                22

I
    motivated by opposition to the prevailing structure and way of life
I          .
    i n SOC1Cty.
                 8
                   Warninr,s have preceded most bomhing attempts in public
    buildi ngs, an indication perhaps that specific aims are not at issue.
I   Threats have become nearly as effective      a~   explosive incidents, en-
    couraged by the rapid dissemination of information about ·bombings
I   or attempts and bomb construction techniques.
         Explosive devices are not inordinately difficult to make; in-

I   cendiary bomb construction is well within the ability of any person
    of reasonable intelligence using materials from a supermarket or

I   drugstore.     Bombs are relatively simp l e to conceal and smal l enough
    to be placed in almost any part of a conventional building -- at
    least given the present state of the art of bomb detection.          Although
I   premature detonation is a constant threat to the constructor/em-
    placer, determined bombers have displayed remarkable ingenuity in
I   constructing sophisticated devices with at-hand components.
         While explosive and fire bombs remain as popular weapons, the
I   question still must be asked:
    problem in the courthouse?
                                      What can be done about this security


I        Modern building construction techniques apparently provide
    ample strength compared to th e explosi ve    pm~er   of most bomhs used

I   to date.     Confined structural and fire damage would appear to he
    the major prohlem to be overcome.
         When a huilding i s set on fire hy a bomb the emergency can be
I   handled as would any other fire.      Architectural and construction
    standards mandated under l ocal fire and safety codes also should be
I   effective against fire bomh damage.      Fire alarms, fire drills and
    evacuation plans are familiar techniques here.        h~at   is not so fa-
I   miliar is the pr oper response to a bomh threat once it is received.
         First, it is essential upon receiving such a thre at to put into

I   effect a proven emergency plan.      Such a plan shoul d cover the



I   8. Ibid, Table D.



I
I
I                                                                             23


I
    contingencies of information transfer -- how to get word of the
I   incident to the authorized decision-makers. and how to get their
    instructions implemented. It would also embrace procedures. routes
I   of evacuation (not including any usc of automatic elevators), and
    what action to take concerning ongoi ng court processes and records.

I   The choice of whether to take action at all cannot rest individually
    with the occupants of the hui ldin ~ wh o mos t likely do not have

I   accurate informati on on th e s ituati on. h'ithout such facts, they
    should not be placed in th e position of making potential life-and-
    death decisions. Because the threat of bomhing can have as much
I   effect on courthouse operation as an actual incident, the action
    taken is of primary i mportanc e and mus t apply comprehensively to
I   the entire courthouse .   Left to be i mp rovised, the response likel y
    will fail.
I        Bomb detection and disposal practices vary throughout juris-
    dictions . Some large cities have police bomb squads .· ~1ost admin-

I   istrators may find it necess ary to rely on .military experts or fed-
    eral or state agencies which may not be close enough to respond

I   immediately in an eme rgency.   The administrator, or his de legate,
    will have to make an initial decision -- to evacuate or remain --
    probabl y only on limited info~ation as to the reality of the threat
I   or the possihle nature and effects of the devic e.    Given the greater
    frequency of throats over actual in ci dents and the de~ree of dis-
I   ruption to proceedings resultin g even from a threat, it is important
    to define specifically what is to be done \"ith record s, exhibits,
I   prisoners. and all persons participating in court processes and
    objects in the court ' s custody.

I        Operational and technol ogical measures have application to the
    detection of explosive devices being smuggled into a courthouse, a

I   topic discussed late r in this monog raph .



I   • New York City maintains onl y a 12-man bomb squad which mus t contend
      each year with at least 10, 000 sit uations.


I
I
I                                                                              24


I
I   COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS



I   Security systems ana l ysis is fundamental in assessing and improving
    security     in   existin~   courthouses.   Four steps constitute this pro-

I   cedure:
         1. Threat analysis: assessment of threats to peopl e, facilities,

I           and functions of a courthouse.
         2. Space use analysis: determination of the usc of space hy

I           persons (circulation) and for function .
         3. Application of security measures: reduction of total risk.
         4. Evaluation: comparison of alternative solutions for effect-
I              iveness, cost, and impact on operati ons.


I   SOME DEFINITIONS

    The security of persons and flmctions is inversely related to t heir

I   cxnnsure to risk: to increase security. reduce exposure. To r educe
    exposure, two techniques ar e used : 1) minimize circulation exposed

I   to risk and 2) minimize spaces exposed to risk . These procedures
    can be implemented in several \"ays, but before discussing them, the

I   t erms circulation and space need to he defined .
          The concept of circu l ation carries several connotations.        ~1ost

    directly, ci r culation can be defined as a r ecord of locations and
I   the path of movement between them of a person (or function) over a
    period of time. Circulation refers t o the spaces occupi ed one after
I   another by a person while in a courthouse. This time sequence in-
    c ludes the spaces through which he moves (such as corridors, eleva-

I   t ors , and stairs), as well as th ose in which he functions (such as
    chambers, courtrooms. offices , or r obing rooms).

I        Spaces can be defi ned as areas within a courthouse denoted by
    the functions taking place in t~ ~m, typified hy a courtroom and its
    ancillary spaces; or a judge's spaces of robing room, bench area.
I   chambers. or private elevator.         Spaces may be se t off by wa ll s, but

I
I
I                                                                                  25

I
I   they are always determined by associations between functions.
    large record room might he considered to have several spaces within
                                                                              A



I   it -- a file space, a copyin~ space, a fee -coll ection space , and a
    supervisory space -- although it has no walls or physical dividers,
    because each function or procedure is distinct.
I
    THREAT ANALYSIS

I   Security is affected by the relative l ocation of functionally re-
    lated spaces, their distance from oth er spaces, accessibility of
I   spaces to various categories of persons in the courthouse. methods
    of   circulatin ~   he tween spaces, and physical protection within spaces.

I   To minimize risk to all cirnllation, th e persons and functions in a
    courthouse can be assigned "security . categories" and significant

I   circulations can be trace d. For thi s procedure, persons are com-
    pared accordin g to their r e lati ve hazard to each other and to court-
    house functions as well as to the relative protection each may need.
I   Functions are categorized according to         require~e nt s   of access or
    privacy. Then. because functions are performed in spaces , security
I   needs for spaces can he developed based on occupants and functions.
         For purposes here, the typical .criminal court will be consider-
I   ed because it includes most security problems found in any type of
    court .   The per sons and spaces of a criminal court significant in a

I   security   a~alysis    are listed   below~ .

                                         PEOPLE

I   Judges
    Defendants
                                 Prosecuting Attorneys
                                 Defense Attorneys
                                 Jurors
                                                                     Witnesses
                                                                     Court Staff
                                                                     Puhlic
    Complainants

I   Courtrooms
                                         SPACES
                                 Jury Assemh l y and                 Puhlic Corridors
    Detention Faci l ities         Impaneling Rooms                   and Areas
I   Chamhers
    Robing Rooms
                                 Clerk I s Offices
                                 Record Rooms
                                                                     Elevators
                                                                     Sta i rs
    Jury Deliheration            Wit ness \'Iai.ting Rooms           Court Staff 100ms
I    Rooms                       Fi ling Offi ces



I
I
I                                                                          26


I
    SPACE USE ANALYSIS

I   A comprehensive analytic security study must: 1) trace the circula-
    tion onc by one of each class of participants in the courthouse pro-
I   cesses, and 2) gradually comhine these circulation patterns into a
    comprehensive pattern for all spaces. Sensitive to time and space,
I   this procedure correlates to security measures    dealin~   with persons
    as they move in time throu~h spaces, and spaces as they are occu-
I   pied at various times by persons.
         When security of judges   is being considered, their circulation

I   patterns would be traced through the courthouse    durin~   a typical day,
    examining their relative security in each space occupied or transitted.

I   When considering the security of a courtroom, on the other hand, each
    kind of proceeding would be examined . as to location and movement of
    occupants. Specific security measures then can be applied, including
I   factors of space planning, technology and operations, to provide
    alternative degrees of security.
I        The analysis can be expedited by follo\.,.ing a few simple rules.
    After people, functions, and spaces have been categorized accordin g
I   to requirements of privacy and relative hazard, circulation patterns
    can be examined, space by space, as built up in composite courthouse

I   circulation charts. Ideally, where two different circulation pat-
    terns cross or overlap in the same space, they should be separated

I   in time or space, depending on the measures adopted. Time separation
    is fundamentally an operational measure, as when all persons in a
    courtroom are required to remain in their places until the judge
I   leaves the bench and is beyond interference. Spatial separation
    introduces "privacy f eatures," such as those listed in Tahle 1.
I        Where neither space nor time separation is feasible, protection
    is required in areas of common circulation. A judge, for instance,
I   mi~ht be escorted by an armed court officer from courtroom to judges'

    elevator through puhlic corridors. Such protection measures, al-

I   though frequently used, smack of expediency and present a poor



I
I
I                                                                              27


I
I   impression to the puhlic.       Such measures also run the risk of
    being inadvertently relaxed at the wrong time and place a consider-
    able responsibility on           a few persons.   Where safe corridors
I                            ju~t

    for court staff and judges can he provided and made completely in-
    accessible to all others, more constant and effective security re-
I   sults.
         The effects on security of      t~is   analytic procedure can be seen
I   in some examples.
         When a detained defendant is out of sight and hearing of all

I   other parties to criminal court proceedings, he can neither reach
    nor be reached by anyone for any purpose. except as directed by

I   the court. Only in the courtroom is he visibly and audibly part
    of the proceedings and there. as with paroled or hailed defendants,
    he is always individually guarded. His departure and arrival are
I   out of sight of the jury, as is the detention cell adjoining the
    court. Detention spaces are isolated from all others in the court-
I   house.
         Separate spaces and passages for judges give maximum protection.
I   Only in designated spaces (courtroom. chamhers, conference room,
    hearing room, robing room) where rules of decorum and procedure

I   govern, do judges come in contact with other participants. Minimal
    opportunity for prejudicial contacts and minimal out~of-court ex-

I   posure to litigants and other interested parties
    balanced judicial atmosphere.
                                                             can enhance the


         Jurors, isolated from the courtroom and other persons while de-
I   liberating, moving between the courtroom and deliherating spaces,
    and travelling between court and assemhly spaces under escort, re-
I   quire several different kinds of security measures. To isolate the
    deliberation process, it must take place in a space near the court-
I   room and be connected to it by private passages, preferably as short
    as possible.

I        Impanelin~   procedures are separated only in space from the



I
I
I                                                                                  28

I
I   rest of the courthouse.          When an impaneled jury moves hetween
    assembly area and courtroom it is escorted by court officers to
    guide it directly, protect it from any interference, and to keep
I   the   ~ r oup   together.   Time or space separation even may be possible
    for this movement, depending on overall courthou!';c         desi~n.

I        Witnesses normally are given a l esser de~ree of privacy and
    isolation th an juries, in part because they come and go more fre~

I   quently and individually and need to be presen t in the courtroom
    only while on the stand.          ~~en   separate courtroom ancillary spaces

I   are provided, witnesses cannot see or hear the court proceedings
    except when testifying . They are separated temporarily from the
    public and trial participants and can be guarded to protect them
I   from influence.
         Certain courthouse operations involve public participation
I   by persons having specific business within the building; others do
    not. Typically, the clerk's office where civil actions are initiat-
I   ed is closely involved with the public because it hegins the judi-
    cial process when a plaintiff files a complaint.           The complaint

I   room in a criminal court, visited by police officers and complainants
    who file papers to start the judicial process, has 3 public function.

I   In contrast, the r ecords room of a family court probation department
    is completely private and its cont en ts Ma~ not be accessible even to
    judges at certain       sta~es   in a proceeding .
I         The location and ~~ace nlannin~ ~f staff office and clerical
    spaces th erefore contribute directly to courthouse security. As a
I   .~eneral rule, where staff spaces to ,.. hich the public need s access

    are located close to the main entrances and, preferab l y , on the main
I   floor, and ,..here private staff spaces are located remote from puhlic
    and public staff spaces, security i s enhanced. In a multi-story

I   courthouse a great many security probleMS are deterred hy locating
    th e entire criminal arrai~nment pr ocess, includi n~ deten tion, court

I   and complaint spaces, in c lose proximity on the main floor. Espe-
    cially where ni ght and weekend arraignment courts are held. this

I
I
I                                                                             29


I
    eliminates one potential security prohlem: unauthorized persons
I   moving vertically throu~h a building after hours. It is always a
    sound security practice to make public access to non- puhlic areas
I   difficult. either by    lockin ~   the non-puhlic spaces or making them
    difficult to reach.
I   APPLICATION OF SECURITY MEASURES

I   SPACE PLANNING MEASURES

    Applying space planning techniques to securi t y probl ems can be com-
I   plex. Not only do different security needs interact with or inhib-
    it each other, but other functi onal space needs may conflict with

I   security needs.
    rooms?
                       Where should chamhers be located relative to court-
              1'I'hat route should judges use to move between them?   Hinimum

I   distance between chambers and courtroom reduces exposure en route
    and is convenient for a judge, given that the courtroom is near the
    judges' entrance to the courthouse and, perhaps, the l aw library,
I   and that a chambers space is adequate for law assistant or clerk" sec-
    retary, and other aides.     But when chambe rs is located adjacent to
I   a courtroom, a number of other difficulties are introduced.
           If judges are assigned to different COUTt parts from time to

I   time      a common practice in jurisdictions implementinr. new cal en-
    daring techniques -- chambers also mus t be reassi~n ed or th e entire

I   security precaution becomes meaningless. But when chambers are
    periodically reassigned, they no lon ger are functional as private.
    permanent offices. Chambers adjoining courtrooms cannot as readily
    be made private as if they were on a separate floor. because puhlic,
    trial participants and others are in the courtroom areas durinr.
    most of th e day. A few chambers spread across each floor are diffi-
    cult and expensive to protect or provide with rec eption service
    after hours. Chamhers tend to occupy m ore area than other anci 11 ary
    spaces,    and thu s are an expensive competing use for relatively
    scarce space.     Finally, it usually will be e:JCtrcmel y difficult to




I
I                                                                               30

I
    arrange full private circulation for judges hetween chambers ad-
I   joining courts and other spaces they use.
         A more useful approach is to provide only a robing room ad-
I   j acent to a court. Iolhich can he used in recesses and for informal
    conferences, and to locate al l chambers together in another area
I   of the courthouse. Separate chambers floors are easier and les s
    expensive t o secure, can have better reception services    \~ith   fewer

I   personnel, and permit a much higher proportion of private circulation
    for all judges' functions. I f complete chambers floors are not feas-

I   ibl e , then one area of a floor can be reserved for chamhers and made
    completely private.   In either situation, the courthouse is an en-
    tity and can be thought of as a sys tem of spaces containing a sub-
I   system of private spaces dedicated to the judicial function, as
    well as other subsystems of private spaces dedicated to other
I   function s , and spaces of less r es trict ed access and unrestricted
    access.
I        Space management is an arch itectura l /systems discip line that
    is most effectively handled hy profe ssional s in the field. Some

I   commonly used measur es -- which shoul d not he applied piecemeal or
    indi scrimi nately -- are li s ted in Tables I and 2. Security measures

I   within th e architectural field are diverse, and include acoustical
    and li ghtin g design, surface treatment and finishing, overall di-
    mensi onality, and design esthetics. Tables I and 2, fo llowing , list
I   a nwnber of "do's" and "don't's" for secu rity sys tems.


I   TABLE 1 : USEFUL SPACE PLANNING AND ARCHITECTURAL PARAMETERS

            Private corridors, stai r s, and elevators for each category
I           of person requiring comp l ete privacy .
            Detention spaces directly feeding each criminal courtroom.

I           Separate access to courts for judp:es and court staff I juries I
            witnesses and attorneys, puh lic, and detained defendants.

I           Detention floors or floor areas in a crimi na l courthouse
            connected directly to a detention building and feeding

I
I
I
I
I           directly and onl y to spaces where prisoners are routinely
            sent.

I           Trial courtroom floors or floor areas in a criminal court-
            house surrounding detention floors (vertical or horizontal) .

I           Chambers loc ated in close proximity to each other on their
            own separate flo or s or floor areas.
            Limited and controlled public access to chamber spaces .
I           Private huilding entrances for judges and prosecuting attor-
            neys.
I           Limited number of doors giving public access to building.
            Public functions (complaint, arraignment, bai l and paro l e
I           hearin gs) on first and lowest f loors.
            Secured building entrance into detention spaces for prisoners

I           under arrest.
            Facilities with higher security needs located in proximity
            to each other and away from public and low security areas.
I           Double walls or soundproofed wal l s for jury deliberation
            rooms .
I   TABLE 2: SPACE PLANNING FEATURES TO AVOID


I           Courtrooms adjoining puhlic spaces, such as washrooms in which
            bombs can be eas il y hidden .

I           Public spaces, such as washrooms, with false ceilings or re-
            movahle ceilings, ducts, or wall panels. Bombs can be easily

I           secreted behind access panels and fixtures, especiall y where
            some measure of temporary privacy in a public space is possib le.
            Cul-de-sacs in corridors and littl e used corridors or stair-
I           wells which would present an excellent environment for a would-
            be bomber to install an exp losive device.
I           Low ceilings and those with ducts and removable panel s in
            puhlic spaces are attractive locations for bomhs.
I           Public furniture, including ash trays, flower pots. benches.


I
I
I                                                                              32

I
I           and seats which can be opened, moved, or otherwise used to
            conceal bornhs .   ~~ere   feasible, furnishinp,5 should be de-

I           signed as an integral part of the wall, flush-finished t o
            avoid good hidinr, places.
            Furnishings and ohjects of li ghtwei ght or flimsy construc-
I           tion in or near courtrooms ""hich can :,e used wholly or
            broken as weapons. Chairs. ashtrays. tables, l amps, and
I           other furniture would be included in thi s category .
            Public elevators that are not easily programmed to by-pass
I           certain floors. Those floors designated as secured deten-
            tion floors for example. must not have puhlic e levator ac-

I           cess. A combination of no- s top programming and walled- over
            elevator door openinp's can achieve these ends. Floors which

I           are to he inaccessible at night also shoul d be by-passed by
            elevators.
            A high degree of accessibility for the pub lic to all parts
I           of the building. Stain'ays ar e necessary as fire escapes
            and other eme r .~e n cy r outes , but need not be used for inter-
I           floor access. Locks or cr ash locks and alarms can deny
            these routes to the curious and nefarious alike without
I           seriously inconveniencing o:rers .


I   OPERATIONAL MEASURES

    Security operations may have developed to accommodate court pro-

I   cedures and courthol~e architectural design and space allocation.
    Optimal security operations, however, are not the r esult of fitting

I   manpower to cover deficiencies in overall securi t y systems; rather
    optimal security is a well-balanced mix of operational, techn o lo ~ical
    and architectural security procedures.
I        Securit y operations are conducted by persons operatin r. in t he
    architectural environment of a courthou!'ic and usinr. sitch t ools as
I   are available t o them.    These tools can range from the   techn o l o~ica l




I
I
I
I
I        weapons, alarms , detection, and communications,    to name a few __
    to those of the medical, behavioral and managmcnt sciences.        Perhaps
    the major contribution s till l ack in r. in mos t courthouse se curity op-
I   erations is a complete rang e of the se tool s .
         A paradox concerning uniformed court officer requirements ex-
I   ists in some criminal courts in thi s country. The great mass of all
    criminal cases -- misdemeanors, petty offenses and preliminary fel-
I   ony hearings -- are heard in criminal courts of limited jurisdicti on,
    the lower COUrts. (Cases of this kind in 1970 amounted to at least
                       9
I   90% of the tot a l. ) By nature of their procedures. these are courts
    of last resort for most citizens coming in contact with the criminal
                         10
I   justice process.
         Yet the qualifications of uniformed court officers in the lower
    criminal courts often are less stringent than for offi ce rs serving
I   in the higher courts. The lower criminal courts. those with the
    largest security problems in terms of numbers of persons proces sed.
I   are served by security personnel with the fewest qualifications for
    job entry.  It follows th at the lowe r courts may be served by se-
I   curity officers of less experience than their counterparts in the
    higher courts -- except where trainin g is available.

I        This paradox reflects a gene r a l attitude toward courthouse se-
    curity best characterized. perhaps, as haphazard. At one extreme

I   is a courthouse closed to the public except when court is in session.
    During the session, all persons enterinr. are searched; some judges
                                              ll
    and prosecuting attorneys carry firearms.     At the other extreme
I   are some jurisdicti ons in which court officers are appointed with
    no particular experience, or at bes t, a hi ~h school re~ tificate.
I   No on-the-job training is offe r ed , and the officer may be required
    to be in court only when reques ted on special occasions.

I
    9.   T.F.R.: The Courts, p. 29. op. cit.
I   10. Ibid.
    11. A.H. Goldstein, Jr., Brief Case , San Francisco Bar Assn •• March-
          April, 1971.
I
I
I
I
I           Salaries   ran~e   from less than $4,000 to as much as S15,000
    annually for responsibilities that may include simply keeping order

I   in the court and escorting       jud~es   to and from court, or encompass
    building-wide responsibilities for security such as regular searches
    of all spaces.
I           Some courts use security equipment, including alarms and weap-
    ons detectors; others do not arm their personnel .         Police officers
I   and deputy sheriffs are sometimes used as court officers and huild-
    ing security personnel; more commonly, building security is provided

I   only be maintenance personnel.        Keys generally are issued by a cus-
    todial superintendent, the loosest forn of control.         Haintenance

I   personnel, sometimes supervised by a building custodian, usually
    have unlimited access to all parts of the courthouse and, in many
    cases, are not subject to a security clearance.         Occasionally, an
I   infornal liaison is maintained Idth other security or police agen-
    cies in the courthouse or in nearhy jurisdictions, but even this is
I   rare.
            These disparities probably reflect differing severities of
I   local security problems.        Given such a wide range of conditions, it
    may be fair to assume that the comments helo\\' derived from study of

I   metropolitan courts are representative of serious security problems
    in general .    The belief here is that what applies for these courts

I   will hold, probably in relaxed form, elsewhere.
            Operational security measures can be conveniently separated
    into three categories : procedures, management organization, and
I   personnel qualifications.        Each can be discussed alone, although,
    in application, they function together.
I
    PROCEDURAL MEASURES

I   From a security viewpoint, a courthouse is an entity lv-here problems
    can spread from one location and one level of responsibility to an-

I   other.     A prisoner attempting escape from a courtroom is not aloj'arded


I
I
I                                                                             35


I
I   freedom for successfully reaching the public corridor, but often
    he need go no further to make good his attempt. If there are
    several jurisdictions in a courthouse, security respons ibilities
I   may be fragmented with no group responsible for overall building
    security.     In such a case, an effective form of unification must
I   be structured, takinp. into account building-wide emergencies. such
    as fires, security control outside of courtrooms and after-hours
I   protection.    For this force to be effective, it should be able to
    communicate Quickly with all other security units.

I        In courthouses subject to bomb threats, regular and thorough
    searches are basic deterrent and detection measures.      If it is

I   known that searches are routine practice, some threat s and actual
    incidents may be discouraged. Regu l ar patrols during and after
    court hours not on l y provide a hi ghly visib l e function for security
I   personnel, but also are a strong deterrent to prospective troubl e-
    makers.
I        Courtrooms and ancillary spaces kept locked, except while
    court is in session, discourage threats of hidden bombs or weapons
I   (and the annoyance of littered and disordered courts). Clearing a
    courtroom when it i s not in session enhances its dignity and im-

I   portance as a place where justice is dispensed.
         Doors to all private and public spaces not in use shoul d be

I   locked after hours. If the locking procedure is checked regularly,
    control of the premises is easier.     Controlling the issuance of keys
    and noting their disposition on accurate, up -to-d ate records can
I   help to keep effective this aspect of security. But it is diffi-
    cult to avoid the gradual loss and unauthorized duplication of keys
I   in a l arge organization. A more effective po li cy would he to limit
    the number of spaces Nhere denial of entrance is a security factor
I   and to give keys to onl y one person in the spaces in question. Al-
    though a common practice,   makin~   the huildin g custodian completely

I   responsible for issuin?, keys seems an excessive security respons i-
    bility, one that might better be handled directly hy      building

I   security personnel .



I
I                                                                              36



I
         An effective procedure to improve security, if not already in
I   use, is to encourage an habitual challenge in non-public spaces of
    all persons unknown to the staff .       Receptioni sts , court staff per-

I   sonnel. and security officers, all can make such simple challenges
    by offering to be of assistance.        Suspicious persons in .a courthouse

I   ought also to be challenged, although courts frequently require sus-
    picious persons to be on the premises . In large measure . common
    sense must rule.      Someone carrying an unusually large box, wearing
I   a heavy coat in August, or asking unusually detailed questions about
    the location of private spaces in the courthouse might be considered
I   suspicious and observed or questioned further.
         A courthouse evacuation plan for firc, bomb, and other energen-
I   cies is an inexpensive investment of high potential value.         Three
    key elements characterize an evacuation plan:

I        1. Establishing procedures to control the movement of all
            people out of the huilding.
I        2. Establishing safe r out es of evacuation from every space
            in the building.

I        3. Denoting, by job title, personnel to carry out the plan.

         In developing an emergency plan, it must be remembered that

I   persons do not act calmly or make rational decisions when they are
    frightened and uninforned. Security personnel directing such oper-

I   ations need accurate information to relay to th e buildinr, occupants
    -- and accurate information is difficult to ohtain during an emer-
    gency.   msinformation and rumors tend to spread rapidly; th e t ele -
I   phone system   ~ay   not he reliable.   Security personnel should have
    alternate communications procedures such as runners or two-way
I   portable radio or intercom systems. A chain of reporting and
    command, linkin ~ responsihle authoratative sources of information
I   with security personnel directing operations, is essential. Pre-
                         !
    established reportin ,:,; procedures then can detemine quickly th e

I   status of evacuations and damage.


I
I
I                                                                            37


I
I        The courts, like hanks and hospita ls, cannot stop cold to exit
    in an emergency.   Records in st orage and in use, trial exhibits, de-

I   tain ed prisoners, witnesses, and jurors, to name a few, each present
    special handling prohlems in respect of on~oinr, court processes.
    When court reconvene~ after an evacuation, how can it be determined
I   that normal procedural requirements and safeguards have been observed?
    Have the jurors mingled with witnesses and attorneys or talked with
I   parties?   Have all records been returned to safe storage or been
    otherwise accounted for?    If the emergency was an action planned to

I   release a prisoner or destroy certain exhibits, were routine pre-
    cautions ohserved to ~ua rd against such possihi lities? Emergency

I   plans, prepared in advance, should anticipate these and other con-
    tingenci es with a degree of assu ranc e impossible with ad hoc measures.
         The condition of a buildin~ and its services can he altered by
I   damage. Lights may be out, glass may be shattered and spread across
    floor areas, and elevators may be dangerously inoperative in a fire.
I   Many newer automatic e levators have heat sensi tive call buttons ,",' hich
    have been knmffl t o mal fun cti on in a fire by drat·linl! all operating
I   elevators to the floor on fire and holdin~ then there with doors open.
    To allow for contingencies, ~ n emergency plan should list primary

I   evacuation routes, using the most reliable and directly accessible
    stairs and corridors, and alternate routes to use if primary routes

I   become blocked.
         A final point on procedural measures concerns a re gular need:
    the subjugation of violent persons.     One majo r me tropolitan court has
I   unofficiall y recorded 26 instances of courtroom violence over a re-
    cent IO-year period. In most of them, one or more court officers \'Ias
I   injured subduing a violent defendant or spec tator. In none of the
    abov e is there n report of t he use of guns carried by court officers
I   during each incident. Apparently, restraining personal force is the
    preferred method for dealing with vio lent individuals.

I        A pre-established procedure for suhdui ng violent persons would
    seem to be appropriate, using specific Me t hods and means of cooperation

I
I
I                                                                                   38


I
I   among all court officers present .         Such a procedure would offer in-
    creased safety for court officers and more effective performance in

I   this difficult duty.
    deservin~ of study.
                                 Non-lethal weapons may be of use here and are



I   PE RSONNEL OUALIF ICATIONS


I   The uniformed court officer holds a unique position.             Neither po l ice-
    man, prison guard, nor court clerk, he combines in his job require-
I   ments of all three.          He is. above all. responsible for security in
    the courtroom -- for maintainin g order, carrying out rules of decorum,
I   and ensuring the personal safety of the judge. He also may be re-
    sponsible for security in corridors, chamhers, or other courthouse

I   spaces. In some courts . the uniformed officer also is responsihle
    for clerical functions of hailiff or court clerk . In any court.

I   the officer must he thoroup-h ly familiar with all court procedures,
    including handling evidence, proper placement and treatment of
    participants and attorneys, and traffic through the court. Some
I   duties are specific to the type of court or the particular courtroom,
    and the wishes of the        presidin~   judge; but most duties are common to
I   all court officers.
         To assure an adequate supply of professionally capahle court

I   officers, standard require~entsJ independent of court assi2nment,
    would be desirahle. 5tandardi.zed prior requirements for job entry,

I   pre- assignment    trainin~J

    erate professionaliz3tion.
                                     and continuing update traininp, would accel-
                                        Over a period of time, availab l e security

I   tools and problems change;
    to such changes.
                                        training could adapt court officer skil l s

         Joh entry requirements are formulated to attract persons with
I   desire? ~kills . Specific deficiencies. especially experience with
    court procedures and security operations J can be remedied by a
I   formal traininR     pro~ram     upon entry , thus   differentiatin~   from


I
I
I                                                                            39

I
I   fundamental qualifications of personality. intelligence. and physical
    characteristics.   The alternative of early on-the-job training, es-

I   pecially in CTOI"d control and handlin g violent persons. appears to be
    a slow and inefficient procedure and, in any event, usually places a
    man on duty in the courtroom who may not he fully qualified. Period-
I   ic   refresher trainin ~ will update skills, improve readiness for new
    situations, and refresh familiarity with changing court procedures.
I   In many court systems, appropri ate refresher and entrance training
    might be obtained at a local university or community college.      Ex-

I   perienced court officers and security special ists could offer prac-
    tical instruction either periodically for short, intensive courses

I   or in regular after-hours classes, if there is sufficient enrollment.
         Valuable fields of trainin g to the court officer might include :

I        1. Adult and child behavioral psychology
         2. Spanish or another locally spoken   langua~e


I        3. Cultural hack~rounds of ethnic groups
         4. First aid
         S. Court procedures and trial rul es
I        6. Crowd and riot control procedures
         7. Bombs and bomb detection (incendiary and explosive)
I        8. Buildinp, space planning concept and space use
         9. Use of weapons (stressinr, non-l ethal techniqu·e s and devices)
I       10. Subjugation of viol ent persons


I   MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION



I   Most courthouses contain spaces for non-courtroom functions, includ-
    ing clerical and record operations. ~. Iany large courthouses also pr o-

I   vide space for several jurisdictions of courts. possibly criminal
    courts of limited jurisdiction and of general juri sdiction. Securit y
    problems occur in any building space. not only in courtrooms. and can
I   spread across spaces and among jurisdictions.    The basic problem of

I
I
I                                                                               40

I
I   security is building-wide protection.
    of a court   s~cur it y
                                                The hasic   mana~cment   activity
                              force is to integrate all security efforts and
    personnel into a coo rdin ated operation within the huilding.
I        Imple mentin~ security operati ons on a hroader hasis than the
    individual courtroom level may imply far-reaching consequences in
I   some jurisdi ctions .     Feasible means of achievement will differ, de-
    pending on local conditions, legis lative traditions, civil service
I   rules, and other relevant practices . Security personnel in some
    courts are part of that system only; in other systems, th ey are part

I   of a separate security force, such as a sheriff's office, administer-
    ed outside th e courts .

I        With outside administration, building-wide operations are more
    easily coordinated. Securit y organizations admini5tered by a court
    system may be more r esponsive to i ndivjdual judgcs or courts. If
I   the goals here considered desirable are to be realizcd -- adequate
    minimum l eve ls of training. huilding-wide operations, flexibility
I   of assignment in emergencies, up graded professionalism, app lication
    of current technology , and uniformly effective ope rations -- then
I   each courthouse will have to find an aopropriate way t o implement a
    security Qrganization.

I        Whatever the mana,gement format, central security staffs can
    best be organized around lines of operati onal information £101'1. In

I   the range of situations beth'een routine daily courtroom assignments
    of court officers and emergency deployment of all availahle personnel
    for riot-control dut ies: the rapid flow of accur ate information is
I   necessary to effective operational control. Operations are effect-
    ive when directed from a sin~le operations center, whether it be a
I   captain's office \olith phone and duty roster board or a command center
    equipped with T.V., alarms, mobile radio, tele phone~ , and a public-
I   address system. Effect ive operational control then can he achieved
    by organizing security operations around these lines of communication

I   and implementing them with emergency and routine communications
    eqUipment.

I
I
I                                                                                  41

I
           Not every court system has an organizational entity around
I   which to structure building-wide security staffs.          In fact. few
    court systems have any fonn of building organization.           Many court-
I   house buildings simply are maintained and operated by a puhlic
    works department and house a numher of government agencies, includ-
I   ing courts,    court-as~ociated    agencies, and non-rel ated agencies.
    Security problems for the entire building are set by its most secur-

I   ity-sensitive occupants, the co urt s .      Unfortunately for the courts,
    buildin p, security provisions are not always equal t o court problems.

I   The remedy for thi s deficiency lies not i n piecemeal security meas-
    ures applied haphazardl y in spaces where present jurisdiction per-
    mits, but in comprehensive application of security measures which
I   integrate operationa:, technological, and archit ectural features
    of courthouse design and use.
I          Elementary schools hold r egu l ar fire drills, hoth to prepare
    for safe evacuation and t o educate students in non-panic response

I   to emergencies.       Internationa l ag reements require lifeboat drills
    on passenge r ships to reh earse     passen~ers   and crews to re spond well

I   in   eme r~ encies.   Recently, New York Ci t y , after several di sas trous
    fires in new buildings, instituted a requirement for fire drills in
                         12
    all large buildings.    It should not be difficult, considering the
I   alternatives, to conduct evacuation drills in         courth~uses,   perhaps
    annually or semi-annually .       Since the major purpose of holding
I   drills would be to rehearse court personnel, especially court se-
    curity staffs, in the exercise of emergency responsibilities , it
I   probably would be satisfactory to conduct them outside of re gu lar
    hours.

I   TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES


I   ~rodern   tcchnoJogy. especially electronic s , offers many aids -- but
    no panaceas -- to to the maintenance of courthouse security.            Applicable

I   12. "Fire Drills Due In Skyscrapers," The New York Times , New York,
        July 6, 1971. p. 1.
I
I
I                                                                                          42


I
I   devices and sys tems generally operate t o reduce the number of
    personnel for a given function or to extend the capability of the
    previous ly unaid ed person .        ~l os t   useful in the detecti on of se curity
I   probl ems . techno logica l measures a l so have some de terrent va lue to
    all but the most expe ri enced or de t ermined . when it is known that
I   they are heing used .         Technol ogy is signifi cant fo r informa ti on
    transfer functions,         inc]udin~   voice cOl'UlllDlications an d transmission

I   of alarm signals.          Finally, among t ech no logical meas ures , it i s log-
    ical to include weapons. especially t he techno l ogy of non-lethal

I   device s .
          Technol og i ca l measures can be $!Toupcd under four headings:

I   detection, signalling and conmunications, protection, and weapons.
    These are briefly described he l Ol'" in terms of their securit y appli-
    cat ions, physi cal confi gurati on and major operationa l feature s .
I   DETEC TI ON T EC HNOLOGY


I   Detection t echnology provides thr ee ar eas of security detection as
    listed in Table 3 at the back of t hi s mono graph :

I         1. Un authoriz ed entrance t o pr enises
          2. Concealed metallic and non-me t a llic weapons and devices
I         3. Exp los i ve materials
    Detect ors of all types genera lly follow a standard method of oper-
I   ation. ~~en a sensor detects a change in the physical condition it
    is moni t oring, it compares the change to a standard r eference and

I   signals an alarm if th e chan ge exceeds an allowable val ue .
          Explosives detectors gene r a ll y operate on th e principle of

I   sensing the vapors emitted by mos t explosives . No entri e s f or such
    devices are ma de in th e folloh'in,g tah l es because r e liahle dete ct ion
    te chniques are more or l ess sti ll in the r ange of esoterica .
I        At the ti me of thi s writing . two categories of detectors were
    being te sted and evaluated : chemical dev ices and the IlS C of dogs.
I
I
I
I                                                                                43


I
I   Dogs have been used to detect marijuana and heroin by scent, and
    are bein~ evaluated for use against explosives. Chemical and bio-
    chemical devices in development use reactions peculiar to ex-
I   plosive naterial vapors. Operationally, a certain amount of time
    is needed to confirm vapor identification. Present experimental
I   techni ques, therefore. do not appear applicahle to detecting a
    bomb being carried into a courthouse past a checkpoint. Such
I   devices promise more usefulness in l ocating explosives already
    placed in a courthouse.

I   SIGNALLING AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY


    In the     area of technol ogical sys tems described in Table 4, the
I   followin g three functions can be included:


I         1.
          2.
                Personal safety
                Surveillance of space (including transmission of court-
                                           room proceed in gs to remote locations)
I         3.    General communicat i ons


I   The capabilities of this techn ol ogy are particularly well adapted
    to:

I         A.    Integrated alarm and communications sys t ems having a
                multi plicity of purposes and individual users
          B.    Serving spaces and moving persons
I
    PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY


I   Various types of conventiona l and unconventional l ocking devicqs
    and systems under thi s category are shO\m in Tahle 5 . One
I   intriguing new concept usin g computer-control is capahle of going
    far heyond ordinary lock-and-key control systems in systematizing

I   an'd controlling the operation of all locks and authorizing access
    to al l keyholders.

I
I
I
I                                                                        44

I
I   WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY


    No comments are made in this monoRraph ahout weapons for security

I   personnel, with the exception that non-lethal weapons appear to
    merit further study.
                                                                ~Iost
I        Courthouse security officers infrequently use g.uns.
    jurisdictions do not permit ~uns to be taken into detention spaces
    (with the paradoxical exception in some cases of police officers),
I   The use of guns in courtrooms is considered hazardous, at hest,
    to bystanders and spectator~ . For attorneys and judges to carry
I   guns, which presumes their possib l e use, is an even ~reater risk
    to the safety of persons in a courtroom. A shot from the bench

I   toward the trial participants' and the spectators' areas most likely
    would injure bystanders or other court personnel -~ to say nothing

I   of its effect to the image of justice.
         Several types of incapacitating gases ("Mace," tear gases)
    and other chemicals. such as tranquilizers, have been used or tested.
I   Presumably other techniques are being studied by police and military
    units, but these apparently do not as yet offer the ease. speed of
I   use or accuracy of the gun.


I   CONCLUDIN G EXA MPL ES


I   Courthouse security has been examined here by introducing the concept
    of a security system to inte~rate several problems, thereby al l owing

I   them to be treater! as a whole. Nhile the information here is interim
    in nature, based on research studies still under way, it is timely to

I   discuss the concept of approachin~ security on a systems basis.
         The methodolo~y of security syste~s analysis is accessible to a
    court administrator ""hen he fully understands that security is inex~
I   tricable from the other courthouse functions. and. in fact. inter-
    acts strongly with them. In well-designed courthouses. most
I   security problems \'lill have heen antiCipated and resolved by the


I
I
I                                                                             4S

I
I   designers; in others, the administrator may not have come to appre-
    ciate what good security design can accomplish.

I         Since the goal of thi s paper is to explain, not prescribe, a
    list of simple recommendations is not given; instead, a number of
    observations and guidelines was offered for court administrators'
I   use in examining their particul ar proh lens . To develop widely
    applicable recommendations, a continuing program of analysis and
I   empirical testin g is requisite. However, to illustrate the major
    points made here, three brief conclud ing examples are presented

I   for an arraignment court, a criminal trial court and a family court.

    ARRAIGNMENT FACILITIES
I   Substantial i"pTovements in the security of crowded arraignment

I   processes should result from introducing operational measures
    designed to reduce tension and architectural measures adapted to
    the needs of thi s court . From the earlier description of an
I   arraignment court, it is obvious th at :


I            Where more people occupy the spectator area than are con-
             cerned with the hearing in progress, crowd control is more

I            difficult and order harder to maintain.

             Excess traffic through the court disturbs defendants and

I            others .

              Inefficient circulation patterns throughout the court waste

I             time and heighten ten sion .

             The lack of s ecure spaces fo r prisoner/lat",),er conferences

I             and prisoner/family visits only increases confusion and
              heightens tension.

I        A comprehensive attack on these diffi culties can he mounted in
                                         n
    a system-oriented security design. A arraignment court need not

I   be   desi~ned   to resemhle other courtroons.   It should he feasible to


I
I
I                                                                             46

I
I   design the arrai gnment courtroom containing two spaces:
    space for the waiting officers, complainants, public, summoned
                                                                   a larger



I   defendant s . and rel ative s , and a smaller space for hearin gs.
    in the waiting space would keep the calendar up-to-date and advise
                                                                         Clerks


    parties ""hen to move into the hearin g space.      "Iuch more privacy
I   would be possible for all pa rticipant s .   CTowde~   spectator areas
    no lon ger cX'fIosed to emotional confusIon sometimes accor.l.panyi ng
I   hearings could be kept more orderly.      A higher case flow with more
    time for hearings might he achieved.      If small spaces were provided

I   for interview and visiting rooms. one of the most serious security
    prohlems might be defused: lal'l)'crs and relatives could meet with

I   prisoners away from the business of the court without impeding
    case flow. Some of these ~easures are practiced now in some family

I   court intake parts ,."here no one is allowed to be present durinr, a
    hearing except the actual participants.
         The system objective -- increased security -- can be aChieved
I   by:

          1.   Reducing queues of persons in the hearing court waitin g
I              for service, accomplished by:
               A.   Settinr, up a waiting space separate from the hearing
I                   space.
               B.   Scheduling the waiting room queue approximately, say
I                   on a one- to two-hour basis, and monitoring the hearing
                    status closely, perhaps on a 10-lS minute basis.

I              C.   Schedulin~ participants into the hearing space no

                    earlier than about IS minutes before their case is due

I         2.
                    to be called.
               Usin g security measures that reduce tension, not increase
               it, such as:
I              A. Advising participants (pictorially, hy si~ns, or by
                   personal instructions) as to what to expect and how to
I                   behave in and near the courtroom.


I
I
I                                                                              47

I
I             B.   Establi5hin~   small, secure interview and
                   for detain ed defendants.
                                                                visitin~   spaces


I             C.   Directing around the hearing space traffic between
                   detention and other spaces not related to the present
                   Or next hearing.
I             D.   Planning a smaller courtroom, but one with t he same
                   amount of hearing space to provide more efficient.
I                  faster circulation through the court.


I   CRIMINAL TRIAL FACILITIES

    Earlier this monograph examined security prob l ems in criminal trial

I   courtrooms and the concept of a "secure" courtroom designed for
    situations of extreme hazard.     Conceptually, a security system is

I   needed which deals primarily ,'lith the normal courtroom security
    problems but which adapts well to the extreme. The approach
    throughout this monograph amounts to a comprehensive way of looking
I   at a problem characterized by these four dimensions:


I        1.   The emotional state and, perhaps, the tactics of spectators
              are relatively predictable .
         2.   The number of spectators allowed in the courtroom and
I             courthouse can be controlled.
         3.   Routes of spectator movement through the courthouse and the
I             opening of courtroom doors are controlled by securi t y
              personnel.
I        4.   In the courtroom, spectators and defendants can be kept
              separated.

I        Given these points, the    underlyin~   security problems can he
    dealt with in a coordinated manner, including:

I        1.   An adequate number of security personnel deployed opera-
              tionally on a huildin~-wide basis from a central security
I             command post.


I
I                                                                               48

I
I        2.    Fast communication between a command post and all security
               personnel, as well as all courtrooms.

I        3.    Means of eliminating th e possibility of weapons heinr. brought
               into a courtroom at any ti me .
                             de5i~n
I        4.    A courtroom            ",'hich provides space for unrestrained
               movement of security and other court personne l, adequate
               personal supervision of defendants and a reliable degree
I              of separation bebJeen spectators and all pa rticipants.
         S.    Absolutely no standing in the courtroom at any time. except
I              as authorized.
         6.    A system of   preventin~   more spectators than can be accommo-

I        7.
               dated in a courtroom from approaching its vicinity.
               Design of li ghtin g. thermal, and acoustic environment

I              which permits security personnel adequate observation of
               all persons in the courtroom .

I   FAMILY COURT FACILITIES

    Because all   ~ersons   not directly participating in a hearin g are
I   excluded from family courtrooms, security attention i s shifted to
    the parties themsel ves and to other courthouse operations. Family
I   court security problems are characterized hy:

              Emotionally unstable and immature persons who may be prone
I             to violence and escape attempts.

I             Disputes between persons which cannot be confined to t hc
              courtroom hut may hreak out else'.Jhere.

I             A high proportion of intervic,.J and waiting spaces in relation
              to courtroom spaces .

I             Juveniles held in detention facilities who arc potentially
              dan gerous to th emse l ves and to each other.   They may he

I             held "in need of supcrvision" or for offenses up to homicide.



I
I
I                                                                              49

I
I             Children in the courthouse who are present with families
              but are not themselves part ies and are undergo inp,      lon~


I             waits.

        To implement the ohjective of increased security , these com-
I   prehensive measures may he applicahle:

         1.    Assigning to courtroom and other courthouse spaces security
I              personnel ,.,.he are:
               A.   Trained and particularly conpetent in child behavior

I                   and th e handling of disturbed people; ahle to persuade,
                    inspire confidence and command the respect of juveniles;

I                   and possessed of the physica l strength and experience
                    to control violence.

I              B.   Capablc of reducin g tension hy showi ng empathy with
                    the people and     probl~ ~5   brought before the court.
               C.   Quick to respond ,..hen informed by a central security
I                   office when prohlems occur elsewhere in the court-
                    hou se. Security personne l should be stationed in
I                   waiting and intervie. . ' spaces and halls to deter out-
                   breaks and r estrain violence.

I        2.    Detention facilities designed and staffed to handle juve-
               niles which are:

I              A. Free of prison atmosphere and equipped with facilities
                    to occupy the minds and attention of detained children
                    and which are appropriate to the legal and socia l
I                   situation.
               B.   St affed by unarmed supervising personnel in civilian
I                   clothes, trained in handlin g disturbed and violent
                    children. The total environment should he arranged
I              C.
                    to calm fears and divert energies from des tru ctive ends.
                    Located remote from any juvenile detention center,

I                   re formatory , or jail. A jail looming over a family
                    courthouse will increase tension, adding to security

I                   problems.



I
I                                                                     50


I
I   3.   Circulation spaces for detained juveniles 'ihich are:
         A.   Private so th at juveniles prone to violence and escape

I        B.
              can receive constant close supervision.
              Isolated so that others in the courthouse who could be
              exposed to the potential physical and emotional hazards
I             of detained juveniles can he protected .
         C.   Planned for vertical and horizontal movement of de-
I             tained juveniles. From huildin~ entrance to detention
              facilities, to courtrooms. and to interview spaces,
I             all juvenile detention spaces should he private and
              separated from all other spaces. In multi-court

I             buildings , waitin g rooms for detained juveniles should
              be included adjacent to courtrooms .

I        D.   Completely separate from adult detention spaces,
              including circulation and holding spaces . Nhether
              adult detention should be private dep ends on the
I             experience of the court.
    4.   Waiting spaces for chi ldren not parties to proceedings or
I        not actually participating:
         A.   Children from infancy to late teens, some only by-

I             standers, may he required to spend a lon g day waiting.
              They arc likely to become restl ess and noisy and

I             disturb others .   Infants will require   attentio~,

              feedin g , changin~, sleep , and protection. Older

I             children also ne ed protection as Ive ll as to occupy
              their minds and hands.
         B.   The sounds and sigh t s of bored children lend a chaotic
I             and uneasy air to the serious business of a family
              court.
I        C.   Private spaces, equipped to care for the mental and
              physical need s of infant s and older children, staffed

I             by trained counse lors and isolated from other court-
              house activities, will remedy this difficu lty.




I
--------- ------ - - --
  TABLE 3: DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
  3.1 DETECTING ENTRANCE TO PREMISES



            TECIINIQIIE                       OPERATION                              ' CO~NT


  A. At building pe.im.utr1l


  Photo-electric beams         Establish I1ght beams from point-to-point    Works during hours of darkness .
  --visible light              along outside perimeter of courthouse:
  --infra-red light            person or object interrupting activates
                               alarm; light source and receiver

  Floodlights                  Light building exterior decoratively,        Personnel must observe directly
                               and for personnel or TV monitor              or on monitors
                               surveillance

  Closed-circuit               Normal TV cameras for daylight or floorlit   Unless automatic detector used,
  television (CCTV)            buildings and ultra-sensitive cameras for    requires constant attention
                               unlit night surveillance; monitors also
                               can be fitted with automatic detectors to
                               activate alarms

  B.   At   buildinG .n'!fnm


  Door alarms                  Applied to doors, windows, gates, etc;       Can be connected to commercial.
       t-fagnetic switch       alarms locally (buzzer on door), remotely    police, or security staff central
       Mechanical switch '     or both when door opened by key or force     office ; alarm location identified
       Open or closed                                                       by central office equipment
        cireui t

  Wall vibration pickups       Applied to walls to sense and amplify        Main use: vaults, safes; prone to
                               unusual vibration levels, send remote or     false alarm at normal building "
                               local alarm; sensitive to sledge hammer      vibration levels
                               blows~ boring drills. etc.


  Light sensors                Detects light entering when safe or closed
                               dark space opened; remote alarm routine
                                                                            Very sensitive and reliable
                                                                                                                 -
                                                                                                                 '"
-----------------
3.1 DETECTING ENTRANCE TO PREMISES (CONTINUED)



    TECHNIQUE                           OPERATION                              COMMENT

C. Fcw inl.iof !11K"


Switch cords and mats     Placed near entrance, sounds alarm,           In stores. signals customer's
                          local or remote, when depressed               en trance
Ul tra-scns i ti ve       Picks up indistinct room sounds; pos-         Used in vacated building, other-
microphone                sible false alarm detecting rodents,          wise false alarm on normal activity
                          cats, bi r ds, street noises

Microwave                 Small wall transmitters, receiver(s) flood    Possible false alarms on electrical
                          corridors, rooms \"ith "radar-like" energy;   interference from radios, elevators,
                          adjusted and calibrated to space; movement    etc; can be jammed and deceived
                          detected of greater than set minimum vel-
                          ocity of objects greater than set minimum
                          size. Signals locally or remotely when
                          beam disturbed

Ultrasonic                Similar to microwave but emits sound energy   False alarm prone on air movement,
                          of higher than audible frequency; transmit-   from heat, wind, vibration. vents,
                          ter (loudspeaker) and receiver (microphone)   blowers; can be jammed and deceived

CCTV                       Similar to building perimeter application    Similar to   buildin~   perimeter comment

Capaci tance               Safes, file cabinets; detects change in      Not too reliable; setup may be too
                           electronic capacitance to ground when        complex
                           person touches

Door alarms                Similar to operation at building             Similar to building entrance comment
   Nall vibration          entrances
    pick-up
   Light sensors                                                                                               '"
                                                                                                               N
-----------------
3.2   DETECTING CONCEALED WEAPONS



      TECHNIQUE -                                         OPERATION                        COMMENT

At ~ys. tumstil... dnk..   p t..,   _ct.   pointe .nd ifI ' eo"idon


Magnetometer                         Senses alteration in normal ambient           No radiation from devices; can
                                     magnetic field when magnetic metals           indicate falsely on keys, coins,
                                     (steel, iron) brought near                    when sensitive enough to reliably
                                                                                   detect weapons

                                     Can detect concealed guns, knives, metal      Can fail to detect weapons when made
                                     combs, tools, ice picks, etc.,carried         insensitive to false alarms; useful
                                     on person or in packages; alarm signals       to screen possible weapons carriers
                                     audibly or visually. local or remote          and limit number of personal searches

                                     Models hand-held (night stick size)   and     Can be useful to locate metallic
                                     fixed (two tall tubes) ; aimed at person      objects, frisking still necessary
                                     or walk between tubes -- immediate reaction

X-ray                                Compact machine radiates into packages;       Can detect weapons hidden in items
                                     X-ray film. including Polaroid, used          ordinarily not opened: portable
                                     for indicator                                 radios, tape recorders, briefcase
                                                                                   false bottoms, etc. Not useful if
                                                                                   packages can be opened. Film must be
                                                                                   developed, relatively slow indication.
                                                                                   Trained interpreter must read picture
                                                                                   for dynamite, bomb components, other
                                                                                   eye discrimination. Cannot be used on
                                                                                   persons, X- rays harmful



                                                                                                                       '"
                                                                                                                       '"
       ----------------
TABLE 4:    SIGNALLING AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
4.1   PERSONAL SAFETY:   SIGNALLING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS


        TECHNIQUE                         OPERATION                               COHMENT


Alarm button concealed      Connection by wire or radio system             Useful in courtrooms. chambers.
and fixed to bench.         (see below) to r emo te courthouse location.   other offices; unobtrusive;
desk, chair, etc.           About 4"x2"xl".   Connects to central office   reliabl e and precise. usually
                            where space identified, alarm network can      difficult to actuat e false alarm.
                            cover many spaces                              Location depends on personal
                                                                           judgement -- in court. probably at
                            Actuated by finger on button, removing         bench. Courtroom. courthouse must be
                            weight (3 book) from switch, pulling           wired. if wire device used. to connect
                            paper from switch jaws, foot pedal, etc.       each loca tion; can give local alarm
                            Actuating device also can activate sur-        (in courtroom). if desired. Available
                            veillance equipment (TV or audio pickup)       from many sources
                            to transmit to central office visible
                            and audible activities

Alarm button concealed      Similar to above; cigarette-pack size          Similar to above except does not
on person                   radio transmitter signals to receiver          directly identify location. only
                            and relays to central station; trans-          bearer; simpler to install than
                            mitting frequency and possibly other signal    wired alarms; needs additional
                            characteristics identify unit, person car-     equipment to actuate local alarm
                            rying it and assumed location; not
                            restricted to one location; can be trans-
                            ferred to another person.




                                                                                                              .~
-                          - ------------
    4.2   REMOTE SURVEILLANCE: TRANSMISSION OF COURTROOM PROCEDURES
          AND REMOTE SPACE ACTIVITY FOR OBSERVATION ELSEWHERE



             TECIINIQUE                         OPERATION                               CO~~IENT



    Closed circuit t e levis ion   TV came ras fixe d t o walls, ceilings;        ~1an ual or au toma tic/manual
    (CCTV)                         operat ed from remote location; zoom           moni t or ing needed (continual
                                   or turret lenses; transmits pictur e of        manual monitor ing fatiguing);
                                   space to monitor via wires. In court -         can reduce security manpower
                                   room application, as for defendant tried       patrol dut ies. When used "in
                                   in absentia, can be manually operated in       absen ti a l l trials, m.ly require
                                   studio-type situation . A monitor panel        specia l legal precaution; shou ld
                                   for camera network throughout courthouse       not be subject to possibility of
                                   feasible; ultra-sensitive for low light        unauthorized r ecording
                                   levels, normal cameras; automatic monitors
                                   to detect movement feasible

    Film cameras                   As in banks, automatically operated,           Possible use as evidence and
                                   r emote l y actu~tcd cameras photograph        identification for apprehension
                                   persons in emergencies for subsequent
                                   identification

    Audio                          Emergency-actuated system transmits
                                   courtroom si t uat ion to central securi t y
                                   office




                                                                                                                        '"
                                                                                                                        '"
                          ---------------
 4.3 COMMUNICATIONS


          TECHNIQUE                       OPERATION                                  COt.\I!ENT

A.   ~ol"I'lo-pol"t ,   WiNd


Telephones, intercom           Emergency signalling with special            Telephone on cradle also used
                               dial codes to and from security              in system to pick up and trans-
                               offices; party-line broadcasts of            mit sounds to prearranged
                               emergency mcssages from central security     receiver, under local or remote
                               office to al l others                        control


B. Sound bro..:tuJ1lng


Audio public-address           Broadcast to public in crowd-and riot-
 system                        control operations or to security per-
                               sonnel in control operations. Notifica-
                               tion of evacuations, fires; in selected
                               spaccs and times, public information on
                               calendars, court locations; to call parti-
                               cipants into court

C. Mobil.

Radio
     Portable "walkie          Broadcast messages throughout courthousc     Requires FCC license and frequency
      talkie"                  from central trans mi tter to unlimited      allocations; portable units bat-
     Fixed or portable         numbe r of portablc rcccivers--voice or      tery operated. can be small and
      central station          alarm signals; two-way tran smissions        sec reted, if de sired; system can
     Broadcast or two-way      throughout courthouse between central        conncct to PA or teleph one systems;
      operation                transmit/receive station and limited         courtroom alar ms can feed sys tem;
     Voice transmissions       number of portable transceivers ; multi-     inte~rates into courthouse communi-
      or ala r m signals       channe l capahi lity to handle multiple      cations for normal (non-security)
                               communications simultaneously. either        operations; r eceive rs can he silent
                               hroadcast or two-way; coverage through-      (visual alarm notifies beare r to go
                               out courthouse, including all closed         phone or take other specific action)    '"
                                                                                                                    '"
                               rooms, sub-hasements . elevators; se-        or squelched (to be silent except
                               l ective calling capahility to address       when called)
                               specific receivers
-------------------
  TABLE 5: PROTECTIVE TECHNOLOGY
  5.1   LOCKING SYSTEMS: DOORS, GATES, TURNSTILES, OTHER ACCESS MECHANISMS


          TECHNIQUE                          OPERATION                              CO~~IENT


  Mechanical locks              Conventional lock-and-key systems with       Various devices using mechanical
                                hierarchical mastering                       and magnetic keys inserted in lock
                                                                             actuate it; function only to lock
                                                                             and unlock access (no record keeping);
                                                                             locks difficult to alter; difficult
                                                                             to limit availability of keys; mos t
                                                                             keys easily duplicated

  Electrical locks              Lock operated by electrical solenoids,       Magnetic keys difficult t o duplicate;
                                no conventional key; actuated by switch      code usually cannot be chan ged; new
                                (pushbutton on desk, etc.) or inserted       key card must be made if lock code
                                magneticall y-coded card; lock measures      is changed by rewiring or inserting
                                magnetic code and actuates itself, if        a permanent or temporary code card;
                                se t for that code; key cards issued to      standby power source required~ locks
                                personnel as keys can also be ID card;       can be networked into door alarm
                                hierarchical mastering possib l e; control   system. replacing sepa rate alarms
                                of a ll or some courthouse l ocks from
                                central office possible, i.e., to seal
                                off particular area

  Computer-controlled           As above, but with added control and         Record kept. printed out of each time
   locks                        recording capability provided by small       lock opened and by which key; list of
                                digital computer wired to all courthouse     key/door authorizations can be mod -
                                loc ks~ Computer determines key cards        ified at central computer in real time.
                                allowed to actuate each lock. accord-        Overriding control by computer can open
                                ing to memory-stored list; hierarchical      or close any lock selectively; locked
                                mastering associated with key card code      doors automatically relock and canno t
                                a l so can be assigned to bearer for pre-    be le ft open; computer will automatic-
                                determined access; one key per person        ally signal malfunction, blocked door,
                                for any number of doors; l ock time con-     etc; feasib l e to check automatically
                                trol by central computer can be programm-    from central office any Joor left open
                                ed to lock public doors after hours; all
                                lock status (open or closed) computer-
                                                                                                                       '"
                                                                                                                       ~




                                monitored , custodial operations included

								
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