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Self Directed Ira Business Agreement Llc

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					                                                   409 – Business Enterprises
                                                          Professor Lawrence
                                                                  Spring 2004
                               Keyed to: Business Associations,5th Edition, Klein, Ramseyer, and Bainbridge



Course Overview ............................................................................................................................................ 3
  I.    Business Forms / Legal Structure ................................................................................................ 3
  II.   Corporate Forms are more Complicated .................................................................................... 5
CHAPTER 1: AGENCY ........................................................................................................................... 6
  I.    Exam Hints ..................................................................................................................................... 6
  II.   Generally ........................................................................................................................................ 6
  III.  3 Types of Agency .......................................................................................................................... 6
  IV.   Who is an Agent ............................................................................................................................. 7
  V.    Liability of Principal to Third Parties in Contract .................................................................... 8
  VI.   Liability of Principal to Third Parties in Tort .......................................................................... 11
  VII. Fiduciary Obligations of Agents................................................................................................. 13
CHAPTER 2: PARTNERSHIPS ........................................................................................................... 14
  I.    What is a Partnership? And Who are the Partners? .............................................................. 14
  II.   Fiduciary Obligations of Partners.............................................................................................. 15
  III.  Partnership Property .................................................................................................................. 16
  IV.   Raising Additional Capital ......................................................................................................... 16
  V.    The Rights of Partners in Management .................................................................................... 17
  VI.   Additions / Addendums to Partnership Agreements ............................................................... 17
  VII. Partnership Dissolution............................................................................................................... 18
CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION................................................................. 23
  I.    Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 23
  II.   Promoters and the Corporate Entity ......................................................................................... 23
  III.  The Corporate Entity and Limited Liability ............................................................................ 23
  IV.   Shareholder Derivative Actions ................................................................................................. 25
CHAPTER 4: THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ................................................................... 30
  I.    Overview ....................................................................................................................................... 30
  II.   Strategic Uses ............................................................................................................................... 31
  III.  LLC Features ............................................................................................................................... 33
  IV.   Formation ..................................................................................................................................... 35
  V.    The Operating Agreement .......................................................................................................... 35
  VI.   Piercing the “LLC” Veil ............................................................................................................. 36
  VII. Fiduciary Obligation ................................................................................................................... 36
  VIII.   Dissolution ................................................................................................................................ 36
CHAPTER 5: THE DUTIES OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND OTHER INSIDERS .............. 38
  I.    Business Judgment Rule ............................................................................................................. 38
  II.   Duty of Care – Obligations of Control ...................................................................................... 38
  4.    Challenging Executive Compensation (How to) ....................................................................... 40
  III.  Duty of Loyalty ............................................................................................................................ 41
  IV.   Disclosures and Fairness ............................................................................................................. 47
CHAPTER 6: PROBLEMS OF CONTROL ........................................................................................ 60
  I.    Proxy Fights ................................................................................................................................. 60
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 II.  Shareholder Voting Control ....................................................................................................... 67
 III. Control in Closely Held Corporations ....................................................................................... 68
 IV.  Abuse of Control .......................................................................................................................... 72
 V.   Control, Duration, and Statutory Dissolution .......................................................................... 74
 VI.  Transfer of Control ..................................................................................................................... 76
CHAPTER 7: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND TAKEOVERS .................................................. 79
 I.   Mergers and Acquisitions ........................................................................................................... 79
 II.  Takeovers ..................................................................................................................................... 86
CHAPTER 8: CORPORATE DEBT ..................................................................................................... 96
 I.   Generally ...................................................................................................................................... 96
 II.  Debtor’s Sale of Substantially All Its Assets ............................................................................. 96
 III. Incurrence of Additional Debt.................................................................................................... 96
 IV.  Exchange Offers........................................................................................................................... 96
 V.   Redemption and Call Protection ................................................................................................ 96




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Course Overview
I.     Business Forms / Legal Structure
            A.    Sole Proprietor
            B.    Partnership               General, Limited, LLP
            C.    Corporations              C-Corp, S-Corp
            D.    LLC
            E.    Others                    Non-profit


Sole Proprietor            General                          Advantages                     Disadvantages
Sole Proprietor            Owned/operated by single         Easy setup                     #1 – Owner is personally
                           person                           Least complicated              liable for all of business‟s
                                                                                           liabilities and debts
                                                            “Flow-through” taxation. All
                                                            profits/losses reported        Financing opportunities
                                                            directed on owners personal    limited to own assets and/or
                                                            tax return. Thus, no           borrowing money
                                                            “double taxation.”
                                                            Owner retains all control.


Partnerships               General                          Advantages                     Disadvantages
General Partnership        A business owned by two or       Few legal requirements for     #1 – Partners are personally
                           more individuals                 formation. Nothing is          responsible for all business
                           Owners share profits and         required. De facto             liabilities and losses. Each
                           losses                           partnership status is          partners is 100%
                                                            possible. With De facto        responsible regardless of
                           Even with NO election or         partnerships, if you have      which partner incurred the
                           agreement                        problems then go to state      liability or debt. (Joint and
                           If no agreement, then state      statutes.                      Severally Liable)
                           law determines the contract      Allows for pooling of
                           between the partners             resources. Someone can
                                                            provide sweat equity and
                                                            another provides financial
                                                            equity.
                                                            “Flow-through” taxation.
                                                            Losses if any report on
                                                            personal return. No double
                                                            taxation
Limited Partnership        Business owned by 2 or           Limited partners risk is       General partners remains
                           more individuals or other        limited to his/her financial   personally responsible for all
                           business entities in which at    investment in business         liabilities and debts of the
                           least one of the partners        General partner can retain     business
                           have limited liability           personal control, while        Limited partners may not
                           protection. (limited liability   increasing financial           work in the business or
                           caps liability to the extend     resources by selling           participate in management
                           of investment)                   additional limited             without losing limited
                           At least one general partner     partnership interests.         liability status
                           remains personally liable for
                           all debts or partnership.
                           Statutory partnership




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LLC                    General                              Advantages                         Disadvantages
Limited Liability      New entity combining concepts        Can be taxed like a partnership.   More difficult to bring in new
Company (LLC)          of partnerships for tax purposes     Flow-through taxation.             financing because there are no
                       (ie flow through taxation) and       Taxation is elected.               shares to distribute. Members
                       corporation for liability purposes   Limited liability for members      have ownership but not shares
                       Owners (“members”) elect or                                             per se.
                                                            Similar to S Corp, but without
                       hire managers to run business                                           Business form is less recognized
                                                            the restrictions placed on S
                       This form has killed the             Corporation.                       Tax and liability treatment not
                       necessity of the partnership                                            uniform across state lines
                       form. No one should elect a
                       partnership anymore. It has all
                       the benefits of a partnership
                       with limited liability.


Corporate              General                              Advantages                         Disadvantages
C Corp                 Legal entity that exists             Greater stability. Corporation     Owners are liable if “corporate
                       separately from the people who       continues to exist and od          veil” has been pierced. Piercing
                       create it                            business when owner dies or        the corporate veil is an
                       Owned by shareholders, run by        sells                              argument that the shareholders
                       board of directors elected by        Limited liability – legal entity   should not benefit of limited
                       shareholders.                        separate from owners with life     liability. It is an attempt to get
                                                            of its own. Creates wall of        the assets of the shareholders.
                       Created by filing “Articles of
                                                            separation that normally limits    Profits may be subject to double
                       Incorporation” with Secretary of
                                                            stockholder liability to the       taxation. Corporate profits
                       State and by adopting bylaws.
                                                            amount of his/her investment.      taxes, distributions to
                       Bylaws do not need to be filed.
                                                            Broad range of financing           shareholders also taxed.
                       Bylaws are agreements or Rules
                       of the Road by the directors to      opportunities. Equity financing
                       what they will do, officers will     or debt financing.
                       do, notice requirements for
                       meetings, etc.
                       Board may hire officers to
                       manage day-to-day operations
                       of the business. In small
                       corporations, directs and
                       corporate officers are usually
                       the same individuals.
                       Close Corporation
                       Same as regular corporation,
                       but statutes make them
                       condensed. Example: Only one
                       person ones all shares, he
                       doesn‟t have to hold annual
                       meetings, elect himself, etc.
S Corp                 Corporation with special tax         All the advantages of a regular    To qualify, corporation must
                       status granted by IRS to tax the     C Corporation                      comply with certain restrictions
                       business like partnership or sole    Flow through taxation                  -    may have only one
                       proprietorship.                                                                  class of stock
                                                                                                   -    max of 75 shareholders
                                                                                                   -    shareholders must be
                                                                                                        natural person (no
                                                                                                        corporations)
                                                                                               [Might be able to give shares
                                                                                               that have same distribution
                                                                                               rights BUT different voting
                                                                                               rights]




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Others                 General                          Advantages                   Disadvantages

Non-profits Orgs       Organization that uses all
                       profits to further
                       organizational goals instead
                       of distributing the profits to
                       shareholders.
                       Generally, may elect to be
                       unincorporated or
                       incorporated.
                       May qualify for tax-exempt
                       status under 501(c) in one
                       or more areas.
Out of State           Must register in every state
Businesses             in which you do business
                       Exception: Mail order


           F.   Areas of Concern when determining which Legal Entity to use
                     1.   Financial and legal risk
                     2.   Management and control
                     3.   Financing                                  Why is DE so popular?
                     4.   Tax implications                              DE has favorable laws for managers
                                                                        DE has very competent judiciary to
                                                                         handle business issues
II.    Corporate Forms are more Complicated
           A.   Bylaws
                     1.   Bylaws are internal documents
                     2.   Should be very broad, “Our purpose is to engage in any lawful business…”
                     3.   If business extends beyond authority, then it is violating the law
                           a.    Ultra Vires – a violation of extending beyond the limitations of the
                                 bylaws or business
           B.   Articles of Incorporation
                     1.   Articles are public documents
                     2.   Same as a company‟s Charter
           C.   Financing / Selling Stock
                     1.   General Rule: If you sell stock, you must register with your State and SEC
                           a.    Exception: Small business have exceptions like Reg D
                                    1)   Stock offering to small number of sophisticated buyers
           D.   Financing / “Blue Sky” Laws
                     1.   State laws on securities issues
                     2.   Corporation can be protected by Reg D for Federal Laws, but “Blue Sky” laws
                          still need to be addressed.
                           a.    Must research state laws in all states where buyers live
                           b.    Reporting before soliciting might be required… research first!
                           c.    Part of an attorney‟s Due Diligence
                           d.    Great source of billable hours


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CHAPTER 1: AGENCY
I.     Exam Hints
           Step 1: Identify the parties: (i) principle, (ii) agent, and (iii) third party
           Step 2: Does an agency exist? Identify the type of agency
           Step 3: Determine scope of agency
           Step 4: Determine liability


II.    Generally
           A.   Importance of Agency relationships
                     1.   It is the core principle behind the employee/employer relationship
                     2.   Respondent Superior – Impune liabilities on employer for acts of employee
                          through the laws of agency.
           B.   Agency deals with Fiduciary Obligations
           C.   Rest 2d § 1
                     1.   Agency is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by
                          one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
                          control, and consent by the other so to act.
           D.   Example: When is corporate McDonalds liable for employee‟s actions?
                     1.   Self-owned stores – Definitely liable
                     2.   Franchise stores – Look at circumstances of “control”
                           a.   They can structure the relationship to mitigate liability
                           b.   If they sufficiently “control” the franchise, then liable
                           c.   If they do not “control”, then not liable
           E.   Policy of holding Principle liable for Agent‟s acts
                     1.   Based on Least Cost Avoidance
                           a.   Which party is in the best position to prevent the harm? Principle.
                                                                                     3 Types of Agency
III.   3 Types of Agency
                                                                                           Actual Authority
           A.   Actual Authority                                                           Apparent Authority
                     1.   Rest. 2d §2.01                                                   Inherent Authority
                           a.   A acts with actual authority if at the time of taking authority the A
                                actually believes that the P wishes the A to act
                     2.   KEY: A believes he has been given authority
                     3.   Express
                           a.   P tells A he has authority and Agent believes it.
                           b.   Example: P tells A to drive to sandwich shop. A runs 3P over. P is liable.
                     4.   Implied
                           a.   P tells A to get something done and Agent believes he must take certain
                                steps to get it done.
                           b.   Example 1: P tells A to get him a sandwich from the deli. A must drive
                                to deli and runs 3P over. P is liable.



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                           c.   Example 2: P tells A to cut his lawn. P‟s mower sucks, A goes to get his
                                own. A runs 3P over on the way. P is liable.
           B.   Apparent Authority
                     1.   Rest. 2d §2.03
                           a.   Through an act of the principle, 3P reasonably believes the A has power
                                to act because P as manifested consent.
                     2.   KEY: 3P reasonably believes P has manifested consent for A to act.
                     3.   Rest. 2d §8
                           a.   Requirements of Apparent Authority (2):
                                   1)   3P must know P has placed A in position of agency
                                   2)   A acts in a reasonably customary way.
           C.   Inherent Authority
                     1.   P is responsible to 3P for acts of A which while unauthorized or unstated are
                          close to those that are authorized
                     2.   Example 1: Watteau. It looks to the world like A is the owner, but P owns the
                          business. Something happens and P says A had neither actual nor implied
                          authority.
                     3.   Inherent Authority should be argued when no Actual or Apparent Authority
                          exists
                           a.   Although, you can have both Apparent Authority and Inherent Authority
           D.   HYPO #1a: Paul owns an apartment building. Paul hires Ann to manage it. Paul tells
                Ann to fix the stairs.
                     1.   Agency: Yes         Type: Actual
           E.   HYPO #1b: Ann hires a janitor to clean the building.
                     1.   Agency: Yes         Type: Implied
           F.   HYPO #1c: Ann hires a janitor, but Paul specifically instructed Ann not to hire a janitor.
                Local custom, however, gives apartment managers the power to hire janitors.
                     1.   Agency: Yes         Type: Apparent Authority (also Inherent Authority)
           G.   HYPO #2a: Al tells Ted that he is Pam‟s agent.
                     1.   Agency: No          Type: No manifestation from Pam to Ted
           H.   HYPO #2b: Suppose Pam had been present when Al made the statement to Ted. She
                was silent.
                     1.   Agency: Yes, through Ratification        Type: Apparent Authority
                     2.   Ratification on an estoppel theory because of silence. If Pam does not speak
                          up to deny the assertion, she manifests her assent.


IV.    Who is an Agent
           A.   Loans do NOT create agency. Bailment does NOT create agency.
                     1.   Look for “This is a loan” language to argue loan or bailment
           B.   Gorton v. Doty
                     1.   Facts: Football coach was driving Doty‟s car and wrecked. Kid was hurt. Was
                          coach an agent of Doty?




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                     2.   ROLs: (i) Ownership creates a prima facie case of agency (ii) Manifestation of
                          consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
                          subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. Rest. 2d. §1.
                     3.   Important control factors: Actual Authority
                            a.   Doty required Coach to drive (condition precedent)
                            b.   Doty offered the use of her car
           C.   A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.
                     1.   Facts: Grain elevator basically controlled by its creditor.
                     2.   ROLs: A creditor who assumes control of their debtor‟s business may become
                          liable as principal for the acts of the debtor in connection with the business.
                     3.   Important control factors: Apparent Authority
                            a.   Checks were imprinted with creditors information
                            b.   Creditor was paying all the bills


V.     Liability of Principal to Third Parties in Contract
           A.   Generally: Principle is liable when an agency relationship exists.
           B.   Authority
                     1.   Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan
                     2.   Facts: Church hired Bill to paint. Bill hired his brother to help. Brother hurt.
                     3.   ROL: Implied authority is actual authority circumstantially proven which the
                          principal actually intended the agent to possess and includes such powers as
                          are practically necessary to carry out the duties actually delegated.
                     4.   Important factors:
                            a.   Job required 2 people, but church only hired 1
                            b.   Bill hired his brother in the past to help with church jobs
                     5.   HYPO off Hogan: Church says, “Hire no one else!”
                            a.   Still a good case for Apparent Authority. Brother has reasonable belief
                                 because (i) he worked with them in the past, (ii) job required 2 people
           C.   Apparent Authority
                     1.   Lind v. Schenley Industries, Inc.
                            a.   Facts: Lind promoted, boss promised 1% commission. Never got it.
                            b.   ROL: Apparent authority arises when a principal acts in such a manner
                                 as to convey the impression to a 3rd party that an agent has certain
                                 powers which he may or may not actually possess. Whether agent has
                                 actual power is irrelevant.
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   Boss did not have actual authority, but that is irrelevant.
                                    2)   Lind was told his Boss had authority
                     2.   Three-Seventy Leasing Corporation v. Ampex Corporation
                            a.   Facts: Joyce tried to buy computers from Ampex to lease to EDS.
                            b.   ROL: Absent contrary knowledge on the part of the 3rd party, an agent
                                 has the apparent authority to do those things which are usual and
                                 customary to the conduct of the business which he is employed to
                                 conduct.

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                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Mueller sent intraoffice memo expressing Keys is contact
                                   2)   Keys sent letter confirming dates
           D.   Inherent Agency Power
                     1.   Undisclosed principal is liable for acts of agent on his account, if usual or
                          necessary in such transactions
                           a.   Undisclosed principle is liable for entrusted agent‟s actions. Watteau.
                           b.   Customary powers for such agents. Kidd.
                           c.   No manifestation of principle needed. Nogales.
                     2.   Watteau v. Fenwick
                           a.   Facts: Humble operated a beerhouse for principle. No one was aware
                                principle owned beerhouse. Cigarette supplier sold stuff to Humble
                                against expressed authority of P. Π wins.
                           b.   ROL: (i) Undisclosed principle is liable for acts of agent done on his
                                account, if usual or necessary in such transactions, although forbidden by
                                principal. (ii) Undisclosed principles are liable to 3rd parties if they entrust
                                an agent with managing their business, even if contrary to directions of
                                principle.
                           c.   Note: No Apparent Authority because principle is undisclosed.
                                Impossible for principle to manifest anything.
                     3.   Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc. - Customary power of such agents
                           a.   Facts: Tone tests. Fuller contracted with Kidd for US tour. Fuller only
                                had authority for recitals, not US tour. Π wins.
                           b.   ROL: Scope of authority measured by entirety of setting, including the
                                customary powers of such agents.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Customary powers, Kidd had no reason to believe otherwise
                                   2)   Fuller was entrusted with setting up the whole recital
                     4.   Nogalas Service Ctr v. Atlantic Richfield Co. - No manifestation needed
                           a.   Facts: Tucker negotiated with station owners. During trial, Π wanted
                                instruction given for Inherent Agency. It wasn‟t. Court erred, Π wins.
                           b.   ROL: Inherent agency powers, principle may be liable upon contract by
                                its agent if (i) usual type made by agent, (ii) even if forbidden by
                                principle, (iii) no manifestation by principle needed.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Customary for Tucker to deal with stations in that area
                                   2)   For special problems, matters of investment, grant volume
                                        discounts
           E.   Ratification
                     1.   Principle adopts by words or actions a contract negotiated by an unauthorized
                          person
                           a.   Acceptance of the results of the act,
                           b.   Intention to ratify, and
                           c.   With full knowledge of all material circumstances


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                      2.   Exam Procedure (2)
                            a.   What act was an affirmation by principle
                            b.   What effect should be given to the affirmation
                      3.   Botticello v. Stefanovicz
                            a.   Facts: Husband/wife were tenants in common. Husband not wife‟s agent
                                 for selling the land.
                            b.   ROL: Ratification requirements (i) acceptance of the results of the
                                 act, (ii) with an intent to ratify, and (iii) with full knowledge of all material
                                 circumstances.
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   Won‟t sell for “less than $85” is not the same as selling for $85
                                    2)   Marital status cannot itself prove agency relationship
                                    3)   Owning land jointly cannot itself prove agency relationship
                                    4)   Not important that she failed to repudiate
           F.   Estoppel
                      1.   Hoddeson v. Koos Bros
                            a.   Facts: Fake furniture salesman took customers money. Store is liable.
                            b.   ROL: Duty of the proprietor encircles the exercise of reasonable care and
                                 vigilance to protect the customer from loss occasioned by the deceptions
                                 of an apparent salesman.
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   Proprietor should take care of their own store
                                    2)   Objective standard – Would an ordinary person have believed he
                                         was an agent?
           G.   Agent‟s Liability on the Contract
                      1.   Atlantic Salmon A/S v. Curran
                            a.   Facts: Salmon companies sold salmon to Boston. Boston was actually
                                 Marketing Designs. Π never knew of MD. Π sued agent, and was liable.
                            b.   ROL: To avoid personal liability, agent must disclose his agency and
                                 must not rely upon others to discover it. Third party must know of
                                 agency/principle relationship for agent to escape liability.
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   Π never had actual knowledge. Π did have ability to discover.

  Exam Process on Agency - Analyze Liability
  1. Was there Actual, Apparent, or Inherent Agency?
          a. Actual                – Was power given to A from P (actual or implied)?
          b. Apparent              – Did P manifest authority in A (A‟s words don‟t matter)?
          c. Inherent              – Customary authority in A?
  2. If no agency, then analyze Ratification and Estoppel theories
          a. Ratification          – i) accept results ii) intent to ratify iii) full knowledge matl circum
          b. Estoppel              – i) duty ii) negligence causes harm



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VI.    Liability of Principal to Third Parties in Tort
           A.   Servant v. Independent Contractor
                     1.   Respondent Superior
                           a.   Master is liable for acts of employees
                           b.   When does the Master/Servant relationship exist (look for control)
                                   1)   Servant has agreed to work on behalf of master
                                   2)   Has agreed to be subject to the master‟s control
                           c.   Distinguish from Independent Contractor status       (look for control)
                                   1)   The party is either an (i) agent or (ii) non-agent
                     2.   Employee / Servant
                           a.   Servant has agreed
                           b.   To work on behalf of the master
                           c.   To be subject to the master‟s control or right to control the “physical
                                conduct” of the servant
                                   1)   Manner in which the job is performed as opposed to the result
                     3.   Independent Contractor
                           a.   Agent Type
                                   1)   One who agreed to act on behalf of the principal, but not subject
                                        to the principal‟s control over how the result is accomplished
                           b.   Non-agent Type
                                   1)   One who operates independently and simply enters into arm‟s
                                        length transactions with otheres
                     4.   Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin
                           a.   Facts: Love left her car at gas station. Car rolled into family. Humble
                                and station has relationship governed by contract which stated they had
                                an Independent Contractor relationship. Humble still liable.
                           b.   ROL: Master/servant relationship can still exist when proposed master
                                has control or right to control the conduct of the servant. Even if contract
                                between master/servant says they have an independent contractor
                                relationship.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Control is most important issue
                                   2)   Terms of agreement are immaterial
                     5.   Hoover v. Sun Oil Company
                           a.   Facts: Barone owned a Sun gas station. Fire caused by negligence of
                                station employee. Sun has no control; therefore, not liable.
                           b.   ROL: Control or right to control daily operations creates a
                                master/servant relationship.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   First look to agreements
                                   2)   Then look to actual control
                                             a)   Duration of relationship, control, & risk of loss/return
                     6.   Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc. – Franchise can create agency


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                           a.   Facts: Holiday Inn franchise did not constitute control.
                           b.   ROL: Franchise agreements can create agency if there is sufficient
                                control over day-to-day functions of the servant company.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   No control over day-to-day functions
                                   2)   No power over (i) business expenses, (ii) rates, (iii) share of
                                        profits, & (iv) limited power over hiring
           B.   Tort Liability and Apparent Agency
                     1.   Billops v. Magness Contruction Co.
                           a.   Facts: Party at franchised Hilton. Π sued corp Hilton. Π wins.
                           b.   ROL: Apparent agency manifestations can be made (i) directly to the 3 rd
                                party, and (ii) to the community through advertising, logos, letterhead,
                                representations, etc.
                           c.   Rebuttable presumption of Apparent Agency with franchisee
           C.   Scope of Employment
                     1.   Rest. 2d §228: Scope of Employment
                           a.   Old: Motivation based
                           b.   New: Did conduct arise out of and in course of employment
                     2.   Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. V. United States
                           a.   Facts: Seaman floods dry dock. Court determined its triable.
                           b.   ROL: Even if employee is acting in a manner which does not benefit the
                                employer, liability can be still attached.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Acts of servant do not need to benefit master for liable to attach
                                   2)   Foreseeability issues
                           d.   Some deviations from scope of employment are not sufficient to take
                                employee out of scope of employment if they resume. Clover v.
                                Snowbird Ski Resort.
                     3.   Manning v. Grimsley
                           a.   Facts: Pitcher threw the ball at fan. Pitcher can be liable.
                           b.   ROL: Recovery for Intentional Tort of employee requires a showing (i)
                                employee‟s assault, (ii) was in response to plaintiff‟s conduct, (iii) which
                                was presently interfering with the employee‟s ability to perform his duties
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Plaintiff‟s actions must interfere with scope of employment
           D.   Statutory Claims
                     1.   Arguello v. Concoco, Inc.
                           a.   Facts: Racial discrimination at Conoco-branded stores. Conoco liable.
                           b.   ROL: 5 factor balancing test for tort liability while acting in scope of
                                employment: (i) time, place, and purpose of the acts, (ii) similarity of
                                act to authorized acts, (iii) whether act is commonly performed by
                                servants, (iv) extend of departure from normal methods, and (v) whether
                                the master could reasonably expect such act.
                           c.   Important factors: Rest 2d §219 – 5 factor balancing test

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           E.   Liability for Torts of Independent Contractors
                     1.   Majestic Realty Associates, Inc. v. Toti Contracting Co.
                           a.   Facts: Wrecking ball screwed up and chunk went through Majestic‟s roof.
                                Demolition is hazardous, go to jury to determine level.
                           b.   ROL: Generally, property owner is not liable for acts of an independent
                                contractor. Exceptions: (i) landowner retains control of how work is
                                done, (ii) engages an incompetent contractor, OR (iii) where the work
                                constitutes a nuisance per se.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Nuisance per se – Ultra Hazardous or Inherently Hazardous
                                   2)   Ultra hazardous is serious risk – liability is absolute
                                   3)   Inherently hazardous risk of harm if precautions aren‟t taken –
                                        liability is possible


VII.   Fiduciary Obligations of Agents
           A.   Duties During Agency
                     1.   Reading v. Regem
                           a.   Facts: Royal army sargeant used uniform and position to smuggle. No
                                fiduciary relationship, but still liable because unjustly enriched.
                           b.   ROL: If a servant is enriched ONLY by virtue of his service to his master,
                                then the master deserves the money. If the virtue of the service gives
                                the servant an opportunity for enrichment, then he keeps the money.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Only by virtue v. Opportunity
                                   2)   No fiduciary relationship because far outside scope of employment
                     2.   General Automotive Manufacturing Co. v. Singer
                           a.   Facts: Singer had great machining skills. Hired under employment K to
                                “devote his entire time, skill, labor… and not to engage in any other
                                business of permanent nature during term” He farmed out business, kept
                                cut. Singer had fiduciary duty.
                           b.   ROL: Servants have a fiduciary duty to disclose opportunities that come
                                to them during the course of their employment, before taking the
                                opportunity for themselves.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Look to nature of business to determine competitiveness
           B.   Duties During and After Termination of Agency: Herein of “Grabbing & Leaving”
                     1.   Town & Country House & Home Service, Inc. v. Newbery
                           a.   Facts: Unique housekeeping business. Former ees took customer list
                                and solicited from it exclusively. Ees liable for taking customer list.
                           b.   ROL: Fiduciary obligations of a servant and master extend beyond the
                                immediate relationship to even periods after their relationship
                     2.   Prevention Methods
                           a.   No compete clauses (2-3 yrs)
                           b.   Non-disclosure agreements


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CHAPTER 2: PARTNERSHIPS
I.     What is a Partnership? And Who are the Partners?
           A.   Nature of Partnership
                     1.   UPA §6
                           a.   An association of two or more person to carry on as co-owners of a
                                business for profit
                     2.   UPA §7(4)
                           a.   Receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie
                                evidence that he is a partner is the business
                     3.   UPA §15
                           a.   All partners are liable
                                   1)   Jointly and severally liable for everything chargeable to
                                        partnership (through partner‟s wrongful acts (§13) and partner‟s
                                        breach of trust (§14))
                                   2)   Jointly and severally liable for all other debts and obligations of
                                        the partnership.
           B.   Partners Compared to Employees
                     1.   Fenwick v. Uemployment Compensation Commission
                           a.   Facts: Fenwick owned beauty salon. Arline cashier. Provide bonus and
                                said she was a partner. Court says employee.
                           b.   ROL: Sharing of profits creates a prima facie case that relationship is a
                                partnership. But, courts will look to “entirety of circumstances”.
                           c.   Entirety of Circumstances:
                                   1)   Intention of parties
                                   2)   Right to share in profits
                                   3)   Obligation to share losses
                                   4)   Ownership and control
                                   5)   Community of power in action
                                   6)   Language of agreement
                                   7)   Conduct toward 3rd parties
                                   8)   Rights on dissolution
           C.   Partners compared to Lenders
                     1.   Martin v. Peyton
                           a.   Facts: Loaned securities to Hall for use as collateral to obtain additional
                                funding. Hall defaulted. Court says no partnership.
                           b.   ROL: Lenders are not liable for the acts or negligence of their clients.
                                When determining who is lender v. partner you must look to the entirety
                                of the circumstances.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Closer to mortgage or other secured loan, then not partnership
                                   2)   Option to become partner, closer to a partnership
                     2.   Southex Exhibitions, Inc. V. Rhode Island Builders Association



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                            a.   Facts: Sponsor tradeshows. Agreement to provide services/support.
                                 Many mutual obligations too.
                            b.   ROL: Labels used by parties do not automatically create a partnership.
                                 Must look to entirety of the circumstances to determine if parties
                                 intended to act as partners.
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   Working together for many years, is not dispositive of partnership
                                    2)   Agreement stating Partnership can be colloquial, rather than legal
           D.   Partnership by Estoppel
                     1.   UPA §16: Partnership by Estoppel
                            a.   When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents
                                 himself, or consents to another representing him to any one, as a
                                 partners…, he is liable to any such person.. who has, on the faith of such
                                 representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership.
                     2.   Young v. Jones
                            a.   Facts: PW-Bahamas issued unqualified opinion. TX investors sued PW-
                                 US under partnership. Court says no partnership no estoppel.
                            b.   ROL: Elements of partnership estoppel are: (i) representations by
                                 principle, and (ii) reliance on partnership representations by 3 rd
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   Generally, those who are not partners to each other cannot be
                                         partners to 3rd parties
                                    2)   Liability to 3rd persons requires elements of partnership estoppel
II.    Fiduciary Obligations of Partners
           A.   Generally
                     1.   Meinhard v. Salmon
                            a.   Facts: Partners on a lease. Salmon had power over operations. Took
                                 opportunity that became available as result of partnership. Court says
                                 Fiduciary duty.
                            b.   ROL: Partners have a fiduciary duty to not secretly appropriate
                                 opportunities from the partnership that were created solely by the
                                 partnership. If one partner has complete control over operations, he has
                                 a duty to disclose opportunities that were created as a result of that
                                 partnership.
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   Opportunity created solely because of partnership
                                    2)   “Joint Adverturers” Cardozo-ism
           B.   After Dissolution
                     1.   Bane v. Ferguson
                            a.   Facts: Former partner at Chicago law firm retired and collecting pension.
                                 Firm merged and pension stops. Retired sues saying Partners violated FO
                                 for acts of negligence. Court says no.
                            b.   ROL: Partners only have a fiduciary duty to other partners. UPA purpose
                                 is to limit the liability of the other partners for the unauthorized acts of
                                 one partner.


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                           c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   BJR would have protected partners even if fiduciary duty found
           C.   Grabbing and Leaving
                     1.   Meehan v. Shaughnessy
                           a.   Facts: Partners at law firm were planning on leaving. During secrecy
                                period they made plans, and sprung them on firm and clients. Took
                                many clients. Court says ees grabbed and left.
                           b.   ROL: Existing partners who take unfair advantage over existing the
                                business are in violation of their fiduciary duties.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   Secretive preparation
                                    2)   Substance and method of their communications to clients
           D.   Explusion
                     1.   Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray
                           a.   Facts: Partner at law firm developed drinking problem. K drafted which
                                stated “no second chance.” They gave them. Finance committee
                                eventually booted him. Court says firm ok.
                           b.   ROL: When partners expel a partner under a “no cause” clause in a
                                partnership agreement freely negotiated into, the expelling partners act
                                in “good faith” regardless of motivation, that act is not wrongful.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                    1)   “No cause” clause freely negotiated
                                    2)   Good faith


III.   Partnership Property
           A.   Putname v. Shoaf
                     1.   Facts: 2 couples started gin business. Man died, widow wanted out. Sold her
                          interest. Came out later, bookkeeper was stealing. Her estate wanted portion
                     2.   ROL: A co-partner owns no personal specific interest in any specific property
                          or asset of the partnership. The partnership owns the asset.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Wanted portion of settlement when no longer partner - No


IV.    Raising Additional Capital
           A.   Pro-Rata Dilution
                     1.   Additional fund request from partners. Partners who do not provide funds, his
                          share is reduced according to existing formula.
           B.   Penalty Dilution
                     1.   Additional fund request from partners at a reduced rate from previous round.
                          Partners who participate get equal bargaining power at reduced rate.
           C.   Loan Approach
                     1.   Additional fund request in form of loan. Preferential treatment in dissolution
           D.   Issue New Shares to 3rd Parties


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                     1.   Additional fund request from new partners.


V.     The Rights of Partners in Management
           A.   Generally
                     1.   UPA §18: Rights and Duties of Partners
                            a.   The rights and duties of the partners … shall be determined, subject to
                                 any agreement between them, by the following rules:
                                    1)   (a) Each… shall be repaid his contributions, … share equally in the
                                         profits…; and contribute towards the losses… according to his
                                         share of the profits
                                    2)   (e) All … have equal rights in the management and conduct of the
                                         partnership business
           B.   National Biscuit Company v. Stroud
                     1.   Facts: 2 men open grocery business. Stroud says no to bread purchases.
                          Freeman bought bread. Bread man did not know. Court says partnership.
                     2.   ROL: A partner with authority in a particular matter within the scope of a
                          partnership can bind the partnership to 3rd parties. A partner without authority
                          and if the 3rd party knows of the lack of authority, cannot bind the partnership
                          to that 3rd party.
                     3.   Important factors:
                            a.   Buying bread was an ordinary matter in course of this business
                            b.   Does not matter Stroud said he would not be responsible
           C.   Summers v. Dooley
                     1.   Facts: Partners in trash collecting business. Agreement stated if one cant
                          work he is responsible for finding replacement. Doty didn‟t want to work,
                          hired another said Summers should pay. Court says no.
                     2.   ROL: Business differences must be decided by a majority of the partners
                          provided no other agreement between the partners speaks to the issue.
                     3.   Important factors:
                            a.   Benefit was actually Doty‟s because of expressed agreement
           D.   Day v. Sidley & Austin
                     1.   Facts: Former partner at law firm upset over merger. Day thought he had
                          contractual right to remain sole partner at WA office and Exec committee
                          misrepresented. Exec committee had power via PA. Courts says no.
                     2.   ROL: Provided the agreement does not violate fiduciary duties, the
                          partnership agreement determines the rights and privileges of partners and
                          executive committees. Freedom of K – partners are free to bargain any
                          agreement provision.
                     3.   Important factors:
                            a.   Plain reading of agreement
                            b.   Executive committee has great power. Power is expressed via agreement


VI.    Additions / Addendums to Partnership Agreements
           A.   When a partner leaves or is added to a partnership, technically the old partnership is
                dissolved and a new one is formed.

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           B.   Continuation Agreements
                     1.   Provision specifying that the remaining partners will continue as partners
                          under the existing agreement
                     2.   Agreement obligating the remaining partners to continue to associate with one
                          another as partners under the existing agreement
           C.   Dissociation UPA §601
                     1.   If a partner retires pursuant to an appropriate provision in the partnership
                          agreement
                              a.   The partnership continues as to the remaining partners and the
                                   dissociated partner is entitled to payout, in the absence of an agreement
                                   to the contrary.
                              b.   Payout to be paid in an amount determined “on the date of dissolution,”
                                   the assets of the partnership were sold at a price equal to the greater of
                                   the liquidation value or the value based on a sale of the entire business
                                   as a going concern with the dissociated partner
           D.   Dissolution UPA §801
                     1.   a
                     2.



VII.   Partnership Dissolution
           A.   Generally
                     1.   UPA §18(a): Sharing of Losses
                              a.   Each partners shall be repaid his contributions… and share equally in the
                                   profits…; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or
                                   otherwise… according to this share in the profits
                     2.   UPA §29: Dissolution Defined
                              a.   The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the
                                   partners ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from
                                   the winding up of the business
                     3.   UPA §30: Partnership not Terminated by Dissolution
                              a.   On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the
                                   winding up of partnership affairs is completed.
                     4.   UPA §31: Causes of Dissolution
                              a.   Dissolution is caused:
                                      1)   (1) without violation of the partnership agreement
                                                a)   (a) by termination of definite term or task
                                                b)   (b) by the express will of any partner
                                      2)   (2) in contravention of the partnership agreement
                                                a)   by express will of any partner at the time
                     5.   UPA §37: Right to Wind Up
                              a.   Unless otherwise agreed, the partner who has not wrongfully dissolved
                                   the partnership … has the right to wind up the partnership affairs.
                     6.   UPA §38: Rights of Partners re: Property
                              a.   (2) When in contravention of agreement


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                                   1)   (a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall
                                        have…
                                             a)     The right, as against each partner who has caused the
                                                  dissolution wrongfully, to damage for breach
                                   2)   (b) Partners who have not cased dissolution wrongfully, if they
                                        desire to continue the business,… may do so…
                                   3)   (c) A partner who has caused dissolution wrongfully shall have:
                                             a)     Right… to have the value of interest in partnership, less
                                                  any damages; good of the business shall not be
                                                  considered.
                     7.   UPA §40: Rules for Distribution
                           a.   In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution,… subject to
                                any agreement to the contrary,
                                   1)   (a) the assets of the partnership are:
                                             a)    I. The partnership property
                                             b)     II. The contributions of the partners necessary for the
                                                  payment of all the liabilities…
                                   2)   (c) The assets shall be applied in order of their declaration (above
                                        to satisfy liabilities)
                                   3)   (d) Sharing of Losses: The partners shall contribute, as provided
                                        by section 18(a) the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities.
           B.   The Right to Dissolve
                     1.   Owen v. Cohen
                           a.   Facts: 2 men started a bowling alley. 1 gave a loan to p-ship. Other
                                practically sabotaged the business. Court says ok to dissolve.
                           b.   ROL: UPA §32: Partners can bring action to dissolve partnership if (c) a
                                partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially
                                the carrying on of the business, (d) a partners willfully or persistently
                                commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts
                                himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is no
                                reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him,
                                (f) other circumstances render a dissolution equitable
                           c.   ROL on Term of Partnership: When a partner loans a sum of money
                                to a partnership with the understanding that the amount contributed was
                                to be a loan to the partnership and was to be repaid as soon as feasible
                                from the prospective profits of the business, the partnership is for the
                                term reasonably required to repay the loan.
                           d.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Loan to be repaid from profits
                                   2)   Partner acted against business of partnership
                     2.   Collins v. Lewis
                           a.   Facts: Cateteria partnership gets late start. Collins wanted dissolution
                                because (i) right to foreclosure because payment is late, (ii) belief Lewis
                                was extravagant. Lewis tries to buy out Collins, Collins refuses. Collins
                                wants dissolution.
                           b.   ROL: Right to dissolve is not the same as power to dissolve.


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                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Lewis would have been able to conduct business but for Collin
                                        conduct
                     3.   Page v. Page
                           a.   Facts: 2 brothers start linen supply business. Court says not a term
                                partnership.
                           b.   ROL: Common hope is not enough to obligate all parties to continue
                                partnership until losses have been recovered.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   No showing of bad faith
                                   2)   Former partnership provided for 5 year term, then at will after
                                   3)   No mention of term of present partnership in event of loss
           C.   Consequences of Dissolution
                     1.   Prentiss v. Shaffel
                           a.   Facts: 3 man partnership with shopping center. Δ wins in TC and assets
                                are sold. Π buys. Δ is pissed. Appeals sale order.
                           b.   ROL: Absent bad faith, a former partner may acquire assets of a
                                partnership. Former partners still have a fiduciary duty.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   No bad faith, his bid actual drove up value
                     2.   Monin v. Monin
                           a.   Facts: 2 brothers in milk business. Both brothers applied for supplier
                                license. One brother won right, but other brother did not w/d supplier
                                application. 1st brother lost deal, value of business dropped. Court says
                                other brother should have, now owes damages.
                           b.   ROL: Former partners still have fiduciary duty after dissolution
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Bad faith by other brother – s/h withdrew application
                     3.   Pav-Saver Corporation v. Vasso Corporation
                           a.   Facts: Dissolution requested by PSC who owns patent. PSMC was
                                partnership who had rights to patent for manufacturing paving machines.
                                Not a partnership at will. Provision 11. Court says permanent p-ship.
                           b.   ROL: UPA §38(2)(b) – Partners who have not caused dissolution
                                wrongfully can continue the business if they desire to do so.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Dissolution = end of partnership
                                   2)   Termination = everything is completely over
           D.   The Sharing of Losses
                     1.   Kovacik v. Reed
                           a.   Facts: Kitchen remodeling business. One partner contributed cash, other
                                services. Belly up. Money partner wanted money from services guy.
                                Court says no.
                           b.   ROL: When one partners contributes money and the other services,
                                neither party is liable to the other for contribution of any loss sustained.


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                                Thus, upon loss of money the party who contributed it is not entitled to
                                recover any part of it from the party who contributed only services.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Agreement only spoke of sharing profits 50/50, not losses
                                   2)   Contradicts UPA 40(a) & UPA 18(a)
           E.   Buyout Agreements (Important Items)
                     1.   Important Items for Buyout Agreements
                           a.   “Trigger” Events
                                   1)   Death
                                   2)   Disability
                                   3)   Will of any partner
                           b.   Obligation to buy versus option
                                   1)   Firm
                                   2)   Other investors
                                   3)   Consequences of refusal to buy
                                               a)   If there is an/no obligation
                           c.   Price
                                   1)   Book value
                                   2)   Appraisal
                                   3)   Formula (5x earnings)
                                   4)   Set price each year
                           d.   Method of Payment
                                   1)   Cash
                                   2)   Installments (with interest)
                           e.   Protection against debts of partnership
                           f.   Procedure for offering either to buy or sell
                                   1)   First mover sets price to buy or sell
                                   2)   First mover forces others to set price
                     2.   G&S Investments v. Belman
                           a.   Facts: Coke addict with investment partnership. Buyout provision
                                provided for out if dissolution occurs. Court says follow the agreement.
                           b.   ROL: Buyout formula should be used rather than dissolution formula.
                                Dissolution does not occur at the beginning of the lawsuit, it began with
                                death of partner. Also, look to agreement for continuation provisions.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Freely negotiated provision
           F.   Law Partnership Dissolutions
                     1.   Jewel v. Boxer
                           a.   Facts: No partnership agreement at law firm. Firm dissolved and they
                                tried to allocate attorneys fees received from cases that were still active
                                at trial.



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                           b.   ROL: In the absence of an agreement, any income generated through
                                the winding up of unfinished business is allocate to the former partners
                                according to their respective interests in the partnership (no agreement,
                                follow UPA). UPA unequivocally prohibits extra compensation for post-
                                dissolution services with a sign exception for surviving partnership.
                           c.   3 Important factors:
                                   1)   Time spent by each firm handling each case
                                   2)   Source of each case
                                   3)   The fees achieved by the new firm
                     2.   Meehan v. Shaughnessy
                           a.   Facts: Law firm carefully drafted partnership agreement. A few partners
                                left and wanted to take clients. Courts says agreement prevails.
                           b.   ROL: Where an agreement states that it supercedes the UPA and does
                                not disadvantage clients, then the agreement will prevail
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Court finds that Partners drafted agreement so UPA would not
                                        apply
                                   2)   Professional ethics forbids preventing clients from leaving from
                                        one firm to another
                                   3)   Clients – who was responsible for bring in the client
                                   4)   Clients – Skill of removing attorneys
                                   5)   Clients – Sophicated client
                                   6)   Clients – who worked on the case
           G.   Limited Partnerships
                     1.   RUUPA §303(a)
                           a.   If the limited partner takes part in the control of the business and is not
                                also a general partner, the limited partner is liable only to persons who
                                transact business with the limited partnership and who reasonably
                                believes, based upon the limited partner‟s conduct that the limited
                                partner is a general partner.
                     2.   Hozman v. DeEscamilla
                           a.   Facts: Limited partnership went bankrupt. Trustee went after limited
                                partner under theory that he asserted himself into control. Court agreed.
                           b.   ROL: If a limited partner inserts himself into the control of the
                                partnership, then his assets can be reached as though they were general
                                partners.
                           c.   Important factors (limited partner taking control):
                                   1)   Frequent visits and consulted
                                   2)   Made business decisions on what to plant and when
                                   3)   Made business decisions on hiring/firing management




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CHAPTER 3: THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION
I.     Introduction
           A.   Piercing the Corporate Veil – Get to Shareholder‟s Assets
                     1.   Π must show BOTH (i) Unity of Interests , and (ii) Fraud
                           a.   Unity of Interests – Intermingling of the assets
                           b.   Fraud – Manifest injustice if not allowed to pierce
                     2.   Tort Claims v. Contract Claims
                           a.   Lower degree of showing required for torts
                           b.   Why, Policy – Parties injured in tortious actions tend to be random and K
                                parties often know the risks
           B.   Process of Incorporation
                     1.   File paperwork with state
                     2.   Organizational meeting by incorporators
                     3.   Adopt the bylaws
                     4.   Shareholders
                     5.   Elect directors                  Piercing the Corporate Veil
                     6.   Directors elect managers            1. Unity of Interest
                                                              2. Fraud – or – Manifest Injustice

II.    Promoters and the Corporate Entity
           A.   Corporation by Estoppel
           B.   Southern-Gulf Marine Co. No. 9, Inc. v. Camcraft, Inc.
                     1.   Facts: We have a K. They tried to get out of their K. SGM recognizes it was a
                          great deal and wants to keep it, Camcraft realized the opposite. Π argued K is
                          not valid because SGM was not an entity at the time of the signing.
                     2.   ROL: Corporation by estoppel can occur when both parties act as though one
                          existed; especially if the relationship is later ratified.


III.   The Corporate Entity and Limited Liability
           A.   Walkovszky v. Carlton
                     1.   Facts: Carlton owned 10 cab companies each only owning 2 cab. Each
                          company insured for the minimum statutory amount of $10K. This was
                          common practice to reduce liability. Companies owned no other assets. Π
                          sued company that hurt them, and other 9 companies (reverse piercing)
                     2.   ROL: Corporate veil cannot simply be pierced because the assets of the
                          corporation plus the mandatory insurance coverage were insufficient to cover
                          the recovery sought.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Inadequate capitalization is only a factor when determining veil piercing
           B.   Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source
                     1.   Facts:
                     2.   ROL: Piercing the veil occurs when there is a (i) Unity of Interest, and (ii)
                          Respecting the corporate form would promote injustice or sanction a fraud.
                     3.   Important factors:

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                           a.   Intermingling of funds (killer factor)
                           b.   Separate books
                           c.   Not observing formalities
                           d.   Low payments
           C.   Kinney Shoe Corporation v. Polan
                     1.   Facts: Kinney owned a building. Leased to Industrial, who subleased to Polan.
                          Industrial had no assets and was solely owned by Polan (basically a shell).
                          Polan did not pay Industrial, who did not pay Industrial. Kinney wins.
                     2.   ROL: Piercing the corporate veil requires 3 prongs: (1) unity of interest, (2)
                          equitable result, and (3) Sophisticated parties beware
                           a.   Unity of Interest
                                   1)   Intermingling of funds
                                   2)   No corporate formalities
                                   3)   Under capitalized
                           b.   Equitable Result (Fraud)
                                   1)   Setup business to avoid liability
                                   2)   Inference of fraud
                           c.   Sophisticated parties beware (permissive prong when equity requires)
                                   1)   Institutional lenders should know better
                                   2)   This could kill a piercing even if first 2 prongs are met
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Recovery is possible if wrongfulness of D‟s conduct is egregious enough.
           D.   In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation
                     1.   Facts: Bristol is the sole shareholder of Bristol. Bristol designs/manf breast
                          implants. Bristol tried Sum Dispo saying Piercing could not reach them.
                     2.   ROL: Piercing the corporate veil can occur and can extend to the corporate
                          shareholders as well as individual shareholders.
                     3.   Important factors showing Unity of Interest (Substantial Domination):
                           a.   Common directors
                           b.   Common business departments
                           c.   Consolidated F/S & Tax returns
                           d.   Parent financed everything
                           e.   Parent helped with incorporation
                           f.   Use of corporate name really did NOT go to Unity of Interest, more of an
                                agency concept
           E.   Frigidaire Sales Corporation
                     1.   Facts: Commercial was a limited partnership. Union Properties is a general
                          partner and Mannon & Baxter were limited partners. Mannon & Baxter were
                          also sole shareholders of Union. K existed between Frigidaire an Commercial.
                     2.   ROL: Piercing the corporate veil applies to limited partnership also.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Generally, only the “general partner” is jointly/severally liable.


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IV.    Shareholder Derivative Actions
           A.   Def: Lawsuit against directors/officers of the corporation initiated by shareholders on
                behalf of the corporation.
           B.   How to bring Shareholder Derivative Action
                     1.   Step1: Send letters to the board. Become the squeaky wheel.
                     2.   Step2: Make a “Demand”
                           a.   In writing, tell the board to conduct an investigation
                           b.   Some states require this “demand” (DE requires it)
                     3.   Step3: `Bring suit
           C.   How to bring an individual action
                     1.   Step1: Complaint must allege more than an injury resulting from a wrong to
                          the corporation
                     2.   Step2: The Plaintiff must state a claim for “an injury which is separate and
                          distinct from that suffered by other shareholders” or “a wrong involving a
                          contractual right of the shareholder which exists independently of any right of
                          the corporation.” Moran v. Household, DE 1985.
           D.   Introduction
                     1.   Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp
                           a.   Facts: Shareholder brought Derivative action against Corp. BIL
                                incorporated in DE, run from NJ. SH owned very little stock. NJ required
                                SH who owned < 5% post a bond for $125K: DE provided no bond.
                                Which law applies?
                           b.   ROL: (i) Not unconstitutional to base classification for SH derivative
                                actions upon the amount of stock owned by party. (ii) Use of bonds ok in
                                derivative actions.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Derivative action – bonds OK
                     2.   Use of Bonds by some states
                           a.   Helps prevent frivolous actions, “Strike Suit”
                           b.   Creates a procedural nightmare for the corporation, so it just becomes
                                easier for them to settle.
                     3.   Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
                           a.   Facts: Max sued Flying Tiger. He claims it was an individual action, not a
                                derivative action. FTL claims it was a derivative actions therefore bond is
                                needed.
                           b.   ROL: Look to complaint to determine type of suit. If injury is to the
                                corporation, then it‟s a derivative action. If injury is one to the plaintiff,
                                then its an individual and maybe take the form of a representative class
                                action.
                           c.   Important factors:
                     4.   Settlements and Attorney Fees
                           a.   Corporation Pays
                                   1)   If a derivative action is settled before judgment, then the
                                        corporation can pay the legal fees of the plaintiff and of the
                                        defendants.


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                           b.   Manager Pays
                                   1)   A judgment for money damages is imposed on the defendants
                                        (above insurance) and to the extent the corporation does not
                                        provide indemnity
                                   2)   Test: Despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all the
                                        circumstances of the case, the defendant is fairly entitled to
                                        indemnity.
                     5.   Individual Recovery in a Derivative Action
                           a.   A court can award individual recovery in a derivative action
                           b.   Lynch v. Patterson (WY)
                                   1)   30% owner quit and other two owners overpaid themselves. 30
                                        won derivative action to have money repaid to corp. Court gave
                                        30% of the money directly to 30. Reason – giving the money
                                        back would have only put it back in the hands of the wrongdoers.
           E.   The Requirement of “Demand” on the Directors
                     1.   Important Concepts
                           a.   Demand Futility
                     2.   Business Judgment Rule
                           a.   Presumption that directors were acting in the best interest of the
                                corporation provided:
                                   1)   They acted in Good Faith
                                   2)   Their decisions were informed decisions
                           b.   The BJR prevents courts from making 2nd guess (20/20) judgments of
                                the manager‟s decisions.
                     3.   Grimes v. Donald (DE)
                           a.   Facts: Demand Made and Refused. Grimes made a demand that the
                                board abrogate an agreement to executive officer. Board refused.
                                Grimes complaint involved allegations of violation of due care, waste, and
                                excessive compensation; thus, derivative claim. Since derivative action,
                                demand is required.
                           b.   ROL: If a demand is made and rejected, the board rejecting the board
                                demand is entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule
                                unless the stockholder can allege facts with particularity creating a
                                reasonable doubt that the board is entitled to the benefit of the
                                presumption.
                           c.   Demand Futility
                                   1)   You believe the Board will not look at demand properly, and the
                                        Demand would be Futile
                                   2)   If there is reason to doubt the board acted independently or with
                                        due care in responding to the demand, the stockholder may have
                                        the basis ex post to claim wrongful refusal.
                                   3)   Factors:
                                             a)    Majority of the Board has a familial or financial interest
                                             b)    Majority of the Board is incapable of acting independently
                                             c)    Underlying transaction is not a product of BJR
                           d.   Important factors:

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                                   1)   Must be in pleadings
                                   2)   A preemptory refusal might overturn BJR
                                   3)   Lack of independence might overturn BJR
                     4.   Marx v. Akers (NY) 1996
                           a.   Facts: Demand Excused.
                           b.   ROL: Demand will be excused if (and only if) the complaint alleges “with
                                particularity” any of the following
                                   1)   Majority of the board is interested in the transaction
                                   2)   The board did not fully inform themselves about the challenged
                                        transaction to the extent reasonably appropriate under the
                                        circumstances (ie. Passively rubber stamping)
                                   3)   The challenged transaction was so egregious on its face that it
                                        could not have been the product of sound business judgment
                           c.   Important factors:
                           d.
           F.   The Role of Special Committees
                     1.   General Process of Special Committees
                           a.   As soon as P files his derivative suit or makes a demand, the board
                                appoints a supposedly “independent committee” of directors to
                                investigate P‟s allegations.
                                   1)   No financial stake: Only those directors who do not have a
                                        financial stake in the transaction are put on the committee.
                                   2)   Investigation and Report: Typically procures independent counsel
                                        and investigates through interviews and reviews
                                   3)   Dismissal Recommended: Often times the committee will
                                        recommend dismissal.
                           b.   Steps are important to preserve BJR
                     2.   Exam Process:
                           a.   Step1: Is the committee independent? (i) financial or familial stake, (ii)
                                fully informed, (iii) transaction is really egregious.
                           b.   Step2: Breakdown committee decision into 2 parts (i) procedural and (ii)
                                substantive
                                   1)   Courts will probably intervene when process is defective. Zapata.
                                   2)   Courts will probably NOT intervene to 2nd guess substantive
                                        findings. Auerbach.
                                             a)   Except: (i)
                     3.   Auerbach v. Bennett (NY 1979) – Court will NOT examine substance
                           a.   Facts: Allegations of kickbacks. Audit committee found bribes did occur.
                                Hired Special Litigation Committee to figure out best course of action.
                                SLC determined the corporation should dismiss cuz recovery chance was
                                low and costs were high. SH sued.
                           b.   ROL: Courts will not make an independent determination of whether the
                                committee was correct in its conclusion that the probability of recovery
                                was low and costs high. Instead, the committee‟s substantive



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                                recommendation that the suit be dismissed and the board‟s approval will
                                receive the protection of the BJR.
                                   1)   Courts will intervene on procedural issues
                                   2)   Courts will NOT intervene on substantive issues
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Committee was comprised of truly independent directors
                                   2)   The issue was substantive because they looked at the decision,
                                        not how they got to the decision.
                     4.   Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado (DE 1981) – Court will examine procedures
                           a.   Facts: Maldonado instituted a derivative action on behalf of Zapata
                                alleging breach of FD. Maldonado did not make demand stating all
                                directors had „interests‟.
                           b.   ROL: A court will evaluate the Procedures a committee uses. Thus, a
                                court must balance the interests of the parties with a
                                   1)   2 Step Zapata Test (DE Only)
                                             a)     Step1: Determine if the committee acted in Good Faith
                                                  and Independently
                                                        Did the committee follow reasonable procedures
                                                         during this process
                                                        If No in Step1; then court will automatically
                                                         disregard the committee‟s decision and allow the
                                                         lawsuit to proceed
                                             b)    Step2: Court can apply its own independent judgment
                                                  whether the lawsuit should have been dismissed.
                                                        Looking at substantive merits of case
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   ONLY apply Zapata test in “Demand Excused” cases
                                   2)   Demand activates BJR; then court will not apply their own BJR
                                   3)   If no Demand, then no activation of BJR; court will apply their own
                                        BJR
           G.   The Role and Purposes of Corporations
                     1.   A.P. Smith Mfg Co. v. Barlow (S.Ct. 1953) – Ultra Vires
                           a.   Facts: Value company gave charitable donations to Princeton. SH
                                Derivative action claiming the donations were ultra vires. Court
                                determined charitable contributions are ok for corporations.
                           b.   ROL: (i) Corporations formed before the enactment of a law still must
                                abide by that law, (ii) Charitable donations are permitted and within the
                                charter of all corporations.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Not to pet charities
                                   2)   Not in furtherance of personal needs v. corporate needs
                                   3)   Made to preeminent institutions of higher learning
                                   4)   Within limits of statutory enactments
                                   5)   Public policy supports charitable donations


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                     2.   Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Mich 1919) – Corp not for personal agenda
                           a.   Facts: Ford was doing very well. Decided to stop paying dividends to
                                expand operations and reduce price of cars for the working man. Court
                                forced him to pay dividends of ½ surplus, but did not stop expanding of
                                operations.
                           b.   ROL: Corporation is organized for the benefit of the shareholders, not for
                                charitable purposes.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Ford wanted to make cars more affordable for the working man
                                   2)   Plenty of surplus
                     3.   Shlensky v. Wrigley (IL 1968) – Acting within Corporate Interests
                           a.   Facts: Derivative action where SH wanted Wrigley to start playing night
                                games to increase revenue. Wrigley considered, but determined night
                                games would decrease value of property and they owned a lot of property
                                in the area. Since no allegations of fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest,
                                court applied BJR. Wrigley wins.
                           b.   ROL: Allegations that directors are not acting within corporate interest,
                                but are not fraudulent, illegal, or conflict with interests must be evaluated
                                using the BJR.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   No allegations of fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest




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CHAPTER 4: THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
I.     Overview
           A.   Key Advantages
                     1.   Pass through taxation for business
                     2.   Limited liability for owners
                     3.   Best of Both Worlds
           B.   Advantages over other forms
                     1.   S-Corp
                           a.   S-Corp has strict requirements on (i) # of owners & (ii) types of
                                ownership
                           b.   LLC do not
                     2.   Limited Partnership
                           a.   LP Does not provide 100% limited liability
                                   1)   Requires at least 1 general partner
           C.   LLC is a Hybrid Entity
                     1.   LLCs combine the best of the Partnership and Corporation worlds
                     2.   LLCs Allows
                           a.   Complete pass through tax advantages
                           b.   Operational flexibility of a partnership
                           c.   Corporation style limited liability under state law
                           d.   Management participate by ALL members, if desired
           D.   Legal Entity created under state law
                     1.   Separate from owners
                     2.   LLC may own property, incur debts, enter into contracts, sue and be sued
                     3.   Members are shielded from entity‟s liabilities
           E.   Professional LLCs (PLLC)
                     1.   Members are shield from negligent acts and omission of fellow members
                     2.   NOT relieved of liability of own misdeeds & negligence though
           F.   More widely accepted after 1996 IRS and Tres Dept “Check the Box” Regs
                     1.   Relaxed the requirements for:
                           a.   Transferability of Membership Interests
                                   1)   Prior to 1996, transferability had significant restrictions
                                   2)   Now, many states allow the LLC to determine their own
                                        transferability rules for membership interests.
                           b.   Lifespan
                                   1)   Prior to 1996, state statutes required LLCs to dissolve after a
                                        given time period or after member‟s interest terminated
           G.   Most LLC are now classified as partnership for federal tax purposes
                     1.   File Form 1065
                     2.   LLC members generally treated as partners for tax purposes
           H.   LLCs are Internationally similar

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                     1.   GmbH in Germany
                     2.   SARL in France
                     3.   Limitada throughout Central and South
           I.   State Statutes
                     1.   “Bulletproof”
                           a.   Defined LLCs characteristics in a way that ensured classification as
                                partnership
                           b.   Rigid requirements for drafting the operating agreement
                           c.   Most states adopted “Bulletproof” statutes before 1997
                                   1)   Why: Rev.Rul 88-76, approving WY bulletproof statute
                                   2)   To quality for taxation as partnership, entity had to lack least 2 of
                                        the following 4 corporate characteristics
                                             a)   Limited liability
                                             b)   Centralized management
                                             c)   Free transferability of interests
                                             d)   Continuity of life
                                   3)   WY statute focused on 3 & 4
                     2.   “Flexible”
                           a.   Allowed more flexibility in drafting LLC‟s operating agreement
                     3.   Distinction between “bulletproof” and “flexible”
                           a.   No longer significant: All 51 jurisdictions now have flexible statutes
                           b.   Why: 1997 “check-the-box” regs; favorable rulings
           J.   Model Acts
                     1.   Uniform LLC Act (ULLCA)
                           a.   Adopted 1994, amended 1995, 1996
                           b.   Used as a template by many states
                     2.   ULLCA – Key Point - Flexible
                           a.   Majority of provisions may be modified by LLC members in a private
                                agreement
                           b.   Designed with default rules so that small entrepreneurs may operate
                                without complex agreements
                                   1)   Allow at-will dissolution, rather than term of years
                                   2)   Member managed, unless otherwise specified
                                   3)   Permits single member LLCs
II.    Strategic Uses
           A.   Closely Held Businesses
                     1.   Simplified management structure
                     2.   More operational flexibility
                           a.   Ex: Managerial team unfettered by formalities required w/a corporate
                                Board of Directors
                           b.   Can more efficiently oversee, operate, adjust business
                     3.   No restriction upon types of ownership interest it can offer

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                     4.   Attractive for venture capitalists
                           a.   Pass-thru taxation
                           b.   Allows active participate without liability
           B.   International Transactions
                     1.   LLC form well recognized internationally
                     2.   No limitation on ownership by nonresident alien or entity (compared to S Corp)
                     3.   Most states allow registration of foreign LLCs
           C.   Professional LLCs (PLLC)
                     1.   MCL 450.4902
           D.   Exempt Organizations
                     1.   LLC allows greater flexibility in structuring company management
                     2.   Must look to “purposes” provision
                           a.   MCL 450.4201 – whether nonprofit fits definition
                     3.   To qualify for nonprofit tax benefits
                           a.   Nonprofit LLC cannot have any members other than Sec 501(c)(3)
                                organizations or governmental instrumentalities
                                   1)   Distribution to private persons would be a prohibited inurnment




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           E.   Tax advantages over S-Corp


                 LLC                                             S-Corp
                 Debt of LLC entity may be included in           Debt of S-Corp is not includable in the
                 the basis of the interests of the LLC           basis of S-Corp SH even where they‟ve
                 owners                                          guaranteed the debt
                 Basically, permits greater opportunity
                 for LLC member to pass through losses
                 and make tax-free cash distributions
                 Contributions of appreciated property           Contributions to S-Corp is tax-free only
                 to LLC (and partnership) are tax-free,          if contributor will own at least 80%
                 regardless of ownership interest of             interest in corporation.
                 contributing member
                 Distribution of appreciated property by         Distribution of appreciated property by
                 LLC generally does not cause                    S-Corp generally does not cause
                 recognition of gain to LLC or its               recognition of gain by corporation, but
                 members                                         there will be a tax for shareholders
                 Securities Law                                  Securities Law
                    Interests in LLC are not necessarily           S-Corp shares are securities
                     securities
                    Often subject to more favorable
                     state tax (like partnerships)


           F.   Disadvantages / Risks of LLC
                     1.   Lack of Case law for LLC, many unresolved tax issues
                     2.   Regarding professional practice partnerships, some factors leading to decision
                          to remain partnership or LLP (where available)
                            a.   Easier regulatory and licensing compliance (particular in case of multi-
                                 state practices)
                            b.   Avoidance of revisiting existing partnership agreements
                            c.   Avoidance of compliance with securities law (in some states)
                            d.   Avoidance of some employment and age discrimination laws
                            e.   Avoidance of entity level taxes (in some states)
                            f.   Favorable income tax rule for liquidation payments – 736(b)
III.   LLC Features
           A.   Name:                   State law requires identification as “LLC” or “L.L.C.”
           B.   Duration:        Amendments and newer acts allow longer duration
           C.   Membership:        MCL 450.4501 – In absence of contrary arrangement, “upon
                unanimous vote of members entitled to vote”
           D.   Purpose:     MCL 450.4201 – “Any lawful purpose for which a domestic corporation or
                domestic partnership could be formed.”
           E.   Professional Service LLC
                     1.   MCL 450.4901 et seq
                     2.   MCL 450.4905(2) – Liability


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           F.   Powers:       MCL 450.4210 – Broad powers, “all powers necessary or convenient to
                effect any purpose for which the company is formed”
           G.   Organization (3): In Michigan
                     1.   Formation
                           a.   MCL 450.4201 et seq.              Documents, filing, etc
                           b.   MCL 450.4202(1)              Maybe formed by 1 person, by filing
                                executed articles of incorporation
                           c.   MCL 450.4202(2)                Duration is “perpetual unless otherwise
                                provided in the articles of incorporation”
                     2.   Articles of Incorporation
                           a.   MCL 450.4203            Shall contain: name, purpose, street address, initial
                                registered office, initial resident agent, statement of management by
                                managers (if applicable), maximum duration if other than perpetual.
                                    1)   May contain “any provision no inconsistent with this act or another
                                         statute of this state”
                     3.   Operating Agreement
                           a.   MCL 450.4214            Not required by the state, but if one exists and it
                                conflict with the articles of incorporation, “the articles of incorporation
                                shall control”
                           b.   As a matter of good practice, advisable to adopt written operating
                                agreement
                                    1)   Statutory default rules may not be acceptable to the parties
                                    2)   Statutory default rules may not exist or may be ambiguous with
                                         respect to certain matters
                                    3)   Great flexibility is possible (if state in operating agreement) on
                                         matters such as allocations/distributions
                                    4)   Advisable to define fiduciary duties
           H.   Liability to 3rd parties
                     1.   MCL 450.4501(2)       Limited liability (subject to “piercing” as with Corps)
           I.   Capital Contributions
                     1.   MCL 450.4301 et seq       May include, “cash property, services performed,
                          promissory notes, contracts for services, or other binding obligation…”
                     2.   MCL 450.4302(1)       Promise to contribute is enforceable if in writing
                     3.   MCL 450.4302(2) Member remains liable for contribution, even after death,
                          disability, or other reason
           J.   Allocation of Profits and Losses; Distributions
                     1.   MCL 450.4303(1)(a) & (b)
                           a.   Assets, absent agreement
                           b.   “on the basis of value… of contributions made by member”, if company
                                formed before statutory amendment
                           c.   “in equal shares to all members” if after statutory amendment
                     2.   Losses?
           K.   Management



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                     1.   MCL 450.4401         Absent agreement, company “shall be managed by the
                          members”
                     2.   If so members are treated as managers for purposes of the statute
           L.   Fiduciary Duties
                     1.   MCL 450.4404(1)      Manager shall discharge duties in “good faith”
                     2.   MCL 450.4404(5) Manager shall “hold as trustee for [LLC] any profit or
                          benefit derived by manager from any transaction connected with” LLC
                     3.   MCL 450.4406         Manager as agent; Both actual and apparent
           M.   Members & Transferability
                     1.   Voting (Absent Agreement)
                           a.   MCL 450.4502(1)(a) & (b) “in proportion to shares of distributions of
                                the company” fi company was formed before amending statute
                           b.   “each member of LLC shall have one vote” if formed after amending
                                statute
                     2.   Transferability (Absent Agreement)
                           a.   MCL 450.4506(1)    “assignee of a membership interest in LLC having
                                more than one member may become a member only upon the unanimous
                                consent of the members entitled to vote.”
           N.   Dissolution
                     1.   MCL 450.4801         Dissolution may occur if…
                           a.   “at the time specified in the articles of organization”
                           b.   “upon the happening of an event specified in the articles of organization
                                or in an non-operating agreement including a vote of members”
                           c.   “upon the unanimous vote of all members entitled to vote”
                           d.   “upon the entry of a decree of judicial dissolution”
IV.    Formation
           A.   Water, Waste, & Land, Inc. d/b/a Westec v. Lanham (CO 1998) Undisclosed Agent
                     1.   Facts: Latham and Clark are members of PII, LLC. They contracted with
                          Westec to do a job. Westec did it, PII LLC didn‟t pay. Westec people only did
                          business with Lanhma and Clark but didn‟t know there was a LLC behind them.
                     2.   ROL: An agent/member of an LLC who fails to disclose himself as an agent of
                          the LLC can be found personally liable under common law.
                           a.   Additionally, an agent is liable even when the 3rd party knows that the
                                agent is acting on behalf of an unidentified principal. Known as Partially
                                Disclosed Principal Doctrine.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Westec never knew, nor did Latham or Clark disclose they were working
                                as agents for PII, LLC
                           b.   Latham and Clark failed to properly identify themselves as working for an
                                LLC. They should have used the LLC behind the company name.
V.     The Operating Agreement
        Exam Tip: When LLC agreement is at issue, say:
        “The construction of written Ks is a matter of law. If a K is clear and unambiguous, there is no
        issue of act to be determined. Only where the language of the K is unclear or ambiguous or when
        the cirucsmtances surrounding the agreement invest the language of the K with a special meaning
        will extrinsic evidence be considered in an effort give effect to the parties‟ intentions.”

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           A.   Elf Atochem North Amer, Inc. v. Jaffari (DE 1999)            Operating Agreement is
                Binding on LLC and Members
                     1.   Facts: Derivative action on behalf of LLC and Member manager. Formation
                          agreement contained (i) forum selection clause, and (ii) arbitration clause.
                          LLC never signed it but the members did. One member sued in DE, Court
                          dismissed for lack of lack of SMJ.
                     2.   ROL: In DE, LLC agreement is defined as “any agreement, written or oral, of
                          the member of members as to the affairs of a LLC and the conduct of its
                          business; therefore, even though the LLC did not sign the agreement it is still
                          bound.
                           a.   The Act is a statute designed to permit members maximum flexibility in
                                entering into an agreement to govern their relationship.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   DE laws based on Freedom of Contract
VI.    Piercing the “LLC” Veil
           A.   Kaycee Land and Livestock v. Flahive (3d 2002)       Piercing the LLC Veil is Possible
                     1.   Facts: Party wants to PCV and LLC who violated the law. LLC had only one
                          member.
                     2.   ROL: PCV is an equitable doctrine and is possible with LLC.
                           a.   Court did not provide examples, but left it to the DC to figure out and use
                                their equity powers and judgment.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Rules of common law are not to be overturn except by clear and
                                unambiguous language
                           b.   Every other state has adopted corporate law standards and has not
                                developed new LLC standards
VII.   Fiduciary Obligation
           A.   McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enter. (OH 1999)       Look to Operating Agreement for FD
                     1.   Facts: McDonnell seeks declaratory judgment to exclude Hunt from franchise.
                     2.   ROL: Look to the Operating agreement for the member‟s Fiduciary
                          Obligations. Normally, members of an LLC have a FD similar to that of a
                          partnership, but in this case the operating agreement specifically stated that
                          members can compete with each other and the LLC. No FD here for the
                          competition issue.
                           a.   They did have a FD to follow the other provisions of the agreement,
                                which they did not. Agreement stated they must get approval of majority
                                before taking action, they did not. They violated their FD on this issue.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Section 3.3 of Operating Agreement stated that members were allowed to
                                compete with each other, with the LLC, with anything.
                           b.   Operating agreement was not unclear, was not unambiguous
                           c.   Look at plain language of the agreement
VIII. Dissolution
           A.   New Horizons Supply Coop v. Haack. (WI 1999)         Member Liability After Dissolution
                     1.   Facts: Member failed to follow the proper procedures for dissolution of an LLC.
                          She should have (i) filed articles of dissolution, then (ii) notified creditors. She

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                          did nothing. She did sell the assets then give the money to the bank. No
                          evidence presented as to the disposition of the remaining assets. Small Claims
                          Court said PCV cuz she failed to follow formalities. AP reversed reason, but
                          affirmed judgment because member failed to prove disposition of assets
                          received.
                     2.   ROL: In dissolution of an LLC, a member should follow the proper state
                          procedures of filing articles of dissolution, then notifying creditors.
                           a.   If member sells LLC assets without following proper dissolution
                                procedures they can be liable to the extent of the member‟s
                                proportionate share of the claim or to the extent of the asset of the LLC
                                distribute to the member in liquidation (whichever is less), but a
                                member‟s total liability for all claims under this section may not exceed
                                the total value of assets distributed to the member in liquidation.
                     3.   Important factors:




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CHAPTER 5: THE DUTIES OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND OTHER INSIDERS
I.     Business Judgment Rule
           A.   Generally
                     1.   Give directors broad discretion to make decisions which have immunity from
                          liability
                     2.   The presumption of sound business judgment will not be disturbed, if their
                          decision can be attributed to ANY rational business purpose
                     3.   Legislatures have deliberately chosen NOT to codify the BJR because they do
                          not want to freeze the concept. It is fluid.
                     4.   It is not reasonable to reexamine an unsuccessful decision with the benefit of
                          hindsight. Kamin.
           B.   How BJR Operates
                     1.   Shields directors from personal liability; and
                     2.   Insulates decisions of the Board from judicial review (Business Judgment
                          Doctrine)
                            a.   Protects against “hind sight” analysis – which is always 20/20
           C.   Provided those decisions are made:
                     1.   Without fraud, illegality
                     2.   Without conflicts of interest          (duty of loyalty)
                     3.   Without negligence                     (duty of care)
           D.   Elements


            Common Law                                            MCBA §8.30
            (1) Good faith;                                       (1) Good faith;
            (2) In the honest belief that the action              (2) In a manner they reasonably believe to
                taken was in the best interest of the                 the in the best interest of the
                company; and                                          corporation; and
            (3) On an informed basis                              (3) With the care of ordinarily prudent
                                                                      person in a like position and under
                                                                      similar circumstances


II.    Duty of Care – Obligations of Control
           A.   Generally – Duty of Care Definition
                     1.   The responsibility of a corporate fiduciary to exercise, in the performance of
                          tasks, the care that a reasonably prudent person in similar position would use
                          under similar circumstances
           B.   Kamin v. American Express Company (NY 1976) BJR Applies – No violations
                     1.   Facts: Stockholder derivative suit. Amex made a bad investment in DLJ.
                          Directors investigated 2 options, and went with dividend distribution.
                          Shareholders sued because they wanted Directors to take the I/S hit for tax
                          savings. No allegations of bad faith.
                     2.   ROL: In the absence of bad faith allegations, courts will apply the BJR and not
                          second guess the business decisions of the Board.



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                     3.   Analysis: Courts wil normally presume BJR in the (i) absence of self interested
                          behavior, (ii) good faith, (iii) due care…, thus assumption that the Directors
                          have adequately carried out their duties.
                     4.   Important factors:
                           a.    No allegations of bad faith, violations of duty of care or loyalty
                           b.    Only allegation, “Directors made a bad choice”
           C.   Smith v. Van Gorkom (DE 1985)             No Investigations – Failed Duty of Care
                     1.   Facts: Directors sold the company for $55/sh which was a premium price, but
                          came to that price after only a 2hr discussion. SH thought they should have
                          gotten more, even through $55 was a premium.
                     2.   ROL: A failure to adequately investigate is a failure of the duty of care to
                          maximize shareholder wealth.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.    No investigation
                           b.    No materials were circulated before the meeting
                           c.    No investigation used to come to share price
                           d.    Lazy directors just picked a number out of the air
           D.   Cinerama, Inc. V. Technicolor, Inc.
                     1.   Facts:
                     2.   ROL:
                     3.   Important factors:
                     4.   Legislative Response
           E.   Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (DE)                Violation of Duty of Loyalty = No BJR
                     1.   FACTS:
                     2.   ROL: DE court, Once Directors violate their duty of care, then business
                          judgment rule cannot protect them.
                     3.   ANAYSIS: Duty of Loyalty & Duty of Care.
                           a.    Duty of Care
                                    (1) Did Directors take a corporate opportunity for themselves instead
                                        of offering to a company?
                                    (2) Look to how the disinterested directors voted
                           b.    Duty of Loyalty
                                    (1) Look to the Smith v. VanGorkem standard
                                    (2) Was there a prudent search for alternatives
                                    (3) Were all the facts and information thoroughly discussed?
                                    (4) Did they keep the enterprise adequately informed of the
                                        discussions
                                    (5) How long did they deliberate before submitting the proposal to the
                                        shareholders?
                                    (6) Can rebut the business judgment rule
                           c.    Timing of Merger
                                    (1) Look at the effective date of the merger as the valuation date
                                    (2) Was the new business plan pare of the valuation?


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                                   (3) They didn‟t set the value of the business
                                   (4) Most states don‟t do it this way
                                   (5) It is the value of the business on the date of the merger
                                   (6) DE it is the value of the business on the date of the agreement
           F.   Brehm v. Eisner (DE 2000)              Executive Compensation – Waste Doctrine
                     1.   Facts: Eisner hired Ovitz to be president of Disney. Ovitz‟s employment K had
                          5 yr term w/several monetary components and included a clause that if Disney
                          chose to “no fault” terminate Ovitz, he would receive the cash value of
                          exercising his A options immediately (instead of waiting the 5 years as
                          required if he were working-then having to come up with the cash). Court
                     2.   ROL: Courts will defer to the Director‟s decisions for executive compensation
                          unless there is reasonable doubt that (i) the directors are disinterested and
                          independent or (ii) the challenged transaction was the product of a valid
                          exercise of business judgment.
                           a.   Waste cases limited to: “unconscionable cases” where directors
                                irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Courts look at the Process, not the amounts
                           b.   Board members can rely on Consultant‟s Reports
                           c.   Directors were disinterested
                           d.   No allegation of fraud
                           e.   Seems to be that they just disagreed with the Board (not enough)
                     4.   Challenging Executive Compensation (How to)
                           a.   Duty of Loyalty – Show the majority were interested, then burden shift to
                                the compensation committee (most effective)
                           b.   If uninterested, then Attack under BJR under Waste. Brehm.
                           c.   Possibly challenge that Board did not have all the information (remember
                                relying on experts, or consultants is ok)
                           d.   If can‟t show that it was either (i) unreasonable or (ii) not loyal; then
                                Plaintiff must show the decision was totally irrational. (unlikely)
           G.   Francis v. United Jersey Bank (NJ 1981)              Lack of Reasonable Care
                     1.   Facts: Mrs. Pritchard was a director of company. Her sons ran the company
                          and stole it blind. She was an elderly, alcoholic, who never attended
                          meetings, didn‟t read anything, etc. Court says she violated her FD Duty of
                          Care.
                     2.   ROL: Directors are required to conform to the level of directorial skill and
                          diligence that an ordinary “reasonable” director would have shown under the
                          circumstances. Not attending meetings, not learning about the business, or
                          even paying attention to the business is a violation of her FD.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Never attended meetings
                           b.   Knew nothing of the corporation‟s affairs
                           c.   Never read or obtained the financial statements
                           d.   She could have stopped the theft had she paid attention to her sons



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III.   Duty of Loyalty
           A.   Generally – 5 Types
                        1.   Corporate Opportunity
                              a.   Corporate officer/director may not seize opportunities for himself, if the
                                   self interest of the officer/director will be brought in conflict with that of
                                   the corporation. Guth.
                                      (1) Conflict can be resolved by disclosure and agreement by
  Duty of Loyalty - 5
                                          corporation
   Corporate
    Opporutnity                       (2) Example: Officer presents the opportunity to the board and board
                                          rejects. This creates a “Safe Harbor”
   SH have no FD
                              b.   Elements. Guth.
   Dominant SH do
    have FD                           (1) Corporation is financially able to take the opportunity
   Directors/Ctrling                 (2) Opportunity is in corporation‟s line of business
    SH (IFT)
                                      (3) Corporation has interest or expectancy in the opportunity
   Protect Captial
    Structure                         (4) By embracing opportunity, officer or director would crate conflict
                                          between his/her self interest and that of the corporation
                              c.   Analysis:
                                      (1) Is the new venture a “business opportunity” under ALI 5.05?
                                      (2) If so, was the opportunity properly rejected by the appropriate
                                          decision maker?
                        2.   Shareholders
                              a.   Shareholders and Directors/Officers do NOT bear the same FD
                                      (1) Investors do not buy stock in order to look out for other people‟s
                                          interests; rather, they buy stock to make money for themselves
                                      (2) Directors, by contract, are elected specifically to monitor the firm
                                          on behalf of the shareholders
                        3.   Dominant Shareholders
                              a.   There is a FD for Dominant Shareholders
                              b.   If “self-dealing” is present, then must meet the Intrinsic Fairness Test
                                      (1) Controlling SH has burden to prove transaction was fair to the
                                          corporation
                                      (2) Applies only when a potential for self-dealing exists in the
                                          arrangement
                        4.   Directors & Controlling Shareholders
                              a.   Duty of Loyalty – Intrinsic Fairness Test
                                      (1) “Dealings are subjected to rigorous scrutiny… Burden is on the
                                          director or shareholder to not only prove the good faith of the
                                          transaction, but also to show its inherent fairness [to the
                                          corporation]” Pepper v. Litton, (S.Ct. 1939)
                                      (2) When to Apply:
                                                 a)   When there is evidence of “Self-Dealing”
                        5.   Capital Structure
                              a.   Directors should protect the interests of the investors bearing the
                                   greatest risk.


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                                     (1) (Zahn, the A shareholders who did not have the information on
                                          the true value of the firm)
                             b.   HYPOS
                                     (1) ACME has 100 A shares, 100 B shares, & $1K in cash
                                               a)     A:B shs, annual dividends and liquidation of assets
 Intrinsic Fairness Test                            distribution 2:1
    Shifts the burden to the                  b)    Redemption of A for $60
     defendants to
     demonstrate intrinsic                     c)    Class A shs can convert 1:1 for B shares
     fairness of the dividend                  d)    Company liquidates, what will A & B owners get?
     declaration.
                                               e)    A gets $40/sh & B gets $20/sh
    Basically, Did the Board
     make a decision that was        (2) Do the B owners have an incentive to have the firm redeem the A
     fair?                                shares at $60 before liquidating?
    Litton                                    a)     No. Redeeming the 100 A shares for $60 would leave
                                                    nothing for the B owners.
                                     (3) Do the B owners ever have the incentive to have the company
                                          redeem the A shares?
                                               a)    Yes. When the company is doing well
                                               b)     Absent redemption, fi company has cash of $30K, A
                                                    owners will get $200 per share and B owners will get $100
                                                    per share
                                     (4) By contract, if A shares are redeemed, what will B owners get?
                                               a)    $240 per share
                                               b)    Company redeems the A shares for $60, leaving the firm
                                                    with $24,000 (30,000-(60)(100)=24,000
                                               c)    Thus, $24,00/100 B owners = $240
                                     (5) What will A owners do if they know company has $30,000?
                                               a)    A owners will convert to B shares leaving no A shares and
                                                    200 B shares.
                                               b)    Each share will then get $150 (30k/200=150)
                                     (6) Why might the A owners NOT convert (as in Zahn)
                                               a)    They might not convert if they didn‟t know the company
                                                    was worth so much
              B.   Directors and Managers
                       1.   Bayer v. Beran (NY 1944)                 Close Family Relationship - Loyalty
                             a.   Facts: $1M advertising campaign. Before 1942, the company had no
                                  radio advertising, but did a lot of advertising. The court looked at ratio of
                                  exp/rev. The company had been considering radio for awhile, especially
                                  after the FTC required Cleanese products to be labeled rayon. As a result
                                  they wanted to implement a different marketing campaign. Started radio
                                  ads which featured President‟s wife. SH sued.
                             b.   ROL: Where a Close relative of decision maker takes a position closely
                                  associated with anew and expensive field of activity, the motives of the
                                  director are scrutinized under the Inherent Fairness Test.
                                     (1) Burden shifts and Director must show the decision was made in
                                          good faith and fair and reasonable to the corporation.


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                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) RED FLAG: Close relative of decision maker takes a position
                                       closely associated with anew and expensive field of activity, the
                                       motives of the director are likely to be questioned.
                                   (2) No formal meeting to decide in this case. BUT this was a different
                                       situation because the directors worked together. They knew what
                                       was happening and were informed.
                                            a)    Daily association
                                   (3) 2 Directors were not present, but later ratified
                                            a)    Expressly ratified the renewal of the broadcasting K
                                            b)     Expressed Renewal acted as a ratification of ALL previous
                                                 decision to get to this point. Includes the initial decision.
                     2.   Lewis v. SL & E, Inc. (2nd Cir 1980)         Director is Officer - Loyalty
                           a.   Facts: Lewis was the principal SH of SLE & LGT. LGT operated a tire
                                dealership. SLE owned land/complex of buildings (on significant asset).
                                In 62, Lewis transferred his SGT hares to his 6 kids. Then the kids all
                                entered into a “shareholder‟s agreement” whereby anyone who did not
                                own LGT stock on 6/1/72 would be required to sell their SLE shares to
                                LGT. They would be required to buyback at market value. LGT rented
                                the property from SLE. After a few years, a lease was signed for 10
                                years. After lease term expired, no new lease was signed , but GLT
                                continue to pay $14.4k/yr. P wins.
                           b.   ROL: IFT Applied. Because directors of SLE were directors / officers /
                                shareholders of LGT, the burden shifts to Defendant to demonstrate that
                                the transactions between SLE and LGT were fair and reasonable.
                                   (1) D failed to show they were fair and reasonable, so they lost.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) LGT Directors viewed SLE as a company who solely benefits LGT,
                                       btu there were minority SH of SLE that they still owed a FD duty
                                       to
                                   (2) Remedy: P is not required to sell his shares to LGT without such
                                       upward adjustment to value based on fair/reasonable rental
                                       revenue received.
           C.   Corporate Opportunities
                     1.   Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc. (DE 1996)       Not Taking Op
                           a.   Facts: Broz was president and sole shareholder of RFBC and outside
                                director of CIS. CIS and RFBC were in similar businesses of providing
                                Cellular services. CIS provided cellular telephone services to the
                                Midwest, and RFBC owned and operated an FCC license area, which
                                allowed RFBC to provide cellular service to mid-Michigan.
                                   (1) In April 94, another cellular company wanted to get rid of a license
                                       area. They offered the opportunity to RFBC, but this opportunity
                                       was never offered to CIS, because CIS was going through financial
                                       problems
                                   (2) Broz discussed with other CIS directors, who said CIS not
                                       interested
                                   (3) Broz buys license 11/14/1994, PC tenders on 11/23/1994


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                           b.   ROL: A director/officer has a duty to not appropriate corporate
                                opportunities which (i) the corporation is financially able to undertake, (ii)
                                within the line of business, and (iii) which the corporation has an
                                expectancy in it.
                                   (1) 4 Elements of Corporate Opportunity. Guth.
                                             a)    Corp is financial able to take the opportunity
                                             b)    Opportunity is in corporations line of business
                                             c)    Corporation has interest or expectancy in the opportunity
                                             d)     By embracing the opportunity, officer/director would
                                                  create a conflict between his/her self interest and that of
                                                  the corporation.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) CIS was not financial capable of taking the opportunity
                                   (2) No Expectancy Interest because CIS was divesting itself of similar
                                       interests
                                   (3) Broz owed NO duty to PC because they did not CIS until AFTER he
                                       purchased the license
                           d.   Safe Harbor Rule
                                   (1) If a director gets an opportunity, then presents the opportunity to
                                       the board FORMALLY before taking it for himself and they reject it,
                                       then he is home free.
           D.   Dominant Shareholders
                     1.   Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien (DE 1971)                  Exclusion of Minority
                           a.   Facts: From 1960-66, Sinven issued about $108M in dividends. Sinclair
                                owned about 97% of Sinven and nominated/placed all board members
                                who were officers/directors/employees of Sinclair. P claim dividends were
                                made because Sinclair needed cash; thus violated duty of loyalty.
                                   (1) Dividends issue:             No IFT application in this case.
                                   (2) Breach of K issue:           IFT application was proper
                           b.   ROL: The Intrinsic Fairness Test is applied when there is a Fiduciary
                                Duty and Self-Interest. Self-Interest (Dealing) occurs when a parent by
                                virtue of its domination of the subsidiary causes the subsidiary to act in a
                                way that the parent receives something at the exclusion and detriment to
                                the minority shareholders of the sub.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) For dividends, majority and minority received the same benefits
                                   (2) Issue of Motive is immaterial unless P can show (i) dividend
                                       payments resulted from improper motive AND (ii) amounted to
                                       Waste.
                                             a)     P only contends D drained cash to the extent to prevent
                                                  expanding. No proof of improper motive or waste.
                                   (3) For K, majority received benefit to the exclusion of minority
                                             a)     Sinclair was allowed to be late with pmts, didn‟t purchase
                                                  everything it promised
                     2.   Zahn v. Transamerica Corporation (3d Cir 1947)                  Shut Out Minority


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                           a.   Facts: Axton-Fisher had 2 classes of stock. Each with different rights.
                                Approx 5/1941 Transamerica started buying AF shares. Continued
                                buying for 2 years, ended up with 66% of A, 80% of B. AF‟s principle
                                asset was tobacco which cost them $6.3M. This jumped in value to
                                $20M. Complaint alleged TA planned to appropriate the value increase of
                                the tobacco and not share with minority by calling the Class-A shares,
                                then selling the tobacco to Phillip Morris. Court says TA violated their FD
                                duties, remand for damages.
                           b.   ROL: (i) The majority does have right to control, but when it does so it
                                occupies a fiduciary relation toward the minority. (ii) Directors may not
                                declare or withhold the declaration of dividends for the purpose for
                                personal profit or take any corporate action for such purpose.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Directors did have right to call for any purpose at anytime
                                             a)   “Right to call” is not a freebie to call for any reason
                                   (2) Court determined AF purpose was to appropriate all the gain of
                                       the tobacco for themselves and not share with minority
                                   (3) Damages = Class A should receive what they would have received
                                       had they converted to Class B – (minus) what they did receive.
           E.   Ratification
                     1.   Ratification Conclusions
                           a.   BJR drops out of the picture in conflict situations
                                   (1) Analysis shifts to procedures for ratification and to burden of proof
                           b.   Event if transaction is validated by 144(a)(1) or (2)
                                   (1) Plaintiff need merely meet ordinary burden of proof of unfairness
                                       to invalidate transaction
                           c.   If transaction is not validated by 144(a)(1) or (2)
                                   (1) Not automatically void – D can validate by establishing fairness
                                       (under 144(a)(3))
                     2.   Fliegler v. Lawrence (DE 1976)               Effect of Ratification
                           a.   Facts: SH Derivative action on behalf of Agau Mines. President of Agau
                                purchased land as individual. He offered to transfer to Agau, but after
                                consulting with other board members transferred to USAC instead. USAC
                                formed for this purpose. Agau later purchased land from USAC for 800K
                                shares of Agau. Majority approved, minority sued. Court says use
                                Intrinsic Fairness Test, and Defendant has proven fairness.
                           b.   ROL: A transaction will not be voidable if ratified by a majority of
                                disinterested shareholders and made in good faith.
                                   (1) Effect of Ratification – if majority of disinterested shareholders
                                       ratifies a transaction, then burden shifts back to Plaintiff.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) IFT because only 1/3 of disinterested SH voted; thus it cannot be
                                       said all the disinterested SH approved or disapproved.
                                   (2) Defendants proved the transaction was fair
                                             a)   Agau received valuable properties
                                             b)   The price was fair


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                                            c)     Done through self-financing, which made sense
                                   (3) “Entire Atmosphere” was not refreshed with ratification because all
                                       the disinterested SH did not approve
                     3.   In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc. Shareholders Litigation (DE 1995)
                          Majority of Minority Vote (Tricky Burden Shifting)
                           a.   Facts: WTI SH brought derivative action against Directors. Waste
                                purchased 22% of WTI. Waste elected 4 of its own directors onto the
                                WTI board. They negotiated another 33% in a merger agreement.
                                Giving all WTI SH a portion of Waste shares for every WTI share that was
                                owned. WTI held a special meeting. All members other than Waste
                                members attended. They reviewed the information, presentations were
                                given by investment bankers and WTI counsel. All speakers thought the
                                deal was fair. All members approved. Sent proxy statement to WTI SHs
                                – announcing the approval for the non-waste members and of the entire
                                board. Court says no failure of due care, appropriate standard is BJR.
                           b.   ROL: 2 Types of Duty of Loyalty claims
                                   (1) Interested Transactions
                                            a)     (i) corp & its directors, or (ii) corp & entity which it has
                                                 an interest
                                            b)     8 Del.C. §144(a)(2) – Transaction will not be void if made
                                                 in good faith and ratified by majority of disinterested
                                                 shareholders. Agau.
                                            c)     Approval by a fully informed, disinterested shareholders
                                                 pursuant to §144(a)(2) invokes the BJR and limits judicial
                                                 review to issues of gift or waste with burden on attacking
                                                 party
                                   (2) Transactions Between the Corporation & Controlling Shareholder
                                            a)     Primarily parent-subsidiary merger situations, D must
                                                 show the Entire Fairness of the transaction
                                            b)     EVEN IF there is a “majority of the minority” SH vote, the
                                                 standard remains Entire Fairness
                                                        BUT, the Burden shifts to the Plaintiff. Thus, the P
                                                         must prove the merger was NOT entirely fair
                                                        This burden shifting also hold true involving mergers
                                                         with de facto controlling SH
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Disclosure Claim
                                            a)     3 hr discussion was enough here because they had
                                                 substantial background knowledge
                                            b)     Attended by Investment Bankers & Outside Counsel to
                                                 provide consulting advise
                                   (2) FD: Duty of Care Claim
                                            a)     No negligence, no claim
                                   (3) FD: Duty of Loyalty Claim
                                   (4) Appropriate Review Standard & Burden of Proof
                                            a)     No de facto control; appropriate standard is BJR


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IV.    Disclosures and Fairness
           A.   Overview of Securities Issues
                     1.   Definition of Security: Stocks, bonds, notes, warrants, or other documents
                          that represent a share in a company or a debt owed by a company. „33 Act;
                          section 2
                     2.   2 Types of Markets for Securities
                           a.   Primary – Issuer sells securities to investors
                           b.   Secondary – Investors trade securities among selves
                     3.   “Blue Sky Laws”
                           a.   State laws regulating primary market. Some regulate “quality” (ie.
                                Riskiness) of the securities issued.
                     4.   Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)
                           a.   Principally concerned with the primary market
                           b.   Essentially a disclosure statute
                                   (1) Requires companies issuing stock to disclose information about
                                       business and capital structure (Form S-1)
                                   (2) Does not regulate riskiness of the offering
                     5.   Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) (created by SEC)
                           a.   Primarily concerned with the secondary market
                           b.   Examples: insider trading, securities fraud, short-swing profits, proxy
                                regulations, disclosure (Forms 10-K, 10-Q)
                     6.   Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
                           a.   Primary federal agency administering securities laws and regulations
                           b.   5 commissioners (no more than 3 from one political party); confirmed by
                                Senate
                           c.   Staff (mostly lawyers) – 3 primary functions
                                   (1) Provide interpretive guidance to private parties
                                   (2) Advise Commission on new rules or revisions
                                   (3) Investigate and prosecute violations of securities laws
                     7.   When is a transaction/scheme an “investment contract” (and thereby
                          a „security‟ for purposes of securities law)?
                           a.   An Investment Contract for purposes of the Securities Act is a contract,
                                transaction or scheme whereby a person:
                                   (1) Invests money in
                                   (2) A common enterprise and is led to
                                   (3) Expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or third
                                       party. SEC v. Howey (S.Ct. 1946)
                     8.   Exemptions (From Securities Regulations)
                           a.   Private Placement (Securities Act Sec. 4(2)). Doran.
                                   4 Factors
                                   (1) Number of Offerees – Few relatively sophisticated people who
                                       preferably know each other
                                   (2) Number of Units – Involves only a few shares of stock


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                                   (3) Size of Offering – Should raise only a small amount of money
                                   (4) Manner of Offering – Does not involve public advertising
                           b.   #1 Regulation D (rules 501-506)
                                   (1) Provides a number of Safe Harbors that issuers can use to come
                                       within private-placement exemptions.
                                   (2) Rule 504: if issuer raises less than $1M through the securities, it
                                       generally may sell to unlimited number of people
                                   (3) Rule 505: if issuer raises no more than $5M, it may sell up to 35
                                       investors
                                   (4) Rule 506: if issuer raises more than $5M, it may sell to no more
                                       than 35 sophisticated investors
                                             a)     Limits do not apply to “accredited investors” – examples:
                                                  banks, brokers, etc.
                                   (5) Generally exempt only the initial sale
                                             a)     Therefore, most buyers can resell the securities only if
                                                  they find another exemption (eg Sec 4(1))
                                             b)     Issuer can protect exemption by exercising “reasonable
                                                  care” to make sure buyers are planning to hold the stock
                                                  for themselves
                                   (6) Rule 144, Safe Harbor: Buyers may resell stock they acquire in a
                                       Reg D offering if they first hold it for 2 years and then resell it in
                                       limited volumes.
                           c.   #2 Securities Act Sec 4(1)
                                   (1) “transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
                                       dealer”
                                   (2) Person may be deemed an “underwriter” if s/he buys a security
                                       “with a view to” reselling it
                                             a)     If s/he then resold the shares to a large number of
                                                  people, a court could integrate her resale into the initial
                                                  offering and invalidate the issuer‟s exemption (eg. Reg D)
                                                  for the entire issue.
                           d.   #3 Securities Act Sec 3(11)
                                   (1) Company incorporated in a state where it does it business offers
                                       issue only to offerees in that state
           B.   Definition of a Security
                     1.   If party sues you for failing to register as a security, then you should
                           a.   First, you claim the instruments are not securities
                           b.   Second, if it is deemed a security, then argue it falls under an exception
                           c.   Third, if that doesn‟t work, Settle
                     2.   Importance of Security Distinction (3)
                           a.   #1: Whether Securities Act applies to the transaction
                           b.   #2: Whether Antifraud provisions of Securities Act applies
                                   (1) Common law is much harder to prove
                     3.   Basic Issues
                           a.   Is it a Security?                       Must follow Securities laws

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                           b.   Is it a Commercial Interest?             Need not follow Securities laws
                     4.   Great Lakes Chemical Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (DE 2000)                  Def of Security
                           a.   Facts: Monsanto and STI sold STI to Great Lakes. Great Lakes claims
                                Monsanto violated §10(b) when they failed to disclose material
                                information in conjunction with the sale. P says security, D says no
                                security. Court says NO security, cuz it fails Howry #3.
                           b.   ROL: (i) To be an investment contract, the profits earned MUST come
                                solely from the efforts of others. (ii)A security is either an Investment
                                Contract or its Stock
                                      (1) 3 Elements of Investment Contract. Howry.
                                               a)    An investment of money
                                               b)     In a common enterprise (means common with someone
                                                    else)
                                                          Horizontal Commonality: pooling of investors
                                                           contributions an distribution of profits/losses on a
                                                           pro-rata basis
                                                          Vertical Commonality: Investor and promoter be
                                                           engaged in same enterprise
                                               c)    With profits to come solely from the efforts of others
                                                          Great Lakes LOST cause of this point, they had an
                                                           element of control themselves; therefore, the profits
                                                           were not coming solely from the efforts of others.
                                      (2) 5 Elements to find a “Stock” (even if it‟s a 100% sale)
                                               a)     The right to receive dividends contingent upon an
                                                    apportionment of profits;
                                               b)    Negotiability;
                                               c)    The ability to be pledged or hypothecated;
                                               d)    Voting rights in proportion to the number of shares
                                                    owned; AND
                                               e)    The ability to appreciate in value
                           c.   Important factors:
                     5.   Ownership Interests in Equity – Is it a Security?
                           a.   Corporations
                                      (1) Yes – 100% sale of public, Yes, it is a security – It is a Stock
                                      (2) Yes – Closely Held Corp – Yes, it is a security. It is a Stock.
                                         Landreth.
                           b.   Partnerships
                                      (1) General: No – Profits come from individuals as well as others
                                      (2) Limited: Yes.
                           c.   Limited Partnership
                                      (1) No for General Partners
                                      (2) Yes/Maybe for Limited Partners. Depends on level of control.
                           d.   LLC
                                      (1) Maybe – Depends on level of control


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           C.   Registration Process
                     1.   3 Requirements for Registration
                           a.   Security may not be offered for sale through the mails or by use of other
                                means of interstate commerce unless a registration statement has been
                                filed with the SEC
                           b.   Securities may not be sold until the registration statement has become
                                effective; and
                           c.   The prospectus (a disclosure document) must be delivered to the
                                purchaser before the sale
                     2.   If you have an exemption, then you do not need to comply with obligations of
                          registration
                     3.   Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt Corp (DE 2000)              Private Placement Exemption
                           a.   Facts: Doran assumed loans for his interest in an oil well. They sent him
                                information that was wrong. Wells were deliberately overproduced in
                                violation of WY law. WY stopped them from drilling. When they
                                resumed, they were getting very little. Company defaulted on loans
                                guaranteed by Doran. Doran sues for breach of K and recession based on
                                violations of Securities Laws. Court says no private placement exemption
                                here, reverse & remand.
                           b.   ROL: There are 4 relevant factors when determining Private Placement
                                   (1) Number of offerees and their relationship to each other and the
                                       issuer;            (most important factor)
                                              a)    Number is not dispositive
                                   (2) The number of units offered;
                                   (3) The size of the offering; and
                                   (4) The manner of the offering
                           c.   Analysis/Important factors:
                                   (1) Number of offerees
                                              a)    More offerees the more likely it is public
                                              b)    Only 8 in this case, leans toward private
                                   (2) Relationship to the Issuer
                                              a)     Must have available information. Sufficient basis of
                                                   accurate information upon which the sophisticated investor
                                                   may exercise his skills
                                              b)    All the information was not available to Doran
                     4.   Securities Act Civil Liabilities
                     5.   Excott v. BarChris Const Corp (5th Cir 1977)          Section 11-Expert/Non
                           a.   Facts: Defendant made bowling alleys. D‟s issued debentures of
                                BarChris. P brought action under Section 11 of ‟33 Act. P alleged the
                                registration statement filed with SEC contained material false statements
                                and material omissions.
                           b.   ROL: Section 11 claims have different standards for expert portions of
                                the registration statement and non-expert portions. Due Diligence
                                cannot be delegated
                                   (1) Non-expert portion – Due Diligence is Defense


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                                            a)      D must show (i) he made a reasonable investigation; and
                                                 (ii) after that investigation, he was left with reasonable
                                                 grounds to believe and did in fact believe that there was no
                                                 material misstatement or omission
                                            b)    This Due Diligence cannot be delegated. The Director
                                                 must review the docs.
                                   (2) Expert portion – Ext. use of experts to prep is expertised portion.
                                            a)     Experts: Expert must use (i) reasonable investigation
                                                 which gave him a reasonable ground to believe (and actual
                                                 belief) that the part he prepared was accurate.
                                            b)     Non-experts: They had no reasonable ground to believe
                                                 and did not believe there was a material misstatement or
                                                 omission.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Section 11
                                            a)     Imposes liability for false statements in a registration
                                                 statement. ‟33 Act
                                            b)    Very tough. Almost Strict Liability
                                   (2) Typical Expertised Portions
                                            a)     Financial statements, Engineering reports, Appraisals of
                                                 property
                                   (3) Every person who signed the registration statement as being true
                                       or accurate will be liable
                                   (4) Due Diligence requires:
                                            a)    Reasonable investigation – a prudent man in the
                                                 management of his own business
                                   (5) Materiality = Those matters as to which an average prudent
                                       investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the
                                       security registered. Something that would deter him from
                                       purchasing a security
                                   (6) Damages Under Section 11:
                                            a)     Difference between (i) the price the P paid for the stock
                                                 and (ii) the value of the stock at the time of the suit (or
                                                 price when sold)
                                            b)     D‟s Affirmative Defense, if D can show the decline in
                                                 value was caused by other factors other than the error
                     6.   Integrated Disclosure and Exchange Act Disclosures
           D.   Rule 10b-5      Insider Trading
                     1.   Def: It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
                          any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
                          any national securities exchange,
                           a.   (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
                           b.   (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
                                material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of
                                the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or



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                           c.   (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
                                or would operate as fraud or deceit.
                     2.   Applications
                           a.   Prevent insiders from making explicit fraudulent statements to investors
                           b.   Applies to any form of deceit or fraud, including situations where the
                                insider silently buys/sells on material non-public information (thus no
                                affirmative misrepresentations are necessary)
                           c.   Applies to one who makes misrepresentations that induces others to
                                buy/sell, even if the maker never buys/sells
                           d.   Provides investor with private suit against violator
                                   (1) Originally, only meant to give SEC power to stop fraud
                     3.   4 Elements for 10b-5 “Private Action”
                           a.   Reliance on the statements
                                   (1) Fraud on the Market Theory
                           b.   Materiality
                                   (1) Balance all facts
                                              a)     Assess Probability – (i) board resolutions, (ii) instructions
                                                   to investment bankers, (iii) actual negotiations
                                              b)     Assess Magnitude – show that the misrepresentations in
                                                   fact did not lead to a distortion of price or that an individual
                                                   plaintiff traded or would have traded despite his knowledge
                                                   the statement was false
                           c.   Scienter           (can be shown through an attempt)
                                   (1) Negligence is sufficient
                                   (2) Recklessness can meet the requirements
                                   (3) (Rule 11: Scienter is not required)
                           d.   Causation
                     4.   3 Elements for 10b-5 “SEC Enforcement Action”
                           a.   Must show materiality
                           b.   Scienter
                           c.   Not need to nay injury to a private person, no reliance is required.
                     5.   Basic Inc. v. Levinson (S.Ct. 1988)            Causation thru FOM Theory
                           a.   Facts: Combustion wanted to purchase Basic. Basic mgmt released to
                                the public that no negotiations were taking place. After the first release,
                                P sold their shares. Merger occurred. P claim they were mislead by
                                announcement. Court says certification ok and statements were
                                materials.
                           b.   ROL: “Fraud on the Market Theory” – Presumption that “most publicly
                                available information is reflected in the market price, an investor‟s
                                reliance on any public material misrepresentations; therefore, may be
                                presumed for purposes of Rule 10b-5 action. Thus, P can show that he
                                was harmed by D‟s misconduct even though he did not rely on anything D
                                did or said.




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                                   (1) Reliance, the injured party must “buy or sell” shares in reliance.
                                       If party does not buy or sell, then party does not have standing to
                                       sue. Cannot have COA based on “not buying”
                                   (2) Materiality is determined by balancing all facts and looking at
                                       Probability and Magnitude.
                                            a)     Assess Probability: (i) board resolutions, (ii) instructions
                                                 by investment bankers, and (iii) actual negotiations
                                            b)     Assess Magnitude: (i) size of 2 companies, and (ii)
                                                 potential premiums over market value.
                                   (3) Rebuttals
                                            a)    Rebut Presumption of Materiality
                                                        Rebut actual proofs (facts) giving rise to
                                                         presumption
                                                        Show that the misrepresentations in fact did not
                                                         lead to distortion of price or that an individual P
                                                         traded or would have traded despite his knowing the
                                                         statement was false
                                            b)    Rebut Presumption of Reliance
                                                        Any showing the severs the link between the alleged
                                                         misrepresentations and price received/decision
                                                         trade at a fair market price
                                                        Examples
                                                                  Market makers were privy to the truth and
                                                                   price was factored into the price
                                                                  Statements were leaked and those
                                                                   statements were weighed and factored into
                                                                   the market price
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Reliance requires individual to Buy or Sell
                     6.   West v. Prudential Securities, Inc. (7th Cir 2002) FOM Requires Disclosure
                          be Public
                           a.   Facts: Hofman did not release information to the public, and his clients
                                thought that they were receiving and acting on non-public information. P
                                contend it was unimportant that the information was not public. Thus,
                                District court certified case under Fraud on the market theory. Wrong.
                           b.   ROL: For small, non-public disclosures you cannot apply FOM theory to
                                show causation.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) The material was not publicly disclosed
                     7.   Pommer v. Medtest Corporation (7th Cir 1992)                 Measure of Damages
                           a.   Facts: 2 guys started a company. 1 guy sold some shares to Pommers.
                                Pommers said Manning claimed they were about to get purchased, but
                                really they were just beginning negotiations. Fell through. Pommers
                                sued.
                           b.   ROL: A statement materially false when made does not become
                                acceptable because it happens to come true. Good fortune may reduce
                                damages, but does not make the falsehood any less material.

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                                    (1) Restitution should take into account the probability of unlikely
                                         occurrence.
                                    (2) Example: If there was a 10% chance of not earning the amount,
                                         then reduce verdict to get lower judgment. $200 judgment – 10%
                                         of not earning = $180 Verdict
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    (1) Possible agency issues because West sold these shares on his own
                                         behalf not on behalf of the company
                     8.    Judicial Limitations on Actions Under Rule 10b-5
                     9.    Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green (S.Ct. 1977)          No bad conduct
                            a.   Facts: Santa Fe keeps gobbling up Kirby, up to 95%. Then they
                                 petitioned for DE §253 “Short Form” Merger. They compiled the info.
                                 Got independent appraisals, $125, then they offered $150. Minority
                                 didn‟t approve, so they sued under 10b-5.
                            b.   ROL: 10b-5 cause of action cannot be maintained where there is NO
                                 manipulative or deceptive conduct.
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    (1) Shareholders did not pursue appraisal rights
                                    (2) No allegations of manipulation
                                    (3) No allegations of deception
                                    (4) Independent appraisals show good faith
                                    (5) “Short Form” Merger
                                              a)    In DE, a parent which owns 90% of a sub, can choose to
                                                   merge with sub by parent board approval. Then payout
                                                   minority in cash.
                     10.   Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp (3d 1988)           Options are Securities
                            a.   Facts: P claims he was hurt by misrepresentations when he bought
                                 options. DC said options are not securities. AP reversed.
                            b.   ROL: Options are securities for purposes of 10b-5 actions
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    (1) Call/Put Options are always securities under SEC rules
           E.   Inside Information
                     1.    4 Legal Doctrines: Imposing Liability For Insider Trading
                            a.   10b-5
                                    (1) Dirks, Chiarella, and TGA
                            b.   Misappropriation Theory
                            c.   14E-3
                                    (1) Special rule for Tender Offers imposing liability on almost anyone
                                         even those who have no fiduciary obligations.
                            d.   Mail and Wire Fraud
                     2.    Insider Analysis Under 10b-5 (Exam)
                            a.   First, Is the person an insider?
                            b.   Second, Is the information “inside” information?
                            c.   Third, Is the information material?

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                                   (1) Does the stock price change?
                                   (2) How are people reacting
                     3.   Rule 10b-5 – Who are Insiders, Tippee, or Misappropriator


Insider (tipper)                      Tippee                                Misappropriator
A person is an “insider” only if      A person is a “tippee” only if        A person is a “misappropriator”
he has some kind of FD that           (a) He receives information that is   if he is an “outsider” who gets
requires him to keep the non-             given to him in Breach of an      the information from one other
public information confidential.          Insider‟s FD, AND                 than the issuer, in voilation of
                                      (b) He knows or should have known     an express or implied promise of
                                           that the breach has occurred.    confidentiality.
                                      (c) The insider/tipper has received
                                           some benefit from the breach




                           a.   Obligation of an Insider
                                   (1) Must obstain from trading (when in possession of material info)
                                   (2) Unless he has disclosed all material inside information
                           b.   THUS, if a person does not have a FD to the corporation, they cannot be
                                an insider thus cannot be liable under 10b-5. Chiarella.
                     4.   Goodwin v. Agassiz (MA 1933)                 State Common Law Approach
                           a.   Facts: D bought stock form P thru an exchange after a speculative
                                mining report. D purchased the shares through an exchange. P claims D
                                withheld inside information. Court says no fraud; therefore no liability.
                           b.   ROL: Common Law Approach: (i) Where a director personally seeks a
                                stockholder for the purpose of buying his shares without making
                                disclosure of material facts within his peculiar knowledge and not within
                                reach of the shareholder, the transaction will be closely scrutinized and
                                relief may be granted in appropriate instances. (ii) Purchases through a
                                broker are evaluated with less scrutiny.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Disclosure of theories or hopes are not required (nature of
                                       information in question was speculative)
                                   (2) Purchased through broker
                                   (3) Again, No Fraud… no liability
                           d.   Side Note: Common Law Recap
                                   (1) “No Duty” Rule – Liability is based only on Fraud
                                   (2) “Duty to Disclose” Rule – Directors/Mgrs (insiders) have a duty to
                                       disclose materiali information before trading to insiders
                                   (3) “Special Circumstances” Rule – Generally, Directors/Mgrs owe no
                                       duty, but duty MAY arise in special circumstances.
                     5.   SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (2d Cir 1969)               Insider Duties
                           a.   Facts: Good core samples. Directors wanted to keep it under raps to
                                keep the land price down. A few TGS ees began trading stock/options.
                                Rumors got out. TGS denied the rumors thru press releases saying the
                                results were not as good as rumors stated. Then they made public

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                                announcement, and IMMEDIATELY (1/2 sec) started trading. Courts says
                                the insiders should have waited for the information to disseminate
                                throughout the public rather than trading ½ sec after the announcement.
                           b.   ROL: SEC Statutory Approach to Insider Trading under 10b-5
                                (i) Insider is anyone trading for his own account in the securities of
                                information intended to be available only for a corporate pruposes and
                                not the personal benefit of anyone may not take advantage of such
                                information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
                                (ii) Anyone in possession of material inside information must either:
                                   (1) Disclose it to the investing public and WAIT for dissemination, or
                                   (2) If he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate
                                       confidence or he chooses not to do so, he must ABSTAIN from
                                       trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such
                                       inside information remains undisclosed.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) When determining materiality – look at reactions of insiders
                           d.   Side Note:
                                   (1) Insiders are not precluded from trading in their own
                                       companies. They are preclude from trading on information that
                                       is (i) Extraordinary, and (ii) Reasonably certain to have substantial
                                       effect.
                     6.   Dirks v. SEC (S.Ct 1983)                   Tippee
                           a.   Facts: Dirks, analysts, was asked to investigate fraud. He did. Found
                                likely fraud. He reported it to WSJ, but they refused to print it. He told
                                his clients and they divested their interests. DC & AP found him liable.
                                S.Ct. reversed.
                           b.   ROL: An outsider is allowed to trade on non-public information that he
                                has acquired through his own investigations/diligence; provided no one
                                has breached their own FD in passing the information on to the outsider.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) He acquired all the information through his own diligence
                           d.   3 Important Principles for Tippee/Tipper (ROL)
                                   (1) Did the tippor breach a FD?
                                   (2) Whether tippee know or should have known about the breach?
                                   (3) Lawyers are considered to be Temporary Insiders (just like
                                       accountants)
                     7.   United States v. O‟Hagan (S.Ct 1997)               10b-5 Misappropriation
                           a.   Facts: Pillsbury hired law firm to handle tender offer. Partner in firm
                                who was not working on the case found out about it. He purchased
                                options in Pillsbury. Made 4.3M.
                           b.   ROL: (i) 10b-5 liability can be based upon the misappropriation of
                                confidential data from a person other than the issuer then buys/sells the
                                issuer‟s stock.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Definition of Misappropriation is still unclear
                                             a)   Deception seems to be the key

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                                             b)  Court implies that if the supplier of the information could
                                               bring some sort of “theft of information” tort claim
                                   (2) 14E-3 is an issue because of the Proxy Statement
                           d.   Exam Note
                                   (1) This holding broadens 10b-5 to include anyone who
                                       misappropriates confidential information from anyone can be liable
                                       for trading on that information.
                                   (2) Thus, if Chiarella occurred today, then they might be liable.
                                   (3) Very important Public Policy holding
           F.   Short-Swing Trading Profits and §16(b)
                     1.   16(b)
                           a.   Definition: “For the purposes of preventing the unfair use of information
                                which may have been obtained by [any beneficial owner of more than
                                10% of a class of stock], director, or officer by reason of his
                                relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase
                                and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
                                issuer… within any period of less than six months.. shall inure to and
                                be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part
                                of the beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such
                                transaction of holding the security purchase or of not repurchasing the
                                security sold for a period not exceeding six months… This subsection shall
                                not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
                                was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale and purchase, f
                                the security involved, or any transaction or transaction which the
                                Commission by rules and regulations may exempt…”
                           b.   Beneficial Owner: Individual must own 10% of outstanding shares
                                   (1) BOTH at the time of Purchase and Sale (Black Letter Law)
                                   (2) 6 months time gap between transactions
                           c.   Effect: Must disgorge all profits to corporation
                     2.   Exam Analysis(3 step):
                           a.   Is the person a beneficial owner?
                           b.   Is the person liable under 16(b)?
                           c.   How much does party need to disgorge?

         Exam Tip: If there is a question about 16(b) effectiveness in stopping insider
         trading, then respond, “10b-5 is also required to be completely effective. 16(b) is
         good, but is not broad enough to cover all people who should be included as insiders.”


                     3.   Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson El. Co. (S.Ct. 1972) 10% is Black Letter
                           a.   Facts: Lawyer recommended they break up the short-swing profit sales
                                to specifically avoid entire 16(b) liability. 3.4% sold in first block which
                                reduced their holdings to below 10%, then 9% in the second block.
                           b.   ROL: 16(b) “Short Swing” profits only applies when someone owns 10%
                                or more at both the time of purchase and sale.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Motivation is irrelevant; therefore, they can split the sale into 2
                                       batches to avoid larger liability

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                     4.   Foremost-McKesson. v. Provident Sec. Co (S.Ct 1976) Timing of Purchase
                           a.   Facts:
                           b.   ROL: The purchase that puts someone over 10% is not subject to 16(b).
                                Only purchases made AFTER owning the 10% are subject to 16(b).
                           c.   Important factors:
                           d.   Example 1
                                   (1) Jan1         buys              5%
                                   (2) Feb1         buys addl         20% (becomes a “Beneficial Owner”)
                                   (3) Mar2 buys addl                 2%
                                   (4) Jul15        sells             10%   ONLY, the 2% is subject to 16(b)
                                   (5) Aug31 sells                    9%    All 9% is subject
                                   (6) Sep2         sells             ALL   No liability… after 6 months
                           e.   Example 2
                                   (1) Jan1         owns 20%                All ready a Beneficial Owner
                                   (2) Jan2         sells 5% for $50        Now only 15% owner
                                   (3) Feb2         buys 5% for $10
                                               a)    They were beneficial owners at time of sale within 6
                                                    months
                                               b)     Liable for $40/sh x Number of Shares
                                               c)     If he bought 9% on 2/2 instead of the 5%, then he would
                                                    still only be liable for 5%
                     5.   Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (S.Ct. 1973) What is a
                          Sale
                           a.   Facts: Occidental lost a take-over attempt after buying more than 10%.
                                Received options to purchase. Sold the options before 6 month window.
                           b.   ROL: Buying and selling options received during a hostile takeover are
                                NOT securities for purposes of 16(b).
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Options are securities for purposes of 10b-5
                                   (2) Options are NOT securities for purposes of 16(b)
                                   (3) Does not violate policy: 16(b) is to prevent those who have
                                         insider information from trading on that information. But, a
                                         hostile bidder (in a take-over attempt) does NOT have access to
                                         this type of inside information.
                           d.   Additional Analysis: This is an Unorthodox Transaction
                                   (1) 2 Part Test
                                               a)     D must show that BOTH (i) the transaction was
                                                    essentially involuntary, and (ii) the transaction was of a
                                                    type which the D almost certainly did not have access to
                                                    the inside information.
                     6.   Notes on §16(b)
           G.   Indemnification and Insurance
                     1.   Generally


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                           a.   Statutory language and contractual language will usually be the case in
                                Indemnification and Insurance issues
                           b.   Indemnification and Insurance spreads risks
                           c.   Directors/Officers want some assurance from the company that they will
                                be protected against lawsuits
                     2.   Mandatory Indemnification
                           a.   Most states require a company to indemnify an officer or directors when:
                                   (1) The director/officer is completely successful in defending himself
                                       against the charges; and
                                   (2) When the corporation has previously bound itself by charter, law,
                                       or contract to indemnify.
                     3.   Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, Inc. (2d Cir 1996) Success on Merits
                           a.   Facts: Waltuch spent $2.5M on his own defense when he and Conti were
                                sued. Without consulting Waltuch, Conti settled the case for both
                                Waltuch and Conti. Waltuch wanted reimbursement for what he paid on
                                his defense. Conti argued that they paid the settlement; therefore, he
                                did not succeed on the merits. Court says he did.
                           b.   ROL: Basically the lawsuit was dismissed without Waltuch having paid a
                                settlement and it is not for the court to ask why this result was reached.
                                Thus, since he paid nothing and the case is over, he was successful on
                                the merits.
                                   (1) Might be different if he agreed to the settlement paid by Conti
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Conti paid the settlement without consulting Waltuch – it was
                                       basically involuntary for him.
                     4.   Citadel Holding Corporation v. Roven (DE 1992)             Advance Payment
                           a.   Facts: Citadel and Roven entered into an Indemnity Agreement whose
                                purpose with was to give Roven greater protection than that of the
                                charter or bylaws. Agreement specifically states, “Roven is entitled to
                                require Citadel to advance the costs of defending certain lawsuits.”
                                Roven asked for an advance, Citadel didn‟t. Roven sued, wins.
                           b.   ROL: Breach of K issue. If the agreement provides a company must
                                provide advance payments for lawsuits, then they must.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   (1) Agreement was specific, right of advancement did exist
                                   (2) Beware, this does not guarantee indemnification… only
                                       advancement
                     5.   Note on Insurance
           H.   Securities Analysis (Exam)
                     1.   First: Is the item subject to the act (basically, is it a security)?
                           a.   If yes, then ‟33 requires filing
                           b.   If yes, is there an exemption?
                                   (1) Reg D, Private Placement,
                                   (2) Research Blue Sky laws.
                                   (3) Section 11


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CHAPTER 6: PROBLEMS OF CONTROL
I.     Proxy Fights
           A.   Definition: A proxy contest is any competition between two competing factions
                (generally management v. outsiders) to obtain shareholder votes on a proposal.
                     1.   The contest is much like a political campaign: Each side will take out
                          newspaper ads, direct marketing (of proxy materials), makes personal phone
                          class to important voters, and does anything else in its legal power to gain
                          more votes than the other side.
                     2.   Types of Proxy Contests
                           a.   Election of Directors
                           b.   Management Proposals
                           c.   Shareholder Proposals
                     3.   Why have Proxy Contests
                           a.   Management wants to retain control, and insurgents want to gain control
                           b.   Proxy contests are less expensive than hostile takeover bid (in theory)
                     4.   Proxy contests have decreased over the years, while Tender offers have
                          increased
           B.   Strategic Use of Proxies
                     1.   Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. (SDNY 1967)             Company Resources
                           a.   Facts: 2 groups within MGM vying for control. P contend that D have
                                wrongfully committed company resources to pay for the services of
                                specially retained attorneys, a public relations firm, and proxy soliciting
                                organizations to aid their side. P sought injunctive relief. D wins.
                           b.   ROL: Management may use the corporate treasury to pay for reasonable
                                expenses of soliciting proxies to defend its position in a bona fide policy
                                contest.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Definite conflict over policy on how to run the company
                                   2)   D never lied, or committed fraud
                                   3)   D announced and disclosed every intention to use company funds
                                   4)   The amounts were not excessive nor unreasonable
           C.   Reimbursement of Costs
                     1.   Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Eng & Air Corp (NY 1955)           Conflict over Policy
                           a.   Facts: S/H Derivative action to recover $261K from 2 groups who had a
                                proxy fight. Their fight was over policies, NOT a personal power contest
                           b.   ROL:
                                   1)   Insurgent SH may be reimbursed reasonable expenses if (i) they
                                        win, and (ii) reimbursement is ratified by SH
                                   2)   Incumbent Management may be reimbursed regardless of success,
                                        but only so long as (i) expenses are reasonable, and (ii) issues
                                        related to policy instead of personal power struggle.
                                   3)   Burden is on directors to show the propriety and reasonableness
                                        of specific items (basically, subject to court‟s scrutiny if
                                        challenged)


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                                   4)   No reimbursement for investigating firms to takeover.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Definitely over policy, not personal power struggle
                     2.   Notes on Regulation of Proxy Fights
                           a.   Concept of Solicitation
                                   1)   Broad interpretation, but 14a-2 specifies that a shareholder does
                                        not fall under the general SEC filing requirements if it does not
                                        solicit proxies for itself.
                                   2)   Thus, a pension fund that submits a SH proposal might not be
                                        subject to requirements because it is not asking SH to give it
                                        proxies.
                           b.   Proxy Statement Required (14a-3, 14a-4, 14a-5, 14a-11)
                                   1)   Parties who solicit proxies must furnish it to each SH
                                   2)   Also must file copies with SEC
                                   3)   Must disclose information that may be relevant to the decision the
                                        SH are to make
                                              a)    Annual Report
                                              b)    Disclosure of conflicts of interest
                                              c)    Other major issues which are anticipated at the SH
                                                   meeting
                           c.   Insurgent Group communication with Shareholders
                                   1)   Insurgent‟s want the list to do their mailings and solicitation
                                   2)   Management has a choice (2)
                                              a)     Management can mail the insurgent group‟s material to
                                                   the SH directly and charge the group for the cost (almost
                                                   ALWAYS the case), OR
                                              b)     Management can give a copy of SH list an dlet it
                                                   distribute its own material (Rare to Never)
                                                         Beware: Insurgents might have a right under State
                                                          Law to obtain the list. Look for relevant statute.
           D.   Implied Private Actions for Proxy Rule Violations
                     1.   Implied because nothing in the ‟34 act or SEC rules expressly give a private
                          investor the right to sue if the proxy rules are violated. But, S.Ct. has
                          recognized an “implied private right of action” on behalf of individuals who
                          have been injured by a violation of proxy rules.
                     2.   Summary of Law
                           a.   Materiality
                                   1)   If “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
                                        would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” TSC
                                        Industries.
                                   2)   P must show there was material misstatement
                                   3)   Not necessary to show SHs were actually mislead, only important
                                        to the vote. TSC
                           b.   Causation


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                                   1)   P does not have to show that he relied, the court will presume as
                                        long as the falsehood was material. Mills.
                           c.   Standard of Fault
                                   1)   Some courts require Scienter, so say Negligence is ok
                           d.   Remedies
                                   1)   Damages, Injunction, maybe even undoing of a consummated trx.
                                        Borak.
                     3.   J.I. Case Co. v. Borak (S.Ct. 1964)        Implied Private Right of Action
                           a.   Facts: Minority SH sued to enjoin a proposed merger. P claimed illegal
                                self-dealing, unfair to SHs, and proxy materials were false and misleading
                                in that they did not disclose the true facts about the merger and its value
                                to shareholders. DC dismissed, S.Ct. reversed. Trx had already
                                completed.
                           b.   ROL: Federal courts have the power to hear both derivative and private
                                right of actions for 14(e) violations involving materially false or
                                misleading proxy statements
                                   1)   Remedy ROL: The court did not undo the merger, but suggested
                                        that it could.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)

                     4.   Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. (S.Ct. 1970) Causal Link with Misstatements
                          & Damages
                           a.   Facts: P sought to have merger set aside because of 14(a) violations.
                                The violation was that the proxy stated that all board members
                                recommended the merger to SHs, but failed to tell SHs that all 11 of
                                those board members were nominees of Mergenthaler (thus under their
                                control and domination). DC said material. AP reversed because P failed
                                to show causation, basically they wanted to know that SHs would have
                                changed their mind with the omitted info. S.Ct. said too high a burden,
                                reversed P wins.
                           b.   ROL: If P shows that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the
                                particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in the
                                accomplishment of the transaction.
                                   1)   P merely has to show that the merger could not have carried out
                                        without the submission of proxy materials t the minority
                                        shareholders. Once this was done, then the requisite causal link
                                        would be deemed established
                           c.   ROL#2: Reimbursement – Where an action by a SH results in a
                                substantial benefit to a corporation he should recover his costs and
                                expenses.
                           d.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Mergenthaler owned a majority of the SHs, but still needed 2/3
                                        majority to pass their proposal; thus
                                   2)   Minority SH were necessary for D to win
                                   3)   This lowered the previous burden
                     5.   Seinfeld v. Bartz



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                           a.   Facts: Derivative action against company and 10 directors. P asserts D
                                materially omitted the value of the director‟s stock options – claiming the
                                $32K was their only compensation. P wanted D to include Black-Scholes
                                valuations. BUT, all previous courts have held that Black-Scholes
                                valuations are not material.
                           b.   ROL: Black-Scholes valuations are not material for purposes of the 14a-9
                                analysis.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Proper materiality standard is TSC Industries.
           E.   Shareholder Proposals
                     1.   2 Methods by which SHs can communicate with the other SHs
                           a.   Shareholder Bears Cost
                                   1)   Under 14a-7, If SH is willing to bear the costs of printing/postage,
                                        then company must either (i) mail or (ii) give over the SH list
                                   2)   Usually used to disagree with company decision
                                   3)   3 Requirements:
                                             a)     SH proxy materials must relate to a meeting in which the
                                                  company will be making its own solicitation (must have a
                                                  meeting called)
                                             b)    SH must be entitled to vote on the matter, and
                                             c)     SH must defray the expenses that the corporation will
                                                  incur
Can management refuse under 14a-7? Are there exceptions?
                           b.   Company Bears Cost
                                   1)   Uder 14a-8, Requires management to include the SH proposal in
                                        management‟s own proxy materials, at the corporation‟s expense
                                   2)   2 Requirements:
                                             a)    Own either at least 1% or $1000 market value
                                             b)     Have held the shares for at least 1 year prior to
                                                  submission
                                   3)   13 Exclusions for Management under 14a-8(c). Most often, the
                                        company will not just refuse. They will write to the SEC and
                                        obtain an Opinion Letter.
                                             a)    c1- Proposal is not a proper subject for action by SH
                                                  under state law
                                             b)    c2- Proposal would result in a violation of laws
                                             c)     c5- Not significantly related to company‟s business (must
                                                  be more than 5% of TA or NI). Lovenheim.
                                             d)    c6- Beyond company‟s power to implement
                                             e)     c7- Proposal relates to “conduct of the ordinary business
                                                  operations”
                                             f)    c8- Relates to election of directors
                                             g)    c10- Proposal is moot; and
                                             h)    c13- Relates to specific dividends
                     2.   Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands (DDC 1985)           Policy Makes Issue Significant

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                           a.   Facts: Mr. Lovenheim wanted to prevent IB from excluding proxy
                                materials from upcoming materials. The materials have to do with
                                cruelty to geese. His proposal talks about the process, which the geese
                                are forced through. Directors refused under 14a-8(i)(5) because it
                                relates to less than 5% of operations.
                           b.   ROL: Although a company is able to refuse inclusion based on 5%
                                significance‟s test, if the proposal raises important policy questions which
                                are important enough to be considered „significantly related‟ to the
                                issuer‟s business, that proposal can be included.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Social or ethical issues
                     3.   NYC Ees‟ Retirement Sys v. Dole.(NY 1992) Ordinary Business Operation,
                                                                        Significant Relationship
                                                                       & Beyond Power to Effectuate
                           a.   Facts: NYCERS asked Dole to include their proposal which maintained
                                that Dole create a committee which would investigate various health care
                                proposals. Dole wrote to the office of chief counsel of SEC and stated
                                that Dole‟s position that Dole could exclude the proposal as concerned
                                employee benefits which is an „ordinary business operation‟ SEC then
                                gave permission to exclude. Dole told NYCERS, NYCERS submitted an
                                affidavit stating that this effects ALL Americans; thus it‟s a policy issue.
                                NYCERS sues. Court says (i) does not relate to ordinary business
                                operations, (ii) likely to be significant, and (iii) is within power.
                           b.   ROL: Must include the SH proposal
                                   1)   (BO 14a-8(i)(7)) Companies can exclude proposal which involve
                                        business matters that are mundane in nature and do not involve
                                        any substantial policy or other considerations, BUT the proposal
                                        may NOT be exclude if it involves a significant strategic decision
                                        as to those daily business matters.
                                   2)   (SR 14a-8(i)(5)) Significant Relationship is one which does occupy
                                        or LIKELY to occupy at least 5% of NI or GS, AND is not otherwise
                                        significantly related to the registrant‟s business
                                   3)   (BPE 14a-8(i)(6)) Corporation does not need to include a proposal
                                        which deals with a matter beyond the registrant‟s power to
                                        effectuate.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Normally, great deference is given to SEC Staff Opinion letters
                                   2)   Dole provided no information on (i) whether Dole has a health
                                        insurance program, (ii) if such a program exists at Dole, how it
                                        operates, and (iii) the amount of corporate financial resources that
                                        Dole devotes to heath insurance.
                                   3)   No information on above/below 5%, but it is LIKELY to occupy
                                        more than 5%
                                   4)   Forming an investigative committee is definitely within the power
                                        of the company to effectuate.
                           d.   Aftermath
                     4.   Austin v. Consol. Edison Co NY, Inc. (SDNY 1992) Relates to Personal Gain


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                           a.   Facts: 3 P suing as SH, not derivative suit. P want D to include in its
                                proxy materials for the upcoming SH meeting a non-binding resolution
                                endorsing the idea that defendant‟s employee‟s should be allowed to
                                retire after 30 days of service, regardless of age. D wrote to SEC to get
                                opinion on exclusion cuz (i) deals with day-to-day, and (ii) does not
                                confer a benefit not common to all shareholders generally. SEC issued a
                                “No Action” Letter for D.
                           b.   ROL:
                                   1)   14a-8(i)(7) Pension proposals are excludable from proxy
                                        materials. Long history of this decision. “P‟s resolution shows
                                        that even an „audacious‟ proposal on a mundane topic is still
                                        mundane.”
                                   2)   14a-8(i)(4) Proposal is excludable if the proposal relates to the
                                        redress of a personal claim or grievance against the registrant or
                                        any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to the
                                        proponent, or to further a personal interest, which benefit or
                                        interest is not shared with the other security holders at large.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   P‟s proposal was personal.
                                   2)   Collective Bargaining is available and should be used by the P
           F.   Shareholder Inspection Rights (Attempts to get SH Lists)
                     1.   Why the “List” is so important
                           a.   If you pay for the mailing, the company is required to mail out the
                                proposal (even if you are trying to elect a new board)
                                   1)   But, relying upon the Board‟s good will, is not comforting
                                   2)   You WANT the SH list to send materials to directly
                                   3)   How do you get it?
                                             a)     Nothing in proxy rules requiring companies to hand over
                                                  the list; therefore federal rules do not impair any rights
                                             b)    Most battles are fought under State Laws
                     2.   Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co. (NY 1976)                        Proper Purpose
                           a.   Facts: Crane trying to acquire Anaconda. $100M bond for 5M shares.
                                Anaconda fights back. Crane registers with SEC and begins distributing
                                prospectus to brokers. Then Crane asks for Anaconda‟s list telling them
                                that they owe a FD duty to give SH all information. Crane owned no
                                Anaconda stock. Anaconda refused. By 12/11/75 2.3M shares were
                                tendered to Crane. Crane requested for list again pursuant to section
                                1315. Court says give Crane the list.
                           b.   ROL: Takeover bid is not an improper purpose under 1315
                                   1)   Section 1315 provides that “access must be permitted to qualified
                                        shareholders on written demand, subject to the denial if the
                                        petitioner refused to furnish an affidavit that the „inspection is not
                                        desired for a purpose… other than the business‟ of the corporation
                                        and that the petitioner has not been involved in the sale of stock
                                        lists within the last 5 years.”
                                   2)   Defendant corporation has burden of showing improper purpose
                           c.   Important factors:


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                                   1)   D failed to show that a takeover bid is improper business purpose
                                   2)   Anaconda even offered to send proposals for Crane at Crane‟s
                                        expense. Crane refused, they wanted the list.
                                   3)   Relief: Anaconda must give list to Crane
                                   4)   Multiple Purposes
                                             a)    Evaluation of Investment                     Proper
                                             b)    Pursuit of unrelated personal goals          Improper
                                             c)    Deal with SH as investors                    Proper
                                                        Hostility to management
                                                        Suit against corporation
                                                        List of “non-objecting beneficial owners”
                                             d)    Pursuit of social/political goals            ~Improper
                     3.   State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc. (MN 1971)         Improper Purpose
                           a.   Facts: Pills lost in DC when they tried to get Original SH ledger, current
                                SH ledger, and all corporate records dealing with weapons and munitions
                                manufacture. On 7/3/69 Pills found out that HW was making bombs for
                                the Vietnam War. He wanted to stop it. 7/14/69 Pills purchased 100
                                shares of HW for the sole purpose of giving himself a voice. He wanted
                                all the records to insure accuracy and he wanted all other SH to know
                                about HW‟s involvement. Court affirms, company does not have to hand
                                over the list.
                           b.   ROL: Proper Purpose contemplates a concern with investment return.
                                   1)   “where it is shown that such stockholding is only colorable, or
                                        solely for the purpose of maintaining proceedings of this kind, we
                                        fail to see how the petitioner can be said to be a persona
                                        interested, entitled as of right to inspect…” quoting Chas A Day.
                                                         Be careful with this Burden of Proof
                                   2)   P wants Corporate Records
                                             a)    P has burden to show he has a proper purpose
                                   3)   P wants SH Lists
                                             a)    D, corporation, must show that P has an improper
                                                  purpose
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Pills purchased SOLELY for the purpose of trying to influence HW‟s
                                        business affairs
                                   2)   He had no prior interest
                                   3)   He had no Long Term interest in HW either
                                   4)   Lawsuit might have been appropriate when a SH has a bona fide
                                        concern about the adverse effects of abstention from profitable
                                        war contracts on his investment in HW
                     4.   Sadler v. NCR Corporation. (2d 1991)                         NOBO List
                           a.   Facts: AT&T began Tender Offer. NCR mailed the offer to all SH. NCR
                                board rejected the offer & rejected the offer to redeem the poison pill.
                                AT&T sought to replace the board by calling “Special Meeting”, so they



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                                needed a 80% of outstanding to agree. Sadler (acting on AT&T‟s
                                request) asked for CEDE & NOBO.
                           b.   ROL: NY Law allows a party to a proxy fight to require a corporation to
                                furnish a list of “non-objecting beneficial owners (NOBO),” even where
                                the corporation is not domiciled in NY but does business there.
                                   1)   Also, company must compile and produce this list
                                   2)   If corporation claim improper purpose, then it is their burden to
                                        show it
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   CEDE – identifies the brokerage firms and other record owners
                                        who bought shares in a street name for their customers
                                   2)   NOBO – non-objecting beneficial owners who have given consen
                                        tto the disclosure of their identities.
                                   3)   AT&T asked Sadler because NY law 1315 permits any (i) NY
                                        resident, (ii) who has owned the stock for over 6 mos… Sadler
                                        qualified but AT&T did not.
                                             a)   This agreement is ok
                                   4)   Court says 1315 should be read liberally and in favor of SH
                                   5)   Not the same as DE
                                                                  DE                 NY
                                             a)   CEDE            compiled           Compile
                                             b)   NOBO            not compiled       Compile
II.    Shareholder Voting Control
           A.

           B.   Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp. (IL 1971)              Proprietary Rights
                     1.   Facts: Validity of 500K shares of Blackhawk Class B stock. Provision stated
                          that shares have voting rights, but are NOT entitled to dividends either upon
                          voluntary/involuntary liquidation. P claims that the shares were not shares
                          pursuant to IL law. Courts says they are shares.
                     2.   ROL: Right to assets and rights to earnings (“economic rights”) may be
                          eliminated from the other attributes of a share of stock. Only management
                          incident of ownership may not be removed (voting).
                           a.   IL business statute (Corporation Act 163 Section 2.6) provides that
                                “shares” means the units into which the proprietary interests in a
                                corporation are divided.
                           b.   Thus, proprietary rights are rights to participate
                                   1)   in the control of the corporation,
                                   2)   in its surplus or profits, OR
                                   3)   in the distribution of its assets.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   The statute specifically says “OR”, thus one of those rights must be given
                                not all.
                           b.   Class B was less expensive than the Class A, this would basically give B
                                the same rights as A but they paid less



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                           c.   Current Changes: IL BCA 1983 §7.40(b) – now provides that
                                corporations, in their articles, “may limit or deny voting rights or may
                                provide special voting rights as to any class or classes or series of
                                shares.”
           C.   State of WS Inv Bd v. Peerless Sys, Corp. (DE 2000)          Thwarting SH Votes
                     1.   Facts: SWIB invests the assets of WS Retirement system. SWIB became a
                          Beneficial Owner of Peerless. Peerless issued a proxy statement with 3
                          proposals. SWIB disagreed with #2 which provided another 1M shares could
                          be issued. Argued dilution thus decreased value. Special Meeting held were
                          they discussed merger with another company. Then the annual meeting held
                          (SWIB not there), they voted on #1 and 3, but adjourned on #2. During that
                          time, Peerless continued to solicit votes and finally when vote was held they
                          won #2. P asserts D improperly adjourned. Summary judgment denied on
                          both sides because more facts are needed.
                     2.   ROL: Standing & Breach of FD by Adjourning
                           a.   Standing: SH does not need to attend a meeting to object to a proposal
                                to preserve ability to challenge propriety of SH vote.
                           b.   Breach of FD: Application of Blasius Test. First, P must establish that
                                the board acted for the primary purpose of thwarting the exercise of a SH
                                vote. Second, the board has the burden to demonstrate a compelling
                                justification for its actions.
                                   1)   When to Apply Blasius Test: Only apply when “the primary
                                        purpose of the board‟s action is to interfere with or impede
                                        exercise of the shareholder franchise,” and the stockholders are
                                        not given a “full and fair opportunity to vote.”
                           c.   Improper Acts are in 2 categories:
                                   1)   Void Acts – Those that are ultra vires, fraudulent, gifts or waste
                                        and are legal nullities incapable of cure
                                   2)   Voidable Acts – Performed in the interest of the company, but are
                                        beyond the authority of mgmt and are also cause for relief. If SH
                                        ratify a voidable act, then it cures the defect (provided ratification
                                        was “fairly accomplished”)
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Quorum was present on first meeting. No need to have additional voters.
                           b.   Blasius Test applies because this is a Board Entrenchment Situation
III.   Control in Closely Held Corporations
           A.   Important Considerations with Closely Held Corporations (CHC)
                     1.   Employment contracts (discuss on exam)
                     2.   Buy-sell agreements (discuss on exam)
                     3.   Pooling agreements
                     4.   Voting Trusts



   General Rule – FD of CHC Shareholder:
   “The relationship among SH in a CHC is analogous to that of partners. SH in CHC owe one
   another a FD. Owing a FD includes dealing „openly, honestly, and fairly with other SH.‟”
   Evans.


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           B.   Ringling Bros. B&B Comb Sh v. Ringling. (DE 1947)             Pooling Agreements OK
                     1.   Facts: There was an agreement among SH to vote together. There were 7
                          board spots. History – they previously pooled and ousted Robert and inserted
                          James. James went to Jail. Years later they have this board meeting. Both
                          Dunn and Griffith show up and vote as Chairman. They had a SH agreement.
                          The agreement provided that they would consult and confer with to the rother
                          and to vote their shares together on any issues put to a stockholder vote.
                          They also agree that if they can‟t agree o how the shares shouldb e voted,
                          their lawyer Mr. Loos shall act as arbitrator. They disagreed and Mrs. Haley
                          refused to vote with Mrs. Ringling and refused to comply with arbitrator. Court
                          says agreement is valid.
                     2.   ROL: SH are offered wide discretion when voting. They may vote any way or
                          any reason, so long as they do not violate a previous agreement. If one party
                          violates the agreement, they are not required to vote with the other side,
                          instead their votes are just NOT counted.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Today, the votes not counted remedy would probably fail. Court would
                                probably require specific performance.
                           b.   Arbitrator did not have proxy power to vote the share. Basically, he
                                could only arbitrate, but could not enforce the decision.
                           c.   Remedy
                                   1)   Specific performance was NOT given. Court did not make losing
                                        party vote with the other side.
                                   2)   Remedy given was that Mrs. Haley‟s votes were not counted
                     4.   Moral
                           a.   Make sure you setup your agreement to understand the impact of proxy
                                power
                           b.   Specific performance was never requested in this case, it might have
                                helped
                           c.   If you have an arbitrator, give them the power to vote the shares after
                                the decision has been made.
           C.   McQuade v. Stoneham. (NY 1934)                        Limiting Board Power is Illegal
                     1.   Facts: Action for Specific Performance of an agreement between 2 parties.
                          Agreement provided parties will use best endeavors for the purpose of
                          continuing as directors/officers of said company.. names., then Stoneham has
                          power to name all additional directors as he sees fit. After a few years, they
                          ousted McGraw. McGraw sues. Court says K was illegal and void.
                     2.   ROL: A SH Agreement is illegal and void so far as it precludes the board of
                          directors at the risk of incurring legal liability from changing officers, salaries,
                          or policies or retaining individuals in office, except by consent of the
                          contracting parties.
                           a.   Directors must retain the power and have the duty to act in accordance
                                with their own best judgment so long as they remain directors.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   This “voting or shareholders agreement” prevented Directors from firing
                                McGraw and they would have run the risk of incurring legal liability –
                                Effectively “tied the hands of mgmt.”
                                   1)   Use an employment K instead

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                           b.   Thus, until the date when the D repudiated the agreement, its
                                performance constituted a violation of the statute
           D.   Clark v. Dodge. (NY 1936)                         Limitation of Board Power Can Be OK
                     1.   Facts: 2 guys owned 2 companies. Clark owned 25% and Dodge 75%. Clark
                          knew the formula, Dodge had the money. They entered into a voting
                          agreement whereby Clark would always remain employed and on the board
                          provided he give up the formula. He gave it up, Dodge booted him. Clark
                          wants his job back and money. Court says Clark wins.
                     2.   ROL: Where the public was not effected, the parties in interest, might, by
                          their original agreement of incorporation, limit their respective rights and
                          powers. (VERY LIMITED – Only in CHC where public was not effected)
                           a.   Basically a Reversal of McQuade, but ONLY when public is not effected,
                                and ALL SHs approved
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Also a Legitimate Expectations case
                           b.   There was no attempt to sterilize the board of directors with this
                                agreement (4 factors)
                                     1)   Dodge was to vote for Clark
                                     2)   As a director Dodge should continue Clark as GM
                                     3)   Clark would always receive a salary
                                     4)   No salaries which are unreasonable should be paid
                     4.   Differentiate McQuade and Clark
                                McQuade                                 Clark
                           a.   Publicly held shares                    CHC
                           b.   Sterilized the board                    Board was still free

           Synthesized ROL: Agreements Which Limit Board Powers
           Synthesis of McQuade, Clark, and other NY cases
           In order for an agreement to be valid: (i) must not harm creditors, the public, or non-
           consenting SHs; and (ii) must involve only an “innocuous variance” from the rule that
           a corporation‟s business should be managed by the board.
                 Also it might be required that ALL SH consent (or at the very least that the
                 person now attacking the agreement have previously consented to it)


           E.   Corporate Planning by Use of Employment Contracts
                     1.   Duration
                           a.   Number years. Then what?
                           b.   Termination for cause
                                     1)   By whom?
                                     2)   What is “cause”?
                           c.   Effect of illness, incapacity, etc.
                     2.   Compensation
                           a.   Salary
                           b.   Adjustments (inflation)

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                           c.   Bonuses, stock options, etc.
                           d.   Benefits
                           e.   Travel and other expenses
                           f.   Perquisties (perks)
                     3.   Duties and Status
                           a.   Job description
                           b.   Other duties
                           c.   Amount of time; vacation
                           d.   Outside activities
                     4.   Competition and Trade Secrets
                     5.   Consequences of Termination
                           a.   Liquidated damages
                           b.   Duty to Mitigate
                     6.   Parties
                           a.   Mergers, etc.
                           b.   Guarantee by majority SH
           F.   Shareholders Agreements, Voting Trusts, Statutory Close Corporations, and
                Involuntary Dissolution
                     1.   Shareholders Agreements / Pooling Agreements
                           a.   McQuade & Clark
                           b.   Commitment to elect Board of Directors
                                    1)   Agreements by which SH simple commit to electing themselves or
                                         others as directors are generally considered unobjectionable and
                                         are now expressly validated in many jurisdictions
                           c.   Commitment to appoint Officers or Employees
                                    1)   This restricts the Board‟s power
                                    2)   Modern view, agreements are enforceable, at least for CHC, as
                                         long as they are signed by all SHs.
                     2.   Voting Trusts
                           a.   A device specifically authorized by the corporation laws of most states
                           b.   SH who wish to act in concert turn their shares over to a trustee. The
                                trustee then votes all the shares, in accordance with instructions in the
                                document establishing the trust.
                           c.   Often used to maintain control by a Family or Group
                           d.   Existence of a voting trusts generally must be made public
                     3.   Statutory Close Corporation
                           a.   Under DE Law §342,
                                    1)   Election by any corporation with fewer than 30 SHs
                           b.   Advantages of CHC
                                    1)   Maintain control
                                    2)   Benefits of regular C-Corp
                                    3)   Avoidance of any need to provide certain corporate formalities


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                           c.   Alternative to CHC – To maintain effective control can be had by
                                   1)   Adaptation to the articles of incorporation & bylaws
                                   2)   Together with ancillary agreements such as voting agreements,
                                        employment agreements, and buy-sell agreements
                                   3)   LLC is a viable alterative too
                     4.   Involuntary Dissolution
           G.   Galler v. Galler. (IL 1964)            Modern View of Limiting Board Discretion
                     1.   Facts: 2 principal owners of the corporation, Ben and Isa, each owned 47.5%.
                          They signed a shareholders‟ agreement in which they agreed to pay certain
                          dividends each year and to pay in the even to either should die a specific
                          pension to his widow. Ben died, and Isa refused to carry out the agreement.
                     2.   ROL: In the context of a CHC, an agreement is valid even though it limits the
                          discretion of the Board of Directors if (i) there is no minority interest who is
                          injured by it; (ii) there must be no injury to the public or to creditors; and (iii)
                          the agreement must not violate a clear statutory prohibition.
                           a.   Might be applicable in a public company too
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Investors in CHC usually have more at stake than investors in a publicly
                                held corp
                           b.   Without a SH agreement which is enforceable, the minority might be at
                                the mercy of an oppressive or unknowledgeable majority
                           c.   Look to Public Policy too
           H.   Ramos v. Estrada. (CA 1992)                                  Pooling Downsides
                     1.   Facts: BG 50% ownership with 25% Ramos (pres)/5% Estrada (board). They
                          agreed to vote as a block. If anyone violates, then forced to sell shares at 8%
                          per year. Estrada went against the agreement. Estrada claims the agreement
                          is void. Estrada votes with Venture to oust Ramos. At next meeting of B6, B6
                          excludes Ramos from Board and Ms. Schramn. Courts says agreement is ok.
                     2.   ROL: Minority shareholders are permitted to pool their efforts to gain some
                          control. Downside is that you lose some control within the goup because you
                          need to abide by the group‟s decisions.
                     3.   Important factors:
IV.    Abuse of Control
           A.   Squeeze-Outs
                     1.   ROL: SH in a CHC owe one another a FD of “utmost good faith and loyalty”.
                          SH in a CHC “may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in
                          derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other SHs and to the corporation.
                          Donahue (MA).
           B.   Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. (MA 1976)        Legitimate Business Purpose
                     1.   Facts: P and 3 other SHs each owned 25% of the corporation. Each holder
                          participated in mgmt, and received an equal salary. Relations went bad.
                          Other 3 ousted Wilkes from CHC – no salary and dropped from board. He
                          brings Breach of FD claim. Other SH violated their duty to him. Court agrees.
                     2.   ROL: Ordinarily SH have no FD to each other, but in certain cases when those
                          Shs are involved in a corporation, there are exceptions. One such rule is that
                          shareholders in a CHC have substantially the same fiduciary obligations to


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                          each other as so partners in a partnership. “Co-adventures” as Justice Scalia
                          put it.
                           a.   2 Step Analysis
                                   1)   Majority must show they “have a legitimate business purpose
                                        for their actions”
                                   2)   If majority succeeds, then injured party must show there was a
                                        less harmful alternative
                           b.   Application (narrow)
                                   1)   Applies only when minority holder reasonably regards his
                                        continued employment a major means of realizing a return on this
                                        stock investment.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Grossly inadequate buyback offer is evidence of a plan to buy back shares
                                at price below their value.
                           b.   Majority failed to show they had a legitimate business purpose
                           c.   Possible “less harmful alternatives”:
                                   1)   Training, night school, etc.
                           d.   Still Possible to Fire someone
                                   1)   if, the majority can show that “they are not acting with purpose
                                        or effect of depriving the minority holder of the fruits that he
                                        reasonably anticipated from his stockholdings.”
           C.   Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc. (NY 1989)                 At-will Before Shareholder
                     1.   Facts: After business was running Ingle was hired. He purchased shares of
                          the company and eventually got 40% of the shares. There is an additional
                          offering where majority buys, and majority‟s sons buys, but they never offered
                          more to Ingle. Eventually fired Ingle. Majority bought back all his shares
                          pursuant to SH agreement. Court says no COA.
                     2.   ROL: A person who begins employment as an at-will employee and later
                          becomes a shareholder does not have a COA when he is terminated and
                          agrees to sell back his shares pursuant to Agreement.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Started as an at-will employee
                           b.   Shareholder agreement was binding
                           c.   This is a K case, not a breach of FD
                           d.   This agreement basically allowed for a freeze-out; thus, we do not need
                                to go through a Wilkes analysis
           D.   Sugarman v. Sugarman. (1st 1986)                 Minority Need Not Sell to be Harmed
                     1.   Facts: Leonard appeals DC decision that he violated FD to minority in CHC. 4
                          brothers started partnership selling paper products. Each owned equal share.
                          Court says he did breach his FD.
                     2.   ROL: in a CHC, a minority SH who merely receives an offer from a majority
                          SH to sell stock at an inadequate price, but does not accept that offer, can still
                          seek damages if the shareholder can prove that the offer was part of a plan to
                          freeze the minority SH out of the corporation. Basically, Majority did not want
                          minority to have ANY financial benefits
                           a.   Analysis:

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                                   1)   First, Minority SH must establish that the majority SH employed
                                        various devices to ensure that the minority SH is frozen out of any
                                        financial benefits from the corporation through such means as the
                                        receipt of dividends or employment
                                   2)   Second, Minority SH must establish that the offer to buy stock at a
                                        low price is the “capstone of a majority plan” to freeze-out the
                                        minority
                           b.   Must show more than just:
                                   1)   Majority too excess compensation
                                   2)   Majority only offered to buy back at low price
                     3.   Freeze-out devices employed by majority
                           a.   Leonard gave his father unequal salary and benefits
                           b.   Offered to buy back at grossly inadequate price
                           c.   Leonard received excessive compensation
                           d.   Never paid dividends
                           e.   Refused to give Marjorie desired employment
                     4.   Remedy:
                           a.   Damages = Loss of value of shares
                           b.   No remedy for instatement
                     5.   Buy-Sell Agreement could have helped with marketability of shares
           E.   Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc. (MA 1981)                Obligation of Minority SH
                     1.   Facts: Veto possible for any of the 4 SHs. 1 of SHs doesn‟t need the money
                          when the other 3 do. He keeps veto‟ing dividend distribution vote. He wants
                          to reinvest the money, the other 3 want to distribute. Due to 80%
                          requirement, they are deadlocked. Consequently, company is nailed by IRS
                          with huge fine. Court says minority owes.
                     2.   ROL: A minority SH might still be held to have FD if their shares have the
                          ability to control the corporation and their purpose is NOT that of a legitimate
                          business purpose.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Minority purpose was personal, not business. Look to motivation
                     4.   Remedy:
                           a.   Minority must reimburse corporation for its loss incurred as a result of his
                                unreasonableness
                           b.   Court might also declare a dividend
           F.   Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc. [READ]
                     1.   Facts:
                     2.   ROL: Corporations buying their own stock owe a FD to those persons who are
                          selling their stock. They must provide adequate information to the seller.
                     3.   Important factors:
V.     Control, Duration, and Statutory Dissolution
           A.   Remedies Available to Minority hurt in CHC
                     1.   Courts can order Dissolution                      (very extreme)
                     2.   Require Buyout at FMV                             (less extreme)

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                     3.   Equity Powers to fashion appropriate remedy
           B.   Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock (AL 1980)              Equitable Remedy as an Option
                     1.   Facts: 3 owners. 1 got a divorce and had to split his share of the company
                          with his wife. 3 owner never told the ex about meetings, votings, etc. 3
                          started getting salaries, Muir never received a dime. They offered her $15, but
                          she appraised the shares at $23-40. AL purchased Valley Plastic. AL burned
                          down, 3 did not rebuild, they just moved everything to Valley Plastics. 3 made
                          2 more offers, Muir sues. Both Derivative and Direct actions.
                     2.   ROL: Courts can liquidate a corporation when it is shown that the acts of
                          those in control are oppressive or fraudulent. However, courts retain equitable
                          authority to fashion a less drastic remedy to fit the parties‟ situation.
                     3.   4 ways to get a Buy-out
                           a.    Provision in articles or bylaws;
                           b.    P can petition courts for Involuntary Dissolution;
                                    1)   Very extreme, usually reserved when “corporate assets are being
                                         misapplied or wasted” and court feels that liquidation of assets is
                                         best for all parties.
                                    2)   Also, “illegal, oppressive or fraudulent” actions
                                    3)   Creditors first, cost of liquidation second, then pro-rata to SH.
                                    4)   Different States have different standards:
                                              a)    AL – Illegal, oppressive, or fraud
                                              b)     NC – Reasonably necessary for protection of the
                                                   shareholders
                           c.    P demand statutory right of appraisal; or
                                    1)   Available upon merger or consolidation, or other “fundamental
                                         change to nature of the corporate structure” that there is a “de
                                         facto” merger which triggers the same statutory appraisal remedy
                           d.    Equitable remedy after breach of FD
                                    1)   Transactions by one group of SHs that enable it to derive some
                                         special benefit not shared in common by all SHs should be subject
                                         to close judicial scrutiny.
                                    2)   Burden Shift: Heightened scrutiny requires D to show that the
                                         transaction was fair
                     4.   Important factors:
                           a.    BJR applies to the Derivative claims
                     5.   Aftermath
           C.   Pedro v. Pedro. (MN 1992)                               Primary Expectations
                     1.   Facts: 3 brothers in business. 1 is terminated (wrongfully). He was fired
                          after investigating unaccounted for money. MN court can order (i) buyout and
                          payment in installments. They had a buyout agreement, SRA.
                     2.   ROL:
                           a.    Damages: If the fair value of the shares is greater than the purchase
                                 price for the buyout as calculated from the formula in the agreement, the
                                 difference is the measure of injured party‟s damages resulting from
                                 having been forced to sell his shares in the company.


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                           b.   Reasonable Expectations: Depends on reasonable expectations of the
                                SHs as they exist at the inception an develop during the course of the
                                SHs relationship with the corporation; thus reasonable expectations of
                                such a SH can be job, salary, a significant place in mgmt, and economic
                                security for his family.
                           c.   Future Employment: In a CHC the nature of the employment of a SH
                                may create a reasonable expectation by the employee-owner that his
                                employment is not terminable at-will.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Majority breached their FD by forcing resignation
                           b.   Can recover attorney‟s fees
           D.   Stuparich v. Harbor Furniture Mfg, inc. (CA 2000)            2 Ways to get Dissolution
                     1.   Facts: Ps were sisters, D were other family members. Father built successful
                          business. He wants to pass the torch. He sells some of his shares at a
                          discount to his son; thereby giving son a majority. P got frustrated because
                          they disagreed and stop attending the meetings. Sum Jud for D, no COA.
                     2.   ROL: New law specifically authorizes formation of CHC and the agreements
                          necessary to dissolution. But, this drastic remedy is aptly limited to 2 possible
                          scenarios (might be more too)
                           a.   #1: “The liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of the
                                rights or interests of any substantial number of the SHs
                           b.   #2: Existence of mismanagement , abuse of authority, or persistent
                                unfairness toward SH
                     3.   POLICY: Court must come in to protect the interests and rights of the minority
                          because they are unable to do so on their own.
                     4.   Important factors:
                           a.   Father has privilege to sell to son at ANY price he wants
VI.    Transfer of Control
           A.   General Rule: A controlling shareholder may sell his control block for a premium and
                may keep the premium himself. Clark.
                     1.   Exceptions:
                           a.   Looting;
                           b.   Sale of a vote; and
                           c.   Diversion of collective opportunity
                     2.   Control Block: A person has effective control if he has the power to use the
                          assets of a corporation (not always the majority holder)
           B.   Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency, Inc. (7th 1986)         A [Reread]
                     1.   Facts: Dispute over minority rights in CHC. Walter owned 100% of JSA. He
                          sold 52% to his family and 8% to Dennis. Additionally, Walter made them sign
                          a “Right of First Refusal” agreement which provided that if the majority bloc
                          offered to sell its shares it had to give Walter the right to buy the shares at the
                          same offer price. If Walter declined, the majority bloc had to offer to buy his
                          shares at the same price at which it sold its own shares. So, Merger occurring
                          and all SHs except Walter sign. He instead wants to exercise this right to buy
                          those shares at $62. They do not wish to sell to him.
                     2.   ROL: (i) Asset sales generally do not trigger “rights of first refusal”, (ii) rights
                          of first refusal are to be interpreted narrowly.

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                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Competition is not a tort
           C.   Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, Inc. (xya)                 Control Premiums Are OK
                     1.   Facts: D and their families own 44% of stock. D sell their interests in
                          Flintkote for $15, when it was selling for $7 on open market. P contends that
                          he and other minority SH should be given that same premium. Court says no.
                     2.   ROL: A controlling SH is free to sell and purchaser is free to buy, the
                          controlling interest at a premium price. Unless, there is looting, corporate
                          assets, conversion of a corporate opportunity, fraud or other acts of bad faith.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   No bad allegations made to qualify for exceptions
           D.   Perlman v. Feldman (dd)                               Taking Corporate Level Gain
                     1.   Facts: During Korean War Feldman grew NWSC. He used the Feldman Plan to
                          acquire interest free loans from customers. Feldmen sold his control bloc to
                          Wilport. W then used the company as a supply company for their steel use.
                          SH sued Feldman because they lost value. P recover individually – not to corp.
                     2.   ROL: Where the controlling SH takes a corporate-level gain and instead
                          appropriates that gain for himself, it is a violation of FD.
                           a.   Newport could have continued to realize its extra profits by maintaining
                                and even expanding the Feldman Plan; instead, this corporation
                                opportunity was (apparently) transformed into abolition of the Feldman
                                Plan and dollars into Feldman‟s own pocket.
                     3.   Important factors:
                           a.   Remedy: Premium payback was to be paid solely to the minority
                                shareholders and not back to corporation.
                           b.   Significance of Feldman seems narrow. If the corporation has an unusual
                                business opportunity that it is not completely taking advantage (ability to
                                raise prices, to obtain interest free loans, or otherwise to prosper in a
                                time of great demand for its products), this opportunity may not be
                                appropriate by the controlling SH in the form of a premium for the sale of
                                control.
           E.   Essex Universal Corporation v. Yates. (2d 1962) Immediate Transfer of Control
                     1.   Facts: Yates owned 28% of the shares of RPC. He agreed to sell his shares to
                          Essex. This agreement provided that Yates will (i) deliver resignations of the
                          majority of directors of RPC, and (ii) cause a special meeting were they resign
                          and take the new nominees “mass seriatim”. He tries to back out cuz $ went
                          up. Essex sues. Yates claims the trx was illegal, because they negotiated the
                          sale of board positions. Court says not illegal.
                     2.   ROL: It is legal to give and receive payment for the immediate transfer of
                          management control to one who has achieved majority share control but would
                          not otherwise be able to convert that share control into operating control for
                          some time.
                           a.   3 Stage Analysis
                                   1)   Is there a sufficient transfer of stock to justify or insulate a
                                        decision to give director positions;
                                   2)   Is this enough stock to give the purchaser control;



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                                   3)   Burden is on person challenging the arrangement to prove that
                                        control is insufficient
                     3.   Analysis:
                           a.   The new controlling SH had control, it would have been only a matter of
                                time before they would have replaced all the directors because of the
                                staggered board. THUS, this would benefit noone to make them wait for
                                something that is evitable.




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CHAPTER 7: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND TAKEOVERS
I.     Mergers and Acquisitions
           A.   Mergers Under SPOON – 8 Forms of Mergers (1 extra)
                     1.   Statutory Merger             [Type A Reorg – Trx b/w companies]
                           a.   A gives A-Stock to B‟s shareholders
                           b.   By operation of law ALL B-Assets & B-Liabilities become part of A
                           c.   Approval: Both A & B shareholders
                           d.   Taxes: No tax for A & B shareholders – reorganization
                           e.   Survivor: Only A-Corp survives. B-Corp dissolves, and B-Corp shares
                                disappear.
                                   1)   Type “A” Reorganization
                           f.   Don‟t forget about Appraisal Rights
                                   1)   Provides that dissenting SHs to a merger are allowed a legal
                                        remedy to have the company purchase their shares at FMV, if the
                                        company is substantially different
                     2.   Cash Out Merger              [Trx b/w companies]
                           a.   A gives Cash to B‟s shareholders
                           b.   By operation of law ALL B-Assets & B-Liabilities become part of A
                           c.   Approval: Both A & B shareholders vote
                           d.   Taxes: Former B shareholders pay tax since they received cash
                           e.   Survivor: Only A-Corp survives
                     3.   Asset Sale                   [Trx b/w companies]
                           a.   A gives Cash to B-Corp
                           b.   B sells Assets and Liabilities to A
                           c.   Approval: Board only
                           d.   Tax: Taxable for B shareholders because they receive cash
                           e.   Survivor: A-Corp survives.
                           f.   B-Corp liquidates by distributing its only asset (cash) to Shareholders

                                Example of Asset Sale via Lawrence
                                                Purchaser             Target
                                Day 1           -cash/p stock         -cash/t-stock
                                                -p assets             -t assets

                                Day 2           -p assets             -cash/p stock
                                                -t assets             -cash/t stock

                                Day 3           -liquidate t


                     4.   Cash for Stock               [Tender Offer – Trx b/w shareholders]
                           a.   A‟s Shareholder(s) send Cash to B‟s Shareholders
                           b.   B‟s Shareholders give their B-Corp shares to A‟s Shareholders



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                           c.   Approval: Direct transaction between A s/h and B s/h. No company
                                approval necessary.
                           d.   Taxes: Former B shareholders pay tax since they received cash
                           e.   Survivor: Both A-Corp and B-Corp Survive
                           f.   Downside: Not all of B‟s shareholders will sell their stock in this
                                transaction. If you want 100%, then try a Statutory Merger.
                     5.   Stock for Assets            [Trx b/w companies]
                           a.   A gives to B A-Corp stock
                           b.   B gives to A certain B-Corp assets and liabilities
                           c.   Approval: Selling substantial all of Bs assets; therefore, requires B
                                shareholder approval. Not As.
                           d.   Survivor: B dissolves and distributes A-Corp shares to its Shareholders
                           e.   Tax: Tax free to A and B
                           f.   Extra: If A‟s stock price fluctuates greatly immediately before the close
                                of the deal, it might be renegotiated.
                     6.   Stock for Stock             [Type “B” Reorg – Trx b/w A & B‟s SHs]
                           a.   A-Corp send its stock to B‟s shareholders
                           b.   B‟s shareholders sends it‟s B shares to A
                           c.   Approval: Direct transaction between A-Corp and B Shareholders
                           d.   Tax: Not taxable to B shareholders
                     7.   Reverse Triangular Merger             [Technically, Merger is between B-Corp
                          and A-Subsidiary]
                           a.   A forms new company (100% wholly owned sub) A1
                           b.   A1 merges with B-Corp
                           c.   B shareholders get Cash or A1-Corp stock
                           d.   B-Corp becomes 100% subsidiary of A-Corp
                           e.   Approval: Requires A‟s Shareholders approval
                           f.   Survivor: B-Corp is the surviving company
                           g.   Keeps all B‟s Goodwill, License, contractual agreements, and Patents
                                alive.
                           h.   Tax: Depends on whether cash or stock is received
                     8.   Forward Triangular Merger             [Technically, Merger is between B-Corp
                          and A-Subsidiary]
                           a.   A forms a new company (100% wholly owned sub) A1
                           b.   A1 merges with B-Corp.
                           c.   Shields A from B-Corp liability.
                           d.   Approval: Requires B‟s S/H approval, Not A – since A1 is merging
                           e.   Survivor: A1 survives, B dissolves
                           f.   Tax: No tax to B if they receive stock
                     9.   2 Stage Acquisition Squeeze-Out Merger
                           a.   Similar to “Cash for Stock” – Tender Offer, but 10% don‟t Tender
                           b.   A-Corp gets 90% of B-Corp


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                           c.   A-Corp forms A1
                           d.   A1 and B-Corp do a Statutory Merger
                           e.   Thus, remaining 10% of B-Corp hold-outs get A-Corp shares by Operation
                                of Law
           B.   Steps in a Merger
                     1.   File in the State or Jurisdiction that you are merging in to
                     2.   Board initiation and approval
                           a.   Must adopt a document known as a “Plan of Merger”
                                   1)   Outlines terms and conditions of the merger
                                   2)   Consideration
                           b.   Board is bound by its fiduciary duties.
                                   1)   If merging with a controlling shareholder (partner) it is reviewed
                                        as a self-dealing transaction
                                   2)   Disclosure protection – need disclosure of material facts
                     3.   Shareholder approval
                           a.   Plan of Merger must be submitted to shareholders of each corporation for
                                approval
                           b.   Needs complete disclosure, complete candor
                           c.   Dissenting shareholders are bound by the will of the majority
                           d.   Target‟s shareholders have to approve too
                           e.   MBCA
                                   1)   Requires votes by each class of stock and merger is not approved
                                        is rejected by any voting class
                                   2)   Not voting stock which is substantially effected, now gets to vote
                     4.   Appraisal Merger
                           a.   Shareholders cannot opt out of the merger and retain their original
                                investment
                           b.   Shareholders entitled to vote on the merger has a right to receive the
                                appraised, fair value of their shares in cash
           C.   Short Form Merger
                     1.   Company A who owns an overwhelming majority of the shares of another
                          Company B may merge with B with ONLY the vote of the Board of Directors of
                          A. Skips SH approval (exception to the SH vote rule)
                           a.   DE and MBCA allow Short-form Mergers when Company A owns > 90% of
                                Company B
                           b.   Weinberger v. UOP.
                     2.   Minority remedy: Usually limited to Appraisal Rights, unless extremely unfair
           D.   De Facto Merger Doctrine
                     1.   A theory which courts create a functional merger to give minority SHs
                          appraisal rights or SH vote. Those are the 2 most common results.
                           a.   KEY: Company structures merger or selects state law so that minority
                                does not receive appraisal rights.
                           b.   Very few courts have accepted this theory (PA & NJ ok).


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                                   1)   DE rejects
                                   2)   Even PA seems to reject this doctrine now because the legislature
                                        has gone back and rewritten the laws. Additionally, in Terry v.
                                        Penn, the courts basically reversed.
                     2.   Farris v. Glen Alden Corporation (PA 1958)          De Facto Merger Doctrine
                           a.   Facts: Stock for assets merger (C reorg). Companies combined following
                                the transfer of Assets Statute in DE. Original structure was to have Glen
                                buying List, but Glen SH were pissed because List ended up as the
                                majority SH. SH thought List pulled a fast one. Why would List do this?
                                Because in PA no appraisal rights are given to a purchasing company‟s
                                SH, only the Target company. Thus, with this usual structure, Glen SH
                                (minority) would have no appraisal rights. Minority wants appraisal
                                rights. Court says, de facto merger – minority gets rights.
                           b.   ROL: „De Facto‟ Merger Doctrine applies because this merger was driven
                                by the primary motivation to deprive the target SHs of their appraisal
                                rights.
                           c.   Analysis: Court basically said this was merger; therefore, de facto. The
                                court looked to the consequences of the transaction and applicable
                                merger laws.
                           d.   Important Factors:
                                   1)   Increase number of directors
                                   2)   Name changed
                                   3)   Company doubled in size
                                   4)   List would control 76.5% of the shares
                                   5)   Stock value decreased substantially
                                   6)   All of these factors made it a merger


                                                     Glen Alden (PA)      List (Del)
                                 Asset Sale          Appraisal Rights     No Appraisal Rights
                                 Merger              Appraisal Rights     Appraisal Rights


                     3.   Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc. (DE 1963)         No De Facto in DE
                           a.   Facts: Arco agreed to sell all its asset to Loral for Loral shares (C reorg).
                                Arco‟s SHs approved the dissolution of the company. Arco then liquidated
                                and distributed to its SHs all the Loral shares it had received in return of
                                the assets. Net economic result if Arco merged with Loral. BUT, Arco
                                SHs did not get any appraisal rights (asset sales = no appraisal rights in
                                DE under statute). Both Asset Sales and Mergers are covered under DE
                                law. P wanted appraisal rights and argued Farris. Court says no
                                appraisal rights, no de facto.
                           b.   ROL: Where Asset Sales and Mergers are both provided for in statutes,
                                they are both of equal weight and either one can be used by
                                corporations. Courts will look to the letter of the agreement to determine
                                which method was selected by the corporations and will not change the
                                form selected.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   DE had statutes for both Asset Sales and Mergers

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                                   2)   Company selected the Asset Sale statute to perform their
                                        reorganization
           E.   Freeze-Out Mergers
                     1.   2 Methods of Analysis – (EFT or BPT)
                           a.   DE Requires “Entire Fairness Test”
                                   1)   First - P burden to demonstrate some basis for invoking Fairness
                                        Obligation
                                   2)   Second (burden shift) - D burden to show transaction was Fair
                                             a)    If corporation shows there was:
                                                        Approval by majority of minority SHs;
                                                        Adequate disclosures; AND
                                                        Arm‟s length process (independent committee)
                                             b)    THEN, burden shifts back to P to prove the transaction
                                                  was unfair.
                                   3)   Result: If transaction was Fair, then BJR kicks in
                                   4)   DE no longer requires Business Purpose Test.
                           b.   Other Courts Require “Business Purpose Test”
                                   1)   Additional requirement on top of EFT
                                   2)   Even if insiders pay a fair price, they cannot put through a
                                        transaction whose sole purpose is to eliminate the minority
                                        (public) SHs. The transaction must serve a valid corporate
                                        purpose.
                                             a)    2 step acquisition         Usually doesn‟t matter
                                             b)    Going private              Makes a difference
                     2.   Weinberger v. UOP, Inc (DE 1983)                    Entire Fairness Test –
                                                                              Inadequate Disclosures
                           a.   Facts: Signal owned 50/50 of UOP (Parent-sub). 4 key directors of
                                Signal were also directors of UOP. 2 of these directors prepared a
                                feasibility study which said the shares were worth $24. Signal eventually
                                offered only $21 to SHs to to a hurriedly prepared fairness opinion by
                                UOPs investment banks (hurriedly because Signal made it so). Signal
                                never told UOP SHs about their study. Bare majority approved the deal.
                                Court say this wasn‟t fair.
                           b.   ROL: Transactions must pass the requirements of the 3 Prong “Entire
                                Fairness” Test which looks to (i) fair dealing, (ii) fairness of price, and (iii)
                                disclosure.
                                   1)   Remedy Valuation: Use Discounted Cash Flow Method. But, DC
                                        power‟s are complete to form equitable and monetary relief as
                                        may be appropriate, including rescissory damages.
                           c.   Application: Fairness in a Freeze-out Transaction = EFT
                                   1)   Business Purpose requirement gives little protection to minority;
                                        and therefore should be dropped in favor of EFT.
                                   2)   Fair Dealing (Procedural Fairness) – Failed
                                             a)     Signal never negotiated with UOPs board, they just told
                                                  them what price they were going to pay


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                                             b)    Superior knowledge was never shared
                                             c)    Short time constrains
                                             d)    Not an arms-length trx
                                             e)     Factors: timing, how initiated, structure, negotiations,
                                                  disclosures, approved by Directors and SHs
                                   3)   Fairness of Price – Failed
                                             a)     The price was unfair because the “unhurried” feasibility
                                                  analysis said $24, but they only offered $21
                                                         Watch out: The current market price was only
                                                          $14.50 at the time, but that irrelevant to “fairness
                                                          of price”
                                             b)     Factors: Economic considerations, financial
                                                  considerations, assets, mkt value, intrinsic value, inherent
                                                  value
                                   4)   Disclosure - Failed
                                             a)     Signal used confidential UOP information to prepare their
                                                  feasibility study
                                             b)    Signal did not make “fair disclosure” of the (i) hurried
                                                  UOP opinion, or (ii) unhurried $24 opinion.
                           d.   What could Weinberger have done? Independent Committee to Negotiate
                                   1)   W could have used a Special Committee of Independent Directors
                                        to negotiate the transaction
                                   2)   Arms-length transactions provide additional insulation from
                                        perceived unfairness
                                   3)   Had the Directors exerted its bargaining power against the other
                                        at arms-length, it would have been strong evidence that that
                                        transaction meets the test of fairness
                     3.   Coggins v. NE Patriots. (MA 1986)             Legitimate Business Purpose
                                                                        Public company going Private
                           a.   Facts: Sullivan fought to get back control of Patriots. He did, organized
                                new Patriots, then executed merger which eliminated voting stock of Old
                                Patriots. Coggins owned Old Pat stock, brought class action. Court found
                                that Sullivan accomplished the freeze-out merger for his own personal
                                benefit to eliminate the interests of the minority and that was a breach of
                                his FD and so impermissible.
                           b.   ROL: Because the danger of abuse of FD is especially great in a freeze-
                                out merger, the court must be satisfied that the freeze-out was for the
                                advancement of a legitimate corporate. Thus, D must show that the
                                merger serves a valid business purpose, which is unrelated to the
                                personal interests of the majority.
                                   1)   Damage: Ordinarily rescission is possible, but this deal is 10
                                        years old; therefore, monetary damages
                                   2)   Thus Remedy based on giving the Ps what they would have if the
                                        merger were undone and the corporation were put back together
                           c.   Important factors: (Must look to totality of circumstances)
                                   1)   DC decision based on Waste – used corporate assets to
                                        accomplish a persona objective

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                                   2)    Offered price was inadequate
                                   3)    Purpose of the merger
                                   4)    Accuracy and adequacy of disclosure in connection with merger
                                   5)    Fairness of price
                           d.   Commentary:
                                   1)    If we know BP is required in our jurisdiction, a bright manager can
                                         structure the deal to taper to this conclusion.
                     4.   Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical. (DE 1985)              Injunction Damages
                           a.   Facts: An agreement existed to purchase a company in steps. 63%
                                purchase on one date, then remainder to be purchased later for $25/sh.
                                P contend that D pushed through a merger at $20/sh to avoid paying the
                                $25. D was the majority SH of company. D performed independent
                                analysis, evaluations and those came to $19-25. D issued proxy in favor
                                of $20, but also provided all other disclosures regarding other
                                evaluations. P seeks $25 for performance of the K, not appraisal rights.
                                Court says performance of K is correct.
                           b.   ROL: Inequitable conduct will not be protected merely because it is legal.
                                Injunction is a permissible remedy if Ps prove fraud, misrepresentation,
                                or “gross and palpable overreaching” conduct by D. Appraisal remedy is
                                not the only remedy.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)    No requirement of majority of minority SHs
           F.   De Facto Non-Merger
                     1.   A transaction that takes the form of a merger but the P argue in substance this
                          is a sale of assets followed by a redemption.
                     2.   Rauch v. RCA Corporation. (2d 1988)               No De Facto Non-Merger
                           a.   Facts: GE acquired RCA. Per agreement all stock of RCA was converted
                                into cash. P claim this is an illegal dissolution, and they were not
                                receiving the fair value of the dissolution – they were only receiving a
                                stock price.
                           b.   ROL: A conversion of shares to cash to accomplish a merger is legally
                                distinct from a redemption of shares by a corporation. Thus, a
                                corporation may resort to one section of the DE corporate law without
                                having to answer for the consequences that would have arisen from
                                invocation of a different section (similar to Arco Electronics)
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)    Merger agreement complied fully with DE law
                                   2)    Redemption by the corporation was at “its election” not required
                                   3)    No allegations that $40 price was unfair
                                   4)    Majority of the Preferred Shareholders approved this transaction
           G.   LLC Mergers
                     1.

                     2.   VGS, Inc. v. Castiel. (DE 2001)            A
                           a.   Facts:
                                   1)    Court says acts taken to merge are invalid and merger is
                                         rescinded.

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                           b.   ROL:
                           c.   Important factors:
II.    Takeovers
           A.   Defensive Tactics Against Takeovers
                     1.   Before a Hostile Takeover (protection measures, preventative
                          measures)
                           a.   Staggered Board
                                   1)   Only a portion of the board is elected each term.
                                   2)   Another portion of the board is elected next term
                                   3)   How this helps
                                             a)     It takes a minimum of 2 terms to elect a new controlling
                                                  board
                                             b)    Work around for hostile company
                                                        Call a special meeting of the shareholders
                                             c)    Work around for defending company
                                                        Make the % necessary for calling a special meeting
                                                         very high (in Articles)
                                                        Amend Articles to only allow Directors to be
                                                         removed for good cause
                                                        Board usually fight because they are looking out for
                                                         their own interests.
                           b.   Golden Parachutes
                                   1)   Lucrative contracts for senior management teams which provide
                                        for very high payments if there is a change in control
                                   2)   Basically a legal form of Greenmail
                     2.   During a Hostile Takeover
                           a.   Anti-Trust
                                   1)   Get the DOJ involved and get them to interject
                                             a)    Usually only works if acquiring company has been buying
                                                  up other similar businesses
                                   2)   Could buy other companies
                                             a)    Could cause anti-trust problems for acquirer
                                             b)    Could create regulatory problems for the bidder (bank)
                                             c)    As well as, increasing the size of the fish
                           b.   Buy your own Stock
                                   1)   This works on a supply/demand basis; thus, the more you buy,
                                        the less stock remains and the remaining stock will be worth more
                                        per share.
                                   2)   Results:
                                             a)     Cash is reduced significantly; thus, acquiring company
                                                  cannot use your cash to finance the buyout
                                             b)    Cost per share increases
                           c.   White Knight


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                                   1)   Basically, go out and find another friendlier buyer for the company
                                   2)   Company is still taken over, but management and board might be
                                        able to stay
                                   3)   Incentives for the White Knight
                                              a)    “Lock Up” Provisions
                                                          If their buyout attempt fails, they can buy assets at
                                                           a bargain price (Crown Jewel Provision)
                                              b)     “Termination Fee” if they attempt to buy, but it fails, then
                                                   they still get something – a payment
                                   4)   Mechanics
                                              a)     Usually requires a buyout amount very close to the
                                                   hostile company‟s offer.
                           d.   Leveraged Buyout (LBO)
                                   1)   Basically, creating another company who tries to acquire the
                                        existing company.
                                   2)   Effect is that it privatizes the company within the management or
                                        directors.
                                              a)    Makes their own “White Knight”
                                              b)    Management LBO
                           e.   Pac-man Defense
                                   1)   Burrows Corp tried this and now they are no longer around, very
                                        risky
                                   2)   The Target company begins a Tender Offer for the Bidding
                                        company – Turns the tables.
                           f.   Poison Pill
                                   1)   A company‟s stock has a provision which gives the holder the right
                                        to buy additional shares if a hostile corporation comes in and
                                        purchases a certain percentage of the common stock.
                                              a)     It basically increases the cost of the tender offer and
                                                   makes it harder for the hostile take over company to gain
                                                   control
                                              b)    Can be used before or during a hostile takeover
                                              c)     Purpose is to stop or deter the hostile takeover, or
                                                   strengthen the negotiating power to give the existing Board
                                                   and management more power
                                   2)   Provisions
                                              a)    Flip-In Rights         (usually activated pre merge)
                                                          In lieu of purchasing additional preferred stock,
                                                           existing shareholders are given the option to buy
                                                           common stock at an extreme discount (usually
                                                           50%)
                                              b)    Flip-Over Rights       (usually activated post merge)
                                                          After a certain trigger (possibly 20% acquisition) 3
                                                           things normally happen:
                                                                    The rights become separately tradeable;


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                                                                    The rights are no longer redeemable by the
                                                                     target‟s management; and
                                                                    The existing shareholders gets the right to
                                                                     acquire shares of the bidder at ½ price.
                                               c)    Rights to Redeem always exist
                                                          Board can redeem these rights following a buyout
                                                           attempt or unsuccessful attempt.
           B.   Generally
                     1.   Cheff v. Mathes. (DE 1964)                 Greenmailing - Anti-Takeover Device
                            a.   Facts:
                            b.   ROL: If the board shows that a particular hostile takeover will damage
                                 the corporation‟s existence or business policies, and buying back
                                 the raider‟s shares at a premium in return for a standstill agreement will
                                 prevent the takeover attempt, then DE courts will generally approve the
                                 transaction even though it enriches the bidder at the expense of the
                                 corporation‟s treasury.
                            c.   Important factors:
                                    1)    Buyer was a known Greenmailer and Raider
                                    2)    Board was justified in fearing the worst if the Raider took over
                     2.   Note: “Greenmail”
                            a.   ROL: If court determines that the decision to pay the Greenmail was
                                 motivated mostly by the Board‟s desire to retain their positions, then
                                 the Greenmail payment will be struck down.
           C.   Development
                     1.   Generally
                     2.   Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum. (DE 1985)                      Enhanced Scrutiny Analysis
                            a.   Facts: Mesa made a 2-tier offer for Unocal (they already owned 13%).
                                 Board said the 1st tier was coercive, because 2nd was so unattractive.
                                 They looked toward various defensive measures and went for a
                                 “competing tender offer” or “self-tender offer” for notes, but purposely
                                 excluded Mesa. In DE, a statute provides that a Board has the authority
                                 to buy/sell their own securities to whomever they want.
                            b.   ROL: Any response to a potential takeover bid must be proportional to a
                                 reasonable threat. To determine whether a defense was proper, a
                                 board‟s power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to
                                 protect the corporate enterprise (including SHs) from harm reasonably
                                 perceived, regardless of its source.
                                    Unocal Analysis or Enhanced Scrutiny 2 Step Analysis is born
                                    1)    #1: Did the board reasonably believe there was threat to the
                                          corporation?
                                               a)    Can look beyond the premium paid in current time
                                               b)    Was there a threat to LT values and strategies
                                               c)    Burden is on Directors to prove they acted reasonably
                                                    (more than normal BJR)
                                                          Must show Good Faith
                                                          Reasonable Investigation

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                                     2)   #2 Were the Board‟s measures reasonable under the
                                          circumstances?
                                               a)    Enhanced by independent board decision
                                               b)    Great if majority of board are outside directors
                                               c)    Again, Burden is on Directors
                             c.   Important factors:
                                     1)   Burden is on Directors because there is inherent Self-dealing with
                                          all defensive maneuvers.
                                     2)   Today Securities Law are a bit different: Now SEC requires the
                                          same price to be offered to all SHs. Rule 14(d)-10


                     Look at Overall Picture
                     Is there a hostile takeover right now?
                          YES, use Enhanced Scrutiny
                          NO, look at Traditional Business Judgment Rule


                             d.   SEC Reactions and Poison Pills
                             e.   “Junk” Bonds as the Back-End Consideration
                     3.    Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews. (DE 1985)                Revlon Duty
                             a.   Facts: Revlon was target and Pantry was hostile acquirer. Revlon said
                                  “no” and adopted Poison Pill and Share Repuchase. Then began looking
                                  for “White Knight” They found Forstmann Little. Bidding war started,
                                  Revlon eventually accepted Forstmann‟s $57.25 v. Pantrys 56.25 (not yet
                                  final)
                                     1)   Additionally, Revlon gave Forstmann (i) “crown jewel” option to
                                          buy 2 subs at well below mkt price; (ii) agreed to “no-shop”
                                          provision; and (iii) agreed to a $25M cancellation fee.
                                     2)   Revlon provided additional confidential information/materials to F
                                          that they didn‟t provide to Pantry.
                             b.   ROL: Revlon Duty: In a situation were the company is going to be sold
                                  (no question), the duty of the Board MUST be to maximize the amount
                                  they can get for each share.
                                     1)   Basically courts will give Enhanced Scrutiny to both the process
                                          that the Directors followed and ot the substantive fairness of the
                                          result.
                             c.   Analysis: The court determined that the first 2 provisions of PP and SR
                                  were reasonable. But the next 3 provisions (althought not per se illegal)
                                  are not enforceable because:
                                     1)   There was NO question the company was going to be sold
                                               a)     Then the duties of the Board change. It becomes the
                                                    SOLE duty of the Board to get the highest price the
                                                    company (they basically become Auctioneers)
                                               b)    These are now called “Revlon Duties”
                                     2)   Enhanced Scrutiny Test: Was this done to maximize profits? Cuz
                                          you cannot play favorites at the same time. Must have an


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                                        impartial auction after crossing the lie and putting the company in
                                        play.
                                             a)    Question of defensive maneuvers becomes moot
                           d.   Important factors:
                                        Revlon permits management to justify poison pills and other
                                        defensive tactic because they may lead to an auction and thereby
                                        produce a better price for shareholders than would a sale to the
                                        first serious bidder.
                                   1)   They started favoring one deal over the other
                                   2)   Gave financial data to Forstmann and not Pantry
                                   3)   Waived covenants for one but not the other
                                   4)   Basically played favorites
                           e.   2 Situations Trigger Revlon Duties
                                   1)   Corporation initiates active bidding process
                                   2)   During bidding a target abandons LT plan and seeks an attractive
                                        transaction
                     4.   Paramount v. Time Incorporated (DE 1989)          Putting the Company in Play
                           a.   Facts: Paramount tries to interfere with merger between Time and
                                Warner. Time and Warner were about the merge but it required approval
                                of Time‟s SHs (as well as Warners). At the same time Time‟s Board
                                approved of Warner, they adopted several Defensive Maneuvers. After
                                announcment and after proxies were sent out, Paramount comes in with
                                all cash offer of $175/sh (Time was trading at 126). Not subject to
                                financial contingencies, but subject to legal contingencies (regulatory
                                issues). Time rejected because it presented a threat to “control of its
                                own destiny and retention of the Time Culture. So, Time restructured
                                the deal with Warner so SH approval was not needed and Time
                                would take on much more debt. Paramount boosted its offer to $200.
                                Time rejected. Paramount sued to enjoin the trx. Court says No Revlon
                                duties, but apply Unocal.
                           b.   ROL: A board may “just say no” to a buyout transaction or it may refuse
                                to take affirmative steps so as to give the SHs a chance to approve the
                                transactions
                           c.   Analysis:
                                   1)   Time‟s decision to acquire Warner did not trigger Revlon
                                        Duties
                                             a)     Wall Street might have viewed this as “in play” but not
                                                  legally, because it was not enough to constitute an
                                                  attempted sale
                                             b)     Did not amount to a “change of control” of Time. Each
                                                  person who owned Time would still own the same share
                                                  afterwards
                                   2)   Conduct of Time did not violate duties under Unocal, which
                                        governs what defensive responses are proper
                                             a)     First Prong: Reasonable grounds for believing that a
                                                  danger to “corporate policy and effectiveness” exists



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                                                       Time fears that SHs would tender based on
                                                        mistaken belief about the strategic benefits of
                                                        Paramount offer
                                                       Board may consider LT values and strategic, is not
                                                        forced to only look at ST value ($200 offer)
                                             b)  Second Prong: Response was reasonable and proportional
                                               to the threat
                                                       Did not foreclose all opportunities for takeover
                                                       Restructuring merger with Warner was reasonable
                                                        because “the carrying forward of a pre-existing trx
                                                        in an altered form.. was reasonably related to the
                                                        threat.”
                                                                 Even though they would be burdened with
                                                                  heavy debt
                     5.   Paramount v. QVC Networks, Inc. (DE 1994)            Change in Control –
                                                                               Apply Enhanced Scrutiny
                           a.   Facts: Paramount is target Viacom is acquirer. Viacom made cash
                                tender offer for 51%. Additionally, they included provisions to rpevent
                                this transaction from being put “in play”. Provisions were unbalanced (i)
                                no-shop, (ii) termination fee provision, (iii) lock-up stock option. After
                                they agreed, QVC also made Cash Tender Offer for 51%. Paramount‟s
                                mgmt portrayed the QVC offer in a bias manner, there appears to have
                                been some favoritism toward Viacom. They made their Viacom prosition
                                a bit better, but not by much.
                           b.   ROL: Enhanced Scrutiny now occurs whenever the Board proposes a
                                transaction that would result in a “shift of control” from the public to a
                                particular individual or small entity.
                                   1)   Similar to Revlon, courts will give Enhanced Scrutiny to both the
                                        process that the Directors followed an to the substantive fairness
                                        of the result (when the Board sells control)
                           c.   Analysis: Paramount argued that Revlon duties do not apply to them
                                because Paramount was not up for complete sale – Court did not care.
                                Basically 51% or 100% either way it is clearly a change in control
                           d.   Situations requiring Enhanced Scrutiny Test
                                   1)   The threatened diminution of the current stockholders voting
                                        power
                                   2)   The fact that an asset belonging to public stockholders (a control
                                        premium) is being sold and may never be available again
                                   3)   The traditional concern of DE courts for actions that impair or
                                        impeded SH voting rights
                           e.   Key Features of the Enhanced Scrutiny Test
                                   1)   A judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decision
                                        making process employed by the directors, including the
                                        information on which the directors based their decisions
                                   2)   A judicial examination of the reasonableness of the director‟s
                                        action in light of the circumstances then existing
                                   3)   The directors have the burden of proving that they were
                                        adequately informed and acted reasonably

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                                   4)   The court will not substitute their business judgment for that of
                                        the directors, but will determine if the director‟s decision was, on
                                        balance, within a range of reasonableness
                           f.   Application of Enhanced Scrutiny
                                   1)   Break-up does not have to be present or inevitable
                                   2)   Just needs to be a fundamental change of control is contemplated
                                        or occurs
                                   3)   Accordingly, when a corporation undertakes a transaction that will
                                        cause:
                                             a)    A change in corporate control, or
                                             b)    A break-up of the corporate entity
                                             c)     THEN… the directors have an obligation to seek the best
                                                  value reasonably available to the stockholders
                           g.   2 Circumstances where Enhanced Scrutiny Applies
                                   1)   The approval of transaction resulting in a Sale of Control
                                             a)    Directors must act in accordance with their fundamental
                                                  duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and the SHs
                                             b)     Board need to adequately inform themselves in
                                                  negotiating the sale of control
                                             c)     Outside independent directors are particular important,
                                                  need their active participation
                                             d)    Need to seek the best value reasonably available to SHs
                                   2)   The adoption of defensive measures in response to a threat to
                                        corporate control
                           h.   Specific Obligation of the Board:
                                   1)   Be diligent and vigilant in examining critically the transactions and
                                        offers
                                   2)   Act in Good Faith
                                   3)   To obtain and act with due care on all material information
                                        reasonably available, including information necessary to compare
                                        the offers to determine which of the trx or look for alternative
                                        action would provide the best value reasonably available to the
                                        SHs
                                   4)   To negotiate actively and in GF with both or all parties
                           i.   Lock-Up Options
                                   1)   If bringing in Lock-Up options, then make sure those option will
                                        enhance and foster the bidding process.
                     6.   Note: Subsequent Delaware Developments
           D.   Extension of the Unocal/Revlon Framework to Negotiated Acquisitions
                     1.   ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp. (DE 1999)              No-Talk/Lock-Ups
                           a.   Facts: Capital was having problems. ACE gave some money to help. It
                                didn‟t. Decided to merge. Agreement between parties gave “no-talk”
                                and “fiduciary out” provisions. This agreement did not effectuate a
                                change in control such as outlined in QVC, but still significant. Another
                                company comes in. ACE takes its FD right to talk to the competing
                                bidder. Capital says you can‟t and sues. Courts says yes they can.

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                           b.   ROL: DE law of mergers and acquisitions has given primacy to the
                                interest of SHs in being free to maximize value from their ownership of
                                stock without improper compulsion from executory contracts entered into
                                by Boards. Thus, if a more inviting offer comes along, SHs should be
                                able to take it.
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   Deal was not “done”
                           d.   POLICY: Target companies should be able to speak with competitors and
                                it is their FD to do so.
           E.   Extension of the Unocal/Revlon Framework to Shareholder
                Disenfranchisement
                     1.   Hilton Hotels Corp v. ITT Corp. (NV 1997)                 Deprive SH Vote
                           a.   Facts: Hilton wanted to buy ITT and announced plans for proxy contest.
                                ITT decided not to have their annual meeting. Hilton filed suit, but court
                                says ITT bylaws do not require this annual meeting. ITT comes up with a
                                Comprehensive Plan and decides to split their company into 3 parts and
                                tries to create a classified board. Court says ITT purpose for
                                implementing the Comprehensive Plan is impermissible and deprives the
                                SHs of the opportunity to vote to re-elect or to oust incumbent ITT
                                directors. Remedy: comprehensive plan is out, and ITT must have their
                                annual meeting.
                           b.   ROL: Implementation of a “comprehensive plan” to sidestep a takeover
                                attempt is impermissible where it basically deprives the SHs of the
                                opportunity to vote on the deal or if it involves depriving SHs the right to
                                re-elect or oust incumbent directors.
                                   1)   This might have been possible, if the bylaws were different
                           c.   Important factors:
                                   1)   No Revlon duties, because no threat of takeover
                                   2)   Comprehensive plan was “preclusive”
                                   3)   ITT offered no credible justification for not seeking SH approval of
                                        the Comprehensive Plan
           F.   State and Federal Legislation
                     1.   CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America. (S.Ct 1987)
                           a.   Facts: IN Control Share Acquisitions Statute restricts hostile takeovers
                                by preventing the acquirer from voting the shares that he just purchased.
                                He can call a special meeting of the SHs, but if he fails to get approval,
                                then the target may redeem the control shares from the bidder by paying
                                him the FMV
                                   1)   Basically bidder must pay for this special meeting (very
                                        expensive) and if he loses the vote, he may be stuck with shares
                                        that have no voting rights
                           b.   ROL: State Takeover statute are lawful as long as they only apply to
                                those corporation chartered by the state (rather than principle place of
                                business)
                           c.   Analysis: IN statute is Ok. (i) No conflict with Williams Act because
                                both acts were devoted tot eh same purpose (protect the minority by
                                requiring full disclosure), (ii) does not unreasonably burden interstate


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                                commerce because the very commodity being traded is one that is
                                created and maintained under state law (incorporated business)
           G.   State Anti-Takeover Legislation
                     1.   Generally
                           a.   1980s witnessed the fight between raiders and targets move from federal
                                to state courts
                           b.   Now most issues are handled in State courts
                           c.   Federal Acts tender to favor neither party, but State Statutes tend to
                                heavily favor the target company who is within their borders.
                     2.   Federal Tender Offer Act
                           a.   Designed to present a set of rules
                           b.   Attempted to ride the fence and not favor either party
                     3.   Went to the State Takeover Statutes
                           a.   1st Generation: State Takeover Statutes
                                   1)   Basically mimicked the federal laws
                                   2)   But, the Court held they were unconstitutional because they
                                        violated (i) the commerce clause, and
                           b.   2nd Generation: State Takeover Statutes
                                   1)   Control Share Acquisition Acts
                                              a)   General provisions
                                                        Acquisition company becomes subject to the statute
                                                         when their total holding exceeds “control threshold”
                                                         (usually 20, 33, or 50%)
                                                        Acquiring Company can acquire “control shares”
                                                         only if other shareholders approve.
                                                                  A majority of disinterested shareholders have
                                                                   to approve.
                                                        Meant to protect against coercive tender offers by
                                                         authorizing collective shareholder action.
                                              b)   Business Combination Model
                                                        Acquirer obtains a specific number of shares cannot
                                                         for a period of X or more years enter into a second
                                                         stage merger unless:
                                                                  A certain price is met;
                                                                  The Board and a majority or supermajority of
                                                                   the other shareholders approves
                                                                  The Acquirer obtained control in a tender
                                                                   offer for a significant majority of the stock
                                                                   (>85%)
                                                                  The original Board had approve the
                                                                   acquirer‟s purchase
                                   2)   Still exist in 26 states
                                   3)   Michigan Control Share Acquisition Act – Handout #7




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                                             a)     Basically when someone buys enough stock to go over
                                                  the threshold, they will not be able to vote those shares
                                                  until a majority of disinterested shareholders agree
                                             b)    No mandatory filing, like there were in the 1st gen
                                             c)    They must:
                                                         Call a shareholder‟s meeting
                                                         Get a majority to say they can vote
                                                         Get a majority of disinterested to grant voting rights
                                             d)     If they didn‟t get approval for voting rights, then the
                                                  target company has the ability to redeem their shares
                                             e)     If they do get the approval, then all the other
                                                  shareholders can treat this as an acquisition, and ALL other
                                                  shareholders get dissenter‟s rights.
                                             f)     This was challenged in the CTX case (IN). The Court held
                                                  is not like the 1st Gen statutes.
                                                         It is OK
                                                         It is merely a state statute
                                   4)   Michigan Business Combination
                                             a)     Company has to expressly state they are participating in
                                                  the statute within their Articles
                                             b)    If a shareholder acquires more than 10% or more
                                                         Before approval of a merger requires approval of a
                                                          supermajority 90% of all shares and 2/3 of all
                                                          shares outside of the 10%
                                                         You have to meet both
                                             c)     Then minimum price has to be met and have to wait 5
                                                  years, unless
                                             d)     The Board opted out with respect to this shareholder
                                                  before he becomes 10% shareholders
                                   5)   The Share price of companies
                                             a)     Companies have the option to “opt-out” of the statute‟s
                                                  protections
                                   6)   Delaware Statute
                                             a)     A person who acquires 15% or more of a DE
                                                  corporation‟s stock is disabled for the next three years from
                                                  effecting any merger or business combination unless
                                                  certain conditions are met




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CHAPTER 8: CORPORATE DEBT
I.     Generally
II.    Debtor‟s Sale of Substantially All Its Assets
           A.   Sharon Steel Corporation v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA
                     1.   Facts:
                     2.   ROL:
                     3.   Important factors:
III.   Incurrence of Additional Debt
           A.   Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.
                     1.   Facts:
                     2.   ROL:
                     3.   Important factors:
                     4.   Aftermath
           B.   Negative Pledge Covenant and Cure Period
IV.    Exchange Offers
           A.   Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc.
                     1.   Facts:
                     2.   ROL:
                     3.   Important factors:
V.     Redemption and Call Protection
           A.   Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company
                     1.   Facts:
                     2.   ROL:
                     3.   Important factors:
                     4.   Aftermath




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SUPPLEMENTAL:             SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
I.     Generally
           A.   The most sweeping and drastic Act since the 1933 Act
           B.   Rational: The Market failed and we need more regulation
                     1.   Managers were worried more about themselves than the company
                            a.   Typical problem of agency costs gone to the extreme
                     2.   Gate Keepers failed their duties
                            a.   Auditors, Accountants failed
                            b.   Analysts did not disseminate the right information to the market
                            c.   Lawyers improperly or did not advise clients correctly
                     3.   Board of Directors failed their watchdog duties
                            a.   They set policy and have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders to watch
                                 over management
                     4.   Previously, there were insufficient penalties for deter bad behavior
           C.   2 Approaches
                     1.   Regulatory Approach
                            a.   The modern publicly held corporation is distinguished by the central
                                 concept that ownership of a corporation is separate from control of the
                                 corporation
                            b.   Owners must use managers, and they must review and look over
                                 manager‟s duties
                            c.   Significant Agency Costs associated with this structure
                     2.   Contractarian Approach
                            a.   Let the market decided what to do with the corporation
                            b.   If the market does not like inefficient corporations, then they will not
                                 invest in that corporation
           D.   Highlighted Solutions of the SOX Act
                     1.   Generally
                            a.   Courts will not scrutinize Board Member‟s actions/inactions more closely
                            b.   Basically, Federalized a lot of Corporate Law
                                    1)   Has the potential to displace or usurp State based corporate law
                            c.   Some beliefs regarding SOX
                                    1)   Gone too far: costs are too great, admin is too much
                                    2)   Has not gone far enough: Fed needs to take over more
                                    3)   Has not done much itself, but has spurred others to action
                                    4)   NYSE & NASDAQ act as great regulators themselves
                                              a)   Agreements with exchanges must be met
                                              b)   Some provisions go further than SOX
                     2.   All Public Companies must now have Audit Committees SOLEY manned by
                          independent directors
                            a.   These directors cannot be employees of the company
                            b.   Main Duty: Hire and fire the Accountants

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                                   1)   Previously, management was responsible for this task
                     3.   Section 302: Financial Reports
                           a.   All based on officer‟s knowledge
                     4.   Section X: Certifications
                           a.   In the criminal section, Directors must certify there is nothing wrong
                     5.   Section 101: Establishment of the Board (to regulate accountants)
                           a.   New governmental entity to regulate accounts
                                   1)   Previously regulated by AICPA & FASB, but now auditors must
                                        register with this Board
                           b.   They set GAAP standards
                           c.   Funding for this group comes from all public companies
                           d.   Everything is subject to SEC review
                     6.   Section X:
                           a.   Illegal to try and influence accountants
                           b.   Over the years, accountants have become less independent and more
                                client focused
                                   1)   Attorneys also work in the same way, but a bit different because
                                        attorney should be advocates… accountants should not.
                           c.   Accounting Firms responsible for audit may NO longer provided additional
                                services to the same company (exception: Tax Services)
                     7.   Section 402: Enhanced Conflict of Interest
                           a.   Corporations can no longer make loans to officers/directors.
                                   1)   Previously this was a state issue
                                   2)   States have remedies in place to handle abuse
                                   3)   Why? Enron and WorldCom made huge loans to their officers
                     8.   Section X:
                           a.   Lawyers are required to report any incidents of illegality to the
                                management of the corporation
                                   1)   If the managers do nothing, then they MUST report to CEO
                                   2)   If CEO does nothing, then they MUST report to Board
                                   3)   (under debate) If Board does nothing, then to SEC
                           b.   Directly impacts and changes the Client-Attorney Privilege
                           c.   Some states are very unhappy with this provision, because it trumps their
                                state laws
                                   1)   WA and CA have adopted provisions inconsistent with SOX Act
                                             a)     No litigation as of yet, but puts attorney between a rock
                                                  and hard place




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