Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force
2005 Annual Meeting
Anchorage, Alaska; July 27, 2005
Hosted by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
THEME: Pacific Perspectives - Regional Issues of Concern
Task Force Members or their representatives attending this Annual Meeting included Kurt
Fredriksson, Commissioner, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation; Dale Jensen,
Spills Program Manager for the Washington Department of Ecology; Paul Slyman, Deputy Director
of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality; Laurence Lau, Deputy Director for the
Environmental Health Division of the Hawaii Department of Health; Carlton Moore, Administrator of
the Office of Spill Prevention and Response in the California Department of Fish and Game; and
Charles Porter, Director, Environmental Management Branch, British Columbia Ministry of
A total of eighty-seven persons were in attendance, including the Task Force Coordinating
Committee members, 2005 Legacy Award Winners, and invited speakers. Please reference
Attachment A for a complete listing.
PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
The agenda for the 2004 Annual Meeting is provided in Attachment B. The following summary
notes include links to the PowerPoint presentations where used by speakers. Please reference
Attachment C for bios of all speakers.
KEYNOTE SPEAKER: US COAST GUARD RADM JAMES C. OLSON
NOTE: This is a meeting summary and is not intended as a verbatim record of all presentations or
comments made during the meeting.
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 1
Rear Admiral Olson extended Admiral Tom Collins’ regrets that his trip to Alaska had been
RADM Olson noted that both the Selendang Ayu and the Athos I oil spill events highlighted the
need for both commitment and involvement, better use of limited resources, and the need for
more exercises and collaborative efforts.
He particularly noted the need for system-wide tracking of vessel movements in the Aleutian
Islands as demonstrated by the Selendang Ayu incident. Towards that goal, ADM Olson
acknowledged the VTS system in place for Prince William Sound as well as the information
available as a result of AIS carriage requirements which went into effect this year. He stated
that there are 1,371 AIS transponders in place in Prince William Sound alone. However, when
the Selendang Ayu lost power, it was outside the current AIS footprint. He also acknowledged
the Alaska Marine Exchange’s vessel tracking program (see page 12 below).
With regard to non-tank vessel contingency planning requirements, RADM Olson also
acknowledged that states have taken the lead on that issue. Whereas the Selendang Ayu was
in innocent passage through Alaskan waters when it lost power, the response systems and
regimes were in place nevertheless, due to Alaska’s contingency plan requirements. He stated
that the Selendang Ayu response went as well as possible, considering the remote location and
the difficult weather conditions. It could take a year before the National Transportation Safety
Board releases its report on the incident, he commented.
He also noted that the pre-approval decision for dispersant use during the response illustrated
a high level of cooperation within the response community in Alaska, and encouraged everyone
to establish more pre-approval zones.
RADM Olson addressed a number of values and strategies important to the US Coast Guard,
including use of ICS and Unified Command, the concept of “Prevention through People,” and
the use of risk-based decision tools in Port State Control. The US Coast Guard monitors
60,000 port calls a year, including arrivals of approximately 7,600 foreign-flag vessels.
He also acknowledged the diminishing balance in the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. In response
to a question regarding what the states could do, he recommended that we work with our
District US Coast Guard Offices to communicate the importance of the Fund to Congress.
RADM Olson further recommended that the Oil Spill Task Force develop guidelines for
evaluating responses and distributing “lessons learned.”
RADM Olson’s PowerPoint presentation is available at
ALASKA: Kurt Fredriksson, Commissioner, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 2
Kurt Fredriksson explained that Alaskans haven’t forgotten the lessons they learned during the
Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, with the result that many of Alaska’s citizens understand oil spill
issues and demand the best possible spill prevention and response program.
As a result, TAPS operators in Prince William Sound must use Best Available Technology in
their prevention and response systems, including a world-class tug escort system and the best
trained and drilled responders.
Kurt described the Exxon Valdez natural resource damage assessment process as the world’s
longest, noting that $775 million of the $1 billion settlement had been earmarked for restoration.
Besides scientific studies, those funds have also paid for site-specific response equipment
packages as well as land and habitat purchases.
There is an ongoing need to review priorities and evaluate operations, plans, and tactics based
on the studies, especially with regard to applications of alternative response technologies.
The most important lesson which Alaskans learned from the Exxon Valdez, Kurt stated, is NOT
TO LET IT HAPPEN AGAIN.
BRITISH COLUMBIA: Charles Porter, Director, Environmental Management Branch, British
Columbia Ministry of Environment
Charles Porter explained that Chris Trumpy, the Deputy Minister for the Ministry of
Environment and BC’s Task Force Member, had been appointed following the May elections,
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 3
and regretted that he was unable to attend this meeting. British Columbia supports the Task
Force, Charles said, and is proud to have been instrumental in its formation in 1989.
Charles explained that British Columbia has 29,000 kilometers of coastline, with light industry in
the north of the Province and heavier industry to the south. The majority of the population of
four million is also in the southern end of this mountainous province. British Columbia’s
economy is based on logging, fisheries, tourism, coal, and oil and gas resources. Charles
noted that the Pacific Rim economies are all growing, and that British Columbia will be a part of
Federal agencies take the lead in dealing with the maritime sector in Canada, so the Province
relies on the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada, the Navy, and Fisheries & Oceans for
marine spill prevention and response. The Ministry’s role is to monitor federal initiatives and to
protect its people and its environment; the Ministry has authority for spill response once oil hits
As many as 4,000 incidents are reported in British Columbia each year; 200-300 of those
involve Ministry Response Officers. Most of these are inland, but can impact the ocean.
Response for lower-risk spills is shifting to the responsible party and to local government
The Ministry endeavors to ensure that response capabilities in British Columbia are as strong
as possible. Towards that end, the Environmental Emergency Management program is always
training and improving its Incident Management and shoreline cleanup assessment teams, and
building relationships with others in the response community. The Ministry has also conducted
a coastal analysis which identifies sensitive environmental resources and provides baseline
data for estimating response and recovery needs.
Priority concerns for the Ministry of Environment include Places of Refuge, cruise ship impacts,
Unified Command, and the use of alternative response technologies. Charles noted that cruise
ships now make 150 calls/year in British Columbia, and that number is expected to increase
following the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver.
CALIFORNIA: Carlton Moore, Administrator of the Office of Spill Prevention and Response in the
California Department of Fish and Game
Carl described the Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) as having authority for
marine oil spills and pipelines that could affect the marine environment. He explained that
OSPR writes regulations to prevent oil spills; reviews and approves all vessel and facility
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 4
contingency plans; provides State-On-Scene Coordinators and other responders; funds the
Oiled Wildlife Care Network; and oversees restoration of natural resources damaged by spills.
Evolving marine and vessel issues -such as invasive species carried in ballast water and LNG
tankers - have been assigned to OSPR as well.
OSPR has a staff of 203 persons; as part of the Department of Fish and Game, they rely on
DFG Wardens to serve as State-on-Scene Coordinators. OSPR has an Enforcement Branch, a
Marine Safety Branch, Legal and Administrative Branches, a Public Affairs Unit, and a
Scientific Branch which provides wildlife biologists and research labs. Carl noted that one of
their wildlife experts had assisted with the Selendang Ayu response. OSPR also has Natural
Resource Damage Assessment expertise on staff.
Carl elaborated on the 2004 Spill of National Significance (SONS) exercise which OSPR co-
sponsored with the US Coast Guard. This was the largest oil spill exercise in US history,
involving five command posts and 2,300 responders from 141 agencies and organizations. The
scenario involved the Mexican Navy as participants at command posts in both Ensenada and
California. The exercise also tested the cross-border movement of response equipment from
Mexico into the US.
Carl described the Kinder-Morgan pipeline spill in Suisun Marsh, during which 126,000 gallons
of #2 diesel were spilled. California has had numerous pipeline breaks over the last few years
caused by soil erosion, train derailments onto pipelines, third party damage, and an overall lack
of maintenance. Kinder-Morgan alone has had six spills in the last fourteen months, with three
related fatalities. One involved the release of 140,000 gallons of Jet A fuel into groundwater.
Carl listed multiple agencies which have regulatory authority over pipelines in California
(OSPR, the State Fire Marshall, the State Lands Commissions, and the Division of Oil, Gas,
and Geothermal Resource ), but noted that only OSPR is mandated to respond and clean up
Another potential source of oil spills in California is sunken vessels. Carl reported that NOAA
has developed a national database of sunken vessels which indicates that there are 1200
sunken vessels in California, 18-20% of which still have oil on board.
OSPR is working with EPA to develop a Memorandum of Agreement in order to improve
coordination at spill response events. OSPR also sponsored an On-Scene Coordinator
workshop in May which included state, EPA, USCG, and Navy personnel; they plan to make
this an annual event.
Carl closed by noting that the US Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund does not cover releases from
natural seeps, and California had a major natural release this past winter that resulted in oiling
of a large number of grebes; $1.8 million had to be used from the State fund for the response.
Carlton Moore’s PowerPoint presentation is available at
HAWAII: Laurence Lau, Deputy Director for the Environmental Health Division of the Hawaii
Department of Health
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 5
Larry Lau explained that the Hazard Evaluation & Emergency Response (HEER) Office
implements Hawaii’s Superfund Law, which includes oil. The HEER office responds whenever
a release of oil or other hazardous substance threatens human health and environment.
Larry noted that Hawaii’s economy depends on protecting its environment; he also
acknowledged the state’s reliance on shipping for the import and export of goods. At the same
time, Hawaii’s isolated location has fostered an attitude of self-sufficiency.
Larry explained that Hawaii’s oil spill incidents mirror those of the other Task Force
jurisdictions, but are fewer in number. Recent incidents included pipeline releases, oil recovery
in Honolulu Harbor, cleanup of the “Hilo Burrito” site, the groundings of the M/V Cape Flattery
and the M/V Casitas, and barge releases.
Although there are less than 400 miles of pipelines in the state, there were two pipeline
releases totaling approximately 60 barrels of black oil in 2004–2005. One was the Hilo pipeline
release and the other occurred at the Tesoro refinery on Oahu; the latter was caused by
He noted that tankers bring oil to refineries on Oahu and seven tank barges deliver product to
the other islands. Deliveries to the other islands must continue, since each island has a
capacity of only seven to ten days of reserve fuel. With that in mind, there are 45 - 50 fuel
loadings/month from the Kalaeloa Harbor.
One recent vessel grounding involved the M/V Cape Flattery, a cement ship which grounded
on a reef outside of Honolulu in February; 128,000 gallons of fuel was safely removed, but the
vessel did damage the reef. There have been a number of other groundings in the islands,
especially those involving fishing vessels. How to avoid such groundings, which are primarily
caused by human error, is an ongoing challenge.
Larry also showed photos of the July 2, 2005 grounding of the M/V Casitas on Pearl and
Hermes Atoll, which is part of the Hawaiian Islands National Wildlife Refuge.
Cleanup of abandoned fuel lines in Honolulu Harbor is a long-term project, he noted, requiring
ongoing negotiation with EPA. The total area affected covers 300 acres and approximately 20
miles of abandoned fuel lines. To date 17,349 gallons of residual oil has been recovered from
both abandoned pipelines and groundwater.
Cleanup of the “Hilo Burrito” involves removal of contaminated soils.
Hawaii maintains an agreement with the US Coast Guard and the Clean Islands Council for
access to an Airborne Dispersant Delivery System (ADDs) pack mounted on either a C-130 or
a helicopter. The ADDS pack system is exercised twice/year.
In addition to concern about pipeline releases and vessel groundings, cruise ship arrivals also
present security and pollution concerns, as well as the threat of food-borne disease outbreaks
and additional demands for energy use.
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 6
Mr. Lau explained that 31 cruise ships made 182 port calls in Hawaii in 2004; 25 cruise ships
were projected to make 186 calls in 2005. Two Norwegian Cruise Line ships plan to make
Honolulu their homeport.
The State had implemented a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the NW Cruise
Association which provided for oil spill contingency plans for cruise ships, as well as bans on
discharges beyond the state’s 3-mile jurisdiction. Mr. Lau reported that the Hawaii Legislature
had just passed HB 422, which establishes standards for the discharge of treated sewage and
air emissions from cruise ships and commercial passenger vessels into the marine waters of
the State, and prohibits the discharge of untreated sewage. Larry noted, however, that HB 422
does NOT require oil spill contingency plans, as did the MOA, and he fears that the cruise
operators will abandon the voluntary MOA now that new laws are in place.
Larry Lau’s PowerPoint presentation is available at
OREGON: Paul Slyman, Deputy Director of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
By way of background, Paul Slyman explained that Oregon has no refineries and no offshore
platforms; all petroleum products enter the state either by pipeline, tank vessel, or tank truck.
The Emergency Response and Site Assessment Section program at DEQ is only 10 out of 800
The program’s funding is limited by a constitutional restriction requiring that all gas taxes go to
roads. He did explain that vessel fees support that part of the program which regulates vessels,
and that Oregon has required contingency plans for non-tank vessels since 1990. The rest of
the program’s funding comes from the state’s General Fund, and has been reduced over the
years as state budgets have been reduced. Paul commented that there is a general
unwillingness to invest in spill prevention measures, such as a rescue tug stationed off Coos
The Emergency Response Section receives more than 2000 spill notifications a year; these are
handled by three State-on-Scene Coordinators supported by planning and preparedness staff
at headquarters. The section also oversees remediation of more than 500 contaminated sites.
Paul also noted that ODEQ works well with EPA, since most of their spills are inland.
Paul described a recent response which presented particularly challenging aspects. A fire at an
oil recycling facility in the Portland urban area resulted in a release to a nearby creek which had
recently been restored and was highly valued by the community. In addition to the oil spill,
asbestos-laden debris was deposited by air into the neighborhood; this hazardous material
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 7
release meant that EPA could not access response funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund,
yet CERCLA does not cover oil spill response. The State and the RP funded response
contractors, but this complicated cost recovery is an issue which needs resolution, Paul said.
Paul also explained that the Emergency Response Section has become more involved in all
hazardous response, and that ODEQ’s lab is the primary first response lab for the state. ODEQ
will continue to be involved in security and terrorism response issues, since no other state
agency has a mandate to do so.
WASHINGTON: Dale Jensen, Spills Program Manager for the Washington Department of Ecology
Dale Jensen noted that Washington Governor Christine Gregoire had been one of the founders
of the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force and is very supportive of its work. He also reported
that she has appointed Jay Manning as Director of the Washington Department of Ecology,
who extends his regrets that he was unable to include this meeting in his schedule this year.
Dale reported that the Ecology Spills Program has followed up on “Lessons Learned” from
recent spills, debriefing with the US Coast Guard and OSROs; they also contracted for an
analysis of the response to the Dalco Passage spill. He noted that all Spill Program staff had
received response training prior to that event, and this proved to be very important, since the
Dalco Passage spill was initially an “orphan” spill.
Outcomes of the Dalco Passage spill include the creation by the Legislature of an Oil Spill
Advisory Council as well as ongoing efforts by Ecology to upgrade mutual aid, GRPs, and
Dale also reported that the Spills Program was revising their regulations on oil transfers for
facilities, vessels, and trucks, as directed by the 2004 Washington Legislature. Final regulations
are expected by June of 2006.
Looking ahead, Dale noted priorities such as improving rapid response, outreach to media and
the Legislature, coordination with the Oil Spill Advisory Council, ongoing emphasis on
unannounced drills, and oil transfer regulations, with spill prevention continuing to be their
UPDATE ON TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS, Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator
Jean Cameron reported on 2004-2005 activities as reported in the 2005 Annual Report, as
o Under the Task Force’s Spill Prevention Objective, work continued in support of the
Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET), monitoring TAPS tankers, and
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 8
tracking Prevention Topics of Concern. Best Industry Spill Prevention Practices were
referred to Pacific Area Harbor Safety Committees with a recommendation that they be
adopted as Standards of Care. A table showing the member agencies’ oil transfer
regulations was developed and posted, and data on oil spills in Alaska, Washington,
Oregon, California, and British Columbia was compiled for the third year. That 2004
data is available in the 2005 Annual Report
(http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/OSTF_2005.pdf (827kb)); in her summary, Jean
noted that only 2,092 gallons of crude were spilled in 2004, compared with 675,175
gallons of non-crude product. Overall, 2004 saw an increase of 423,661 gallons spilled
compared with 2003. Jean also noted that all member agencies had participated in an
incident investigation course sponsored by the California Office of Spill Prevention and
o Under the Task Force’s Spill Preparedness/Response Objective, work continued in
support of the Integrated Vessel Response Plan Guidelines, maintaining the 1-800-
OILS-911 spill reporting number, and tracking Preparedness/Response Topics of
Concern. The Task Force’s major initiative under this Objective in 2004 was the
development of an Area Contingency Plan annex to guide planning and decision-
making for Places of Refuge
The Task Force also sponsored a Roundtable on oil spills from trucks and posted a
summary on its website
f (10M)), with recommendations for further steps to prevent such spills. Jean also noted
ongoing efforts by the Task Force to track and provide input to US Coast Guard efforts
to develop regulations for non-tank vessel contingency plans and to restore funding to
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
o Under the Task Force’s Communications Objective, Jean noted various Task Force
forums for stakeholder involvement, including project workgroups, roundtables, annual
meetings, the website, and the Legacy Awards. She also reported that the Coordinating
Committee meets annually with both US and Canadian officials. In addition, the Task
Force tracks and comments on federal regulatory initiatives.
o Jean also briefed the Annual Meeting attendees on new Task Force initiatives outlined
in the 2005-2006 Annual Work Plan (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/2005-
2006_AWP.doc (289kb)), including a multi-year review of regulations and voluntary
initiatives designed to prevent spill from pipelines and a Roundtable to explore
“Expanding Response Options.” She noted that the Task Force Members were also
interested in evaluating ways to broaden outreach to other provinces and states.
ALASKA INITIATIVES AS WEST COAST MODELS; Kurt Fredriksson, Moderator
Aquatic Nuisance Species in Ballast Water – Regional Issues & Activities; Marilyn Leland, Deputy
Director and Lisa Ka’aihue, Project Manager, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 9
Marilyn Leland explained that the Prince William Sound RCAC, which was created by OPA 90,
“will exist as long as oil flows through the pipeline.” Among its accomplishments - done in
partnership with agencies, industry, and local communities - are the Disabled Tanker Towing
Study, installation of Ice Detection Radar, and the Prince William Sound Tanker Risk
Because the tankers loading oil in Valdez are exempt from ballast water regulations which
apply to other vessels, the RCAC is working to prevent the possible introduction of invasive
species in Prince William Sound by these vessels.
Lisa Ka’aihue noted that just one gallon of sea water can hold 3,842 million organisms, not
including pathogens. Citizens of Prince William Sound are most concerned about the possible
introduction of the European Green Crab, a very aggressive species which has spread up the
West Coast and could survive in the temperatures and salinity of Prince William Sound.
The Smithsonian, which is conducting a nationwide analysis of coastal invasions, is
collaborating with the PWS RCAC to monitor the possible introduction of invasive species in
Prince William Sound. The Smithsonian conducts field surveys nationwide and maintains an
online database of all reported Non-Indigenous Species (NIS) which allows them to track new
invasions and spread patterns. This information is used to guide and evaluate management
The Smithsonian’s 2000 Final Project Report indicated that 24 non-indigenous species have
been introduced in Alaska; 15 species were recorded in Prince William Sound and 13 species
were recorded in Kachemak Bay and Cook Inlet.
The PWS RCAC also conducts ballast water exchange experiments and green crab lab
studies, and is considering research on NIS carried on ships’ hulls. Looking ahead, Marilyn and
Lisa anticipate more emphasis on technologies for treating ballast water in addition on ongoing
monitoring for green crabs.
Besides hosting the NIS Working Group in Alaska, the PWS RCAC coordinates with the
Western Regional Panel of the Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force and also sits on the
Invasive Species Advisory Committee. Please reference the last slide in their PowerPoint for
websites with more information on invasive species and programs.
Alaska Spill Response Permits Project; Michael L. Munger, Executive Director, Cook Inlet RCAC,
and John Kwietniak, Tesoro Alaska Company
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 10
Mike Munger explained that a drill with Tesoro had identified the problem that securing the
many federal, state, and locally-required permits can create a bottleneck during an emergency
With that in mind, CIRCAC, the PWS RCAC, ADEC, CISPRI, and Tesoro Alaska worked
together to facilitate the process of identifying, filling out, and filing the forms and permits
required to carry out an effective spill response.
John Kwietniak noted that 120 different permits were identified by this project; many were
outdated or redundant, or multiple versions existed of the same form. The Permits Project
group was able to reduce the final number to less than 40.
The Project also standardized the terminology used in various permits and aligned it to ICS
The goal is to put the permits on the internet (www.nukaresearch.com/permits). A user can
select a permit form either by agency or by activity and, once it’s approved by Unified
Command, submit the finished application by email. Information entered on one form can be
transferred to others via standardized categories.
John Kwietniak also described the Geographic Response Information Network, or GRIN,
another collaborative project of CIRCAC and Tesoro Alaska.
GRIN provides reference information about resources, capabilities, and infrastructures in
coastal Alaskan communities. The information in the GRIN is intended for use by oil spill
response personnel during an incident response or training exercise.
The GRIN datasets cover “General,” Liaison, Public Information, Logistics, and Safety
“General” data covers location-specific information such as contacts, population, the economy,
subsistence activities, and transportation resources.
“Liaison” data provides 24/7 contact information for government agencies, stakeholders, and
“Public Information” covers media contacts and briefing facilities in the area.
“Logistics” data includes information on port facilities, aircraft, heavy equipment, vessels, fuel
and utilities, transportation and storage, and food and supplies.
“Safety” information covers emergency, medical, and public safety resources.
GRIN databases are also available on the web at www.nukaresearch.com/grin.
Alaska’s Tactics Manual; Tim Robertson, NUKA Research & Planning Group
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 11
Tim Robertson explained that the Spill Tactics for Alaska Responders (STAR) Manual was a
“brainchild” of Larry Dietrick at the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC).
The project has been managed by Craig Wilson and Larry Iwamoto.
The purpose of the STAR project is to produce a standardized oil spill response tactics manual
specific to Alaska; to provide a tactical reference for oil spill planning and response activities;
and to bridge the gap between contingency planning and response by providing tactics and
terminology that can be easily transferred from a contingency plan to an Incident Action Plan. It
provides non-prescriptive guidance for meeting State planning standards; contingency plan
holders are free to develop and use other tactics.
The Manual focuses on tactics for the Emergency Phase of a response, not the cleanup phase.
It is also flexible; responders are expected to adjust or modify tactics to fit actual field
The first phase of the project involved a review of 35 existing tactics manuals and an
assessment of copyright issues. A final report from this phase led to the formation of a work
group in October 2004. Besides ADEC, project participants included Alaska response
organizations, Alyeska, major oil companies operating in Alaska, and US federal agencies.
They agreed on the scope, format, and content of the STAR manual and developed a first draft
including sixteen tactics. Phase III began in July 2005 and will focus on finalizing the planning
version as well as developing and finalizing a field version.
Tim noted that the manual would be designed for expandability, since the Work Group plans for
periodic updates and will embrace innovation.
Tim reviewed the format and content of the STAR manual, which will include recommended
classifications for personnel, vessels, and operating environments; these classifications support
the manual. The front section also provides a variety of checklists and a cross-reference table
that facilitates which tactics work in which environment.
The Tactics section includes the categories of Safety, Oil Spill Surveillance and Tracking,
Mechanical Response, Non-Mechanical Response, and Logistics. Symbols for various
operating environments and tactic categories, combined with tactic icons, should facilitate the
The remaining timeline for the projects is as follows:
October 2005 - Draft Planning Manual
January 2006 - Final Planning Manual
March 2006 - Final Field Manual
• A possible future addition is a companion training module. Drafts are available on the ADEC
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 12
• Mr. Robertson’s PowerPoint is available at
Alaska’s Vessel Tracking Program; CAPT Ed Page, Executive Director, the Marine Exchange of
• Ed Page explained that the Marine Exchange of Alaska is a” non-profit maritime organization
established to provide the Alaska maritime community information, communications and
services to ensure safe, secure, efficient and environmentally responsible maritime operations.”
Its customers and clients include all vessels operating in Alaska waters, as well as the US
Coast Guard and other agencies.
• The AK Marine Exchange participates in MISNA, the Maritime Information Services of North
America; this provides it with access to information shared among other marine exchanges on
the West Coast and nationwide.
• In addition to its vessel tracking program, the Marine Exchange of Alaska offers charts and
publications, assistance with regulatory compliance, a maritime database, and maritime
advocacy. Attendees were encouraged to visit the Marine Exchange website at www.mxak.org.
• Noting that the concept of “Maritime Domain Awareness” has been endorsed by the President,
Congress, the US Coast Guard, and IMO, CAPT Page also noted the need to “Just Do it” and
that “All good ideas come from Alaska.”
• In other words, the Automated Secure Vessel Tracking System (ASVTS) is a Vessel Tracking
System developed by the Marine Exchange of Alaska that utilizes satellite communications,
marine exchange information, and AIS to track the locations of vessels; i.e., it “just does it.”
• Participation by the marine industry is voluntary, although USCG District 17 has adopted its use
as a “Standard of Care” and USCG Captains of the Port have access to the ASVTS
information. Shipping companies like the information, since their Security Officers can track a
company’s vessels and identify anomalies.
• It is conceivable that a loss of power can be identified and intercepted before a grounding
occurs, or a collision could be avoided. If a casualty or an oil spill has occurred, the ASVTS
can identify response and rescue vessels in the vicinity.
• The system has the capability to determine a vessel’s global track history. The average
tracking cost is $3.00 - $5.00 day based on tracking interval and equipment used.
• Reviewing the pros/cons of AIS, CAPT Page noted that it provides a position report every 6
minutes, it shares information with other vessels, and there are no communication costs to the
vessel. However, it requires an expensive shore-based infrastructure as well as additional
equipment on vessels, and has a limited range (line of sight) due to VHF frequency limitations.
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 13
• ASVTS, on the other hand, is available today. As a voluntary, incentive-based solution, it’s the
most expedient way of bringing a maritime domain awareness capability on-line. In addition, it’s
inexpensive, and it aids safety, security, efficiency and environmental protection.
• Its environmental applications are numerous, CAPT Page noted. These include its ability to aid
Emergency Response by locating assist vessels to prevent groundings and oil spills, to monitor
and direct spill response assets to enhance effectiveness of response, to monitor compliance
with ATBAS (Areas to Be Avoided), to aid Spill Investigations, and as a risk analysis tool.
• CAPT Page’s PowerPoint is available at
A buffet luncheon for all participants was co-hosted by Tesoro Alaska and the Pacific States/BC Oil
Spill Task Force. The 2005 Legacy Awards were given during the luncheon.
2005 LEGACY AWARD PRESENTATIONS
The Task Force gives Legacy Awards to recognize the work of organizations and individuals in
both the public and private sectors who have done outstanding work to prevent, prepare for, or
respond to oil spills in our region. The 2005 Legacy Award winners are clearly deserving of
recognition for their investments in spill prevention, preparedness, and response, as well as their
commitment and innovation. The 2005 Legacy Award winners are:
Crowley Marine Transport Corporation
BP Shipping, Inc.
US Coast Guard Commander (Retired) William Whitson
US Coast Guard District 11
Cholly Mercer, President, Rainier Petroleum Corporation
Legacy Awards Ceremony, Anchorage, Alaska, July 27, 2005. From left to right: Simon Lisiecki, Director for
Government and Industry, BP Shipping, Inc.; Thomas Crowley, President and CEO, Crowley Marine
Transport Corporation; CAPT Jerry Swanson, Chief of Marine Safety, US Coast Guard District 11; and
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 14
Cholly Mercer, President, Rainier Petroleum Corporation. US Coast Guard Commander William Whitson was
unable to attend.
PLEASE NOTE: More photos and information about the 2005 Legacy Award winners is available
on the Task Force website (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/awards_2005.htm ).
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 15
NON-TANK VESSEL RESPONSE ISSUES, PART I; Paul Slyman, Moderator
The M/V Selendang Ayu Case Study; Gary Folley, Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC) State On-Scene Coordinator
• At 4:00 a.m. on December 7, the Coast Guard was notified that the M/V Selendang Ayu had
lost engine power and was drifting towards Unalaska Island. The vessel was located about 35
nautical miles northwest of Unalaska Island at the time. Weather was severe. The US Coast
Guard (USCG) Cutter Alex Haley was diverted from Bering Sea patrol to assist and the tug
Sydney Foss was dispatched from Dutch Harbor. Two Jayhawk helicopters were deployed
from the USCG Air Station Kodiak.
• At 7:00 a.m. on December 8 the tug Sydney Foss reported breaking a tow cable in an attempt
to tow the freighter. At 3:25 that afternoon the M/V Selendang Ayu had drifted into shallow
water off Skan Bay and had dropped anchor, which appeared to be holding; less than two
hours later the anchor failed and the Coast Guard began evacuation of the crew.
• At 6:23 p.m. a Coast Guard rescue helicopter crashed during the rescue attempt with ten
persons aboard. Four were rescued by a second helicopter and six persons were lost at sea.
At 7:14 p.m. the M/V Selendang Ayu broke in two, pounded by heavy seas.
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 16
• Even though the Selendang Ayu was on innocent passage through state waters and not
required to have a contingency plan, the ramp-up in this response was just as it would have
been if a contingency plan were in place, noted Mr. Folley. An all-out cooperative effort
involved State, Federal, and local governments, Gallagher Marine Services, Pacific Rim
Logistics, Alaska Chadux, and scientists and salvage experts from all over the world, “people
who literally wrote the book in their fields” Mr. Folley stated. He served in the unified command
with US Coast Guard Captain Ron Morris, the FOSC, and Howard Hile, the Incident
• Mr. Folley noted that he would focus on three critical aspects of the response: lightering, the
measures that were taken to protect the fisheries, and the fate of the 60,000 tons of soybeans
which was the cargo of the M/V Selendang Ayu.
• A Salvage team representing six salvage companies boarded the stern section on December
12th and the bow on December 14th; the bow section was partially afloat and swinging with the
current. The forward ballast tanks and the #1 cargo hold were flooded, effectively dashing any
hope of towing the bow section to safe refuge. The #1 centerline fuel oil tank located beneath
the number 2 and 3 cargo holds in the bow section was breached and open to the sea. How
badly the tank was damaged and how much of the 176,000 gallons of fuel oil the tank was
originally holding was still in the tank could not be determined. However, the salvage team
considered it to be not accessible under the existing conditions.
• The stern section was firmly on the bottom. The #3 centerline tank in the stern section,
containing 104,000 gallons fuel oil, was also believed to be breached. Accessing any fuel
remaining in this damaged tank, although extremely difficult, was still considered a possibility
by the salvors. The engine room was flooded. The #4 port fuel oil tank was intact and there was
optimism that the #4 starboard tank was also OK, along with the MDO tanks and assorted
service and settling tanks, all located in the stern section.
• The M/V Selendang Ayu carried 446,280 gallons IFO & 31,573 gallons of marine diesel oil.
Freighters are difficult to lighter, since access to the fuel tanks is through the cargo holds,
which were full of soybeans in this case. Some of the fuel tanks were considered inaccessible,
although it was determined that others could be lightered.
• A heavy-lift helicopter lightering option was chosen by Unified Command, even though it was
the most expensive option, because it was the safest method considering the full exposure of
the wreck to winter gales. Positioning a lightering vessel alongside the wreck posed a real
danger of producing two wrecks instead of one. With this method, lightering could take place as
long as the helicopter could fly, independent of sea states. The contract was awarded to SMIT
Americas on December 15. Fuel was loaded into 2000 gallon metal cubes weighing 20,000 lb.
each, which were flown to Dutch Harbor by helicopters.
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 17
• The fuel was lightered off the Selendang Ayu using a Vogelsang pump with “Hot Tap”
capabilities which had been flown in from South Africa. Of the total IFO & MDO on board,
146,774 gallons were lightered and 335,732 gallons were released to the environment. An
estimated 140 gallons remained on board because it could not be removed. Mr. Folley noted
that adverse weather required operation stand down approximately 50% of the time, and that
“people worked hard under difficult conditions to get every bit of accessible oil off the vessel.”
The entire lightering operation was completed February 11, 2005.
• Very little “skimmable” oil was encountered offshore; either the oil was quickly blown ashore
during storms or the viscous oil was rapidly broken into tar balls and patties by the high energy
• The Alaska RRT had approved use of dispersants, and they were pre-staged, although never
• There was a significant potential that the spilled oil would impact high-value crab fisheries in
the area, including the Tanner Crab and Snow Crab. Both crab seasons were scheduled to
open January 15th. Some of the Tanner Crab areas were closed, while others were allowed to
• The Snow Crab vessels deliver their catch to processors in Dutch Harbor and Akutan, and
have live holds in which fresh seawater is constantly pumped over the catch to keep it fresh.
Any oil encountered while the vessel is in transit threatens the entire catch. Based on
information provided by local knowledge at public meetings, Unified Command realized that
tarballs could be carried across the Snow Crab fishing vessel transit routes.
• There were also concerns about impacts on the Pollock fisheries, worth $1 billion, and the
largest in the US. These vessels use refrigerated sea water to cool their holding tanks, so there
was a potential exposure there as well. Fortunately, they had a successful season and the
market pricing was not affected.
• “So we knew we had to do something quickly,” said Mr. Folley. “We needed to track the oil so
that we could take steps to alert fishermen and minimize oil encounters. We also needed to
know if the oil was on the sea bottom. But the oil could not be tracked by traditional methods
since it existed as tarballs, not as sheens and slicks visible from overflights. What we came up
with was a combination of traditional methods such as whole water sampling for dissolved
hydrocarbons and an array of new practical techniques devised by the good folks at Nuka
Research. With support of the DEC crisis management team, we were able to create this
program and present it to the public within a 24 hour period.”
• To check for benthic contamination, crab pots filled with oil snare were set in the spill impact
area, while crab was caught by the traditional pot method to check for contamination. To survey
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 18
for tarballs, Unified Command contracted fishing boats to tow fine mesh plankton nets at
surface and keel levels. Inspectors also placed oil traps in the vessels’ seawater pumping
system. They did the same thing at the seawater intakes at the fish processing plants in
Unalaska Bay and on mobile fish processors operating near Unalaska. The results of these
surveys were presented to the public on a daily basis.
• The Selendang Ayu carried 132 million pounds of dried #2 yellow soybeans, intended for
human consumption, so no pesticides or preservatives were applied in the ship’s hold. Release
of this cargo raised a number of concerns: Would island ecology be altered? Would the birds
and resident cattle eat the beans with ill affect? Would decaying beans deplete oxygen and
otherwise wreak havoc in benthic habitats near the wreck? It was determined that some could
sprout, but there was zero chance of viability in that climate. Most beans would sink in
seawater, although a small percentage could float. SCAT assessment teams continue to
assess the amount and condition of the soybeans on the shoreline, and if the rate of
decomposition is unacceptable to the state, ADEC would require removal.
Soybeans on the beach of Skan Bay
• In closing, Mr. Folley showed a video taped by a diver inspecting the sea bottom in the wreck
area; many soybeans were found, but no oil. Mr. Folley’s PowerPoint presentation is available
at (insert link).
USCG Contingency Plans for Non-Tank Vessels; Captain Steven Hanewich, Chief of the US Coast
Guard Office of Response
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 19
• CAPT Hanewich explained that the Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Act of 2004
amends section 311(a) and (j) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to require the
preparation and submissions of response plans by all non-tank vessels over 400 gross tons as
defined in 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(9) [International Tonnage]. Non-tank vessels are comprised of
any vessel carrying oil of any kind as fuel for main propulsion. He also explained that US
navigable waters for the purpose of this law are those out to 3 nautical miles.
• He noted that response plans are to be submitted to the Coast Guard by August 9, 2005 (12-
months from enactment). CAPT Hanewich stated that the Non-tank Vessel requirements are
expected to mirror those found for Tank Vessel Response Plans in 33 CFR 155. Some of the
expected requirements include notification procedures, shipboard spill mitigation, shore-based
response activities, training, and exercising.
• The scope of requirements in the Non-tank Vessel Response Plans (NTVRPs) is considerably
broader than those for Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plans, he explained. NTVRPs also
require identification and designation of Qualified Individuals, Spill Management Teams, and
OSROs for response to various response scenarios. In addition, all vessels must have pre-
identified salvage capability since prevention and mitigation to rescue a stricken vessel before
a spill occurs are of paramount importance. Moreover, non-tank vessel response plan
requirements will help distribute the cost of OSROs and enhance national salvage and marine
firefighting capability, he stated.
• As spelled out in the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) published earlier this
year, the USCG anticipates that the regulations will utilize a Tiered Approach based on vessel
fuel capacities, since the mitigation and response capabilities vary with the threat posed by the
quantity of fuel carried. Vessels 2,500 bbls and under must have pre-identified assets capable
of responding to Average Most Probable and Maximum Most Probable Discharge scenarios.
Only the vessels carrying more than 2,500 bbls will have to ensure resource availability through
contracts or other approved means. This group of vessels will also need to plan for the Worst
Case Discharge scenario.
• The 2004 Act requires that the response plans be prepared and submitted by August 9, 2005
(i.e., one year after the enactment of the 2004 Act). In addition, the Act requires the President
(Coast Guard) to issue regulations requiring the submission of plans. Because of the length of
time needed to provide the necessary opportunity for, and consideration of, public comments,
final regulations will not be in effect on that date, although CAPT Hanewich stated that
development of these regulations and those for vessel salvage are among the Coast Guard’s
• He acknowledged that this raises the question of whether the Coast Guard intends to enforce
the Act - specifically the non-tank vessel response plan submission requirement - if it does not
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 20
have regulations in place on August 9, 2005, he noted. The Coast Guard will not initiate
Penalty Action for failure to comply with Non-tank Vessel requirements until such time as
regulations are issued and in effect. He strongly encouraged industry to follow the NVIC
guidelines in the interim. He also noted that over 700 plans had been received, out of an
estimated 5,000 non-tank vessels which would be required to submit plans.
• On February 4, 2005, the USCG published Navigation and Vessel Information Circular 01-05
(NVIC 01-05) entitled “Interim Guidance for the Development and Review of Response Plans
for Non-tank Vessels.” The NVIC describes a voluntary process for submitting response plans
and for obtaining interim authorization letters from the Coast Guard.
• Although the USCG will not know precisely which vessels must comply with the response plan
requirements until rulemaking is complete, vessels not measured under the Convention
measurement system, whether they are 400 gross register tons under the regulatory
measurement system or not, may ultimately be covered under the regulations. Therefore,
CAPT Hanewich advised, vessel owners and operators who want to secure interim
authorization letters because they believe their vessels may be covered by the response plan
regulations are highly encouraged to use the voluntary interim authorization process under
NVIC 01-05. Submission of a response plan based on the NVIC guidance will be accepted by
the Coast Guard for the initial vessel response plan submission and vessel’s will be issued a 2-
year interim operating authorization.
• CAPT Hanewich further noted that the law contains a mandate that the USCG consider existing
state regulations in crafting the federal rule. The mandate to consider state statutes requires
the USCG to be aware of state laws and to the extent practicable ensure that their regulations
do not set up conflict or contradiction between our laws and the state laws.
• He noted that the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force had developed Integrated
Vessel Response Plan (IVRP) Guidelines for tank vessels; this format is provided as a
voluntary option for complying with both Federal and state oil spill contingency plan
requirements. The matrix provides a cross-reference table that can be used in submitting an
integrated vessel response plan. The Coast Guard anticipates amending the existing regulation
found in Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 155, Subpart D, to add non-tank vessels to
the requirements for vessels carrying oil as a primary cargo. Submission of a vessel response
plan based on the IVRP guidance will be accepted by the Coast Guard for the initial vessel
response plan submission.
• CAPT Hanewich’s PowerPoint presentation is available at (insert link).
The Value of Incident Management Teams for Non-tank Vessel Response; Leslie Pearson, DEC
Prevention & Emergency Response Program Manager
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 21
• Ms. Pearson noted that all of the West Coast states and British Columbia have some type of
non-tank vessel oil spill preparedness and response rules in effect. Alaska has what is referred
to as a “Streamline” process administered by DEC’s Industry Preparedness Program, Marine
• A series of significant oil spills in the late 1990’s and the year of 2000 identified the need to
extend Alaska’s oil spill prevention and response laws. After two years of deliberation with a
23-member Task Force, the 2001-2002 Legislature unanimously agreed on the appropriate
level of prevention and preparedness to impose on all self-propelled non-tank vessels (NTV)
over 400 gross tons that operate in Alaskan waters.. Contingency plans became a
requirement; a specific component of the law requires the contingency plan applicant to register
that they’ve contracted with an oil spill primary response action contractor and an incident
management team (IMT) company.
• The need to have a pre-identified Incident Management Team (IMT) was based on “lessons-
learned” from oil spills involving cruise ships, freighters and the railroad. Pre-negotiated private
service contracts between the plan holder and IMT companies are necessary to insure prompt
mobilization of resources to a spill, since time is always of the essence during an emergency
• Under Alaska law, the classification and size of the team is based on the maximum vessel fuel
capacity or fuel volume to be carried. There are two classifications:
1. Classification A: up to and including 30,000 barrels of fuel; 12 identified individuals and 10
2. Classification B: carrying greater than 30,000 barrels of fuel; 12 identified individuals and 15
IMT’s can register for specific regions of the state - the state is broken out into ten regions -
they can apply for statewide status.
A list of identified IMT personnel and available responders, by region and physical location,
plus supporting information that demonstrates that the applicant meets or exceeds the
requirement is submitted to the department for review. IMT personnel are identified by name
and position, and must include the incident commander, deputy incident commander, planning
section chief, operations section chief, logistics section chief, finance section chief and
alternates for each position.
The timeframe to mobilize personnel is a critical element of Alaska regulations, Ms. Pearson
noted. After initial notification of a spill the incident commander and alternate must be available
within two hours to establish, direct, and manage the organization. They must be capable of
arriving “in region” within six hours after initial notification to continue to direct and manage the
response. The deputy incident commander and alternate must be “in region” within six hours
after the incident commander. The section chiefs and alternates must be “in region” within 12
hours and, within 24 hours additional responders arrive and are assigned to positions within the
Essentially, she stated, the regulations establish an effort to cascade IMT personnel into the
region to manage an oil spill. There’s no deterrent for compressing the timeframe. There are
currently four state-approved IMT companies: The O’Brien Group, Alaska Steamship
Response, Meredith Management Group and Corbett & Holt/Gallagher Marine Systems. Three
of the companies are registered statewide. IMT companies must complete and submit an
application form and registration fee of $500.00 to the Department for review and approval.
Since the regulations have been in effect approximately 10 exercises have been conducted by
DEC in order to assure that the IMTs can meet state requirements. The exercises have been
designed to demonstrate whether the approved IMTs can bring the identified team members
into a region of operation within the stipulated timeframe. Initially, several of the IMTs failed
because there were insufficient identified personnel in Alaska, and the logistics for moving
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 22
people from the lower 48 to Alaska was expensive and complex. Following each exercise the
IMT companies addressed shortfalls and improved their teams.
There’s nothing like a few real incidents to test the system, as well, Ms. Pearson commented.
In the past year and a half, Alaska has had a couple of non-tank vessel groundings that
resulted in the activation of approved IMT’s:
On May 10, 2004 the state ferry LeConte grounded on Cozian Reef near Sitka. The
vessel did not spill any oil during the grounding, salvage or transit to Ketchikan
where it was repaired and subsequently brought back into service. The incident was
the first in which a non-tank vessel IMT- Alaska Steamship Response and cleanup
contractors SEAPRO - was activated and mobilized under a pre-negotiated contract
with the Alaska Marine Highway System. The infrastructure required under the non-
tank vessel regulations proved to be of significant value. Without the regulations it
may have been unlikely that either an IMT or cleanup contractor could have been
activated as quickly or effectively.
Another example is the M/V Clipper Odyssey which grounded at 9:00pm on July 31,
2004 northwest of Baby Island in the Aleutian Islands. This eco-tour cruise ship
voyage was doing a bird watch when the ship ran aground on an uncharted rock.
Immediately following the grounding, the ship’s non-tank vessel oil spill contingency
plan was activated. A couple of tugs from Dutch Harbor were dispatched to the
grounding site. The ship’s IMT (O’Brien Group) and cleanup contractor (Alaska
Chadux Corporation) were immediately notified and mobilized to Dutch Harbor.
Approximately 800 gallons of diesel was released. By 7:30am the following morning
the Clipper Odyssey arrived at Dutch Harbor and was safely moored to the city dock
While the Selendang Ayu was not covered under Alaska’s non-tank vessel program the
infrastructure set up by the program assisted in facilitating the response. When the potential of
the grounding became a possibility contact was made with three of the registered non-tank
vessel IMT’s to ask for assistance and Corbett & Holt/Gallagher Marine Systems, who has a
number of response personnel in Alaska, was hired. A contract was also set with the registered
response contractor, Alaska Chadux, to provide the response equipment and responders. Both
contracts were handled quickly, in part because of the infrastructure set up through the Alaska
Non-tank Vessel Program.
Although Alaska’s non-tank vessel regulations are only a couple of years old, the exercises and
actual responses have shown the value of having a mechanism in place that expedites the
mobilization of professional Incident Management Teams and response contractors, Ms.
NON-TANK VESSEL RESPONSE ISSUES, PART II; Carlton Moore, Moderator
Certificates of Financial Responsibility and Limits of Liability for Non-tank vessels; Carlton Moore,
California Office of Spill Prevention and Response and Al Peacock III, Keesal, Young & Logan
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 23
According to OPA 90 as encoded in 33 USC 2716, non-tank vessels of 300 gross tons or
greater must provide proof of financial responsibility to meet their maximum liability under 33
USC 2704 (the limitation of liability section of OPA ’90). This liability is the greater of either
$600 per gross ton or $500,000.
Mr. Peacock went on to explain that all west coast states except Hawaii also require certificates
of financial responsibility (COFRs) as part of their contingency planning requirements for non-
tank vessels. Alaska’s requirement is found in AS 46.04.05 and requires proof of responsibility
for the greater of $400.20 per incident, per barrel of storage capacity of all fuel, lube and other
petroleum tanks or $6,670,000 for vessels having predominately persistent product on board.
For vessels having predominately non-persistent product on board, the COFR must meet the
greater of $133.40 per incident, per barrel of storage capacity or $1,334,000.
California’s COFR requirement is found in Government Code 8670.37.58 and in state
regulations. An operator of a non-tank vessel of 300 GT or greater must provide a COFR for
$300 million if have a carrying capacity of more than 6,500 barrels of oil; for $2 million if it has a
carrying capacity of between 1 and 10 barrels; for $5 million for a carrying capacity of between
10 and 50 barrels; for $10 million for a carrying capacity of between 50 and 500 barrels; for
$18.9 million for a carrying capacity of between 500 and 1,000 barrels, and for a carrying
capacity of more than 1,000 but less than 6,500 barrels, a formula is used (capacity – 1,000
barrels x $5,670 +$18.9 million).
Oregon’s COFR law is in ORS 468B.390, and requires that non-tank vessels of 300 GT or
greater provide financial responsibility of the greater of $600 per Gross Ton or $500,000, which
is the same as the OPA limits. Proof of compliance with OPA ’90 financial responsibility
requirements satisfies Oregon law.
Washington’s COFR law is in RCW 88.40.020 and requires $300 million for a cargo or
passenger vessel that carries oil as fuel. It also requires the greater of $600 per gross ton or
$500,000 (OPA limits) for cargo or passenger vessel carrying passengers and vehicles
between Washington and a foreign country ; the greater of $133.40 per barrel of total oil
storage capacity or $1.34 million for fishing vessels carrying predominantly non-persistent
product; and the greater of $400.20 per barrel or $6.67 million for fishing vessels carrying
predominantly persistent product.
Under 33 USC 2702, Mr. Peacock explained, the Responsible Party is strictly liable for removal
costs and damages, including:
All removal costs;
Damages to Natural Resources including the reasonable cost of assessing same;
Property damage including lost revenues and profits from same;
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 24
Lost subsistence; and
Cost of public services.
Possible defenses to liability are covered in 33 U.S.C. § 2703.A responsible party is not liable
for removal costs or damages if the discharge and the resulting damages were caused solely
by an act of God, an act of war, an act or omission of an independent third party (with no
contractual relationship with the responsible party), or any combination of these circumstances.
While an “Act of God” is defined in OPA 90, and “Act of War” is not, although it is defined
elsewhere in US federal law. Mr. Peacock noted, however, that since 9/11 there has been no
case law on whether “War on Terrorism” qualifies. Prior to 9/11 case law held that an act of
terrorism was not an “Act of War” where it was not committed by foreign governments. He also
noted that since 9/11 most marine insurance policies include terrorism within their “war risk”
exclusions from coverage.
He also explained that if a Responsible Party (RP) alleges that the spill was caused solely by
the negligence of a Third Party the RP must still pay all removal costs and damages, and is
then given a subrogation claim against the Third Party for those costs/damages.
Limitations of liability are set in 33 U.S.C.§ 2704. Except as otherwise provided,” the total of the
liability of a responsible party with respect to each incident shall not exceed the greater of:
$1,200/gross ton for tank vessels, or
$10,000,000 in the case of a tank vessel >3,000 GT; or $2,000,000 in the case of a
tank vessel < 3,000 GT; or, ,
As noted previously, $600/GT for non-tank vessels, or $500,000.
According to 2704 (c)(1) there is no right to a limit of liability if the incident was proximately
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, or the violation of an applicable Federal
safety, construction, or operating regulation by the RP or a person in a contractual relationship
with the RP.
Mr. Peacock pointed out that there is also no defense or limitation if the RP fails or refuses:
To report the incident as required by law and the responsible party knows or has
reason to know of the incident;
To provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by a responsible
official in connection with removal activities; or
Without sufficient cause, to comply with an order issued under 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)
or (e) or under the Intervention on the High Seas Act.
• He also explained that an RP cannot stop paying when it reaches the limit of its OPA liability,
since it’s not a true limit on liability; instead, it’s a right to a refund. For example, in the Tenyo
Maru spill resulting from a collision in Canada, near the US border, the vessel’s Limit of Liability
was $5 million, so the owners stopped paying once $5 million had been spent. As a result, they
eventually paid more than $15 million, including penalties for failing to completely cleanup the
• For response expenses incurred beyond the Limit of Liability, an RP may assert a claim to the
National Pollution Fund Center (NPFC). The RP must demonstrate that it is entitled to a
complete defense to liability or limitation of its liability, and the NPFC then decides the RP’s
claim and determines the amount to be refunded, a process which could take years, he
The Canadian Perspective; Craig Dougans, Burrard Clean Operations (BC0)
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 25
• Mr. Dougans explained that Part XV of the Canada Shipping Act covers pollution prevention
and response, and enacts the international OPRC Convention. Part XV prescribes measures to
prevent pollution and minimize its effects should a spill occur. It applies to:
Oil tankers of 150 or more gross tons;
Other ships (“non-tank vessels”) of 400 or more gross tons carrying oil as cargo or
Designated oil handling facilities (OHFs), i.e., those facilities transferring oil to or
from the above-listed vessels.
Sections 660.2 and 660.3 of Part XV require that ships and OHFs have both an arrangement
with a Response Organization (RO) and an oil pollution emergency plan (SOPEP). Ships must
have a declaration on board which identifies the name and address of the ship’s insurer,
confirms the arrangement with the RO, identifies every person authorized to implement the
arrangement with the RO as well as the SOPEP. In addition, ships must take reasonable
measures to implement the plan.
Mr. Dougans noted that the US and Canadian rules for non-tank vessels are similar, with the
result that US and Canadian industry has been working with regulators on reciprocity for ships
in transit in Juan de Fuca Strait.
The Canadian approach involves a Government/Industry partnership and shared responsibility,
Mr. Dougans explained. Industry pays for preparedness, and the polluter manages/pays for the
spill. The Response Organization provides the response. The Canadian Coast Guard, as Lead
Agency on water, monitors the response and becomes the OSC if the polluter is unable,
unwilling, or unknown. The Province of British Columbia and Environment Canada advise
Incident Command or the OSC on response priorities through the Regional Environmental
Emergencies Team (REET). Response actions in Canada are put o the “test of
reasonableness,” Mr. Dougans noted.
BCO is one of four Canadian Response Organizations certified by Transport Canada on a
three-year cycle, and has approximately 1700 ship and OHF members. Their main office and
warehouse are in Burnaby, and they also have an office on Vancouver Island. BCO maintains a
mobile ICP/Communications Center and over forty equipment trailers. BCO also has twenty
response vessels from 18 to 185 feet – including 3 dedicated skimming vessels. In addition,
they maintain a network of contractors including fishing vessel operators.
If a ship owner does not have the local resources to manage an incident effectively, the
certified RO can provide incident (ICS) management. Canadian law allows the ship owner to
use a contracted Incident Management Team, but the person authorized must direct the
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 26
response, i.e., the Incident Commander. There has been limited involvement in Canada to-date
by US QI or Incident Management Teams, Mr. Dougans noted.
Regarding financial responsibility, Part 6 of the Marine Liability Act establishes that the ship
owner is responsible for oil pollution damage, reasonable cleanup costs for pollution damage
(oil and other pollutants), and the costs of reasonable measures to reinstate the environment
damaged by the spill. The owner’s liability is strict, meaning that proof of fault or negligence is
not required and defenses are limited.
With regard to other Canadian issues, Mr. Dougans noted that the recently passed Bill C-15,
which amends the Migratory Bird Convention Act, provides some new authorities in conflict with
the Canada Shipping Act. The act extends criminal liability for oiled wildlife impacts to the
management of ship operating companies.
Regarding the issue of Places of Refuge, Transport Canada has developed a preliminary list of
sites which is under review. Their next step is stakeholder consultation.
Mr. Dougans also noted that, through the ITOS system, data on suitable rescue and salvage
tugs is kept by the Marine Exchange of Puget Sound and vessels are tracked using AIS and
VTS systems. Overall, he stated, British Columbia doesn’t have much rescue or salvage
Mr. Dougans also noted that Burrard Clean Operations maintains transboundary mutual aid
agreements with the Marine Spill Response Corporation in Washington State and with
SEAPRO in SE Alaska.
Salvage Issues and Capabilities on the West Coast; Richard Fairbanks, President, the American
Mr. Fairbanks explained that the American Salvage Association represents fourteen salvors in
the US and Canada.
The Association is looking forward to the US Coast Guard’s adoption of the final salvage and
firefighting regulations, he said. If these had already been in place, many of the spill and
casualty responses over the past year would have been improved.
As an example, Mr. Fairbanks noted that the Athos I, a tanker carrying crude oil, had a
contingency plan which named a salvor, so when the Captain of the Port asked them to
implement a salvage plan, the salvor was mobilized quickly.
As Mr. Folley noted earlier, there were six salvors on site after the Selendang Ayu grounding,
but Mr. Fairbanks pointed out that it took the vessel owner and insurer a week to hire one,
since the vessel had no US federal contingency plan in place.
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 27
In the case of the Cape Flattery, the cement ship that grounded outside of Honolulu, it was a
non-tank vessel without a contingency plan or a named salvor, so the fuel and cargo lightering
operation took days longer to be initiated than was necessary.
Mr. Fairbanks also noted that the response to the Thunderhorse oil platform, which had been
damaged by Hurricane Dennis, involved delays in securing a salvor and implementing a plan.
He recommended that the US Coast Guard or the Minerals Management Service extend the
salvage regulations to cover offshore platforms.
In the case of the tank barge EMC 423, it did have a required contingency plan, but the salvor
named in the plan was the barge owner. As a result, it took more than a month to have a
salvage plan approved.
Mr. Fairbanks noted that there are 267 different salvors named in the US Coast Guard’s current
tank vessel contingency plans, but there aren’t that many in the world, so obviously not all are
qualified salvors. The draft salvage regulations, he noted, do not set standards for salvors.
He reported that the US Coast Guard has issued guidelines to Area Planning Committees on
the salvage sections of the Area Contingency Plans, and urged them to expedite the salvage
regulations and extend them to non-tank as well as tank vessels.
Mr. Tom Lakosh of Parker Associates spoke to the Task Force Members in reference to his
report on the response to the Selendang Ayu grounding and provided the Members with copies
of his report.
Mr. Lakosh noted his concern with the delays in rescue tug and salvage response, and
recommended that a strategy be developed which would guarantee financial support by all
stakeholders for a salvage response system. The size of vessels should be considered when
planning for rescue tug assets, he recommended, and noted that he has done some research
on adequate tug engine capabilities.
He also recommended that Area Contingency Plans should provide for response to orphan
spills as well as to those covered by contingency plan holders. Likewise, vessels in innocent
passage should be covered by Area Plans similar to vessels covered by approved contingency
plans. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund should cover these gaps, he noted.
He also recommended support for a vessel tracking system for the Aleutians.
TASK FORCE MEMBERS ADOPT THE 2005-2006 ANNUAL WORK PLAN
Following public comment, the Task Force Members signed the authorization for the 2005-
2006 Annual Work Plan.
Carlton Moore then invited the Members and audience to California for the 2006 Annual
Kurt Fredriksson expressed his appreciation to ADEC staff members Karen Miller, who
assisted with meeting planning and registration, Young Ha, who served as photographer for the
Meeting, and Dan Buchholz, who managed the PowerPoint presentation. After thanking all
participants, he then adjourned the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Pacific States/British Columbia
Oil Spill Task Force.
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 28
2005 Annual Meeting Attendees
Task Force Members or Alternates
1. Kurt Fredriksson, ADEC
2. Dale Jensen, WA DOE
3. Paul Slyman, ODEQ
4. Laurence Lau, HI DOH
5. Carlton Moore, CA OSPR
6. Charles Porter, BC Ministry of Environment
1. Bill Hutmacher, ADEC (Leslie Pearson listed under speakers)
2. Lisa Curtis, CA OSPR
3. Curtis Martin, HI DOH
4. Jon Neel, WA DOE
5. Mike Zollitsch, ODEQ
Task Force Staff and ADEC Assistants
1. Jean Cameron, PS/BC OSTF
2. Karen Miller, registration
3. Dan Buchholz, IT support
4. Young Ha, photographer
1. USCG RADM James C. Olson
2. Marilyn Leland, PWS RCAC
3. Lisa Ka’aihue, PWS RACAC
4. Mike Munger, CIRCAC
5. John Kwietniak, Tesoro
6. Tim Robertson, Nuka Research & Planning
7. Ed Page, AK Marine Exchange
8. Gary Folley, ADEC
9. Leslie Pearson, ADEC
10. CAPT Steve Hanewich, USCG Office of Response
11. Al Peacock, P&I Club rep
12. Craig Dougans, Burrard Clean Operations
13. Richard Fairbanks, American Salvage Association
Legacy Award Winners
1. Tom Crowley Jr., Chairman, President, and CEO of Crowley
2. Rockwell Smith, Senior VP and General Manager for Crowley’s petroleum transport
3. Craig Tornga, General Manager, Crowley
4. Dave Roggenbeck, Director ATB Operations, Crowley MTC
5. Simon Lisiecki, Director for Government and Industry, BP Shipping, Inc.
6. Cholly Mercer, President, Rainier Petroleum
7. CAPT Jerry Swanson, Chief of Marine Safety, US Coast Guard District 11
1. Cindy Anderson, Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources
2. Kirsten Ballard, ADEC
3. Joe Banta, Prince William Sound RCAC
4. LT Eric Bauer, USCG Office of Response, Washington, DC
5. John Bauer, ADEC
6. Catherine Berg, US Fish & Wildlife Service, Anchorage Fish & Wildlife Field Office
7. Richard Berkowitz, Director, Pacific Coast Operations, Transportation Institute
8. Daniel Bevington, Ecology and Environment, Inc.
9. Nancy Bird, President, PWS Science Center
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 29
10. John Brown, ADEC
11. MK3 Gary Bullock, USCG MSO Valdez
12. CAPT Paula Carroll, Chief, Marine Safety, USCG D14
13. Tom Colby, Alaska Tanker Company Port Manager Valdez
14. Bill Conley, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council
15. John Devens, PWS RCAC
16. CAPT Mark DeVries, Commanding Officer, USCG MSO Anchorage
17. Bob Flint, ADEC Marine Vessel Section/Non-tank vessel group
18. Sara Francis, US Coast Guard
19. Dale Gardner, ADEC
20. Dan Gilson, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council
21. Mary K. Goolie. US EPA AK Area Planner
22. CAPT Paul Gugg, Chief, Marine Safety, USCG Pacific Area
23. USCG LT Emily Harding, RADM Olson’s aide
24. Linda Hay, Special Assistant for Natural Resources to Governor Murkowski
25. Bob Heavilin, General Manager, Alaska Chadux Corporation
26. Don Hunter, Anchorage Daily News
27. LT Catherine Huot, USCG MSO Valdez
28. LCDR Bill Jeffries, USCG MSO Anchorage
29. Jace Johnson, Navy Supervisor of Salvage, Base Anchorage
30. DR Doug Jones, CIRCAC and Coastline Engineering
31. Vince Kelly, ADEC Valdez
32. John Kotula, ADEC Valdez
33. Tom Lakosh, Parker Associates
34. Barat LaPorte, Patton Boggs
35. John LeClair, Response Manager, Alaska Chadux Corporation
36. CDR Anthony Lloyd, Commanding Officer, USCG Pacific Strike Team
37. Sharon Marchant, Sr. Programs Advisor, APSC SERVS
38. Bob Mattson, ADEC SE SOSC
39. Kevin Mercier, Assistant Division Chief, Marine Facilities Division
40. Dianne Munson, North Slope Charter Agreement Manager, ADEC
41. Capt. Phillip J. Nelson, President, Council of Marine Carriers
42. Kristina M. O'Connor, Director, Government & Community Affairs, ConocoPhillips Marine/Polar Tankers
43. Walt Parker, Parker Associates
44. Yereth Rosen, Reuters
45. Betty Schorr, ADEC Marine Vessels Section Manager
46. Beth Sharp, Conoco Phillips/Weston
47. Jeanie Shifflett, Conoco Phillips
48. Kevin B. Smith, Water Quality Insurance Syndicate
49. Terry Smith, Alaska Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Management (DHS&EM)
50. John Whitney, NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator for Alaska
51. Richard Wright, Vice President, Pacific/Northwest Region, MSRC
52. Ruth Yender, Scientific Support Coordinator for the Northwest and Oceania, NOAA Office of Response
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 30
2005 Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Annual Meeting
July 27, 2005
Hawthorn Suites Hotel, 1110 West 8th Avenue, Anchorage, Alaska
Theme: Pacific Perspectives - Regional Issues of Concern
7:30 a.m. Registration Opens
8 a.m. Meeting Convenes/Introductions
8:15 Keynote Speaker: US Coast Guard RADM James C. Olson, Commander 17th
Coast Guard District
8:45 Task Force Member Updates
Dale Jenson, Spills Program Manager, Washington Department of Ecology
Laurence Lau, Hawaii Deputy Director for Environmental Health
Carl Moore, Administrator, California Office of Spill Prevention and Response
Paul Slyman, Deputy Director, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
Charles Porter, Director, Environmental Management Branch, British Columbia
Ministry of Environment
Kurt Fredriksson, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
10:30 Update on Task Force Activities and Plans: Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator
10:45 Alaska Initiatives as West Coast Models; Kurt Fredriksson, Moderator
Aquatic Nuisance Species in AK; Marilyn Leland & Lisa Ka’aihue, Prince William Sound
Regional Citizens Advisory Council
Alaska Spill Response Permit Project; Michael L. Munger, Executive Director, CIRCAC,
and John Kwietniak, Tesoro, Alaska
Alaska’s Tactics Manual; Tim Robertson, NUKA Research & Planning Group
Marine Exchange of Alaska’s Vessel Tracking System; Ed Page, Executive Director
Noon Buffet Luncheon co-hosted by Tesoro Alaska and the Pacific States/British
Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, and the 2005 Legacy Award Presentations:
Crowley Marine Transport Corporation
BP Shipping, Inc.
US Coast Guard CDR (Retired) William Whitson
US Coast Guard District 11
Cholly Mercer, President, Rainier Petroleum Corporation
1:30 Non-tank Vessel Response Issues, Part I; Paul Slyman, Moderator
The Selendang Ayu Case Study; Gary Folley, DEC State On-Scene Coordinator
USCG Contingency Plans for Non-Tank Vessels; USCG CAPT Steven Hanewich
The Value of Incident Management Teams; Leslie Pearson, DEC Prevention & Emergency Response
3:00 Non-tank Vessel Response Issues, Part II; Carlton Moore, Moderator
Certificates of Financial Responsibility and Limits of Liability for Non-tank vessels; Carlton Moore, OSPR
& Al Peacock III, Keesal, Young & Logan
The Canadian Perspective; Craig Dougans, Burrard Clean
Salvage Issues and Capabilities on the West Coast; Richard Fairbanks, American Salvage Association
4:15 Public Comment and Task Force Members’ Response
4:55 Task Force Members adopt the 2005-2006 Annual Work Plan
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 31
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 32
As Manager for Operations/Maintenance at Burrard Clean Operations (BCO), Craig Dougans is responsible
for the acquisition, maintenance and operational deployment of BCO’s inventory of oil spill response vessels
and equipment on Canada’s West Coast. Craig has been employed by BCO since 1995 when he left a 19-
year career with the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) to pursue opportunities in the private sector. During his
time in the CCG, Craig worked in a variety of occupations at sea and ashore, including search and rescue
(SAR) operations, SAR training, SAR program development, Public Affairs, environmental response training,
contingency planning, and environmental response operations. Craig is a graduate of the CCG’s Marine
Emergency Management Course, and Transport Canada’s Intermediate Management. Craig is a graduate of
Simon Fraser University, with a degree in Communication and a Management Skills in Advanced
Technology (MSAT) certificate from the School of Engineering Science. He holds a Master Limited
certificate issued by Transport Canada. Craig responded to his first oil spill in 1973, and since that time has
responded to hundreds of spills on Canada’s West Coast and in the Canadian Arctic. He has written and
presented papers on marine oil spill response training methods and the Canadian spill response regime.
Dick Fairbanks, President of the American Salvage Association, grew up on the coast of Massachusetts. He
received his informal maritime education playing around with small boats, and his formal education in
Mechanical Engineering at the University of Massachusetts and in Business Administration at Boston
University. He learned about ships and ship propulsion at General Electric’s Medium Steam Turbine,
Generator and Gear Department in Lynn Massachusetts. He rounded out his work experience by spending
some time in both the yacht business and the real estate business before joining Titan, the Florida based
marine salvage and wreck removal contractor in 1988 as a partner and General Manager. In 1990 he
convinced his partners to get out of the tug and barge business and focus on marine salvage worldwide.
Today Dick is President of the company which now has offices in Florida, the UK, and Singapore. He is also
President of the American Salvage Association.
Gary Folley has been with the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) since 1989. He is
presently State On-Scene Coordinator and manager of the Central Alaska Response Team, covering a
response area that includes Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, Anchorage and the Mat-Su borough, Kodiak,
the Aleutian Islands, and Western Alaska. Mr. Folley participated in the Exxon Valdez response, working for
both the Coast Guard and ADEC. He worked as an oil spill specialist on contract to the Saudi Government
from 1984 to 1987, responding to catastrophic releases that occurred as the result of the Iran-Iraq War. As a
Coast Guard officer in the 1970's and 1980's he was stationed at Governor's Island, MSO Jacksonville, and
Coast Guard Headquarters.
A native of Attleboro, Massachusetts, Captain Steven Hanewich assumed duties as Chief of the Coast
Guard Headquarters Office of Response in July 2005. He is a 1983 graduate of the Massachusetts Maritime
Academy, where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Transportation, and a 1990 graduate
of the University of Michigan, where he received a Master of Science Degree in Natural Resource Policy and
Administration. His previous assignments have included Marine Safety Offices in Hampton Roads, Virginia,
Miami, Florida, San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Providence, Rhode Island, as well as staff tours at Coast Guard
Headquarters Port Safety and Security Division and the National Response Center. Commander
Hanewich’s personal decorations include two Meritorious Service Medals, three Coast Guard Commendation
Medals, the 9-11 Medal, and the Coast Guard Achievement Medal.
Lisa Ka'aihue is the Environmental Monitoring Project Manager with the Prince William Sound Regional
Citizens' Advisory Council. She manages a variety of environmental monitoring projects including research
and educational activities related to invasive species issues in the Prince William Sound region.
John Kwietniak is the Supervisor of Contingency Planning & Emergency Response for Tesoro Alaska.
He has been with Tesoro for over ten years after retiring with 27 years in the US Coast Guard. John writes,
maintains, and audits all of Tesoro Alaska’s Facility and Vessel Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency
Plans. He also prepares all the Dock Operations Manuals and Spill Prevention, Countermeasures, and
Control Plans (SPCC Plans) for Tesoro Alaska Operations. John is responsible for all Spill Prevention / C-
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 33
Plan training, as well as response training. He developed the Tesoro Incident Command System training
program for the entire corporation and continues to conduct ICS training and drills at other Tesoro business
units. John also serves as the liaison for Tesoro with state and federal agencies, as well as with both
Regional Citizens Advisory Councils. He Co-Chairs all Cook Inlet, Kodiak and PWS Geographic Response
Strategy (GRS) workgroups, and is a “Qualified Individual” and Operations Section Chief on the Tesoro Spill
(Crisis) Management Team.
Marilyn Leland is the Deputy Director of the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council. She
is a member of the national Invasive Species Advisory Committee, the Western Regional Panel of the
National Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force, and the Board of Directors for the Prince William Sound Oil
Spill Recovery Institute. At the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, she was the Executive Director of Cordova
District Fishermen United. She also spent 2-1/2 years on assignment to the US Coast Guard in Washington,
DC on the Oil Pollution Act staff.
Michael Munger is the Executive Director of the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council (RCAC). An
Alaskan for 41 years, Michael has a diversified professional background having worked for the Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation as an Environmental Specialist, in the Alaska Oil industry, both
on the North Slope and Cook Inlet, and also as a Commercial Fisherman.
Rear Admiral James C. Olson directs Coast Guard operations including search and rescue, maritime safety,
environmental protection, fisheries law enforcement and military readiness in Alaska and the North Pacific.
Units and personnel under his command patrol more than 3.8 million square miles of ocean and 33,000
miles of coastline, including some of the most treacherous waters in the world. Rear Admiral Olson’s
operational assignments include: deck watch officer aboard Coast Guard Cutter DUANE; search and rescue
pilot at Coast Guard Station Astoria, Oregon; flight safety officer, and instructor pilot at Air Stations Brooklyn,
New York and Cape Cod, Massachusetts; and Operations Officer at Air Station Sitka, Alaska, a unit he later
commanded. In the summer of 1994, Rear Admiral Olson took command of one of the Coast Guard’s
largest Air Stations at Kodiak, Alaska. He has over 5,000 accident-free hours in HH-52, HH-3F, and HH60J
Helicopters. Rear Admiral Olson most recently served as Chief of Operations Capability where he was
responsible for allocation, distribution, and recapitalization of Coast Guard aircraft, vessels, shore facilities
and operational command infrastructure as well as the administration of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. His first
flag assignment was as Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) West. Other staff assignments
include Chief of Operations and Chief of Staff for the Coast Guard’s 13 District in Seattle, Washington. He
also served at Coast Guard Headquarters in the Office of Programs, and on the Coordinating Council Staff in
the Chief of Staff’s Office. While in the 7 District in Miami, Florida, he served as the Chief of Intelligence
and Investigations, and directed the Maritime Intelligence Center. A 1970 graduate of the US Coast Guard
Academy, Rear Admiral Olson earned a Masters Degree in Business Administration in his off duty time while
serving at Air Station Brooklyn, New York. He was designated as a naval aviator following training
completed in 1972, and is the current holder of the Coast Guard's Ancient Albatross Award, which is
presented to honor the aviator who has held that designation for the longest period of time. He is a 1990
graduate of the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
Captain Ed Page became the first Executive Director of the Marine Exchange of Alaska in 2001. The Marine
Exchange is a non-profit maritime organization established to provide the Alaska maritime community with
information, communications and services to ensure safe, secure, efficient and environmentally responsible
maritime operations. Prior to his present position, he served 29 years as a commissioned officer in the US
Coast Guard served in a variety of marine safety and environmental protection assignments ranging from
Captain of the Port LA/LB to Chief of Marine Safety and Environmental Protection for the Pacific Area. He
was actively involved in the Coast Guard’s response to the T/V Glacier Bay oil spill in Cook Inlet in 1987 and
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In his capacity as the Executive Director of Marine Exchange of Alaska, Captain
Page developed the Automated Secure Vessel Tracking System. He has expanded the operation of this
vessel tracking system nationally in his capacity as the President of the Maritime Information Service of
North America (MISNA).
Albert Peacock, III, has been with Keesal, Young & Logan since 1988 and a shareholder since 1991. His
trials & arbitrations include more than fifteen arbitrations in California, Alaska and Texas involving insurance
coverage, securities, commercial and personal injury claims, as well as one Hawaii Supreme Court, four
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 34
Ninth Circuit, and one California Appellate Court appeal briefed and/or argued. He has also represented
clients at a number of National Transportation Safety Board hearings on incidents in Alaska, including the
M/S Nieuw Amsterdam grounding in 1994, the M/V Star Princess grounding in 1995, and the M/V Universe
Explorer case in 1996, which involved fire and five crew fatalities. Mr. Peacock has also conducted a number
of on-board investigations on behalf of his clients. His papers, articles, and speeches include a speech on
vessel interests’ liability and insurance coverage for a hypothetical terrorist attack in the Port of Oakland,
presented to the Pacific Admiralty Seminar, San Francisco, California, in 2004; a speech on OPA ’90 and
state laws on oil pollution presented to the International P&I Club Correspondents’ Conference, Paris, France
in 1999; and a speech on responding to maritime casualties in Alaska presented to the same group in 1996.
Mr. Peacock received a BA in 1980 from the University of Southern California, Magna Cum Laude, and a JD
in 1983 from the University of Southern California Law Center.
Leslie Pearson is the Prevention and Emergency Response Program Manager for the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation. Leslie started her tenure with the department sixteen years ago during the T/V
Exxon Valdez oil spill. She was staff to the State’s Technology Review Council for Oil & Hazardous
substances and has focused specifically on issues associated with oil pollution, preparedness, response,
damage assessment and technology. She has also worked on and managed a myriad of oil spills in Alaska.
Leslie earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Geology from Evergreen State College in Washington, and a
Master of Science in Environmental Science from Alaska Pacific University.
Tim Robertson has worked in oil spill and disaster contingency planning, pollution prevention and emergency
response, commercial fisheries management and regulatory compliance in Alaska since 1976. Mr.
Robertson’s professional experience includes:
o Organizing and leading a group of commercial fishermen responding to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill;
o Evaluating oil spill contingency plans, drills, exercises, and spill responses;
o Developing over 250 Geographic Response Strategies (GRS) throughout the state of Alaska,
o Developing and standardizing oil spill tactics;
o Developing and implementing oil spill response training courses; and
o Training, evaluating and participating on oil spill incident management teams.
Tim Robertson also has considerable spill response experience. He was Director of Seldovia Spill
Operations for VECO in 1989 as part of the Exxon Valdez incident. In 1989, as founding president of the
Seldovia Response Team, he contracted, managed and trained fishing vessel crews for oil spill response.
From 1989 to 2001, he also served as a founding director and Vice-President for Oil Spill Prevention and
Response for the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council. In 1992 he received the Public
Service Award from the US Coast Guard for his role on the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, which
assisted in developing the federal vessel response plan regulations. Mr. Robertson holds a Masters degree
in Fisheries Biology from the University of Alaska. He has also received training in oil spill response and
emergency response planning from NOAA and FEMA. He is a past holder of a US Coast Guard Masters
license and has experience in operating boats in Bristol Bay, Cook Inlet, Kodiak, the outer Kenai coast, and
Prince William Sound.
Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting 35