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					                                     SUMMARY NOTES1
                    Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force
                                    2005 Annual Meeting
                             Anchorage, Alaska; July 27, 2005
              Hosted by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
                 THEME: Pacific Perspectives - Regional Issues of Concern




PARTICIPANTS
Task Force Members or their representatives attending this Annual Meeting included Kurt
Fredriksson, Commissioner, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation; Dale Jensen,
Spills Program Manager for the Washington Department of Ecology; Paul Slyman, Deputy Director
of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality; Laurence Lau, Deputy Director for the
Environmental Health Division of the Hawaii Department of Health; Carlton Moore, Administrator of
the Office of Spill Prevention and Response in the California Department of Fish and Game; and
Charles Porter, Director, Environmental Management Branch, British Columbia Ministry of
Environment.

A total of eighty-seven persons were in attendance, including the Task Force Coordinating
Committee members, 2005 Legacy Award Winners, and invited speakers. Please reference
Attachment A for a complete listing.

PRESENTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
The agenda for the 2004 Annual Meeting is provided in Attachment B. The following summary
notes include links to the PowerPoint presentations where used by speakers. Please reference
Attachment C for bios of all speakers.
KEYNOTE SPEAKER: US COAST GUARD RADM JAMES C. OLSON




1
 NOTE: This is a meeting summary and is not intended as a verbatim record of all presentations or
comments made during the meeting.

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                   1
   Rear Admiral Olson extended Admiral Tom Collins’ regrets that his trip to Alaska had been
    cancelled.
   RADM Olson noted that both the Selendang Ayu and the Athos I oil spill events highlighted the
    need for both commitment and involvement, better use of limited resources, and the need for
    more exercises and collaborative efforts.
   He particularly noted the need for system-wide tracking of vessel movements in the Aleutian
    Islands as demonstrated by the Selendang Ayu incident. Towards that goal, ADM Olson
    acknowledged the VTS system in place for Prince William Sound as well as the information
    available as a result of AIS carriage requirements which went into effect this year. He stated
    that there are 1,371 AIS transponders in place in Prince William Sound alone. However, when
    the Selendang Ayu lost power, it was outside the current AIS footprint. He also acknowledged
    the Alaska Marine Exchange’s vessel tracking program (see page 12 below).
   With regard to non-tank vessel contingency planning requirements, RADM Olson also
    acknowledged that states have taken the lead on that issue. Whereas the Selendang Ayu was
    in innocent passage through Alaskan waters when it lost power, the response systems and
    regimes were in place nevertheless, due to Alaska’s contingency plan requirements. He stated
    that the Selendang Ayu response went as well as possible, considering the remote location and
    the difficult weather conditions. It could take a year before the National Transportation Safety
    Board releases its report on the incident, he commented.
   He also noted that the pre-approval decision for dispersant use during the response illustrated
    a high level of cooperation within the response community in Alaska, and encouraged everyone
    to establish more pre-approval zones.
   RADM Olson addressed a number of values and strategies important to the US Coast Guard,
    including use of ICS and Unified Command, the concept of “Prevention through People,” and
    the use of risk-based decision tools in Port State Control. The US Coast Guard monitors
    60,000 port calls a year, including arrivals of approximately 7,600 foreign-flag vessels.
   He also acknowledged the diminishing balance in the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. In response
    to a question regarding what the states could do, he recommended that we work with our
    District US Coast Guard Offices to communicate the importance of the Fund to Congress.
   RADM Olson further recommended that the Oil Spill Task Force develop guidelines for
    evaluating responses and distributing “lessons learned.”
   RADM Olson’s PowerPoint presentation is available at
    (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/annual_mtg_2005/ppt/james_olson/PS-
    BC_OilSpillTaskForce.ppt (23m)).

JURISDICTIONAL REPORTS
ALASKA: Kurt Fredriksson, Commissioner, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                 2
   Kurt Fredriksson explained that Alaskans haven’t forgotten the lessons they learned during the
    Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, with the result that many of Alaska’s citizens understand oil spill
    issues and demand the best possible spill prevention and response program.
   As a result, TAPS operators in Prince William Sound must use Best Available Technology in
    their prevention and response systems, including a world-class tug escort system and the best
    trained and drilled responders.
   Kurt described the Exxon Valdez natural resource damage assessment process as the world’s
    longest, noting that $775 million of the $1 billion settlement had been earmarked for restoration.
    Besides scientific studies, those funds have also paid for site-specific response equipment
    packages as well as land and habitat purchases.
   There is an ongoing need to review priorities and evaluate operations, plans, and tactics based
    on the studies, especially with regard to applications of alternative response technologies.
   The most important lesson which Alaskans learned from the Exxon Valdez, Kurt stated, is NOT
    TO LET IT HAPPEN AGAIN.

BRITISH COLUMBIA: Charles Porter, Director, Environmental Management Branch, British
Columbia Ministry of Environment




   Charles Porter explained that Chris Trumpy, the Deputy Minister for the Ministry of
    Environment and BC’s Task Force Member, had been appointed following the May elections,


Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                    3
    and regretted that he was unable to attend this meeting. British Columbia supports the Task
    Force, Charles said, and is proud to have been instrumental in its formation in 1989.
   Charles explained that British Columbia has 29,000 kilometers of coastline, with light industry in
    the north of the Province and heavier industry to the south. The majority of the population of
    four million is also in the southern end of this mountainous province. British Columbia’s
    economy is based on logging, fisheries, tourism, coal, and oil and gas resources. Charles
    noted that the Pacific Rim economies are all growing, and that British Columbia will be a part of
    that growth
   Federal agencies take the lead in dealing with the maritime sector in Canada, so the Province
    relies on the Canadian Coast Guard, Transport Canada, the Navy, and Fisheries & Oceans for
    marine spill prevention and response. The Ministry’s role is to monitor federal initiatives and to
    protect its people and its environment; the Ministry has authority for spill response once oil hits
    the shorelines.
   As many as 4,000 incidents are reported in British Columbia each year; 200-300 of those
    involve Ministry Response Officers. Most of these are inland, but can impact the ocean.
    Response for lower-risk spills is shifting to the responsible party and to local government
    responders.
   The Ministry endeavors to ensure that response capabilities in British Columbia are as strong
    as possible. Towards that end, the Environmental Emergency Management program is always
    training and improving its Incident Management and shoreline cleanup assessment teams, and
    building relationships with others in the response community. The Ministry has also conducted
    a coastal analysis which identifies sensitive environmental resources and provides baseline
    data for estimating response and recovery needs.
   Priority concerns for the Ministry of Environment include Places of Refuge, cruise ship impacts,
    Unified Command, and the use of alternative response technologies. Charles noted that cruise
    ships now make 150 calls/year in British Columbia, and that number is expected to increase
    following the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver.

CALIFORNIA: Carlton Moore, Administrator of the Office of Spill Prevention and Response in the
California Department of Fish and Game




   Carl described the Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) as having authority for
    marine oil spills and pipelines that could affect the marine environment. He explained that
    OSPR writes regulations to prevent oil spills; reviews and approves all vessel and facility


Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                    4
    contingency plans; provides State-On-Scene Coordinators and other responders; funds the
    Oiled Wildlife Care Network; and oversees restoration of natural resources damaged by spills.
    Evolving marine and vessel issues -such as invasive species carried in ballast water and LNG
    tankers - have been assigned to OSPR as well.
   OSPR has a staff of 203 persons; as part of the Department of Fish and Game, they rely on
    DFG Wardens to serve as State-on-Scene Coordinators. OSPR has an Enforcement Branch, a
    Marine Safety Branch, Legal and Administrative Branches, a Public Affairs Unit, and a
    Scientific Branch which provides wildlife biologists and research labs. Carl noted that one of
    their wildlife experts had assisted with the Selendang Ayu response. OSPR also has Natural
    Resource Damage Assessment expertise on staff.
   Carl elaborated on the 2004 Spill of National Significance (SONS) exercise which OSPR co-
    sponsored with the US Coast Guard. This was the largest oil spill exercise in US history,
    involving five command posts and 2,300 responders from 141 agencies and organizations. The
    scenario involved the Mexican Navy as participants at command posts in both Ensenada and
    California. The exercise also tested the cross-border movement of response equipment from
    Mexico into the US.
   Carl described the Kinder-Morgan pipeline spill in Suisun Marsh, during which 126,000 gallons
    of #2 diesel were spilled. California has had numerous pipeline breaks over the last few years
    caused by soil erosion, train derailments onto pipelines, third party damage, and an overall lack
    of maintenance. Kinder-Morgan alone has had six spills in the last fourteen months, with three
    related fatalities. One involved the release of 140,000 gallons of Jet A fuel into groundwater.
   Carl listed multiple agencies which have regulatory authority over pipelines in California
    (OSPR, the State Fire Marshall, the State Lands Commissions, and the Division of Oil, Gas,
    and Geothermal Resource ), but noted that only OSPR is mandated to respond and clean up
    pipeline spills.
   Another potential source of oil spills in California is sunken vessels. Carl reported that NOAA
    has developed a national database of sunken vessels which indicates that there are 1200
    sunken vessels in California, 18-20% of which still have oil on board.
   OSPR is working with EPA to develop a Memorandum of Agreement in order to improve
    coordination at spill response events. OSPR also sponsored an On-Scene Coordinator
    workshop in May which included state, EPA, USCG, and Navy personnel; they plan to make
    this an annual event.
   Carl closed by noting that the US Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund does not cover releases from
    natural seeps, and California had a major natural release this past winter that resulted in oiling
    of a large number of grebes; $1.8 million had to be used from the State fund for the response.
   Carlton Moore’s PowerPoint presentation is available at
    (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/annual_mtg_2005/ppt/carl_moore/presentation.ppt
    (13m)).

HAWAII: Laurence Lau, Deputy Director for the Environmental Health Division of the Hawaii
Department of Health




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                    5
   Larry Lau explained that the Hazard Evaluation & Emergency Response (HEER) Office
    implements Hawaii’s Superfund Law, which includes oil. The HEER office responds whenever
    a release of oil or other hazardous substance threatens human health and environment.
   Larry noted that Hawaii’s economy depends on protecting its environment; he also
    acknowledged the state’s reliance on shipping for the import and export of goods. At the same
    time, Hawaii’s isolated location has fostered an attitude of self-sufficiency.
   Larry explained that Hawaii’s oil spill incidents mirror those of the other Task Force
    jurisdictions, but are fewer in number. Recent incidents included pipeline releases, oil recovery
    in Honolulu Harbor, cleanup of the “Hilo Burrito” site, the groundings of the M/V Cape Flattery
    and the M/V Casitas, and barge releases.
   Although there are less than 400 miles of pipelines in the state, there were two pipeline
    releases totaling approximately 60 barrels of black oil in 2004–2005. One was the Hilo pipeline
    release and the other occurred at the Tesoro refinery on Oahu; the latter was caused by
    corrosion.
   He noted that tankers bring oil to refineries on Oahu and seven tank barges deliver product to
    the other islands. Deliveries to the other islands must continue, since each island has a
    capacity of only seven to ten days of reserve fuel. With that in mind, there are 45 - 50 fuel
    loadings/month from the Kalaeloa Harbor.
   One recent vessel grounding involved the M/V Cape Flattery, a cement ship which grounded
    on a reef outside of Honolulu in February; 128,000 gallons of fuel was safely removed, but the
    vessel did damage the reef. There have been a number of other groundings in the islands,
    especially those involving fishing vessels. How to avoid such groundings, which are primarily
    caused by human error, is an ongoing challenge.
   Larry also showed photos of the July 2, 2005 grounding of the M/V Casitas on Pearl and
    Hermes Atoll, which is part of the Hawaiian Islands National Wildlife Refuge.
   Cleanup of abandoned fuel lines in Honolulu Harbor is a long-term project, he noted, requiring
    ongoing negotiation with EPA. The total area affected covers 300 acres and approximately 20
    miles of abandoned fuel lines. To date 17,349 gallons of residual oil has been recovered from
    both abandoned pipelines and groundwater.
   Cleanup of the “Hilo Burrito” involves removal of contaminated soils.
   Hawaii maintains an agreement with the US Coast Guard and the Clean Islands Council for
    access to an Airborne Dispersant Delivery System (ADDs) pack mounted on either a C-130 or
    a helicopter. The ADDS pack system is exercised twice/year.
   In addition to concern about pipeline releases and vessel groundings, cruise ship arrivals also
    present security and pollution concerns, as well as the threat of food-borne disease outbreaks
    and additional demands for energy use.

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                   6
   Mr. Lau explained that 31 cruise ships made 182 port calls in Hawaii in 2004; 25 cruise ships
    were projected to make 186 calls in 2005. Two Norwegian Cruise Line ships plan to make
    Honolulu their homeport.
   The State had implemented a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the NW Cruise
    Association which provided for oil spill contingency plans for cruise ships, as well as bans on
    discharges beyond the state’s 3-mile jurisdiction. Mr. Lau reported that the Hawaii Legislature
    had just passed HB 422, which establishes standards for the discharge of treated sewage and
    air emissions from cruise ships and commercial passenger vessels into the marine waters of
    the State, and prohibits the discharge of untreated sewage. Larry noted, however, that HB 422
    does NOT require oil spill contingency plans, as did the MOA, and he fears that the cruise
    operators will abandon the voluntary MOA now that new laws are in place.
   Larry Lau’s PowerPoint presentation is available at
    (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/annual_mtg_2005/ppt/laurence_lau/presentation.ppt
    (52m)).

OREGON: Paul Slyman, Deputy Director of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality




   By way of background, Paul Slyman explained that Oregon has no refineries and no offshore
    platforms; all petroleum products enter the state either by pipeline, tank vessel, or tank truck.
    The Emergency Response and Site Assessment Section program at DEQ is only 10 out of 800
    FTE agency-wide.
   The program’s funding is limited by a constitutional restriction requiring that all gas taxes go to
    roads. He did explain that vessel fees support that part of the program which regulates vessels,
    and that Oregon has required contingency plans for non-tank vessels since 1990. The rest of
    the program’s funding comes from the state’s General Fund, and has been reduced over the
    years as state budgets have been reduced. Paul commented that there is a general
    unwillingness to invest in spill prevention measures, such as a rescue tug stationed off Coos
    Bay.
   The Emergency Response Section receives more than 2000 spill notifications a year; these are
    handled by three State-on-Scene Coordinators supported by planning and preparedness staff
    at headquarters. The section also oversees remediation of more than 500 contaminated sites.
    Paul also noted that ODEQ works well with EPA, since most of their spills are inland.
   Paul described a recent response which presented particularly challenging aspects. A fire at an
    oil recycling facility in the Portland urban area resulted in a release to a nearby creek which had
    recently been restored and was highly valued by the community. In addition to the oil spill,
    asbestos-laden debris was deposited by air into the neighborhood; this hazardous material

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                    7
    release meant that EPA could not access response funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund,
    yet CERCLA does not cover oil spill response. The State and the RP funded response
    contractors, but this complicated cost recovery is an issue which needs resolution, Paul said.
   Paul also explained that the Emergency Response Section has become more involved in all
    hazardous response, and that ODEQ’s lab is the primary first response lab for the state. ODEQ
    will continue to be involved in security and terrorism response issues, since no other state
    agency has a mandate to do so.

WASHINGTON: Dale Jensen, Spills Program Manager for the Washington Department of Ecology




   Dale Jensen noted that Washington Governor Christine Gregoire had been one of the founders
    of the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force and is very supportive of its work. He also reported
    that she has appointed Jay Manning as Director of the Washington Department of Ecology,
    who extends his regrets that he was unable to include this meeting in his schedule this year.
   Dale reported that the Ecology Spills Program has followed up on “Lessons Learned” from
    recent spills, debriefing with the US Coast Guard and OSROs; they also contracted for an
    analysis of the response to the Dalco Passage spill. He noted that all Spill Program staff had
    received response training prior to that event, and this proved to be very important, since the
    Dalco Passage spill was initially an “orphan” spill.
   Outcomes of the Dalco Passage spill include the creation by the Legislature of an Oil Spill
    Advisory Council as well as ongoing efforts by Ecology to upgrade mutual aid, GRPs, and
    OSRO agreements.
   Dale also reported that the Spills Program was revising their regulations on oil transfers for
    facilities, vessels, and trucks, as directed by the 2004 Washington Legislature. Final regulations
    are expected by June of 2006.
   Looking ahead, Dale noted priorities such as improving rapid response, outreach to media and
    the Legislature, coordination with the Oil Spill Advisory Council, ongoing emphasis on
    unannounced drills, and oil transfer regulations, with spill prevention continuing to be their
    highest priority.



UPDATE ON TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS, Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator
 Jean Cameron reported on 2004-2005 activities as reported in the 2005 Annual Report, as
  follows:
       o Under the Task Force’s Spill Prevention Objective, work continued in support of the
          Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET), monitoring TAPS tankers, and

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                   8
           tracking Prevention Topics of Concern. Best Industry Spill Prevention Practices were
           referred to Pacific Area Harbor Safety Committees with a recommendation that they be
           adopted as Standards of Care. A table showing the member agencies’ oil transfer
           regulations was developed and posted, and data on oil spills in Alaska, Washington,
           Oregon, California, and British Columbia was compiled for the third year. That 2004
           data is available in the 2005 Annual Report
           (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/OSTF_2005.pdf (827kb)); in her summary, Jean
           noted that only 2,092 gallons of crude were spilled in 2004, compared with 675,175
           gallons of non-crude product. Overall, 2004 saw an increase of 423,661 gallons spilled
           compared with 2003. Jean also noted that all member agencies had participated in an
           incident investigation course sponsored by the California Office of Spill Prevention and
           Response.
       o   Under the Task Force’s Spill Preparedness/Response Objective, work continued in
           support of the Integrated Vessel Response Plan Guidelines, maintaining the 1-800-
           OILS-911 spill reporting number, and tracking Preparedness/Response Topics of
           Concern. The Task Force’s major initiative under this Objective in 2004 was the
           development of an Area Contingency Plan annex to guide planning and decision-
           making for Places of Refuge
           (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/PlacesRefugeProject.pdf (224kb)).
           The Task Force also sponsored a Roundtable on oil spills from trucks and posted a
           summary on its website
           (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/TruckingSpillsRtSummaryNotes.pd
           f (10M)), with recommendations for further steps to prevent such spills. Jean also noted
           ongoing efforts by the Task Force to track and provide input to US Coast Guard efforts
           to develop regulations for non-tank vessel contingency plans and to restore funding to
           the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
       o   Under the Task Force’s Communications Objective, Jean noted various Task Force
           forums for stakeholder involvement, including project workgroups, roundtables, annual
           meetings, the website, and the Legacy Awards. She also reported that the Coordinating
           Committee meets annually with both US and Canadian officials. In addition, the Task
           Force tracks and comments on federal regulatory initiatives.
       o   Jean also briefed the Annual Meeting attendees on new Task Force initiatives outlined
           in the 2005-2006 Annual Work Plan (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/2005-
           2006_AWP.doc (289kb)), including a multi-year review of regulations and voluntary
           initiatives designed to prevent spill from pipelines and a Roundtable to explore
           “Expanding Response Options.” She noted that the Task Force Members were also
           interested in evaluating ways to broaden outreach to other provinces and states.




ALASKA INITIATIVES AS WEST COAST MODELS; Kurt Fredriksson, Moderator
Aquatic Nuisance Species in Ballast Water – Regional Issues & Activities; Marilyn Leland, Deputy
Director and Lisa Ka’aihue, Project Manager, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory
Council




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                  9
   Marilyn Leland explained that the Prince William Sound RCAC, which was created by OPA 90,
    “will exist as long as oil flows through the pipeline.” Among its accomplishments - done in
    partnership with agencies, industry, and local communities - are the Disabled Tanker Towing
    Study, installation of Ice Detection Radar, and the Prince William Sound Tanker Risk
    Assessment.
   Because the tankers loading oil in Valdez are exempt from ballast water regulations which
    apply to other vessels, the RCAC is working to prevent the possible introduction of invasive
    species in Prince William Sound by these vessels.
   Lisa Ka’aihue noted that just one gallon of sea water can hold 3,842 million organisms, not
    including pathogens. Citizens of Prince William Sound are most concerned about the possible
    introduction of the European Green Crab, a very aggressive species which has spread up the
    West Coast and could survive in the temperatures and salinity of Prince William Sound.
   The Smithsonian, which is conducting a nationwide analysis of coastal invasions, is
    collaborating with the PWS RCAC to monitor the possible introduction of invasive species in
    Prince William Sound. The Smithsonian conducts field surveys nationwide and maintains an
    online database of all reported Non-Indigenous Species (NIS) which allows them to track new
    invasions and spread patterns. This information is used to guide and evaluate management
    strategies.
   The Smithsonian’s 2000 Final Project Report indicated that 24 non-indigenous species have
    been introduced in Alaska; 15 species were recorded in Prince William Sound and 13 species
    were recorded in Kachemak Bay and Cook Inlet.
   The PWS RCAC also conducts ballast water exchange experiments and green crab lab
    studies, and is considering research on NIS carried on ships’ hulls. Looking ahead, Marilyn and
    Lisa anticipate more emphasis on technologies for treating ballast water in addition on ongoing
    monitoring for green crabs.
   Besides hosting the NIS Working Group in Alaska, the PWS RCAC coordinates with the
    Western Regional Panel of the Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force and also sits on the
    Invasive Species Advisory Committee. Please reference the last slide in their PowerPoint for
    websites with more information on invasive species and programs.
    (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/annual_mtg_2005/ppt/lisa_kaaihue/presentation.ppt (6M))

Alaska Spill Response Permits Project; Michael L. Munger, Executive Director, Cook Inlet RCAC,
and John Kwietniak, Tesoro Alaska Company




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                10
   Mike Munger explained that a drill with Tesoro had identified the problem that securing the
    many federal, state, and locally-required permits can create a bottleneck during an emergency
    response.
   With that in mind, CIRCAC, the PWS RCAC, ADEC, CISPRI, and Tesoro Alaska worked
    together to facilitate the process of identifying, filling out, and filing the forms and permits
    required to carry out an effective spill response.
   John Kwietniak noted that 120 different permits were identified by this project; many were
    outdated or redundant, or multiple versions existed of the same form. The Permits Project
    group was able to reduce the final number to less than 40.
   The Project also standardized the terminology used in various permits and aligned it to ICS
    functions.
   The goal is to put the permits on the internet (www.nukaresearch.com/permits). A user can
    select a permit form either by agency or by activity and, once it’s approved by Unified
    Command, submit the finished application by email. Information entered on one form can be
    transferred to others via standardized categories.
   John Kwietniak also described the Geographic Response Information Network, or GRIN,
    another collaborative project of CIRCAC and Tesoro Alaska.
   GRIN provides reference information about resources, capabilities, and infrastructures in
    coastal Alaskan communities. The information in the GRIN is intended for use by oil spill
    response personnel during an incident response or training exercise.
   The GRIN datasets cover “General,” Liaison, Public Information, Logistics, and Safety
    categories.
   “General” data covers location-specific information such as contacts, population, the economy,
    subsistence activities, and transportation resources.
   “Liaison” data provides 24/7 contact information for government agencies, stakeholders, and
    native/tribal organizations.
   “Public Information” covers media contacts and briefing facilities in the area.
   “Logistics” data includes information on port facilities, aircraft, heavy equipment, vessels, fuel
    and utilities, transportation and storage, and food and supplies.
   “Safety” information covers emergency, medical, and public safety resources.
   GRIN databases are also available on the web at www.nukaresearch.com/grin.

Alaska’s Tactics Manual; Tim Robertson, NUKA Research & Planning Group



Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                    11
   Tim Robertson explained that the Spill Tactics for Alaska Responders (STAR) Manual was a
    “brainchild” of Larry Dietrick at the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC).
    The project has been managed by Craig Wilson and Larry Iwamoto.
    The purpose of the STAR project is to produce a standardized oil spill response tactics manual
    specific to Alaska; to provide a tactical reference for oil spill planning and response activities;
    and to bridge the gap between contingency planning and response by providing tactics and
    terminology that can be easily transferred from a contingency plan to an Incident Action Plan. It
    provides non-prescriptive guidance for meeting State planning standards; contingency plan
    holders are free to develop and use other tactics.
   The Manual focuses on tactics for the Emergency Phase of a response, not the cleanup phase.
    It is also flexible; responders are expected to adjust or modify tactics to fit actual field
    conditions.
   The first phase of the project involved a review of 35 existing tactics manuals and an
    assessment of copyright issues. A final report from this phase led to the formation of a work
    group in October 2004. Besides ADEC, project participants included Alaska response
    organizations, Alyeska, major oil companies operating in Alaska, and US federal agencies.
   They agreed on the scope, format, and content of the STAR manual and developed a first draft
    including sixteen tactics. Phase III began in July 2005 and will focus on finalizing the planning
    version as well as developing and finalizing a field version.
   Tim noted that the manual would be designed for expandability, since the Work Group plans for
    periodic updates and will embrace innovation.
   Tim reviewed the format and content of the STAR manual, which will include recommended
    classifications for personnel, vessels, and operating environments; these classifications support
    the manual. The front section also provides a variety of checklists and a cross-reference table
    that facilitates which tactics work in which environment.
   The Tactics section includes the categories of Safety, Oil Spill Surveillance and Tracking,
    Mechanical Response, Non-Mechanical Response, and Logistics. Symbols for various
    operating environments and tactic categories, combined with tactic icons, should facilitate the
    manual’s use.
   The remaining timeline for the projects is as follows:
                   October 2005 - Draft Planning Manual
                   January 2006 - Final Planning Manual
                   March 2006 - Final Field Manual
•   A possible future addition is a companion training module. Drafts are available on the ADEC
    website: http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                   12
•   Mr. Robertson’s PowerPoint is available at
    (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/annual_mtg_2005/ppt/tim_robertson.TacticsManual.ppt
    (3M)).

Alaska’s Vessel Tracking Program; CAPT Ed Page, Executive Director, the Marine Exchange of
Alaska




•   Ed Page explained that the Marine Exchange of Alaska is a” non-profit maritime organization
    established to provide the Alaska maritime community information, communications and
    services to ensure safe, secure, efficient and environmentally responsible maritime operations.”
    Its customers and clients include all vessels operating in Alaska waters, as well as the US
    Coast Guard and other agencies.
•   The AK Marine Exchange participates in MISNA, the Maritime Information Services of North
    America; this provides it with access to information shared among other marine exchanges on
    the West Coast and nationwide.
•   In addition to its vessel tracking program, the Marine Exchange of Alaska offers charts and
    publications, assistance with regulatory compliance, a maritime database, and maritime
    advocacy. Attendees were encouraged to visit the Marine Exchange website at www.mxak.org.
•   Noting that the concept of “Maritime Domain Awareness” has been endorsed by the President,
    Congress, the US Coast Guard, and IMO, CAPT Page also noted the need to “Just Do it” and
    that “All good ideas come from Alaska.”
•   In other words, the Automated Secure Vessel Tracking System (ASVTS) is a Vessel Tracking
    System developed by the Marine Exchange of Alaska that utilizes satellite communications,
    marine exchange information, and AIS to track the locations of vessels; i.e., it “just does it.”
•   Participation by the marine industry is voluntary, although USCG District 17 has adopted its use
    as a “Standard of Care” and USCG Captains of the Port have access to the ASVTS
    information. Shipping companies like the information, since their Security Officers can track a
    company’s vessels and identify anomalies.
•   It is conceivable that a loss of power can be identified and intercepted before a grounding
    occurs, or a collision could be avoided. If a casualty or an oil spill has occurred, the ASVTS
    can identify response and rescue vessels in the vicinity.
•   The system has the capability to determine a vessel’s global track history. The average
    tracking cost is $3.00 - $5.00 day based on tracking interval and equipment used.
•   Reviewing the pros/cons of AIS, CAPT Page noted that it provides a position report every 6
    minutes, it shares information with other vessels, and there are no communication costs to the
    vessel. However, it requires an expensive shore-based infrastructure as well as additional
    equipment on vessels, and has a limited range (line of sight) due to VHF frequency limitations.

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                13
•   ASVTS, on the other hand, is available today. As a voluntary, incentive-based solution, it’s the
    most expedient way of bringing a maritime domain awareness capability on-line. In addition, it’s
    inexpensive, and it aids safety, security, efficiency and environmental protection.
•   Its environmental applications are numerous, CAPT Page noted. These include its ability to aid
    Emergency Response by locating assist vessels to prevent groundings and oil spills, to monitor
    and direct spill response assets to enhance effectiveness of response, to monitor compliance
    with ATBAS (Areas to Be Avoided), to aid Spill Investigations, and as a risk analysis tool.
•   CAPT Page’s PowerPoint is available at
    (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/annual_mtg_2005/ppt/ed_page/bc_states_taskforce.ppt
    (20M)).

A buffet luncheon for all participants was co-hosted by Tesoro Alaska and the Pacific States/BC Oil
Spill Task Force. The 2005 Legacy Awards were given during the luncheon.


2005 LEGACY AWARD PRESENTATIONS
The Task Force gives Legacy Awards to recognize the work of organizations and individuals in
both the public and private sectors who have done outstanding work to prevent, prepare for, or
respond to oil spills in our region. The 2005 Legacy Award winners are clearly deserving of
recognition for their investments in spill prevention, preparedness, and response, as well as their
commitment and innovation. The 2005 Legacy Award winners are:
        Crowley Marine Transport Corporation
        BP Shipping, Inc.
        US Coast Guard Commander (Retired) William Whitson
        US Coast Guard District 11
        Cholly Mercer, President, Rainier Petroleum Corporation




Legacy Awards Ceremony, Anchorage, Alaska, July 27, 2005. From left to right: Simon Lisiecki, Director for
   Government and Industry, BP Shipping, Inc.; Thomas Crowley, President and CEO, Crowley Marine
  Transport Corporation; CAPT Jerry Swanson, Chief of Marine Safety, US Coast Guard District 11; and



Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                       14
Cholly Mercer, President, Rainier Petroleum Corporation. US Coast Guard Commander William Whitson was
                                             unable to attend.

PLEASE NOTE: More photos and information about the 2005 Legacy Award winners is available
on the Task Force website (http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/awards_2005.htm ).




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                 15
NON-TANK VESSEL RESPONSE ISSUES, PART I; Paul Slyman, Moderator
The M/V Selendang Ayu Case Study; Gary Folley, Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC) State On-Scene Coordinator




•   At 4:00 a.m. on December 7, the Coast Guard was notified that the M/V Selendang Ayu had
    lost engine power and was drifting towards Unalaska Island. The vessel was located about 35
    nautical miles northwest of Unalaska Island at the time. Weather was severe. The US Coast
    Guard (USCG) Cutter Alex Haley was diverted from Bering Sea patrol to assist and the tug
    Sydney Foss was dispatched from Dutch Harbor. Two Jayhawk helicopters were deployed
    from the USCG Air Station Kodiak.
•   At 7:00 a.m. on December 8 the tug Sydney Foss reported breaking a tow cable in an attempt
    to tow the freighter. At 3:25 that afternoon the M/V Selendang Ayu had drifted into shallow
    water off Skan Bay and had dropped anchor, which appeared to be holding; less than two
    hours later the anchor failed and the Coast Guard began evacuation of the crew.




•   At 6:23 p.m. a Coast Guard rescue helicopter crashed during the rescue attempt with ten
    persons aboard. Four were rescued by a second helicopter and six persons were lost at sea.
    At 7:14 p.m. the M/V Selendang Ayu broke in two, pounded by heavy seas.




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                16
•   Even though the Selendang Ayu was on innocent passage through state waters and not
    required to have a contingency plan, the ramp-up in this response was just as it would have
    been if a contingency plan were in place, noted Mr. Folley. An all-out cooperative effort
    involved State, Federal, and local governments, Gallagher Marine Services, Pacific Rim
    Logistics, Alaska Chadux, and scientists and salvage experts from all over the world, “people
    who literally wrote the book in their fields” Mr. Folley stated. He served in the unified command
    with US Coast Guard Captain Ron Morris, the FOSC, and Howard Hile, the Incident
    Commander.
•   Mr. Folley noted that he would focus on three critical aspects of the response: lightering, the
    measures that were taken to protect the fisheries, and the fate of the 60,000 tons of soybeans
    which was the cargo of the M/V Selendang Ayu.
•   A Salvage team representing six salvage companies boarded the stern section on December
    12th and the bow on December 14th; the bow section was partially afloat and swinging with the
    current. The forward ballast tanks and the #1 cargo hold were flooded, effectively dashing any
    hope of towing the bow section to safe refuge. The #1 centerline fuel oil tank located beneath
    the number 2 and 3 cargo holds in the bow section was breached and open to the sea. How
    badly the tank was damaged and how much of the 176,000 gallons of fuel oil the tank was
    originally holding was still in the tank could not be determined. However, the salvage team
    considered it to be not accessible under the existing conditions.
•   The stern section was firmly on the bottom. The #3 centerline tank in the stern section,
    containing 104,000 gallons fuel oil, was also believed to be breached. Accessing any fuel
    remaining in this damaged tank, although extremely difficult, was still considered a possibility
    by the salvors. The engine room was flooded. The #4 port fuel oil tank was intact and there was
    optimism that the #4 starboard tank was also OK, along with the MDO tanks and assorted
    service and settling tanks, all located in the stern section.
•   The M/V Selendang Ayu carried 446,280 gallons IFO & 31,573 gallons of marine diesel oil.
    Freighters are difficult to lighter, since access to the fuel tanks is through the cargo holds,
    which were full of soybeans in this case. Some of the fuel tanks were considered inaccessible,
    although it was determined that others could be lightered.
•   A heavy-lift helicopter lightering option was chosen by Unified Command, even though it was
    the most expensive option, because it was the safest method considering the full exposure of
    the wreck to winter gales. Positioning a lightering vessel alongside the wreck posed a real
    danger of producing two wrecks instead of one. With this method, lightering could take place as
    long as the helicopter could fly, independent of sea states. The contract was awarded to SMIT
    Americas on December 15. Fuel was loaded into 2000 gallon metal cubes weighing 20,000 lb.
    each, which were flown to Dutch Harbor by helicopters.

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                 17
•   The fuel was lightered off the Selendang Ayu using a Vogelsang pump with “Hot Tap”
    capabilities which had been flown in from South Africa. Of the total IFO & MDO on board,
    146,774 gallons were lightered and 335,732 gallons were released to the environment. An
    estimated 140 gallons remained on board because it could not be removed. Mr. Folley noted
    that adverse weather required operation stand down approximately 50% of the time, and that
    “people worked hard under difficult conditions to get every bit of accessible oil off the vessel.”
    The entire lightering operation was completed February 11, 2005.
•   Very little “skimmable” oil was encountered offshore; either the oil was quickly blown ashore
    during storms or the viscous oil was rapidly broken into tar balls and patties by the high energy
    seas.
•   The Alaska RRT had approved use of dispersants, and they were pre-staged, although never
    used.
•   There was a significant potential that the spilled oil would impact high-value crab fisheries in
    the area, including the Tanner Crab and Snow Crab. Both crab seasons were scheduled to
    open January 15th. Some of the Tanner Crab areas were closed, while others were allowed to
    stay open.
•   The Snow Crab vessels deliver their catch to processors in Dutch Harbor and Akutan, and
    have live holds in which fresh seawater is constantly pumped over the catch to keep it fresh.
    Any oil encountered while the vessel is in transit threatens the entire catch. Based on
    information provided by local knowledge at public meetings, Unified Command realized that
    tarballs could be carried across the Snow Crab fishing vessel transit routes.
•   There were also concerns about impacts on the Pollock fisheries, worth $1 billion, and the
    largest in the US. These vessels use refrigerated sea water to cool their holding tanks, so there
    was a potential exposure there as well. Fortunately, they had a successful season and the
    market pricing was not affected.
•   “So we knew we had to do something quickly,” said Mr. Folley. “We needed to track the oil so
    that we could take steps to alert fishermen and minimize oil encounters. We also needed to
    know if the oil was on the sea bottom. But the oil could not be tracked by traditional methods
    since it existed as tarballs, not as sheens and slicks visible from overflights. What we came up
    with was a combination of traditional methods such as whole water sampling for dissolved
    hydrocarbons and an array of new practical techniques devised by the good folks at Nuka
    Research. With support of the DEC crisis management team, we were able to create this
    program and present it to the public within a 24 hour period.”
•   To check for benthic contamination, crab pots filled with oil snare were set in the spill impact
    area, while crab was caught by the traditional pot method to check for contamination. To survey


Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                  18
    for tarballs, Unified Command contracted fishing boats to tow fine mesh plankton nets at
    surface and keel levels. Inspectors also placed oil traps in the vessels’ seawater pumping
    system. They did the same thing at the seawater intakes at the fish processing plants in
    Unalaska Bay and on mobile fish processors operating near Unalaska. The results of these
    surveys were presented to the public on a daily basis.
•   The Selendang Ayu carried 132 million pounds of dried #2 yellow soybeans, intended for
    human consumption, so no pesticides or preservatives were applied in the ship’s hold. Release
    of this cargo raised a number of concerns: Would island ecology be altered? Would the birds
    and resident cattle eat the beans with ill affect? Would decaying beans deplete oxygen and
    otherwise wreak havoc in benthic habitats near the wreck? It was determined that some could
    sprout, but there was zero chance of viability in that climate. Most beans would sink in
    seawater, although a small percentage could float. SCAT assessment teams continue to
    assess the amount and condition of the soybeans on the shoreline, and if the rate of
    decomposition is unacceptable to the state, ADEC would require removal.




                                 Soybeans on the beach of Skan Bay

•   In closing, Mr. Folley showed a video taped by a diver inspecting the sea bottom in the wreck
    area; many soybeans were found, but no oil. Mr. Folley’s PowerPoint presentation is available
    at (insert link).

USCG Contingency Plans for Non-Tank Vessels; Captain Steven Hanewich, Chief of the US Coast
Guard Office of Response




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                               19
•   CAPT Hanewich explained that the Coast Guard and Marine Transportation Act of 2004
    amends section 311(a) and (j) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to require the
    preparation and submissions of response plans by all non-tank vessels over 400 gross tons as
    defined in 33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(9) [International Tonnage]. Non-tank vessels are comprised of
    any vessel carrying oil of any kind as fuel for main propulsion. He also explained that US
    navigable waters for the purpose of this law are those out to 3 nautical miles.
•   He noted that response plans are to be submitted to the Coast Guard by August 9, 2005 (12-
    months from enactment). CAPT Hanewich stated that the Non-tank Vessel requirements are
    expected to mirror those found for Tank Vessel Response Plans in 33 CFR 155. Some of the
    expected requirements include notification procedures, shipboard spill mitigation, shore-based
    response activities, training, and exercising.
•   The scope of requirements in the Non-tank Vessel Response Plans (NTVRPs) is considerably
    broader than those for Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plans, he explained. NTVRPs also
    require identification and designation of Qualified Individuals, Spill Management Teams, and
    OSROs for response to various response scenarios. In addition, all vessels must have pre-
    identified salvage capability since prevention and mitigation to rescue a stricken vessel before
    a spill occurs are of paramount importance. Moreover, non-tank vessel response plan
    requirements will help distribute the cost of OSROs and enhance national salvage and marine
    firefighting capability, he stated.
•   As spelled out in the Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) published earlier this
    year, the USCG anticipates that the regulations will utilize a Tiered Approach based on vessel
    fuel capacities, since the mitigation and response capabilities vary with the threat posed by the
    quantity of fuel carried. Vessels 2,500 bbls and under must have pre-identified assets capable
    of responding to Average Most Probable and Maximum Most Probable Discharge scenarios.
    Only the vessels carrying more than 2,500 bbls will have to ensure resource availability through
    contracts or other approved means. This group of vessels will also need to plan for the Worst
    Case Discharge scenario.
•   The 2004 Act requires that the response plans be prepared and submitted by August 9, 2005
    (i.e., one year after the enactment of the 2004 Act). In addition, the Act requires the President
    (Coast Guard) to issue regulations requiring the submission of plans. Because of the length of
    time needed to provide the necessary opportunity for, and consideration of, public comments,
    final regulations will not be in effect on that date, although CAPT Hanewich stated that
    development of these regulations and those for vessel salvage are among the Coast Guard’s
    highest priorities.
•   He acknowledged that this raises the question of whether the Coast Guard intends to enforce
    the Act - specifically the non-tank vessel response plan submission requirement - if it does not

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                 20
    have regulations in place on August 9, 2005, he noted. The Coast Guard will not initiate
    Penalty Action for failure to comply with Non-tank Vessel requirements until such time as
    regulations are issued and in effect. He strongly encouraged industry to follow the NVIC
    guidelines in the interim. He also noted that over 700 plans had been received, out of an
    estimated 5,000 non-tank vessels which would be required to submit plans.
•   On February 4, 2005, the USCG published Navigation and Vessel Information Circular 01-05
    (NVIC 01-05) entitled “Interim Guidance for the Development and Review of Response Plans
    for Non-tank Vessels.” The NVIC describes a voluntary process for submitting response plans
    and for obtaining interim authorization letters from the Coast Guard.
•   Although the USCG will not know precisely which vessels must comply with the response plan
    requirements until rulemaking is complete, vessels not measured under the Convention
    measurement system, whether they are 400 gross register tons under the regulatory
    measurement system or not, may ultimately be covered under the regulations. Therefore,
    CAPT Hanewich advised, vessel owners and operators who want to secure interim
    authorization letters because they believe their vessels may be covered by the response plan
    regulations are highly encouraged to use the voluntary interim authorization process under
    NVIC 01-05. Submission of a response plan based on the NVIC guidance will be accepted by
    the Coast Guard for the initial vessel response plan submission and vessel’s will be issued a 2-
    year interim operating authorization.
•   CAPT Hanewich further noted that the law contains a mandate that the USCG consider existing
    state regulations in crafting the federal rule. The mandate to consider state statutes requires
    the USCG to be aware of state laws and to the extent practicable ensure that their regulations
    do not set up conflict or contradiction between our laws and the state laws.
•   He noted that the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force had developed Integrated
    Vessel Response Plan (IVRP) Guidelines for tank vessels; this format is provided as a
    voluntary option for complying with both Federal and state oil spill contingency plan
    requirements. The matrix provides a cross-reference table that can be used in submitting an
    integrated vessel response plan. The Coast Guard anticipates amending the existing regulation
    found in Title 33 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 155, Subpart D, to add non-tank vessels to
    the requirements for vessels carrying oil as a primary cargo. Submission of a vessel response
    plan based on the IVRP guidance will be accepted by the Coast Guard for the initial vessel
    response plan submission.
•   CAPT Hanewich’s PowerPoint presentation is available at (insert link).

The Value of Incident Management Teams for Non-tank Vessel Response; Leslie Pearson, DEC
Prevention & Emergency Response Program Manager




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                21
•   Ms. Pearson noted that all of the West Coast states and British Columbia have some type of
    non-tank vessel oil spill preparedness and response rules in effect. Alaska has what is referred
    to as a “Streamline” process administered by DEC’s Industry Preparedness Program, Marine
    Vessel Section.
•   A series of significant oil spills in the late 1990’s and the year of 2000 identified the need to
    extend Alaska’s oil spill prevention and response laws. After two years of deliberation with a
    23-member Task Force, the 2001-2002 Legislature unanimously agreed on the appropriate
    level of prevention and preparedness to impose on all self-propelled non-tank vessels (NTV)
    over 400 gross tons that operate in Alaskan waters.. Contingency plans became a
    requirement; a specific component of the law requires the contingency plan applicant to register
    that they’ve contracted with an oil spill primary response action contractor and an incident
    management team (IMT) company.
•   The need to have a pre-identified Incident Management Team (IMT) was based on “lessons-
    learned” from oil spills involving cruise ships, freighters and the railroad. Pre-negotiated private
    service contracts between the plan holder and IMT companies are necessary to insure prompt
    mobilization of resources to a spill, since time is always of the essence during an emergency
    response.
•   Under Alaska law, the classification and size of the team is based on the maximum vessel fuel
    capacity or fuel volume to be carried. There are two classifications:
    1. Classification A: up to and including 30,000 barrels of fuel; 12 identified individuals and 10
         additional responders.
    2. Classification B: carrying greater than 30,000 barrels of fuel; 12 identified individuals and 15
         additional responders.
   IMT’s can register for specific regions of the state - the state is broken out into ten regions -
    they can apply for statewide status.
   A list of identified IMT personnel and available responders, by region and physical location,
    plus supporting information that demonstrates that the applicant meets or exceeds the
    requirement is submitted to the department for review. IMT personnel are identified by name
    and position, and must include the incident commander, deputy incident commander, planning
    section chief, operations section chief, logistics section chief, finance section chief and
    alternates for each position.
   The timeframe to mobilize personnel is a critical element of Alaska regulations, Ms. Pearson
    noted. After initial notification of a spill the incident commander and alternate must be available
    within two hours to establish, direct, and manage the organization. They must be capable of
    arriving “in region” within six hours after initial notification to continue to direct and manage the
    response. The deputy incident commander and alternate must be “in region” within six hours
    after the incident commander. The section chiefs and alternates must be “in region” within 12
    hours and, within 24 hours additional responders arrive and are assigned to positions within the
    management system.
   Essentially, she stated, the regulations establish an effort to cascade IMT personnel into the
    region to manage an oil spill. There’s no deterrent for compressing the timeframe. There are
    currently four state-approved IMT companies: The O’Brien Group, Alaska Steamship
    Response, Meredith Management Group and Corbett & Holt/Gallagher Marine Systems. Three
    of the companies are registered statewide. IMT companies must complete and submit an
    application form and registration fee of $500.00 to the Department for review and approval.
   Since the regulations have been in effect approximately 10 exercises have been conducted by
    DEC in order to assure that the IMTs can meet state requirements. The exercises have been
    designed to demonstrate whether the approved IMTs can bring the identified team members
    into a region of operation within the stipulated timeframe. Initially, several of the IMTs failed
    because there were insufficient identified personnel in Alaska, and the logistics for moving


Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                     22
    people from the lower 48 to Alaska was expensive and complex. Following each exercise the
    IMT companies addressed shortfalls and improved their teams.
   There’s nothing like a few real incidents to test the system, as well, Ms. Pearson commented.
    In the past year and a half, Alaska has had a couple of non-tank vessel groundings that
    resulted in the activation of approved IMT’s:
             On May 10, 2004 the state ferry LeConte grounded on Cozian Reef near Sitka. The
                vessel did not spill any oil during the grounding, salvage or transit to Ketchikan
                where it was repaired and subsequently brought back into service. The incident was
                the first in which a non-tank vessel IMT- Alaska Steamship Response and cleanup
                contractors SEAPRO - was activated and mobilized under a pre-negotiated contract
                with the Alaska Marine Highway System. The infrastructure required under the non-
                tank vessel regulations proved to be of significant value. Without the regulations it
                may have been unlikely that either an IMT or cleanup contractor could have been
                activated as quickly or effectively.
             Another example is the M/V Clipper Odyssey which grounded at 9:00pm on July 31,
                2004 northwest of Baby Island in the Aleutian Islands. This eco-tour cruise ship
                voyage was doing a bird watch when the ship ran aground on an uncharted rock.
                Immediately following the grounding, the ship’s non-tank vessel oil spill contingency
                plan was activated. A couple of tugs from Dutch Harbor were dispatched to the
                grounding site. The ship’s IMT (O’Brien Group) and cleanup contractor (Alaska
                Chadux Corporation) were immediately notified and mobilized to Dutch Harbor.
                Approximately 800 gallons of diesel was released. By 7:30am the following morning
                the Clipper Odyssey arrived at Dutch Harbor and was safely moored to the city dock
                facility.
   While the Selendang Ayu was not covered under Alaska’s non-tank vessel program the
    infrastructure set up by the program assisted in facilitating the response. When the potential of
    the grounding became a possibility contact was made with three of the registered non-tank
    vessel IMT’s to ask for assistance and Corbett & Holt/Gallagher Marine Systems, who has a
    number of response personnel in Alaska, was hired. A contract was also set with the registered
    response contractor, Alaska Chadux, to provide the response equipment and responders. Both
    contracts were handled quickly, in part because of the infrastructure set up through the Alaska
    Non-tank Vessel Program.
   Although Alaska’s non-tank vessel regulations are only a couple of years old, the exercises and
    actual responses have shown the value of having a mechanism in place that expedites the
    mobilization of professional Incident Management Teams and response contractors, Ms.
    Pearson concluded.



NON-TANK VESSEL RESPONSE ISSUES, PART II; Carlton Moore, Moderator
Certificates of Financial Responsibility and Limits of Liability for Non-tank vessels; Carlton Moore,
California Office of Spill Prevention and Response and Al Peacock III, Keesal, Young & Logan




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                  23
   According to OPA 90 as encoded in 33 USC 2716, non-tank vessels of 300 gross tons or
    greater must provide proof of financial responsibility to meet their maximum liability under 33
    USC 2704 (the limitation of liability section of OPA ’90). This liability is the greater of either
    $600 per gross ton or $500,000.
   Mr. Peacock went on to explain that all west coast states except Hawaii also require certificates
    of financial responsibility (COFRs) as part of their contingency planning requirements for non-
    tank vessels. Alaska’s requirement is found in AS 46.04.05 and requires proof of responsibility
    for the greater of $400.20 per incident, per barrel of storage capacity of all fuel, lube and other
    petroleum tanks or $6,670,000 for vessels having predominately persistent product on board.
    For vessels having predominately non-persistent product on board, the COFR must meet the
    greater of $133.40 per incident, per barrel of storage capacity or $1,334,000.
   California’s COFR requirement is found in Government Code 8670.37.58 and in state
    regulations. An operator of a non-tank vessel of 300 GT or greater must provide a COFR for
    $300 million if have a carrying capacity of more than 6,500 barrels of oil; for $2 million if it has a
    carrying capacity of between 1 and 10 barrels; for $5 million for a carrying capacity of between
    10 and 50 barrels; for $10 million for a carrying capacity of between 50 and 500 barrels; for
    $18.9 million for a carrying capacity of between 500 and 1,000 barrels, and for a carrying
    capacity of more than 1,000 but less than 6,500 barrels, a formula is used (capacity – 1,000
    barrels x $5,670 +$18.9 million).
   Oregon’s COFR law is in ORS 468B.390, and requires that non-tank vessels of 300 GT or
    greater provide financial responsibility of the greater of $600 per Gross Ton or $500,000, which
    is the same as the OPA limits. Proof of compliance with OPA ’90 financial responsibility
    requirements satisfies Oregon law.
   Washington’s COFR law is in RCW 88.40.020 and requires $300 million for a cargo or
    passenger vessel that carries oil as fuel. It also requires the greater of $600 per gross ton or
    $500,000 (OPA limits) for cargo or passenger vessel carrying passengers and vehicles
    between Washington and a foreign country ; the greater of $133.40 per barrel of total oil
    storage capacity or $1.34 million for fishing vessels carrying predominantly non-persistent
    product; and the greater of $400.20 per barrel or $6.67 million for fishing vessels carrying
    predominantly persistent product.
   Under 33 USC 2702, Mr. Peacock explained, the Responsible Party is strictly liable for removal
    costs and damages, including:
             All removal costs;
             Damages to Natural Resources including the reasonable cost of assessing same;
             Property damage including lost revenues and profits from same;

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                      24
                 Lost subsistence; and
                 Cost of public services.
   Possible defenses to liability are covered in 33 U.S.C. § 2703.A responsible party is not liable
    for removal costs or damages if the discharge and the resulting damages were caused solely
    by an act of God, an act of war, an act or omission of an independent third party (with no
    contractual relationship with the responsible party), or any combination of these circumstances.
   While an “Act of God” is defined in OPA 90, and “Act of War” is not, although it is defined
    elsewhere in US federal law. Mr. Peacock noted, however, that since 9/11 there has been no
    case law on whether “War on Terrorism” qualifies. Prior to 9/11 case law held that an act of
    terrorism was not an “Act of War” where it was not committed by foreign governments. He also
    noted that since 9/11 most marine insurance policies include terrorism within their “war risk”
    exclusions from coverage.
   He also explained that if a Responsible Party (RP) alleges that the spill was caused solely by
    the negligence of a Third Party the RP must still pay all removal costs and damages, and is
    then given a subrogation claim against the Third Party for those costs/damages.
   Limitations of liability are set in 33 U.S.C.§ 2704. Except as otherwise provided,” the total of the
    liability of a responsible party with respect to each incident shall not exceed the greater of:
               $1,200/gross ton for tank vessels, or
               $10,000,000 in the case of a tank vessel >3,000 GT; or $2,000,000 in the case of a
                  tank vessel < 3,000 GT; or, ,
               As noted previously, $600/GT for non-tank vessels, or $500,000.
   According to 2704 (c)(1) there is no right to a limit of liability if the incident was proximately
    caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, or the violation of an applicable Federal
    safety, construction, or operating regulation by the RP or a person in a contractual relationship
    with the RP.
   Mr. Peacock pointed out that there is also no defense or limitation if the RP fails or refuses:
               To report the incident as required by law and the responsible party knows or has
                  reason to know of the incident;
               To provide all reasonable cooperation and assistance requested by a responsible
                  official in connection with removal activities; or
               Without sufficient cause, to comply with an order issued under 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)
                  or (e) or under the Intervention on the High Seas Act.
•   He also explained that an RP cannot stop paying when it reaches the limit of its OPA liability,
    since it’s not a true limit on liability; instead, it’s a right to a refund. For example, in the Tenyo
    Maru spill resulting from a collision in Canada, near the US border, the vessel’s Limit of Liability
    was $5 million, so the owners stopped paying once $5 million had been spent. As a result, they
    eventually paid more than $15 million, including penalties for failing to completely cleanup the
    oil.
•   For response expenses incurred beyond the Limit of Liability, an RP may assert a claim to the
    National Pollution Fund Center (NPFC). The RP must demonstrate that it is entitled to a
    complete defense to liability or limitation of its liability, and the NPFC then decides the RP’s
    claim and determines the amount to be refunded, a process which could take years, he
    asserted.

The Canadian Perspective; Craig Dougans, Burrard Clean Operations (BC0)




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                      25
•   Mr. Dougans explained that Part XV of the Canada Shipping Act covers pollution prevention
    and response, and enacts the international OPRC Convention. Part XV prescribes measures to
    prevent pollution and minimize its effects should a spill occur. It applies to:
              Oil tankers of 150 or more gross tons;
              Other ships (“non-tank vessels”) of 400 or more gross tons carrying oil as cargo or
                 fuel; and
              Designated oil handling facilities (OHFs), i.e., those facilities transferring oil to or
                 from the above-listed vessels.
   Sections 660.2 and 660.3 of Part XV require that ships and OHFs have both an arrangement
    with a Response Organization (RO) and an oil pollution emergency plan (SOPEP). Ships must
    have a declaration on board which identifies the name and address of the ship’s insurer,
    confirms the arrangement with the RO, identifies every person authorized to implement the
    arrangement with the RO as well as the SOPEP. In addition, ships must take reasonable
    measures to implement the plan.
   Mr. Dougans noted that the US and Canadian rules for non-tank vessels are similar, with the
    result that US and Canadian industry has been working with regulators on reciprocity for ships
    in transit in Juan de Fuca Strait.
   The Canadian approach involves a Government/Industry partnership and shared responsibility,
    Mr. Dougans explained. Industry pays for preparedness, and the polluter manages/pays for the
    spill. The Response Organization provides the response. The Canadian Coast Guard, as Lead
    Agency on water, monitors the response and becomes the OSC if the polluter is unable,
    unwilling, or unknown. The Province of British Columbia and Environment Canada advise
    Incident Command or the OSC on response priorities through the Regional Environmental
    Emergencies Team (REET). Response actions in Canada are put o the “test of
    reasonableness,” Mr. Dougans noted.
   BCO is one of four Canadian Response Organizations certified by Transport Canada on a
    three-year cycle, and has approximately 1700 ship and OHF members. Their main office and
    warehouse are in Burnaby, and they also have an office on Vancouver Island. BCO maintains a
    mobile ICP/Communications Center and over forty equipment trailers. BCO also has twenty
    response vessels from 18 to 185 feet – including 3 dedicated skimming vessels. In addition,
    they maintain a network of contractors including fishing vessel operators.
   If a ship owner does not have the local resources to manage an incident effectively, the
    certified RO can provide incident (ICS) management. Canadian law allows the ship owner to
    use a contracted Incident Management Team, but the person authorized must direct the



Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                   26
    response, i.e., the Incident Commander. There has been limited involvement in Canada to-date
    by US QI or Incident Management Teams, Mr. Dougans noted.
   Regarding financial responsibility, Part 6 of the Marine Liability Act establishes that the ship
    owner is responsible for oil pollution damage, reasonable cleanup costs for pollution damage
    (oil and other pollutants), and the costs of reasonable measures to reinstate the environment
    damaged by the spill. The owner’s liability is strict, meaning that proof of fault or negligence is
    not required and defenses are limited.
   With regard to other Canadian issues, Mr. Dougans noted that the recently passed Bill C-15,
    which amends the Migratory Bird Convention Act, provides some new authorities in conflict with
    the Canada Shipping Act. The act extends criminal liability for oiled wildlife impacts to the
    management of ship operating companies.
   Regarding the issue of Places of Refuge, Transport Canada has developed a preliminary list of
    sites which is under review. Their next step is stakeholder consultation.
   Mr. Dougans also noted that, through the ITOS system, data on suitable rescue and salvage
    tugs is kept by the Marine Exchange of Puget Sound and vessels are tracked using AIS and
    VTS systems. Overall, he stated, British Columbia doesn’t have much rescue or salvage
    capability.
   Mr. Dougans also noted that Burrard Clean Operations maintains transboundary mutual aid
    agreements with the Marine Spill Response Corporation in Washington State and with
    SEAPRO in SE Alaska.

Salvage Issues and Capabilities on the West Coast; Richard Fairbanks, President, the American
Salvage Association




   Mr. Fairbanks explained that the American Salvage Association represents fourteen salvors in
    the US and Canada.
   The Association is looking forward to the US Coast Guard’s adoption of the final salvage and
    firefighting regulations, he said. If these had already been in place, many of the spill and
    casualty responses over the past year would have been improved.
   As an example, Mr. Fairbanks noted that the Athos I, a tanker carrying crude oil, had a
    contingency plan which named a salvor, so when the Captain of the Port asked them to
    implement a salvage plan, the salvor was mobilized quickly.
   As Mr. Folley noted earlier, there were six salvors on site after the Selendang Ayu grounding,
    but Mr. Fairbanks pointed out that it took the vessel owner and insurer a week to hire one,
    since the vessel had no US federal contingency plan in place.


Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                   27
   In the case of the Cape Flattery, the cement ship that grounded outside of Honolulu, it was a
    non-tank vessel without a contingency plan or a named salvor, so the fuel and cargo lightering
    operation took days longer to be initiated than was necessary.
   Mr. Fairbanks also noted that the response to the Thunderhorse oil platform, which had been
    damaged by Hurricane Dennis, involved delays in securing a salvor and implementing a plan.
    He recommended that the US Coast Guard or the Minerals Management Service extend the
    salvage regulations to cover offshore platforms.
   In the case of the tank barge EMC 423, it did have a required contingency plan, but the salvor
    named in the plan was the barge owner. As a result, it took more than a month to have a
    salvage plan approved.
   Mr. Fairbanks noted that there are 267 different salvors named in the US Coast Guard’s current
    tank vessel contingency plans, but there aren’t that many in the world, so obviously not all are
    qualified salvors. The draft salvage regulations, he noted, do not set standards for salvors.
   He reported that the US Coast Guard has issued guidelines to Area Planning Committees on
    the salvage sections of the Area Contingency Plans, and urged them to expedite the salvage
    regulations and extend them to non-tank as well as tank vessels.

PUBLIC COMMENT
 Mr. Tom Lakosh of Parker Associates spoke to the Task Force Members in reference to his
  report on the response to the Selendang Ayu grounding and provided the Members with copies
  of his report.
 Mr. Lakosh noted his concern with the delays in rescue tug and salvage response, and
  recommended that a strategy be developed which would guarantee financial support by all
  stakeholders for a salvage response system. The size of vessels should be considered when
  planning for rescue tug assets, he recommended, and noted that he has done some research
  on adequate tug engine capabilities.
 He also recommended that Area Contingency Plans should provide for response to orphan
  spills as well as to those covered by contingency plan holders. Likewise, vessels in innocent
  passage should be covered by Area Plans similar to vessels covered by approved contingency
  plans. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund should cover these gaps, he noted.
 He also recommended support for a vessel tracking system for the Aleutians.

TASK FORCE MEMBERS ADOPT THE 2005-2006 ANNUAL WORK PLAN
 Following public comment, the Task Force Members signed the authorization for the 2005-
   2006 Annual Work Plan.
 Carlton Moore then invited the Members and audience to California for the 2006 Annual
   Meeting.
 Kurt Fredriksson expressed his appreciation to ADEC staff members Karen Miller, who
   assisted with meeting planning and registration, Young Ha, who served as photographer for the
   Meeting, and Dan Buchholz, who managed the PowerPoint presentation. After thanking all
   participants, he then adjourned the 2005 Annual Meeting of the Pacific States/British Columbia
   Oil Spill Task Force.




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                28
                                          Attachment A
                                  2005 Annual Meeting Attendees

Task Force Members or Alternates
1. Kurt Fredriksson, ADEC
2. Dale Jensen, WA DOE
3. Paul Slyman, ODEQ
4. Laurence Lau, HI DOH
5. Carlton Moore, CA OSPR
6. Charles Porter, BC Ministry of Environment

Coordinating Committee
1. Bill Hutmacher, ADEC (Leslie Pearson listed under speakers)
2. Lisa Curtis, CA OSPR
3. Curtis Martin, HI DOH
4. Jon Neel, WA DOE
5. Mike Zollitsch, ODEQ

Task Force Staff and ADEC Assistants
1. Jean Cameron, PS/BC OSTF
2. Karen Miller, registration
3. Dan Buchholz, IT support
4. Young Ha, photographer

Speakers
1. USCG RADM James C. Olson
2. Marilyn Leland, PWS RCAC
3. Lisa Ka’aihue, PWS RACAC
4. Mike Munger, CIRCAC
5. John Kwietniak, Tesoro
6. Tim Robertson, Nuka Research & Planning
7. Ed Page, AK Marine Exchange
8. Gary Folley, ADEC
9. Leslie Pearson, ADEC
10. CAPT Steve Hanewich, USCG Office of Response
11. Al Peacock, P&I Club rep
12. Craig Dougans, Burrard Clean Operations
13. Richard Fairbanks, American Salvage Association

Legacy Award Winners
1. Tom Crowley Jr., Chairman, President, and CEO of Crowley
2. Rockwell Smith, Senior VP and General Manager for Crowley’s petroleum transport
3. Craig Tornga, General Manager, Crowley
4. Dave Roggenbeck, Director ATB Operations, Crowley MTC
5. Simon Lisiecki, Director for Government and Industry, BP Shipping, Inc.
6. Cholly Mercer, President, Rainier Petroleum
7. CAPT Jerry Swanson, Chief of Marine Safety, US Coast Guard District 11
Other attendees
1. Cindy Anderson, Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources
2. Kirsten Ballard, ADEC
3. Joe Banta, Prince William Sound RCAC
4. LT Eric Bauer, USCG Office of Response, Washington, DC
5. John Bauer, ADEC
6. Catherine Berg, US Fish & Wildlife Service, Anchorage Fish & Wildlife Field Office
7. Richard Berkowitz, Director, Pacific Coast Operations, Transportation Institute
8. Daniel Bevington, Ecology and Environment, Inc.
9. Nancy Bird, President, PWS Science Center


Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                       29
10.   John Brown, ADEC
11.   MK3 Gary Bullock, USCG MSO Valdez
12.   CAPT Paula Carroll, Chief, Marine Safety, USCG D14
13.   Tom Colby, Alaska Tanker Company Port Manager Valdez
14.   Bill Conley, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council
15.   John Devens, PWS RCAC
16.   CAPT Mark DeVries, Commanding Officer, USCG MSO Anchorage
17.   Bob Flint, ADEC Marine Vessel Section/Non-tank vessel group
18.   Sara Francis, US Coast Guard
19.   Dale Gardner, ADEC
20.   Dan Gilson, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council
21.   Mary K. Goolie. US EPA AK Area Planner
22.   CAPT Paul Gugg, Chief, Marine Safety, USCG Pacific Area
23.   USCG LT Emily Harding, RADM Olson’s aide
24.   Linda Hay, Special Assistant for Natural Resources to Governor Murkowski
25.   Bob Heavilin, General Manager, Alaska Chadux Corporation
26.   Don Hunter, Anchorage Daily News
27.   LT Catherine Huot, USCG MSO Valdez
28.   LCDR Bill Jeffries, USCG MSO Anchorage
29.   Jace Johnson, Navy Supervisor of Salvage, Base Anchorage
30.   DR Doug Jones, CIRCAC and Coastline Engineering
31.   Vince Kelly, ADEC Valdez
32.   John Kotula, ADEC Valdez
33.   Tom Lakosh, Parker Associates
34.   Barat LaPorte, Patton Boggs
35.   John LeClair, Response Manager, Alaska Chadux Corporation
36.   CDR Anthony Lloyd, Commanding Officer, USCG Pacific Strike Team
37.   Sharon Marchant, Sr. Programs Advisor, APSC SERVS
38.   Bob Mattson, ADEC SE SOSC
39.   Kevin Mercier, Assistant Division Chief, Marine Facilities Division
40.   Dianne Munson, North Slope Charter Agreement Manager, ADEC
41.   Capt. Phillip J. Nelson, President, Council of Marine Carriers
42.   Kristina M. O'Connor, Director, Government & Community Affairs, ConocoPhillips Marine/Polar Tankers
43.   Walt Parker, Parker Associates
44.   Yereth Rosen, Reuters
45.   Betty Schorr, ADEC Marine Vessels Section Manager
46.   Beth Sharp, Conoco Phillips/Weston
47.   Jeanie Shifflett, Conoco Phillips
48.   Kevin B. Smith, Water Quality Insurance Syndicate
49.   Terry Smith, Alaska Division of Homeland Security & Emergency Management (DHS&EM)
50.   John Whitney, NOAA Scientific Support Coordinator for Alaska
51.   Richard Wright, Vice President, Pacific/Northwest Region, MSRC
52.   Ruth Yender, Scientific Support Coordinator for the Northwest and Oceania, NOAA Office of Response
      and Restoration




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                      30
                                          Attachment B
                                            AGENDA
            2005 Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Annual Meeting
                                          July 27, 2005
               Hawthorn Suites Hotel, 1110 West 8th Avenue, Anchorage, Alaska
                   Theme: Pacific Perspectives - Regional Issues of Concern



7:30 a.m.     Registration Opens
8 a.m.        Meeting Convenes/Introductions
8:15          Keynote Speaker: US Coast Guard RADM James C. Olson, Commander 17th
              Coast Guard District
8:45          Task Force Member Updates
               Dale Jenson, Spills Program Manager, Washington Department of Ecology
               Laurence Lau, Hawaii Deputy Director for Environmental Health
               Carl Moore, Administrator, California Office of Spill Prevention and Response
               Paul Slyman, Deputy Director, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
               Charles Porter, Director, Environmental Management Branch, British Columbia
                      Ministry of Environment
               Kurt Fredriksson, Commissioner, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
10:15         Break
10:30         Update on Task Force Activities and Plans: Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator
10:45         Alaska Initiatives as West Coast Models; Kurt Fredriksson, Moderator
               Aquatic Nuisance Species in AK; Marilyn Leland & Lisa Ka’aihue, Prince William Sound
                  Regional Citizens Advisory Council
               Alaska Spill Response Permit Project; Michael L. Munger, Executive Director, CIRCAC,
                  and John Kwietniak, Tesoro, Alaska
               Alaska’s Tactics Manual; Tim Robertson, NUKA Research & Planning Group
               Marine Exchange of Alaska’s Vessel Tracking System; Ed Page, Executive Director
Noon          Buffet Luncheon co-hosted by Tesoro Alaska and the Pacific States/British
              Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, and the 2005 Legacy Award Presentations:
               Crowley Marine Transport Corporation
               BP Shipping, Inc.
               US Coast Guard CDR (Retired) William Whitson
               US Coast Guard District 11
               Cholly Mercer, President, Rainier Petroleum Corporation
1:30          Non-tank Vessel Response Issues, Part I; Paul Slyman, Moderator
 The Selendang Ayu Case Study; Gary Folley, DEC State On-Scene Coordinator
 USCG Contingency Plans for Non-Tank Vessels; USCG CAPT Steven Hanewich
 The Value of Incident Management Teams; Leslie Pearson, DEC Prevention & Emergency Response
    Program Manager
2:45          Break


3:00           Non-tank Vessel Response Issues, Part II; Carlton Moore, Moderator
 Certificates of Financial Responsibility and Limits of Liability for Non-tank vessels; Carlton Moore, OSPR
    & Al Peacock III, Keesal, Young & Logan
 The Canadian Perspective; Craig Dougans, Burrard Clean
 Salvage Issues and Capabilities on the West Coast; Richard Fairbanks, American Salvage Association
4:15           Public Comment and Task Force Members’ Response
4:55           Task Force Members adopt the 2005-2006 Annual Work Plan

Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                        31
5pm          Adjourn




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting   32
                                               Attachment C
                                               Speaker Bios


As Manager for Operations/Maintenance at Burrard Clean Operations (BCO), Craig Dougans is responsible
for the acquisition, maintenance and operational deployment of BCO’s inventory of oil spill response vessels
and equipment on Canada’s West Coast. Craig has been employed by BCO since 1995 when he left a 19-
year career with the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) to pursue opportunities in the private sector. During his
time in the CCG, Craig worked in a variety of occupations at sea and ashore, including search and rescue
(SAR) operations, SAR training, SAR program development, Public Affairs, environmental response training,
contingency planning, and environmental response operations. Craig is a graduate of the CCG’s Marine
Emergency Management Course, and Transport Canada’s Intermediate Management. Craig is a graduate of
Simon Fraser University, with a degree in Communication and a Management Skills in Advanced
Technology (MSAT) certificate from the School of Engineering Science. He holds a Master Limited
certificate issued by Transport Canada. Craig responded to his first oil spill in 1973, and since that time has
responded to hundreds of spills on Canada’s West Coast and in the Canadian Arctic. He has written and
presented papers on marine oil spill response training methods and the Canadian spill response regime.

Dick Fairbanks, President of the American Salvage Association, grew up on the coast of Massachusetts. He
received his informal maritime education playing around with small boats, and his formal education in
Mechanical Engineering at the University of Massachusetts and in Business Administration at Boston
University. He learned about ships and ship propulsion at General Electric’s Medium Steam Turbine,
Generator and Gear Department in Lynn Massachusetts. He rounded out his work experience by spending
some time in both the yacht business and the real estate business before joining Titan, the Florida based
marine salvage and wreck removal contractor in 1988 as a partner and General Manager. In 1990 he
convinced his partners to get out of the tug and barge business and focus on marine salvage worldwide.
Today Dick is President of the company which now has offices in Florida, the UK, and Singapore. He is also
President of the American Salvage Association.

Gary Folley has been with the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) since 1989. He is
presently State On-Scene Coordinator and manager of the Central Alaska Response Team, covering a
response area that includes Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, Anchorage and the Mat-Su borough, Kodiak,
the Aleutian Islands, and Western Alaska. Mr. Folley participated in the Exxon Valdez response, working for
both the Coast Guard and ADEC. He worked as an oil spill specialist on contract to the Saudi Government
from 1984 to 1987, responding to catastrophic releases that occurred as the result of the Iran-Iraq War. As a
Coast Guard officer in the 1970's and 1980's he was stationed at Governor's Island, MSO Jacksonville, and
Coast Guard Headquarters.

A native of Attleboro, Massachusetts, Captain Steven Hanewich assumed duties as Chief of the Coast
Guard Headquarters Office of Response in July 2005. He is a 1983 graduate of the Massachusetts Maritime
Academy, where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Transportation, and a 1990 graduate
of the University of Michigan, where he received a Master of Science Degree in Natural Resource Policy and
Administration. His previous assignments have included Marine Safety Offices in Hampton Roads, Virginia,
Miami, Florida, San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Providence, Rhode Island, as well as staff tours at Coast Guard
Headquarters Port Safety and Security Division and the National Response Center. Commander
Hanewich’s personal decorations include two Meritorious Service Medals, three Coast Guard Commendation
Medals, the 9-11 Medal, and the Coast Guard Achievement Medal.

Lisa Ka'aihue is the Environmental Monitoring Project Manager with the Prince William Sound Regional
Citizens' Advisory Council. She manages a variety of environmental monitoring projects including research
and educational activities related to invasive species issues in the Prince William Sound region.

John Kwietniak is the Supervisor of Contingency Planning & Emergency Response for Tesoro Alaska.
He has been with Tesoro for over ten years after retiring with 27 years in the US Coast Guard. John writes,
maintains, and audits all of Tesoro Alaska’s Facility and Vessel Oil Discharge Prevention and Contingency
Plans. He also prepares all the Dock Operations Manuals and Spill Prevention, Countermeasures, and
Control Plans (SPCC Plans) for Tesoro Alaska Operations. John is responsible for all Spill Prevention / C-


Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                           33
Plan training, as well as response training. He developed the Tesoro Incident Command System training
program for the entire corporation and continues to conduct ICS training and drills at other Tesoro business
units. John also serves as the liaison for Tesoro with state and federal agencies, as well as with both
Regional Citizens Advisory Councils. He Co-Chairs all Cook Inlet, Kodiak and PWS Geographic Response
Strategy (GRS) workgroups, and is a “Qualified Individual” and Operations Section Chief on the Tesoro Spill
(Crisis) Management Team.

Marilyn Leland is the Deputy Director of the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council. She
is a member of the national Invasive Species Advisory Committee, the Western Regional Panel of the
National Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force, and the Board of Directors for the Prince William Sound Oil
Spill Recovery Institute. At the time of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, she was the Executive Director of Cordova
District Fishermen United. She also spent 2-1/2 years on assignment to the US Coast Guard in Washington,
DC on the Oil Pollution Act staff.

Michael Munger is the Executive Director of the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council (RCAC). An
Alaskan for 41 years, Michael has a diversified professional background having worked for the Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation as an Environmental Specialist, in the Alaska Oil industry, both
on the North Slope and Cook Inlet, and also as a Commercial Fisherman.

Rear Admiral James C. Olson directs Coast Guard operations including search and rescue, maritime safety,
environmental protection, fisheries law enforcement and military readiness in Alaska and the North Pacific.
Units and personnel under his command patrol more than 3.8 million square miles of ocean and 33,000
miles of coastline, including some of the most treacherous waters in the world. Rear Admiral Olson’s
operational assignments include: deck watch officer aboard Coast Guard Cutter DUANE; search and rescue
pilot at Coast Guard Station Astoria, Oregon; flight safety officer, and instructor pilot at Air Stations Brooklyn,
New York and Cape Cod, Massachusetts; and Operations Officer at Air Station Sitka, Alaska, a unit he later
commanded. In the summer of 1994, Rear Admiral Olson took command of one of the Coast Guard’s
largest Air Stations at Kodiak, Alaska. He has over 5,000 accident-free hours in HH-52, HH-3F, and HH60J
Helicopters. Rear Admiral Olson most recently served as Chief of Operations Capability where he was
responsible for allocation, distribution, and recapitalization of Coast Guard aircraft, vessels, shore facilities
and operational command infrastructure as well as the administration of the Coast Guard Auxiliary. His first
flag assignment was as Director of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) West. Other staff assignments
                                                                           th
include Chief of Operations and Chief of Staff for the Coast Guard’s 13 District in Seattle, Washington. He
also served at Coast Guard Headquarters in the Office of Programs, and on the Coordinating Council Staff in
                                            th
the Chief of Staff’s Office. While in the 7 District in Miami, Florida, he served as the Chief of Intelligence
and Investigations, and directed the Maritime Intelligence Center. A 1970 graduate of the US Coast Guard
Academy, Rear Admiral Olson earned a Masters Degree in Business Administration in his off duty time while
serving at Air Station Brooklyn, New York. He was designated as a naval aviator following training
completed in 1972, and is the current holder of the Coast Guard's Ancient Albatross Award, which is
presented to honor the aviator who has held that designation for the longest period of time. He is a 1990
graduate of the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Captain Ed Page became the first Executive Director of the Marine Exchange of Alaska in 2001. The Marine
Exchange is a non-profit maritime organization established to provide the Alaska maritime community with
information, communications and services to ensure safe, secure, efficient and environmentally responsible
maritime operations. Prior to his present position, he served 29 years as a commissioned officer in the US
Coast Guard served in a variety of marine safety and environmental protection assignments ranging from
Captain of the Port LA/LB to Chief of Marine Safety and Environmental Protection for the Pacific Area. He
was actively involved in the Coast Guard’s response to the T/V Glacier Bay oil spill in Cook Inlet in 1987 and
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In his capacity as the Executive Director of Marine Exchange of Alaska, Captain
Page developed the Automated Secure Vessel Tracking System. He has expanded the operation of this
vessel tracking system nationally in his capacity as the President of the Maritime Information Service of
North America (MISNA).

Albert Peacock, III, has been with Keesal, Young & Logan since 1988 and a shareholder since 1991. His
trials & arbitrations include more than fifteen arbitrations in California, Alaska and Texas involving insurance
coverage, securities, commercial and personal injury claims, as well as one Hawaii Supreme Court, four


Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                               34
Ninth Circuit, and one California Appellate Court appeal briefed and/or argued. He has also represented
clients at a number of National Transportation Safety Board hearings on incidents in Alaska, including the
M/S Nieuw Amsterdam grounding in 1994, the M/V Star Princess grounding in 1995, and the M/V Universe
Explorer case in 1996, which involved fire and five crew fatalities. Mr. Peacock has also conducted a number
of on-board investigations on behalf of his clients. His papers, articles, and speeches include a speech on
vessel interests’ liability and insurance coverage for a hypothetical terrorist attack in the Port of Oakland,
presented to the Pacific Admiralty Seminar, San Francisco, California, in 2004; a speech on OPA ’90 and
state laws on oil pollution presented to the International P&I Club Correspondents’ Conference, Paris, France
in 1999; and a speech on responding to maritime casualties in Alaska presented to the same group in 1996.
Mr. Peacock received a BA in 1980 from the University of Southern California, Magna Cum Laude, and a JD
in 1983 from the University of Southern California Law Center.

Leslie Pearson is the Prevention and Emergency Response Program Manager for the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation. Leslie started her tenure with the department sixteen years ago during the T/V
Exxon Valdez oil spill. She was staff to the State’s Technology Review Council for Oil & Hazardous
substances and has focused specifically on issues associated with oil pollution, preparedness, response,
damage assessment and technology. She has also worked on and managed a myriad of oil spills in Alaska.
Leslie earned a Bachelor of Science degree in Geology from Evergreen State College in Washington, and a
Master of Science in Environmental Science from Alaska Pacific University.

Tim Robertson has worked in oil spill and disaster contingency planning, pollution prevention and emergency
response, commercial fisheries management and regulatory compliance in Alaska since 1976. Mr.
Robertson’s professional experience includes:
     o Organizing and leading a group of commercial fishermen responding to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill;
     o Evaluating oil spill contingency plans, drills, exercises, and spill responses;
     o Developing over 250 Geographic Response Strategies (GRS) throughout the state of Alaska,
     o Developing and standardizing oil spill tactics;
     o Developing and implementing oil spill response training courses; and
     o Training, evaluating and participating on oil spill incident management teams.
Tim Robertson also has considerable spill response experience. He was Director of Seldovia Spill
Operations for VECO in 1989 as part of the Exxon Valdez incident. In 1989, as founding president of the
Seldovia Response Team, he contracted, managed and trained fishing vessel crews for oil spill response.
From 1989 to 2001, he also served as a founding director and Vice-President for Oil Spill Prevention and
Response for the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council. In 1992 he received the Public
Service Award from the US Coast Guard for his role on the Negotiated Rulemaking Committee, which
assisted in developing the federal vessel response plan regulations. Mr. Robertson holds a Masters degree
in Fisheries Biology from the University of Alaska. He has also received training in oil spill response and
emergency response planning from NOAA and FEMA. He is a past holder of a US Coast Guard Masters
license and has experience in operating boats in Bristol Bay, Cook Inlet, Kodiak, the outer Kenai coast, and
Prince William Sound.




Summary Notes 2005 Annual Meeting                                                                          35

				
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