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The Atlantic Alliance:
A View
from the Pentagon
By W I L L I A M S. C O H E N
O
n last Veterans Day I joined people to stand up and to defend one
in honoring those who have another. As a result, a quarter century
served the Nation in uni- after the end of World War I, Europe
form. In cities and towns faced an even more terrible conflict
across North America and Europe, we and a shadow was once again falling
also commemorated the 80th anniver- over the continent. But in the wake of
sary of the end of World War I. A vet- World War II the West responded be-
eran who had been on the front on No- fore it was too late. By establishing
vember 11, 1918, described the NATO, we finally embraced collective
moment when the guns fell silent; how defense, a concept that has been at the
men on both sides slowly, cautiously core of our transatlantic partnership
lifted their heads, how for the first time for fifty years.
in four years they were able to stand up
outside their squalid trenches. Emerging Consensus
But in the years that followed, Today the shadow of a global con-
that hopeful moment of peace was lost flict no longer exists. The Alliance is
by leaders who failed to realize their strong, successful, and growing. Eu-
common destiny and the need for free rope is both free and undivided for the
first time. And our values are advanc-
ing on every continent. At the same
The Honorable William S. Cohen is the twentieth Secretary of Defense and time, the world remains dangerous, a
previously represented the State of Maine in the U.S. Senate. landscape of rogue regimes, rekindled
Spring 1999 / JFQ 31
s JFQ FORUM
408th Intelligence Group (Andrew P. Robinson)
SFOR troops on parade
for change of command,
October 1998.
ethnic hatreds, and the proliferation of Giulio Douhet said, “Victory smiles future, we should anticipate doing so
dangerous weapons. upon those who anticipate the without preexisting communications,
Fortunately, we know that the co- changes in the character of war, not logistics, or other infrastructure. To
operation and determination which upon those who wait to adapt them- merely maintain a force designed to de-
created NATO and saw us through the selves after the changes occur.” fend against Warsaw Pact aggression or
Cold War can guide us through the In addition to marking the an- to make only superficial adjustments
challenges ahead. But while our funda- niversary of the most successful military would be a dereliction of our duty to
mental security principles endure, our alliance in history, the Washington the soldiers, nations, and future of the
forces must be transformed to suit this Summit presents a unique opportunity Alliance. We must seize the historic op-
to focus on transforming the portunity of the Washington Summit to
capabilities of the Alliance to propel this necessary transformation.
Bosnia has demonstrated that the meet the defense challenges
transformation of NATO from a fixed of the next fifty years. Our A Revised Strategic Concept
experience in Bosnia has not Because our allies are modernizing
positional defense to a flexible only proven to be a success and restructuring at different rates and
mobile defense is incomplete in humanitarian and geopo- observe differing national visions,
litical terms, it has demon- NATO is not as effective as it should be.
strated that the transforma- To move forward, we must build on the
new landscape. We need a new Al- tion of NATO from a fixed positional emerging consensus on developing a
liance for the new century, one that al- defense to a flexible mobile defense is Common Operational Vision that em-
lows us to seize opportunities and is incomplete. Indeed, Implementation braces the concepts to be found in the
designed for the missions ahead. As Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force
(SFOR) suggest that should we have to
operate outside Alliance territory in the
32 JFQ / Spring 1999
Cohen
Thirteen-nation NATO
combined air operations
center, Vincenza.
Loading laser-guided
bomb on F–15 Eagle at
RAF Lakenheath.
DOD
These capa- for developing and implementing a
bilities require single integrated C3 architecture.
three enablers: With respect to logistics, experi-
U.S. Air Force (Paul R. Caron)
responsive infor- ence has taught us that static Cold
mation collec- War-style support arrangements are
tion, processing, not useful for missions such as IFOR
and dissemina- and SFOR since they are not deploy-
tion; interoper- able. As a short-term goal of the Wash-
ability; and the ington Summit, individual nations
exploitation of would ensure that their logistics capa-
technological in- bilities are as deployable as their force
new Strategic Concept. We must forge a novations. In practical terms our im- structures. Allied commanders must
perspective that incorporates four core mediate focus must be on communica- have the ability to quickly locate and
capabilities: mobility, effective engage- tions and logistics. A military force is move assets to support their forces.
ment, survivability, and sustainability. only as effective as its flow of informa- Over the longer term, I have asked the
We must be capable of projecting joint tion, and NATO must have a fully in- Senior NATO Logisticians Conference
forces and joint assistance. We must teroperable communications capability to consider creative solutions such as a
engage effectively by delivering assets for the next century to be successful. multinational logistics center.
when and where they are needed. We In the near term, the Washington In addition to transforming our
must enhance survivability by protect- Summit should agree to develop and assets and capabilities, we must trans-
ing allied forces against terrorism and implement specific command, control, form the way we think about opera-
attack by chemical, biological, and and communications (C3) capabilities tional challenges and move promising
electronic weapons. Finally, we must for allied forces that are now or may be concepts from the desktop to the bat-
improve sustainability by being able to working together in the future. For the tlefield. To begin the process, we must
deliver supplies in any contingency. long term, heads of state can approve
efforts aimed at drawing up a timetable
Spring 1999 / JFQ 33
s JFQ FORUM
Our objective is nothing less than
HMS Illustrious alongside
USS Independence,
transforming our military capabilities,
Southern Watch. creating forces that are designed,
equipped, and prepared for the 21 st
century and that can be combined into
a single, powerful, interoperable unit
to carry out any mission directed by
the Alliance. These are ambitious goals
but they are no more difficult than the
many NATO successes over the last
fifty years.
We cannot allow this effort to
simply be a paper exercise, a flash of
rhetoric developed for our anniversary
DOD (John Sullivan)
summit that is left to gather dust after
the celebration. Good intentions will
do little for our soldiers in the field.
The Dutch colonel who commands a
multinational brigade in a future con-
Hungarian MiG–29 taxiing tingency may not care about what was
past C–130, Carpathian resolved at the Washington Summit in
Exchange. April 1999, but he will care about the
ability of his battalions to work to-
gether in battle. The German sergeant
who directs supplies of food to ten
thousand refugees may not care if our
negotiations are conducted in a diplo-
matically correct manner, but he will
care about effective communications
with the Turkish transports hauling
the supplies. And the Greek platoon
leader who targets air support may not
U.S. Air Force
care about a statement containing
high minded propositions, but he will
care about the compatibility of his
computer system with that of the
French pilot circling overhead.
The lives of our troops and the fu-
identify those critical operational chal- sustainability, and survivability—are ture success of the Alliance depend on
lenges we face in each of the core and better reflected in the day-to-day activ- our actions today. I trust that the gen-
enabling capabilities. A revised Strate- ities of the C3 Board and Senior NATO eration of NATO leaders who gather in
gic Concept and innovative summit Logisticians Conference. Change re- 2049 will remember that we stood up
initiatives on defense capabilities will and fulfilled our duty
require equally innovative processes our objective is nothing less than creating by preparing for to-
for their implementation. We must pri- morrow. As the world
oritize, coordinate, and integrate our
forces that are designed, equipped, and changes, we must
work to ensure that the new Strategic prepared for the 21st century have the foresight to
Concept results in action that im- change with it in
proves both national-level and Al- quires a common commitment. Thus order to bring about another fifty years
liance defense capabilities. I have sug- the allies can best achieve these goals of progress and cooperation. On that
gested that a high level steering group by learning from one another. day, all the members of our Alliance
modeled on the Defense Group on Through collaboration, specific recom- will celebrate a full century of peace
Proliferation or the Senior Level Group mendations can be considered and im- and stability. JFQ
could act as an effective mechanism. plemented in coming years.
This is not to imply that we should
abandon existing committees, but This article is adapted from a keynote ad-
dress presented to a conference entitled
rather that this group ensure that the
“Transforming NATO’s Defense Capabilities,”
ideas found in the new Strategic Con- which was held on November 13, 1998,
cept—mobility, effective engagement, in Norfolk, Virginia.
34 JFQ / Spring 1999
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