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Morality Shifting 1 Running head: MORALITY SHIFTING Morality Shifting In In-Group and Out-Group Atrocities Christopher Seemann Doreen Brady New School for Social Research January 2008 Word count 4878 Please Address Correspondences To: Christopher Seemann The New School for Social Research 80 Fifth Avenue, Box 165 New York, NY 10003 USA Telephone: 646.438.1850 E-mail: email@example.com Morality Shifting 2 Abstract: Previous research has shown that when rating an atrocity committed by one’s in-group, individuals rate it less negatively because individuals disengage morally when judging these events. Leidner (unpublished) provided an alternative explanation for this finding by suggesting that what occurs is not an individual morally disengaging from an atrocity, but an individual shifting the tenets used to evaluate the atrocity. This study attempts to replicate Leidner’s initial findings that individuals engage in morality shifting and that this effect is moderated by glorification. In an extension, the role of infrahumanization and negative emotions in morality shifting will be investigations. However, this study was unable to demonstrate that individuals engage in morality shifting. An analysis of these findings suggests that they may be the result of methodological issues or may be the explained through an alternative model of the relationship between glorification, attachment, and infrahumanization that stems from an individuals worldview rather than his or her reaction to a specific atrocity given the correlational relationships found by this study. Key Words: Atrocity, In-group, Out-group, Morality Shifting, Infrahumanization, Negative Emotions, Haidt Morality Shifting 3 Morality Shifting in In-group and Out-group Atrocities One of the most notable atrocities in history was committed against the Jew by the Nazis in World War II. At that time, individuals within Germany reacted to this atrocity in one of three ways by becoming Nazi supporters of the act, becoming inactive bystanders, or becoming rescuers of the Jews. In order to understand what led to these different approaches, Monroe (2008) investigated the psychological factors used to explain these behaviors during the Holocaust. Interpretive analysis of in-depth interviews with bystanders, Nazis, and rescuers during the Holocaust revealed the importance of cognitive categorization and the way participants viewed themselves in relations to others. Bystanders and Nazis differed from the rescuers in their self-image, worldviews, and cognitive classification. The bystanders viewed themselves as defenseless. The Nazis believed they were the protectors of their community. The rescuers felt they were protectors of their own community as well as the community of the human race. The distinct reaction to the same event by the bystanders, Nazis, and rescuers, according to Bandura (1999), was due to the difference in moral disengagement strategies employed to ameliorate the negative effects of committing an unthinkable act. Bandura (1999) suggested that through the act of morphing an atrocity into an acceptable act, we are able to maneuver our moral self-sanctions and engage in inhumane conduct. Monroe’s (2008) anecdotal observation demonstrates that Nazis employed what Bandura calls dehumanization - the act of the perceiving an out-group as less than human - to decrease personal distress. Additionally, the Nazis employed moral justification strategies in that they were protecting their community from the Jewish threats (Bandura, 1999; Monroe, 2008). Cohen (2008) went on to propose that the morality for ingroup interactions do not demand benevolent behavior toward the outgroup but, Morality Shifting 4 instead encourages them to do what is best for their in-group regardless of the amount of suffering experienced by the out-group. The bystander, on the other hand, utilized the diffusion of responsibility as a moral disengagement strategy. “[T]he bystanders saw themselves as people who were weak, low on efficacy, with little control over their situation (Monroe, 2008, p.712).” Being a member of a group that commits an atrocity is sufficient to prompt an individual to employ psychological defenses to minimize the negative affect that stems from the actions of his or her group (for review, see Castano, 2008). Research has demonstrated that in such situations, individuals will react with guilt, the realization that one has done something wrong, or shame, one is a bad individual because of the misdeed. When an individual’s in-group commits an atrocity, he or she feels morally responsible for the actions of the group and experiences these emotions because of a shared, collective identity (Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 2005). In the experience of these emotions, shame has been linked to negative outcomes such as the dehumanization described by Bandura (1990), while guilt has been linked to positive outcomes like reparations (e.g. Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). As with the actions of individuals in Nazi Germany, how an individual indentifies with his or her in-group determines whether an individual experiences shame or guilt when that individual’s in-group commits an atrocity. How an individual identifies with his or her in-group can be described as patriotic, which is the typical love of one’s group, or nationalistic, which is an aggrandizing of one’s group. Individuals with a nationalistic identity, known as high- glorifiers, have been shown to experience shame because of the actions of the in-group (Johns, Schmader, and Lickel, 2005). Moreover, high-glorifiers have been shown to be harsher on victims and to downplay the suffering of the families of the victims (Castano, 2008). Morality Shifting 5 In order to cope with the shame from an atrocity, high glorifiers engage in a number of psychological defenses to minimize the feeling of shame. In addition to blatant dehumanization of the victims and outright denial of the events, an individual may perceive the victims of an atrocity committed by his or her in-group as infrahuman, or less human, through the denial of characteristic that make us human. Leyens et al. (2000) demonstrated that individuals differentially attribute emotions to individuals of an in-group and of an out-group. Using both positive and negative primary emotion (i.e. anger, fear, attraction, etc.) and positive and negative secondary emotions (i.e. love, humiliation, guilt, etc.), Leyens and his colleagues (2000) found that in-group participants attributed an equal amount of primary emotions to both the in-group and out-group, while secondary emotions were mostly assigned to the in-group. It is these secondary emotions that are uniquely human and through whose denial, victims can be made less human and moral culpability can be limited (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). The previously described psychological defense mechanisms are examples of moral disengagement where an individual acts to ameliorate the effects of the knowledge of an atrocity committed by that individual’s in-group through judging the atrocity amorally. Judging an action amorally precludes the necessity of experiencing a negative effect, as an amoral action is neither right nor wrong, but is value neutral. However, in this is the tacit assumption that we disengage from our morals when our well-being is threatened, as suggested by Bandura. However, morality is not an either/or proposition where there is but one absolute standard of judgment. Instead, we possess a number of different principles through which we evaluate actions. Haidt & Graham (2006) described morality as consisting of five psychological foundations that an individual may use to evaluate an action and include harm, fairness, in- group, authority, and purity. Within these sets of principles are two major approaches to moral Morality Shifting 6 reasoning that a biological/evolutionary trait. The first is the prevention of harm and embracement of care, which is found in the evolutionary trait of kin selection. The second is the encouragement of fairness and preservation of justice, which is founded on the evolutionary trait of reciprocal altruism (Haidt & Graham, 2006). Drawing on Haidt’s principles of morality, Leidner (unpublished) suggested that what moral disengagement represents is not the judgment of actions as amoral, but the shifting of moral principles to a different standard of judgment. For a group to function there is a need for the other four principles in Haidt’s view of morality as these serve to ensure that actions benefit the group. This approach, termed groupism by Leidner, plays an important role in an individual’s judgment of an action. However, research into moral disengagement strategies focuses on the harm/care principle of morality. In doing so, researchers have missed the shifting of morality to a groupism perspective and so have viewed individuals as morally disengaging from an atrocity and judging that action amorally. In a preliminary test of his hypotheses, Leidner (unpublished) presented Americans with a news article that discussed an atrocity, the killing of Iraqi prisoners, which was committed by the in-group (Americans) or the out-group (Australians). He found that when presented with atrocities committed by an in-group, individuals do in fact shift moral principles from a harm/care perspective to a groupism perspective when evaluating actions committed by the in- group. This shift did not occur when evaluating atrocities committed by an out-group. Leidner also found that glorification was a moderating factor, suggesting that a high glorifier’s morality was based on authority to a higher degree when the in-group committed the atrocity. Rationale and Hypothesis Morality Shifting 7 This analysis suggests that when an individual is presented with an atrocity, he or she will experience shame or guilt. Shame or guilt, utilizing atrocity committed against Iraqis in detainee camps in the Iraq as an example, drawn from current events, we intend to empirically test Leidner’s (2008) hypothesis that individuals engage in morality shifting when viewing an atrocity committed by an in-group (American) or by an out-group (Australian). First this study will replicate Leidner’s initial findings. Then, we will provide an empirical extension by drawing on the findings from research on moral disengagement and infrahumanization to explore the role of the assignment of emotions to the victims and the role of the experience of negative emotions by the individual when engaging in psychological defense mechanisms to cope with an atrocity committed by the in-group in morality shifting. As such, we hypothesize that: 1. Participants will value different moral principles when an in-group versus out-group commits an atrocity. In an in-group condition, individuals will value in-group/authority more than harm/fairness when an atrocity is committed by an in-group. In the out-group condition the trend will be reversed with individuals valuing harm/fairness more than in- group/authority. 2. The participant’s glorification will act as a moderating factor in the shifting of moral principles. 3. When engaging in morality shifting, higher infrahumanization would result in a greater distinction between the in-group and the out-group conditions in respect to the value place on harm/fairness and in-group/authority. 4. When engaging in morality shifting, participants will experience a negative affective state as a result of learning of the atrocity committed by the in-group. Methods Morality Shifting 8 Participants United States born participants were recruited through advertisements on websites such as facebook and Craig’s list. The participants were asked to complete an online questionnaire, which was hosted on Surveymonkey, concerning American’s perception of an atrocity committed against Iraqi prisoners. Participants were given the opportunity to enter a $50 dollar raffle for completion of the survey. 305 participants (25% male; 75% female) completed the questionnaire. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 74 years with an average age of 35.79 (13.08) years. From this sample, 7 participants were excluded because they were not born in the United States. 22 participants were excluded for failing to correctly complete a reading test in which they were asked the country of origin of the soldiers in the story. Procedures Participants were randomly assigned to either an in-group (n = 158) or out-group (n = 150) condition. In all conditions, participants were first asked complete a consent form and then were asked to read a newspaper article unrelated to any atrocity. Next, participants were presented with the experimental article. Participants assigned to the in-group condition read an article in which American soldiers committed an atrocity against Iraqi prisoners, while participants in the out-group condition article read an article in which Australian soldiers committed an atrocity against Iraqi prisoners. Participants were then asked to summarize this article. Next participants in both conditions were presented with the Lickel’s emotions items and the Explicit Infrahumanization Measure in a randomly assigned order. Next, participants completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, followed by Rocca’s National Attachment and Glorification Scale. Participants were then asked to provide demographic information such as gender, political beliefs, location of birth, year of birth. Finally, participants were thanked and Morality Shifting 9 debriefed. On the debrief form, participants were given the opportunity to provide his or her e- mail address in order to enter the $50 raffle. Lickel’s Emotion Items (Johns et al., 2005). Participants were then asked to indicate their feelings towards the article containing the atrocity against the Iraqis, as scored on a 6-point likert scale from 1 for “not at all” to 6 for “extremely intensely.” The items measured the extent to which participants experienced the following emotions: humiliated, regretful, guilty, sorry, embarrassed, hurt, disappointed, angry at others, sad, ashamed, angry at yourself, depressed, remorseful, disgraced. Explicit Infrahumanization Measure. To measure infrahumanization the participants were asked to attribute primary and secondary emotion. Responses were scored on a 5-point scale from 1 for “not at all” to 5 for “very much.” The participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which the thought that the dead prisoner’s family members felt an emotion when informed about the death. The emotions listed were anguish, disgust, dismay, fear, fright, humiliation, melancholy, pain, panic, resentment, shame, suffering, and sorrow. Additionally, explicit infrahumanization was measured on a 6-point scale from 1 for “totally disagree” to 6 for “totally agree.” The participants were asked to what extent he or she agrees or disagree to culture related matters (e.g. “some aspects of Iraqi life are typical of backward culture” or “Iraqi culture is as highly developed as most cultures”). The Moral Foundation Questionnaire (MFQ30; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, revised in 2008). The participants then completed a two part 30-item self-report instrument that consists of five subscales (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity). In the first part, participants were asked to rate to rate the extent in which they consider statements to be relevant to their moral decisions. Responses were scored on a 6-point Morality Shifting 10 rating scale, from 0 for “not at all relevant” to 5 for “extremely relevant.” In the second part, the participants were asked to read a series of sentence and indicate if they were in agreement or disagreement with the statement on 6-point scale, from 0 for “strongly disagree” to 5 for “strongly agree.” National Attachment & Glorification Scale (Roccas et al. 2006). Participants were presented with two scales regarding how they identified with the U.S. The first scale, the National Attachment scale assessed how they perceive themselves as U.S. citizens. The second scale, the National Glorification scale gauged their opinion on the role of their county in the world. Responses were scores on a 6-point likert scale from 1 for “strongly disagree” to 6 for “strongly agree.” Results Preliminary Analysis Each item underwent factor analysis and if a participant’s response was found to be an outlier, that item was excluded from analysis. Each item was also transformed when possible to establish normalcy before the measures where scored. To further increase variance and establish normalcy, the results for Rocca’s Attachment and Glorification scale and the MFQ30 were standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. In addition, a number of metafactors were constructed. From the MFQ30, two metafactors were constructed from averaging subscales. The harm and the fairness scales were averaged to construct the harm/fairness score and the in-group and the authority scales were averaged to construct the in-group/authority score. From the Lickel’s emotion items, five metafactors were constructed by averaging the scores of different items. The feeling of pain is comprised of the average of the scores of the anguish, pain, resentment, suffering, and sorrow Morality Shifting 11 items. The feeling of fear is comprised of the average of the scores of the fear, fright, and panic items. The feeling of shame is comprised of the average of the scores of the humiliation and shame items. The feeling of sentience is comprised of the average of the scores of the anguish, disgust, dismay, fear, fright, humiliation, melancholy, pain, panic, resentment, shame, suffering, and sorrow items. Compunction is comprised of the average of the scores of the embarrassed, angry at others, guilty, disgraced, hurt, depressed, sorry, ashamed, regretful, humiliated, sad, disappointed, and remorseful items. Relative importance of moral foundations We hypothesized that the individuals in an in-group condition would value in-group and loyalty more than harm and fairness, while in the out-group condition this trend would be reversed. Lacking a specific parametric test of this, we chose to rank order the means of each type of morality. Results for each of the original five factors of the MFQ30 and of the two metafactors (harm/fairness and ingroup/authority) are presented in table 1, which suggest that when evaluating an atrocity committed by an in-group rather than an out-group, individuals in the in-group condition place greater emphasis on harm/fairness than on in-group/authority, while this trend is reversed in the out-group condition. A comparison of the means of the reported moral foundations for the in-group and the out-group is presented in table 2 and suggests that there is no difference in the means of the different moral foundations with ts < -2.19, and ps > .30. Moral foundations, glorification, and attachment We also hypothesized that glorification would play a moderating role in the shifting of morality. To test this hypothesis we constructed a 2 (in-group/loyalty vs. harm/fairness) x 2 (in- group vs. out-group) mixed ANOVA with moral foundations as the within-subject variable and Morality Shifting 12 condition as the between-subject variable, will be conducted with in-group glorification and attachment as continuously moderating factors. This analysis suggests a significant within- subject effect for the interaction between the type of morality and glorification, F(1,234) = 56.49, p < .0001, and a significant between-subject effect for attachment, F(1,234) = 15.27, p = .0001. All other effects were not significant with Fs(1,234) < .78, ps > .38 for with-subject effects and Fs(1,234) < 1.58, ps > .21 for between-subject effects. Further analysis demonstrated that for harm/fairness, the effect of glorification was significant, F(1, 234) = 11.98, p < .001, as was the effect of attachment, F(1,234) = 4.58, p < .05. Harm/fairness is negatively correlated with glorification as supported by its Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r(251) = -.18, p < 0.01. For in-group/authority, the effect of glorification was significant, F(1, 234) = 49.72, p < .0001, as was the effect of attachment, F(1,234) = 17.39, p < .0001. In-group/authority is positively correlated with glorification as supported by its Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r(251) = .64, p < 0.0001. In-group/authority is positively correlated with attachment as supported by its Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r(250) = .55, p < 0.0001. No statistically significant differences were found in the reported glorification in the in-group and the out-group, with t = -1.03 and p = .3, while a statistically significant difference was found for attachment with t = -2.02 and p < .05. Moral foundations and infrahumanization Additionally, we hypothesized that infrahumanization would impact morality shifting, with higher infrahumanization resulting in a greater distinction between the in-group and the out- group conditions in the two moral foundation metafactors. To test this hypothesis we constructed a 2 (in-group/authority vs. harm/fairness) x 2 (in-group vs. out-group) mixed ANOVA with moral foundations as the within-subject variable and condition as the between- Morality Shifting 13 subject variable, will be conducted with infrahumanization as a continuously moderating factor. This analysis suggests a significant within-subject effect from the type of morality, F(1,250) = 89.13, p < .0001, and the interaction between the type of morality and infrahumanization, F(1,250) = 96.40, p < .0001, and a significant between-subject effect from infrahumanization, F(1,250) = 14.75, p < .001. All other effects were not significant with Fs(1,250) < .17, ps > .68 for within-subject effects and Fs(1,250) < .59, ps > .44 for between-subject effects. Further analysis demonstrated that for harm/fairness, the effect of infrahumanization was significant, F(1, 250) = 9.30, p < .01. Harm/fairness is negatively correlated with infrahumanization as supported by its Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r(254) = -.18, p < 0.01. For in-group/authority, the effect of infrahumanization was significant, F(1, 250) = 102.90, p < .0001. In-group/authority is positively correlated with infrahumanization as supported by its Pearson’s correlation coefficient, r(254) = .54, p < 0.0001. Moral foundations and negative affect Finally, we hypothesized that morality shifting would occur in the presence of negative emotions. To test this, we conducted T-tests on the five metafactors derived from Lickel’s emotion items and results are presented in table 2. Differences in the means reported by the in- group and the out-group condition for compunction, t(136,121) = 4.24, p < .0001, with the in- group condition reporting more compunction than the out-group condition and for the feeling of pain, t(118,109) = -3.42, p < .001, with the out-group condition reporting a greater feeling of pain than the in-group condition, were found to be statistically significant. Additionally, harm/fairness was found to be positively correlated with compunction (r(259) = 0.46, p < .0001), the feeling of pain (r(219) = 0.25, p < .001), the feeling of fear (r(258) = 0.16, p < .05), and the feeling of sentience (r(254) = 0.26, p < .0001). In-group/authority was found to be positively Morality Shifting 14 correlated at a trend level with the feeling of shame (r(259) = 0.11, p = .068). Discussion Previous research has suggested that when an individual’s in-group commits an atrocity, he or she would morally disengage from the atrocity to cope with the shame that the atrocity causes. In moral disengagement, individuals engage in activities such as infrahumanization, and that this effect is moderated by how an individual identifies with his or her in-group. However, Leidner suggested that it is not that individuals morally disengage from an atrocity committed by the in-group, but that individuals utilize different moral foundations to evaluate atrocities committed by the in-group and the out-group. In ranking the means of the moral foundations, we were able to demonstrate that in the in-group and the out-group condition, there was a reverse order of ranking for the importance of moral foundations. In the in-group condition, individuals valued harm/fairness more than in- group/authority, while in the out-group condition, individuals valued in-group/authority more than harm/fairness. This pattern, however, was opposite the one originally observed by Leidner and the one hypothesized by this study. Lacking a specific statistical method to compare the rankings, we were unable to determine if there was a statistical difference in the ranking of moral foundations in the in-group and out-group condition. Additionally, we were unable to find any differences in the means of the different moral foundations for the in-group and the out-group conditions. Next, attempted to replicate Leidner’s original finding that glorification acts as a moderating variable in the morality shifting. However, we were unable to find an effect of condition for the mixed ANOVAs which utilized glorification or attachment as a moderating variable. The lack of an effect of condition suggests that morality does not shift when an in- Morality Shifting 15 group rather than an out-group commits an atrocity. We were able to find an effect of an interaction between glorification and type of morality as a within-subject variable and attachment as a between-subject variable. Significant effects were also found for both attachment and glorification for the harm/fairness and the in-group/authority metafactors. These suggest that while condition may not have an effect on the principles that an individual utilizes to make a moral judgment, how an individual identifies with his or her in-group does play a role the tenets an individual utilizes to make a moral judgment. In an extension of Leidner’s original findings, we hypothesized that the more an individual infrahumanizes, the greater the distinction between the harm/fairness and the in- group/authority metafactors in the in-group and the out-group condition. However, we were unable to confirm the effect of condition on infrahumanization as a moderating variable in another mixed ANOVA, suggesting that these findings do not support this study’s hypothesis. We were also, despite expectations from the literature on infrahumanization, unable to find a difference in the average level of infrahumanization in the in-group and the out-group condition. We did find statistically significant within-subject effects for the type of morality and for an interaction between the type of morality and infrahumanization and a between-subject effect for infrahumanization. This suggests that while whether an in-group or an out-group commits an atrocity may not have an effect on the principles that an individual utilizes to make a moral judgment, how an individual views the victims of an atrocity does play a role moral judgment. Taken together, the lack of findings on the effect of condition potentially refute Leidner’s original hypothesis. However, these findings could have been the result of methodological issues. The first set of limitations comes from the use of the MFQ30, which is an explicit measure of the moral principles valued by an individual. As the MFQ30 explicit measure, it is Morality Shifting 16 subject to the social desirability effect. The social desirability effect could have led to the extremely skewed distributions as a result of a ceiling effect. To combat this, we transformed and standardized the data in order to increase variance and create normalcy in the distribution. Despite this effort, the use of the MFQ30 could have still contributed to the lack of findings and explain why there were no statistically significant differences in the reported means for either the 5 original factors of the MFQ30 or the 2 metafactors constructed in this study. Future research on morality shifting should attempt to utilize more implicit methodologies to overcome this limitation. An additional methodological issue stems from the sample population. As characteristic of many online psychology surveys, this survey was completed predominately by women. Furthermore, participants were primarily recruit from major cities such as Boston and Los Angeles. More urban areas of the United States are typically less conservative. Since conservatism is positively correlated with glorification, the population sampled would be expected to engage in less glorification. By neglecting typically a more conservative, rural population, the expected effect may have been hidden from observation. The lack of the expected finding that when an in-group commits an atrocity individuals infrahumanize the victims more than if the atrocity is committed by an in-group than if the atrocity is committed by an out-group strengthens the possibility that this sample is not representative. As such, further refinement and reanalysis of the sample, including an attempt to control for political conservatism, may reveal the expected findings. While the findings of this study may be the result of methodological issues, a second possibility is that these findings are the result of an alternative relationship between the moral foundations, infrahumanization, glorification, and attachment. In this study, we were able to Morality Shifting 17 suggest a correlational relationship between the two moral foundation metafactors and how an individual identifies with his or her in-group. The two metafactors, in-group/authority and harm/fairness represent two different approaches to moral reasoning, relying on the shared and specific values of the group or a moral universal idea of morality respectively. The findings of this study suggest that the more an individual identifies with his or her in-group, whether it is through glorification or attachment, will lead to an increase in the importance of the group’s shared and specific view of morality as represented by in-group/authority. However, for the more universal harm/fairness moral foundation, there was a negative correlation with glorification, suggesting that individuals who glorify rely less on a universally applicable principle of morality. These findings were both expected, though there was no difference between these relationships by condition, which suggests that global differences in the value that individuals place on the moral foundations are a product of how the individual identifies with his or her in-group, rather than a defense mechanism utilized to cope with the knowledge of a specific atrocity. For infrahumanization, we found a correlational effect with harm/fairness being negatively correlated with infrahumanization and in-group/authority being positively correlated with infrahumanization. This suggests that individuals who view members of an out-group as more human are more likely to utilize an in-group/authority foundation to judge an atrocity, while individuals who view members of an out-group as less human are more likely to utilize a harm/fairness foundation. There were no findings of an effect of condition on this relationship. This is in line with expectations given the correlational relationships found between the moral foundations and glorification and attachment. Taken with the previous findings of the relationship between moral foundations and glorification and attachment, these findings Morality Shifting 18 strengthens the suggestion that it is an individuals worldview and not a reaction to a specific atrocity that effects the value an individual places on the different moral foundations. However, for infrahumanization, this finding is more tenuous as there were, despite the expectations derived from previous research, no differences in the level of infrahumanization for the in-group and the out-group condition. In final point of discussion, we hypothesized that morality shifting would occur in the presence of negative emotions. In this analysis, it was found that in the in-group condition, individuals experienced more compunction and in the out-group condition individuals experienced more pain. Furthermore, harm/fairness was positively correlated with compunction, the feeling of pain, the feeling of fear, and the feeling of sentience, while in-group/authority was positively correlated at a trend level with the feeling of shame. Previous research has suggested that moral disengagement is a method of coping with the shame that an individual experiences as a consequence of membership to the group committing the atrocity. The finding that in- group/authority is positively correlated with shame matches the expectations derived from Leidner’s original study, however, as this study was unable to find a relationship between condition and the value placed on the moral foundations, it is harder to interpret the strength or importance of these findings. The other emotions were combinations of negative, primary and secondary emotions and were positively correlated with the in-group/authority metafactor. This suggests that the more an individual experiences these sets of emotions, the more strongly the individual values an in-group/authority moral foundation. Conclusion In conclusion, this study was unable to replicate the findings of Leidner’s study in which he developed the hypothesis of morality shifting. However, an analysis of this study’s findings Morality Shifting 19 does not suggest that morality shifting does not occur, but suggests that the lack of findings could come from methodological issues that stem from the measures selected and the sample population. Further research, which would utilize implicit measures of moral foundations and a more representative sample, may confirm Leidner’s original hypothesis. This paper also suggested that these findings might be better explained through an alternative framework. This study suggested the possibility that the moral foundations that an individual values do not shift when evaluating an atrocity committed by an in-group or an out-group, but are the product of individuals global traits and are related to how an individual views those in the out-group and identifies with the in-group. Further research will be able to evaluate this possibility as an alternative explanation for how individuals make moral judgments. Morality Shifting 20 References Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, [Special Issue on Evil and Violence], 3, 1993-209. Castano, E. (2008). On the perils of glorifying the in-group: Intergroup violence, in-group glorification, and moral disengagement. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2/1, 154-170. Castano, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2006). Not quite human: Infrahumanization in response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing. 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Morality Shifting 21 Table 1: Order Ranking of Moral Foundation by In-group and Out-group Ingroup Outgroup Condition Condition Harm 1 5 Fairness 2 4 In-group 3 3 Purity 4 2 Authority 5 1 Harm/Fairness 1 2 In-group/Authority 2 1 Morality Shifting 22 Table 2: T-Test of Means between the In-group and Out-group Condition In-group Out-group M (SD) M (SD) t df MFQ30 Harm 0.056 (1.00) -0.063 (1.00) 0.18 257 Fairness 0.017 (1.03) -0.020 (0.97) 0.18 257 In-group 0.012 (0.95) -0.014 (1.05) 0.86 257 Purity -0.0014 (0.98) 0.0016 (1.01) 0.46 257 Authority -0.12 (1.05) 0.14 (1.00) -2.19 257 Harm/Fairness 0.040 (1.05) -0.045 (0.95) 0.68 257 In-group/Authority -0.060 (0.98) 0.067 (1.02) -1.02 257 Explicit Infrahumanization 2.70 (0.97) 2.60 (0.91) 0.86 252 Rocca’s A&G Scale Glorification -0.062 (1.01) 0.068 (0.99) -1.03 249 Attachment -0.12 (1.02) 0.14 (0.96) -2.02 * 249 Lickel’s Emotion Items Compunction 3.53 (0.99) 2.97 (0.93) 4.24 *** 257 Feeling of Shame 3.46 (1.60) 3.41 (1.61) 0.27 257 Feeling of Pain 5.83 (0.26) 5.93 (0.13) -3.42 *** 217 Feeling of Fear 4.69 (1.06) 4.58 (1.27) 0.74 256 Feeling of Sentience 4.91 (0.61) 4.99 (0.66) -0.99 252 *p < .05. ***p < .001.
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