Docstoc

FINDING RIGHT MIX

Document Sample
FINDING RIGHT MIX Powered By Docstoc
					                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs




                        F INDING
                          THE
                 RIGHT
                     MIX




                                Disaster Diplomacy,
                                National Security, and
                                International Cooperation
                                January 2009
                                   e Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis


Finding the Right Mix
                                    Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                    a
                                             International Cooperation
 F INDING
   THE
RIGHT
     MIX
     Disaster Diplomacy,
     National Security, and
     International Cooperation

     Charles M. Perry
     with
     Marina Travayiakis
     Bobby Andersen
     Yaron Eisenberg

     January 2009
     A Publication by
        e Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
                                                                                                                    Contents
Illustrations                                                                                                  v
Acknowledgments                                                                                              vii
Introduction                                                                                                   1
            References                                                                                         4

The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process                                                                     5
            State as the Lead Federal Agency                                                                    6
            Requesting Department of Defense and Military Assistance                                          10
                       The Executive Secretariat Process and Recent Adjustments                                11
                       Capacity Building over the Longer Term                                                  15
            Initiatives to Improve and Institutionalize the Interagency Process                               17
            The Issue of Funding                                                                              21
            Conclusion                                                                                        26
            References                                                                                        26

Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster Relief & Humanitarian Assistance                                       29
            Accessing U.S. Military Capabilities and Skills                                                   30
                       Will Capability Gaps Be a Problem?                                                     32
                       DoD and Service Efforts to Ensure That HA/DR Capabilities Are Available                35
                       Is an Inventory of Key Capabilities Really Needed?                                     38
            Review of High-Value/High-Leverage Assets                                                         39
                       Airlift and Sealift Support                                                            39
                       Supply Chain Management and Distribution Logistics                                     43
                       Engineering and Construction Support                                                   47
                       Communications and Information Management                                              50
                       Medical Assistance and Health Diplomacy                                                53
                       Summary                                                                                58
            Private Sector Contributions and Capabilities                                                     59
            Conclusion                                                                                        66
            References                                                                                        67

Operational Challenges, Civil-Military Coordination, &                                                       72
COCOM Platforms for HA/DR Collaboration
            Developing a Concept of Operations for Military Support                                           73
            Ongoing Challenges to Civil-Military Coordination                                                 81
            COCOM Platforms and Programs to Promote Collaboration                                             87
                      U.S. Pacific Command                                                                    87
                      U.S. Southern Command                                                                   91
                      U.S. Africa Command                                                                     96
            Conclusion                                                                                        98
            References                                                                                        99

Finding the Right Mix

                                                                 the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs      iii
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for International Cooperation                          102
                              UN Structures and Procedures                                               102
                              NATO Structures and Procedures                                             108
                              European Union Structures and Procedures                                    112
                              ASEAN Initiatives                                                           115
                              Key Non-European Allied and Partner Country Capabilities                    119
                                         Australia                                                        119
                                         Singapore                                                        122
                                         The Republic of Korea (ROK)                                      124
                                         Japan                                                            126
                                         Canada                                                           130
                                         A Final Note on India and China                                  132
                              Conclusion                                                                 134
                              References                                                                 134

                  Summary Conclusions & Recommendations                                                  141
                              Reference                                                                  147

                  Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms                                              148
                  About the Author & Contributors                                                        152




                                                                                         Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
iv
                  International Cooperation
                                                                        the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs



                                                                                                       Illustrations
            State as the Lead Federal Agency                                                              7
            The Executive Secretariat Process                                                            11
            The DoD Coordination/Approval Process                                                       13
            Letter of Commitment Process                                                                15
            Major DoD Funding Lines for HA/DR Operations                                                24
            GFM / JFP Allocation Process with JFCOM as Primary JFP                                      31
            U.S. Contributions to Operation Unified Assistance                                          41
            U.S. Contributions to Operation Lifeline                                                    42
            Global Snapshot of Seabee Deployment                                                        48
            Expansion of FFE/FEST Units for Stability Operations                                        49
            USNS Comfort – Continuing Promise 2007                                                      55
            USNS Mercy – Pacific Partnership 2008                                                       56
            U.S. Private Sector Contributions to the Tsunami Response                                   59
            GRT’s Data Management System                                                                63
            U.S. Corporate Donations to Earthquake Relief in China                                      65
            HA/DR Operational Phases                                                                    73
            Disaster Relief Life Cycle                                                                  75
            Comparison between Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC),                                    77
            Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), and
            Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)
            Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center                                   78
            Coordination at the Joint Task Force Level                                                   79
            Pacific Partnership – USS Peleliu (2007), USNS Mercy (2008)                                  91
            Continuing Promise 2008 (April-November)                                                     93
            5 exercises in 5 countries: a snapshot of New Horizons in 2007                               94
            Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs                                        103
            UN Response to Pakistan Earthquake – The Cluster Approach                                  107
            Requests for Assistance to Nato-Eadrcc                                                     109
            NATO Contributions To Pakistan Relief                                                      110
            Requests for Assistance to EU Civil Protection Mechanism                                    114
            ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response                       116
            ASEAN Institutional Arrangements                                                            117
            Decision Process for Australia’s AUSASSIST Plan                                             119
            Major ROK Disaster Relief and Reconstruction Assistance                                     125
            Types of ROK Assistance for Disaster Relief and Reconstruction                             126
            Structure of Japan Platform                                                                128
            Chain of Command for Disaster Relief within Canadian Forces                                 131




Finding the Right Mix
                                                                        Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                       v
                                                                                International Cooperation
                                                        Finding the Right Mix

vi   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs
                                                                                          Acknowledgments



Obviously, any study effort of this magnitude has        and U.S. Africa Command, as well as on national di-
benefitted from the support of numerous individu-        saster relief programs in Singapore, the Republic of
als and organizations both from the public and pri-      Korea, Japan, and Canada. The efforts of all three
vate sector. First and foremost, I want to thank the     of these individuals were crucial to the completion
Smith Richardson Foundation of Westport, Connect-        of this project.
icut, and especially Marin Strmecki, the Foundation’s        At various points in the study, other IFPA colleagues
Senior Vice President and Director of Programs, and     – especially Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jacquelyn Davis, and
Allan Song, a Senior Program Officer for Interna-        James Schoff – provided important additional
tional Security and Foreign Policy at the Founda-        insights, assistance, and guidance, all of which made
tion. Without their initial encouragement and the        the final report better than it otherwise would have
Foundation’s generous financial support, this study      been. Many thanks are also due to Nicholas Perry
would never have been possible.                          for his excellent research support on a range of
   As for the research team at the Institute for For-    project tasks and issues, Anika Binnendijk for her
eign Policy Analysis (IFPA), special thanks are due      in-depth research on the 2005 Pakistan earthquake,
to Marina Travayiakis, who worked closely with me        Adelaide Ketchum for her outstanding contributions
throughout all phases of the study. Marina also con-     in editing this report, and Christian Hoffman for his
ducted extensive research on U.S., UN, NATO, and         superior graphic design and layout work.
EU disaster relief planning and civil-military coor-         With respect to the field research and interviews
dination, and prepared draft papers on these issues      conducted as a key part of this study effort, a host of
for integration into the final report. She helped as     other individuals need to be thanked as well for pro-
well to draft the section of the report that examines    viding critical insights on key issues discussed in this
Department of Defense (DoD) and military service         report and/or for contributing in important ways to
concepts of operations (CONOPS) for humanitarian         workshop dialogues and brainstorming sessions or-
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In addition      ganized in support of the study. From U.S. official and
to Marina’s assistance, Bobby Andersen provided in-      nongovernmental expert circles, this would include,
dispensable drafts on private sector contributions       in alphabetical order, Thomas Baltazar, Maureen
to HA/DR operations, various aspects of civil-mili-      Bannon, Lieutenant General Robert “Rusty” Black-
tary relations, and trends with respect to disaster      man, Colonel Gene Bonventre, Andrew Bruzewicz,
relief planning now under way at the Association         James Castle, Marc Cheek, W.I. “Ike” Clark, Kath-
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in Aus-           leen Connolly, General Bantz Craddock, Tom Dolan,
tralia. Finally, Yaron Eisenberg prepared extreme-       Robert Eldridge, Emily Goldman, Lieutenant Gen-
ly helpful draft reports on HA/DR-related activities     eral John Goodman, Lieutenant General W. C. “Chip”
at U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command,          Gregson, Bailey Hand, Clifford Hart, Ambassador


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs   vii
the    InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                John Herbst, Malcolm Johnson, Colonel Charlie King,    Koichi, Maurits Jochem, Kanehara Nobukatsu, Ka-
                Captain Robert Kiser, Donald Kisicki, Stacie Konan,    nazawa Hironori, Kim Changsu, Kim Jungsup, Lee
                Leonard Kotkiewicz, Rear Admiral Michael LeFever,      Chung Min, Lee Yongsoo, Asta Mackeviciute, Moon
                Kate Legates, Nancy Lindberg, Peter Long, Bernd        Chung-in, Zabeta Moutafis, Major General (Ret.) Pan
               “Bear” McConnell, Joseph McMenamin, Eric McVa-          Zhenqiang, Park Chang Kwoun, Marc Preston, Seki
                don, Colonel David Mitchell, Captain Rick Morrison,    Kaoruko, Suzuki Atsuo, Takamatsu Koji, Tokuchi
                Captain Donald Morton, Barry Pavel, Linda Poteat,      Hideshi, Umemoto Kazuyoshi, Commander Darryl
                Ambassador Clark Randt, Jr., Susan Reinert, Admiral    Watters, Lieutenant General Yamaguchi Noboru, Ya-
                Gary Roughead, Robert Salesses, Jon Smart, Edward      mamoto Rika, Yoshuzaki Tomonori, and Zhuang Ji-
                Smith, Lieutenant General Glenn Spears, Captain        anzhong. I am grateful to all of these individuals for
                Allan Stratman, Rob Thayer, Rabih Torbay, John Tri-    the perspectives and knowledge that they offered
                gilio, Douglas Wallace, Scott Weidie, and Colonel      over the course of this project.
                Christopher Wrenn. From potential partner coun-           Charles M. Perry
                tries and major regional or international organiza-       Cambridge, MA
                tions, I wish to thank, again in alphabetical order,      January 2009
                Ahn Kwang Chan, Choi Kang, Major General (Ret.)
                Gong Xianfu, Hoshino Toshiya, Major General Isobe




                                                                                                         Finding the Right Mix
                   Key Partnerships and Platforms for
viii
                   International Cooperation
 1
ChaPter




                                                         Introduction
Over the past decade, the conduct of humanitari-         pabilities to weather future disasters with less need
an assistance and disaster relief (or HA/DR) opera-      for external support.
tions has become an increasingly prominent aspect            As for the U.S military’s larger role in disaster relief
of American diplomacy, and one in which U.S. mil-        overseas, a number of additional factors come into
itary forces are playing an ever more central role.      play. To begin with, America’s regional combatant
The reasons for this development are both varied         commands (or COCOMs), such as U.S. Pacific Com-
and intertwined. First and perhaps foremost is the       mand, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Southern
simple fact that many foreign disasters, particularly    Command (to name just three), collectively main-
those that occur in less developed parts of the world,   tain an unrivaled global network of forward-based,
quickly outstrip local capacities to cope, and can       ready-to-respond assets in the transportation, lo-
only be managed and contained by means of prompt         gistics, engineering, communications, and medical
outside help. Secondly, the frequency, scale, and so-    support arenas that have proven to be well-nigh in-
cio-economic impact of such disasters have all ris-      dispensable – and are often the first to arrive on the
en quite steeply since the 1990s, and these trends       scene – when civilian alternatives are unavailable,
show no signs of abating (Wiharta et al. 2008). In-      already committed elsewhere, and/or overwhelmed.
deed, whether the result of climate change, rap-         When necessary (and approved by the secretary of
id urbanization, environmental degradation, poor         defense), the COCOMs can also reach back to an ex-
governance, civil unrest, or some combination of         tensive array of bases, warehouses, and technical
these and associated factors, natural disasters of       support centers in the continental United States (CO-
one kind or another are likely to occur more often       NUS) for additional troops, supplies, and specialized
in the years ahead, to leave increased levels of death   skills, pulling them forward in an expe- 1 According to the World Bank, disaster-
and destruction in their wake, and to impose costs       ditious manner to where they are most related costs for the decade 1990-1999 were
                                                                                                        more than fifteen times higher than those for
on the global economy in the hundreds of billions        needed. Hence, when a sudden foreign the 1950-1959 period, rising from about $38
(if not trillions) of dollars.1 The United States, to-   disaster occurs, American armed forc- billion in the 1950s to about $652 billion in
gether with other nations and various regional and       es are often looked to as a source for the 1990s (World Bank Independent Evalua-
international organizations with an ability (and re-                                                                                        Federa-
                                                         early relief, precisely because they are tion Group2006). The International Societies
                                                                                                        tion of Red Cross and Red Crescent
sponsibility) to respond, therefore, can expect to be    already likely to be deployed relative- (IFRC) further reports that natural disas-
called upon more regularly and on a more urgent          ly close to the area affected, are capa- ters between 2001 and 2007 have cost some
basis to provide emergency assistance when disas-        ble of organizing a first response with $658 billion (IFRC 2008). Finally, both the
                                                                                                        World Bank and the United Nations Interna-
ter strikes overseas. And to maximize the benefits       little delay, and are able to draw fairly tional Strategy for Natural Disaster Reduc-
of such assistance, it will need to be followed up, in   quickly (when authorized to do so) on tion (UNISDR) project that costs imposed by
many cases, by longer-term foreign aid investments       a much larger pool of talent and mate- global natural disasters will exceed $300 bil-
                                                                                                        lion per year by 2050, barring aggressive
to underwrite recovery and reconstruction in the af-     rial for a more tailored and sustained disaster reduction measures (United Na-
fected nation or nations, and to build up local ca-      response.                                      tions Development Program; World Bank).



Finding the Right Mix

                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs                  1
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                           However, beyond U.S. military forces’ short-no-         2008, similar increases in local support for the Unit-
                                       tice availability, inherent capacity to respond, and        ed States and its military have also been evident in
                                       comparatively large inventories of useful disaster-         Southeast Asia, Oceania, Central and South America,
                                       relevant capabilities, changes in doctrine and strat-       and the Caribbean region after visits paid by the U.S.
                                       egy have made it even more likely that the military         Navy’s hospital ships, the USNS Mercy and the USNS
                                       will contribute significantly to future foreign HA/DR.      Comfort, as well as by a number of amphibious as-
                                       Of highest importance in this context is the greater        sault ships (including the USS Peleliu, the USS Boxer,
                                       emphasis that the Department of Defense (DoD) now           and the USS Kearsarge) that were fitted out specifi-
                                       places on stability operations and what it calls de-        cally for medical care and public outreach missions,
                                       fense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in meeting        including the construction of schools and clinics.
                                       the security challenges of the twenty-first century.2       So, too, as demonstrated in August 2008 when U.S.
                                       This particular development is discussed in some de-        warships delivered much needed supplies of bottled
2             DoD’s formal definition describes “stabili- tail in chapters 2 and 3, as the level   water, nonperishable food, blankets, and other relief
  ty operations” as an overarching term encompass- of support for stability operations             items to the Georgian port of Batumi, the military’s
  ing various military missions, tasks, and activities
    conducted outside the United States in coordina-
                                                           and DSCA missions overall will be       capacity to respond promptly with humanitarian aid
     tion with other instruments of national power to a critical factor in determining the         can also send an important signal of political resolve
  maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environ- degree to which the U.S. military             in a relatively non-confrontational manner (Bengali
    ment and to provide essential government servic-
    es, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and
                                                           is (or will be) properly postured,      2008). Again, a good deal more will be said in subse-
        humanitarian assistance, of which disaster re- equipped, and trained to conduct            quent chapters about these and similar initiatives,
     lief is an integral part (Joint Staff 2006). DSCA re- effective HA/DR operations in the       but the principal point to be made here is that HA/
    fers very specifically to the provision of DoD and/
                                                           future. Suffice it to say here that     DR operations – including goodwill missions car-
     or military support to non-DoD civilian authori-
  ties, principally during a civil emergency or home- stability operations require skills          ried out well before any disasters ever strike – can
     land defense-type contingency (Joint Staff 2001). and capabilities for civil support          pay significant dividends in the battle for hearts and
                                                           missions – including efforts to im-     minds in strategically important countries.
                                       prove or rebuild local infrastructure and to encour-            Positive poll ratings, of course, tend to fall over
                                       age self-sufficiency – that are central as well to the      time, especially when they are based on time-limited
                                       success of HA/DR activities that are more narrow-           and only occasional engagements (however helpful
                                       ly aimed at disaster relief and disaster prevention.        at the moment) between one country and another.
                                       So, as American armed forces become more com-               When military teams providing HA/DR assistance
                                       fortable with and engaged in stability operations in        depart from the country being helped (sometimes
                                       the broad sense, they will also become better pre-          with little likelihood of returning), the improve-
                                       pared for – and are more likely to be asked to sup-         ments they were able to establish on the ground –
                                       port – HA/DR missions overseas.                             and the good feelings toward America so generated
                                           Additional motivation for the U.S. military to          – can begin to wither, at times quite quickly. This is
                                       move in this direction can be found in the very real        especially true when the local capacity to maintain
                                       strategic benefits that have resulted from recent           those same improvements is limited. Therefore, as
                                       HA/DR efforts, and in the prospect that similar re-         a way to sustain the material benefits U.S. military
                                       sults can be achieved by future missions along the          forces can and do provide to countries in need (and
                                       same lines. For example, shortly after the 2004 tsu-        to bolster the good feelings such aid can produce),
                                       nami and 2005 earthquake relief operations in which         DoD officials have begun to advocate taking a longer-
                                       American military units played such decisive and            term approach to HA/DR that would focus on more
3         TSCPs refer to the theater-level plans de- high-profile roles, public approval rat-      regular (and repeated) contact with aid recipients
   veloped by the regional COCOMs and their in- ings for the United States jumped signif-          overseas, as well as on projects that would promote
   dividual service components (the army, navy,
      air force, and marine corps forces assigned
                                                       icantly in Indonesia and Pakistan, two      lasting cooperative relationships and build local ca-
    to the COCOM) to build cooperative relation- largely Islamic countries that are key to         pacity. A number of regional COCOMs and their ser-
 ships with foreign defense establishments that the war on terror but had harbored de-             vice components are now making major progress in
      promote specific U.S. security interests, de-
   velop allied and friendly military capabilities
                                                       cidedly mixed (and at times quite nega-     this direction by building into their theater security
         for self-defense and multinational opera- tive) attitudes toward America after the        cooperation plans (TSCPs) many additional opportu-
   tions, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime U.S. invasion of Iraq. Between 2006 and           nities for HA/DR-related collaboration.3 As a result,
  and contingency access to a host nation. See
   “security cooperation” in Joint Staff (2008).
                                                                                                                                      Finding the Right Mix

                2                 the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

the HA/DR content of COCOM security cooperation            time surveillance aircraft on Hainan island in March
activities overall is rising, and it is becoming insti-    2001 (interview 2007a, 2007b).
tutionalized through annual exercises and training             Each of the trends and examples noted above un-
programs at the bilateral and multilateral levels. On      derscores the great potential that exists to leverage
more than one occasion, moreover, these activities         HA/DR operations in support of U.S. strategic inter-
have taken place at just the right time and place          ests (and those of its allies and friends), while at the
when a disaster occurs so that they have been able         same time addressing very real global needs for hu-
to transition right into a live relief operation.          manitarian assistance. There are, however, a num-
    As a core part of COCOM TSCPs, then, HA/DR ac-         ber of organizational and operational challenges to
tivities are emerging as important tools for strength-     HA/DR planning and implementation that must be
ening a regional capacity to respond collaboratively       better understood and more fully dealt with if di-
to sudden disasters and for building regional part-        saster diplomacy and the U.S. military’s support for
nerships (and encouraging cooperative engage-              it are to meet these particular goals. To begin with,
ment) more broadly. This could include, it is worth        while critical military assets can not be easily held
noting, the construction of warehouses, supply de-         in reserve for HA/DR operations, much more can
pots, airstrips, and port facilities to which U.S. mil-    and should be done before any future deployment to
itary forces might be granted access during future         ensure that U.S. and allied/coalition partner forces
contingencies that are not directly connected to an        are really ready to contribute usefully to such opera-
HA/DR operation. In this way, TSCP-related HA/DR           tions. Secondly, in the disaster relief realm in partic-
projects help to build forward access and pre-posi-        ular, an appropriate division of labor must be defined
tioned support that can be utilized for a wide range       and maintained between military and non-military
of U.S. military operations. Moreover, given their fair-   responders, and greater efforts must be made to fa-
ly non-controversial character, HA/DR-oriented pro-        miliarize the military and civilian disaster response
grams are increasingly being viewed by countries           communities with one another’s quite divergent op-
other than United States, as well as by regional se-       erational cultures. Thirdly, potential political con-
curity organizations, as politically attractive venues     straints on HA/DR plans and operations – such as
for pursuing – and, in some cases, restoring – mil-        the ongoing debate between NATO and the Europe-
itary cooperation between and among potential              an Union (EU) over which organization should take
partners for whom such cooperation remains lim-            the lead in disaster relief and civil support missions
ited or has faltered. Since the early days of the post-    in and around Europe – must be fully factored into
Cold War era, for example, NATO has relied on HA/          U.S. and allied preparations. Fourth and finally, both
DR exercises as a way to bring candidates for mem-         a whole-of-government approach and a public-pri-
bership closer to NATO operational standards and           vate approach to collaboration need to be embraced
to establish a tradition of collaboration with many        more widely within the HA/DR community. Such a
other countries beyond NATO’s boundaries who nev-          shift in perspective is essential, precisely because
ertheless have an impact on Euro-Atlantic security.        foreign relief efforts have become highly complex
So, too, in the Asia-Pacific theater, Japan and the        and sophisticated exercises in international coordi-
Republic of Korea (ROK), who still find it difficult       nation and cooperation, requiring enormous mana-
to collaborate in the military arena, have nonethe-        gerial skills across diverse disciplines to link together
less been able to do so more consistently on HA/DR         and effectively coordinate a daunting array of mili-
matters, and there are signs that this cooperation         tary units, humanitarian agencies, international or-
may soon be extended to include China and other            ganizations, non-governmental organizations, and
regional powers (Chosun Ilbo 2008). According to           private sector contributors.
Chinese strategic experts, bilateral and multilater-           What is urgently needed at this point, then, is a
al collaboration on HA/DR activities may also be the       hard-headed, strategic assessment of U.S and key al-
perfect way to get Sino-American military coopera-         lied plans, capabilities, and operations in the HA/DR
tion back on track, which has floundered since the         arena, and it is to this task that the rest of this study
May 1999 bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade            devotes itself. Chapter 2 explores in depth current
and the forced landing of an American EP-3 mari-           American procedures for requesting and approving


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                          the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process              3
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  military support for HD/DR efforts overseas, clarify-     HA/DR operation, paying especially close attention
                  ing how that process now works and how it might           to recent lessons learned in that regard by region-
                  work better. Chapter 3 delves deeply into the ques-       al COCOMs that now are emerging as real innova-
                  tion of capability needs (and potential gaps) inso-       tors in the HA/DR sector. Chapter 5 surveys various
                  far as HA/DR missions are concerned, identifying          bilateral and multilateral partnerships and institu-
                  those military assets and skills that would appear        tional arrangements that the United States might
                  to be particularly important to the successful com-       exploit more thoroughly in providing military sup-
                  pletion of these missions, as well as a number of         port to future HA/DR operations. Finally, chapter 6
                  operational areas where the private sector might          offers a few summary conclusions on how America
                  provide a cost-effective alternative or reinforcing       might achieve and maintain a better mix, as stated
                  contribution. Chapter 4 explores more comprehen-          in the title of this study, between and among disas-
                  sively the overriding challenge of civil-military coor-   ter diplomacy, national security, and internation-
                  dination in the organization and management of an         al cooperation.


                  References
                  Shashank Bengali. 2008. U.S. warship delivers relief aid to Georgia. McClatchy News Service. August 25.
                  Chosun Ilbo. 2008. Korea, China, Japan FMs meet. June 16.
                  http://english.chosun.com/cgi-bin/printNews?id=200806160025.
                  IFRCS. 2008. World disasters report.
                  http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/disasters/wdr2008/WDR2008-full.pdf.
                  ———. 2007. World disasters report.
                  http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/pubs/disasters/wdr2007/WDR2007-English.pdf.
                  interview 2007a. Major General (Ret.) Pan Zhenqiang, director, Internation-
                  al Security Program, China Reform Forum, Beijing, China. April 26.
                  ———. 2007b. Major General (Ret.) Gong Xianfu, vice chairman, China Insti-
                  tute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing, China. April 30.
                  Joint Staff. 2001. Joint publication 1-02. Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms
                  (as amended through 26 August 2008).
                  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
                  Daniel Pipes. 2002. What is Jihad? New York Post. December 31.
                  http://www.danielpipes.org/article/990.
                  United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
                  http://www.undp.org/cpr/disred/english/wedo/wedo.htm.
                  Sharon Wiharta, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randal. 2008. The effective-
                  ness of foreign military assets in a natural disaster response. Stockholm International Peace Research In-
                  stitute (SIPRI).
                  http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=358#.
                  World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. 2006. Hazards of nature, risks to development.
                  http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/naturaldisasters/docs/natural_disasters_evaluation.pdf.
                  ——— Briefing on global disaster trends.
                  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSF/Resourc-
                  es/395669-1126194965141/1635383-1207662247174/Burton_Toolkit.pdf, 3.




                                                                                                              Finding the Right Mix

4                 the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
 2
ChaPter




                          The U.S.
                    Foreign Disaster Response Process
                                                    How It Works and How It Could Work Better



Since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 2005 Pak-           number of small- and medium-sized disasters of re-
istan earthquake relief efforts, much has been writ-        cent years, none of which approach the scale of the
ten about what went right and what went wrong,              tsunami or earthquake noted above, but nonethe-
and how a future U.S. response to a foreign disaster        less require the prompt provision of targeted mili-
could be made more effective. A critical first step         tary and non-military aid. One of the consequences,
to improving the overall process, however, is to un-        however, is that there could be precious little money
derstand how an initial decision to respond is made         left in the DoD kitty for any large-scale disaster that
and implemented. What are the criteria for respond-         might occur, prompting in turn an earlier than ex-
ing? What are the procedures for authorizing a re-          pected need for supplemental funding the approv-
sponse? When is it appropriate to request military          al of which can not be guaranteed.
help? How can the responsible parties make sure                 As noted in the introduction, moreover, current
that military assistance is provided when and where         thinking with respect to disaster relief planning
it is needed and in the proper scale? Perhaps most          has become increasingly intertwined with and in-
importantly, are the policies and procedures now            fluenced by broader discussions on stability opera-
in place, some of which were designed and autho-            tions, with its emphasis on coordinated military and
rized thirty to forty years ago, still relevant to cur-     civilian support to nations in need across a wide
rent and emerging requirements for disaster relief          spectrum of relief, recovery, and reconstruction ac-
and humanitarian assistance?                                tivities. As a result, those charged with responsibility
    Answers to these questions have never been as           for preparing and managing disaster relief opera-
obvious and pro forma as one might think, in part           tions – and for absorbing lessons learned to improve
because the formal U.S. process for approving for-          the effectiveness of future operations – are increas-
eign disaster relief efforts and, most specifically, mil-   ingly taking a longer-term perspective that places as
itary support has often been bypassed in favor of           much emphasis on preventive measures that may be
an informal, back-channel process that is not al-           initiated before and after a disaster has occurred to
ways exacting, well informed, or consistent. More-          reduce the damage and the costs of future incidents
over, new procedures and organizational structures          as it does on the provision of emergency relief in the
introduced largely as a result of the 2004 tsunami          midst of a disaster. This shift in perspective has in
and 2005 earthquake experiences have caused many            turn underscored the critical importance of cou-
to question the relevance of past practice via either       pling relatively short-term disaster relief efforts with
process for deciding when and how to respond. So,           humanitarian assistance programs aimed at build-
too, policies and funding mechanisms put in place           ing local capacities over time to cope with sudden
to cope with an occasional large-scale disaster have        disasters. Hence, traditional notions of what a prop-
proven to be inadequate for responding to the rising        erly framed foreign disaster relief policy really ought


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs   5
               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                 to include and emphasize, and the manner in which                 In addition to staff from the regional bureau, the
                                 it should ideally be executed, have begun to change           State Department’s IASC generally includes repre-
                                 quite significantly over the past few years.                  sentatives from the bureaus of political-military af-
                                     The goal of this chapter is to clarify how the U.S.       fairs, consular affairs, diplomatic security, and public
                                 decision process is likely to unfold from this point          affairs, as well as personnel from USAID, the Nation-
                                 on, given reforms now or soon to be in place. This            al Security Council (NSC), and the Departments of
                                 chapter also highlights a number of improvements              Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and De-
                                 that still could be made to ensure that America’s             fense, each of which establishes a parallel depart-
                                 participation in foreign disaster relief efforts – and        mental joint task force (or JTF) that is linked to the
                                 any decision to deploy U.S. military assets in sup-           White House and all other relevant agencies through
                                 port of such efforts – at least begins on the right           the Operations Center. Given the numbers involved,
                                 foot and then paves the way to disaster prevention            managing and directing the interactions among all
                                 and damage limitation via targeted humanitarian               the relevant offices and agencies can be a very time-
                                 assistance. Obviously, when both objectives can be            consuming and labor-intensive process, especial-
                                 achieved more consistently, the overall relief opera-         ly during major disasters. In response to the 2004
                                 tion, from first response to recovery and reconstruc-         tsunami tragedy, for example, the Operations Cen-
                                 tion, is likely to be more successful and the military        ter operated twenty-four hours a day for seventeen
                                 component in particular more cost effective.                  days, with over 280 people rotating through in shifts
                                                                                               (Schoff 2005, 63). Moreover, the NSC chaired a daily
                                                                                               video conference with the various JTF heads that fo-
                                 State as the Lead Federal Agency                              cused on operational issues, led by the NSC’s director
                                     For foreign disaster relief operations, the Depart-       for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/
                                     ment of State serves as the U.S. lead federal agency      DR) in the International Economic Affairs section.3
                                     (LFA), relying on the regional bureau responsible for         In the field, USAID works closely with the U.S. em-
                                     the area where the disaster has struck and on the         bassy and the local USAID mission in the affected
                                     U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)         country (assuming that USAID has a mission there)
                                     to coordinate the overall response. Once the gov-         to assess the humanitarian situation and determine
                                     ernment of a disaster-stricken nation has requested       priority needs. Within USAID, the Office of Foreign
                                     assistance, the local U.S. embassy reaches out imme-      Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the primary party re-
                                     diately to the Operations Center within the Execu-        sponsible for coordinating the U.S. government re-
1      Under U.S. law, to set a formal disaster re- tive Secretariat of the State Department   sponse to both natural and man-made disasters over-
   lief operation in motion, the cable must meet via a disaster declaration cable.1 For        seas, including those arising from civil conflict, acts
   three criteria: 1) the disaster must be beyond
    the ability of the host nation to handle on its
                                                    large-scale events, the U.S. ambassa-      of terrorism, or industrial accidents. Insofar as disas-
  own; 2) the host nation must formally request     dor will probably also contact the rele-   ter relief operations more specifically are concerned,
 U.S. assistance; and 3) such assistance must be vant U.S. military regional combatant         then, OFDA actually serves as the operational-level
  in the strategic interests of the United States.
                                                    command (COCOM) directly, such as U.S.     LFA within the broader State Department communi-
2               The State Department’s lead-agen-
      cy role for non-military incidents was con-   Pacific Command (PACOM) in Honolu-         ty. Within twenty-four hours of a disaster declaration,
          firmed in presidential directive/NSC-27, lu, though this depends largely on the      OFDA provides up to $50,000 to the U.S. ambassador
   January 19, 1978. http://www.jimmycarter li- personal ties between the ambassador           in the affected country for the purchase of local re-
   brary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd27.pdf.
                                                    in question and the COCOM command-         lief supplies (OFDA 2006, 10), though this amount can
3           This approach to the management of a
        “complex contingency operation” is simi-    er. For its part, the Operations Center,   be quickly increased to $100,000 without much dif-
   lar to that outlined in the May 1997 presiden- which maintains a twenty-four hour           ficulty. If the scope of a disaster merits it, OFDA de-
    tial decision directive (PDD) 56, in which the watch on emerging or rapid-onset cri-       ploys a regional advisor and a disaster assistance re-
      deputy secretaries of relevant departments
      established appropriate interagency work-
                                                    ses overseas, will quickly set up an in-   sponse team (DART) to the affected area to conduct
  ing groups (normally an executive committee teragency standing committee (or IASC)           rapid assessments of the disaster situation, analyze
     at the assistant secretary level) to supervise led by the appropriate regional bureau     the existing capacity of the host nation and other re-
  the day-to-day management of the operation.
                                                    to monitor the situation and facilitate    lief agencies, and, if required, coordinate operations
     http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.
                                                    interagency coordination.2                 on the ground with the affected country, other pri-



                                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix

               6                 the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

vate donors and international organizations, and,          mostly UN agencies and nongovernmental organi-
when present, U.S. and foreign militaries.                 zations (NGOs) active in disaster-prone areas, such
    OFDA teams include specialists from a variety          as UNICEF, CARE, and the International Federation
of disciplines, including experts in disaster relief       of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In total,
planning, damage assessment, search and rescue,            OFDA funds to local and international NGOs and UN
water and sanitation, nutrition, shelter, logistics,       agencies providing relief to tsunami-affected coun-
contracting, communications, and medicine. As              tries reached over $84 million (OFDA 2005, 17). OFDA
no two disasters are alike, DARTs generally are tai-       support to relief agencies operating in Pakistan and
lored and scaled to the crisis at hand, drawing in         India after the 2005 earthquake totaled more than
non-State Department experts as required. During           $69 million (OFDA 2006, 7).
the 2004 tsunami response, for example, OFDA dis-              So, too, OFDA works closely with other parts of
patched over fifty-five DART members and one hun-          USAID, such as the Office of Food for Peace (FFP),
dred field-based USAID staff to India, Indonesia, the      the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the Office
Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Through fifteen         of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), the
airlifts of emergency relief commodities, OFDA de-         Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and the appropriate
livered hygiene kits to meet the emergency needs of
more than 80,000 people, water containers for over             State as the Lead Federal Agency
143,000 people, and emergency medical kits from                 Host Nation                                 COCOM
the World Health Organization (WHO) with suffi-                   Request for Support
cient supplies for 10,000 people for three months                 from US Embassy
(OFDA 2005, 16). The response to tropical cyclone                                                     D oD Executive Secretariat
                                                                Local U.S. Embassy
Sidr that hit Bangladesh in November 2007, on the                                                              State requests DoD support
other hand, was far more limited in scale and time-              Issues Disaster Declaration Cable
frame, but nonetheless vital, including the dispatch                                                                    Regional Bureau
of a five-person DART team the day after the storm             USAID/OFDA                 Operations Center
                                                                                          Executive Secretariat
and the provision of USAID emergency funding for                                          State Department
                                                                                                                         White House
much-needed fresh water supplies and for airlifting
plastic sheeting, hygiene and sanitation kits, and                             Interagency Standing Committee (IASC)
medical supplies to key distribution points. In early                          Members include representatives from USAID, NSC , the
                                                                DART           bureaus of political-military affairs, consular affairs,
March 2008, a similarly small but essential response
                                                                               diplomatic affairs, public affairs, and the departments of
to heavy flooding in Ecuador involved a single C-130                           health and human services, agriculture, and defense
cargo plane ( from the Kentucky Air National Guard)
delivering some 162 flood cleanup kits, 9,000 alco-                                          Joint Task Forces
hol pads, 2,250 bio-hazard waste bags, and 9,000
disposable vinyl gloves.
    All requests for assistance from OFDA staff and        USAID regional bureau, to ensure that the immedi-
DARTs in the field are relayed to an on-call response      ate needs of the affected population are met. OFDA
management team (RMT) in charge of emergency               collaboration with these organizations extends to
operations based back in Washington. Logistics of-         establishing the groundwork for longer-term recov-
ficers from the RMT coordinate the delivery of initial     ery and reconstruction assistance, including devel-
relief supplies, such as plastic sheeting, hygiene kits,   opment projects and cash-for-work activities, such
health supplies, water containers and purification         as waste management, debris removal, and shelter
units, and blankets, from one of OFDA’s commodity          construction. Moreover, USAID has standing con-
stockpiles located in Dubai, Italy, and Miami. The         tracts in place with private contractors whereby it
RMT also serves as the logistics liaison to other cri-     can charter commercial aircraft (both fixed- and ro-
sis centers and task forces involved in a U.S. govern-     tary-wing) to provide lift support, ship relief supplies,
ment response, including the State Department’s            and conduct search and rescue operations. That said,
IASC. Project officers in Washington also review           when the evolving requirements of a particular relief
and fund flash appeals from partners in the field,         effort cannot be met by civilian assets contracted


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                           the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process                 7
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  or chartered by USAID, or by the UN, local and inter-      in response to flash floods in the Horn of Africa in
                  national NGOs, and various donor countries, OFDA           2006, State issued a request for DoD assistance. When
                  (and the State Department more generally) is au-           personnel from DoD spoke with the relevant region-
                  thorized to work with the Department of Defense            al bureau at State, they found that staff at the bu-
                  (DoD) to identify and direct the use of military as-       reau were unaware of OFDA’s role or that USAID was
                  sets (if deployed) for HA/DR missions overseas. In         in fact the LFA, and needed to provide the justifi-
                  most cases, this involves the provision of addition-       cation for DoD assistance. Still worse, DoD actually
                  al air- and sealift support, but it may also include       had to give bureau officials the contact information
                  a broader array of special military assets and ex-         for the proper USAID/OFDA representatives (inter-
                  pertise in the communications, engineering, water          view 2007a). Examples such as this illustrate the co-
                  production and purification, and medical support           nundrum facing DoD: How does the military (meant
                  arenas, among other contributions.                         primarily as a resource of last resort) respond to re-
                      Traditionally, if it is determined that military as-   quests for assistance when State Department offi-
                  sets are indeed necessary to respond to a disaster,        cials may not yet have properly coordinated with
                  OFDA will submit a formal request for military as-         USAID/OFDA to fully assess the availability of civil-
                  sistance to the State Department’s Executive Secre-        ian options, including cheaper, commercial alter-
                  tariat, which will in turn forward the request to the      natives? In an effort to avoid such situations in the
                  Executive Secretariat of DoD. Following an intensive       future, USAID, DoD, and State’s Bureau of Political-
                  intra-DoD review process, the secretary of defense or      Military Affairs (State/PM) are drafting new HA/DR
                  deputy secretary may order the deployment of mil-          guidelines to clarify how State should respond to
                  itary assets to the disaster zone in support of OFDA       and handle overseas disasters, and to improve the
                  efforts, signing what is called a “third party waiver”     State-DoD assistance request process.
                  to allow U.S. military goods and services to be used           OFDA, of course, is generally quite willing to re-
                  in a non-military operation to assist a “third party.”     quest the mobilization of military assets for over-
                  On the basis of such a waiver, over fifteen thousand       seas relief missions, and to give DoD relatively wide
                  U.S. soldiers and sailors were deployed as part of the     latitude to work directly with its counterpart in the
                  2004 tsunami response to work alongside OFDA in the        affected nation. This is especially true when that na-
                  affected regions. More specifically, the U.S. military     tion lies within a region of strategic interest, as was
                  provided twenty-six ships, eighty-two planes, and          the case during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the
                  fifty-one helicopters to help deliver more than 24.5       2005 Pakistan earthquake, the 2006 Philippine mud-
                  million tons of relief supplies and enable USAID and       slide, and the 2007 Bangladesh cyclone. That said,
                  other disaster relief agencies to move much-need-          increased calls for DoD involvement in HA/DR mis-
                  ed aid to inaccessible areas affected by the tsunami       sions have pushed the military to operate less as
                  (OFDA 2005, 17). But DoD assistance may be as lim-         an instrument of last resort in support of civilian
                  ited (if nonetheless crucial) as the dispatch of a sin-    relief agencies and more as a regular contributor,
                  gle C-130 to deliver supplies to a disaster zone, or the   intimately involved in a broad range of humanitar-
                  diversion of a nearby ship to assist in the evacuation     ian work. Increasingly, U.S. forces are on the ground,
                  of people at risk or injured. In theory, the criterion     working alongside host nation officials and military
                  for both levels of response is that no commercial al-      personnel to eliminate sources of instability and im-
                  ternative exists or is readily available.                  prove livelihoods through various development and
                      However, despite the formal process for request-       capacity-building projects. In the Horn of Africa, for
                  ing military assistance, local U.S. ambassadors and        example, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estab-
                  country officers in the relevant regional bureau at        lished the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Afri-
                  the State Department have often requested DoD as-          ca (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 to promote regional stability
                  sistance directly, leaving USAID and OFDA out of the       and protect coalition interests through disaster re-
                  loop. Moreover, some officials at State are neither        lief, humanitarian support, medical and dental as-
                  familiar with disaster management issues and pro-          sistance, and construction and water development
                  cedures nor even aware of USAID’s and OFDA’s role          projects. CJTF-HOA also provides military-to-mili-
                  as the LFA for foreign HA/DR activities. For instance,     tary training in counterterrorism and in border and


                                                                                                                Finding the Right Mix

8                 the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

maritime security. In 2008, U.S. Africa Command            Pakistan. With OMA help, USAID also updated its
(AFRICOM) became fully operational, absorbed the           Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and
CJTF-HOA and expanded its efforts, and began to            Response in 2005, which included reference mate-
promote similar civil affairs-type projects elsewhere      rial for OFDA staff working with U.S., coalition, and
on the continent. For their part, U.S. Southern Com-       multinational military forces, including NATO. And
mand (SOUTHCOM) and PACOM already run similar              while OMA tends to focus on policy issues related to
programs in their respective areas of responsibility       U.S. civil-military coordination (CMCoord), yet an-
(or AORs), such as Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bra-        other group within OFDA concentrates on the oper-
vo) in Central America and Joint Special Operations        ational aspects. This group, the Operational Liaison
Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).                          Unit (OLU), conducts training on joint humanitarian
    Yet, despite the military’s accomplished record        operations in cooperation with the U.S. military re-
and expanding portfolio in the HA/DR arena, it still       gional commands, and it dispatches CMCoord offi-
lacks the necessary skills to conduct a number of          cers to onsite locations to assist with coordination in
essential non-military activities, such as camp man-       actual relief efforts. Some senior USAID staff are as-
agement for displaced persons, medical assistance          signed as well to regional COCOMs, especially those
for women and children, and child protection. In          – such as PACOM and SOUTHCOM – that oversee de-
contrast, USAID, along with the broader humani-            fense operations in disaster-prone AORs.
tarian community, has been working in the field for            Of course, initiatives to enhance CMCoord for di-
some time now, and is generally better able than the       saster relief operations (about which more is said in
military to determine the longer-term needs of an af-      chapter 4) will be inadequate if similar efforts are
fected community, particularly with regard to gender       not made to improve how State’s regional bureaus
and pediatric issues, nutrition assistance, and infra-     and its Executive Secretariat coordinate disaster re-
structure development. Therefore, military engage-         lief efforts with USAID/OFDA. In this sense, intra-
ment in HA/DR missions still needs to be carefully         State coordination is just as important an objective
coordinated with host nation (HN) personnel, USAID,        as interagency coordination. One step toward that
UN staff, local and international NGOs, and private        goal was taken in January 2006, when the secretary
sector partners to identify priority local needs and to    of state created the Office of the Director of Foreign
ensure that the various stakeholders in a disaster re-     Assistance (DFA) as a way to align more effectively
lief effort focus on areas where they have a compar-       the foreign assistance activities promoted and car-
ative advantage: security, logistics, and transport for    ried out by various main State Department offices
militaries, and recovery, reconstruction, and reha-        and those of USAID (which is better seen as an inde-
bilitation for aid workers. With more fully integrat-      pendent agency that nonetheless reports to State).
ed planning and response strategies, the military          The DFA has authority over most State and USAID
and civilian components of HA/DR activities should         foreign assistance programs and provides guidance
be able to remain distinct but nonetheless closely         to other agencies that manage foreign aid activi-
aligned, thereby enabling a seamless transition from       ties.4 The DFA also serves concurrently as the USAID        4 Some foreign aid pro-
relief to recovery and a harmless military exit.           administrator.                                              grams, such as the Millenni-
                                                                                                                       um Challenge Account, the
    In an effort to formalize a closer working rela-           In May 2007, USAID and State jointly released their     Office of the Global AIDS Co-
tionship with DoD as well as with foreign militar-         Strategic Plan for FY 2007-12, which defines the pri-       ordinator, and the Office for
ies, USAID established the earlier mentioned OMA in        mary aims of U.S. foreign development assistance as         Reconstruction and Stabi-
                                                                                                                       lization, will remain out-
2005 to serve as the focal point for USAID interaction     1) achieving peace and security, 2) supporting just         side the scope of the DFA.
with military planners during disaster response ac-        and democratic governance, 3) investing in people,
tivities and stability operations. To date, OMA has fa-   4) promoting economic growth and prosperity, 5)
cilitated the establishment of a joint USAID and DoD       providing humanitarian assistance, 6) promoting
emergency supply warehouse in Bulgaria, provided           international understanding, and 7) strengthening
pre-deployment briefings to U.S. military units en         U.S. consular and management capabilities (U.S. De-
route to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, and       partment of State/USAID 2007, 10). With regard to
served as a liaison between the humanitarian com-          providing humanitarian assistance, the new frame-
munity and DoD during disaster response efforts in         work proposes to provide life-saving disaster relief


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                          the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process               9
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                  assistance in emergencies, prevent and mitigate di-            ed programs a central DoD policy objective, though
                                  sasters by developing local and global mechanisms              much remains to be done to educate defense officials
                                  to anticipate and respond to natural or man-made               and military commanders on the strategic value of
                                  disasters, and help build the capacity of foreign gov-         such missions, how best to implement them in con-
                                  ernments to manage problems associated with dis-               cert with non-DoD civilian authorities, and what the
                                  placed persons and refugees. To accomplish this, the           implications may be for force structure and military
                                  Strategic Plan identifies the Departments of Home-             procurement. The creation of a new deputy assistant
                                  land Security, Health and Human Services, and De-              secretary of defense for stability operations capabil-
                                  fense as key government partners with which State              ities (ODASD/STB) in early 2007 should help in this
                                  and USAID plan to coordinate to help implement fu-             regard, but the work of this office is only in the early
                                  ture foreign assistance activities.                            stages and its influence is unclear. As a sub-branch
                                      At this point, it is unclear whether these and oth-        of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
                                  er recent efforts to restructure the cumbersome and            Policy (OUSD(P)), ODASD/STB can urge the individu-
                                  fragmented U.S. foreign assistance program will im-            al military services to plan and acquire capabilities
                                  prove once and for all how State coordinates future            for stability operations, including disaster relief, but
                                  HA/DR efforts with USAID. Some argue that since the            it can not require them to do so.
                                  DFA also serves as USAID administrator, USAID will                 Meanwhile, as requests for U.S. military and
                                  likely participate in the policy and budget decision-          broader DoD assistance in support of foreign disas-
                                  making process to a greater extent than it does at             ter relief have steadily risen in recent years, so has
                                  present (Veillette 2007, 2). On the other hand, some           the need to ensure that those requests are ground-
                                  critics fear that the role of USAID is being steadily          ed in sound strategic assessments, communicated
                                  marginalized in favor of the Department of State,              to DoD in a useable format, and based on a dem-
                                  with some of its responsibilities being usurped by             onstrated need for unique military capabilities not
                                  main State bureaus and offices. Either way, State              (or no longer) available from civilian or commercial
                                  and USAID need to improve internal HA/DR pro-                  sources. All too often, State Department officials will
                                  cedures so that both are operating with the same               simply request a specific type and scale of military
                                  understanding and assumptions when it is time                  support ( for example, sea-based transport helicop-
                                  to turn to the military for additional disaster re-            ters for evacuating disaster victims) without think-
                                  lief assistance.                                               ing through the logistical support required to make
                                                                                                 that capability available, or the possible availabili-
                                                                                                 ty of more cost-effective alternatives. Rising inter-
                                  Requesting Department of Defense                               est in “getting the request process right” (which DoD
                                  and Military Assistance                                        officials believe would resolve at least 70 percent
                                                                                                 of the difficulties that bedevil the current process)
                                    For their part, DoD, service staff, and COCOM plan-
                                                                                                 coincided as well with a wholesale reorganization
                                    ners are exploring various ways to enhance military
                                                                                                 of OUSD(P) in January 2007 to better address the
                                    readiness for and involvement in HA/DR activities,
                                                                                                 department’s growing emphasis on managing in-
                                    as military support to disaster relief operations has
                                                                                                 ternational military coalitions, equipping partner
                                    become an increasingly prominent part of Ameri-
                                                                                                 nations to fight terrorists, and improving U.S. and
                                    ca’s diplomatic repertoire. In late 2005, for example,
                                                                                                 coalition responses to sudden disasters and human-
                                    after the Pakistan earthquake, the Pentagon intro-
                                                                                                 itarian crises.
5     As noted in chapter 1, stability operations in- duced DoD directive 3000.05, “Mil-
  clude a wide variety of military missions and ac- itary Support for Stability, Securi-             As part of this shakeup, a number of new assis-
      tivities to restore and/or maintain a safe and                                             tant and deputy assistant secretary of defense posi-
      secure environment in a foreign country that
                                                      ty, Transition, and Reconstruction
                                                                                                 tions were established, including, in addition to the
    is trying to cope with, or recently experienced, (SSTR) Operations,” essentially elevat-
      significant internal conflict or a major disas- ing stability operations to a core mili-
                                                                                                 ODASD/STB slot described above, an assistant sec-
   ter, natural or man-made. Apart from interact-                                                retary of defense for global security affairs (OASD/
                                                      tary mission comparable to tradition-
     ing with host nation officials, such operations                                             GSA), and, under this post, a deputy assistant sec-
         generally would involve extensive collabo-   al combat missions.5 Simply put, the
                                                                                                 retary for partnership strategy (ODASD/PRT) and a
       ration between U.S. military forces and civil directive makes the provision of mil-
    authorities attached to U.S., non-U.S., interna-                                             deputy assistant secretary for coalition and multi-
                                                      itary aid in support of HA/DR-relat-
   tional, and non-governmental offices and agen-
         cies operating in the country in question.
                                                                                                                                     Finding the Right Mix

                10                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

national operations (ODASD/CMO). Together, these         cific military units/commands to respond), via the
three new offices share responsibility for organiz-      intra-DoD and the broader interagency policy re-
ing the DoD response to natural or man-made di-          view process. However, this arrangement is fairly
sasters. These organizational changes have in turn       recent and has yet to be tested against a serious,
prompted a top-to-bottom re-examination of the           large-scale catastrophe.
formal State-DoD disaster assistance request pro-            Once an overseas crisis erupts, DoD may, if asked,
cess as it is supposed to work, as well as a review of   decide to deploy military assets in support of civilian
the informal, back-channel process as it has tended      relief agencies and foreign governments if 1) the re-
to unfold. The idea behind these reviews has been        sponse capacity of the host nation and international
to introduce reforms to improve the process (com-        community is overwhelmed, 2) all other commer-
monly known to insiders as the Executive Secretar-       cial options have been exhausted, and 3) there ex-
iat process) and to make sure that military/DoD as-      ists no comparable civilian alternative to the use of
sistance is requested – and efforts made to make         military and civil defense assets. These three basic
it available – only when it is truly necessary. The      standards essentially replicate what are known as
OUSD(P) reorganization for handling disaster relief      the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military
and associated humanitarian assistance missions          and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief devel-
is described below, along with what the responsi-        oped by the UN (UNOCHA 2007). The decision to re-
ble officials are suggesting with regard to addition-    quest the use of military assets is formally made by
al reforms and adjustments.                              the Department of State, validated by USAID/OFDA,
                                                         and approved by DoD. As mentioned earlier, once
The Executive Secretariat Process                        the host nation has requested assistance from the
and Recent Adjustments                                   local U.S. ambassador, who in turn has issued a di-
Within OASD/GSA, the office of coalition and multi-      saster declaration cable back to State via the appro-
national operations (CMO) has responsibility for han-    priate regional bureau and the Executive Secretariat
dling DoD activities during the early weeks or initial   (where the operations center resides), OFDA deploys
emergency phase of a disaster relief operation. How-     to the disaster site to assess the situation and deter-
ever, the Office of Partnership Strategy (PRT), also     mine the type of emergency relief needed. If OFDA
within OASD/GSA, directs longer-term assistance          decides DoD involvement is called for, it will inform
and recovery projects, focused on host-nation ca-        State’s Executive Secretariat, which will forward the
pacity building and rehabilitation, including educa-     request for military assistance to the Executive Sec-
tion programs, medical and public health support,        retariat at DoD.
and HA/DR-related security cooperation (to create            Interestingly, while DoD representatives – gener-
and/or strengthen local first responder teams). The      ally drawn from the local embassy’s Joint U.S. Mil-
ODASD/STB office is responsible for drafting DoD pol-    itary Assistance Group (JUSMAG) or from a nearby
icy for stability operations and for studying mea-       U.S. forward base or smaller military facility – may
sures to improve the interagency process, military       participate in the OFDA assessment as DART team
training, and education exercises for post-conflict      members, DoD does not have the legal authority to
SSTR operations, and, to a certain extent, humani-       conduct an alternative assessment as to whether
tarian and disaster relief missions. As
                                                 e Executive Secretariat Process
its title suggests, ODASD/STB also ap-
pears poised to play a role in promot-        Host Nation              STEP 1: USAID/OFDA
ing the utility and eventual acquisition
                                               Request for Support             Validates Request          State Department
                                               from U.S. Embassy     1                                    Drafts Request
of SSTR-related capabilities, many of                                                                                      2
which would be appropriate for HA/DR,                                              STEP 2: Request Transmitted to DoD
though little appears to be happening          OUSD P /CMO
                                               Staffs Request with 3
on this front at the moment. All three         Appropriate Offices        STEP 3: Request Approved                e Joint Staff
offices work closely together and with                                          and DoD Response Sent                      4
other DoD bureaus and agencies, as well                                                          STEP 4: Order Issued
                                                                  Regional Command
as with the Joint Staff ( for tasking spe-


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                        the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process            11
                 the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                        military aid is truly required and should be request-      the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for final
                                        ed. Given OFDA’s role as the LFA for foreign disaster      review and approval by the secretary and/or deputy
                                        relief, the DART teams are supposed to have the fi-        secretary of defense. Once approval (which would
                                        nal word on such matters. In practice, however, for-       include the third-party waiver discussed earlier) is
                                        ward-deployed military units are often the first to        given, the Joint Staff orders the appropriate regional
                                        arrive on scene as part of a DoD humanitarian assis-       combatant command, such as PACOM or SOUTHCOM,
                                        tance survey team (or HAST), and such teams may            and, if necessary, a functional combatant command,
                                        very well conduct the first in-depth assessment of         such as U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM)
                                        conditions on the ground, including making ini-            or Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), to respond to the
                                        tial recommendations with regard to the type and           crisis and provide both humanitarian assistance and
                                        level of military support required. This is especial-      any needed on-site organizational support.7 Mean-
                                        ly true when disasters occur in countries quite dis-       while, throughout this entire process, the CMO ex-
                                        tant from the United States. When cyclone Sidr hit         perts will have been coordinating planning efforts
                                        Bangladesh in November 2007, for example, a twen-          informally with their counterparts in the main State
                                        ty-three-person HAST unit from the 3rd Marine Ex-          Department, USAID/OFDA, the local U.S. embassy
                                        peditionary Force (MEF) based on Okinawa arrived           in the disaster-stricken country, and other relevant
                                        well before any DART team members from Wash-               agencies and departments, to determine the neces-
                                        ington, and immediately began to develop a plan, in        sary extent of the operation and the optimal mili-
                                        coordination with Bangladeshi government and U.S.          tary deployment, given the evolving situation within
                                        embassy officials in Dhaka, for how best to provide        the disaster zone.
                                        essential U.S. military assistance (Dubee 2007; U.S.           Since the 2007 OUSD(P) reorganization, this back-
                                        Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Force Public Affairs         channel coordination process has also forestalled a
                                        Office 2007). That said, the official request for such     frivolous or inappropriate request for military assis-
                                        aid must still be agreed to by USAID/OFDA experts          tance on more than one occasion. For example, when
                                        and forwarded to DoD based on a DART recommen-             State and DoD were discussing how best to respond
                                        dation, albeit one that may have been definitively         to the March 2007 floods in Bolivia, GSA/CMO offi-
                                        shaped by a prior HAST assessment.                         cials got wind of, and were then able to head off, an
                                            Only DoD, however, can actually commit military        impending request from State that DoD airlift three
                                        assets in support of an OFDA-approved assessment,          bailey bridges (pre-engineered, ready-to-assemble
                                        having first reached a conclusion that appropri-           steel bridges often used by the military) to hard-hit
                                        ate assets are indeed available and that there are         areas, a response that would have been out of propor-
                                        no overriding military mission requirements else-          tion to the damage on the ground, overly expensive,
6                 Specific guidance for DoD and mil- where for the use of said assets.6 With-      and of dubious utility to the local population even if
           itary involvement in foreign disaster re- in DoD, the humanitarian operations           delivered. During the same crisis, SOUTHCOM, at the
           lief is set forth in DoD directive 5100.46,
         “Responsibilities for Foreign Disaster Re-
                                                       staff based in the CMO office takes the     request of the U.S. embassy in La Paz, was preparing
          lief Operations,” http://www.js.mil/whs/ lead in moving a request for military           to airlift relief supplies (such as blankets and plastic
                 directives/corres/pdf/510046p.pdf. support through the in-house bureau-           sheets) found at a Miami-based USAID warehouse to
7            Support from functional COCOMs may cratic process. Through an intra-DoD re-           the disaster area, but, again, timely GSA/CMO inter-
      be requested if, for example, additional air- view process that it manages, this staff       vention helped USAID to identify a less expensive al-
    lift or sealift from TRANSCOM is needed, or if
     regional COCOM forces need to be reinforced
                                                       collaborates with other DoD offices, in-    ternative – shipment by Federal Express. Reaching
        with forces based in the continental Unit- cluding the appropriate regional desk,          these decisions took a good deal of back and forth,
           ed States (CONUS) under JFCOM control. the Joint Staff, the Office of the Comp-         largely via email, between State and DoD, but the pro-
                                        troller, Legal Affairs, and the Defense Security Co-       cess demonstrates that DoD can and does exert con-
                                        operation Agency (DSCA), to organize and propose a         siderable influence behind the scenes to shape and,
                                        military response or to deny the request. Even in the      if necessary, redirect State Department requests for
                                        event of a large-scale disaster likely to require a sub-   military assistance, even if it can not always prevent
                                        stantial DoD/military response, this review can be         ill-considered requests in the first place.
                                        accomplished within two to three hours, after which            Several factors, however, may prompt either
                                        a draft plan is sent back up the chain of command in       the U.S. ambassador or the regional COCOM com-


                                                                                                                                       Finding the Right Mix

                 12                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

mander to side-step both the formal and infor-               e DoD Coordination/Approval Process
mal request processes described above and to                                                   Coordination             Secretary of State
                                                          Secretary of State
set in motion a military response to a local di-
                                                                      Request for             DoD Comptroller
saster without a prior request for DoD assistance                     DoD Support                                       Secretary of Defense
from State’s Executive Secretariat or, in some
                                                          Secretary of Defense
cases, without waiting for DoD approval of such a                                             OSD Regional
                                                                                              Desks                     OSD Leadership
request. First, a COCOM commander already has
a limited degree of authority to act alone (gen-          Office of the Under                   DSCA                      Coalition & Multinational
erally in the first forty-eight hours) to provide         Secretary of Defense                                          Operations
                                                          for Policy / Coalition
emergency assistance when a rapid response is             & Multinational                     Joint Staff
seen as vital to saving life, limb, and property. In      Operations (CMO)                                              Joint Staff/Regional
                                                                                                                        Command
such cases, the COCOM commander may deploy                                                    DoD General
military and civil defense assets under his or her                                            Counsel
control to the disaster site without prior DoD ap-
proval, though such assistance normally must be
                                                        ularly strong in AORs (such as the Asia-Pacific the-
capped at $100,000 in value. Moreover, once the
                                                        ater) where the distances and travel time can be
immediate crisis has been stabilized, further ac-
                                                        quite long between potential military responders
tion requires formal DoD guidance via the CMO
                                                        and the disaster site in question.
and the wider intra-DoD/interagency process. For
                                                            For instance, in response to an undersea earth-
instance, within hours of the Indian Ocean tsu-
                                                        quake and tsunami in the Solomon Islands on April
nami tragedy, the U.S. Navy deployed P-3 Orion re-
                                                        2, 2007, the U.S. ambassador to Papua New Guinea,
connaissance aircraft to assist with initial search
                                                        the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, Leslie V. Rowe,
and rescue efforts and to assess the extent of the
                                                        requested urgent military assistance from PACOM
damage. All subsequent military action, howev-
                                                        Commander Admiral Timothy J. Keating, including
er, was directed through the appropriate chan-
                                                        helicopter support that had proven so popular and
nels and chains of command.
                                                        effective in both the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and
    Second, even before a regional COCOM acts, a U.S.
                                                        the 2005 Pakistan earthquake relief efforts. Though
ambassador in the COCOM AOR may reach out di-
                                                        relatively minor compared to the death and destruc-
rectly to the COCOM commander and ask for assis-
                                                        tion caused by these two larger disasters, the dam-
tance (though, as suggested earlier, the likelihood
                                                        age wrought by the Solomon Islands earthquake and
of such a request would depend largely on any per-
                                                        tsunami was viewed by local officials as the most ex-
sonal relationship already established between the
                                                        tensive to be suffered by the islands since the bat-
ambassador and the COCOM commander). At a min-
                                                        tle-related damage of World War II, much of which,
imum, such a move would preempt the formal plan-
                                                        in the eyes of the indigenous population, had been
ning and interagency decision-making processes of
                                                        imposed by American military operations. Draw-
the Departments of State and Defense, including
                                                        ing perhaps on the example set in Pakistan (where
OFDA, processes that, as noted above, are already
                                                        U.S. helicopters came to be seen as “angels of mer-
susceptible to being short-circuited or incorrectly
                                                        cy” by Pakistanis who had previously expressed hos-
followed. Unfortunately, in some cases where this
                                                        tility towards America), Ambassador Rowe hoped
has occurred, the eagerness of the U.S. ambassador,
                                                        that the rapid deployment of helicopter-carrying
the COCOM commander, or both, to show clout, en-
                                                        U.S. naval platforms to the Solomons would trigger
gage in humanitarian activities, and promote the U.S.
                                                        an equally welcome degree of goodwill toward the
image abroad has generated decisions whose impli-
                                                        United States among the islanders while also pro-
cations were not fully considered, especially with
                                                        viding timely relief assistance of a more practical
regard to the utility and necessity of the military
                                                        and necessary sort.
support provided or the level and source of fund-
                                                            In response to Ambassador Rowe’s request, PA-
ing needed to underwrite it. The inclination to act
                                                        COM immediately pre-deployed the USNS Stockham,
in a somewhat more precipitous manner than may
                                                        which carried a contingent of the ship-borne heli-
be warranted, moreover, would seem to be partic-
                                                        copters so desired by Rowe (in this case, SH 60F Sea

Finding the Right Mix

                                                                       the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process                 13
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                    Hawks), so that the helicopters would be nearby and          mally well versed in HA/DR issues and procedures,
                                     ready to provide some medical-related lift assistance       tend to drive the process for requesting DoD assis-
                                    as soon as formal DoD approval came through.8 How-           tance and to bypass USAID. Moreover, since a request
                                    ever, in this particular case, the decision to request       for military assistance via the Executive Secretari-
                                                     and send U.S. military equipment was        at process must be sent from one Cabinet-level of-
8       Since it could take up to six days to get a premature. USAID/OFDA did not believe,       fice to another (in this case, from the secretary of
  ship with the necessary assets from Hawaii to and OASD/GSA later agreed, that the              state to the secretary of defense), USAID’s authori-
    the Solomon Islands, and as long as seven to
   ten days to complete the Executive Secretari-
                                                     scale or scope of the disaster, as bad as   ty and interaction with DoD are often subordinated
   at approval process, it might be two weeks or it was for the islands, really warranted        to that of the U.S. ambassador, the regional bureaus,
    more before help arrived if PACOM had wait- DoD involvement, especially since Aus-           and, more specifically, State’s Executive Secretari-
        ed for formal approval before deploying.
                                                     tralia and New Zealand were closer and      at (which is also staffed largely by regional bureau/
                                                     already assisting militarily (interview     country team veterans). As a result, the COCOMs
                                    2007a). In the end, the Sea Hawks aboard the Stock-          sometimes provide services (or are pressed to do
                                    ham did provide some medical-related transport               so) even when OFDA assessments have concluded,
                                    and lift assistance, and, somewhat ironically, they          or would if consulted, that such assistance, though
                                    were used to “rescue some rescuers” when Red Cross           useful, may be unnecessary.
                                     relief workers traveling on a Taiwanese freighter got           This is not to suggest, however, that ambassa-
                                    caught up on some off-shore reefs. For the most part,        dors, COCOM commanders, and others on the front
                                     however, local officials and NGO teams ashore had           lines of a sudden disaster are wrong to try to expe-
                                    no idea how to use the Sea Hawks as part of the              dite the process, nor that following the Executive
                                     initial relief effort, and there were almost certain-       Secretariat process to the letter will produce the
                                     ly cheaper and perfectly adequate ways to provide           best and most effective response when time is of
                                    what help the Stockham and its crew eventually did           the essence. Indeed, unless there is high-level po-
                                    provide. After some deliberation, USAID determined           litical pressure moving the process along, as there
                                     that no more than $200,000 worth of non-military            almost always is for large-scale disasters such as
                                    U.S. assistance was really required, and PACOM had           the Pakistan earthquake, the Executive Secretariat
                                     to absorb most of the costs of deploying the Stock-         process can be cumbersome and time-consuming,
                                    ham. Hence, even though the Stockham proved use-             even when it unfolds as it should via the appropri-
                                     ful once it was on the scene, it was not essential, and     ate experts at OFDA and DoD. For the more com-
                                     the entire episode illustrates how calling on U.S. mil-     mon small- to medium-scale disasters, however,
                                     itary assets prematurely and/or unnecessarily can           such pressure is often absent, and requests for very
                                    waste scarce resources and burden an already over-           specific, time-urgent military assistance can get un-
                                     taxed military.                                             necessarily bogged down in red tape, even if prop-
    9             Though admittedly somewhat arbi-          As a general rule, GSA/CMO offi-     er procedures are being followed.9 To some extent,
        trary, disaster response planners in DoD de- cials argue, the U.S. military should       this was the case during the Solomon Islands crisis,
    fine small- to medium-scale disasters as events
           that cost around $2 million or less, and in
                                                        be viewed as a resource of last re-      and it seemed likely to become an ongoing problem
         which no more than two thousand to three sort, not a resource of first resort. It       during a rash of similarly small-scale, but nonethe-
          thousand (and normally considerably few- should be called on to assist when            less quite devastating, disasters that occurred within
         er) people die and no more than a few thou-
       sand are displaced. In contrast, a large-scale
                                                        the civilian response capacity has       fairly narrow geographic zones during the summer
         disaster might involve tens of thousands of been overwhelmed and the mili-              and fall of 2007, including an August earthquake in
      deaths and hundreds of thousands (if not mil- tary can provide a unique service            Peru, flooding in Nicaragua in September as a re-
         lions) of displaced persons, while imposing
                                                        for which no other comparable ci-        sult of hurricane Felix, widespread wind and water
     costs of tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.
                                                        vilian alternative exists. However,      damage in the Dominican Republic in November
                                    even though USAID is the LFA for overseas disas-             due to tropical storm Noel, and later in November
                                     ter assistance, it is often viewed as an LFA in name        the impact of cyclone Sidr on Bangladesh. Clearly,
                                    only, and its expertise and responsibilities ignored.        relying on an Executive Secretariat review process
                                    As likely happened in the Solomon Islands case, the          that could take anywhere from seven to fourteen
                                     local U.S. ambassador and the country officers in the       days to complete was not ideal for handling back-
                                     relevant regional bureau at State, who are not nor-         to-back disasters of this magnitude. Something had


                                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix

                14                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                      the   InstItute    for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

to be done to accelerate the provision of essential        the likely depletion of DoD’s quite small annual fund-
military assistance in these lesser, but still serious,    ing line for disaster response), the more deliberative
cases, when essential aid could not be found from lo-      Executive Secretariat process will be followed. This
cal or international civilian sources, and the prompt         Letter of Commitment Process
and targeted provision of American military assis-
                                                                Host Nation
tance could make a world of difference.                         Request for Support         Letter of Commitment
                                                                                                                        Regional Command
    Fortunately, lessons learned from this series of            from US Embassy                         faxed from
                                                                                                                        Prepares and
                                                                                                    USAID/OFDA
back-to-back crises have prompted a real break-                                                                         pre-positions forces
through in how requests for military assistance will                  3-way Dialogue
be handled in the future for small- and medium-scale                                                                    OUSD P /CMO
                                                                              USAID/OFDA
                                                                                                                        Expedites intra-DoD
disasters. When such an event occurs, the appropri-                                                                     Review and Approval
ate officers from the main State Department, USAID/              Main State Bureaus
OFDA, OSD, and the local regional COCOM will have a                                                                     Joint Staff
four-way dialogue (mostly via email) to determine                             OUSD P /CMO                               Directs COCOMs on
                                                                                                                        Specific Deployments
if military assistance really seems to be required. If
the answer is yes, then USAID/OFDA will fax a one-
                                                                           Regional Command                          Functional Commands
page “letter of commitment” stating that this is in-                       Back Channel Dialogue                     Alerted if Necessary
deed the case to the regional COCOM, a copy of which
is sent simultaneously to the CMO office in OSD. CMO
authorities then will expedite the intra-DoD coordi-       makes perfect sense given that the military compo-
nation they would normally begin when military as-         nent of any response is likely to be quite diverse and
sistance is requested, facilitate a DoD decision on a      sizeable, and will almost certainly play – as it did in
proper course of action, forward that decision to          the responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and
the secretary or deputy secretary of defense for for-      the 2005 Pakistani earthquake – a prominent man-
mal approval (and the third-party waiver), and then        agement role in the early relief phases of such oper-
transmit that approval to the COCOM, which will al-        ations, which must be carefully coordinated across
ready be organizing the required response on the ba-       interagency lines and aligned with broader interna-
sis of the faxed letter of commitment. The goal is to      tional efforts. Making sure to cross as many of the t’s
complete this whole process, from initial request to       and dot as many of the i’s as possible in the initial
deployment, in less than twelve hours, and recent          requests for support and deployment decisions will
experiences suggest that it can often be done even         make the response that follows that much smoother
faster. Operating with only a skeletal crew the day        and more effective. On the other hand, when one or
before Thanksgiving in 2007, for example, it took DoD      more smaller disasters occur, the task is not so much
no more than ten hours to get the requested mili-          one of marshalling a huge multi-agency, cross-insti-
tary aid headed to Bangladesh after cyclone Sidr hit,      tutional response over a wide geographical area, but
and it took only fifteen minutes to get the assistance     one of getting very specific assets and supplies, such
needed on its way to the Dominican Republic dur-           as search and rescue helicopters or fresh drinking
ing tropical storm Noel (interview 2007b). For com-        water, very quickly on the scene. For this more lim-
parison’s sake, under the traditional Executive Sec-       ited but still very essential type of operation, the let-
retariat format, it can take two to three days just to     ter-of-commitment process will be preferred, as it
complete the State-USAID-DoD coordination process,         allows a timely and targeted response.
and up to seven to ten days to get any approved mil-
itary assistance to the actual disaster zone.              Capacity Building over the Longer Term
    Since late 2007, then, decisions on DoD’s provision    In addition to such efforts to reform and stream-
of foreign disaster relief have in theory been guided      line the State-DoD request for assistance process
by a new two-tier process. In the event of a large-scale   (discussed more fully under “Initiatives to Improve
disaster such as a massive tsunami or earthquake           and Institutionalize the Interagency Process,” be-
(perhaps involving tens of thousands killed, hun-          low), OASD/GSA planners are taking steps to improve
dreds of thousands or even millions displaced, and         the overall impact of military-led humanitarian


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                          the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process                           15
               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                     assistance activities by shifting DoD’s focus from        the countries visited (some of which were home to
                                     short-term recovery projects and high-profile, time-      large Islamic populations), the cost of the deploy-
                                     limited initiatives to longer-term capacity-building      ment plus all the services provided amounted to be-
                                     activities to enhance local and regional skills and re-   tween $26 million and $30 million, and many argue
                                     sources. Each year, DoD receives about $60 million        that most of the benefits of these visits – including
                                     for overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid        the needed medical support and the boost in Amer-
                                     (OHDACA) projects, some $40 million of which is tar-      ican popularity – simply sailed away or atrophied
                                     geted for longer-term capacity-building efforts that      once the Mercy left port. Moreover, among some so-
                                     include medical and logistical assistance, the con-       cieties, it has been further argued, such operations
                                     struction of schools, clinics, and roads, and training    can create dangerous dependencies among the pop-
                                     in disaster planning and preparedness.10 Even with        ulations served that might produce over time the op-
                                     the best of intentions, however, the desired outcome      posite effect of what is desired – local resentment
                                                    can prove difficult to achieve and sus-    over a level of American assistance that could never
10      Of the $60 million, roughly $40 million is
   earmarked for humanitarian assistance pro- tain. For example, as the U.S. military          be adequately repaid or developed indigenously.11
   grams, $5 million for the humanitarian mine relief effort in Pakistan after the earth-          More recent medical and “health diplomacy”
     action program, and $17 million for foreign quake came to a close, the decision was       missions undertaken in 2007 by the USS Peleliu, an
     disaster relief and emergency response. For
 more information, see U.S. Department of De-
                                                    made to donate to the Pakistani 67th       amphibious assault ship equipped for the first time
      fense, Defense Security Cooperation Agen-     Medical Battalion a Mobile Army Sur-       to conduct a medical mission, in Southeast Asia and
       cy (2007). Funding issues are discussed in gical Hospital (MASH) that had been set      Oceania and by the USNS Comfort hospital ship in
  more depth in the last section of this chapter.
                                                    up in Muzaffarabad. The MASH unit had      the Caribbean and South America made a consid-
11      Some experts argue that this could be es-
    pecially troublesome when dealing with the      treated over twenty thousand patients,     erable effort to redress some of these shortcomings.
  island communities of Oceania and the West- conducted some sixteen thousand im-              The missions integrated a number of off-ship civic
       ern Pacific where “gift culture” traditions, munizations, and filled close to thir-     assistance and educational programs into the op-
   most notably the felt need to “repay” a gift or
      service provided by a visitor, are deeply in-
                                                    ty-eight thousand prescriptions, and       erational plan and began to establish partnerships,
    grained. In this context, when providing aid the idea was that it could now play an        when possible well before the ship deploys, between
        and humanitarian assistance, one should equally crucial role in addressing fu-         on-board civil support teams and NGOs based ashore.
     be careful, these experts argue, not to make
                                                    ture local needs during the recovery       In 2008, the same approach was followed with a
       the recipients feel incapable of reciprocat-
     ing in some meaningful way, because of the     period. Unfortunately, the MASH unit       good deal of success in organizing the Mercy’s fol-
    scale and/or nature of the support provided. was soon abandoned as the Pakistani           low-on deployment to Southeast Asia and Oceania,
                                                    military was not sufficiently trained or   and the maiden medical missions undertaken by the
                                     equipped to sustain it, and all the operational man-      amphibious assault ships USS Boxer and USS Kear-
                                     uals that might have helped had somehow been lost         sarge in the Caribbean Sea and along both the Atlan-
                                     soon after the donation. The U.S. Army, moreover,         tic and Pacific coasts of Central and South America.
                                     had already mothballed the remaining MASH units           Such efforts (discussed in more detail in chapters 3
                                     in its own possession and shifted to a more mod-          and 4) may well lay the groundwork for more sus-
                                     ern field hospital system, so access to spare parts       tainable projects that help build local capacity with-
                                     would have become a problem in the relative near          in the countries visited, all of which could, in turn,
                                     future even if the Pakistanis could have sustained        help to reduce the damage suffered and the outside
                                     operations.                                               assistance needed in the event of future disasters.
                                          Humanitarian assistance specialists in OASD/             The cost of each operation, however, has hovered
                                     GSA’s Partnership Strategy Office argue that simi-        in the $20 million range, and the projected costs for
                                     lar inefficiencies and failures to take a longer-term     similar operations in the future are not expected to
                                     perspective tended to limit the overall utility of the    decline. Funding at that level is clearly beyond the
                                     highly publicized medical missions undertaken in          scope of DoD’s annual OHDACA budget, so the U.S.
                                     2006 by the USNS Mercy, one the U.S. Navy’s two ac-       Navy, whose leadership views these deployments
                                     tive hospital ships. While the thirty-day deployment      as crucial tools for engaging key foreign countries
                                     of the Mercy in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of        and improving America’s image among their citizens,
                                     the Indian Ocean tsunami led to immediate jumps           is now hoping to build into the Navy’s 2010 budget
                                     in local approval ratings for the United States among     (and the future-years defense budget, of which it will


                                                                                                                                 Finding the Right Mix

               16                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 be a part), a line item for up to four such missions       prove to be critical in turning back efforts by local
 a year, for a total of $80 million. In the meantime,       insurgents or terrorist groups to exploit the dire cir-
 the Navy appears willing to continue to underwrite         cumstances that often prevail after a disaster to ad-
 such costs as part of its annual operations and main-      vance their own agendas.
 tenance (O&M) expenditures, but it remains to be
 seen if it will continue to do so if special line-item     Initiatives to Improve and
 funding is not approved for 2010 or maintained in          Institutionalize the Interagency
 subsequent years (interview 2008).12                       Process
     With these considerations in mind, OSD planners
                                                            As mentioned above, given the shortcomings of
 in the GSA/PRT office are turning increasingly to
                                                            the State-DoD military assistance request process
 the experiences of the NGO humanitarian assistance
                                                            as practiced in recent years (especially in Execu-
 community for guidance on the design of cost-effec-                                                                     12 The current chief of na-
                                                            tive Secretariat format), disaster relief specialists        val operations, Admiral
 tive projects that may have a longer-lasting impact
                                                            in OSD’s CMO office have focused since the office            Gary Roughead, USN, speaks
 on local capacities to manage and recover from di-                                                                      strongly in favor of such fund-
                                                            was created in January 2007 on introducing a high-
 saster events. The conclusion these planners seem                                                                       ing for carefully planned med-
                                                            er degree of professionalism and standardization to
 to be reaching is that a smaller amount of mon-                                                                         ical ship deployments and
                                                            the overall process. To a large extent, this has in-         other naval humanitarian ac-
 ey more wisely spent may have a larger overall im-
                                                            volved greater efforts on DoD’s part to educate re-          tivities that are programmed
 pact – including on local attitudes toward America                                                                      well in advance. From his per-
                                                            gional bureau and Executive Secretariat personnel
– than high-profile, one-off, photo-op events that                                                                       spective, such efforts – which
                                                            at the State Department on the rules and proper              he calls “proactive humani-
 don’t directly help the local population help itself
                                                            procedures for assessing a foreign disaster and or-          tarian assistance” – offer bet-
 and that may or may not be repeated. Future initia-                                                                     ter opportunities to bring to
                                                            ganizing a properly scaled and composed response
 tives should also focus, these planners say, on leav-                                                                   bear the full range of the Na-
                                                            that includes the military. This is a vital first step to-   vy’s HA/DR capabilities (e.g.,
 ing something more permanent behind and on what
                                                            ward improving State-DoD and broader interagency             medical aid, engineering, lift,
 happens after the mission ends. In this context, par-                                                                   training) in support of useful
                                                            coordination, and it needs to be pursued on a reg-
 ticular note was made of a month-long health edu-                                                                       projects that will have a last-
                                                            ular, institutionalized basis, given that there is no
 cation program run by the Red Cross in East Timor                                                                       ing impact (interview 2008).
                                                            established, functional equivalent at State to OSD’s
 that pulled fifty healthcare officials from fifteen dis-
                                                            CMO operation. Indeed, since the OHDACA funding
 tricts together for a two-week intensive course, took
                                                            began in earnest in 1996, personnel now assigned to
 the top 20 percent for more in-depth training with-
                                                            CMO have developed considerable expertise in disas-
 in their home districts, and finally drew them all to-
                                                            ter relief and humanitarian operations, but the non-
 gether again for a broader health policy course, all
                                                            USAID personnel they must interact with at State
 for a total cost of just $110,000.
                                                            have relatively little background in HA/DR issues
     To be sure, hospital ship visits can be of great
                                                            and procedures, including for many a limited un-
 service, especially during the early days of a disas-
                                                            derstanding of the State/USAID role as LFA. To help
 ter and during the immediate recovery phase, and
                                                            bridge this information gap, CMO has developed a
 in view of the successful cruises of the Peleliu and
                                                            detailed briefing, “Foreign Disaster Response,” that
 Comfort in 2007, as well as Mercy, Boxer, and Kear-
                                                            it has been presenting primarily to regional bureau
 sarge in 2008, a more multi-mission approach with
                                                            personnel. The briefing is essentially a primer on
 greater activity ashore promises to be the wave of
                                                            the overall U.S. foreign disaster response decision-
 the future regarding the Navy’s annual humanitari-
                                                            making process, but with an emphasis on DoD’s role,
 an assistance activities in key regional theaters. That
                                                            authority, and organizational structure in the area
 said, for U.S. military and broader DoD engagement
                                                            of HA/DR operations.
 efforts with vulnerable countries in the periods be-
                                                                In part as an outgrowth of these briefing activi-
 fore and after a disaster strikes, smaller-scale, ca-
                                                            ties, DoD and State (with CMO and USAID/OFDA, re-
 pacity-building programs may yield better “disaster
                                                            spectively, in the lead) have set up a joint working
 diplomacy” returns over time. As the more success-
                                                            group aimed at reforming and professionalizing
 ful provincial reconstruction team (PRT) programs
                                                            the much-discussed Executive Secretariat process,
 in Afghanistan and Iraq are proving, such efforts to
                                                            which remains the preferred approach for larger-
 address local needs in a sustainable way could also
                                                            scale disasters. A key DoD objective in the working

Finding the Right Mix

                                                                            the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process              17
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                       group is to promote reforms to current practice           of action. Rather than make a specific request for a
                                       that would require State to confirm that DoD as-          particular military capability (which State officials,
                                       sistance is in fact “necessary and essential” (and        including those at OFDA, tend to do), the template
                                       not simply “desirable” or “useful to have”) and to        would lay out a more detailed description of the sit-
                                       vest in USAID, and OFDA specifically, the authori-        uation on the ground, such as the scale and type of
                                       ty to make that determination. At present, USAID          physical damage, the level and nature of casualties,
                                       and OFDA, despite their putative LFA expertise, are       the status of any displaced persons or refugees, the
13       Similarly, DoD never really wants to re- only required “to check a box” (along          condition of transport infrastructure, and the over-
       fuse a serious request from State for mili- with other main State Department of-          all security conditions. The request would leave it
    tary support, in part as such support is seen
  as an increasingly important mission in what
                                                     fices) simply confirming that military      to OSD, the Joint Staff, and ultimately the region-
    is now called phase 0 (pre-conflict) military assistance would be “useful,” a confir-        al and functional COCOMs to determine what mili-
   operations aimed at shaping the security en- mation that USAID and OFDA are gener-            tary assets to provide, where they should be drawn
     vironment in key regional theaters (and en-
 gaging potential allies and coalition partners)
                                                     ally quite willing to give once a request   from, when they should depart or be supplied, and
     so as to prevent future crises and/or to pre-   gets this far, as it would normally mean    under what rules of engagement. Working together
   pare for an effective response. Hence, the im- fewer demands on the USAID budget to           with main State and USAID/OFDA specialists, CMO
   portance of ensuring that there’s a real need,
                                                     underwrite support that DoD and the         officials are also putting together a one-day train-
      lest scarce DoD resources, including fund-
             ing, for disaster relief be misapplied. military would otherwise provide.13 To      ing course and a longer course module on the for-
                                                     help boost USAID/OFDA authority, the        eign disaster relief decision process that will soon be
                                       CMO office in OSD also supports the adoption of a         integrated into the core curriculum of the Foreign
                                       national security presidential directive (NSPD) that      Service Institute (FSI). Ideally, once the diplomats
                                       would give USAID Cabinet-level authority, given that      so trained are assigned to various regional bureaus
                                       the State-to-DoD request for military assistance un-      and/or posted overseas, the ideas presented in these
                                       der the Executive Secretariat process must proceed        educational materials will be sustained by efforts
                                       as a Cabinet-level exchange. Clearly, this will not       now underway at the State Department’s Bureau
                                       happen in the near term, but if it ever does, OFDA as-    for Political-Military Affairs to publish a first-ever
                                       sessments of the need (or lack thereof) for military/     guidebook on HA/DR policies and procedures.
                                       DoD assistance, which more often than not are quite           Over at the Pentagon, recent efforts to update
                                       similar to those made by disaster relief experts in       OSD policy guidance with regard to foreign disaster
                                       OASD/GSA/CMO, would presumably hold sway over             relief should also make for a smoother, better-coor-
                                       those of State’s Executive Secretariat and regional       dinated interagency process. For example, the CMO
                                       bureaus, who tend to support the requests of the          office is in the midst of substantially updating DoD
                                       local ambassador, however inexpert he or she may          directive 5100.46, “Responsibilities for Foreign Disas-
                                       be. For smaller-scale relief operations, of course, the   ter Relief Operations,” a key DoD document last up-
                                       newly instituted letter-of-commitment process al-         dated in December 1975. The current effort will bring
                                       ready assures USAID and OFDA a more central role          DoD’s stated policy more fully into accord with the
                                       in authorizing and coordinating a military/COCOM          strategic realities of the post-9/11 world, and ensure
                                       response.                                                 that the sections of the directive that detail which
                                           Meanwhile, DoD’s focus, both in the working           DoD offices and agencies have lead responsibility for
                                       group and more generally, will be on educating the        organizing and implementing any U.S. military sup-
                                       non-expert community at State on the criteria for         port to a foreign disaster relief effort reflect the orga-
                                       determining whether or not military assistance is         nizational changes instituted at OUSD(P) in January
                                       essential and on the correct procedural steps to re-      2007. Further, the updated directive will require CO-
                                       quest and secure such support, be it via a letter of      COMs to file carefully structured after-action reports
                                       commitment or the more formal Executive Secre-            following any disaster relief operation they are in-
                                       tariat process. Toward that end, another key objec-       volved in, so that the primary lessons learned with
                                       tive of the CMO office has been to develop a template     regard to operational challenges, capability needs,
                                       for the Department of State to use when requesting        requirements for interagency/multinational coor-
                                       DoD assistance, so that such requests will provide in-    dination, and the like are captured on paper and
                                       formation that DoD can use in deciding on a course        filed in a central location, even if they are still not


                                                                                                                                      Finding the Right Mix

                18                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                 the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

fully embraced by those responsible for disaster re-      for how to more effectively leverage existing DoD/
lief planning and preparedness. Moreover, while DoD       military assets in concert with those that may be
directive 5100.46 has been undergoing revisions, the      provided by non-DoD/civil contributors to foreign
Partnership Strategy Office at OASD/GSA has been          disaster relief (U.S. GAO 2007, 24-33).
crafting a new DoD directive on humanitarian assis-           As is discussed in greater detail in subsequent
tance, outlining procedures and assigning responsi-       chapters of this study, clarifying capability needs
bilities for DoD relief efforts and disaster prevention   and interagency coordination requirements will be
programs that may be set in motion after the ini-         no easy task. Moreover, as imperfect as the State De-
tial crisis response. Such a document (a final draft      partment’s understanding of DoD procedures and
of which should be ready by 2009) has never ex-           capabilities for HA/DR missions may be, many of
isted before, and the need for one now is but one         the roadblocks that now inhibit smoother State-
more illustration of DoD’s growing role in post-di-       DoD and broader interagency coordination can be
saster recovery and capacity-building efforts, all of     traced to shortcomings in DoD policies and organi-
which must be closely coordinated with those of the       zational structures. Among the COCOMs, for exam-
Department of State, other federal agencies and in-       ple, efforts to facilitate interagency participation in
ternational organizations that become involved in         contingency planning for HA/DR missions and oth-
foreign disasters, and the nongovernmental human-         er stability operations – principally through each
itarian-aid community.                                    COCOM’s Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JI-
    At a broader policy level, the PRT office is also     ACG) – have met with limited success so far, not the
leading a DoD effort to integrate the secretary of        least because of the relatively small number of quali-
defense’s Security Cooperation Guidance (which in-        fied personnel from non-DoD agencies and organiza-
cludes military training, exercise, and assistance        tions who are trained and available to participate in
projects by the COCOMs to help build foreign part-        JIACG planning sessions. For example, CENTCOM’s JI-
ner skills and capabilities) with his Contingency         ACG, which is by far the largest in terms of proposed
Planning Guidance (which focuses on military ser-         staffing, had a total projected membership of fifty-
vice requirements to cope with primary warfighting        six in 2007, consisting of forty-nine DoD employees
scenarios). The end result, currently referred to as      ( forty-one military, eight civilian), two FBI agents,
the Guidance for the Employment of Forces (or the         and only one representative each from State, DEA,
GEF), should accord a higher degree of importance         Homeland Security, Treasury, and USAID (U.S. GAO
in military planning circles to non-warfighting, en-      2007, 28). Similarly limited representation from be-
gagement-type missions such as disaster relief and        yond DoD was projected for the EUCOM and PACOM
humanitarian assistance, just as the earlier-men-         JIACGs, and in all cases competing commitments
tioned DoD directive 3000.05 elevated stability op-       elsewhere and travel funding constraints rendered
erations as a whole to the level of a core military       the presence of even these few non-DoD person-
mission on par ( for planning purposes at least) with     nel an uncertain proposition. As one COCOM wag
combat operations. Whether or not the GEF – a fi-         summed it up, “It’s awfully hard to promote inter-
nal draft of which was approved in May 2008 – will        agency coordination when the people attending in-
be adhered to and fully embraced by the military          teragency meetings are almost all DoD personnel”
services and COCOMs remains to be seen, but, if it        (interview 2007c).
is, the incentives to develop better procedures and           Other DoD-related constraints include the fact
improved capabilities to support foreign disaster re-     that DoD policy generally discourages the sharing
lief operations, including mechanisms to enhance          of DoD contingency plans with non-DoD agencies
interagency coordination among all primary partic-        or offices unless the secretary of defense explicitly
ipants in such operations, would certainly receive        authorizes it. Moreover, COCOM commanders nor-
a boost. Ideally, this would help as well to reinforce    mally must pass the interagency elements of any
recent calls by Congress that DoD and the COCOMs          contingency plan (including those for HA/DR opera-
make greater efforts to identify potential capability     tions) through the Joint Staff to the National Security
gaps in the stability operations realm (which, again,     Council (NSC) for interagency staffing and plan de-
includes HA/DR missions), together with proposals         velopment (U.S. GAO 2007, 32). In addition to the co-


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                         the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process            19
               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                      ordination challenges that such a cumbersome and          the Pentagon, the CMO office has prepared as well
                                      hierarchical process presents, the planning cultures      an in-depth review section on HA/DR planning and
                                      of DoD and non-DoD officials are often quite diver-       operations for DoD’s standard action officer train-
                                      gent, leading to false expectations in DoD with re-       ing course, held several times each year, that will
                                      gard to the approach that other federal agencies are      provide new staff with a comprehensive overview
                                      likely to take in tackling a common problem and to        of the key players and their roles, at both the na-
                                      underestimations with regard to the level of resourc-     tional and international levels. A similar CMO brief
                                      es they would or could assign to its resolution. DoD      with a more focused DoD pitch will be integrated
                                      maintains a very robust approach to planning, sup-        into USAID’s Joint Humanitarian Operations Course
                                      ported by dedicated career personnel with access to       (JHOC) that OFDA presents on a regular basis to CO-
                                      substantial resources compared to what is available       COM staffs. According to DoD officials, these JHOC
                                      to other executive departments, and trained to an-        presentations, which began in February 2007, have
                                      ticipate and prepare for all manner of plausible sce-     helped to bring COCOM personnel up to speed on
                                      narios in any given situation (U.S. GAO 2007, 31). The    the HA/DR responsibilities and capabilities of non-
                                      State Department, by contrast, tends to focus more        DoD agencies, while making sure that they also un-
                                      narrowly on current operations and the immediate          derstand proper procedures and decision-making
                                      task at hand, an approach that, among other things,       channels for requesting and approving DoD and CO-
                                      has left it with a relatively small pool of planners to   COM assistance for foreign disaster relief beyond the
                                      support COCOM planning activities. As partial rem-        initial emergency response that any COCOM com-
                                      edy, State Department officials have proposed that        mander may authorize.15
                                      the COCOMs “virtually include” State planners, us-            So, too, recent adjustments at the Department
                                      ing electronic communication tools, and they have         of State signal a more determined effort to foster
                                      suggested as well that DoD revise its policies to al-     State-DoD and broader interagency coordination in
                                      low COCOM commanders to reach back directly to            the stability operations arena, including HA/DR ac-
                                      State and other government offices (bypassing the         tivities. In February 2007, the relatively new Office
                                      Joint Staff and the NSC) for input as HA/DR and oth-      of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabiliza-
                                      er stability operations are being organized (U.S. GAO     tion and (S/C/R&S) was removed from the main State
                                      2007, 32).14 EUCOM is apparently testing the “virtu-      Department’s organizational structure and placed
14       CNO Admiral Roughead has taken a step al linkage” idea with State, but broader         under the foreign-aid coordinator (who also heads
    in that direction by initiating a series of dis- adaptations to DoD policy to allow for     USAID), a shift that brought the S/C/R&S enterprise
  cussions and briefings with the State Depart-
    ment’s various regional bureaus to bring key
                                                     more direct COCOM reach-back to non-       squarely within a policy planning community that
    personnel up to speed on the Navy’s plan for DoD assets have yet to be taken.               is deeply committed to (if not always adept at) the
      future HA/DR missions (especially via Mer-        That said, there are signs of move-     civil dimensions of stability operations. With sup-
   cy-, Comfort-, and Peleliu-type ship visits) and
   to encourage wider participation by interest-
                                                     ment toward longer-term solutions on       port from the foreign-aid coordinator, this consoli-
      ed foreign service officers (interview 2008). the specific issue of interagency coor-     dation should eventually help the S/C/R&S office to
15       USAID personnel may not formally pres- dination for foreign disaster relief, in-       attract much-needed funding increases and more
     ent or explain DoD briefing material includ- cluding the new interagency working           personnel, both of which could help ease a num-
      ed in the overall JHOC course material, but
 they can (and do) provide it to COCOM JHOC at-
                                                     group known for now as the Foreign Di-     ber of the State-DoD coordination difficulties noted
 tendees as a key “leave behind.” This would in- saster Relief Standing Committee. This         above, such as limited staff for JIACG meetings. For
 clude clear organizational charts and decision group was created in mid-2007 as a way          example, plans to have on hand by 2008 an active
    trees, detailing primary POCs and telephone
 numbers/email addresses for key OSD officials
                                                     for the true experts and practitioners     response corps of about 30 R&S technical experts,
  who manage DoD/COCOM contributions to di- from the U.S. government’s four main                and perhaps as many as 250 sometime in the future,
       saster relief operations (interview 2007a). disaster relief offices (OASD/GSA/CMO,       who could be deployed to crisis spots overseas with-
                                                     USAID/OFDA, and both the Political-Mil-    in forty-eight hours, together with proposals to cre-
                                      itary Affairs (PM) Bureau and the Refugees, Popula-       ate a much larger civilian reserve corps (possibly in
                                      tion, and Migration (RPM) Bureau at the main State        the thousands) that could mobilize for deployment
                                      Department) to gather on a regular basis to com-          in four to six weeks, may eventually pave the way
                                      pare notes, float proposals, coordinate policies, and     to closer and more effective civilian and military
                                      identify key areas for further improvement. Within        collaboration across a range of stability and recon-


                                                                                                                                  Finding the Right Mix

               20                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

struction missions (Hegland 2007; IFPA 2007; Lopez
2008).16 By definition, this would include operations      The Issue of Funding
aimed at building up local capacity in countries that      Even if impediments to interagency coordination
have been destabilized or have become vulnerable           are reduced significantly, the ever-present chal-
to instability as a result of natural or man-made di-      lenge of securing and sustaining adequate fund-
sasters. The prospects for such collaboration seem         ing for military support to HA/DR operations will
particularly bright if still somewhat distant when         likely remain. On the surface, money issues would
note is made of the fact that S/C/R&S officials, in        not appear to be overly problematic. USAID, ele-
contrast to their State Department “cousins,” appear       ments of the main State Department, 16 Initial efforts to boost civilian R&S ca-
to have adopted a robust approach to operation-            and DoD all control a variety of fund- pabilities along these lines were out-
                                                                                                       lined by Ambassador John E. Herbst, the
al planning similar to DoD’s (Joint Force Quarter-         ing lines that are either earmarked for State Department’s coordinator for recon-
ly 2006, 82-83).                                           or could be used to underwrite foreign struction and stabilization, at a June 13,
    In the end, then, while there are clearly specific     disaster relief and humanitarian assis- 2007, Institute for Foreign Policy Analy-
improvements to be made in current HA/DR plan-             tance. In recent years, total U.S. govern- sis (IFPA) workshop in Washington, D.C..
                                                                                                       17 In this context, unity of effort could
ning and implementation procedures, solving inter-         ment spending in support of such oper- be defined as the existence a common un-
agency challenges at the broader stability operations      ations has averaged about $2.3 billion derstanding among the various partici-
level may be the real key to solving these same chal-      per year, and that figure could easily in- pants in a disaster relief operation of the
                                                                                                       overall purpose and concept of operations,
lenges at the more specific level of individual HA/DR      crease by $1 billion or so if a sudden cri- based on closely coordinated plans and pol-
operations. Both sets of activities, HA/DR missions        sis of major proportions were to occur icies and a solid foundation of mutual trust
and stability operations overall, confront a common        (Straw 2006).19 However, only a relative- and confidence (U.S. GAO 2007, 24-25).
underlying reality, namely that the tasks they must        ly small percentage of that money – un- 18 The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 re-
manage can not be accomplished by the military             til FY 2008 no more than $60 million to worked the command structure of the Unit-
                                                                                                       ed States military, placing new emphasis on
alone, but rather require a multifaceted interagen-        $63 million per year – is set aside via OH- joint, cross-service planning and operations
cy, and often multinational, team. That team, more-        DACA funding to help finance DoD and (as opposed to service-specific activities that
over, must be tailored to fit the changing needs of        COCOM activities in the HA/DR realm, were often uncoordinated). Given the new em-
the overall operation ( for example, moving from                                                                              civil-military coordi-
                                                           and a smaller percentage still (recent- phasis now placed on departments in support
                                                                                                       nation across various
initial crisis response to stabilization, recovery, and    ly about $17 million per year) for specif- of stability operations and similar activities,
reconstruction), drawing from a mix of civil and mil-      ic foreign disaster relief and emergency some now call for the passage of legislation
itary, national and international, and governmen-          response initiatives (U.S. Department that would encourage and facilitate interagen-
                                                                                                       cy collaboration in the same way that Gold-
tal and nongovernmental assets, including private          of Defense/Defense Security Coopera- water-Nichols paved the way to joint force
sector sources. This is discussed further in chap-         tion Agency 2007). Much of the OHDA- collaboration across the military services.
ter 4 (especially in the sections dealing with HA/DR       CA funding, moreover, is programmed 19 In May 2005, the U.S. Congress approved
operational concepts and civil-military coordina-          for specific activities planned well in emergency supplemental appropriations for
                                                                                                       FY 2005 in the amount of $907.34 million, $656
tion, or CMCoord, as it is now called), but the main       advance, allowing limited flexibility million of which went to the various tsunami
point here is that policy reforms and organization-        to respond to unanticipated events or relief and recovery projects with most of the
al shifts now in place or proposed for the State/DoD       to direct funding toward new, possibly remaining funds (over $250 million) going to
disaster relief decision-making process will never be      more promising, opportunities for HA/ DoD, both for OHDACA and O&M expenditures.
as effective as planned or expected unless or until        DR collaboration with foreign partners
the diverse interagency and institutional contribu-        as they arise.
tors that increasingly are drawn into foreign disas-           That said, despite their limitations, OHDACA ap-
ter relief operations, particularly large-scale ones       propriations provide the lifeblood for a family of DoD
such as the 2005 Pakistan earthquake response, real-       HA/DR programs authorized under Title 10 of the
ly learn to collaborate and achieve a unity of effort.17   U.S. Code (which deals with the structure and opera-
And this, most American disaster relief specialists        tions of America’s armed forces), and it is through a
never tire of saying, could require nothing less than      strengthening of this OHDACA vehicle that increased
the equivalent of a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the          funding for these baseline programs could most eas-
interagency and its likely partners outside the U.S.       ily be secured. A brief overview of OHDACA-funded
government.18                                              programs and a proposed expansion, therefore, is



Finding the Right Mix

                                                                           the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process               21
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  perhaps a necessary prelude to any further money-       disaster assistance from the United States (includ-
                  related discussion.                                     ing from DoD and the COCOMs) may be reduced. For
                      To begin with, OHDACA funding has focused for       FY 2008 alone, the four major foreign area COCOMs
                  a number of years on three core programs: humani-       (CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM) had
                  tarian assistance (HA), foreign disaster relief/emer-   identified some 880 HA projects the total cost of
                  gency response (FDR/ER), and humanitarian mine          which was estimated at over $83 million, twice the
                  action (HMA). Funds for all three programs are man-     amount normally approved by Congress. So even be-
                  aged for DoD by DSCA in consultation with State and     fore any potential reassignments of money might be
                  USAID. As stated on the DSCA website, the actual        considered, programmatic trade-offs must be made
                  programs are planned and executed by the COCOMs         that are likely to complicate disaster relief planning
                  for two primary purposes: 1) to shape the interna-      over the long haul.
                  tional security environment in a manner that dis-           As for FDR/ER initiatives, the operational focus
                  suades would-be aggressors and reassures allies and     is on providing timely and effective disaster relief to
                  friends via low-level cooperation (when other pro-      nations in a COCOM’s AOR, thereby reducing the pos-
                  grams are not available to do so), and 2) to respond    sibility of increased instability after a disaster occurs
                  rapidly and effectively when called upon to assist      (including efforts by local terrorists or insurgents to
                  victims of natural or man-made disasters (U.S. De-      exploit post-disaster chaos and fear to their advan-
                  partment of Defense 2008). Generally, some $40 mil-     tage). Not surprisingly, typical activities funded un-
                  lion of the total budget is reserved for HA, with the   der this category of assistance include air or sealift
                  bulk of the rest (as referenced above) now going to     to transport emergency supplies to the disaster area,
                  FDR/ER after being split fifty-fifty with HMA for a     forward logistical support to facilitate distribution
                  period of time. In an emergency, such as a sudden       of supplies, search and rescue missions, and medical
                  earthquake or tsunami, funds can certainly be re-       evacuation. Similar to the HA category, FDR/ER ex-
                  assigned by the COCOMs from one program to an-          penditures could also include programs to boost the
                  other, but that normally means that money is made       disaster response capabilities of local governments
                  available for one worthy initiative at the expense of   and relief-minded NGOs, thereby decreasing future
                  another. To the extent that HA funding is shifted to    requirements for outside help. In theory, the avail-
                  the FDR/ER category, it could also mean that longer-    ability of funding from the FDR/ER account means
                  term capacity-building and goodwill-development         that the COCOM commander need not draw on his
                  efforts will be sacrificed to immediate short-term      own O&M funds and thus decrease overall command
                  needs, without any assurance that those funds and       readiness to provide such emergency assistance. In
                  the programs they support will ever be reimbursed       reality, however, the level of funds normally avail-
                  or restored.                                            able, which must be shared among all COCOM AORs,
                      A quick rundown on specific activities in each      is quite limited (again, only about $17 million in re-
                  program, especially in the HA and FDA/ER catego-        cent years), sufficient only for small-scale contin-
                  ries, is sufficient to illustrate how intertwined and   gencies or to provide seed money for much larger
                  reinforcing they often are, and how disruptive taking   operations, in which case funding for non-emergen-
                  from one to pay for another can be. HA projects, for    cy capacity-building projects would be severely lim-
                  example, are aimed at averting humanitarian crises,     ited, if not consumed altogether, by the crisis at hand.
                  promoting regional stability, and facilitating recov-   The end result, of course, is that as requests for DoD
                  ery from conflict by donating excess non-lethal DoD     disaster relief have increased, COCOM efforts to tap
                  property and providing on-the-ground civil support      whatever FDR/ER monies are made available each
                  by U.S. military personnel. Typical projects include    year have also risen, often to an aggregate level well
                  building schools, clinics, and roads, as well as pro-   beyond what has been appropriated. This, in turn,
                  viding medical, technical, engineering, and logisti-    has led to some very difficult – and, from individu-
                  cal assistance. Increasingly, however, such aid has     al COCOM perspectives, rather arbitrary – decisions
                  also included targeted investment in disaster pre-      about which military responses do and do not qual-
                  paredness and mitigation programs in vulnerable         ify for OHDACA funding, and to the short-changing
                  countries, so that future demands for emergency         of a number of longer-term investments in local ca-


                                                                                                              Finding the Right Mix

22                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

pabilities that could eventually ease the overall CO-      tember 30, 2010). The bill stipulated, however, that
COM burden by building in-country response and             the $40 million was to be used “solely for foreign
recovery capacities.                                       disaster relief and response activities,” so the op-
    The third major OHDACA program is the human-           tion of shifting any unused portion to support un-
itarian mine action initiative, aimed at educating         funded HA projects may be foreclosed (U.S. House of
civilian populations in participating countries to         Representatives 2007). Moreover, while the boost in
identify and report mines and other unexplod-              funding targeted specifically for foreign disaster re-
ed ordnance and at training a local demining cad-          lief is certainly welcome and should alleviate some
re. HMA remains a fairly small effort in monetary          of the cost constraints that have emerged in recent
terms at about $5 million per year, and one that           years as DoD responses have become more frequent,
is very specifically tied to a particular set of activi-   funding shortfalls still could arise – and possibly be
ties. Hence, it can not be readily tapped for supple-      quite acute – in FY 2010, for example, if there are one
mental funds to finance additional HA or FDR/ER            or two fairly large-scale events to respond to in FY
requirements as they emerge. In an effort to alleviate     2008 and FY 2009, or even a greater than expected
annual funding shortfalls in either category, there-       number of medium-scale events, in addition to the
fore, DoD budgeteers requested in 2007 the creation        dozen or more small-scale disasters to which the
of an entirely new OHDACA funding category for FY          military almost certainly will be asked to respond
2008-09 entitled the Building Partnership Capacity         to each year. So, too, as baseline funding for OHDA-
Initiative, to be funded at an initial level of $40 mil-   CA has hovered in the $60 million range per year, HA
lion. In the first instance, these new monies, it was      initiatives, which have generally cost at least $40
proposed, could be used to buy necessary disaster          million per year (with FDR/ER and HMA taking the
relief supplies (such as water, tents, blankets, plas-     rest), could be underfunded by as much as $20 mil-
tic sheeting.) and to cover the costs of transport-        lion over the FY 2008-09 timeframe, unless addition-
ing emergency relief personnel and supplies to the         al monies are appropriated for FY 2009. The key may
scene of any disaster. However, since DoD proposed         rest in the degree to which selected HA projects can
that these funds should also be considered “two-           be interpreted as falling within the definition of “for-
year money,” if the funding for FY 2008 was not used       eign disaster relief and response activities,” but this
for foreign disaster efforts, it could then be used, so    possibility remains highly uncertain, given that the
the argument went, to help finance unfunded HA             three-year $40 million funding line is entirely new
projects, for which, as noted above, there is nev-         and that there is no precedent as yet with regard to
er enough money. It is perhaps no coincidence, in          how it may actually be spent.
this context, that the additional $40 million would            One option, therefore, to which the COCOMs and
be just enough (when combined with the $40 mil-            their service components increasingly may turn to
lion regularly appropriated) to underwrite all 880         help fund HA and FDR/ER activities (but especial-
HA projects identified by the foreign area COCOMs          ly the HA component) is to draw upon their own
in 2007 (U.S. Department of Defense 2007).                 O&M budgets, as the U.S. Navy already does to un-
    As it happened, the 2008 defense appropriations        derwrite the costs of its hospital ship deployments
bill signed by the president on November 13, 2007, in-     and newly-instituted “grey hull” medical missions.
cluded the $40 million increase in OHDACA funds, but       In that event, however, concerns with regard to the
the timing associated with their expenditure and the       potential negative impact on other priority opera-
potential restrictions placed on monies earmarked          tions would most likely increase. Both in the military
for disaster relief activities may afford less flexibil-   and in Congress, for example, there are those who
ity than was initially hoped. While the total OHDA-        will argue that the benefits of diverting O&M funds
CA budget was increased to $103.3 million ( from a         to cover HA/DR-related missions are not worth the
final budget of about $63 million for FY 2007), $63.3      costs in terms of reduced command readiness, es-
million was authorized as “two-year money” (avail-         pecially as such missions can be quite expensive. In-
able through September 30, 2009) and $40 million           deed, while they may be unique in scope and scale,
(presumably the new “partnership” funds) was au-           future Mercy, Comfort, and grey-hull medical mis-
thorized as “three-year money” (good through Sep-          sions are projected to cost at least $20 million each,


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                          the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process            23
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 Major DoD Funding Lines for HA/DR Operations                                                                  far as project focus is concerned. Most
                       Managed for DoD by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in coopera-           HCA events have a medical and/or en-
                       tion with Department of State and USAID.
                       The primary Title 10 funding vehicle for COCOM HA/DR activities, including foreign
                                                                                                               gineering focus – commonly referred to
Overseas Human-
itarian, Disas-        disaster relief and emergency response (FDR/ER), humanitarian assistance (HA), and      as a medical civic action program (MED-
ter, and Civic Aid     humanitarian mine action (HCA)                                                          CAP) or an engineering civic action pro-
(OHDACA)               FY 08 funding set at $103.3 million, $63.3 million of which is two-year money (spend-
                       able through 30 Sept 09) and $40 million of which is three-year money (spendable        gram (ENCAP) – such as minor surgery
                       through 30 Sept 10). The $40 million is to be used solely to support FDR.               and dental care, vaccination of children
Humanitarian Civic     Covers DoD relief and development activities that are implemented as part of a U.S.
                       military exercise or training event overseas (e.g., MEDRETEs, MEDCAPs, ENCAPs, etc.)
                                                                                                               and animals, well digging, and the con-
Assistance (or Civic
Action) Under Sec-     Also managed by DSCA, but charged against O&M budgets of military services              struction of roads, schools, and clin-
tion 401 of Title 10   Annual funding rose from $7 million in FY 2000 to $11 million in FY 2008.               ics, but measures to enhance disaster
Section 1206 Fund-     Allows DoD and the COCOMs, with State Department approval, to “train and equip”         preparedness (such as training first re-
ing Under the Na-      foreign militaries to perform counterterrorism and stability operations, which could
tional Defense         include HA/DR operations                                                                sponders and building or repairing ware-
Authorization Act      FY 09 budget sets asides up to $350 million for this purpose and extends 1206 au-       houses) may also qualify for HCA funding.
of 2006                thority for three years (through 30 Sept 11)
                                                                                                               That said, annual funding levels for HCA
Commander’s            Allows U.S. military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to spend up to $500 mil-
Emergency Re-          lion in O&M funds per year on special humanitarian assistance/civic aid projects        remain rather limited (totalling about
sponse Program         Efforts to increase spending level to $1 billion and to use the money in other coun-    $11 million for all COCOMs in FY 2007),
(CERP)                 tries have failed so far
                                                                                                               and, since it must be used in the con-
                       Provides COCOM commanders with funds for civic assistance and humanitarian re-
                       lief/reconstruction, particularly in foreign countries where U.S. military forces are   text of planned military training, exer-
Combatant Com-         engaged in contingency operations
manders Initiative                                                                                             cises, or operations, it could not easily
                       Annual funding normally $25 million, but FY 09 request was for $100 million. Less
Fund (CCIF)            than $1 million used for HCA-type projects between FY 05 and FY 07, but spending is     be drawn upon to help support emer-
                       expected to increase in FY 09                                                           gency measures in response to a sudden
                       Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP) covers expenses incurred         disaster or to help fund HA activities by
                       by a developing country in a bilateral or multilateral exercise
                       Personnel Expenses (PE) Program covers travel and other personal expenses of for-       service units when they are out of rota-
                       eign personnel attending a training seminar or conference                               tion from their primary mission deploy-
Smaller O&M            Exercise Related Construction (ERC) Program permits U.S. forces to conduct low-
Funding Lines                                                                                                  ments ( for example, the Peleliu medical
                       cost infrastructure improvements in host country to support joint military exercises
                       Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) Program allows U.S. Special Operations          mission in 2007 and the Boxer mission in
                       Forces to conduct HA as an adjunct to training exercises with foreign military forces   2008). Moreover, precisely because they
                       in support of stability and/or COIN operations
                       Authorizes the U.S. president to redirect up to $100 million from programmed DoD
                                                                                                               are considered to be standard O&M ex-
Presidential Draw-
down Authority         funding to a sudden disaster response that requires immediate military support          penses, HCA costs are not reimbursable
Under Foreign As-      Primary funding mechanism for 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 2005 Pakistan               (as are many humanitarian-related ex-
sistance Act           earthquake responses
(Title 22)             Reimbursed by Congress via special supplemental appropriations
                                                                                                               penses incurred by the military during
                                                                                                               a disaster relief operation). In a number
                                    equivalent to about one-third of previous OHDA-                            of ambiguous circumstances ( for exam-
                                    CA annual budgets for just one HA event.20 For this           ple, a COCOM or service component decision to offer
20        In view of these costs, the fact that the reason, perhaps the least controversial       emergency aid when a disaster unexpectedly strikes
     U.S. Navy leadership is now aiming to con- move by the COCOMs and their com-                 during a military exercise in or near the disaster area),
        duct at least four such medical missions
    each year confirms the impossibility of cov-
                                                    ponents would be to utilize more cre-         this has led to unhelpful wrangles between forward-
     ering such an expansion in service-tied HA     atively and purposefully annual funds         based commanders and Pentagon-based lawyers as
   via the classic OHDACA route. Further details authorized for humanitarian civic as-            to what was and was not legally permissible, ren-
     on this initiative can be found in chapter 3.
                                                    sistance (HCA), which, like HA, FDR/ER        dering timely assistance to disaster victims all the
                                    and HMA, is managed by DSCA, but charged to ser-              more complicated and reducing any incentive to of-
                                    vice O&M accounts (rather than to OHDACA monies)              fer such aid in the future.
                                    because HCA must be directly tied – or legally inter-            That said, since 9/11, HCA activities, together with
                                    preted as being tied – to an overseas training or ex-         HA, HMA, and FDR/ER efforts, have increasingly been
                                    ercise opportunity for U.S. military forces (U.S. Code        viewed as key military tools in the global war on
                                    2006). In other words, HCA projects can not be un-            terror, helping to ease local conditions (including
                                    dertaken solely for humanitarian purposes.                    disaster-related damage) in overseas communities
                                         Within the confines of this particular restric-          that may be vulnerable to radicalization and politi-
                                    tion, however, there is a fair amount of leeway inso-         cal instability. Accordingly, DoD and the regional CO-


                                                                                                                                      Finding the Right Mix

                24                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

COMs have begun to explore alternative sources of         sonnel Expenses (PE) program allows DoD to pay
O&M monies to help fund HA/DR initiatives, includ-        the travel, subsistence, and personal expenses of de-
ing both emergency assistance and capacity-build-         fense personnel from developing countries in con-
ing efforts. One possibility that remains controver-      nection with their attendance at a bi-
sial is to leverage more fully funding provided under     lateral or regional conference, seminar, 21 In early 2007, DoD proposed a new initia-
section 1206 of the 2006 National Defense Authoriza-      or similar meeting. Perhaps even more tive, commonly known as the Building Glob-
                                                                                                       al Partnerships Act, under which it could
tion Act (NDAA), which currently authorizes DoD and       useful, the Exercise Related Construc- provide up to $750 million per year to “train
the COCOMs (with State Department concurrence)            tion (ERC) program permits U.S. forces and equip”-type missions anywhere in the
to spend up to $350 million per year to train and         to carry out low-cost infrastructure im- world, and do so free of the funding restric-
equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterror-                                                                             to certain human
                                                          provements in host countries to support tions (such as adherenceoften accompany mon-
                                                                                                       rights regulations) that
ism and stability operations, the latter of which (as     military exercises overseas, including ies provided under the Foreign Assistance Act
discussed earlier) could be interpreted as including a    site adaptation, training facilities, se- (FAA). Congress refused to approve this re-
variety of HA/DR-oriented missions (Pincus 2007a).21      curity fencing, and the storing of sup- quest, and legislation that supports the cur-
                                                                                                       rent 1206 program was simply extended in
Another option might be to utilize funds made avail-      plies that could also be used in disaster 2008 through September 30, 2011 and capped
able under the Commander’s Emergency Response             relief-oriented operations. In addition, for FY 2009 at $350 million. Not surprising-
Program (CERP), which now authorizes U.S. military        the Joint Combined Exchange Train- ly, in his April 2008 testimony to the House
                                                                                                       Armed Service Committee, Secretary of De-
commanders operating in Iraq and Afghanistan to           ing (JCET) program allows U.S. Special fense Robert Gates has called on Congress to
spend up to $500 million a year of O&M monies, pro-       Operations Forces to conduct limited make this program permanent and to increase
vided via supplemental funding, on local humanitar-       civil support-type efforts as an adjunct 1206 funding to the $750 million level request-
ian assistance and construction projects such as re-      to training exercises with foreign mili- ed in 2007 (Pincus 2007b; Valero 2008, 1).
                                                                                                       22 Congress did approve an additional $500
building schools and roads, setting up clinics, digging   tary forces in support of stability and/ million in CERP funds to be used anywhere in
wells, and the like. More to the point, the Pentagon      or COIN operations. Together, all four the world as part of the FY 2007 Iraq supple-
hoped to increase CERP funding in FY 2008 to $1 bil-      programs offer useful opportunities to mental appropriations bill, but the bill was
                                                                                                       vetoed by President Bush and sent back to Con-
lion and to receive authorization to spend that mon-      boost foreign partner country HA/DR gress (Pincus 2007b). Appropriations legis-
ey in countries other than Iraq and Afghanistan, but      capabilities via exercises and training lation proposed in the Senate in March 2008
neither this proposal nor a more limited version – ei-    with U.S. forces and to enhance disaster for fiscal year 2009 includes provisions to
ther of which might well have eliminated overnight        preparedness by means of warehouse make the CERP program permanent and glob-
                                                                                                       al in coverage, but no particular funding line
a host of funding problems related to HA/DR pro-          construction and the pre-positioning of was proposed (U.S. Senate 2008). The fate of
grams – was able to secure congressional approv-          essential supplies.23 At current levels of the CERP program, like that of the 1206 pro-
al (Pincus 2007b).22 One alternative may be to draw       funding, however, they can provide no gram, will be determined largely by the broad-
                                                                                                       er debate over the degree to which DoD should
upon some of the money made available to COCOM            more than a partial and largely acciden- assume foreign aid and humanitarian assis-
commanders as part of the Combatant Commanders            tal solution to what are expected to be tance responsibilities that were once primari-
Initiative Fund (CCIF), money that Congress agreed        increasing demands in the years ahead ly the responsibility of the State Department.
in 2006 could be directed in part to HCA projects, es-    for HA/DR-related funding.                   23 Such improvements, it needs to be
pecially in foreign countries where U.S. forces are en-       In the event of a truly major disaster, stressed, can be extremely cost-effective. Ac-
                                                                                                       cording to one informed observer, every dol-
gaged in a contingency operation of one kind or an-       of course, the president has the power, lar invested in preparedness could achieve
other. Through FY 2008, however, CCIF support for         under sub-section 506(a) (1) of the For- an eight-dollar reduction in disaster re-
such projects was quite limited (Congressional Re-        eign Assistance Act, to draw down (i.e., lief costs. See remarks by U.S. Ambassador
search Service 2008, 39-40).                                                                                                                    Eu-
                                                          redirect) up to $100 million in any fis- to Croatia Ralph Frank at the Southeast in Du-
                                                                                                       rope Disaster Preparedness Conference
    Beyond HCA, section 1206, CERP, and CCIF consid-      cal year from previously programmed brovnik on March 21, 2006 (Ferrare 2006).
erations, there are a few additional, but rather small,   DoD funding for unspecified emergen-
pockets of O&M funds that COCOMs may tap to pro-          cies that require immediate military assistance. This
vide a degree of financial relief on the HA/DR front.     is what happened in response to the 2004 Indian
The Developing Countries Combined Exercise Pro-           Ocean tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake,
gram (DCCEP), for example, allows DoD, after con-         and most of the funds so expended have been re-
sultation with State, to use O&M funds to pay the         imbursed to DoD (or soon will be) by Congress via
incremental expenses that are incurred by a devel-        special supplemental appropriations. Presidential
oping country while participating in a bilateral or       draw-downs, however, are exceptional measures, of-
multilateral exercise with U.S. forces, while the Per-    fering no possibility of relief from the everyday limits


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                          the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process               25
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  that now exist and will only grow on HA/DR-relat-         a larger than desirable element of “robbing Peter to
                  ed funding for smaller-scale contingencies. What          pay Paul,” with the hope that the new guidelines now
                  is really needed is a sustained increase in OHDA-         being codified by the GSA/CMO office in OUSD(P)
                  CA funding along the lines originally proposed for        will hold to a minimum any approval of DoD and/
                  FY 2008-09 (an annual baseline of some $60 mil-           or COCOM expenditures that are not truly required
                  lion, plus another $40 million in two-year funds that     or appropriate.
                  could be flexibly billed), though even a more mod-
                  est increase could have a significant beneficial effect
                  on HA and FDR/ER activities, most if not all of which     Conclusion
                  would also provide, in the words of one former se-        Looking ahead, then, the U.S. foreign disaster re-
                  nior PACOM commander, “vital axle grease” to help         sponse process – and, most particularly, that portion
                  advance DoD and COCOM theater security cooper-            dealing with the provision of DoD/military support –
                  ation (TSC) objectives (Gregson 2004). A doubling         should run far more smoothly and predictably once
                  of traditional OHDACA funding lines to some $120          the reforms proposed and/or already adopted with
                  million per year, which remains a relatively mod-         regard to the State-DoD Executive Secretariat dy-
                  est amount of money in the context of the defense         namic really take hold, and the new procedures for
                  budget as a whole, would likely eliminate any mon-        authorizing military aid for small- and medium-
                  ey shortages for some time to come, providing am-         scale disasters become standard operating practice.
                  ple flexibility to cover both sudden emergencies and      The higher priority both State and DoD now place on
                  out-of-cycle opportunities to work with allies and        stability operations and humanitarian assistance as
                  partner countries in the HA/DR realm.                     key components of the war on terror and the “diplo-
                      If accompanied by relatively small-scale increas-     macy of deeds” also suggests that current problems
                  es ( for example, less than $10 million per command)      with respect to interagency coordination – prob-
                  in COCOM O&M funds that could be used for TSC             lems that bedevil disaster relief missions as much
                  projects (to include HA/DR initiatives), the positive     as any other SSTR-type operation – will eventually
                  impact of OHDACA increases would simply be mag-           get the attention they deserve. After that, the key
                  nified and rendered longer-lasting. Dedicated steps       challenge for HA/DR planners and practitioners at
                  in this direction, however, may be difficult to set in    DoD and the COCOMs will be to make sure that these
                  motion before a consensus is reached at the high-         policy and operational adjustments are matched by
                  er policy level between Congress and the adminis-         the necessary increases in funding. Only then will
                  tration on the rising role of DoD and the military        it be safe to assume that the capabilities and skills
                  services in foreign aid activities, including with re-    needed to implement a major U.S. disaster relief ef-
                  gard to the scale and global applicability of section     fort overseas will be available when and where they
                  1206 and CERP appropriations. Until then, even with       are required and in sufficient quantity.
                  the $40 million in three-year money earmarked for
                  disaster-related operations in the FY 2008 defense
                  appropriations bill, DoD approval for FDR/ER oper-
                  ations and related HA initiatives will always include


                  References
                  Congressional Research Service. 2008. The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background,
                  Major Issues, and Options for Congress. August 25.
                  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34639.pdf
                  Bryce S. Dubee. 2007. Okinawa Marines to assess deadly cyclone damage. Stars and Stripes, November 21.
                  http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=57895&archive=true.
                  Joe Ferrare. 2006. Southeastern European experts work together in disaster preparedness. American
                  Forces Press Service. March 22.
                  http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=15096.


                                                                                                              Finding the Right Mix

26                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
                                                                                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

Lt. General W.C. “Chip” Gregson, USMC (Ret.), then Commander, U.S. Marine Forces
Pacific. 2004. Email exchange with Dr. Charles M. Perry, IFPA, October 4.
Corine Hegland. 2007. Pentagon, State struggle to define nation-building roles. National Journal, April
30.
http://www.govexec.com/story_page_pf.cfm?articleid=36760&printerfriendly vers=1.
IFPA. 2007. Rethinking the war on terror: Developing a strategy to coun-
ter radical Islamist ideologies. June 13, Washington, D.C.
interview. 2007a. With foreign affairs specialist, OASD/GSA/CMO-Humanitarian Affairs. July 12.
———. 2007b. With foreign affairs specialist, OASD/GSA/CMO-Humanitarian Affairs. November 30.
———. 2008. With HA/DR senior planners, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. January 30.
Joint Force Quarterly. 2006. An interview with Carlos Pascual, vice president and direc-
tor of foreign policy studies of the Brookings Institution. No. 42 (3rd quarter): 80-85.
Joint Staff. 2006. Joint publication 3-0. Joint Operations. Washington, D.C.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.
Todd C. Lopez. 2008. Army, State Department partner in stability operations. Army News Service. March 3.
http://www.army.mil/-news/2008/03/07/7029.
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 2008. Operation and maintenance overview fiscal year (FY) 2009
budget estimates. February.
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/fy2009_overview.pdf.
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). 2005. Annual report for fiscal year 2005.
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_as-
sistance/publications/annual_reports/pdf/AR2005.pdf.
———. 2006. Annual report for fiscal year 2006.
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_as-
sistance/publications/annual_reports/pdf/AR2006.pdf.
Walter Pincus. 2007a. Taking Defense’s hand out of State’s pocket. Washington Post, July 9.
———. 2007b. Pentagon hopes to expand aid program. Washington Post, May 13.
James Schoff. 2005. Tools for trilateralism: Improving U.S.-Japan-Korea coopera-
tion to manage complex contingencies. Herndon, Virginia: Potomac Books.
Liz Straw. 2006. The international community’s funding of the tsunami emergency: U.S. government
funding. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. Washington, D.C. DARA. June. http://www.daraint.org.
UNOCHA. 2007. Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief –“Oslo
Guidelines.” Revision 1.1. November.
http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServices-
BranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordinationSection/PolicyGuidanceandPublica-
tions/tabid/1403/Default.aspx/Oslo_Guidlines_Nov06_Rev1.1[1].pdf.
U.S. Code. 2006. Title 10 (Armed Forces), section 401. Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in con-
junction with military operations.
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/uscmain.html and http://www.ciponline.org/facts/hca.htm.
U.S. Department of Defense. 2007. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Overseas humanitarian,
disaster, and civic aid (OHDACA), Defense fiscal year (FY) 2008/FY 2009 budget estimates. February.
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/budget_justi-
fication/pdfs/operation/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/30_OHDACA.pdf.
———. 2008. DSCA Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action (HDM).
http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm.


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                        the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process            27
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. 2007. Strategic plan fiscal years
                  2007-2012. Washington, D.C.
                  http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86291.pdf.
                  U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2007. Military operations: Actions needed to im-
                  prove DoD’s stability operations approach and enhance interagency planning. Report to rank-
                  ing member, House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee
                  on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives. GAO-07-549. May.
                  U.S. House of Representatives. 2007. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008. HR 3222. 110th
                  Cong. 1st sess. November 13.
                  http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-3222.
                  U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Force Public Affairs Office. 2007. COMMARFORPAC leads relief ef-
                  forts. U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. Release 07-001. November 22.
                  U.S. Senate. 2008. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for military activities of the De-
                  partment of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2009, and for other purposes.
                  S.2787. 110th Cong. 2nd sess. March 31.
                  http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-2787.
                  Connie Veillette. 2007. Restructuring U.S. foreign aid: The role of the director of foreign assistance in trans-
                  formational development. A CRS Report to Congress. Congressional Research Service. January 23.
                  http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/rl33491.pdf.
                  Rafael Enrique Valero. 2008. House committee presses State and Defense officials on lack of coordination
                  on nation building. Government Executive.Com. April 17.
                  http://www.govexec.com/story_page_pf.cfm?articleid=39801&printerfriendlyvers=1.




                                                                                                                Finding the Right Mix

28                the U.S. Foreign Disaster response Process
 3
ChaPter




                             Key Capabilities for
                                  Foreign Disaster Relief &
                              Humanitarian Assistance
                                     What’s Available and What Might Be Needed

In theory, identifying and assembling military skills      some extent, this will be true as well with respect
and capabilities that are best suited for an approved      to the programmed humanitarian missions under-
(or soon to be approved) foreign disaster relief op-       taken by the regional COCOMs that are not crisis-
eration should not be overly complicated. As soon          driven (such as the multi-port medical ship visits
as the secretary or deputy secretary of defense has        touched on in chapter 2), since the aid priorities
signed off on the mission, the full weight of the mil-     of one country may obviously differ sharply from
itary chain of command comes into play, and or-            those in another region and even from those of its
ders to deploy with all deliberate speed are rapidly       neighbors. That said, based on lessons learned from
drafted and transmitted. In many cases, as noted           recent disaster responses and humanitarian assis-
in chapter 2, DoD and the regional COCOM likely to         tance programs, it is entirely possible to develop a       1 Of course, in a bilateral or
lead the mission will already have taken significant       good understanding of the general types of military        multinational disaster relief
                                                                                                                      operation, additional skills,
preparatory steps well before a formal decision to         capabilities and skills that have proven to be most        capabilities, and supplies can
respond has been taken, in order to speed deploy-          useful to HA/DR operations, together with an appre-        and will be provided by allied
ment to the disaster location and/or to forward stag-      ciation of the various configurations and formats in       or partner nations, regional
                                                                                                                      organizations (such as NATO
ing areas from which assistance will be distributed.       which such assets appear to be most effective in a         and the EU), and international
Yet, even if these first steps to organize military sup-   range of regional settings. A quick review of DoD and      organizations (including the
port for disaster relief go like clockwork, this would     service staff efforts to accommodate the capability        UN and its constituent agen-
                                                                                                                      cies). The degree to which
not necessarily guarantee that the right mix of per-       needs of stability operations as they plan for the fu-
                                                                                                                      these various groups become
sonnel, platforms, equipment, and supplies would           ture should provide some insight as well into wheth-       involved, and the nature and
be readily available at the levels really needed. To a     er or not HA/DR-relevant capabilities are likely to be     scale of their contributions,
greater or lesser degree, there will almost always be      fielded and deployed as needed, given that HA/DR           will vary from disaster to di-
                                                                                                                      saster, with some not con-
capability gaps of one kind or another that must be        operations are a subset of stability operations. Both      tributing at all or in only a
filled or worked around over the course of an opera-       assessments – that is, the lessons-learned analysis        limited way. How the groups
tion, not the least because relief requirements quite      and the DoD/service planning review – should also          are organized to respond to
                                                                                                                      foreign disaster, and what ca-
often change as the situation evolves. What is need-       shed light on the degree to which additional capa-         pabilities they can bring to
ed during the first phase of a disaster response by        bilities ought to be sought from other quarters, in-       bear, are discussed in detail
the military could be quite different from what is         cluding from the private sector (which is emerging         in chapter 5, “Key Partner-
                                                                                                                      ships and Platforms for In-
needed in the middle or closing phases. The key is to      as a more prominent contributor to foreign disaster
                                                                                                                      ternational Collaboration.”
have as clear a sense as possible in advance of what       relief and humanitarian assistance efforts).1              The present discussion focus-
those changing requirements might entail and how               The goals of this chapter are threefold. First, it     es on U.S. military capabili-
they might ideally be met.                                 seeks to clarify – and to render more transparent to       ties and, to a lesser extent, on
                                                                                                                      corporate capabilities found
    Of course, since no two foreign disasters will ever    those who are not students of military affairs – the       principally in the Ameri-
be exactly alike, there is a limit to what the military    current U.S. force planning and force management           can business community.
can know and prepare for before a crisis erupts. To        process as it relates to the organization of HA/DR

Finding the Right Mix

                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs              29
                  the   InstItute     for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                      operations. The key question to be explored in this        responders. Classic examples would be the use of PA-
                                      context is whether or not current practice is likely       COM’s 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) based
                                      to provide HA/DR-relevant assets when, where, and          in Okinawa to establish the initial JTF in Utapao,
                                      in the formats and quantities in which they may be         Thailand (which quickly transformed into a multi-
                                      needed, or, alternatively, if some form of standing        national combined support force, or CSF), after the
                                      inventory that keeps more careful track of such as-        2004 tsunami struck, and reliance on CENTCOM’s
                                      sets ought to be developed as well to facilitate their     Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 1, then operating
                                      ready availability. The second objective of the chap-      in waters close to the Arabian Gulf, to organize the
                                      ter is to discuss in some detail those skills and capa-    disaster assistance center (DAC) in Pakistan in the
                                      bilities that have been or are likely to be especially     wake of the 2005 earthquake.
                                      valuable to HA/DR operations, referencing when ap-             When regional COCOMs that maintain substan-
                                      propriate various policy and/or operational adjust-        tial forward-based forces (PACOM, EUCOM, and, for
                                      ments that could be taken to enhance their utility.        the moment, CENTCOM) do not have sufficient or
                                      Third, and finally, the chapter will examine the grow-     appropriate capabilities on hand to respond, they
                                      ing contributions that the private sector (especially      may reach back – as COCOMs with limited assigned
                                      the American business community) is making to di-          forces (such as SOUTHCOM) do on a regular basis
                                      saster responses overseas, highlighting areas of ex-      – to various functional COCOMs and their compo-
                                      pertise where companies can most usefully reinforce        nent commands based in the continental United
                                     – and at times perhaps stand in place of – military         States for additional support via a special request
                                      forces engaged in HA/DR missions. Together, these          for forces (RFF) or a request for forces and/or ca-
                                      three lines of investigation should yield a reasonably     pabilities (RFF/C). For foreign disaster relief, the
                                      complete picture of what capabilities and skills are       primary functional COCOMs involved would be
2        As DoD’s joint force pro-    needed most and likely to be found in the military,        Joint Forces Command (JFCOM),2 which includes
  vider (JFP), JFCOM assigns to       and what alternative sources there may be outside          the Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Na-
     the COCOMs nearly all con-
  ventional forces based in the
                                      of the military, should military assets prove to be        vy’s Fleet Forces Command (FLTFORCOM), the Air
      continental United States.      inadequate or unavailable.                                 Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Ma-
      It controls over 80 percent                                                                rine Corps’ Forces Command (MARFORCOM), as well
     of America’s CONUS-based
     combat-ready convention-
                                                                                                 as TRANSCOM, which includes the Navy’s Military
    al forces, and it also has the   Accessing U.S. Military Capabilities                        Sealift Command (MSC) for sealift assets and the
       responsibility for manag-     and Skills                                                  Air Force’s Air Mobility Command (AMC) for airlift
        ing the assignment of in-
                                                                                                 assets. Working in conjunction with the Joint Staff,
         dividual augmentees to      As described in chapter 2, once DoD policy officials
      deployed units (USJFCOM).                                                                  JFCOM, TRANSCOM, and their various component
                                     propose a military response to a foreign disaster
3             Before the GFM pro-                                                                commands locate and reassign the needed CONUS-
   cess was introduced in 2004,      and it is approved by the secretary or deputy secre-
                                                                                                 based forces to the regional COCOM, along with asso-
   each regional COCOM owned         tary of defense, the task of locating, preparing, and
     his assigned forces and de-
                                                                                                 ciated equipment. Since 2004, all RFF/Cs have been
                                     deploying specific military platforms, supplies, and
    ployed them according to a                                                                   coordinated through what’s called the global force
                                     personnel falls primarily on the Joint Staff and, more
 COCOM-specific plan, with lit-                                                                  management process (GFM), which allows JFCOM,
    tle (if any) attention to how    specifically, on the regional COCOM in whose AOR the
                                                                                                 its service components, and the other functional CO-
      that may impact force lev-     disaster has occurred. Normally, the COCOM com-
  els and requirements for oth-                                                                  COMs to supply the regional COCOMs with the force
                                     mander will direct service units based near or op-
    er COCOMs. In contrast, the                                                                  levels and mixes they require, based on an integrat-
  GFM approach allows JFCOM,         erating closest to the scene of the disaster to move
                                                                                                 ed assessment of the availability of U.S. convention-
       in its JFP role, to examine   as expeditiously as possible to the area in question
       RFF/Cs and possible solu-                                                                 al forces worldwide and their readiness over time.3
                                     to provide whatever assistance is needed. In re-
  tions via a global supply per-                                                                     Depending on the location, scale, and nature of
    spective and in accordance       sponse to major disasters (such as the 2004 Indian
                                                                                                 the disaster, as well as on the readiness of available
     with a long-term cross-CO-      Ocean tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake),
COM plan. See USJFCOM 2007a.
                                                                                                 units, CONUS-based reinforcements could include
                                     the commander will also order a forward-deployed
                                                                                                 active, reserve, National Guard, and even U.S. Coast
                                     service component to stand up a JTF and an asso-
                                                                                                 Guard platforms, personnel, and supplies. Such as-
                                     ciated headquarters element within the disaster
                                                                                                 sets, moreover, could be deployed independently for
                                     zone to manage the overall military operation and
                                                                                                 a specific, time-limited task or as part of a broad-
                                     to facilitate its coordination with civilian disaster

                                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix

                  30                 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                            the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

er, longer-term JTF. For its part, JF-      GFM / JFP Allocation Process with JFCOM as Primary JFP
COM may also provide a JTF-scale
operation with certain key joint                                                                    SECDEF
                                                                  feedback
enabling capabilities that it re-
                                                                                                                                         Forward recommendation
tains under its command, such as                                                                                                         via the orders "book"
a standing joint force headquar-                                                                                                         process to SecDef for
                                                                                                                                         approval
ters-core element (SJFHQ-CE) or a                                                                   CJCS / JCS

joint public affairs support element        Request                 Clarify / define requirements             Staff with agencies and OSD
(JPASE).4 In setting up the DAC af-         from COCOM              Crosswalk RFF/C against existing
                                                                    priorities and GFMB guidance
                                                                                                             Coordinate w/ affected services/COCOM s
                                                                                                             to articulate / attempt adjudication of
ter the Pakistan earthquake, for ex-                                         CJCS Forward RFF/C
                                                                                                             non-concurrences (through GFMB)
ample, an SJFHQ-CE proved to be                                              for sourcing
extremely helpful in transform-
ing a service-based headquarters             CJCS sends appropriate                                          JFCOM provides recommended
team drawn from CENTCOM’s ESG                implementer to SOCOM ,                                         sourcing solution to CJCS / JCS
                                             STRATCOM , TRANSCOM                                                - Info copies all COCOM s and Services
1 into an effective HA/DR-oriented           or other federal agency                                            - From all conventional forces
JTF headquarters able to provide             (if their forces are                                                 (COCOM “assigned” and
                                             required)                                                             Service “unassigned” forces)
command and control for joint and                                                                            Sourcing recommendation includes
multinational operations. JPASE                                                                                 - Risk to sourcing other requirements
units, on the other hand, provide                                                                               - Force rotation sustainability assessment
                                                                                                                - Other issues identified by
trained and equipped teams with                           CJCS sends remaining                                    COCOM / service providing the force(s)
substantial joint public affairs ex-                     RFF/C requirements to
pertise at the operational level, a                  JFCOM . Forwarded RFF/C
                                                      includes DRAFT DEPORD                       Primary JFP ( JFCOM)
skill of immense value in advanc-
ing the strategic communications                                JFCOM components                  Via service components
and public diplomacy objectives                                                                       - Develops global joint sourcing solutions (including RC)
                                                                  FC       CFFC
                                                                                                      - Coordinates recommended solution
of disaster relief and humanitar-                                 ACC MFL
                                                                                                        with other COCOMs and services
ian operations. Indeed, such ca-                                                                  Monitors force availability and recommends sustainment
                                                                RCC components
pabilities are in high demand as                                                                  actions to CJCS / JCS
                                                                    USA USN
efforts to “get the story out” regard-                              USAF USMC
ing the benefits of HA/DR missions
performed by the American mili-
                                                               4 For some time, JFCOM has maintained two deployable SJFHQ-CEs (Alpha and Bra-
tary have become increasingly central to U.S. glob- vo) composed of command and control experts who could assist two- or three-star head-
al engagement strategies.                                      quarters to transition quickly into joint or multinational headquarters (USJFCOM). As
    DoD-approved relief efforts may also tap into the of October 1, 2008, the SJFHQ structure was reorganized into a new Joint Enabling Ca-
                                                               pabilities Command (JECC) format, composed of several smaller, more agile, function-
department’s global network of warehouses for ad- ally-focused capability teams that can be tailored more precisely to the specific needs
ditional supplies not readily available or available in of a JTF. Seven deployable teams or modules are planned, including in the areas of op-
sufficient quantity among regional COCOM units or erations, plans, information management, and logistics (USJFCOM 2008a).
CONUS-based reinforcements. At present, there are 5 Formally such items are referred to as excess defense articles (EDA), and their release to
three major DoD warehouses worldwide, including foreign governments or militaries is managed by DSCA once approved by the secretaries of
                                                               state and defense. EDA are primarily provided to allied or partner nations receiving U.S. se-
a CONUS-based facility in Atlanta, Georgia (which curity assistance, but useful non-lethal equipment may also be released as part of a DoD-sup-
SOUTHCOM can draw on most easily), together with ported HA/DR mission. Under what is known as the Denton program, DoD also may agree to
a facility in Okinawa (primarily for PACOM-managed transport privately donated humanitarian cargo to foreign countries using military trans-
operations) and another in Italy (largely for EUCOM-, portation assets on a space-available basis. In that event, there is no cost to the donat- that
                                                               ing agency or organization, but the State Department, USAID, and DSCA must all certify
AFRICOM-, or CENTCOM-managed activities). Apart transporting the cargo is in the national interest of the United States, that the material be-
from current supplies, these warehouses also store ing transported is in useable condition, and that there are legitimate requirements for the
excess items that are not up to current military stan- transported material and adequate arrangements for distribution in country. There is also
                                                               a minimum load requirement of two thousand pounds, and the donor must have a desig-
dards (such as Cold War era field hospitals and tents) nated recipient for the cargo at the final destination. Transportation depends, moreover,
but which may nevertheless prove to be quite useful on the existence of a military flight between specific points of origin and destination, and
in support of non-combat, HA/DR contingencies.5 there can be no guarantee of a specific delivery date (U.S. House of Representatives 2007).


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                                   Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief               31
                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                       The Atlanta facility, moreover, holds in storage some     so in a quicker and more cost-effective manner, if
                                       four hundred thousand humanitarian daily rations          the Joint Staff, for example, had such data readily at
                                       (HDRs), which are culturally sensitive ( for example,     its fingertips? Might not the development of such
                                       they contain no pork) and diet-attuned ( for exam-        an inventory and roster, it is added, help as well
                                       ple, low-fat and low-calorie) military meals ready to     to identify potential shortfalls in essential military
                                       eat (or MREs) developed specifically for people liv-      assets so that steps could be taken beforehand to
6            For the need to con-      ing under duress and/or displaced as a result of a        avoid any capability gaps in times of crisis? 6 From
        duct capability gap anal-      natural or man-made disaster. Indeed, HDRs have           a big picture perspective, wouldn’t such an assess-
          yses along these lines,
           see GAO 2007 (17-19).
                                       been so well received that the UN’s World Food Pro-       ment process on the HA/DR front, it is further pro-
                                       gram (WFP) is reviewing them as an alternative to         posed, be an ideal stepping stone for putting in place
                                       the WFP’s biscuit meals, which are often discarded        a more comprehensive system, as called for by many
                                       by disaster victims.                                      in Congress following the release of DoD Directive
                                                                                                 3000.5 (“Military Support for Stability, Security, Tran-
                                       Will Capability Gaps Be a Problem?                        sition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations”), for
                                       As DoD, the COCOMs, and their various service-spe-        predicting and redressing potential capability gaps
7         For a useful discussion      cific component commands are called upon more             with respect to stability operations as a whole? 7 In
     of why current DoD and CO-        frequently for HA/DR-related assistance, they are         other words, a key incentive for setting in place a
    COM planning may not be ad-
     equate to identify potential
                                       clearly developing a broader base of knowledge with       capability tracking system for HA/DR missions lies
       capability gaps in the sta-     respect to the types of military capabilities, skills,    in the fact, according its proponents, that it could
        bility operations mission      and supplies that are likely to be needed in respond-     also facilitate broad military support for SSTR-type
     area (to include HA/DR mis-
     sion), see GAO 2007 (40-43).
                                       ing to a variety of disasters in a range of topographic   missions writ large.
                                       and climatic conditions. So, too, they are becoming           So far, however, DoD, COCOM, and service staff
                                       increasingly skilled at assembling in a timely fash-      reactions to such proposals have been less than en-
                                       ion disaster relief teams built around a mix of avail-    thusiastic. In the first place, since every disaster re-
                                       able units and equipment. That said, past experience      sponse is a situation-specific event, maintaining a
                                       alone is no guarantee that the capabilities likely to     pre-ordained inventory or list of essential capabili-
                                       be of greatest utility to HA/DR operations will be        ties, they argue, makes little sense, especially if the
                                       available in the future when, and in the format, need-    idea is to maintain such assets in some type of pre-
8        In this context, the point    ed. Hence, with foreign disaster relief and associated    assigned, standby status.8 Even within specific disas-
      is often made that the costs     humanitarian assistance emerging as a higher prior-       ter categories, they go on to add, efforts to identify
          of storing and maintain-
    ing equipment packages spe-
                                       ity mission for American military forces, a growing       and track a predetermined set of military capabili-
         cifically designed for HA/    number of U.S. defense analysts (especially among         ties likely to be needed – and, on this basis, to fore-
    DR operations could be quite       those working on Capitol Hill) have begun to sug-         cast and remedy any capability gaps – would not
     prohibitive over time. More-
     over, the shelf life of certain
                                       gest that DoD would be well advised to institution-       be particularly helpful, as what is required for an
          types of emergency sup-      alize what it now knows with regard to emerging           earthquake, say, in Pakistan might be quite differ-
     plies (such as MREs or medi-      capability needs, and to develop and maintain an          ent from what would be needed for an earthquake
    cines) may be rather limited.
                                       up-to-date inventory of key platforms and supplies        in Indonesia, given differences in climate, terrain,
                                       deemed to be essential to HA/DR operations. Ideal-        transport networks, population density, and the like.
                                       ly, such an inventory would include details on the        There are, it is acknowledged, generic military ca-
                                       readiness of these assets to deploy, as well as a ros-    pabilities – especially in lift, engineering, logistics,
                                       ter of key personnel who possess skills and practi-       medical, and communications – that would prob-
                                       cal experience critical to such operations.               ably be called upon to one degree or another, when
                                           In answer to those who might question the wis-        civilian alternatives are not available, for virtually
                                       dom of such an inventory and roster, advocates have       any disaster relief operation. In that event, howev-
                                       tended to respond with questions of their own aimed       er, such assets, it is argued, would be drawn largely
                                       at highlighting the operational benefits of such an       from deployed forces (including those already as-
                                       approach. Wouldn’t it be easier to pinpoint the lo-       signed to the regional COCOMs and unassigned forc-
                                       cation and availability of potential disaster response    es managed by CONUS-based service components),
                                       forces and capabilities, they have argued, and to do


                                                                                                                                     Finding the Right Mix

                     32                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

and, to the extent necessary, reconfigured in a force      in needed capabilities should a real disaster sud-
mix tailored to the situation at hand.                     denly flare up.
    Secondly, and as a corollary to this first point,         This approach has proved to be quite productive
the military designs, fields, maintains, and deploys       in the SOUTHCOM and PACOM AORs, where storm-
forces and supporting equipment for its primary            and weather-triggered disasters occur each year on
warfighting missions, not for secondary missions           a fairly regular schedule (interview 2007a, 2008a).
such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and      SOUTHCOM planners, for example, can generally as-
similar civil support activities. When so directed         sume that hurricanes and tropical storms of some
by command authority, military capabilities will be        severity will occur in Central America and the Carib-
deployed in support of these lesser contingencies,         bean between August and November, and advance
but they will not be procured with those contingen-        preparations to cope with such events clearly helped
cies uppermost in mind or requested beforehand by          to speed the command’s responses to the damage
the regional COCOMs specifically for such contingen-       caused in Nicaragua by hurricane Felix in Septem-
cies. Indeed, the underlying assumption for most           ber 2007 and in the Dominican Republic by trop-
DoD and service planners seems to be that anything         ical storm Noel in November 2007. In the specific
one would need for HA/DR operations can readily            case of the Noel relief effort, the medical element
be found in the high-quality general-purpose forc-         (MEDEL) of JTF-Bravo – one of SOUTHCOM’s only for-
es maintained by the COCOMs and their component            ward-deployed elements and one that is dedicated
commands for major combat operations (MCOs) in             to HA/DR missions – was able to prepare five days of
accordance with established DoD guidance.9 Accord-         medicine for deployment to the Domin- 9 Primary guidance in this context comes
ing to this perspective, all the regional COCOMs real-     ican Republic in less than twelve hours from DoD’s Contingency Planning Guidance, a
                                                                                                      classified assessment of key MCO scenarios that
ly need to do in the event of a disaster in their AOR is   (May 2007).10 Turning to the PACOM AOR, DoD urges the COCOMs to use as a baseline for
to re-package units and equipment that they already        when cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar in making their own more detailed concept plans
deploy for combat purposes (together with any re-          May 2008, PACFLT amphibious assault (CONPLANs) for potential combat operations.
inforcements from CONUS-based commands), and               ships with substantial disaster relief ca- 10 According to the MEDEL commander, its
then reassign these forces in accordance with con-         pabilities, as well as C-130 and C-17 car- speedy response is attributable to two factors:
                                                                                                      1) the fact that the MEDEL conducts at least
cept plans (CONPLANs) previously developed by the          go planes from a PACAF rapid response one medical readiness and training exercise
COCOM staff for precisely such an event.                   group, were already in and around Thai- (MEDRETE) a month, and 2) JTF-Bravo’s inher-
    To some extent, of course, regional COCOMs can         land as part of an annual disaster re- ent rapid deployment capability, based in this
increase the likelihood that forces and capabilities                                                                       the prompt availability of
                                                           sponse exercise, and poised to provide particular case on the New York Air National
                                                                                                      a C-5 Galaxy from
that would be especially useful in responding to nat-      almost immediate assistance of direct Guard to transport the MEDEL team, the med-
ural disasters will already be in theater at or close      and significant value (Winn 2008, 8).11 ical supplies, and two of the JTF’s UH-60 Black
to the levels needed, by planning to conduct disas-        Such coincidences, however, are by their Hawk helicopters. Stationed at Soto Cano Air
                                                                                                      Base in Honduras, the full JTF, which includes
ter relief-related exercises during particular times of    nature quite unpredictable, and, while six hundred troops and twenty aircraft, trains
the year when seasonal events, such as floods, hur-        tremendously helpful when they do oc- continuously throughout the year for a va-
ricanes, tropical storms, mudslides, and the like, are     cur and are acted upon, they are hardly riety of likely HA/DR missions (May 2007)
most likely to occur. To support such activities, the      a sufficient basis on which to prepare 11 The ships and planes were forward-de-
COCOMs may also request in their annual RRF mes-           for the fielding and deployment of HA/ ployed as part of the annual multinational
                                                                                                      Cobra Gold exercise that focuses on various
sages to the Joint Staff additional capabilities that      DR-relevant military assets. Moreover, disaster relief contingencies. The C-130 that
they know would be useful for the types of HA/DR           advance planning along these lines by delivered the first relief aid to Myanmar on
missions that are more likely to be called for (and        the COCOMs would be difficult (if not May12 was assigned to PACAF’s 36th Contin-
need to be practiced) within their specific AOR. In        impossible) to carry out for disasters – gency Response Group based in Guam, which
                                                                                                      was created specifically to respond rapidly to
this way, programmed humanitarian assistance (HA)          such as earthquakes and volcanic erup- disasters in the Pacific region (Winn 2008).
and humanitarian civic assistance (HCA) activities         tions – that are not directly connected
and related initiatives that have a foreign disaster       to changing weather and climatic conditions and
relief (FDR) component provide COCOM command-              are less easy to predict.
ers with useful opportunities to anticipate and plan          Still, those who adhere to the “warfighting first”
for the somewhat unique demands of a disaster re-          approach would argue nonetheless that standard
lief operation, thereby minimizing any potential gap       conventional force deployments and planning


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                            Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief           33
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                         procedures, keyed principally to the demands of              high-level DoD directives and strategic planning doc-
                                         high intensity conflict, should constitute sufficient        uments that the COCOMs generally refer to for assess-
                                         preparation for lower intensity (and non-combat)             ing their capability needs do not really provide, it is
                                         operations, including foreign disaster relief and            argued, the level of detail that is required to identify
                                         humanitarian assistance. More specifically, as-              potential capability gaps at the regional (and opera-
                                         sessments made on a regular basis by the region-             tional) level, especially for non-MCO contingencies.
                                         al COCOMs to determine the level and mix of forces           Time after time, recent disaster relief operations
                                         they may need to respond to DoD-sanctioned MCOs              have revealed a higher demand for certain military
                                         should be more than adequate to uncover, so their            assets – heavy transport helicopters that can per-
                                         argument goes, any possible capability gaps of rel-          form sling-load operations at high-altitudes, for ex-
                                         evance to less demanding contingencies below the             ample – than the relevant COCOM predicted would
                                         MCO level. Therefore, any effort to earmark individ-         ever be needed based on current mechanisms for
12          In theory, the regional/geographic CO- ual systems, units, or even categories of          projecting future requirements. The need for other
    COMs regularly complete scenario-driven as- forces as priority capabilities for HA/DR             disaster-appropriate equipment – such as smaller
      sessments of forces and capabilities needed
  for a range of contingencies identified by DoD
                                                      missions is unnecessary, and it could, if       and lighter four-wheel drive vehicles that are more
   as principal planning guidelines. During this pursued, unduly complicate and inter-                easily deployable and earth-moving equipment that
 process, the COCOMs are supposed to compare fere with a COCOM commander’s abili-                     can operate better in remote areas with poor trans-
 the requirements for important emerging mis-
       sion areas – stability operations as a whole
                                                      ty to manage his forces for maximum             port infrastructure – may not be anticipated at all.
 now being one – to current COCOM inventories support of higher strategic priorities.                 Moreover, since a sizeable percentage of the skills
 and recommend remedies to eliminate any ca- In the opinion of some senior DoD offi-                  and capabilities most useful for “secondary” mis-
     pability gaps so revealed. Presumably, these
                                                      cials and military commanders, even just        sions (including HA/DR operations) reside in reserve
 recommendations would be included in the in-
  tegrated priority lists that all COCOMs submit maintaining an agreed-upon list of exist-            and National Guard units, they may be far less avail-
     to the Joint Staff each year for approval. The ing military capabilities and platforms           able than they might otherwise be, given the de-
Joint Staff, moreover, reviews and approves the deemed to be optimal (and, hence, likely              mands now placed on reserves and the Guard by
  overall capability assessments of the COCOMs,
    which are then supposed to drive the system
                                                      to be requested) for disaster relief oper-      operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.13
 development and force procurement programs           ations might give an inaccurate impres-            Secondly, focused as it still is on warfighting pri-
 of the military services. So, too, the joint quar- sion – especially to State Department             orities for MCOs, DoD guidance to the COCOMs and
    terly readiness reviews (JQRRs), which bring
         together the COCOMs, senior DoD person-
                                                      and other non-DoD interagency officials         their service component commands for planning
       nel, the military services, and various DoD    who may be seeking military assistance          military contingency operations continues to pay
    agencies to assess capability needs and risks for a specific relief effort – that these as-       inadequate attention, many HA/DR planners would
   associated with missions that support strate-
                                                      sets are in fact readily available. For those   argue, to the requirements for interagency coordi-
gic-level planning guidance, should provide yet
    another regularized procedure for highlight-      who hold such views, actually putting in        nation that are so central to HA/DR missions, as dis-
    ing potential capability gaps. Unfortunately, place a system to track the current loca-           cussed in chapter 2. As a result, the likelihood is high
  none of these planning efforts can be counted tions and readiness levels of such assets,            that key capabilities for facilitating such coordina-
  on to do so for mission areas other than those
    already programmed in the guidance as high
                                                      and to make that information generally          tion ( for example, compatible communications sys-
       priority. Contrary to the opinion expressed available at the interagency level, would          tems) will be overlooked or maintained at lower than
  by many DoD and COCOM planners, therefore, be even worse.                                           ideal levels. Beyond the hardware issue, moreover,
  one can not simply assume that COCOM gener-
   al purpose forces and force levels determined
                                                          Critics of this point of view argue         past deployments have revealed that disaster relief
   in this manner will in fact account adequate- that business-as-usual planning by DoD               teams organized around (and led by) forward-de-
  ly for the capability needs of lesser contingen- and the COCOMs really provides little as-          ployed general purpose forces may actually be quite
 cies and/or less traditional (and perhaps lower
                                                      surance that the skills and capabilities        ignorant of the fact that there are important non-
     priority) missions. See GAO 2007, 17-19, for a
     more detailed discussion of this point in ref- needed for HA/DR operations – most es-            military groups with whom they may need to coor-
     erence to stability operations requirements. pecially, large-scale relief efforts compa-         dinate in a HA/DR operation, or that there are fairly
13            According to a New York Times edito- rable to those launched in response to             well established procedures for facilitating such co-
        rial published on May 18, 2008, the Guard, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the              ordination. Similar blind spots have also been not-
        whose primary responsibilities are to pro-
          tect the homeland and respond to disas-
                                                      2005 Pakistan earthquake – will be avail-       ed with regard to the existence of potentially helpful
             ters (albeit principally within CONUS), able in a timely fashion at the levels, and      pockets of HA/DR expertise that reside in DoD agen-
             has only about sixty-one percent of its in the locations and formats, most like-         cies or may even be attached to COCOM headquar-
          equipment readily available because the
                   rest is already deployed overseas.
                                                      ly to be needed.12 In the first place, the      ters, which means, in turn, that any reach-back to


                                                                                                                                        Finding the Right Mix

                34                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 tap these specialized capabilities could be delayed       that they require), while still assuring the availabil-
 significantly, if it happens at all. During the 2005      ity of force levels and force mixes needed for priori-
 Pakistan relief effort, for example, the DAC was un-      ty warfighting missions. One of the most significant
 aware that an international health specialist (IHS)       developments in this regard was the earlier-men-
 specifically trained for such operations was resident     tioned release of DoD Directive 3000.5 in late 2005
 on the CENTCOM surgeon’s staff, and there were, as        (discussed in more detail in chapter 2), which ele-
 a result, many unnecessary shortfalls (and short cir-     vated the full spectrum of stability operations, HA/
 cuits) in the military medical support provided.14        DR activities included, to a priority on 14 IHS personnel are only found in the U.S.
     Thirdly, and in a similar vein, the warfighting fo-   par with traditional combat operations. Air Force, but they play (or should play) an ex-
                                                                                                       traordinarily important role in broader CO-
 cus of traditional COCOM and service component            To be sure, this call for a much great- COM planning for international medical
 planning would almost certainly give short shrift to      er emphasis on stability operations re- missions. In addition to their medical exper-
 the civil support and local capacity-building orienta-    quirements in determining U.S. military tise, they are trained in all facets of HA/DR
 tion of HA/DR missions and stability operations as a                                                                          civil-military and
                                                           posture has not been welcomed by all, operations, as well as in procedures. They in-
                                                                                                       teragency coordination
 whole. Drawing again on a healthcare example (giv-        and it will take time to see any real im- also receive extensive training in foreign lan-
 en the importance of such capabilities to effective di-   pact on overall force structure, especially guages and cultures, and generally have some
 saster relief), the medical support requirements es-      with respect to major military platforms embassy experience. As a result, IHS offi-
                                                                                                       cers bring a more integrated, long-term per-
 tablished by the regional COCOMs and their service        (which take years to field from design to spective which is particularly valuable to
 components are likely to give priority, for quite un-     deployment). Nonetheless, stability op- the recovery and reconstruction phases of
 derstandable reasons, to the combat surgery needs         erations considerations are at least being a disaster response (Bonventre 2006a, 4).
 of otherwise healthy young American adults (par-          discussed more frequently and in greater
 ticularly men), but pay little attention to the gener-    depth now among DoD and military service planners,
 al public health requirements of a multigenerational      a trend that can not help but put HA/DR capability
 civilian population living in areas that are medical-     needs more squarely in the spotlight. As mentioned
 ly underserved and/or are coping with the after ef-       earlier in this study, the creation in early 2007 of a
 fects of a natural or man-made disaster. This is an       new office in OSD for stability operations capabilities
 oversight that has become increasingly obvious and        should over time help to make this happen.
 problematic – and that has required adjustments               Of potentially far greater importance, moreover,
 in COCOM/service component planning – as medi-            is the work underway in the Office of the Assistant
 cal diplomacy, including hospital ship deployments        Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, or
 and COCOM MEDCAPs, have become more important             OASD/GSA (also mentioned in chapter 2) , to integrate
 tools for U.S. military engagement overseas. None-        the primary documents that have driven force plan-
 theless, despite a greater awareness of the likely ben-   ning and management for some time now – most
 efits that would accrue, little effort has been made      notably, DoD’s Contingency Planning Guidance ( fo-
 so far to develop – as proposed by a senior lessons-      cused on warfighting requirements) and its Securi-
 learned team shortly after the operation in Pakistan      ty Cooperation Guidance ( focused on peacetime en-
– a military medical equipment and supply package          gagement activities) – into a new, single document
 designed specifically for civilian healthcare in disas-   entitled the Guidance for the Employment of Forces,
 ter relief situations (Bonventre 2006a, 3).               or the GEF (interview 2007b).15 Presumably, this con-
                                                           solidation will place security cooperation initiatives –
DoD and Service Efforts to Ensure That                     which would include peacetime engage- 15 In addition to the guidance docu-
HA/DR Capabilities Are Available                           ment activities with allies and partner ments specified above, this new docu-
                                                                                                       ment will also incorporate DoD’s Nuclear
All that said, whatever one believes regarding the         nations aimed at building, training, and Weapons Employment Policy and various
capacity of standing general purpose forces to sup-        exercising HA/DR capabilities – on a Global Force Management (GFM) and Glob-
ply most (if not all) of the military capabilities that    more equal footing with COCOM and al Defense Posture (GDP) guidelines (in-
may be needed for foreign disaster relief, recent de-      service component efforts to prepare terview 2007b and Hoffman 2007).
velopments in defense planning at the OSD and ser-         for warfighting contingencies. The new guidance –
vice staff levels may open the door to more accurate       approved in final draft form in May 2008 (Sherman
and comprehensive planning in support of HA/DR op-         2008, 1) – is expected as well to move the defense
erations (and the military capabilities and skill sets     planning process away from a primary emphasis on


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                            Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief           35
                   the   InstItute    for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                      designing and refining decisive military responses         make truly unique and desirable contributions, giv-
                                      to specific combat scenarios of greatest concern to        en their inherent mobility and expeditionary charac-
                                      a more concerted focus on preventive measures to           ter, their ability to operate independently off shore,
                                      reduce the likelihood of conflict in the first place and   and their ability to maintain a comparatively small
                                      to minimize the damage (and speed the recovery)            footprint on shore (when operating ashore is re-
                                      from conflicts that can not, in the end, be prevented      quired). So, too, the capacity of maritime forces to
                                      (Sherman 2008, 1). Over time, such a shift in focus,       put to sea and leave the area of operations quickly
                                      in tandem with broader support for DoD Directive           could prove to be extremely valuable in facilitating
                                      3000.5, should help to confirm the growing impor-          the transition from the emergency response phase of
                                      tance of HA/DR missions, the rising demand for the         a disaster relief operation dominated by the military
                                      special skills and capabilities they require, and the      to a civilian-led recovery and reconstruction phase.
                                      clear need for better planning mechanisms to en-           Beyond these considerations, planning and exercis-
                                      sure their availability, wherever they may be locat-       ing for HA/DR missions are activities that the chief of
                                      ed. More specifically, it should confirm the value of      naval operations (CNO) views as an excellent focus
                                      HA/DR training and capacity-building efforts at the        for building allied and partner nation capabilities
                                      bilateral and multilateral levels as tools for restruc-    under his Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) pro-
                                      turing – or, in military parlance, “shaping” – region-     gram (interview 2008b).16 There are not many coun-
                                      al security environments so that they are both less        tries, he has observed, that can partner effectively
16        Originally promoted as      conflict-prone and better able to weather whatever         with the U.S. Navy on high-end, “tip of the spear”
the “thousand ship navy” con-         future instabilities do occur at a lower cost in terms     combat missions, but quite a few are able and ea-
 cept by Admiral Michael Mul-
       len, USN, when he was the
                                      of casualties, property damage, and socio-econom-          ger to do so in the HA/DR arena. As an added bene-
     CNO, the GMP program en-         ic dislocation.                                            fit, working cooperatively on HA/DR programs and
   visions the development and            As in the case of DoD Directive 3000.5, populariz-     exercises not only teaches allied/partner navies how
   effective utilization of a self-
      regulated web of relation-
                                      ing and institutionalizing the integrated approach         to work with U.S. maritime forces, but to work with
     ships with partner nations,      proposed in this new guidance will take time. Even         each other as well, creating in the process a base-
 relying on global cooperation        before the GEF was approved, however, a number of          line for cooperation later on in other mission areas.
     to meet the maritime secu-
                                      rather promising (if still somewhat uncoordinated)         In this way, HA/DR collaboration, the CNO has gone
    rity demands of the twenty-
first century. The current CNO,       steps in this direction were already being taken by        on to argue, can be used as a forcing function to ad-
  Admiral Gary Roughead, has          the leaderships and planning staffs of the individu-       vance GMP objectives more broadly.
    taken up the GMP idea with        al military services as they continued to revise doc-           In part for this reason, the Navy staff has been
  enthusiasm, and has promot-
   ed the notion of “pro-active,
                                      trine, adjust operational priorities, and transform        tasked with developing a global plan for maritime-
expeditionary HA” – which in-         force structure to adapt more effectively to the post-     based HA/HCA activities (including disaster pre-
   volves the carefully planned       Cold War and post-9/11 security environments. Per-         paredness efforts) that would be integrated into
   deployment of ships specifi-
   cally equipped for dedicated
                                      haps the most mature and far-reaching initiatives          the security cooperation programs of the Navy’s
   humanitarian and civil sup-        in this regard have been those of the sea services –       various component commands – such as U.S. Pa-
     port missions (as in the fall    most particularly, the U.S. Navy, but including as         cific Fleet (USPACFLT) and U.S. Naval Forces Europe
      2007 USNS Comfort deploy-
                                      well the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard – in the         (USNAVEUR) – assigned to the regional COCOMs. To
   ment to the Caribbean/Cen-
      tral American region) – as      run-up to and following the release of A Cooperative       ensure continuity and funding in the out-years of
      a way to build cooperative      Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in October 2007.        DoD’s Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), Navy
       ties and partner capabili-     Commonly referred to as the “new maritime strategy,”       planners are hoping as well to integrate this global
  ties (interview 2008b, 2008c).
                                      this document, signed by all three maritime service        HA/HCA plan into the program requirements of the
                                      chiefs, specifically identifies the capacity to conduct    Navy’s Program Objective Memorandum (or POM),
                                      HA/DR operations as one of six core capabilities of        the service’s annual planning document that seeks
                                      U.S. maritime power that need to be strengthened           to align Navy program priorities with the planning
                                      to ensure that a proper blend of peacetime engage-         guidance and fiscal constraints outlined in the De-
                                      ment and MCO assets will be readily available (Sea         fense Planning Guidance (DPG) provided to the mil-
                                      Services 2007, 11).                                        itary departments by the secretary of defense. Navy
                                          Moreover, the HA/DR mission area, the report           planners believe that embedding the HA/HCA plan
                                      points out, is one to which the maritime services can      within the POM would allow for a greater degree


                                                                                                                                    Finding the Right Mix

                   36                 Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 of thoughtful, advance planning, and that this, in           Compared to the Navy (and the sea services as
 turn, would lead to HA/HCA activities that have a        a whole), the Army and Air Force have been a bit
 more powerful and lasting effect on host nation          slower to acknowledge the rising importance of HA/
 populations. More time for planning, for example,        DR missions and to assign a higher priority to them
 would allow for better coordination with NGOs and        in their formal doctrine and operational guidance.
 would improve the chances that the naval platform        The Army, of course, has been understandably pre-
 involved would carry a bigger and more robust suite      occupied with the immediate demands of the Iraq
 of capabilities specifically selected for the tasks to   war, and the Air Force has been focused on the Joint
 be performed (interview 2008c).17 A more delibera-       Strike Fighter (JSF) and tanker aircraft procurements
 tive process would also make it more likely that the     (among other priorities). In recent months, however,
 achievements of the overall mission would be prop-       there are signs that both services are be- 17 That said, it remains more difficult to do
 erly publicized and recorded via carefully designed      ginning to turn their attention to stabil- advance planning for grey-hull ships, such as
                                                                                                      the USS Peleliu and USS Kearsarge, that bring
 public affairs and public diplomacy campaigns, both      ity and civil support operations, includ- more robust capabilities to the mission, be-
 of which are key to the promotion of positive foreign    ing HA/DR-related activities. The Army, cause they can only perform medical and HA/
 attitudes toward the United States.                      for example, released a new field oper- HCA deployments when they are out of rota-
     Together with the CNO’s decision discussed in                                                                               combat missions, a
                                                          ations manual in February 2008 that tion from their primary often hard to predict
                                                                                                      readiness status that is
 chapter 2 to program and fund up to four medical         builds on the precedent of DoD Direc- with precision. White-hull hospital ships, on
 ship deployments per year, the Navy’s efforts noted      tive 3000.5 and puts stability operations the other hand, can be programmed more pre-
 above to institutionalize HA/DR planning and oper-       on par with conventional combat op- cisely. Moving forward, therefore, the Navy
                                                                                                      intends to maintain a balance of grey- and
 ations as a way to assist friends and allies overseas    erations (Headquarters, Department of white-hull deployments, so as to ensure more
– and to help shape the geopolitical environment          Army 2008)19. Drawing on the Army’s ex- predictability in this particular mission sec-
 within which U.S. maritime forces must operate –         periences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as tor. Such predictability, it is argued, is impor-
                                                                                                      tant to the success of security cooperation
 promise to keep HA/DR requirements relatively high       well as on lessons learned from the Ar- and GMP engagement through proactive Na-
 on the priority lists of the Navy, Marine Corps, and     my’s relief efforts after hurricanes Rita vy-sponsored HA/HCA initiatives, given that
 Coast Guard leadership. How and to what degree           and Katrina, this new manual – formal- they are aimed at achieving long-term effects
 this may influence global force management con-          ly known as FM 3-0 – emphasizes the via sustained partnerships (interview 2008c).
                                                                                                      18 SOUTHCOM was the host COCOM for the
 siderations and future procurement preferences re-       need for improved training, skills, and GFS pilot project. See USSOUTHCOM 2007 for
 mains to be seen. Based on recent deployments, it        capabilities to help restore essential civ- details on the Swift’s six-month deployment
 seems likely that an increased emphasis on HA/DR         il services, dispense vital humanitarian in Caribbean and Central American waters.
                                                                                                      A description of the Swift’s HA activities con-
 missions in the future will at least reinforce pre-ex-   assistance, and support critical infra- ducted under Operation Handclasp is report-
 isting demands for amphibious ships and shallow-         structure development (that is,, nation- ed in Clark 2007. Project Handclasp is a Navy
 draft vessels ( for close-in operations), sea-based      building), while conducting at the same HA project that accepts and transports edu-
 transport helicopters, supply ships and sealift ca-      time more effective counterinsurgency cational, humanitarian, and goodwill materi-
                                                                                                      al overseas on Navy ships on a space-available
 pabilities, Seabee assets, and expeditionary medi-       (COIN) operations. On the specific issue basis. This particular delivery involved the
 cal teams, to name but a few platforms and skill         of whether or not existing or currently shipment of medical equipment to Panama.
 sets that have proven especially useful in the HA/       planned general purpose forces are like- 19 Chapter 3 in the field operations man-
 DR context. With regard to new construction, more-       ly to have sufficient capabilities to han- ual “Full Spectrum Operations” is especial-
                                                                                                      ly enlightening on Army requirements for
 over, there has been some discussion of developing       dle such tasks, one senior commander operating simultaneously in four realms –
 a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) variant or an LCS mis-      directly involved in writing the manual namely, offensive, defensive, stability, and
 sion module that would be optimized for HA/DR and        noted that while “there will be people civil support operations, which taken to-
 other stability operations (Ewing 2008, 22), and the     who naturally will say, ‘If I can do high- gether constitute full spectrum operations.
 Navy’s advanced high-speed catamaran – the High          end offense and defense, I can do any lesser kind of
 Speed Vessel (HSV)-2 Swift – served in 2007 as the       operations…what we [the Army] have found through
 test platform for the Global Fleet Station (GFS) con-    seven years [of operating in Afghanistan and Iraq]
 cept, which is aimed at engaging allied and partner      is that is not the case” (Caldwell 2008).
 nations in various training activities (to boost GMP         For its part, the Air Force leadership has been
 goals), while simultaneously providing targeted hu-      less forward leaning than the Army leadership on
 manitarian assistance ashore.18                          the issue of COIN and irregular warfare (IW) require-
                                                          ments, cautioning in its most recent white paper on


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                           Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief             37
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                      future strategic requirements that the United States         Is an Inventory of Key Capabilities Really Needed?
                                      should not assume that future conflicts will be low-         In summary, then, while traditional conventional
                                      intensity, IW-type operations similar to those cur-          force planning procedures (including the GFM pro-
                                      rently being conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S.         cess) may be sufficient to identify, access, and sup-
                                      Air Force 2007). In recent speeches and press inter-         ply most of the resources that the regional COCOMs
                                      views devoted to explaining this white paper, former         might need for HA/DR missions, it is not at all clear
                                      Air Force chief of staff General T. Michael Moseley          that they will yield everything that may be needed,
                                      stressed as well the need to recapitalize and exploit        or that the forces provided will be properly trained
                                      emerging technologies to maintain high-end com-              and the capabilities configured for the mission at
                                      bat capabilities able to match and (if need be) defeat       hand. Hence, the potential for critical capability
                                      those of “ascendant powers” (such as China and a ris-        gaps still does exist, and that potential may become
                                      ing Russia) that are posturing to contest U.S. supe-         a reality on a broader and more regular basis as HA/
20           In this context, the partnership pro- riority in the air, space, and cyberspace       DR missions emerge as a key component of Ameri-
 grams established between individual Ameri- domains (Spiegel 2008). At the same                   ca’s engagement policies in strategically important
  can states and specific foreign countries have
   already facilitated emergency airlifts, for ex-
                                                      time, however, Moseley acknowledged          regions. Based on current military operations and
   ample, by Air National Guard cargo planes to the need to maintain flexible airpower             on recent lessons-learned assessments, an increased
     partner countries in need. In one recent ex- options “across a full spectrum [of mili-        emphasis on full-spectrum capabilities – including
        ample, a C-130 from the Kentucky Air Na-
  tional Guard delivered emergency supplies to
                                                      tary operations] from humanitarian as-       HA/DR and other civil support assets – seems to be
     Ecuador in March 2008 to help in the clean- sistance all the way out to nuclear de-           in the offing, even though it remains to be seen how
   up operation following severe flooding in the terrence” (Spiegel 2008). To underscore           that will affect the precise balance between forces
      western and central portions of that coun-
                                                      the Air Force’s role as “the Nation’s pre-   optimized for warfighting and those for stability op-
           try, which is partnered with Kentucky.
                                                      mier global, multi-dimensional maneu-        erations missions. So, while the scope and scale of
21           Throughout the relief effort, the jun-
       ta in Myanmar refused to allow American ver force,” the white paper points as well          changes to come remain unclear, some adjustments
     warships anchored off that country’s coast- to the service’s increasingly important           will need to be made to force planning, force man-
      line to provide disaster relief via their heli- global reach capacity – or its “ability to   agement, and force sourcing procedures as present-
      copter and landing craft platforms, as U.S.
maritime forces had done so successfully in re-
                                                      move, supply, or position assets, with       ly defined. Such adjustments will be needed both to
  sponse to earlier crises elsewhere. As a result, unrivaled velocity and precision, any-          reduce (if not eliminate altogether) the likelihood
     U.S. Air Force C-130s flying from Utapao air where on the planet” – as demonstrat-            of future capability gaps in the HA/DR realm, and to
    base in Thailand to Yangon airport in Myan-
                                                      ed in America’s recent military respons-     make certain that the forces and capabilities that do
  mar emerged as the only officially sanctioned
  way to get critically needed supplies of water, es to a variety of foreign disasters.            exist are trained and organized (or can be on short
   food, medicine, blankets, and shelter materi-         So, even among Air Force circles          notice) in ways that will maximize their utility in
 als into the country (Kazmin and Lynch 2008). who seem more concerned than their                  HA/DR operations.
                                      Navy and Army counterparts about a potential (and,               That said, adjustments along these lines need not
                                      in their view, unwise) erosion in MCO warfighting ca-        be very extensive, complex, or costly to have a posi-
                                      pabilities due to an overemphasis on stability oper-         tive effect in the relative near term. In its role as joint
                                      ations requirements, it is understood that Air Force         force provider (JFP) to the regional COCOMs, JFCOM
                                      transport and logistical assets that are central to the      is already taking useful steps – via, for example, its
                                      rapid delivery of emergency relief and humanitarian          ongoing series of multinational crisis response ex-
                                      assistance overseas have become vital tools of mili-         periments and its annual Noble Resolve exercise in
                                      tary influence in the security environment now tak-          support of NORTHCOM (both of which have a disaster
                                      ing shape, and that they are likely to be called upon        response focus) – to highlight and ensure the avail-
                                      with increasing frequency in the years ahead.20 In-          ability of special HA/DR requirements that might
                                      deed, as brought so forcefully home during the ini-          otherwise be overlooked by a more business-as-usu-
                                      tial American and broader international response to          al approach to the assessment of capability needs
                                      the damage wrought by cyclone Nargis in Myanmar              (see USJFCOM 2007b, 2008b, 2008c). So, too, as dis-
                                      in May 2008, there will be times when airlift support        cussed above, DoD policy initiatives and recent revi-
                                      by Air Force cargo planes provides the only means            sions to the strategic plans and operational guidance
                                      approved by the assisted nation for delivering crit-         documents of the individual military services are
                                      ically needed aid via a military platform.21                 raising the profile of HA/DR missions and associated


                                                                                                                                         Finding the Right Mix

                38                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

civil support activities, and spotlighting, in the pro-   crease for a more structured (if still non-binding)
cess, how existing and future military platforms and      approach to identifying and preparing in advance
technologies can better support such operations, all      military assets seen to be crucial to successful HA/
in the name of transforming America’s armed forc-         DR operations, whatever the precise scenario. Un-
es to manage more effectively the security challeng-      til that time, however, simply developing a better
es of the twenty-first century.                           sense of the broad categories of military skills and
    What is needed most at this point, therefore, is      capabilities that have already proven to be extreme-
not so much a detailed inventory of military skills       ly valuable in such operations, and that are likely to
and capabilities useful to HA/DR operations that          prove valuable in the future, would be a useful, re-
could be tracked over time, but simply a fuller ap-       inforcing step to take, and it is to this task that we
preciation of how the military as a whole has con-        will now turn.
tributed to such operations in decisive ways in the
recent past, and what might be done, by means of
force posture improvements and a more dedicated           Review of High-Value/High-Leverage
approach to HA/DR planning, to build on this track        Assets
record in the future. One idea recently floated by a
                                                          While a substantial portion of the U.S military’s over-
NORTHCOM official was to attach a detailed checklist
                                                          all conventional force posture might very well be able
of the types of military units and assets that would be
                                                          to contribute in useful ways to HA/DR operations
required to effectively execute HA/DR concept plans
                                                          without major adjustment, not all military skills,
(CONPLANs) or operational plans (OPLANs) devel-
                                                          capabilities, and platforms are equal in this regard.
oped by COCOM planning staffs (USNORTHCOM 2008).
                                                          Based on past performance, there are certain spe-
If one wished to take this approach one step further,
                                                          cific sets of assets – concentrated in the military lift,
such lists could be generated in what is called TPFDL
                                                          logistics, engineering, communications, and medical
(or time-phased force deployment list) format, which
                                                          support sectors – that would be especially valuable at
would include details on the transportation require-
                                                          some level for virtually any disaster response, what-
ments for moving certain units or types of units (and
                                                          ever the scale of the disaster and wherever it may
the supplies and equipment they may need) to a des-
                                                          have occurred. Not surprisingly, most of 22 A formal TPFDL identifies the types of
ignated port of debarkation.22 Attaching a list like
                                                          these same assets would be equally use- and/or actual units required to support a mil-
this to an HA/DR CONPLAN or OPLAN should not                                                          itary OPLAN, indicating precise locations and
                                                          ful for the HCA and similar engagement ports of debarkation. Time-phased force de-
in any way suggest that the units and items listed
                                                          programs that have become increasing- ployment data (TPFDD) adds the details re-
would actually be assigned to (or programmed for)
                                                          ly central to the theater security cooper- garding equipments needs and transportation
the mission described. It would, however, get the CO-
                                                          ation efforts of all the regional COCOMs. to port requirements. See TPFDL and Far-TPFDD
COMs to begin to think more concretely and in real-                                                   definitions on The Free Dictionary by
                                                          Understanding more fully what these lex, at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
istic operational terms about what might be need-
                                                          high-value/high-leverage skills, capabil- time-phased+force+and+deployment+list
ed well beforehand.
                                                          ities, and platforms have done for past and http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
    Of course, the goal of such an exercise would not                                                 time-phased+force+and+deployment+data.
                                                          HA/DR operations, and what they may
and should not be to develop a “one size fits all” ap-
                                                          confidently be expected to do for future operations,
proach to preparing the military for HA/DR missions.
                                                          is the essential first step, therefore, in making sure
As noted earlier, each mission must be carefully tai-
                                                          that they will indeed be available and ready to per-
lored to accommodate the unique conditions of the
                                                          form as required when the next disaster hits or the
situation at hand, and these conditions will proba-
                                                          next HCA-type deployments are planned. What fol-
bly vary quite widely from region to region even for
                                                          lows is a sector by sector evaluation based on the re-
similar types of disasters. In turn, the specific ca-
                                                          sults of recent activities in the field and on current
pabilities that are needed and the forces that can
                                                          DoD, service, and COCOM planning priorities.
best provide them may vary significantly as well
from one HA/DR contingency to another. But once
                                                          Airlift and Sealift Support
the shift toward a greater focus on stability opera-
                                                          Air and sealift support remains perhaps the most
tions matures and becomes a more integral part of
                                                          useful and unique military contribution to foreign
standard military planning, demands will likely in-
                                                          disaster relief operations, particularly in cases where

Finding the Right Mix

                                                                           Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief           39
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  the local transport infrastructure (including air-        Baghram began to deliver critical supplies to Chakla-
                  ports, seaports, roads, and railway lines) has been       la Air Base in Pakistan. From here, the supplies were
                  swept away or severely damaged, leaving local re-         loaded onto helicopters for further distribution to
                  sponse mechanisms powerless to assist devastated          areas that were unreachable by any other means,
                  and isolated communities. In such circumstances,          and, when the altitude was too high for helicop-
                  fixed-wing cargo aircraft, transport helicopters, and     ters to fly effectively, relief supplies were airdropped
                  a variety of maritime supply vessels and naval plat-      close to those in need. Moreover, as the scope and
                  forms have proven, time and again, to be the most re-     magnitude of the disaster became known, addition-
                  sponsive and cost-effective means for transporting        al C-17 and C-130 aircraft from other U.S. air bases in
                  relief-related supplies, equipment, and personnel         America, Europe, the Pacific, and the Persian Gulf
                  quickly to disaster-stricken areas. For example, Air      landed in Islamabad carrying military meals ready
                  Mobility Command’s C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft,         to eat (MREs), blankets, winterized tents, and oth-
                  which are the largest airlifters in the U.S. Air Force    er critical supplies to assist relief efforts.
                  inventory, are often the first to arrive on scene, when       Naturally, fixed-wing military cargo aircraft also
                  the priority task is to move large quantities of mate-    were in high demand following the Indian Ocean
                  rial in the shortest period of time over long distanc-    tsunami in December 2004. The largest tsunami hit
                  es. Capable of carrying more than 270,000 pounds          the west coast of Sumatra in Aceh province, affect-
                  of cargo over 6,320 nautical miles (which can be ex-      ing a five-hundred-kilometer stretch of coastline and
                  tended by in-flight refueling), C-5s can move a good-     sweeping nearly five kilometers inland (Wiharta et
                  ly number of helicopters and/or over-sized ground         al. 2008, 87). Major roadways, coastal roads, and
                  vehicles, as well as a substantial volume of sup-         bridges were washed away, and the country’s few air-
                  plies and key support personnel, to disaster zones        strips and harbors were damaged or destroyed. The
                  on quite short notice (U.S. Air Force 2008). When         tsunami also severely compromised local military
                  available landing strips are limited or damaged, the      assets, leaving the Indonesian government with only
                  smaller C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III air-      two helicopters on the entire island of Sumatra (El-
                  craft, both of which have relatively large payload        leman 2006, 56). Hence, foreign military assistance,
                  capacities, are capable of short takeoffs and land-       especially air assets, were essential to helping the
                  ings on unprepared runways, and support in-flight         local government to gain access to affected and re-
                  refueling, stand out as particularly attractive alter-    mote areas and to deliver the first wave of relief sup-
                  natives. Largely for these reasons, the C-130, which      plies. Toward those objectives, C-5, C-17, and C-130
                  is also the more numerous of the three aircraft, has      aircraft from U.S. bases in Japan and America deliv-
                  become the real workhorse of disaster relief oper-        ered much needed helicopters, humanitarian aid,
                  ations insofar as initial airlift is concerned, and no    support personnel, communications equipment,
                  organization has a greater supply (much of it for-        and emergency responders into or around the di-
                  ward deployed) than the U.S. military.                    saster zone. Overall, the airlift operation involved
                      Indeed, a major reason why American forces were       twenty-four C-5s, thirty-five C-17s, twenty-one C-130s,
                  able to serve as “the backbone of the relief operation    two KC-135 refueling aircraft, and one C-21 (Kreish-
                  in support of the Pakistan military” (USAID 2006a)        er 2005), most (though not all) drawn from bases lo-
                  during the 2005 earthquake response lay in the fact       cated in PACOM’s AOR.
                  that there already was a sizeable airlift presence at         That said, in addition to six C-5s and five C-17s
                  Baghram Air Base in neighboring Afghanistan de-           sent from Air Mobility Command (AMC) inventories
                  ployed in support of operation Enduring Freedom.          based in CONUS, TRANSCOM provided a seven-man
                  With almost 30 percent of the affected areas in Pak-      tanker airlift control element (TALCE) for the on-
                  istan completely sealed off by mudslides and other        site management of airfield operations, including
                  earthquake-induced damage, there was great con-           the provision of command, control, and communi-
                  cern, of course, that numerous villages and towns         cations (C3) networks, aerial port services, main-
                  in the more remote mountainous sectors would re-          tenance, weather reporting, and intelligence. Over
                  main isolated for some time to come. Almost imme-         two thousand airmen from one hundred Air Force
                  diately, however, C-17 and C-130 cargo aircraft from      units and fourteen bases flew more than fourteen


                                                                                                                Finding the Right Mix

40                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

hundred sorties and scores of long-haul missions,         tsunami, the USS Abraham Lincoln was involved in
moving more than eighteen million pounds of re-           a naval rotary-wing reorganization program (Bra-
lief supplies and equipment (averaging 261 tons per       vo to Sea or B2C), which was designed to improve
day) and nearly eight thousand passengers to lo-          the integration of helicopters into carrier flight op-
cal distribution centers from which they could then       erations. Instead of S-3 Viking tanker aircraft as an-
be sent to disaster areas in greatest need (Kreisher      tisubmarine warfare platforms, the carrier had on
2005). A senior USAID official later noted that the       board a light helicopter antisubmarine squadron,
Air Force’s emergency response was indispensable          HSL-47, with eight H-60 Seahawks in its air wing,
to USAID and others in the international relief area,     which amounted to more HSL aircraft than any oth-
concluding that “the one thing that distinguishes         er carrier strike group had (Elleman 2006, 56). The
the United States from the rest of the world [ for di-    Abraham Lincoln had seventeen (instead of seven)
saster relief purposes] is its military, especially the   helicopters from three squadrons – Helicopter An-
Air Force and its airlift capability” (U.S. Air Force     ti-Submarine Squadron 2, Helicopter Anti-Subma-
2005a).                                                   rine (Light) Squadron 47, and Helicopter Combat
    But the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami          Support Squadron 11 – on board that could provide
also provided a striking confirmation of the strategic    direct sea-to-land access and allow responders to
value of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps sea-basing        reach inland areas. Ongoing efforts to integrate heli-
concept, according to which offshore maritime plat-       copter assets into carrier air wings based on the B2C
forms are utilized as a logistical and communica-         experiment will undoubtedly expand naval capacity
tions hub that is much less dependent on land-based       to respond to future HA/DR missions (as well as to
facilities (which are often damaged in a disaster sce-    combat contingencies) in a similar manner.
nario). Since the tsunami had washed out hundreds             PACOM also deployed a seven-ship expeditionary
of miles of coastline, bridges, and major roads, in-      strike group (ESG) led by the helicopter and dock
land areas were inaccessible to first responders via      landing ship USS Bonhomme Richard, which brought
ground-based transport options, forcing many to           another twenty-five helicopters to the scene, includ-
operate from the sea. When the tsunami struck, for-       ing CH-53 Sea Stallion heavy-lift helicopters, CH-46
ward-deployed naval assets were nearby in the Pa-         Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters, and UH-1 Huey
cific theater, and able to arrive with critical mass
to commence sea-based relief operations immedi-                                                             Military Sealift Command Ships
                                                           USS abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike
                                                           Group 9                                          Maritime Prepositioning Ships
ately. In fact, a six-ship carrier strike group (CSG)                                                       MV 1st Lt. Jack Lummus (T-AK 3011)
                                                           USS abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)
led by the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (which was          USS Shiloh (CG 72)                               SS Maj. Stephen W. Pless (T-AK 3007)
the first to arrive, on January 1, 2005) was visiting      USS Benfold (DDG 65)                             MV Cpl. Louis J. hauge Jr. (T-AK 3000)
                                                           USS Shoup (DDG 86)                               MV Pfc. James anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002)
Hong Kong when it was ordered to respond to the
                                                           USS Louisville (SSN 724)                         MV 1st Lt. alex Bonnyman (T-AK 3003)
tsunami crisis. Interestingly enough, just before the                                                       USNS 1st Lt. henry L. Martin (T-AK 3015)
                                                           USNS rainier (T-AOE 7)
                                                                                                            Hospital Ship
    U.S. Contributions to                                   USS Bonhomme richard Expeditionary              USNS Mercy (T-AH 19)
    Operation Unified Assistance                            Strike Group 5                                  Combat Stores Ships
                                                            USS Bonhomme richard (LHD 6)                    USNS San Jose (T-AFS 7)
  Rotary-wing Aircraft        Fixed-wing Aircraft           USS Duluth (LPD 6)                              USNS Concord (T-AFS 5)
  CH-53D Sea Stallion         Medium/Heavy-Lift Car-        USS rushmore (LSD 47)                           USNS Niagara Falls (T-AFS 3)
  CH-46 Sea Knight            go and Passenger Aircraft     USS Milius (DDG 69)                             High-Speed Vessels
  CH-47 Chinook               C-17 Globemaster III          USS Bunker hill (CG 52)                         USS Swift (HSV 2)
  SH-60B Sea hawk             C-5 Galaxy                    USS thach (FFG 43)                              MV WestPac express (HSV 4676)
  HH-60 Pave hawk             C-130 hercules                USCGC Munro (WHEC 724)                          Large, Medium-Speed Roll-
  MH-60S Knight hawk          KC-130                                                                        on/Roll-off Ships
  MH-53E Sea Dragon           MC-130                        Other U.S. Navy Ships                           USNS Watson (T-AKR 310)
  UH-1 huey                   C-2 Greyhound                 Elements of Forward Deployed                    Fleet Replenishment Oilers
                              C-21A                         Amphibious Ready Group                          USNS tippecanoe (T-AO 199)
                              Air Refueling Tanker          USS essex (LHD-2)                               USNS John ericsson (T-AO 194)
                              KC-135 Stratotanker           USS harpers Ferry (LSD 49)                      Oceanographic Survey Ships
                              Reconnaissance Aircraft       Dock Landing Ship                               USNS Mary Sears (T-AGS 65)
                              P-3C Orion                    USS Fort Mchenry (LSD 43)                       USNS John McDonnell (T-AGS 51)



Finding the Right Mix

                                                                           Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief              41
             the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                           light utility helicopters. In addition, the forward-          medical evacuations, and delivering nearly fifteen
                           deployed amphibious ready group (ARG) led by USS              thousand tons of cargo to distressed villages, which
                           Essex left the Persian Gulf on January 10 to assist           was more than any other country or organization
                           ongoing humanitarian relief efforts. En route to In-          handled, including the UN (LeFever 2006).
                           donesia, Essex picked up four Bahrain-based MH-                   CENTCOM and PACOM efforts to get a sufficient
                           53E Sea Dragon heavy-lift helicopters – the Western           number of helicopters where they were most needed,
                           world’s largest helicopters, capable of carrying up to        moreover, were both prompt and persistent. Within
                           fifty-five troops or a sixteen-ton payload fifty nauti-       eight hours of the Pakistan earthquake, Combined
                           cal miles or a ten-ton payload five hundred nautical          Forces Command–Afghanistan deployed eight heli-
                           miles – to augment the lift capacity of the avail-            copters ( five CH-47 Chinooks and three UH-60 Black
                           able U.S. helicopter fleet (U.S. Navy 2005a). In ad-          Hawks) to the affected area (Wiharta et al. 2008, 109).
                           dition to its own helicopter combat squadron, the             The following day, Rear Admiral Michael A. LeFever,
                           ARG also utilized six CH-46 Sea Knight helicopters            USN, commanding officer of ESG 1, arrived in Paki-
                           from Okinawa and two more MH-60S Knight Hawks                 stan to establish a disaster assistance center to co-
                           from USNS Niagara Falls, one of Military Sealift Com-         ordinate U.S. military support with the U.S. Embassy
                           mand’s (MSC) four combat stores ships operating in            and USAID/DART members. By mid-November 2005,
                           the area (U.S. Navy 2005b). Helicopters from the Bon-         U.S. military operations reached their peak with no
                           homme Richard and Essex groups focused primarily              fewer than twenty-five helicopters operating simul-
                           on the efficient dispersal of relief supplies to key dis-     taneously, and some twelve hundred military per-
                           tribution points ashore, leaving those on the Abra-           sonnel providing transportation, cargo processing,
                           ham Lincoln to locate survivors, conduct search and           and engineering support (LeFever 2006). Because
                           rescue missions and medical evacuations, and dis-             of the sustained demand for helicopters as the relief
                           tribute immediate aid to remote areas. At the height          operation unfolded, some even had to be dismantled
                           of the tsunami relief effort, U.S. forces had about fif-      and shipped from bases outside of the region. One
                           ty-eight helicopters all told dedicated to the opera-         army aviation unit from Hawaii’s Wheeler Army Air-
                           tion (Elleman 2006, 10-11).                                   field, for example, was faced with the onerous task of
                               Based in part on their success in the tsunami re-         tearing down components of four Chinook airframes
                           lief effort, military helicopters also played a critical      in five days for transport to Afghanistan via three
                           role in the U.S response to the 2005 Pakistan earth-          C-5s, only to reassemble the pieces once they arrived
                           quake during Operation Lifeline. Although fixed-              at Bagram (U.S. Department of Defense 2005).
  U.S. Contributions to                wing aircraft shuttled relief supplies en             With a harsh winter close at hand and a large
  Operation Lifeline                   masse, “the high altitude and mountain-           number of injured victims, many within the relief
Fixed-wing Aircraft
                                       ous terrain, lack of suitable landing sites,      community were concerned that a second wave of
Medium/Heavy-Lift Car-                 and initial shortage of forward operating         deaths would soon eclipse the initial toll. In order to
go and Passenger Aircraft              refueling locations” meant that the majori-       expedite relief efforts and ensure that those affected
C-17 Globemaster III
                                       ty of the airlift role within the actual disas-   in remote areas received immediate and adequate
C-5 Galaxy
C-130 hercules                         ter zone fell on the helicopters (Center of       aid, the U.S. military outfitted its fleet of CH-47 Chi-
C-9B Skytrain                          Excellence in Disaster Management and             nook helicopters with a special type of loading capa-
Rotary-wing Aircraft (25 Helos)        Humanitarian Assistance 2006). As in the          bility called sling-loads, which are essentially nets
CH-47 Chinook                          tsunami response, helicopters played a cru-       attached underneath the helicopters. Sling-loads al-
UH-60 Black hawk
MH-53 Sea Stallion
                                       cial role in reaching difficult-to-access ar-     lowed each helicopter to carry two nets holding a
MH-53E Sea Dragon                      eas, delivering relief supplies, and airlifting   total of 4.5 tons of cargo (USAID 2006b). Introduced
SH/-60MH-60 Sea hawk                   injured locals to medical centers. Military       for the first time in Pakistan, this new airlift concept
MH-60S Knight hawk                     officials have cited the Pakistan relief oper-    dramatically increased the effectiveness, capacity,
USS tarawa Expeditionary Strike        ation as the largest helicopter airlift in his-   and speed of the rotary-wing relief operation. The
Group (ESG) 1
USS tarawa (LHA 1)                     tory. Overall, U.S. military helicopters flew     local population even dubbed the U.S. fleet of high
USS Cleveland (LPD 7)                  more than fifty-two hundred sorties, car-         altitude heavy lift CH-47 Chinooks “angels of mer-
USS Pearl harbor (LSD 52)              rying more than twenty thousand passen-           cy.” Traditionally, loading and unloading the inside
USS Chosin (CG 65)
USS Ingraham (FFG 61)                  gers, conducting over thirty-seven hundred        of a helicopter takes about twenty to thirty min-


                                                                                                                             Finding the Right Mix

             42                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 utes, and requires, of course, a landing site. How-         existed to help filter the hundreds of daily reports
 ever, by using sling-loads in Pakistan, helicopters         and situation updates. As relief supplies flooded air-
 picked up cargo from forward operating bases, flew          ports and warehouses in the affected regions, first
 up to ten thousand feet into affected areas, hovered        responders struggled to sort through, catalogue, and
 and dropped much-needed medical and relief sup-             distribute the piles of supplies that had accumulat-
 plies, and then quickly flew out. The development           ed (Thomas and Kopczak 2005). So, too, the lack of
 of this technique was a breakthrough in airlift capa-       transport and warehouse capacity in the early days
 bility and will undoubtedly prove its worth in future       of the operation forced first responders to unload
 HA/DR operations in mountainous terrain (such as            relief items at those points that were easiest to ac-
 in Sichuan province in China, where the May 2008            cess, sometimes leaving excess goods piled up on
 earthquake struck).                                         the road (Thomas 2005). Ad hoc supply and trans-
      That said, while the CH-47 Chinooks saved the          port networks sometimes worked to move things
 day in Pakistan, helicopters do not always perform          along, as was the case when a German Red Cross
 well in high-altitude mountainous terrains because          worker simply walked up to an American helicopter
 their rotor lift and engine performance decreases           pilot and convinced him to help deliver ten tons of
 substantially in the thinning air. Hence, an after-ac-      hospital equipment to a German field hospital (El-
 tion U.S. military assessment highlighted the need to       leman 2006, 73). Sadly, even when they get the job
“ensure [that] future joint heavy lift requirements in-      done, such informal channels do little to introduce
 clude high altitude capability” (LeFever 2006), a prior-    a cost-effective approach to managing the flow and
 ity that might well have gone unaddressed had it not        storage of relief goods and services.
 been for the airlift experience in Pakistan. In part as a       Critical to the creation of effective supply chains
 transitional move, the U.S. Navy awarded Sikorsky Air-      are accurate and ongoing assessments of the extent
 craft Corporation a $3 billion contract in April 2006       of damage to existing infrastructure, the number of
 to design and build 156 Sikorsky CH-53K helicopters         people affected, the secondary threats to the popula-
 for the Marine Corps. This new heavy-lift platform          tion, and the capacity of the international communi-
 will be able to carry an external load up to twenty-        ty to respond. Assessments greatly influence the type
 seven thousand pounds out to a distance of 110 nau-         and quantities of relief items mobilized from nearby
 tical miles in hot climates and high altitudes with-        warehouses or procured overseas, and become blue-
 out refueling in flight, making it “the perfect aircraft    prints for planning disaster response activities. Be-
 for humanitarian operations in Pakistan and combat          cause of incomplete or partial assessments, howev-
 operations in Afghanistan” (Sirak 2006).                    er, available supplies are not always well matched to
                                                             victim needs. Too often, relief agencies and organi-
Supply Chain Management and                                  zations simply “push” relief supplies ahead instead
Distribution Logistics                                       of responding to valid requests based on proper as-
The optimal use of transportation assets, whether            sessments of victim needs, assessments that could be
ground-, air-, or sea-based, however, requires an ef-        leveraged to “pull” those supplies that are really re-
ficient logistics and supply chain management pro-           quired into the disaster zone. This push-pull problem
cess to ensure that relief supplies arrive where they        arises in part from the fact that assessment teams of-
are really needed, in the right quantity and in the          ten do not include a logistician; in fact, over 40 per-
proper format. But setting such a process prompt-            cent of the assessment teams sent out by the larg-
ly in place remains quite a challenge, given that a          est aid agencies during the tsunami response did not
clear understanding of what is needed where is of-           include logistics staff (Thomas 2005). This oversight
ten absent in the early days of a relief operation. In       has it roots in the limited number of professional
the wake of the 2004 tsunami tragedy, incomplete             logisticians trained to manage humanitarian logis-
assessment reports and conflicting information re-           tics operations, and in the high turnover of experi-
garding the total number of individuals and coun-            enced field logistics personnel. In addition, of those
tries affected and their outstanding requirements            few logisticians who do work with relief agencies,
wasted resources and time, particularly since no             few (only 26 percent surveyed during the tsunami
systematic data collection and management system             response) have access to appropriate communica-


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                            Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief          43
                 the   InstItute     for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                     tions equipment and to tracking and tracing software,        operations the USS Bonhomme Richard joined the
                                     relying mostly on manual processes to prepare for            effort, flying more than 175,000 pounds of fresh wa-
                                     the receipt of procured or donated goods, or at min-         ter, food, and medical supplies on and off the ship
                                     imum, to locate warehouses, assess physical infra-           (Navy Supply Corps 2005). Logistics professionals
                                     structure in the disaster area, and establish transpor-      and medical and dental personnel aboard Bonhom-
                                     tation pipelines. This paucity of expertise prompted         me Richard, along with embarked logisticians from
                                     a spokesman from Doctors Without Borders to com-             Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 5 and the 15th Ma-
                                     ment that “…what is needed are supply mangers with-          rine Expeditionary Force, formed a logistics opera-
                                     out borders: people to sort goods, identify priorities,      tions command center to assess shore requirements
                                     track deliveries and direct the traffic of a relief effort   and to coordinate the ship’s response with other lo-
                                     in full gear” (Thomas and Kopczak 2005).                     gistics professionals throughout the region.
                                         As a result, military forces increasingly are being          In support of frontline efforts, MSC also sent six
                                     asked to coordinate most, if not all, logistics support      of its twelve maritime pre-positioning ships from
23      The six maritime pre-po-     once they join a relief effort. During the tsunami re-       Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron 3.23 Collec-
     sitioning ships were the MV     sponse, relief aid came from multiple sources, includ-       tively, these ships were stocked with enough equip-
      1st Lt. Jack Lummus (T-AK-
  3011), SS Maj. Stephen W. Pless
                                     ing the Indonesian government, USAID, the UN and             ment and supplies to support fifteen thousand
    (T-AK 3007), MV Cpl. Louis J.    its affiliated agencies, dozens of countries, NGOs, and,     marines for thirty days (U.S. Navy 2004b). In addi-
  Hauge Jr. (T-AK 3000), MV Pfc.     of course, the vessels of TRANSCOM’s Military Sealift        tion to combat equipment, the ships carried food,
James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002),
   MV 1st Lt. Alex Bonnyman (T-
                                     Command (MSC) and the Air Force’s C-130s, C-5s, and          fuel, medical supplies, construction and road build-
 AK 3002) and USNS 1st Lt. Har-      C-17s staged out of Utapao and Singapore (Elleman            ing equipment, electrical power generating equip-
         ry L. Martin (T-AK 3015).   2006, 43). No matter where relief aid came from, how-        ment, airfield matting, and a Navy field hospital. The
                                     ever, sea-based U.S. Navy ships coordinated the logis-       squadron also had forty-three osmosis water purifi-
                                     tical flow of most relief supplies. In addition, P-3C        cation units, each of which was capable of produc-
                                     Orion surveillance aircraft and humanitarian assis-          ing up to six hundred gallons of potable water per
                                     tance assessment teams (HASTs) from PACOM were               hour from seawater, and five of the ships had evap-
                                     deployed to survey the disaster areas and identify re-       orators capable of making an additional twenty-five
                                     quirements for military-specific support in the logis-       thousand gallons of water per day. Given the priority
                                     tics arena (U.S. Navy 2004a). Indonesia’s Minister of        need for clean water for cooking and drinking after
                                     Defense, Juwono Sudarsono, later characterized the           flood-based disasters, these military water produc-
                                     U.S. military as having been the “backbone of the lo-        tion assets proved to be absolutely critical (as they
                                     gistical operations providing assistance to all affect-      were during the 2006 Philippine mudslides and in
24       For example, only days      ed after the disaster” (Elleman 2006, 43).                   Bangladesh after cyclone Sidr in 2007.)24 In addition,
    after cyclone Sidr hit Ban-          Upon hearing of the tsunami tragedy, Rear Ad-            MSC deployed two replenishment oilers, USNS Tippe-
    gladesh in November 2007,
 U.S. Marine helicopters from
                                     miral Douglas Crowder, commander of USS Abra-                canoe and USNS John Ericsson, to provide food and
   the USS Kearsarge amphib-         ham Lincoln, immediately set up a joint planning             fuel to ships and sea-based aircraft, as well as sever-
     ious assault ship were fer-     group (JPG) while en route to Indonesia to plan for          al resupply support vessels, including USNS San Jose,
  rying much needed supplies
    of fresh water produced by
                                     the multiple contingencies involved in the human-            USNS Rainier, USNS Watson, the WestPac Express, and
    the Kearsarge to emergen-        itarian relief mission. The JPG created crisis action        the HSV-2 Swift. These ships also supported partner
cy distribution centers ashore       teams (CATs) to organize the day-to-day activities           nations assisting with relief efforts. For example, the
      (U.S. Marine Corps 2007).
                                     of the relief mission. The CATs located relief supplies,     combat stores ship USNS San Jose replenished at sea
                                     coordinated relief efforts with other regional liaison       the French frigate Georges Leygues and the Austra-
                                     officers, identified personnel with prior disaster-re-       lian amphibious ship HMAS Kanimbla.
                                     lief experience to join shore parties, and provided              Of course, effective supply chain networks de-
                                     daily first aid and cultural awareness training cours-       pend on a range of back-office support services as
                                     es to all shore party volunteers. Helicopter pilots          well as on experienced logistics professionals in the
                                     and crews also received refresher courses on cargo           field. In this context, the U.S. military draws on the
                                     handling, and maintenance crews modified helicop-            Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) for support and
                                     ters to carry emergency supplies. As noted in the lift       supplies, whether for combat readiness, emergen-
                                     discussion, a few days after Abraham Lincoln began           cy preparedness, or day-to-day operations, includ-


                                                                                                                                     Finding the Right Mix

                 44                  Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

ing HA/DR missions. The DLA, in turn, runs several        inventory control, and delivery of all tsunami-relat-
defense supply and distribution centers, such as the      ed aid provided through the various military supply
Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), which fa-           channels. The NRCC even locally purchased more
cilitates the deployment of fuels and other energy        than $t0,000 in relief supplies (U.S. Navy 2005c).
sources, and the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia       Cargo handlers from the Naval Expeditionary Lo-
(DSC-P), which coordinates the procurement and            gistics Support Force (NAVELSF) loaded NRCC in-
delivery of medical supplies and construction ma-         ventory onto MSC supply ships for further delivery
terial. The commanders of both organizations act          to frontline ships. Once supplies reached ships oper-
as key supply chain managers for forward-deployed         ating closer to shore, namely those in the Abraham
forces, responsible for identifying customer require-     Lincoln, Bonhomme Richard and Essex strike groups,
ments and for managing inventory control, storage,        helicopters on board those ships then shuttled relief
distribution, and delivery systems. The main point        supplies from ship to shore. Linked together, CONUS-
here, however, is that when a foreign disaster strikes    based facilities, Hawaii-based facilities, supply units
and a military response is approved, the full scope       tied to main operating bases and to less developed
of the DLA’s network, from CONUS-based centers of         operating sites overseas, and forward-deployed mar-
excellence to supply facilities overseas, can be mo-      itime forces dispersed across the Pacific and Indian
bilized to a degree and at a speed that few (if any)      Oceans, brought to bear a formidable relief capaci-
commercial supply networks could replicate.               ty with long reach that was both highly mobile and
    In response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, for ex-      minimally dependent on shore-based assets (many
ample, DLA coordinated closely with the Navy Supply       of which were unusable in any event.)
Systems Command (NAVSUP), which handled the Na-               The Air Force’s airlift effort operated a supply chain
vy’s logistics during the relief mission. On their end,   similar in many ways to that of the U.S. Navy. Just as
NAVSUP personnel worked closely with the Naval Op-        relief supplies were moved from the FISCs and NRCC
erational Logistics Support Center (NOLSC) in Virgin-     onto MSC supply ships for further delivery to the front-
ia and with three fleet and industrial supply centers     line ships, forward-based and AMC-assigned aircraft
(FISC) in the Pacific area to deliver transport materi-   flew cargo to a central distribution center point at
al, critical supplies, and personnel support to the af-   Utapao in Thailand. From there, in-theater airlift op-
fected countries. FISC Yokosuka, the Navy’s forward       erated mainly in a hub-and-spoke system. Once relief
supply center, sent officers with expertise in fueling    materials arrived at Utapao, they were loaded onto
operations, requisition processing, contracting, and      C-130 and C-17 aircraft and flown to other smaller air-
transportation to the Naval Regional Contracting          fields throughout the disaster area. From these hubs,
Center (NRCC) in Singapore, which headquartered           relief supplies were offloaded onto waiting trucks
the Navy’s logistics operations in the Pacific. FISC      for transport on “spoke” routes to outlying helicop-
Yokosuka also moved high priority ship and air wing       ter landing zones for further delivery. This method
materials from Yokota Air Base to Singapore for fur-      allows for greater efficiency in the use of various air-
ther transport to ships stationed in the Indian Ocean     craft and increases the overall pace and breadth of
(Navy Supply Corps 2005). When Bonhomme Richard           cargo delivery. Moreover, since most coastal roads
arrived on short notice at Guam on its way to Indo-       were washed out in the hardest hits areas of Suma-
nesia, FISC Pearl Harbor handled all of its logistics     tra, “helicopters were the only way to move supplies
requests. Finally, logistics support and contracting      efficiently from the logistical ports of entry at Ban-
representatives from FISC San Diego completely re-        da Aceh and Meulaboh to the more than 60 villages
outfitted USNS Mercy with humanitarian relief sup-        and camps of displaced persons along the coast” (El-
plies, medical equipment, operating theaters, and         leman 2006, 61). Indeed, helicopters “provided [the]
four 75,000-gallon per day evaporators with a 1.2 mil-    last link in the chain as the only way to get the sup-
lion-gallon holding capacity in just five days – a re-    plies to those in need” (Elleman 2006, 55).
markable feat considering USNS Mercy had not been             In Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake, relief goods
deployed in thirteen years (Elleman 2006, 79).            quickly flooded Pakistan’s single airstrip, creating
    Meanwhile, as the key logistics staging point, the    a coordination and logistical nightmare, with non-
NRCC was responsible for the procurement, storage,        essential cargo and inappropriate aid (such as ex-


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                          Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief          45
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  pired food, Viagra, and women’s swim suits) block-           sistance from NOLSC in Virginia. Within days of the
                  ing critical relief supplies and services and further        earthquake, logisticians from NOLSC arrived in Is-
                  congesting the already taxed transport systems. To           lamabad to assist in operational logistics and trans-
                  help manage the international aid pouring into Pak-          portation. NOLSC personnel immediately established
                  istan’s single airstrip, U.S. forces sent in air transpor-   the Disaster Assistance Center Logistics Operations
                  tation specialists, air traffic controllers, cargo movers,   Center (DAC-LOC) to provide twenty-four/seven sup-
                  and aircraft maintenance crew to handle all U.S. aid         port to Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan (DAC-
                  and much of the international aid arriving at Chak-          PAK) and to serve as a liaison to DAC-PAk and the
                  lala Air Base (U.S. Air Force 2005b). A twenty-three-        NAVCENT Logistics Response Center. Additionally,
                  member contingency support group from MacGuire               DAC-LOC coordinated the delivery of critical human-
                  Air Force Base also arrived to provide planning and          itarian relief supplies from ESG 1 and other naval
                  logistics support, including help in the development         logistics aircraft to Islamabad. Once bulldozers
                  of an air operations center (AOC) for aviation tasking       cleared the roads, trucks hauled relief supplies to
                  coordination. U.S. officers also prepared daily brief-       Muzaffarabad and depots deeper inside Azad Jam-
                  ing slides of all air and sea movement in support of         mu and Kashmir (AJK) and the North West Frontier
                  the overall relief effort. A U.S. Congress report later      Province. Of course, as discussed already, helicop-
                  observed, “Perhaps the largest contribution the U.S.         ters handled the final distribution and delivery of re-
                  military made to the relief effort was the logistical        lief supplies into the earthquake zone. As mentioned
                  management of the air space and relief operations            earlier as well, helicopter crews sped up the delivery
                  staged from Chaklala Air Base” (U.S. Senate 2005).           process using sling-loads to ensure that at least thir-
                      U.S. military and commercial ships also ferried hu-      ty days’ worth of food and other relief supplies were
                  manitarian assistance into Karachi, Pakistan’s larg-         on hand at central distribution centers. Using the
                  est city and port. The first U.S. Navy ship to partici-      sling-load method, the U.S. military delivered the li-
                  pate in the relief effort was USS Pearl Harbor, a dock       on’s share of the aid, delivering over twenty-six mil-
                  landing ship from ESG 1. USS Pearl Harbor was on a           lion pounds of supplies and transporting more than
                  regularly scheduled deployment to the North Arabi-           eighteen thousand people in over forty-six hundred
                  an Gulf as part of maritime security operations when         missions (U.S. Department of Defense 2006).
                  it received orders to change course. After a brief stop          To ensure that the right products went to the right
                  in Bahrain to collect heavy engineering equipment,           place at the right time, NOLSC also provided situa-
                  such as dump trucks, front-end loaders, backhoes,            tional awareness updates to the NAVSUP LOC, the
                  cargo trucks, a road grader, and a forklift, the dock        CENTCOM Deployment and Distributions Operations
                  landing ship arrived in Karachi on October 18, 2005.         Center (CDDOC) in Kuwait, and other commanders
                  After offloading its cargo, Pearl Harbor headed to-          and staff assisting with logistics operations. NOLSC
                  wards Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)             transportation and distribution offices worked close-
                  to pick up 130 tons of emergency relief supplies and         ly as well with NAVCENT and TRANSCOM on cargo
                  volunteers from UAE’s Red Crescent Society bound             tracking and tracing by sending cargo routing in-
                  for Pakistan (U.S. Navy 2005d). The ESG 1 amphibious         formation file (CRIF) status reports to all ships and
                  assault ship USS Tarawa and amphibious transport             units (Dodson and McKemmy 2006). Whether in re-
                  dock USS Cleveland delivered engineering equipment           sponse to the Indian Ocean tsunami or the Pakistan
                  and emergency supplies into Karachi as well.                 earthquake, then, the U.S. military established high-
                      Since the earthquake had severely damaged Pak-           ly effective supply chains to manage operational lo-
                  istan’s infrastructure and subsequent mudslides ob-          gistics, linking logistics centers in the United States
                  structed many key roadways, first responders faced           to centers and personnel operating in the wider re-
                  significant logistical challenges. “Relief support had       gion and directly in the disaster zone. In response to
                  to start with the total reconstruction of the trans-         both disasters, U.S. military supply managers and lo-
                  portation infrastructure in areas hardest hit by the         gisticians from logistics operations centers around
                  earthquake” (Dodson and McKemmy 2006). To do                 the world maintained robust information exchange
                  so, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT),             and engagement with deployed forces.
                  a component command of CENTCOM, requested as-


                                                                                                                  Finding the Right Mix

46                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

    The major humanitarian relief organizations, of        when maritime combat forces are also stretched to
 course, could and should take steps to improve their      the maximum because of the hostilities in Iraq and
 own logistical capabilities, thereby easing the burden    Afghanistan, offers perhaps the clearest evidence of
 that military forces – particularly American forces –     the growing importance of military engineering and
 now carry in the management of large-scale disaster       general construction assets that can be used to sup-
 responses. Good first steps would include boosting        port both high-intensity warfighting contingencies
 their in-house logistics staffs and acquiring some of     and lower-intensity stability operations.
 the technology solutions to inventory control now             The specific capabilities of the NMCBs, as well as
 in use by commercial groups and the military. Sim-        those of a number of specialized units maintained
 ply coordinating more closely with each other to re-      by the Seabees (such as the underwater construc-
 duce duplication and maximize the use of limited re-      tion teams or UCTs), run the full gamut of general
 sources such as time, money, goods, transportation,       construction skills.27 Among other capabilities, they
 and human capital would also be helpful. For the          include those related to building construction, hos-
 foreseeable future, however, the military will con-       pital/clinic setup, water-well drilling, utilities con-
 tinue to field the most skilled and ready-to-respond      struction and maintenance (of electrical, plumbing,
 logistical and supply chain capabilities, even if there   heating, and air conditioning systems, for example),
 are situations – as in Myanmar after cyclone Nargis       and the construction and repair of bridges, airfields,
– when politics blocks their full exploitation.            piers, and wharfs. Survey teams may also be includ-
                                                           ed, together with assessment teams able to identi-
Engineering and Construction Support                       fy and quantify engineering and construction capa-
The provision of engineering and general construc-         bilities that may be needed for a particular task. On
tion support constitutes yet another area of exper-        relatively short notice, personnel with the right mix
tise within the U.S. military that has proven to be        of skills can be regrouped into NMCB units that are
of enormous value to HA/DR operations overseas.            scaled to task and that can link up as necessary with
Trained specifically for disaster-relief and civil-sup-    pre-positioned supplies. Their ability to 25 Composed of approximately six hundred
port activities, engineering units from all the mili-      deploy overseas without having to carry Seabees and other personnel, each NMCB can
                                                                                                       be broken down into task-specific detach-
tary services are uniquely prepared and equipped           all their equipment and gear with them, ments (or DETs) ranging from two to a hun-
to participate in such operations, whether as part         together with the fact that they are self- dred or more Seabees. Modular gear and
of an emergency response to a foreign disaster or a        sustaining once deployed, renders these equipment packages for the three NMCBs (and
planned HA/HCA exercise undertaken by a regional                                                                    that are normally forward-de-
                                                           units ideally suited for responding to their DETs)pre-positioned at the battalion bas-
                                                                                                       ployed are
COCOM in the context of its theater security cooper-       foreign disasters and/or for operating es overseas and on supply ships belonging
ation program (TSCP). Units from the Seabees’ naval        in areas with limited capacity to support to the Maritime Pre-positioned Force (MPF).
mobile construction battalions (or NMCBs), which           outside groups. The most agile, ready As a result, the Seabees are an ideal rapid re-
                                                                                                       sponse engineering and construction force
may already be forward-deployed, are expedition-           to respond NMCB elements are the Air for the regional COCOMs (interview 2008d).
ary-minded, can be tailored in size and composition        Detachments (or Air DETs), common- 26 The Navy now has nine active NMCBs,
to the task at hand, and can draw upon pre-posi-           ly referred to as the Seabees’ “911” force. five of which are based in Gulfport, Mis-
                                                                                                       sissippi, and four in Port Hueneme, Cal-
tioned supplies and equipment sets based in theater,       Composed of up to one hundred individ- ifornia. The current eighteen-month
have been especially active in recent years, and de-       uals, the Air DETs can be deployed via C- rotation schedule involves six months
mands for their services are on the rise.25 Indeed, the    130s or C-17s anywhere on the globe in of forward-deployed duty, followed by
NMCBs currently stationed in Okinawa, Kuwait, and          approximately forty-eight hours, while twelve months of homeport training.
                                                                                                       27 While the NMCB is the basic building block
Iraq, along with the smaller DETs that they assign         a full NMCB would normally need about for Seabee deployments, there are a few spe-
to various foreign duty locations, have maintained         seven days to forward deploy.               cial units – including two UTCs, two construc-
some of the highest operational tempos (or OPTEM-              Another valuable Seabee charac- tion battalion maintenance units (CBMUs),
                                                                                                       and one naval construction force support
POs) of any U.S. Navy units. Moreover, the pressures       teristic for HA/DR missions is that all unit (NCFSU) – that may deploy when some-
that such OPTEMPOs placed on active duty units             NMCB DETs are trained and equipped what unique skills are required. The UTCs ob-
were so stressful that the Navy decided to stand up        to deploy to all DET duty stations, no viously do a lot of underwater construction
an additional active duty NMCB in 2007 in order to         matter where they may be initially de- and repair, the CBMUs are active in fleet hos-
                                                                                                       pital operations, and the NCFSU specializes
establish a less taxing and more productive Seabee         ployed. In early February 2008, for exam- in truck transport, quarrying, rock crush-
rotation schedule.26 This decision, taken at a time        ple, NMCB 74, stationed in Kuwait, was ing, and electrical transmission lines.


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                            Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief           47
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                        supporting DET operations in Djibouti ( for roof re-         As for disaster relief support, Seabee DETS were
                                        pairs at the Waddi Primary School, as part of JTF-       among the first military units to arrive on scene fol-
                                        HOA); in Tema, Ghana ( for the construction of a         lowing the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, providing all
                                        major medical facility, as part of the Africa Partner-   manner of disaster relief across the affected region
                                        ship Station (APS) program centered around the USS       from debris removal, road clearing, runway repair,
                                        Fort McHenry deployment in the Gulf of Guinea28);        and overall damage assessment to the distribution
                                        in the Black Sea region of Romania ( for road build-     of potable water, medical supplies and tents. Seabee
                                        ing, as part of JTF-East29); and in Trinidad and To-     DETs from the Okinawa-based NMCB were equally
                                        bago ( for the development of a community center         prompt to respond to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake
                                        and clinic, as part of SOUTHCOM’s annual HA/HCA          and the 2006 Philippines mudslides with a similarly
                                        exercises now known as the New Horizons/Beyond           broad range of construction and engineering sup-
                                        the Horizons initiatives (interview 2008e)).30 World-    port that would not otherwise have been available
28       The Africa Partnership Station (APS) pro- wide, Seabee DETs will be involved in no      in a timely manner. In the Pakistan case, Seabees,
  gram was an international maritime coopera- fewer than twenty-three such efforts of            together with other service engineers, developed
  tion initiative led by U.S. Naval Forces Europe
 that aimed to improve maritime safety and se-
                                                      varying size and duration in FY 2008 in    rather unique solutions to the challenge of earth-
     curity in West and Central Africa through a support of the TSCPs of PACOM, CENT-            moving operations in difficult to reach high-altitude
   series of information exchanges and training COM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, and NORTH-                 village areas, arranging for the accelerated acquisi-
     opportunities with local maritime services.
 Structured around a seven-month deployment
                                                      COM. Seabee teams, moreover, complet-      tion of light-weight Bobcat loaders and excavators
     in the Gulf of Guinea by the USS Fort McHen- ed a number of critical ENCAP missions         that could be flown in by sling-loaded helicopters.
 ry amphibious dock landing ship and the High – including school, hospital, and clinic           On the Philippines front, moreover, regular Seabee
     Speed Vessel (HSV)-2 Swift, APS deployments
                                                      renovations – as part of the HA activi-    participation in the annual HA/DR-oriented Balika-
      included training teams from all three U.S.
       maritime services, plus military staff from ties ashore sponsored by the USS Peleliu      tan exercises between U.S. and Filipino forces has
        various European allies and selected civil- and USNS Comfort medical ship deploy-        provided important opportunities for post-disaster
       ian experts from U.S. government agencies ments in FY 2007, and they will conduct         follow-on assistance and local training to help re-
    and NGOs. Activities ashore included dozens
    of HA missions, many conducted by Seabees,
                                                      similar missions during comparable op-     duce the likely damage from future mudslides and
      in the countries visited. See U.S. Navy 2007.   erations planned by the Navy for FY 2008   similar disasters.
29          JTF-East was established by EUCOM on and beyond. Over the near term, this                Although traditionally much less expeditionary-
  the Black Sea coast of Romania as a base from would include the deployment of the              minded than the Seabees, the U.S. Army Corps of
        which to engage the various Central Asian
    countries in security cooperation initiatives.
                                                      USNS Mercy to the Western Pacific and      Engineers (USACE) has participated in a growing
30           In the Beyond the Horizons portion of Southeast Asia as part of PACOM’s Pacif-      number of HA/DR operations overseas in recent
   these exercises, SOUTHCOM plans for a much- ic Partnership 2008 initiative, and the           years, and it is rapidly adjusting its organizational
         expanded construction component in FY
    2008, with no fewer than nineteen construc-
                                                      deployments of the USS Boxer along the     structure to become a more prominent and effec-
     tion projects in ten countries (as opposed to    Pacific coastline of Central and South     tive player in disaster relief and civil support activ-
    the normal three or four countries). The Sea- America and the USS Kearsarge in the           ities outside the continental United States (CONUS).
          bees will play prominently in most if not
                                                      Caribbean as part of SOUTHCOM’s Con-       Incentives to move in this direction certainly accel-
           all of these activities (interview 2008e).
                                                      tinuing Promise 2008 initiative.           erated with the start of U.S. combat operations in
                    Global Snapshot of Seabee Deployment
                                     Horn of Africa
                                     NMCB 74 Det        Kuwait
                                                       22NCR FWD
                                   Romania             NMCB 74                    Korea
                                                       NMCB 14 Det               NMCB 5 Det                 San Nicholas Island
                                   NMCB 74 Det
                                                                                                            NMCB 5 Det
                          ROTA                             Afghanistan                 Japan
                                                                                                              San Clemente Island
                          NMCB 74 Det                      NMCB 1 Det                 NMCB 5
                                                                                                             NMCB 5 Det             Andros
                                                           NMCB 17 Det
                                                                                                                                    NMCB 74 Det
                                                                                          Guam
                                                               Bahrain                    NMCB 5 Det
                USS Fort McHenry         Iraq                                                                    GTMO
                                                               NMCB 74 Det
                African Partnership      30NCR FWD                               Philippines                     NMCB 74 Det
                NMCB 74 Det              NMCB 1 II MEF                           NMCB 5 Det
                                         NMCB 17 II MEF
                                         NMCB 1 SOF          Diego Garcia
                                         NMCB 17 SOF        NMCB 5 Det



                                                                                                                                    Finding the Right Mix

                48                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                                          the   InstItute    for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

Afghanistan and Iraq, which substantially increased                     Expansion of FFE/FEST Units for Stability Operations
the demand for innovative, forward-deployed army
                                                                                         Forward Engineer Support Team - Main (FEST M)
engineering support. Additional boosts came with                                         28 person team
the release of the 2007 Army Action Plan for Stabil-                                     Forward Engineer Support Team - Advance (FEST A)
ity Operations and the 2008 Army Field Manual on                                         9 x 7 person teams




                                                           Current FFE Structure
Operations, both of which elevated stability opera-                                      Contingency Real Estate Support Team (CREST)
tions to a priority level equal to warfighting. More                                     8(5) x 5 person teams
to the point, they provided important doctrinal jus-                                     Environmental Support Team (E nvST)
                                                                                         8 x 4 person teams
tification for more vigorous efforts by the USACE to
                                                                                         Logistics Support Team (LST)§
support the regional COCOMs with general engineer-                                       8 x 4 person teams
ing skills and capabilities that might be needed for                                     Engineer Infrastructure and
a range of stability operations missions, including                                      Intelligence Reachback Center (EI2RC)‡
those related to public works and civil infrastruc-                                      4 person teams

ture development that are so central as well to more                                     Base Development Team (BDT)‡
                                                                                         10 x 12 person teams
specific HA/DR initiatives.
    A critical first step toward improving USACE                                                                   Reorganize FFE into
                                                                                                                   recognizeable, modular plugs
responsiveness for CONUS contingencies, howev-
er, was taken as early as 2001 when the concept of
Field Force Engineering (FFE) was introduced. The
                                                                                         Forward Engineer Support Team - Main (FEST M)†
idea behind FFE was to create a mechanism that                                           2 teams of 9 military and 28 civilian personnel [TOE]
                                                           Proposed FFE Reorganization



would link forward-deployed forces more effective-
                                                                                                                         Advance (FEST
                                                                                         Forward Engineer Support Team - Main (FEST M)†A)†
ly, especially those engaged in smaller-scale con-                                       2 teams of 9 military and 28 civilian personnel[TOE]
                                                                                         8          2              6 civilian personnel
tingency operations (with limited organic combat
                                                                                         Environmental Support Team -(E nvST)
support), with mission-specific USACE assets. To-                                        8 teams of 4 civilian personnel [TDA]
ward that end, the FFE construct called for relative-
                                                                                         Contingency Real Estate Support Team (CREST)
ly small, multidisciplinary teams of engineers and                                       8 teams of 4 civilian personnel [TDA]
related professionals – known as forward engineer
                                                                                         Engineer Infrastructure and
support teams (or FESTs) – that could be deployed                                        Intelligence Reachback Center (EI2RC)
overseas where needed in a matter of days. Simi-                                         1 team of 8 military personnel [TDA]
lar to the Seabee DETs, the FESTs can be tailored
                                                                                         Base Development Team (BDT )
both in size and composition to meet specific and                                        8 teams of 12 military personnel [TDA]
evolving requirements on the ground, and USACE
                                                                                         FFE - Field Force Engineering
is planning to reorganize existing teams – whose                                         FEST - Forward Engineer Support Team
structure is somewhat ad hoc – into more carefully                                       TOE - Table of Organization and Equipment
                                                                                         TDA - Table of Distribution and Allowances
designed modular plugs. The goal is to have on hand
                                                                                         † tele-engineering capable
eight smaller FEST-advance (or FEST-A) eight-person                                      § LPRT=4/16 FFE trained / designated
teams that can provide a forward JTF with limited                                        ‡ reachback organization with non-deployable teams

but specialized assessment, along with contracting
and technical support capabilities, and two larger       31 FEST support is provided to the regional COCOMs via their Army Service
FEST-main (or FEST-M) teams each with thirty-sev-        Component Commands (ASCCs), and the Army is now assigning USACE liaison
                                                         officers to various COCOM staffs to make sure that the COCOM leaderships un-
en members who can provide broader assistance on         derstand what the FESTs can bring to a disaster response operation, both via
a more sustained basis (USACE 2008a).31                  organic assets and via reach-back capabilities. Both FEST units are led by mil-
    Both FEST elements employ a sophisticated            itary officers but staffed by civilian specialists. FEST-As normally include two
                                                         military staff members and six civilians, while FEST-Ms generally include nine
voice, video, and satellite communications package,      military staff members and twenty-eight civilians. A similar expandable struc-
dubbed the Tele-engineering Communications-De-           ture, it is worth noting, is employed by the U.S. Air Force’s Red Horse engineer
ployable (TCE-D) kit, to reach back for additional ex-   teams, which include a sixteen-person advance element known as a Red Horse
                                                         One team and a more robust ninety-four-person Red Horse Two team. The Red
pertise and engineering support from the USACE’s
                                                         Horse teams, then, can also provide useful expeditionary engineering sup-
worldwide network of offices, labs, and centers of       port to forward-deployed JTFs, but neither one has the range of deployable ca-
excellence. During the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami,        pabilities nor the reach-back capability of the USACE teams (USACE 2008a).



Finding the Right Mix

                                                                                                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief             49
                  the   InstItute    for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

32       Under the National Response Plan (for  for example, FEST-A teams in Indonesia,      nizations to improve local and regional capacities to
  domestic emergencies) developed by the U.S.   Thailand, and Sri Lanka relied on tech-      manage and respond to large-scale disasters (USACE
     Department of Homeland Security, USACE
       has been assigned lead responsibility for
                                                nical evaluations from CONUS-based ex-       2008c).33 Building on this EUCOM/CENTCOM-cen-
      the emergency support function (ESF) re-  perts transferred via TCE-D channels to      tered experience (which it now refers to as its Emer-
     lated to public works and engineering, in- provide relief workers with up-to-date       gency Management International, or EMI, program),
   cluding emergency power and water supply,
 temporary roofing and housing, debris clear-
                                                reports on which transport routes were       USACE hopes to organize future CMEP activities in
ance and removal, and infrastructure assess-    best to use to bring essential supplies to   the AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM AORs, both of which
     ment. As it reorganizes to provide broader isolated communities. Based on their re-     are burdened by numerous disasters each year. So,
  support overseas, USACE seeks to adapt cer-
                                                view of near-real-time satellite imagery,    too, USACE plans to expand on the numerous water
  tain procedures developed to speed the pro-
vision of domestic disaster support to foreign  non-deployed USACE analysts were also        management and civil construction projects (such
                                                able to use TCE-D networks to provide
       disaster scenarios. In this context, long-                                            as the building of clinics, schools, and low-cost hous-
  standing USACE responsibilities for disaster  FEST teams with detailed damage assess-      ing) that it has undertaken for many years now in a
        support in the U.S. trust territories pro-
   vide an especially useful base of experience
                                                ments of airfields, harbors, bridges, and    host of foreign countries under contract to USAID,
                                                buildings, thereby helping to steer local
       relevant to future foreign disaster relief.                                           the World Bank, the UN, the EU, and other govern-
33            Similar to other cooperative pro- populations and relief teams away from       mental agencies. Needless to say, such efforts have
      grams with former Soviet bloc countries, unsafe sectors and establishing an initial    also prepared the USACE well to work effectively with
   these CMEP activities were paid for by War-
    saw Initiative funding. The Warsaw Initia-
                                                data base on which structures should be      a diverse array of civil, military, governmental, and
    tive program is a U.S. program established repaired or rebuilt first in the recovery/    even NGO partners, in itself an important capabili-
 in 1994 by the Clinton administration to ad- reconstruction phase (Bohannon 2005).          ty to bring to HA/DR operations.
  vance closer relations and military interop-
    erability between NATO and PfP countries.
                                                Policy planners at USACE headquarters            So, while not yet deployed forward on as wide
                                                in Washington, D.C., are also drawing        a scale as the Seabees, the USACE’s ability to assist
                                   on lessons learned from supporting the Federal            the regional COCOMs in the event of a sudden for-
                                   Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) during                 eign disaster has grown considerably in recent years,
                                   hurricane Katrina and other domestic disasters to         as has its ability to support both the COCOMs and a
                                   expedite foreign disaster support in the future. Key      variety of non-military development organizations
                                   initiatives on this front include the negotiation of      (be they American, foreign, or international) in lon-
                                   advance contracts with prime venders for overseas         ger-term capacity-building projects. The USACE also
                                   support in the areas of facility construction, debris     enjoys the twin benefits of being tied directly to the
                                   removal, and emergency power supply, as well as the       Army and DoD with authority to operate through the
                                   pre-scripting of critical engineering and construc-       COCOMs, while remaining an organization staffed
                                   tion missions (such as prompt temporary housing,          largely (nearly 90 percent) by civilians with access
                                   emergency power setups, and urban search and res-         to non-DoD funding streams and customers. USACE
                                   cue support) likely to be performed in a disaster sce-    teams, therefore, may have an easier time operating
                                   nario (USACE 2008b).32                                    in foreign environments where uniformed personnel
                                      With an eye toward improving foreign partner di-       may not be welcome (or safe), yet still be able to do
                                   saster prevention and damage limitation capabili-         so in full support of U.S. strategic objectives (given
                                   ties, USACE officials are seeking as well to strengthen   their DoD/Army affiliations). Based in part on new
                                   their civil military emergency preparedness (CMEP)        policies for rehiring retired personnel in emergen-
                                   training programs with former Warsaw Pact coun-           cy situations, non-military USACE staff are likely to
                                   tries as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)       emerge as well as an increasingly important talent
                                   activities, and to extend these programs to other         pool for relieving overstretched military units in key
                                   regional theaters. As of early 2008, some fifty-five      engineering skill sectors.
                                   CMEP events in over twenty-three countries in East
                                   and Central Europe, Central Asia, and the Cauca-          Communications and Information Management
                                   sus had been completed since they began in 1999,          Clearly, effective communications among first re-
                                   using a combination of technical workshops, ta-           sponders, together with accurate information on
                                   ble-top exercises, and larger planning conferences        evolving conditions in and around the disaster
                                   to pull together a broad range of civilian and mili-      zone (or what is commonly referred to as “situation-
                                   tary experts from national and multinational orga-        al awareness”), are essential to successful disaster


                                                                                                                                Finding the Right Mix

                  50                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                 the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

relief operations. This is especially true when local    and the use of chat rooms, which used SIPRNET al-
sources (and networks) of information are over-          most exclusively. As a result, Utapao essentially was
whelmed by the scale and severity of the disaster at     cut out of much of the early decision making (El-
hand (as was the case during the 2004 Indian Ocean       leman 2006, 72). Utapao finally acquired SIPRNET
tsunami), rendering them incapable of communi-           on January 7, but since SIPRNET computers were
cating promptly and accurately on what assistance        housed separately from all other servers, they were
is needed, where it is needed, and in what priority      not monitored around the clock, and thus, were used
order. Timely information sharing may be compli-         little. It was only after Lt. General Blackman, the CSF-
cated further when there is a flood of relief agencies   536 commander, approved the purchase of dozens
all responding at roughly the same time, with many       of commercial cellular phones to distribute among
if not all relying on communications systems – in-       military and civilian first responders, as well as the
cluding hardware, software, and bandwidths – that        construction of an unclassified website that allowed
are not interoperable with those of the others. Over-    foreign militaries and international aid groups to
coming such challenges and developing innovative         monitor the overall operation, that day-to-day com-
solutions to communications barriers is still one        munications were substantially improved. Yet, as
more arena of military expertise that could prove        this example demonstrates, more often than not it
invaluable to future foreign disaster responses. It is   is the military that can best resolve communications
a capability, moreover, that is unlikely to found in     and information-sharing difficulties to the benefit
adequate measure from non-military or commer-            of the wider disaster relief community, even if the
cial quarters.                                           military itself is part of the initial problem.
    This is not to suggest, of course, that the mili-        In the early days of operation Unified Assistance,
tary in general and American forces in particular        while CSF-536 was still active, PACOM’s Joint Intel-
have all the answers when it comes to communi-           ligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) presented another
cations solutions, or that they are free from respon-    example of how the regional COCOMs can assist in
sibility for some of the problems of the past (some      ways that non-military participants in foreign disas-
of which may occur again in the future). Given the       ter relief would be hard pressed to duplicate. JICPAC,
numbers of civilian, military, governmental, and         an intelligence fusion center that provides com-
NGO groups involved, multi-agency and multina-           mand decision makers with a wide variety of intel-
tional HA/DR operations appear to function best in       ligence analyses and risk assessments, used its newly
an unclassified, open-architecture system of infor-      formed Contingencies Operational Intelligence Cell
mation sharing, yet military firewalls and classifi-     to maintain non-stop, all-source intelligence oper-
cation policies have often prohibited such sharing       ations and produced the first comprehensive dam-
and restricted the timely exchange of information.       age assessment and situational awareness reports
This can be (and has been) a problem even between        that could be shared with all interested parties. JIC-
U.S. military units engaged in the same disaster re-     PAC data on transnational threats in the region were
lief operation. During the Indian Ocean tsunami re-      also essential once the OUA relief mission began to
lief operation (operation Unified Assistance, or OUA),   expand in Indonesia’s Aceh province, where a long-
for instance, the USS Abraham Lincoln, which served      standing separatist movement held the potential to
as a main communications hub linking the multi-          block the transport of aid to communities in need.
national CSF-536 headquarters in Utapao with PA-         As an integral part of the JICPAC assessment pro-
COM headquarters in Honolulu, was operating on           cess, P-3 reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters
the classified Secret Internet Protocol Router Net-      equipped with cameras deployed by PACOM soon
work (SIPRNET), while CSF-536 itself was initially       after the disaster struck provided some of the most
set up to use only the unclassified Non-secure In-       detailed photographic imagery of key ports, towns,
ternet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), which          and lines of communication, all of which helped
is relied upon by most non-military government           to direct relief supplies to where they were needed
organizations.                                           most via the quickest route. This information also
    U.S. military-to-military exchanges, moreover,       proved to be extremely helpful in setting priorities
depended quite heavily on Internet Relay Chat (IRC)


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                         Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief          51
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                     for reconstruction during the recovery phase of the        ble ( for example, FalconView software was used
                                     relief operation (Dorsett 2005, 14-15).                    by the U.S. military, while USAID/OFDA teams used
                                         PACOM experts played a central role as well in or-     ArcView), and that communications between Pak-
                                     ganizing and synthesizing commercially developed           istani and American responders were often hin-
                                     information (such as satellite imagery produced by         dered by the fact that “Pakistan was heavily reliant
                                     Digital Globe), and then integrating that with com-        on fax communications while others relied mostly
                                     mand assessments and making the finished product           on e-mail” (Hand 2006). As a result, preparations
                                     readily available to all relief agencies in an unclas-     are being taken both by DoD and COCOM planners
                                     sified format. In this regard, PACOM’s Asia-Pacific        to facilitate the use of cell phones and commercial
                                    Area Network (APAN), a non-secure commercial                e-mail accounts as the principal means of commu-
                                     website created and maintained by the command              nication for and between military and civilian re-
                                     to help promote multilateral defense cooperation           sponders in future operations. In addition, RADM
                                     in the Asia-Pacific region, emerged as a critical in-      LeFever, the DAC commander during the Pakistan
                                     formation portal that was used extensively by for-         relief effort, has pressed DoD to develop a deployable
                                     eign military partners (including Britain, Canada,         wide area network (WAN) that would be compatible
                                     and Australia), the tsunami-affected nations, inter-       between military units (ideally including both U.S.
                                     national organizations, NGOs, and other non-tradi-         and key partner forces) and major non-military re-
                                     tional security partners. Since operation Unified          sponders, and work toward that goal appears to be
34          Another option might be broader reli- Assistance, moreover, APAN has been           underway.34
       ance on the Collaborative (Combined) En- further developed to serve, among oth-              Another promising step toward broader informa-
         terprise Regional Information Exchange
           System (CENTRIXS), a single, multina-
                                                    er roles, as a repository for the daily/    tion sharing on best practices for managing com-
          tional data network that can be used to monthly situation reports and after-ac-       plex civil-military contingencies was taken by JFCOM
     facilitate confidential, multi-level informa- tion assessments filed by a variety of       in October 2007, when the command launched an
       tion sharing. At the moment, however, ac-
      cess to CENTRIXS terminals appears to be
                                                    military and civilian relief teams that     effort to develop an enhanced version of the Joint
       too limited within the disaster relief com- have participated in a number of disas-      Knowledge Online (JKO) network. Basically, this is
           munity to allow effective exploitation. ter responses in the PACOM AOR over          an internet-based portal that uses advanced distrib-
                                     the past several years. As such, it serves as a critical   uted learning technology to deliver courseware and
                                     clearinghouse for disaster response lessons learned.       links to other relevant training products and servic-
                                     The APAN website (http://www1.apan-info.net/) is           es to individuals who are preparing for or currently
                                     also now home to a virtual information center (VIC)        engaged in joint and/or combined integrated op-
                                     that tracks disasters and other regional crises as         erations, including HA/DR operations and exercis-
                                     they unfold in near real-time, as well as an informa-      es. In addition to the U.S. warfighting community,
                                     tion site for the Multinational Planning Augmenta-         the enhanced JKO network is being made available
                                     tion Team (MPAT). As discussed in greater detail in        to key intergovernmental and interagency partici-
                                     chapter 4, MPAT facilitates the creation and/or ex-        pants in such operations, including NATO and other
                                     pansion of multinational task force headquarters           multinational partners. Previously, only DoD per-
                                     to manage disaster relief efforts and other crisis re-     sonnel could access JKO’s content through NIPRNET,
                                     sponses, and the APAN website entries are a conve-         but this improved version can be tapped quite eas-
                                     nient way to share MPAT guidance with the global           ily by authorized non-DoD users via a user name
                                     disaster relief community.                                 and password entry system. A key objective over
                                         Lest it seem that the communication challenges         time is to support knowledge access, management,
                                     described above – and the solutions developed by           and distribution by means of a variety of common-
                                     the military – are specific to the PACOM operating         ly available and easy to manipulate cyber/electron-
                                     environment, it should be noted that incompatible          ic tools, including instant messaging, email, chat
                                     software systems also complicated timely response          rooms, news files, and archived reports and analy-
                                     efforts following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. Af-        ses. An option, moreover, for real-time reach-back
                                     ter-action reports by DoD indicate, for example, that      through JKO channels to service staffs, subject mat-
                                     software systems used by first responders from dif-        ter experts, and additional specialized information
                                     ferent U.S. government agencies were incompati-            banks is likely to be of particular value to both ci-


                                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix

                52                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 vilian and military users who are already forward-         lar schedule to address everyday healthcare needs
 deployed in support of a relief mission.                   and to help build up local medical skills – place a
     Of course, many more communications and data           premium on sustaining and enhancing American
 exchange technologies beyond the JKO network               military capabilities in the area of expeditionary
 could be discussed to illustrate the unique capabil-       medical care.
 ities in this particular sector that U.S. military forc-       Since the deployment of the San Diego-based
 es (and those of many of America’s partner nations)        USNS Mercy to Southeast Asia in January 2005 to
 can contribute to HA/DR-type operations. The main          provide medical assistance to the tsunami victims,
 point, however, is not the military’s technological ca-    the U.S. Navy’s two hospital ships – neither of which
 pacity per se, but its ability to leverage that capacity   had been to sea since operation Desert Storm in
 to ensure command and control and to expedite cri-         1991 before the tsunami struck – have emerged as
 sis operations – including foreign disaster respons-       particularly valuable platforms both for emergency
 es – in austere (and possibly insecure) environments       relief and broader engagement missions. For exam-
 where situational awareness may be incomplete and          ple, during the Mercy’s tsunami-related deployment,
 unclear at the outset. And of all the diverse elements     which led to a six-month stay in the Southeast Asian
 that make up the disaster relief community, none are       region, the ship traveled thirty-six thousand nau-
 better positioned to provide such support than the         tical miles, treated more than one hundred thou-
 increasingly net-centric and expeditionary-minded          sand patients, and performed nearly five hundred
 armed forces of the United States.                         surgeries (Smith 2005).36 After first treating some
                                                            ten thousand patients from Banda Aceh in north-
 Medical Assistance and Health Diplomacy                    western Sumatra (the part of Indonesia closest to
 As noted several times already in this report, provid-     the epicenter of the earthquake that triggered the
 ing emergency medical aid to the victims of a sud-         tsunamis), the Mercy went on to conduct a series of
 den foreign disaster, as well as longer-term public        MEDCAP and dental civic action program (DENCAP)
 health assistance and training through programmed          activities on the island of Alor off the southeastern
 exchanges with regional allies and partner nations,        coast of Sumatra and in East Timor, before rushing
 are missions for which the U.S. military is especial-      back northwest to the island of Nias after it was
 ly well suited and well equipped. Moreover, if the         hit by an 8.7 magnitude earthquake in March 2005.
 raft of small and medium-sized disasters to which          Here, medical personnel from the ship performed
 American forces responded in 2007 and 2008 is any          123 urgent care surgeries and over 19,000 medical
 indication, the demand for military medical support        procedures of one kind or another (Asia-Pacific De-
– be it a one-time airlift of urgently needed medical       fense Forum 2005, 6), before swinging back south-
 supplies via a C-130 or the deployment of one of the       east yet again a month later to assist 35 The USS Kearsarge, for example, can sup-
 U.S. Navy’s multipurpose amphibious assault ships          the people of the Madang area in Papua port up to six hundred patients while still pro-
                                                                                                        viding routine care to crew members and
 (which are second only to the USNS Mercy and USNS          New Guinea after a series of major vol- embarked troops. Major medical facilities in-
 Comfort hospital ships in sea-based medical capa-          canic eruptions there displaced thou- clude four main operating rooms, two emer-
 bility35) – will almost certainly continue to rise. At     sands from their homes, leaving them gency operating rooms, four dental operating
 the same time, MEDCAP and other civic aid initia-                                                                   facilities, a blood bank, various
                                                            without proper shelter, food, or water rooms, x-rayintensive care ward. This setup
                                                                                                        labs, and an
 tives that PACOM and SOUTHCOM have integrated              supplies, and in need of a wide range of is fairly standard for all landing ship, heli-
 into their increasingly sophisticated, multi-stop hu-      basic health care support.                  copter deck (LHD)-class ships, a number of
 manitarian ship visits (such as Continuing Promise            Apart from confirming the utility of which, including the Kearsarge, the Essex and
                                                                                                        the Wasp, have performed admirably in nu-
 2008) – together with the shorter, country-specific        hospital ships for foreign disaster relief, merous foreign disaster responses and pro-
 medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs)            the Mercy’s 2005 deployment highlight- grammed HA/HCA mission (USS Kearsarge).
 that all the regional COCOMs use for training and en-      ed three other characteristics of a suc- 36 On board the ship were twelve operat-
 gagement purposes – underscore the ongoing value           cessful international medical mission. ing theaters, magnetic resonance imaging
                                                                                                        (MRI) equipment, a one thousand-bed hos-
 of what one expert has called “health diplomacy” in        None of the three, it’s worth acknowl- pital facility, a diagnostic and clinical lab-
 non-crisis conditions (Bonventre 2007, 18). Both ini-      edging, was on full display in the Mercy’s oratory, a pharmacy, an optometry lab, two
 tiatives – the provision of emergency disaster relief      post-tsunami tour, but all have had a oxygen-producing plants, and hundreds of
 and the conduct of collaborative efforts on a regu-                                                                              medical
                                                            definitive effect on the design and con- active-duty and reserve(U.S. Navyand med-
                                                                                                        ical support personnel             2005e)


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                             Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief            53
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                      duct of subsequent missions. The first aspect, and         health NGOs that can establish effective coopera-
                                      the one that perhaps received the most coverage            tive ties with counterpart groups and local officials
                                      in news reports of the Mercy’s post-tsunami tour,          in the countries visited. The objective of such part-
                                      relates to the surprisingly positive influence such        nerships, of course, would be to ensure that capaci-
                                      missions can have on public attitudes toward the           ty-building projects on the ground are organized in
                                      United States within the countries assisted, includ-       such a way that they will have a longer lasting ef-
                                      ing among Islamic communities where the image              fect after the ship departs. The 2005 Mercy deploy-
                                      of America has been significantly tarnished follow-        ment took the first steps in this direction by relying
                                      ing the U.S. invasion of Iraq. One survey, for example,    on Project HOPE, a Virginia-based health education
                                      found that favorable views of America in Indonesia         and humanitarian assistance organization, to help
                                      jumped from a low of 15 percent to a high of 79 per-       identify and finance opportunities to repair or re-
                                      cent of those polled after the tsunami relief effort,      build clinics and hospitals damaged or destroyed
                                      with a good portion of that rise directly attributable     by the tsunami.
                                      to the work of the Mercy (Pew Research Center 2007).           It was left, however, to the ship deployments
                                      A similar increase in favorability ratings was record-     that followed – which have been less crisis-driv-
                                      ed during the Mercy’s second, follow-up mission to         en and have benefited from longer lead times for
                                      Southeast Asia in the spring of 2006, with 87 percent      planning – to refine and expand upon this partner-
                                      of those surveyed in Bangladesh stating that the ac-       ship approach. Each new mission has added to the
                                      tivities of the hospital ship had made their opinion of    on-board NGO team such established groups as Op-
                                      the United States more positive (Ballen 2006). Many        eration Smile, CARE International, Aloha Medical
                                      other examples could be noted as well in connection        Mission of Hawaii, and International Relief Teams,
                                      with the deployments of the USNS Comfort in 2006           while reaching out as well to a carefully selected
                                      and 2007 and the USS Peleliu in 2007, but the main         mix of local and international NGOs – and, when
                                      point is that such deployments can have (and have          appropriate, governmental and intergovernmen-
                                      had) a powerful public relations effect, one that can      tal agencies – with which to collaborate on train-
                                      help to advance broader U. S. strategic and foreign        ing, construction, and related development projects
                                      policy interests by laying a more solid foundation of      ashore. Increasingly, the trend has been toward as-
                                      goodwill among the populations served.                     sembling a more robust and multifaceted human-
                                          Hence, more recent medical ship deployments –          itarian assistance program in support of medical
                                      including the last Comfort tour of Central America         ship tours that can complement (and magnify the
                                      and the Caribbean in the fall of 2007 and the Mercy        impact of) the medical team’s work via additional
                                      tour of Oceania and Southeast Asia in the late spring      aid efforts performed both on and off the ship.
                                      and summer of 2008 – have included comprehensive               To the extent possible, moreover, the central
                                      programs for public outreach and media relations           thrust of these “medical ship plus” deployments has
                                      (USSOUTHCOM 2008a).37 That said, even in the case          been on the transfer of skills and technologies that
                                      of the best-planned missions, the rise in positive atti-   can be sustained by the populations being served,
                                      tudes toward the United States achieved in this way        so that there is less likelihood of a sudden gap in ca-
                                      may not last long. Shifts in public opinion may be         pability that the local government or local NGOs will
                                      easily reversed when the mission focuses primarily         struggle to fill once the ship sails away.
37           The USNS Comfort deployment in 2007, on short-term medical care performed               This emphasis on sustainable assistance high-
    for example, prompted over thirty-six thou- largely on board ship, taking only lim-          lights the third key lesson with regard to military
      sand media/public affairs-related products
      and/or events (including local print, televi-
                                                     ited (if any) steps to improve public       medical missions that emerged from the Mercy’s
   sion, and radio news stories), the publication health conditions ashore by building           first tour and has been reconfirmed by subsequent
          of over six hundred articles, the welcom- up local medical capabilities.               ship deployments: the need to leave behind medi-
     ing of close to 900 general public visitors on
       board the ship, the hosting of over 150 dis-
                                                         The second key feature of a success-    cal capabilities and supporting infrastructure that
        tinguished visitors, the conduct of dozens   ful medical mission first revealed by the   reinforce and improve, but don’t exceed or over tax,
         of public concerts by the ship’s band, and Mercy’s 2005 tour, therefore, is the need    local standards and growth potential. This is a vital,
      the distribution of thousands of mementos
                                                     to develop sustainable onshore medi-        if still poorly understood lesson, because providing
      (for example, soccer balls, pamphlets) with
           the Comfort logo (USSOUTHCOM 2008a).      cal facilities by partnering with public    health care and associated assistance that the host


                                                                                                                                    Finding the Right Mix

                54                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                       the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

nation can’t or won’t maintain may actually leave        advanced training, biomedical engineers repaired
the country worse off over the long run than it was      over four hundred pieces of equipment and trained
before such aid was provided.38                          almost five hundred local professionals and tech-
    Moreover, in countries where there is domes-         nicians, Seabee units completed close to $400,000
tic unrest, such a turn of events could also expose      worth of infrastructure repairs (primarily to hos-
the local government to charges that it was un-          pitals, clinics, schools, and orphanages), and en-
able or unwilling to care for its people, accusations    vironmental engineers trained over two thousand
that could undermine its legitimacy and render it        38 To some degree, this was the case after the U.S. disaster relief team operating in Pakistan in
more vulnerable to local insurgents and/or terror-       response to the 2005 earthquake donated the 212th MASH unit to the Pakistan military when the
                                                         relief mission came to an end. Unfortunately, U.S. personnel who staffed the unit during the relief
ist groups (Bonventre 2007, 6). On the other hand,       effort provided a U.S. standard of medical care that local personnel could not possibly replicate.
agreeing to receive and actively supporting port calls   Furthermore, the situation became worse when the Pakistani military sought to move the unit
by U.S. medical ships that carry on board a multi-       from the Azad Jammu and Kashmir region where it was initially deployed to the Federally Admin-
                                                         istered Tribal Areas (FATA) where the local population was in even greater need of better medical
talented medical support and humanitarian assis-         support. As it happened, the AJK governor refused to permit the transfer unless a capability sim-
tance team that is focused on capacity building and      ilar in quality to the MASH unit (as operated by the American team) was provided as a replace-
sustainable aid could significantly improve the sta-     ment (which, of course, was not possible), the Pakistani central government lost an opportunity
                                                         to use health diplomacy to build good will in the FATA region, and the MASH unit itself could not
tus of the host nation government. By offering an al-
                                                         be sustained and went unused in matter of months after it was donated. As a result, the entire
ternative source of medical care that promotes the       initiative backfired, creating more irritation with and distrust of federal authorities in Islam-
idea of greater health care independence for local       abad among communities in the outlying provinces and tribal areas (Bonventre 2006a, 2006b).
communities, such aid can also reduce popular sup-       39 Both the Taliban forces in Afghanistan prior to 2002 and Iraqi insurgents some-
port for insurgent or terrorist groups who may seek      time after the U.S. invasion sought to control access to local medical care as a way to con-
                                                         trol the general population. Similarly, in the parts of Lebanon under their control, Hezbollah
to boost their appeal in areas that are medically un-    units curry favor by offering free or inexpensive medical care, but the type of care provid-
derserved by offering free or low-cost medical care      ed has tended to deepen the dependence of the communities so served on Hezbollah rath-
that nonetheless has little or no capacity-building      er than to build up local capabilities to operate independently. This was also the case
                                                         with medical care offered by al-Qaeda funded groups operating in certain displaced per-
potential.39 USNS Comfort’s four-month 2007 tour         son camps in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake. (Bonventre 2006a; Bonventre 2007, 7).
of countries in Central America and the Caribbe-
                                                         USNS Comfort
an offers perhaps the most complete picture of
                                                                                                                                   Patients
how a hospital ship outfitted along the lines de-                                                                                 Treated Encountered
scribed above can simultaneously provide essen-                                                                 1. Belize           1,281     3,372
                                                                                                                2. Guatemala        5,365   23,065
tial urgent care, train local health providers, repair                                                          3. Panama           8,690   29,028
or replace local facilities and equipment, deliver                                                              4. Nicaragua        8,355   28,345
NGO assistance otherwise unavailable, generate                                                                  5. El Salvador     12,554   47,876
                                                                                 9                              6. Peru             9,360   46,441
positive media coverage and better feelings about              1
                                                                   2                                            7. Ecuador         12,060   51,028
America, and even help to constrain the opera-                                          10                      8. Colombia         6,597    27,131
                                                           5               3                                    9. Haiti           11,833   39,533
tions of local insurgents.                                     4                              11
                                                                                                   12          10. Trinidad and
    Indeed, as detailed in the accompanying map                                                                    Tobago           8,744        30,560
                                                                           8
and table, at the end of the Comfort’s 121-day cruise                                                          11. Guyana          10,061        44,608
                                                                       7                                       12. Suriname         3,738        15,222
during which it visited twelve countries, almost
ninety-nine thousand patients were seen (most-                         6
                                                                                                               Medical
                                                                                                               99,000 patient visits
ly ashore), close to twelve hundred surgeries were       Engineering                                           1,200 Surgeries
performed (many by Project HOPE and Operation            Seabee Units completed >$400,000                      >32,000 immunizations
                                                         worth of infrastructure repair                        >24,000 eyeglasses distributed
Smile volunteers), well over thirty-two thousand         Biomedical engineers repaired hundreds                >122,000 pharmaceuticals distributed
immunizations against infectious diseases were           of pieces of equipment                                29,000 medical students received
given, more than twenty-four thousand pairs of           Environmental engineers trained >2,000                advanced training
                                                         local technicians                                     Dental
eyeglasses were distributed, over 122,000 pharma-
                                                         Strategic Communications                              >25,000 patients
ceuticals were dispensed, and veterinarian teams         >600 articles published in international and          > 3,000 teeth extractions
treated close to eighteen thousand animals. On           local media                                           > 3,000 fillings
                                                         84% of media coverage was positive or                 7,000 sealants
the capacity-building front, close to twenty-nine        balanced                                              >20,000 fluoride applications
thousand medical students and just under three           Colombian government reported increase in
hundred local veterinarian personnel received            intelligence on FARC where Comfort visited                     Continuing Promise 2007



Finding the Right Mix

                                                                               Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief                 55
                 the   InstItute   for    foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

USNS Mercy                                                                                     well as valuable tools for non-crisis humanitarian
                                                    3. Timor-Leste                             engagements performed on a regular rotational ba-
                                                    9,800 medical patients                     sis. That said, with the current emphasis on deploy-
           2                                        270 surgeries
                         1
                                                                                               ing ships with a more robust and multi-mission tool
                                          5         4. Papua New Guinea                        kit to support expeditionary medical operations, a
                                                    25,179 medical patients
                                                    3,175 dental patients                      number of the Navy’s grey-hulled warfighting ships
                          3                   4     6,983 eyeglasses provided                 – most specifically, the LHD and LHA amphibious as-
                                                    $640,300 value of biomedical repair
                                                    9 major engineering projects
                                                                                               sault ships – are also proving to be worthy alter-
                                                    982 animals treated                        natives to the Mercy and Comfort, as illustrated by
                                                                                               the Peleliu deployment in 2007 and the USS Boxer
1. Philippines                                      5.    e Federated States of Micronesia
                                                    Pohnpei and Yap States                     and USS Kearsarge deployments in 2008.40 In addi-
Mindanao
10,972 medical patients                             2,888 medical patients                     tion to their substantial on-board medical facilities,
2,364 dental patients                               551 dental patients                        these ships bring to such operations a vastly superi-
$1.1 million value of biomedical repair             2,735 eyeglasses provided
                                                    $222,700 value of biomedical repair        or transport helicopter capability, as well as tilt-ro-
316 surgeries onboard
2 major engineering projects                        Chuuk State                                tor V-22 Osprey aircraft and air cushioned landing
                                                    11,994 medical patients
Samar                                                                                          craft (LCACs), all of which facilitate the ship-to-shore
9,625medical patients                               204 surgeries
                                                    2,276 dental patients                      transfer of medical personnel, engineers, and other
2,233 dental patients
5 major engineering projects                        6,433 eyeglasses provided                  technical support teams, medical supplies, and var-
                                                    $284,500 value of biomedical repair
2. Vietnam                                          3 major engineering projects
                                                                                               ious tools and supplies needed for construction and
8,879 medical patients                                                                         repair projects. These same airlift and sealift assets
                                                    793 animals treated
2,697 dental patients
$330,400 value of biomedical repair                                                            make it much easier as well to transport patients to
234 surgeries                                                                                  and from the ship and to reach out to patients far-
5 major engineering projects                             Pacific Partnership 2008
                                                                                               ther inland, when treatment options on land are in-
                                                                                               adequate. Similarly, the ability of LHDs and LHAs to
                                    local technicians and conducted numerous ener-             operate in shallow water means that they will often
                                    gy and water use assessments (thereby improving            be able to tie up at a local pier (and at times to low-
                                    overall efficiencies in the medical care sector). On       er their rear loading ramp to the pier or to a beach
                                    the public affairs and strategic communications            area), making for easier access from the shore to the
40       As part of SOUTHCOM’s Continuing Promise 2008 initia- front, more than six hun-       ship and its facilities.
 tive, the USS Boxer deployed along the Pacific coastline of Cen- dred news articles were          When deployed in a “medical ship plus” configu-
      tral and South America from April to June 2008, visiting El
       Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. For its part, the USS Kear-
                                                                  produced by local and        ration, LHDs and LHAs can also accommodate a con-
     sarge cruised along the Atlantic coastline and in the Carib- international media (84      siderably larger than normal Seabee contingent (as
    bean from August to November 2008, visiting Colombia, the percent of which were            well as other military engineers), which would allow
   Dominican Republic, Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama, and Trin-
         idad and Tobago. Country visits were longer (two weeks
                                                                  positive or balanced in      for more numerous and more ambitious engineer-
    each) than those conducted by the USNS Comfort in 2007, al- tone), with significant        ing civic action programs and other infrastructure
      lowing for ambitious humanitarian assistance. Both ships coverage in all the major       projects within the countries visited. Moreover, the
     hosted over 150 military and Public Health Service medical
                                                                  daily newspapers. Last       ready availability of Osprey aircraft and medium-
      professionals, and more than sixty Seabees and other mili-
       tary engineers, as well as a number of NGOs (such as Proj- but not least, the Colom-    lift helicopters (such as the CH-46 Sea Knight and
     ect HOPE and Project Handclasp). See USSOUTHCOM 2008b. bian government report-            the CH-53E Sea Stallion) increases the opportunities
                                                                  ed a marked increase in      for undertaking such projects – and for encourag-
                                    intelligence reporting on FARC rebels and drug traf-       ing more positive views of America as a result – in
                                    fickers in areas visited by the Comfort and its var-       more rural communities farther away from the coast,
                                    ious teams.                                                which are often among the more needy or, in the
                                       As these statistics make clear, the U.S. Navy’s two,    event of a natural disaster, unreachable via tradi-
                                    large, white-hulled hospital ships can serve as highly     tional travel and supply routes. As demonstrated
                                    visible and memorable symbols of American good-            when the Kearsarge provided relief aid to Bangla-
                                    will and capacity to help, generating considerable in-     desh in November 2007 after cyclone Sidr hit, the
                                    terest and publicity wherever they go. As such, they       ability of these types of ships to produce fresh drink-
                                    remain truly unique assets for disaster diplomacy, as      ing water on board – in the case of the Kearsarge,


                                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix

                 56                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                       the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 up to two hundred thousand gallons a day – will             to the waters just off Myanmar, where its helicop-
 be of immense value as well in responding to future         ter fleet could be deployed most effectively in pro-
 foreign disasters, as will use of the ship’s helicop-       viding relief to the hardest-hit areas.42
 ters and LCACs to transport the water to wherev-                Looking ahead to future disaster contingencies,
 er it may be needed (USS Kearsarge Public Affairs           the Air Force Surgeon General’s Office recently de-
 2007). As noted in the discussion of lift assets earli-     veloped an innovative, stand-alone hospital pack-
 er in this chapter, forward-deployed sea-based heli-        age that can be airlifted to a disaster site within
 copters stand out as particularly valuable platforms        twenty-four hours of a request. Once the unit has
 for the distribution of potable water and other relief      arrived at its destination, a basic medical capability
 supplies to coastal areas when the transport infra-         can be up and running within twelve to twenty-four
 structure ashore has been destroyed, and the heli-          hours, with full operational capability reached with-
 copters aboard the U.S. Navy’s LHDs and LHAs are            in thirty-six hours. Dubbed the HUMRO-OCP (short
 among the most ideally suited for such missions.            for the Humanitarian Relief Operations Operation-
     For all of the above, the Navy’s plans to main-         al Capability Package), it is designed to function as
 tain a balance of white- and grey-hulled deploy-            a self-sufficient unit that can operate wholly on its
 ments in support of programmed HA/HCA cruises               own anywhere it is deployed. The package includes
 with substantial medical components makes emi-              complete diagnostic and surgical capabilities for a
 nent sense, especially since the grey hulls can only        twenty-five-bed facility with all the required operat-
 perform such missions when they are out of normal           ing support (such as security forces, engineers, and
 sea duty rotation. As for providing medical support         base services) built in. Personnel required to run
 in response to a sudden disaster, past practice sug-        the facility would total some 90 medical staff, with
 gests that the Navy will remain ready and willing to        around 150 airmen in a support capacity. Perhaps
 redirect either platform – hospital ship or amphibi-        most intriguing, the HUMRO-OCP includes a major
 ous assault ship – that may be close (or soon could         training component for local personnel, so that the
 be) to the vicinity of such a disaster. This is not to      entire hospital can be left behind for the host nation
 suggest, however, that only maritime forces have an         to own and operate after some ninety days. PACAF
 important role to play in providing emergency med-          teams tested the whole concept in early 2008 in a
 ical care and longer-term sustainable aid. As not-          series of field exercises spread across the Hawaiian
 ed earlier, for example, Air Force transport aircraft       islands called Pacific Lifeline, and the first units are
– especially C-17s and C-130s – have played, and will        now being pre-positioned to forward locations in
 continue to play, a principal role in airlifting critical   PACOM’s AOR (Sater 2007).
 medical personnel and supplies to distant disaster             As a mini variant of the Navy’s “medical ship plus”
 zones and distribution hubs. Indeed, there are cir-         deployments, a C-17 Globe- 41 After cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, it is clear that the gen-
 cumstances when airlifting is the quickest and least        master III airlifted approxi- erals of the ruling junta were extremely reluctant to approve re-
                                                                                             lief operations by the Essex expeditionary strike group in part
 threatening response (compared to a warship, that           mately fifty Air Force, Army, because they feared such operations would provide a cover
 is)41, even when an LHD specifically configured to          and Navy personnel in July for – or simply lead to – an armed attack by U.S. military forc-
 provide medical assistance in a disaster situation          2007 from Hickam Air Force es to remove them from power. Single flights by cargo planes
 is close at hand. For example, as mentioned earli-                                                Utapao to Yangon airport and back, on the other hand,
                                                             Base in Hawaii to the Pacif- from much less worrisome (Sevastopulo and Kazmir 2008).
                                                                                             were
 er in this chapter, PACAF C-130s that were pre-de-          ic islands of Vanuatu, Kiri-
                                                                                             42 As an interim measure, some helicopters from the ex-
 ployed to Utapao air base in Thailand as part of the        bati, and Nauru to provide a peditionary strike group led by the Essex had also been pre-
 annual Cobra Gold exercise were the first U.S. plat-        range of medical, dental, en- positioned to Utapao to help boost available lift capability
 forms allowed into Myanmar after Nargis hit, and            gineering, and related civil from there to Yangon and, ideally, from Yangon to the hard-
                                                                                             est-hit areas of the Irrawaddy Delta. Assuming the Myan-
 they were able to deliver large cargoes of drinking         support and training to the mar government agreed, the more optimal deployment of
 water, water purification kits, plastic sheeting, and       local residents, as part of a the helicopters for the purposes of aiding the delta popula-
 other medical supplies to Myanmar in a matter of            PACOM theater security co- tions would have been onboard ships stationed off the Myan-
 hours (once formal approval was received from Yan-          operation (TSC) exercise (Air mar coast, and the Essex group eventually did deploy to that
                                                                                             area to await approval from Yangon to begin ship-to-shore
 gon). On the other hand, it would have taken the USS        Force Print News 2007). Op- relief operations. When that approval was still not forth-
 Essex about four days to travel from the Gulf of Thai-      erationally, the primary goal coming more than two weeks after the cyclone first struck,
 land (where it was deployed as part of Cobra Gold)          was to demonstrate PACAF’s the commander of the Essex strike group reiterated the
                                                                                                idea of basing the helicopters at Utapao (Wright 2008, 5).


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                              Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief                57
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  ability to quickly deliver medical and other key di-       ical assistance is an excellent way to build positive
                  saster relief assistance to remote areas of the Pacific,   and lasting ties that can expand in time into other
                  while at the same time boosting local capabilities to      areas of security cooperation. In certain foreign di-
                  manage the consequences of any future disasters. In        saster situations, moreover, military medical relief
                  a similar vein, 3rd Air Force units assigned to EUCOM      teams may be the only healthcare providers able to
                  began to exercise in November 2007 a new quick-            reach and treat those in need in a timely and effec-
                  response humanitarian assistance capability that           tive manner. This has been proven time again since
                  could respond to a natural disaster anywhere in EU-        the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in numerous over-
                  COM’s AOR, provide initial support (mostly medical),       seas disasters, both large and small. In contrast, the
                  and assess the requirements for follow-on emergen-         refusal of the Myanmar junta to take full advantage
                  cy relief. The capability is designed in such a way        of such support when it was available and need-
                  that it can be tailored to meet the specific needs         ed provides perhaps the most poignant illustration
                  of any disaster that may arise. The 2007 test, how-        of the severe consequences that can occur when
                  ever, involved the deployment of a one hundred-            military medical aid is not accepted. Both exam-
                  person team and about one hundred short tons of            ples suggest that DoD ought to do all that it can to
                  cargo on six C-130s, the first of which took off fully     strengthen the U.S. military’s health diplomacy ca-
                  loaded within sixteen hours of receiving an order          pabilities, and to make them more deployable and
                  to respond, and the last some twenty hours later           more responsive to the medical needs of civil soci-
                  (Dawson 2007).                                             eties in regions of the world where major disasters
                      Army medical teams have also played an active          are most likely to occur.
                  role in foreign disaster relief and in regular exchang-
                  es as part of a TSC exercise. When the 2005 Indian         Summary
                  Ocean tsunami hit, for example, U.S. Army Pacific          In each of the support sectors examined above, the
                  (USARPAC) planners based at Fort Shafter, Hawaii,          U.S. military brings to the table skills and capabili-
                  organized the deployment of special mortuary af-           ties that are truly unique, such as wide-body cargo
                  fairs teams from Army units in the United States to        aircraft that can land on and take off from makeshift
                  the disaster zone to help in the identification and        or damaged runways, heavy helicopters equipped for
                  evacuation of the deceased. For its part, the 8th U.S.     sling-load operations, expeditionary-minded Seabee
                  Army in South Korea sent a number of medical units         DETs and USACE FESTs, and rapidly deployable field
                  along with CH-47 Chinook helicopters to help trans-        hospitals and medical teams. In some cases, more-
                  port them and other relief teams and supplies, to ar-      over, their uniqueness lies as much in the fact that
                  eas where they were most needed. As often happens,         they are forward-deployed, close to the scene of a
                  moreover, a regularly scheduled medical training           foreign disaster, and trained at least in part to of-
                  mission organized by USARPAC evolved into a full-          fer emergency aid when requested, as in what they
                  blown disaster relief effort when cyclone Sidr hit         are innately able to do or accomplish. Depending on
                  Bangladesh in mid-November 2007. At that time, an          the situation at hand, civilian and non-U.S. military
                  eighteen-person team of pediatricians, family prac-        alternatives may also be available, but they will not
                  tice doctors, optometrists, dentists, veterinarians,       often be as numerous, as flexible, or as prompt to
                  and medical technicians was already in Bangladesh          respond. Nor can they easily match the reach-back
                  for an eight-day MEDRETE training mission. Once            options available to most forward-deployed Ameri-
                  it became clear what was needed, however, the en-          can forces. Based on the foregoing analysis, however,
                  tire team was sent to the flood-ravaged area of Pat-       there is still much that can be done to enhance the
                  uakhali in southern Bangladesh, where it treated           utility and impact of U.S. military assets deployed in
                  over two thousand patients and took care of more           support of HA/DR operations, even with respect to
                  than five hundred head of livestock over a three-          so-called high-value/high-leverage assets. Making
                  week period (Kakesako 2007).                               a more concerted effort to identify and set in place
                      In conclusion, since getting good healthcare is        those enhancements, be it via a technology fix, bet-
                  a universal concern and since healthcare activities        ter training, or a slightly more HA/DR-friendly con-
                  are largely non-threatening, providing military med-       cept of operations, therefore, should be the order of


                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix

58                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

the day for HA/DR planners, if they are going to get       ny provided extensive water purification equipment
the most out of what is available. This will be true       and established water management training in the
especially as long as HA/DR missions continue to be        affected areas, and ExxonMobil donated significant
viewed primarily as a secondary priority for the mili-     amounts of diesel fuel for relief vehicles and heavy
tary platforms and technologies that have proven to        equipment used in excavation and evacuation activ-
be most useful, and for which demand in support of         ities. Just as the U.S. military has done, many com-
HA/DR efforts is nevertheless likely to rise.              panies are also looking for ways to contribute more
                                                           effectively to relief operations (and to have a longer-
                                                           lasting impact) by partnering with NGOs and oth-
Private Sector Contributions and                           er organizations that have proven track records in
Capabilities                                               the HA/DR realm (Jordan 2006, Iwata 43 Apart from their deeper understanding
                                                           2005).43 In that respect, the close collab- of the local culture, norms, and political dy-
Some of the demands for U.S. military support to                                                          namics of the countries in which they work,
                                                           oration between UPS and CARE, Pfizer humanitarian aid agencies generally enjoy a
foreign disaster operations may be met in the fu-
                                                           and UNICEF, Citigroup and the World degree of trust and respect overseas that gives
ture by the private sector, which is emerging as an
                                                           Food Program, and Dow Chemical and them a legitimacy that companies can rely on
increasingly important contributor to, and partici-                                                                        their own contributions. Col-
                                                           Habitat for Humanity in the days and to fully leverage aid organizations can also
pant in, such operations. During the unprecedent-                                                         laborating with
                                                           weeks after the tsunami hit helped both keep overhead costs at reasonable levels, pro-
ed business community response to the 2004 Indian
                                                           to speed the delivery of critical corpo- vide better security for donations of cash and
Ocean tsunami, for example, U.S. corporations alone
                                                           rate aid to priority areas and to ensure supplies, and increase the value of donations as
contributed $566 million in cash or products and                                                          a tax incentive, while enhancing a company’s
                                                           that it contributed as much as possible own brand equity. (Jordan 2006; Iwata 2005)
services, and over 140 companies gave more than
                                                           to capacity-building efforts that would
$1 million each (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2005).
                                                           facilitate eventual recovery.
Moreover, if U.S. companies together were a country,
                                                                Such partnerships appear to be especially fruit-
they would have ranked as the fifth largest donor na-
                                                           ful in cases where a private company and a relief
tion in the tsunami response, following the govern-
                                                           group enjoy a longstanding history of collaboration,
ments of the United States, Australia, Germany, and
                                                           such as UPS and CARE (both of which are based in
Japan (Jordan 2006, 5). Similarly, U.S. private sector
                                                           Atlanta, Georgia), or where each maintains a large
aid and contributions to the 2005 earthquake in Pak-
                                                           presence in the areas hit by disaster, such as Exxon-
istan surpassed $104 million (Jordan 2006, 36). Look-
                                                           Mobil and Save the Children in Banda Aceh. Clear-
ing to the future, corporations – especially, though
                                                           ly, the close ties and history of cooperation between
certainly not exclusively, those based in America –
                                                           CARE and UPS were instrumental in ensuring that
seem to be positioning themselves to serve as alter-
                                                           priority shipments of over one million pounds of re-
native sources for a number of the skills, capabilities,
                                                           lief supplies got where
and supplies that are needed most, but often remain                                       U.S. Private Sector Contributions
                                                           they were most need-
in limited supply, for HA/DR operations. The trick                                        to the Tsunami Response
                                                           ed as quickly as possi-
will be in learning how best to mobilize these pri-
                                                           ble in the wake of the          products and
vate sector contributions in support of such opera-                                        services – 25%                        employee/customer
                                                           tsunami (Jordan 2006,
tions, given that this is still relatively new territory                                                                                 giving –27%
                                                           19). Commercial-NGO
for the business world.
                                                           collaboration can also
   Apart from making financial donations (gen-
                                                           achieve significant re-
erally channeled through UN agencies and NGOs),
                                                           sults when there is a
businesses can in theory bring to disaster relief and
                                                           close match between
civil support initiatives a wide range of expertise in
                                                           the company’s prod-
key operational sectors, such as logistics and sup-
                                                           uct or service and the
ply chain management, communications, informa-
                                                           particular needs of a
tion management, medical supply, construction, and
                                                           relief agency, as in Co-
engineering support. In the aftermath of the 2004
                                                           ca-Cola’s response to                                    corporate or affiliated
tsunami, for example, teams of UPS logistics experts                                                                foundation giving – 48%
                                                           the Red Cross’s call for
were able to unravel severe bottlenecks in the sup-                                                        $566 million total
                                                           emergency supplies of
ply and delivery of relief aid, Dow Chemical Compa-

Finding the Right Mix

                                                                             Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief            59
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  potable water for victims of the Indian Ocean tsu-      Logistics Center, the creative use of commercial im-
                  nami. Working with local subsidiaries in Southeast      agery provided PACOM with timely and reliable in-
                  Asia, Coca-Cola converted a number of its soft-drink    formation for evaluating changing priorities and
                  production lines to bottle large amounts of drinking    alternative courses of action throughout the relief
                  water, and then, based on input from the Red Cross      operation (Dorsett 2005).
                  and other humanitarian agencies, used its own dis-          Advanced private sector technologies now being
                  tribution network to deliver the water to stricken      developed or studied as a means to help train more
                  areas in direst need (Hawkins 2006).                    flexible and adaptive military forces are also prov-
                      Similarly, Pfizer’s rapid support to UNICEF in-     ing useful for the disaster response mission. Compa-
                  volved the provision of requested medical supplies      nies in the simulation, virtual reality, and high-tech
                  and water purification expertise to tsunami-impact-     training arenas, for example, have strengthened the
                  ed areas, which in turn contributed to a significant    U.S. military’s ability to leverage so-called info-cen-
                  boost in employee morale and retention (Jordan          tric operations. Immersive simulation techniques al-
                  2006). Based in part on the success of these types      low service members to experience multiple cultures,
                  of partnerships, Abbott Laboratories recently made      terrains, and operational environments similar to
                  arrangements with the American Red Cross for the        conditions they may encounter in the future, pre-
                  timely supply of a variety of products – from anti-     paring those so trained to better manage the flood of
                  biotics to baby food – in the event of a future emer-   information that will bombard them in contingency
                  gency. This arrangement offers increased visibility     operations overseas, including disaster relief efforts
                  for Abbott’s brand name through the distribution of     (Laurent 2007). Language and cultural training mod-
                  the company’s products, while ensuring as well that     ules are being offered as well, given the central im-
                  the products so provided meet the necessary speci-      portance of such training – confirmed by virtually
                  fications of the Red Cross’s delivery system (Thom-     all after-action reports from military units involved
                  as and Fritz 2006).                                     in HA/DR operations – to the success of almost any
                      But private sector companies have also part-        international response effort. Perhaps most inter-
                  nered quite effectively with the U.S. military.         esting of all, private companies are also devising
                  General Electric (GE), one of the world’s leading       ways to provide computerized training to forces that
                  companies, with product lines spanning engines,         are routinely stationed abroad or deployed at sea
                  generators, light bulbs, appliances, finance, health-   (Laurent 2007). Recently, commercial satellite oper-
                  care, and media, mobilized its resources in only four   ator Intelsat, Ltd., and Cisco Systems, Inc., formed a
                  days following the 2004 tsunami and began ship-         partnership with DoD to deliver high-speed internet
                  ping heavy equipment for the relief effort to Indo-     connections to forward-deployed military units, and
                  nesia via the long-range lift assets of the U.S. Navy   in 2007 IBM entered into a cooperative partnership
                  and U.S. Air Force (Jordan 2006). And when tradi-       with JFCOM to provide better collaboration between
                  tional military information sources (including hu-      and among various service components operating
                  man intelligence, airborne imagery, and satellite       in the same theater (Orillion 2007). IBM’s data shar-
                  coverage) proved insufficient to provide a full pic-    ing programs and technologies will allow military
                  ture of conditions on the ground, additional non-       personnel to receive the right operational informa-
                  military imagery from the private sector became         tion in the right context when it is needed, and to
                  a critical tool for assessing the extent of the tsu-    adapt as necessary as the surrounding conditions
                  nami’s destruction and for tracking evolving con-       change (Orillion 2007).
                  ditions (Dorsett 2005). Commercial entities, most           As noted in chapter 2, the Pentagon has also con-
                  notably Digital Globe, provided the U.S. military, as   tracted with commercial air service companies in
                  well as NGOs, international relief agencies, and lo-    the past, including UPS, DHL, and FedEx, to ensure
                  cal government officials, with comprehensive and        the timely delivery of supplies to military units over-
                  accurate high-resolution satellite imagery of the       seas when military lift was unavailable or deemed
                  most heavily devastated areas. Together with the        too costly. Based on this experience, DoD intends
                  unclassified, open-source internet channels main-       to expand such partnerships for HA/DR operations
                  tained on the home pages of USAID and the UN Joint      in particular, in part in order to free up military as-


                                                                                                             Finding the Right Mix

60                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

sets that may be needed elsewhere and to lessen the        nies are also offering aid workers their expertise in
State Department’s reliance on the military when           these two sectors to help ensure the efficient and
commercial alternatives are available. In addition         cost-effective flow and storage of goods and mate-
to those specializing in air and ground transporta-        rials, and to help “identify priorities, track deliv-
tion, private corporations with expertise in other         eries, and direct the traffic of a relief effort in full
support sectors can also offer emergency response          gear” (Economist Global Agenda 2005; Fritz Institute
capabilities similar to those provided by the military,    200544). The World Economic Forum is one organi-
including, as previously noted, in the satellite com-      zation that has been working, through its Logistics
munication and information management realms.              and Transportation Corporate Citizenship Initia-
Indeed, the opportunities for broader private sec-         tive (L&TCCI), to mobilize the core competencies
tor-DoD collaboration on HA/DR training, exercising,       of member companies, including DHL, Exel, FedEx,
and real-world operations appear to be far greater         TNT, and UPS, to accumulate and then distribute
than current practice might suggest. Insofar as the        donated resources effectively. At its January 2008
military is concerned, therefore, the business world       annual meeting at Davos, the Forum announced a
remains a comparatively untapped resource when             new, more formal initiative by three member com-
it comes to the support it could provide for disas-        panies, TNT, UPS, and Agility, to partner with the
ter relief missions.                                       UN’s Global Logistics Cluster45 to provide humani-
    In addition to assisting the military, however, U.S.   tarian agencies with cutting edge logistics support
corporations have also taken steps to build better         in the event of a large-scale disaster. 44 The Fritz Institute is a non-profit or-
cooperative ties with U.S. State Department agen-          When such a disaster strikes, the Lo- ganization which addresses complex op-
                                                                                                        erational challenges in humanitarian
cies and officials charged with LFA responsibilities       gistics Cluster, which is led by the WFP, disaster relief by leveraging corporate sec-
for foreign disaster relief, working primarily through     would pass a request for urgent assis- tor resources and best practices.
USAID’s Global Development Alliance (GDA). Follow-         tance to a committee of representatives 45 In September 2005, the UN’s Inter-Agen-
ing the Indian Ocean tsunami, American business-           from the three companies, who would cy Standing Committee (IASC), which oversees
                                                                                                        disaster relief planning, officially endorsed
es formed a number of private-public partnerships          then decide on the size and composi- the cluster concept as a useful way to organize
through the good offices of the GDA to leverage more       tion of a joint logistics emergency team and mobilize humanitarian agencies with-
than $11 million in corporate sector funds for recon-      (or LET) that would be sent to the di- in particular sectors or areas of activity (with
struction efforts in the tsunami-affected countries.                                                                         a clearly designated and
                                                           saster zone to set in place and manage each cluster havingthereby avoiding the free-
                                                                                                        accountable lead),
Companies as diverse as Chevron, ConocoPhillips,           an appropriately scaled logistics opera- lancing and duplication of effort that occurred
Microsoft, Coca-Cola, Prudential, and 3M, among            tion for the first three to six weeks of the far too often during the Indian Ocean tsuna-
others, helped to design, organize, and fund numer-        disaster response. Depending on local mi response. The Pakistan earthquake pre-
                                                                                                        sented the first opportunity to implement the
ous reconstruction efforts (USAID 2005). In 2005, for      needs, the LET would include logistics concept at the field level and to test its viabil-
example, Chevron Corporation and USAID/Indone-             specialists (such as airport coordina- ity as a framework for coordinating the emer-
sia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU)             tors and warehouse managers), specif- gency response. Ten clusters were established
                                                                                                        within the first twenty-four hours of the Paki-
to jointly contribute $10 million to support the eco-      ic logistics assets (warehouses, trucks, stan relief effort in the areas of food and nutri-
nomic recovery of Banda Aceh, including the provi-         forklifts, etc.), and transportation ser- tion, water and sanitation, health, emergency
sion of technical education and vocational training        vices (World Economic Forum 2008). shelter, early recovery and reconstruction, lo-
in key reconstruction skills, such as welding, car-                                                                telecommunications, camp man-
                                                               The first real-world test of the LET gistics, ITand protection, and education.
                                                                                                        agement
pentry, and even computer programming (Jordan              teams in a foreign disaster scenario
2006). In the disaster prevention field, moreover,         came in May 2008 during the emergency response
USAID helped to coordinate private sector initia-          to cyclone Nargis, which became the deadliest natu-
tives to identify and deploy earthquake and tsuna-         ral disaster in the recorded history of Myanmar. De-
mi detection technologies to the Southeast Asian           spite the complex operating environment and the
region more broadly, and to ensure that local gov-         devastated infrastructure on the ground, the LET
ernments had the capacity to operate and maintain          companies were able to leverage their strong local
such equipment over the longer run (USAID 2005).           resources, networks, and supply chains, especially
    Given the central importance of high-perform-          those based in nearby Thailand, to provide logistics
ing logistics and supply chain operations to effective     support, inventory management, and warehousing,
disaster relief, a growing number of private compa-        and to coordinate large shipments of supplies and


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                            Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief             61
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                      equipment to the Myanmar border. In addition, TNT,           the German logistics group and owner of DHL, part-
                                      Agility, and UPS jointly organized and managed a             nered with OCHA and the UN Development Program
                                      twenty-thousand square meter warehouse for WFP               (UNDP) to help streamline the UN’s overall relief dis-
                                      food and non-food relief items located in Bangkok,           tribution process. Among other things, the agree-
                                      thereby greatly increasing the speed and efficiency          ment calls for DHL staff to train not just UN workers
                                      of aid distribution to the stricken region. On average,      but also other groups, such as customs officials, who
                                      the LETs received and discharged over two hundred            play a key part in the delivery of humanitarian relief
                                      metric tons of cargo each day over the course of the         supplies (Murray 2005a). In addition to its collab-
                                      Myanmar relief effort (Agility 2008).                        oration with OCHA, DHL has also signed a five-year
                                          Well before the LET plan was unveiled, howev-            agreement with the International Federation of Red
                                      er, TNT, a Dutch-owned international mail deliv-             Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to conduct
                                      ery and logistics company, had already been an ac-           research on and develop new supply-chain man-
                                      tive partner of the WFP, working in particular with          agement tools for the IFRC. For its part, FedEx has
                                      WFP’s airlift operation, the United Nations Human-           collaborated with the American Red Cross on sup-
                                      itarian Air Service (UNHAS).46 Apart from providing          ply chain management for over ten years now to
                                      logistical and airlift support to UNHAS, TNT has also        such a degree that the Red Cross’s control room in
46          Operating from several locations around stored WFP commodities at its own              Washington, D.C., is an exact replica of FedEx’s con-
  the world, UNHAS provides UN agencies and oth- expense, and, when necessary, pro-                trol room at its headquarters in Memphis (Murray
      er humanitarian organizations with access to
   chartered aircraft for passenger or cargo flights
                                                       vided a team of supply chain manage-        2005a). Following the 2004 tsunami, moreover, Fe-
     on short notice. UNHAS can contract for a one- ment and fleet management experts              dEx used its logistics and transportation expertise
       time operation or for an extended service. At to assist the WFP during relief emer-         to provide the Red Cross with complimentary ship-
      any one time, it is likely to have over one hun-
     dred aircraft under contract capable of strate-
                                                       gencies. In response to both the Indi-      ping and storage of its emergency pharmaceuticals,
  gic or theater airlift operations. Commonly used an Ocean tsunami and the Pakistan               first aid supplies, protective suits, and water puri-
      aircraft include Lockheed C-130 Hercules, An- earthquake, moreover, TNT airlifted            fication systems that were destined for Southeast
     tonov AN-24s, Beechcraft BE1900s, and Fokker
                                                       food and non-food emergency items           Asia (Warhurst et al. 2005).
     F-50s. As an example of annual efforts, in 2005
     UNHAS arranged transport for close to 370,000 from WFP’s regional warehouses to                   Presumably, these and similar private sector
     individuals and more than 153,000 tons of car- relief distribution hubs, and also pro-        initiatives will provide at least a partial solution
        go. See http://www.unjlc.org/airoperations/ vided airport ground support servic-           to the problem, as stated by one senior Deutsche
    fleet/ and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UNHAS
                                                       es and tented warehouse space. In a         Post World Net executive, that it is not so much the
                                      similar vein, when UPS announced a $2 million do-           “goods that are lacking or the airplanes to bring in
                                      nation in support of relief and recovery efforts for vic-    the goods [in many disaster response situations],
                                      tims of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, half of the con-       but the knowledge of how to distribute them in the
                                      tribution consisted of in-kind services, such as the         right way” (Wulf-Mathies 2005) For instance, as re-
                                      transport of medical and health-related items to and         lief goods streamed into airports and warehouses
                                      within the affected region (UPS 2005). The three-com-        throughout the tsunami-affected regions in 2004
                                      pany LET plan announced at Davos in 2008, therefore,         and 2005, aid agencies struggled to sort through
                                      seems like a logical follow-on activity and a near-per-      and distribute supplies, causing local airport con-
                                      fect match between corporate capabilities and UN             gestion and severely constraining the movement
                                      needs. Delivering relief supplies and food as quickly        of relief supplies to inland communities (Fritz In-
                                      and efficiently as possible to people in need is per-        stitute 2005). Logistical challenges also abounded
                                      haps the toughest challenge in a disaster situation,         downstream, in terms of limited warehouse stor-
                                      but it is one for which private sector logistics orga-       age for excess inventory and bottlenecked trans-
                                      nizations are extremely well prepared.                       portation pipelines (Fritz Institute 2005). To help
                                          For example, Exel, a DHL sister company with             resolve these problems, the Disaster Resource Net-
                                      freight management expertise, managed the road               work (DRN), another increasingly valuable arm of the
                                      transport and container haulage of several tsunami           World Economic Forum, organized private sector
                                      crisis shipments for the WFP, often moving aid on            teams to take control of all relief cargo operations at
                                      the ground at a rate of one hundred tons a day (War-         the airports in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, thereby sig-
                                      hurst et al. 2005). So, too, Deutsche Post World Net,        nificantly enhancing the “throughput and dissem-


                                                                                                                                      Finding the Right Mix

                62                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

ination” of tsunami humanitarian relief (Warhurst              Similarly, Intel Cor- 47 The DRN was created to train engineering, con-
et al. 2005)47 In a subsequent effort, following the poration forged a suc- struction, and logistics specialists from the Forum’s
                                                                                       member companies to support humanitarian relief op-
Pakistan earthquake, DRN was able as well to get cessful private-public erations. DRN emergency teams are deployed when re-
supplies to difficult-to-reach areas despite impass- relationship with the In- quested to do so by a recognized international relief
able conditions on the ground, airlifting over $3 mil- ternational Rescue Com- agency (World Economic Forum; Warhurst et al. 2005).
                                                                                           A random
lion in high-priority relief goods, including fourteen mittee (IRC) in 2004 with 48 prior to itssampling of IRC’s procurementrevealed
                                                                                       tem             partnership with Intel in fact
                                                                                                                                      sys-

hundred transitional shelters and a large number the aim of improving the that the organization’s response time to a world disas-
of light-weight portable wood stoves (Disaster Re- IRC’s overall response ter could be as long as fifty-two days (Thomas 2004).
lief Network).                                              time – that is, reducing the time it takes from the
    Any sizeable international disaster relief oper- announcement of an international emergency op-
ation will also require a considerable effort to co- eration to the arrival of IRC staff and supplies to the
ordinate the flow of information among all the affected population (Thomas 2004). With Intel’s as-
participants involved. For this task, information sistance, IRC procurement and delivery strategies
management technology, as noted earlier, looms have already been restructured in such a way as to
as an especially important capability, and one pri- save the agency $300,000 or more per year (Thomas
vate sector product that shows particular promise 2004).48 Yet another private sector software product
in this regard is the Humanitarian Logistics Soft- with the potential to enhance response efficiency is
ware (HLS) system developed by the San Francisco- Suma, developed by the Pan American Health Orga-
based Fritz Institute in collaboration with the IFRC. nization. This system not only tracks donated relief
This first-ever web-based supply chain software en- supplies and allows relief workers to categorize do-
ables real-time matching of the needs of populations nations rapidly upon receipt; it also helps them to
and areas stricken by disaster with the business ca- manage warehouse stocks more effectively and to
pabilities and donated supplies that could be key to set up more efficient distribution procedures (Mur-
survival and recovery (Synergos Institute 2005). The ray 2005b). For its part, Global Relief Technologies
system also tracks supplies from donation to de- has developed a promising new data management
livery, giving both relief organizations and private system dubbed GRT that can operate from a variety
sector donors an online overview of the overall re- of portable electronic devices used by relief work-
lief pipeline. Beyond that, however,
it enables a faster and more tar-            GRT’s Data Management System
geted order placement process by
means of web-based supplier lists,
online pre-purchasing details, and
catalogs of priority requested items
(Murray 2005b). According to IFRC                                                               satellite
                                                                   relief responder             communications
estimates, the HLS technology could
                                                                   PDA -based rapid
speed up the relief process by 20 per-                                                          no interruptions
                                                                   data management
cent to 30 percent. Furthermore, not            disaster           system
                                                location
only does the HLS system offer the                           field
benefits of standardization and easy                         workers
customization for the specific needs
                                                                                     decisionmaker
of aid agencies, but it can also store
                                                                                     instantly receive critical data
data on exchanges made over time                                                     accurately assess situation
so that a more accurate assessment
can be made later on about how use-
ful the system really has been in a
particular relief operation, and how
it might be improved for use in fu-               appropriate
                                                  resources deployed                                             HQ personnel
ture operations (Synergos Institute                                                   field workers
2005).


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                            Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief          63
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  ers in the field (including cell phones and person-       cil to provide airtime on its F2 satellite to help ac-
                  al organizers), which is slated to soon replace the       celerate both national and international decision
                  outdated, paper-based emergency data-gathering            making with regard to disaster responses, includ-
                  systems currently used by the American Red Cross          ing via the transmission of improved early warning
                  (Copeland 2008). In time, GRT-enabled devices will        information (UN News Centre 2007).
                  allow forward operators to transmit and share crit-           The corporate sector has also played an impor-
                  ical data in real time over satellite networks to se-     tant role in restoring telecommunications networks
                  nior decision makers at regional and home-base            during the recovery phase of major disaster respons-
                  headquarters.                                             es. After the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, for example,
                      Increasingly since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami,     the DRN, drawing on the expertise of its business
                  moreover, other private groups, such as Aidmatrix,        members in the communications field, worked with
                  the Center for International Disaster Information         Pakistan’s IT ministry, as well as with wireless and
                  (CIDI), and Global Hand, have begun to develop on-        satellite technology firms in the United States, to
                  line registries listing corporate goods and services      provide communications equipment and personnel
                  that have been (or will be) donated, and to estab-        to help speed up emergency operations (World Eco-
                  lish online clearinghouses to facilitate private sec-     nomic Forum 2005). Also of note was the creation of
                  tor link-ups with various relief agencies in search of    the World Bank-supported website called RISEPAK
                  assistance. More needs to be done to make these on-       (Relief and Information Systems for Earthquakes in
                  line registries and clearinghouses user friendly, to      Pakistan), a joint venture of researchers and pol-
                  keep them as current as possible, and to improve          icy makers from the United States and Pakistan
                  their utility for responding to foreign (as opposed       which set up an internet portal to share informa-
                  to domestic) disasters. That said, these new infor-       tion on how to facilitate and sustain communica-
                  mation management tools have brought a consider-          tions between and among various disaster relief
                  able degree of order to what has often been a rather      groups working in the field in Pakistan who were
                  chaotic and haphazard system for linking corporate        having difficulty coordinating because of the incom-
                  donors to NGOs and other relief agencies. As a result,    patibility of their communications gear (RISEPAK
                  the prospects for getting donated supplies, equip-        2007). In an even earlier effort to address compatibil-
                  ment, and expertise to where they are most need-          ity problems in the telecommunications sector, the
                  ed have been significantly improved.                      Ericsson Corporation, in partnership with UNOCHA,
                     As alluded to earlier, in the telecommunications       UNDP, and the IFRC, launched a major initiative in
                  sector commercial satellite links stand out as still      2000 known as First on the Ground, which sought
                  one more business-supplied asset that has helped          to provide interoperable mobile communications
                  to facilitate disaster relief efforts overseas, partic-   equipment to first responders in the disaster relief
                  ularly in remote areas or when the ground-based           community, though this initiative obviously has a
                  communications infrastructure has been disrupt-           long way to go to meet its goal and was not mature
                  ed, overloaded, or destroyed (UN News Centre 2007).       when the earthquake struck (UN Department of Pub-
                  In this context, SDN Global, a satellite technology       lic Information 2000). More recently, the UN’s WFP
                  company which participated in the response to the         and the Vodafone Group Foundation (VGF) formed
                  2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, has been collaborating         a collaboration in 2006 to improve emergency infor-
                  with the Disaster Relief and Strategic Telecommuni-       mation-sharing and overall communications tech-
                  cations Infrastructure Company (DRASTIC) to pro-          nologies for disaster response operations (Disaster
                  vide around-the-clock broadband satellite-delivered       Relief Network 2007).
                  voice and data service to humanitarian workers, al-           In addition to partnering with NGOs and other
                  lowing them a constant means of contact with the          humanitarian organizations (as well as with the mil-
                  world, including in the most isolated and austere         itary), many businesses have come to believe that
                  locations (Hoskins 2005). Similarly, satellite provid-    they can provide more decisive and longer-lasting
                  er ICO Global Communications recently partnered           contributions to disaster relief if they join forces
                  with the UN’s International Telecommunications            with other companies in a consortium (Thomas
                  Union (ITU) and the Commonwealth Business Coun-           and Fritz 2006). Examples include the U.S. Cham-


                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix

64                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                                              the    InstItute              for        foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

ber of Commerce’s Business Civic Leadership Cen-         ganizations and businesses around the world, in-
ter (BCLC), the Business Roundtable’s Partnership        creasing still further the prospects that needs on the
for Disaster Response, the Committee Encourag-           ground would be matched to available private sector
ing Corporate Philanthropy (CECP), the Fritz Insti-      resources. Overall, total global private assistance to
tute’s Corporations for Humanity, and the previously     the South Asia disaster surpassed $266 49 The BCLC runs a business-sector informa-
mentioned DRN established by the World Econom-           million, underscoring in dramatic fash- tion resource for Chamber members to support
                                                                                                    disaster preparedness and response partner-
ic Forum.49 Such partnerships within the corporate       ion the important impact of private sec- ships with NGOs and government agencies,
sector can often exploit the combined internation-       tor flows for successful disaster relief and has been at the forefront of efforts to de-
al supply chains and communications networks of          (UNOCHA 2007).                             velop best practices with regard to private sec-

member companies to achieve results far greater                                                     tor support disaster relief
                                                             Many more examples of useful pri- association to chief executiveoperations. An
                                                                                                                  of                officers from
than any individual company could ever secure on         vate sector support to recent disas- leading American companies, the Business
its own. Following the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan,      ter relief efforts could, of course, be Roundtable created the Partnership for Di-
for example, DRN connected Fast Retailing Co., a         described, including the quite sub- saster Response to facilitate member-compa-
                                                                                                    ny contributions in all phases of disaster relief
Japanese provider of fleece jackets, with Crossroads     stantial assistance offered to Chinese and recovery, especially in the logistics, com-
International and the Interfaith League Against          authorities after the May 2008 earth- munications, and data management realms.
Poverty, to distribute ten thousand jackets in the       quake in Sichuan province by a long list The CECP, whose membership includes more
                                                                                                    than 165 CEOs and chairpersons from lead-
Mansehra region. Moreover, with medical supplies         of American companies active in Chi- ing U.S. and foreign corporations, has helped
previously donated by the international pharmaceu-       na and U.S.-China trade (U.S. Chamber member companies to coordinate their finan-
tical distributor Henry Schein, Inc., DRN coordinated    of Commerce 2008). The examples re- cial contributions to disaster relief efforts and
with New York City’s Medics and the Medical Ac-                                                                  their global supply chain networks,
                                                         viewed so far, however, are enough to to leverage technologies, and skilled employees
                                                                                                    innovative
tion Network to bring emergency medical servic-          confirm that the corporate world has to aid affected communities. The Fritz Insti-
es to earthquake survivors. More recently, the DRN       been, and will likely remain, an increas- tute, a non-profit dedicated to the promotion
has taken steps to formalize its ties to the Emer-       ingly able, if still somewhat underuti- of best practices for rapid and effective disas-
                                                                                                    ter relief and recovery, created Corporations
gency Shelter Cluster managed by the UN’s IASC as        lized, source of supply for expertise for Humanity to help mobilize corporate re-
a way to the maximize future HA/DR support from          and capabilities of great value to for- sources and technology for long-term improve-
its member companies with expertise in the engi-         eign disaster relief. Moreover, private ment in the delivery of humanitarian aid.
neering and construction sectors.                        sector contributors can bring to relief
    One of the most noteworthy examples of a multi-      efforts a business-minded, bottom-line approach
company response from the corporate sector, how-         to the task at hand – whether it involves transport,
ever, was the Bush administration’s initiative to        supply chain, information management, or overall
appoint five current and former Business Round-          communications – that is sorely needed, but is of-
table CEOs to lead the South Asia Earthquake Relief      ten ignored, by the traditional humanitarian assis-
Fund following the 2005 Pakistan earthquake. The            U.S. Corporate Donations to Earthquake
Fund, actually administered by the CECP, was a na-          Relief in China
tionwide effort to spur private and corporate contri-
                                                                                                                                                                  others 52.1
butions, to increase awareness about the emergency,
and to stimulate greater engagement from the pri-
vate sector in the overall relief effort. As a result,
the U.S. private sector mobilized close to $113 mil-                                                                                                                                                Amway 4.3

lion for the earthquake victims (CECP). Much of               Wal-Mar t 3                                                                                                                      A nh e u
                                                                                                                                                                                               Busch ser-
                                                                                                                                                                                                      1.6
the non-cash contributions consisted of medicine,                                   le                                                                                                       Avon
                                                                                 amb 7.6                                                                                                          5
emergency care equipment, and supporting servic-                       or   &G                                                                                                         Co
                                                             Pr   oc t                                                                                                                      c a-
                                                                                                         .6                                                                   Fe                   Co
es, which were channeled primarily through Pak-                                                   Co
                                                                                                     1                                                                             dE
                                                                                                                                                                                        x1              la 2
                                                                                                              e




                                                                                                                                                                                                               .4
                                                                                                          4. 2




                                                                                           k in
                                                                                                         N ik




                                                                                                                                                        IB




istani partners and non-profit international relief                                                                                                                                          .5
                                                                                                                                     .1




                                                                                                                                                           M




                                                                                      uS
                                                                                                                                                           I nt e
                                                                                                                                 1.6
                                                                                                                                 1.8
                                                                                                                                la 2




                                                                                                                                          Johnson &

                                                                                                                                                              6.2
                                                                                                                                           Johnson 5




                                                                                                                                                              2




                                                                                  N
organizations that were well established in coun-
                                                                                                                                                                  l Fo
                                                                                                                         os of t
                                                                                                                t o ro


                                                                                                                    McDonald's




                                                                                                                                                                       un d
                                                                                                               Mo




try, such as the IRC, Mercy Corps, and Save the Chil-
                                                                                                                      Micr




                                                                                                                                                                            at i o




dren (McConnell 2005). At the same time, the DRN,
                                                                                                                                                                                   n




in addition to the specific initiatives noted above,
activated the support of more than thirty-seven or-        $102 million total Figures in millions of $US. Contributions over $1.5m broken out.



Finding the Right Mix

                                                                                       Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief                                                                                 65
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

            tance community, focused as it understandably is          tions from the business community in areas where
            on providing direct aid to disaster victims without       it can match and reinforce (if still not really exceed)
            worrying unduly about cost-effectiveness. Good (if        potential contributions from the American military
            not best) value for money considerations, howev-          looms as well as a priority objective, and one that
            er, are likely to become more and more important          should be pursued as quickly as possible, given cur-
            to the humanitarian relief community, as competi-         rent trends in the number and severity of natural di-
            tion increases among them for scarce donor fund-          sasters worldwide.
            ing and as major donors and even the general public
            demand hard evidence of effective performance in
            the field. So, too, the incentive to conduct relief op-   Conclusion
            erations as economically as possible is also likely to    Based on the military programs and operations an-
            increase in years to come, given that the accumulat-      alyzed in this chapter, HA/DR missions are likely to
            ed costs imposed by global disasters in this decade       retain a high profile in the years ahead, both in the
            alone are already expected to total more than $250        context of emergency relief efforts after a foreign di-
            billion. Once the full costs of the damage imposed        saster and as a way to assist and engage with other
            on Myanmar and the broader region in May 2008             countries in a more thoughtful and productive man-
            by cyclone Nargis, as well as by the Sichuan earth-       ner over the longer term. Ideally, the initiatives now
            quake in China, are known, this projection is almost      being taken by OSD and service staff planners to in-
            certain to be much higher come 2010.                      stitutionalize HA/DR activities and to accord them
                Returning to an issue addressed earlier in this       a higher priority in current strategic guidance will
            chapter, tapping the private sector’s capabilities in     help to ensure that the capabilities that are needed
            the HA/DR realm – and integrating them more com-          to conduct effective HA/DR operations will be avail-
            prehensively into the official governmental planning      able where, when, and in the format that they are
            process – could provide as well some additional in-       required. However, as important as it is to have on
            surance against any potential gap that might emerge       hand the hardware, technologies, and expertise to
            in the provision of military assets for disaster relief   successfully execute the types of HA/DR missions
            operations. Indeed, given competing demands for           discussed so far, they are not in and of themselves
            their use in other military contingencies, many of        sufficient to the task. Of equal importance is to have
            the key enabling capabilities that reside in the U.S.     in hand a well-thought-out plan of operation, prefer-
            military (and were highlighted earlier in this chap-      ably one that fully exploits existing mechanisms for
            ter) can justifiably be considered “low density-high      military to military, civilian to military, and broader
            demand” assets in so far as foreign disaster relief is    interagency collaboration. It is, in this sense, rela-
            concerned. As a result, however carefully the CO-         tionships as much as capabilities that will determine
            COMs plan, these particular assets may very well be       the success or failure of future HA/DR operations.
            requested more frequently and in greater quantities       What such a plan should look like, how it should be
            than they are likely to be available. Therefore, in ad-   organized, and what tools may already exist at the
            dition to boosting private sector support to various      regional COCOM level to improve the overall chanc-
            relief agencies, finding ways to maximize contribu-       es for success is the topic of the next chapter.



            References
            Agility. 2008. First-ever deployment of private sector logistics emergency teams benefits re-
            lief efforts for victims of Myanmar cyclone. Press release, Santa Ana, CA, July 15.
            Air Force Print News, Hickam AFB. 2007. Military team to conduct humanitarian assis-
            tance in Oceania. Air Force Link. July 19. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123061260.
            Asia-Pacific Defense Forum. 2005. OUA: Indonesia. Special Edition. http://fo-
            rum.apan-info.net/05_special_ed/indonesia_1.html.
            Kenneth Ballen. 2006. Humanitarian aid: winning the terror war. Christian Science Monitor, December 20.

                                                                                                            Finding the Right Mix

66                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

Dennis K. Bohannon. 2005. Engineers providing essential knowledge to tsunami rescue efforts. News re-
lease no. 050101, January 13. Public Affairs Office, Pacific Ocean Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
COL Gene Bonventre, USAF. 2006a. Trip report for USCENTCOM surgeon general Pakistan med-
ical security cooperation visit, Islamabad, Pakistan, February 11-21, 2006. March 6.
———. 2006b. Trip report for leadership program in regional disaster response and trau-
ma system management, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, August 15-30, 2006. September 6.
———. 2007. Conflict prevention: A public health approach. Unpublished paper. June.
Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, USA. 2008. Quoted in Michael R. Gordon, New weight in
Army manual on stabilization, New York Times, February 8. Lt. Gen. Caldwell is command-
er of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, where FM 3-0 was produced.
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. 2006. Pakistan earthquake:
A review of the civil-military dimensions of the international response. April.
http://www.coe-dmha.org/TAPpdfs/IIIMEF2006/Resource%20Materials/
Best%20Practices%20AAR/PAK%20AAR%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf.
CECP. http://www.corporatephilanthropy.org.
Specialist 1st Class Cynthia Clark. 2007. Global Fleet Station makes Project Handclasp delivery. July 17.
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=599.
Dave Copeland. 2008. Software for hard times. Boston Globe, August 4.
Senior Master Sgt Hollis Dawson, Air Force Public Affairs. 2007. Postured to help: 3rd AF ready. Air Force
Link. November 12.
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123075564.
Disaster Relief Network.
http://www.drnglobal.org.
———. 2007. Emergency information and communications tech-
nology (EICT) in disaster response. January 9.
Robert L. Dodson and George McKemmy. 2006. NOLSC supports Pakistan earthquake re-
lief efforts in CENTCOM. Navy Supply Corps Newsletter 69, no. 2 (March-April).
Rear Admiral David “Jack” Dorsett, USN. 2005. Tsunami! Information shar-
ing in the wake of destruction. Joint Force Quarterly, no. 39 (October).
The Economist Global Agenda. 2005. Quality over quantity. January 5.
Bruce A. Elleman. 2006. Waves of hope: The U.S. Navy’s response to the tsunami in northern In-
donesia. Naval War College Newport Papers 28. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
Philip Ewing. 2008. USMC pitches LCS modules, Defense News, November 3.
Farlex. The Free Dictionary. http://www.thefreedictionary.com.
Fritz Institute. 2005. From logistics to supply chain manage-
ment: The path forward in the humanitarian sector.
GAO. 2007. Military operations: Actions needed to improve DoD’s stabili-
ty operations approach and enhance interagency planning.
Bailey Hand, OSD Stability Operations. 2006. Pakistan earthquake response: Af-
ter action trip: Recommendations. Unpublished briefing. March.
S. Hawkins. 2006. Public-private partnerships provide tsunami relief and re-
construction: A deepening collaboration. UN Chronicle, no. 3.
Headquarters, Department of Army. 2008. Operations FM 3-0. Feb-
ruary. http://downloads.army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf.


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                       Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief          67
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  Tim Hoffman. 2007. Guidance for the employment of force (GEF). Briefing presented at DoD/Joint Staff
                  Worldwide Joint Training and Scheduling Conference, September 17-21.
                  http://www.js.mil/doctrine/training/wjtsc07_2feg_brief.ppt.
                  R. Hoskins. 2005. SDN Global and DRASTIC to provide satellite servic-
                  es. Broadband Wireless Exchange Magazine, September 15.
                  interview. 2007a. With PACOM staff. May 1-3.
                  ———. 2007b. With OSD personnel.June 12.
                  ———. 2008a. With SOUTHCOM staff . March 17.
                  ———. 2008b. Private meeting with Adm. Roughead. January 8.
                  ———. 2008c. Roundtable discussion with senior members of the Navy staff. January 30.
                  ———. 2008d. With CAPT Allan Stratman, USN, Expeditionary Readiness Branch head,
                  Fleet Readiness Programs Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. April 11.
                  ———. 2008e. Briefing by SOUTHCOM staff. March 17.
                  E. Iwata. 2005. Tsunami donors creative in giving. USA TODAY. January 18.
                  Stephen Jordan, ed. 2006. From relief to recovery: The 2005 U.S. business response to the Southeast
                  Asia tsunami and Gulf Coast hurricanes. Washington, D.C.: Business Civic Leadership Center.
                  Gregg K. Kakesako. 2007. Medics in right place, right time to aid victims. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Decem-
                  ber 16.
                  http://strabulletin.com/2007/12/16/news/story07.html.
                  Amy Kazmin and Colum Lynch. 2008. American admiral takes plea to Burma: Mil-
                  itary rulers agree to consider major relief effort. Washington Post. May 13.
                  Otto Kreisher. 2005. Unified Assistance. Air Force Magazine 88, no. 4 (April).
                  http://www.afa.org/magazine/April2005/0405tsunami.asp.
                                                               offer
                  A. Laurent. 2007. Virtual training companies offer products to mil-
                  itary. Government Executive. November 28.
                  Rear Admiral Michael A. LeFever, USN. 2006. Operation Lifeline (Disaster Assistance Center – Pak-
                  istan). VIP briefing by commander of U.S. disaster assistance to Pakistan after 2005 earthquake
                  presented at a workshop organized by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Osa-
                  ka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, in Washington, D.C., December 12.
                  Staff Sgt. Austin M. May. 2007. Rapid deployment of medical troops key to disaster relief mission. No-
                  vember 14.
                  http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/news.php?storyId=897.
                  New York Times. 2008. Editorial, May 18, p. WK11.
                  K. McConnell, U.S. Department of State. 2005. U.S. business-
                  es helping Asia earthquake victims. December 23,
                  S. Murray. 2005a. Good logistics offer better relief. Financial Times, December 16.
                  ———. 2005b. How to deliver on the promises. Financial Times, January 7.
                  Navy Supply Corps. 2005. Navy logistics supports operation Unified Assis-
                  tance. Navy Supply Corps Newsletter. 68, no. 2 (March-April).
                  Army Spc. A. Orillion, USJFCOM. 2007. USJFC, IBM sign new coopera-
                  tive research and development agreement. December 10.
                  Pew Research Center. 2007. America’s image in the world: Findings from the Pew Global Attitudes Proj-
                  ect. March 14.
                  http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=1019.

                                                                                                            Finding the Right Mix

68                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

RISEPAK. 2007. Private sector role in recent disaster response. Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project.
Maj. Richard C. Sater, USAF, PACAF Office of Public Affairs. 2007. PACAF takes lead with Pacific Lifeline.
May 1.
http://www.pacaf.af.mil/news/story_print asp?id=123051533.
Sea Services. 2007. A cooperative strategy for 21st century seapower.
http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf.
Demetri Sevastopulo and Amy Kazmir. 2008. Burma keeps si-
lent on offers of US help. Financial Times. May 17.
Jason Sherman. 2008. Gates signs planning documents to guide in-
vestments, operations. Inside the Pentagon, May 15, p. 1.
Michael Sirak. 2006. Navy awards $3.0 billion for USMC heavy-lift re-
placement helicopter. Defense Daily. April 10.
Joshua Smith, Military Sealift Command Public Affairs. 2005. Sailors reflect on historic mis-
sion of Mercy. Navy.mil, June 17. http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=18781.
Peter Spiegel. 2008. Air Force keeps eye on Russia, China. Los Angeles Times. February 8.
Synergos Institute. 2005. Lessons learned from private sector strengthen links in hu-
manitarian supply chain. Global Giving Matters. December 2004-January 2005.
Anisya Thomas. 2004. Leveraging private expertise for humanitarian supply chains. Fritz Institute.
———. 2005. Linking preparedness and performance: the tsunami experience. Humanitari-
an Exchange Magazine, no. 32 (December). http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2775.
Anisya Thomas and Lynn Fritz. 2006. Disaster Relief, Inc. Harvard Business Review. November.
Anisya S. Thomas and Laura Rock Kopczak. 2005. From logistics to sup-
ply chain management: The path forward in the humanitarian sector. Fritz Insti-
tute. http://www.fritzinstitute.org/PDFs/WhitePaper/FromLogisticsto.pdf.
UN Department of Public Information. 2000. First on the ground. August.
UN News Centre. 2007. UN-backed partnership aims to use satel-
lites to bolster global disaster response. June 20.
UNOCHA, Financial Tracking Service. 2007. South Asia—Earthquake—October 2005. February 26.
UPS. 2005. UPS donates $2 million to earthquake relief. UPS Press Release. November 29.
USACE. 2008a. FEST-A/M force design. Briefing by USACE staff. February 27.
———. 2008b. Briefing on USACE international initiatives by senior USACE staff. February 27.
———. 2008c. Briefing on CMEP and EMI programs by senior USACE staff. February 27.
USAID. 2005. Tsunami assistance, one year later. USAID fact sheet. December 22.
———. 2006a. Rushing to help: The world responds. Pakistan quake relief. U.S. Agency for International
Development brochure. May.
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/documents/
south_asia_quake/pakistan_quakerelief.pdf.
———. 2006b. World’s biggest chopper lift brought U.S. relief to survivors. Pakistan quake relief. U.S.
Agency for International Development brochure. May.
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/documents/
south_asia_quake/pakistan_quakerelief.pdf.
U.S. Air Force. 2005a. AMC aircraft, people support tsunami-relief operations. Air Force Link, January 5.
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123009535.



Finding the Right Mix

                                                                        Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief          69
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  ———. 2005b. Airmen offload 250th Pakistan relief aircraft. Air Force Link, January 12.
                  http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123013273.
                  ———. 2007. The nation’s guardians: America’s 21st century air force. December.
                  ———. 2008. C-5 Galaxy. Air Force Link fact sheet.
                  http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=84.
                  U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 2005. Center for Corporate Citizenship annual report.
                  U.S. Chamber of Commerce Business Civic Leadership Center. 2008. Response to earthquake disaster in
                  China: Corporate donations.
                  http://www.uschamber.com/bclc/programs/disaster/chinaearthquake_donations.htm.
                  U.S. Department of Defense. 2005. ‘Hillclimbers’ Join Task Force Quake: Unit transports CH-47s around
                  the world to help victims of Pakistan’s 7.6-magnitude earthquake. Defend America. November.
                  http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/nov2005/a110105pj2.html.
                  ———. 2006. DoD assistance to Pakistan. Defense Link. Defense Depart-
                  ment fact sheet. February 21. http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/2005/
                  Pakistan/Fact_sheets/20062702a.html?storyID=123013273.
                  U.S. House of Representatives. Office of the Law Revision Counsel. 2007. U.S. Code, Title 10 - Armed Forc-
                  es, Chapter 20 - Humanitarian and other assistance, Section 402. Transportation of humanitarian relief
                  supplies to foreign countries. January 3.
                  http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t09t12+200+24++%28%29%20%20
                  AND%20%28USC%20w%2F10%20%28402%29%29%3ACITE%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20.
                  USJFCOM. USJFCOM as a force provider.
                  http://www.jfcom.mil/about/forceprov.html.
                  ———. 2007a. GFM efforts help improve command’s joint provision process.
                  http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2007/pa061407.html.
                  ———. 2007b. Command continues preparations for multinational effort.
                  http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2007/pa11307.html.
                  ---------. 2008a. Enabling capabilities command to stand up.
                  http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/pa092908a.html.
                  ———. 2008b. Phase one of multinational experiment 5 wraps up.
                  http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/pa021508.html.
                  ———. 2008c. USJFCOM readies for Noble Resolve 08.
                  http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/pa011608.html.
                  U.S. Marine Corps. 2007. 22nd MEU (SOC) ramps up relief operations in Ban-
                  gladesh. Press release from 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. November 26.
                  http://www.marines.mil/units/hqmc/Pages/2007/PRESS27.aspx.
                  U.S. Navy. 2004a. 7th Fleet units help in relief operations in Southeast Asia. Navy.mil, De-
                  cember 30. http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=16449.
                  ———. 2004b. MSC ships join U.S. tsunami relief effort. Navy.mil, Decem-
                  ber 31. http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=16476.
                  ———. 2005a. USS Essex receives deployment order for operation United Assistance.
                  Navy.mil, January 14.
                  http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=16627.
                  ———. 2005b. Essex thanked for delivering relief supplies. Navy.mil, Feb.
                  11. http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=17028.




                                                                                                            Finding the Right Mix

70                Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief
                                                                                 the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

———. 2005c. Singapore logistics commands keep humanitarian relief flowing. Navy.
mil, January. 17. http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=16626.
———. 2005d. USS Pearl Harbor continues Pakistan relief effort. Navy.mil, Octo-
ber 23. http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=20733.
———. 2005e. USNS Mercy arrives in 7th Fleet AOR to aid in tsunami relief efforts. Navy.
mil, January 16. http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=16647.
———. 2007. Africa Partnership Station kicks off. Navy.mil, Octo-
ber 30. http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=32899.
USNORTHCOM. 2008. Teleconference between IFPA and USNORTHCOM staff, June 2.
U.S. Senate. 2005. Pakistan earthquake: International response and impact on US foreign pol-
icies and programs. Staff trip report to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 109th Cong., 1st
sess. S. Prt. 109-41, http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senate11cp109.html.
USS Kearsarge. Mission and Capabilities. http://www.kearsarge.navy.mil/site%20pages/MISSION.aspx.
USS Kearsarge Public Affairs. 2007. Kearsarge aids tropical cyclone humanitarian efforts. Navy.mil, No-
vember 23. http://www.navy.mil/search/print.asp?story_id=33476&VIRIN=53005&imagetype=1&pa.
USSOUTHCOM. 2007. GFS pilot deployment April-September 2007. United States Southern Com-
mand: Partnership for the Americas. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=9.
———. 2008a. USNS Comfort humanitarian civic assistance deployment 2007. Briefing, March 17.
———. 2008b. Continuing Promise May-December 2008. United States Southern Command:
Partnership for the Americas. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=53.
Warhurst et al. 2005. Logistics companies and Asian tsunami relief. Ethical Corporation, January.
Sharon Wiharta, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randal . 2008. The ef-
fectiveness of foreign military assets in a natural disaster response. Stockholm Internation-
al Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=358#.
Patrick Winn. 2008. C-130, 50 airmen first into Myanmar. AirForceTimes.com, May 13.
World Economic Forum. Disaster Resource Network: Humanitarian relief initiative (HRI) sav-
ing lives, one partnership at a time. http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/drn/index.htm.
———. 2005. Business steps in again to offer help and expertise in earthquake after-
math. Press release, October 14. http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/drn/index.htm.
———. 2008. Collaboration key to success as new initiatives launched in the field of hu-
manitarian relief at Davos. Press release, January 25. http://www.weforum.org/
en/media/Latest%20Press%20 Releases/PR_Davos_Humanitarian.
Tom Wright. 2008. U.S. ship waits, ready to help. Wall Street Journal. May 17.
Monika Wulf-Mathies, head of corporate public policy and sustainabili-
ty at Deutsche Post World Net. 2005. Quoted in Murray 2005.




Finding the Right Mix

                                                                       Key Capabilities for Foreign Disaster relief            71
                                                                                                               4
                                                                                                              ChaPter




Operational Challenges,
    Civil-Military Coordination, &
COCOM Platforms for HA/DR Collaboration

         Obviously, the best-laid plans can end up being quite     this chapter, there is no single solution that will ap-
         useless if they are not executed properly, and so it is   ply across the board. Based on recent efforts by HA/
         with HA/DR operations. Moreover, given the num-           DR practitioners to cull key lessons learned from past
         ber and diversity of civil and military organizations     experience, there are, however, common operational
         that could be involved (many of which may have            challenges that arise in virtually every operation, big
         limited experience working together and quite dif-        or small. Understanding these challenges may not
         ferent modes of operation), the task of organizing        yield a template for effective action that fits every
         the participants in an international operation into       situation, but it could certainly lead to a set of gen-
         a single, coordinated campaign is likely to be chal-      eral guidelines that would apply in most cases. Not
         lenging in the extreme. The fact that the traditional     surprisingly, when it comes to organizing military
         humanitarian community and the military bring to          support for foreign relief efforts, many of the tough-
         the table different skills and experiences, and often     est challenges involve the need for more effective co-
         quite divergent perspectives on how best to respond       ordination between civil and military responders at
         to crises, simply makes the challenge of collabora-       the local, national, regional, and/or international
         tion that much more difficult. So, too, the absence       levels. So, while solving civil-military coordination
         of a common playbook for orchestrating a joint civ-       (or CMCoord) problems won’t resolve every difficul-
         il-military operation – or even separate playbooks        ty likely to arise over the course of an HA/DR effort,
         for each community that both could nonetheless            it could take care of the most intractable.
         agree on (and refer to) – renders the objective of ef-        This chapter begins with a review of key opera-
         fective mutual support extremely tough to achieve,        tional issues that must be addressed – and to some
         and more of a “learn as you go” enterprise than one       extent are being addressed by U.S. military plan-
         would like. It should come as no surprise, then, when     ners – in the development of a basic concept of op-
         those being assisted in the wake of a serious foreign     erations (or CONOPS, in military terminology) for
         disaster look at the army of responders rushing to        providing military support to an HA/DR operation
         their aid and wonder, “Who’s really in charge here?”      overseas. Particular attention is given to the overall
         and, “How is this all going to work?” More worri-         challenge of CMCoord in the various phases of a relief
         some, given the current state of play, is that a num-     operation, from initial response to eventual recovery
         ber of those same responders are likely to be asking      and reconstruction. The chapter then takes a more
         the very same questions.                                  in-depth look at very specific CMCoord challenges
             Depending on the location, scale, and type of         that are likely to tax almost any HA/DR operation,
         disaster that occurs or assistance that is required,      however well prepared and attentive to the CONOPS
         answers to these questions may not always be the          discussed. Key challenges here include conducting
         same. As noted in earlier chapters and repeated in        an accurate assessment of needs that both civil and


                                                                                                      Finding the Right Mix

    72   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs
                                                                                   the                   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

military responders can agree on and act upon, tran-      fort in which non-military responders play a more
sitioning from a military to a civilian lead in a way     prominent role.
that sustains and builds upon investments in local            In recent years, moreover, the magnitude, severity,
capacity already made, and supporting a common            and frequency of large-scale and rapid-onset natural
public affairs message or set of messages about the       disasters have triggered a steady growth in military
objectives of the mission at hand. Finally, the chap-     contributions to HA/DR missions, especially during
ter explores at some length the various civil-military    the initial surge phase of a response. As detailed in
programs and platforms for collaboration in the HA/       chapter 3, the reasons, insofar as the U.S. military is
DR realm that three of the regional COCOMs most ac-       concerned, are obvious. In the first place, it possesses
tive in that arena – PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AFRI-           exceptional strategic reach, tremendous capacity for
COM – have set in place or are developing. All three      a rapid and robust response, and unmatched capa-
are emerging as innovative laboratories for planning      bilities in the areas of logistics, transportation, com-
and implementing HA/DR-oriented reforms that are          munications, and emergency medical care, making
minimizing past operational difficulties while pro-       it an ideal first responder to fill immediate gaps in
moting civil-military cooperation.                        assistance. Of course, as the situation on the ground
                                                          evolves from initial relief to recovery, U.S. military
                                                          forces, in close coordination with civilian govern-
Developing a Concept of Operations                        mental entities and various NGOs, are likely to as-
for Military Support                                      sume additional responsibilities to sustain the op-
                                                          eration, including the collection and distribution of
As described in chapter 2, the U.S. military generally
                                                          relief supplies, the organization and administration
plays a supporting role in HA/DR operations, present
                                                          of camps for displaced persons, the training of lo-
to supplement and reinforce the activities of vari-
                                                          cal responders and aid workers, and the reconstruc-
ous civil authorities and NGO relief agencies. Toward
                                                          tion of critical local infrastructure. Viewed from this
that end, the UN’s Guidelines on the Use of Foreign
                                                          angle, military forces assigned to HA/DR operations
Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief
                                                          need to be thinking from the outset of an operation in
– commonly known as the Oslo Guidelines, and dis-
                                                          terms of sequential (but interrelated) phases to their
cussed more fully in chapter 5 – suggest that for-
                                                          support activities. This would include an opening sit-
eign military forces should only be requested when
                                                          uational assessment phase, followed by a forward de-
there is no comparable civilian alternative, in which
                                                          ployment phase, an in-country assistance phase, and,
case the military option becomes an appropriate
                                                          eventually, an exit phase, this last phase marking the
“last resort” to meet a critical humanitarian need
                                                          transition of the mission to a recovery effort led prin-
(UNOCHA 2007). These guidelines, however, do not
                                                          cipally by non-mili-
constitute policy, and many governments, includ-                                        HA/DR Operational Phases
                                                          tary humanitarian
ing that of the United States, interpret them, par-
                                                          relief experts. This                   emergency relief phase                recovery/development
ticularly the principle of last resort, quite broadly.
                                                          chart illustrates in
“Last resort,” for example, does not necessarily mean
                                                          broad brush terms
last to be called upon no matter what the circum-                                                                                  military and civil defense relief
                                                          the phasing of mili-
stances, nor should it. In situations of urgent need,
                                                          tary and civilian re-
the timeliness with which key foreign assets can be
                                                          lief roles over the                                                            international civilian relief
deployed and become operational, and the appro-
                                                          course of a notional
                                                                                   need for assistance




priateness and efficiency with which they may be
                                                          HA/DR operation.
utilized within the overall relief effort, must be con-
                                                              As emphasized
sidered, as well as their specific origin (Wiharta et
                                                          in chapter 3, how-
al. 2008, 31). Indeed, the use of military forces often
                                                          ever, there will nev-
precedes civilian response efforts as a way to jump
                                                          er be a “one size fits
start relief operations and render immediate aid to                                                                                         local/national response
                                                          all” model to fol-
alleviate suffering and save lives, while paving the
                                                          low in times of cri-
way as well to a larger and longer-term follow-on ef-
                                                          sis. Each disaster re-                                                time



Finding the Right Mix
                                                                               Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                                       73
                                                                                 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                      quires a different response tailored to the type and       iar to all. Fortunately, as a way to move forward in
                                      scale of the disaster and to the local operational en-     this direction, the Joint Staff is overseeing a whole-
                                      vironment. So, too, capability needs may differ de-        sale revision of U.S. military doctrine for foreign HA/
                                      pending on whether American forces are providing           DR missions, integrating key lessons learned from
                                      direct or indirect assistance, and doing so as a part      2001 (when the doctrine was last reviewed) to 2008.2
                                      of a U.S. national response or a multinational effort.     Once this new doctrinal guidance is approved and
                                      That said, as American military units have assumed         released, the organization and management of the
                                      a higher-profile role in foreign HA/DR operations, the     military component of American foreign relief ef-
                                      absence of a basic template for organizing such ef-        forts should become more predictable, while remain-
                                      forts has led at times to unnecessary inefficiencies       ing flexible enough to accommodate a variety of cri-
                                      and to a duplication of effort, especially between mil-    sis situations.
                                      itary and civilian responders. Putting all the pieces          According to the most recent draft of the updated
                                      together in launching and directing a major relief ef-     doctrine, once the president and secretary of defense
                                      fort can be, according to the commander of Ameri-          authorize a decision to employ military capabili-
                                      ca’s 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami response, a little like     ties, the critical first step for the regional COCOM
                                      “starting a family vacation for which you were try-        leading the effort is to define a “national strategic
                                      ing to pack the car and decide where you were go-          end-state,” or, in layman’s terms, a set of objectives
                                      ing while you were driving down the road” (Miles           (diplomatic, informational, military, and econom-
                                      2005). Improving U.S. disaster responses in the fu-        ic) that should be met by the conclusion of the op-
                                      ture, therefore, will require a more carefully consid-     eration. The COCOM commander will then develop
                                      ered division of labor between military and non-mil-       a mission statement to provide more specific direc-
                                      itary – and between U.S. and allied/partner nation         tion for achieving the desired end-state objectives.
                                      – stakeholders. It will necessitate as well greater pre-   Generally, the mission statement is a short para-
                                      event coordination and collaboration between the           graph that describes the military’s role in assisting
                                      military and other disaster response organizations,        the host nation and any relief agencies that may be
                                      together with an increased emphasis on HA/DR con-          operating in the disaster area. Following the Indian
                                      siderations overall within military doctrine, plan-        Ocean tsunami, for example, the mission statement
                                      ning, training, and resource management.                   specified that PACOM would “provide assistance to
                                          Of course, it would also help if military command-     the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand
                                      ers and DoD officials could agree up front on a basic,     and other affected nations to mitigate the effects
                                      but adjustable, concept of operations (or CONOPS)          of the recent earthquake and tsunami in the Indian
1            For the military, a CONOPS “describes that could be followed, whatever the          Ocean. Conduct of operation is in support of USG
         how the actions of the joint force compo- specific conditions.1 Coordination and        [U.S. government] lead agency and in coordination
       nents and supporting organizations will be
     integrated, synchronized, and phased to ac-
                                                     unity of effort among civil and military    with international organizations, nongovernmen-
        complish the mission, including potential participants in such operations could be       tal organizations, and coalition nations” (USPACOM
          branches and sequels” (Joint Staff 2006). facilitated as well if these commanders      2005). Of central importance in selecting the mili-
2           The new doctrine is scheduled to be re- and officials reached an agreement on        tary units that will actually undertake the mission,
      leased before 2009 as Joint Publication 3-19, a set of standard operating procedures       moreover, is an early determination of whether or
      Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. It will take
   the place of Joint Publication 3-07.6, Joint Tac-
                                                     (or SOPs) that could be applied, with al-   not they are likely to face, in military parlance, a
    tics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Hu- lowances for obvious adjustments and        “permissive, uncertain, or hostile operational envi-
    manitarian Assistance, dated August 15, 2001. fine tuning, to virtually any HA/DR sce-       ronment,”3 and a decision on what this means for
3           A permissive environment is an opera- nario. SOPs would be especially useful         force protection requirements.
        tional environment in which host country to have on hand to encourage common                 Once the basic nature of the operational setting
     military and law enforcement agencies have
  control, as well as the intent and capability to
                                                     approaches to JTF headquarters orga-        is established, the commander and his or her sup-
      assist in HA/DR operations. In an uncertain nization, to clarify chains of command         porting staff plan the various phases of the opera-
    operational environment, host nation forces, (especially in multinational operations),       tion from beginning to end. Clarifying what will (or
    whether opposed to or receptive to U.S. mili-
     tary involvement, do not have complete con-
                                                     to help coordinate joint and combined       should) happen in each phase helps the command-
  trol of the territory and population within the planning and decision making, and to           er to visualize and think through the entire opera-
   intended operational area. A hostile environ- establish a common terminology famil-           tion, to determine if additional forces need to be
  ment is one in which hostile forces maintain
  control and have the intent and capability to
  oppose or react to U.S. military involvement.                                                                                     Finding the Right Mix
                                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                74
                                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                                                        the       InstItute                          for    foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

requested, and to identify supply sources and poten-              lief and recovery once a disaster occurs, and transi-
tial civilian partners. In essence, the commander of              tion to long-term rehabilitation after the emergency
any large-scale disaster response must plan more or               phase has ended. As in the continuous operations
less simultaneously for all phases, with a continu-               approach described above, the key task here for a
ous process of transition in mind, which one notable              COCOM planner would be to anticipate and think
practitioner referred to as a “continuous operations”             through what could be done before, during, and after
mindset. At one and the same time, planning must                  a disaster to make each phase of a disaster response
be done for an initial deployment, an assessment of               unfold as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible.
the situation, a subsequent execution of the mission              In terms of pre-disaster planning and prevention, for
(possibly in stages), and a redeployment, including a             example, recent relief efforts underscore the value
clear exit strategy and the handover of any ongoing               of laying the groundwork for responsive operations
recovery and reconstruction efforts to the appropri-              well ahead of time by pre-positioning supplies and
ate civilian/international authorities in a way that              equipment for a likely range of disaster events with-
“gets the military off the stage while the audience               in specific regions, and by maintaining these for-
is still clapping” (Blackman 2005). Of course, in ar-             ward-deployed stocks in as ready-to-deploy a state
eas where natural disasters are prevalent or where                as possible.4 Moreover, to achieve the best synergy
HA and HCA exercises are a key part of the regional               of effort, it would be ideal if the con- 4 DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
command’s theater security cooperation (TSC) plans,               tent and scale of such pre-positioning (QDR) points specifically to the importance of
                                                                                                             maintaining forward-deployed forces and ma-
rudimentary contingency plans (or CONPLANs) for                   were coordinated in some way with the terial in and near crisis-prone regions, so that
responding to a range of foreign disasters usually                type and level of military forces (and they may more quickly transition from tradi-
exist already, and they can be (and are) used as a                associated supplies) forward-deployed tional deterrence missions to humanitarian
general framework to facilitate a rapid response.                                                                         relief operations when
                                                                  in a specific region overall, as well as and disasterDepartment of Defense so re- 14).
                                                                                                             quired (U.S.                        2006,
Conditions “in the field,” however, will determine                with the content and scale of stockpiles
how any pre-exiting CONPLAN is actually applied to                maintained in rear areas (including the continental
and adjusted for the situation at hand.                           United States, or CONUS). As described in chapter 3,
    For the military, another useful way to approach              such an integrated approach to logistics could draw
the phasing of an HA/DR operation is to divide the                usefully from the experiences of private-sector sup-
full lifecycle of a disaster event into three primary             pliers and distributors.
phases: pre-disaster planning and prevention, re-

   Disaster Relief Life Cycle
                        intensity




                                                                         U.
                                                                            S.
                                                                                 an                     ho
                                                                                      di                     st
                                                                                            nt                    na
                                                                                                   er                  tio
                                                                                                        n                    na
                                                                                                                                  nd
                                                                                                        at




                                                                                                                                       lo
                                                                                                            io




                                                                                                                                            ca
                                                                                                             na




                                                   transition                                                                                    lc
                                                                                                                  lc




                                                   phase                                                                                              iv
                                                                         U. S




                                                                                                                                                           ili
                                                                                                                   iv i




                                      relief                                                                                                                     a
                                                                                                                        li a
                                                                              .a




                                                                                                                             na




                                                                                                                                                                 n




                                      support
                                                                            nd f o




                                                                                                                                                                     re
                                                                                                                              gen




                                      phase
                                                                                                                                                                     li e




                              surge
                                                                                                                                                                      fa
                                                                                 re i g n




                                                                                                                                   c ie




                              phase
                                                                                                                                                                          ge
                                                                                                                                       s




                                                                                                                                                                            nc
                                                                                                                                                                             ie s
                                                                                   mili t ar i e
                                                                                       s




      time
 pre-disaster planning                relief and                long-term reconstruction
 and prevention                       recovery                  and rehabilitation



Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                                                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                                                                                  75
                                                                                                                    Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                      Disaster responsiveness could be improved as           ties understand well before any request is ever made
                  well by negotiating memoranda of understanding             what is required capability-wise, and what the prob-
                  (MoUs) with a wider array of nations within key re-        able cost would be, when the military is asked to
                  gions that might request aid in the future or serve        perform a specific emergency-related mission (US-
                  as a transit point for overseas military deployments       NORTHCOM 2008). Tasks covered under current
                  in support of disaster relief missions. MoUs might         PSMA agreements include such typical emergency
                  also be a useful way to encourage potential part-          support missions as providing helicopter or fixed-
                  ner nations to place some of their own military as-        wing airlift, conducting airborne or ground-based air
                  sets on standby status or to maintain a special surge      control, supplying various communications packag-
                  capacity that could reinforce a developing or on-          es to first responders, removing debris from emer-
                  going disaster effort. So, too, advance agreements         gency routes, setting up fuel distribution centers,
                  could be signed with a select number of corporations       and organizing and supplying temporary housing.
                  that produce products and capabilities of particular       Whatever the specific task, however, the overarch-
                  value to HA/DR-type efforts, with the companies in         ing idea is to encourage civil and military planners
                  question agreeing to retain a special surge capacity       to think ahead together and avoid duplicating efforts
                  that could be triggered in the event of a major disas-     where critical military support is concerned each
                  ter. With regard to critical supplies, speed of delivery   time a new crisis erupts. Applied to foreign HA/DR
                  to priority areas could be advanced as well by estab-      scenarios, the PSMA concept could at least encour-
                  lishing and/or strengthening partnerships between          age COCOM commanders in charge of military ca-
                  NGOs and other relief agencies and the business sec-       pabilities and units likely to be called upon to think
                  tor. As noted earlier in chapter 3, this is especially     more concretely about equipment lists, overall de-
                  true in cases where a relief group and a private com-      ployment packages, and projected costs for similar
                  pany enjoy a longstanding history of collaboration,        types of support in an OCONUS context. If experts
                  such as CARE and UPS, or where both maintain a             from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
                  significant presence in the country or countries hit       could be convinced to serve as the FEMA equivalents
                  by disaster, such as ExxonMobil and Save the Chil-         in this process, so much the better.
                  dren in Banda Aceh (Jordan 2006, 6-19). In the case            Finally, pre-disaster planning and prevention re-
                  of CARE and UPS, both are headquartered in Atlan-          quire regular joint and multinational military exer-
                  ta and have enjoyed an especially close working re-        cises and training opportunities that are specifically
                  lationship over the years. These ties unquestionably       focused on disaster relief. These exercises must in-
                  made for more direct and effective communication           clude robust non-military participation, most par-
                  between UPS distributors and CARE personnel on             ticularly specialists from OFDA and counterpart
                  the ground in stricken areas, helping to ensure that       agencies in other countries, the UN’s OCHA, disas-
                  priority shipments arrived where they were most            ter assistance offices from other international and
                  needed as quickly as possible.                             transnational governmental organizations, and rel-
                      At the more operational level, military read-          evant disaster-minded NGOs. Cultivating relation-
                  iness could be advanced via the development of             ships with non-military partners through training
                  pre-scripted mission assignments (PSMAs) for spe-          exercises and by means of conference and workshop
                  cific capability sets with a high likelihood of being      dialogues helps to build partnership capacity, in-
                  tapped to support a foreign relief effort. The PSMA        creases familiarity with one another’s capabilities,
                  idea was developed by NORTHCOM and FEMA, large-            and promotes effective civil-military cooperation
                  ly as a way to simplify and facilitate the process of      during disaster response efforts. Of course, partic-
                  providing military assistance to civil authorities for     ipation should also be encouraged from the busi-
                  particular emergency tasks during a U.S. homeland-         ness sector, which has much to offer, but remains
                  defense contingency. Each PSMA includes a detailed         minimally involved in government-led training and
                  statement of work, a description of the assets and         exercise programs. Indeed, as noted earlier, wider
                  personnel required to perform that work, and an es-        business involvement could lead to the pre-disaster
                  timate of the costs involved, all of which is agreed       negotiation of contractual and other arrangements
                  upon in advance by FEMA and DoD so that both par-          with private sector entities for transport, logistics,


                                                                                                                Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
76
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

information management, and other disaster re-           the extent of casualties and loss of life, the capacity
sponse support.                                          of the host nation government to respond, and the
    As for the relief and recovery phase, a key prob-    degree of destruction to local infrastructure, espe-
lem in the initial surge phase of any major disaster     cially the damage done to logistical facilities and var-
relief operation, and one that has bedeviled effec-      ious modes of transportation. To prevent duplication
tive coordination between military units and civil-      of effort, HASTs also establish liaison ties and work
ian relief agencies in recent HA/DR operations, is the   closely with host nation authorities and with OFDA/
difficulty of obtaining timely and accurate informa-     DART personnel, U.S. embassy officials, and NGOs al-
tion on the scope and scale of the disaster, and then    ready operating in the area. Within days of tropical
converting that information into meaningful assess-      cyclone Sidr making landfall in southern Bangla-
ments that would identify critical requirements to       desh on November 15, 2007, for example, PACOM de-
which all could agree. In recent relief efforts, this    ployed a twenty-three member HAST to determine
problem has been exacerbated by the lack of com-         the scope and likely duration of needed support, to
mon standards against which first responders can         survey the area, and to coordinate response efforts
make assessments that would be readily and univer-       with various relief organizations providing emergen-
sally understood, by the absence of a common tem-        cy assistance to those in greatest need (USAID 2007).
plate for organizing the information into a common       HAST members also traveled to cyclone-affected ar-
operational picture, and by the absence as well of       eas with USAID/DART and UN assessment teams to
a common communications architecture for shar-           gain a clearer picture of water and sanitation condi-
ing that picture (and the information on which it is     tions and to determine appropriate remedies.
based) with all participants in the operation.               To assist with interagency coordination in the
    To help acquire critical information and estab-      early stages of an operation, a COCOM commander
lish a clearer understanding of what needs to be         also may establish a humanitarian assistance coordi-
done, therefore, the COCOM commander in charge           nation center (HACC). HACC staff members generally
of an HA/DR operation may deploy at the outset a         include civil-military operations planners, plus liai-
rapid deployment or crisis action team (or CAT) to       son officers (or LNOs) from OFDA, the UN and other
the disaster site to assess the situation and provide    intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), key NGOs,
immediate guidance. The exact composition of the         and host nation agencies. Normally, the HACC is only
team would depend on the severity of the disaster,       a temporary body set up during the early planning
and, in some cases, on restrictions based on status-     and coordination stages of an HA/DR operation, after
of-forces agreements (SOFA), treaties, or informal       which it is integrated into the main structure of the
agreements that may limit the number and type of            Comparison between Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC),
foreign military personnel permitted in the country.        Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC),
                                                            and Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)
At a minimum, the CAT should include damage as-
sessment, logistics, and medical expertise to draw a             establishing                                            composition
                                                                 authority               function                       (representatives from)
reasonably accurate picture of immediate emergen-                                                                       affected countries
cy requirements. The commander can then use the                                                                         UN
                                                                 designated indi-                                       US embassy or consulate
initial assessments and findings of the CAT to plan              vidual of affected      coordinates overall re-        joint task force
how best to organize the overall operation, identi-              country, UN, or U.S.    lief strategy at the nation-   other nonmilitary agencies
fy necessary personnel and equipment, and priori-         HOC    government agency       al level                       private sector
                                                                                         assists with interagency co-   combatant command
tize mission needs for each phase of the operation.                                      ordination and planning at     nongovernmental organizations
Typically, the CAT also forms the nucleus of the fol-                                    the strategic level. Normal-   intergovernmental organizations
                                                                 combatant               ly is disestablished once a    regional organizations
low-on military response.                                 HACC commander                 HOC or CMOC is established     private sector
    As part of the CAT process, the COCOM command-                                       assists in coordinating ac-    joint task force
er may also choose to organize and deploy a human-                                       tivities at the operational    nongovernmental organizations
                                                                                         level with military forc-      intergovernmental organizations
itarian assistance survey team (HAST) to assess more                                     es, US governmental agen-      regional organizations
fully the existing conditions and consequent require-                                    cies, nongovernmental          US governmental agencies
                                                               joint task force          and intergovernmental or-      local government
ments for the HA/DR force structure. HASTs survey              or component              ganizations and regional       multinational forces
the nature and extent of available water and food,        CMOC commander                 organizations                  private sector



Finding the Right Mix
                                                                              Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                     77
                                                                                Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
 the   InstItute     for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

  Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center                        agement (GFM) system, which is also discussed in
                                                     other relief and
                                                                                    chapter 3.
                UN                                   benefit organizations               By their very nature, of course, relief mission
      UNICEF                                             Doctors of the World       JTFs require a greater emphasis than do more com-
                                      military
   UN World                                                   Save the Children     bat-oriented JTFs on combat support and service
Food Program
                                                                        CARE
                                                                                    support forces, such as engineers and specialists
      UN High        IGO s                              NGO s                       in mortuary affairs, logistics, transportation, civil-
Commissioner
  for Refugees                                                                      military affairs, legal affairs, medical services, and
                                                                    International
                                                                    Rescue          public affairs. Civil affairs (CA) officers, in particu-
                                       CMOC                         Committee       lar, play a crucial role in helping the JTF commander
                                                                                    interact with host nation and other civilian author-
         CIA                                       regional                         ities. Composed primarily of experts who special-
                        interagency                organizations                    ize in the rule of law, public health and welfare, and
OFDA/DART
                                                                                    good governance, CA units may be tasked to assess
                                             OAS                ASEAN
        other USG agencies                                                          infrastructure damage, assist in the development
                                             African Union
                                                                                    and management of shelters, and provide support
                                                                                    to the local civil administration. Moreover, since HA/
                     operation. Organizationally, a JTF usually manages             DR operations often involve the participation of nu-
                     a major foreign relief effort, drawing upon various            merous non-military relief groups, CA operators can
                     forward-deployed forces that may be on hand in or              serve as primary LNOs, maintaining communication
                     close to the disaster affected area. In that event, an         and effective coordination between and among civ-
                     expeditionary strike group (ESG) with an embarked              il and military responders. Not surprisingly, some of
                     marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) can often pro-            the greatest challenges in managing HA/DR opera-
                     vide an immediate response in support of HA/DR                 tions have occurred when no U.S. military LNO was
                     operations, while other deployed maritime forces,              able to participate in discussions related to the non-
                     including carrier strike groups (CSGs) and maritime            military component of a major relief effort. This was
                     pre-positioning force (MPF) elements, may offer ad-            apparently the case in the first weeks after the 2004
                     ditional lift capacity and rapid supply options and            Indian Ocean tsunami when no JTF LNOs were able
                     serve as forward staging areas once a broader relief           to attend the UN coordination meetings then tak-
                     operation begins to unfold.                                    ing place in Banda Aceh (Saleniko 2006).
                         Of course, as detailed in chapter 3, hospital ships            Depending on the type of disaster and the op-
                     can provide emergency, on-site care for disaster vic-          erational environment, additional special staff el-
                     tims, while air force units can quickly move critical          ements to support logistics, engineering, security,
                     supplies and personnel into the disaster zone via              liaison, and coordination, among other functions,
                     both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter platforms.             may be set up to assist the JTF commander in car-
                     In time, army units can be moved forward to help               rying out the HA/DR mission. If an HA/DR operation
                     conduct search and rescue missions, distribute relief          requires extensive engineering support, a subordi-
                     supplies, inspect local facilities and infrastructure,         nate JTF may be formed around an existing engineer
                     and provide force protection and security to civil-            command or a naval construction regiment. Anoth-
                     ians, relief workers, and the joint force as a whole,          er unit common to HA/DR efforts is a civil-military
                     among other missions. From a military perspective,             operations center (CMOC), which would be specifi-
                     then, finding the right mix of forces to underwrite            cally tasked with coordinating the activities of U.S.
                     the JTF is the key to the success of any HA/DR op-             and/or multinational military forces with those of
                     eration, and that mix will vary, at times quite sig-           international, regional, local, and host nation civil-
                     nificantly, depending on the type and scale of the             ian-run relief agencies. In close cooperation with
                     disaster at hand. Fortunately, the overall process of          any OFDA/DART team that may be present, the CMOC
                     identifying the forces required and transferring them          would normally act as the primary point of contact
                     to the JTF commander has become smoother and                   with the JTF for non-military contributors to an HA/
                     more rapid with adoption of the global force man-              DR operation, including NGOs, UN agencies, and var-


                                                                                                                        Finding the Right Mix
                     Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
 78
                     Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                    the    InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

ious IGOs. As such, it would screen, validate, and pri-    drawals of U.S. military forces that had deployed to
oritize military support requests from these groups,       Pakistan to provide earthquake-related assistance,
assist non-military partners with access into mili-        an operation that was the largest ever of its kind for
tary-controlled areas, coordinate civilian relief ef-      the U.S. military and one that generated consider-
forts with those of the military, and, when the time       able goodwill among average Pakistanis.
comes, facilitate the transfer of operational respon-         Getting this transition right was especially daunt-
sibility from military to non-military authorities.        ing in Pakistan, where host nation civil and military
    In some cases, the host nation, the UN, or possi-      authorities felt more comfortable dealing directly
bly OFDA during a U.S. unilateral operation will also         Coordination at the Joint Task Force Level
choose to establish a humanitarian operations cen-
ter (HOC). The HOC serves as a senior-level interagen-                                         Ambassador
cy and international body that helps to coordinate
the overall relief strategy and promote unity of ef-
                                                                          Geographic Combatant                  Office of Foreign
fort among all participants in a large HA/DR oper-                        Commander                             Disaster Assistance
ation. Because it operates at the national strategic          Crisis Action Team                                Disaster Assistance
                                                              Humanitarian Assistance                           Response Team
level, the HOC will normally include senior repre-
                                                              Coordination Center
sentatives from the affected country, assisting na-           Humanitarian Assistance                           nongovernmental organizations
tions, the UN, NGOs, IGOs, USAID, and the JTF. Among          Survey Team                                       intergovernmental organizations
                                                              Joint Logistics Operations      chain of
other tasks, it identifies emerging logistic require-         Center                          command
                                                                                                                UN agencies
ments for NGOs, IGOs, and the UN, and submits re-                                                                                          not a
quests to the JTF for military support, often through                                                          lines of                    formal
                                                                           Joint Task Force                                                grouping
the CMOC. Functionally, there is no significant dif-                                                           coordination
ference between the CMOC and the HOC, except for
the fact that the CMOC is established by and works                         Civil Military                     Humanitarian
for the joint force commander and his or her JTF.                          Operations Center                  Operations Center
Unlike the CMOC, however, the HOC is horizontally                                                 request for military support
structured with no real command and control au-
thority, and all participants are equal partners and       with the U.S. military, principally via the Disaster
ultimately responsible for their own organizations         Assistance Center-Pakistan (DAC-PAK) JTF led by
and countries. Similarly, a JTF would have no author-      RADM LeFever, than with UN, NATO, or USAID/OFDA
ity to make decisions regarding the precise structure      personnel. In part this was because of the poten-
and activities of the HOC.                                 tially unstable security environment in areas hit by
    In addition to ensuring adequate civil-military        the earthquake, and in part because of the limited
coordination in the midst of an HA/DR operation,           civilian infrastructure within Pakistan at the time
accomplishing the transition from military to ci-          for coordinating and managing humanitarian re-
vilian management at the tail end in as positive a         lief. Moreover, compared to the procedures followed
manner as possible remains central to the overall          during operation Unified Assistance (or OUA) in re-
success of such an effort. This is vital to establishing   sponse to the Indian Ocean tsunami (when military
the conditions and encouraging the attitudes with-         and civilian response planners assigned to the for-
in the assisted nation, or nations, that will allow for    ward headquarters in Thailand often worked hand-
a longer-term engagement with that nation or na-           in-hand in the same conference room), the DAC-PAK
tions, both by U.S. military forces (principally via se-   operation featured a less direct and more limited
curity cooperation activities) and by USAID teams          form of civil-military interaction. In theory, USAID/
(by means of economic assistance and reconstruc-           OFDA was still in charge on the U.S. side, but in prac-
tion projects) in support of wider-ranging American        tice its lead agency role was much less clear, and rep-
foreign policy and security goals. Presumably, this        resentatives from participating civil relief agencies
was at least part of the rationale behind the first-ever   worked mostly in a separate facility from their U.S.
visit to Pakistan in 2006 by the chairman of the U.S.      military counterparts.
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the occasion of the first with-


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                 Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                      79
                                                                                   Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                      As a result, non-military responders (and even         itary to plug into, and one that can assist the mili-
                  some non-U.S. military responders) were less well          tary’s disengagement from the operation. Of course,
                  integrated into the DAC-PAK decision-making pro-           prior to transferring relief efforts from military to ci-
                  cess than they were in the OUA (and overall tsuna-         vilian management, the JTF commander should also
                  mi response) decision process, making the eventual         review the tasks performed by the joint force and
                  transition to a more civilian-run effort that much         determine whether these tasks can be transferred
                  harder. Looking back on it, even DoD has acknowl-          or should simply be terminated. This review process
                  edged that the DAC-PAK structure was a result of           should help the commander, again working in close
                  the specific and somewhat unique conditions that           consultation with other U. S. government agencies,
                  existed in Pakistan, and that it was not likely to be      to identify host nation or other civilian organizations
                  a preferred approach for relief operations and civil-      most capable of assuming responsibility for certain
                  military coordination in more stable environments.         tasks before handing over final control.
                  Indeed, given the importance of shifting to a civilian         It is important to note as well that transferring
                  lead for longer-term rebuilding efforts, an OSD af-        relief efforts from military to civilian management
                  ter-action report on the Pakistan operation stressed       does not mean an end to military involvement or
                  that future JTFs and military support teams ought          an end to the operation itself. Beyond the particular
                  to “engage Embassy capabilities as much as possi-          hand-off, numerous tasks could be undertaken by
                  ble” and “ensure all USG efforts are in support of [an     military forces to help promote the long-term reha-
                  OFDA lead] in determining appropriate responses in         bilitation and recovery of a disaster-stricken coun-
                  order to maximize the efficacy of joint efforts and        try. First, retaining at least a small force of military
                  to minimize the military footprint”. One proposal          officers and technicians in country to assist civilian
                  made for improving such coordination was to im-            and host nation agencies could help to fill any im-
                  plement more staff exchanges between military and          mediate capability gaps that arise once the bulk of
                  OFDA personnel, and to do so at the Washington,            the military forces withdraws. Moreover, the abil-
                  D.C., regional COCOM, country team, and field lev-         ity to leave behind useful equipment and to train
                  els (Hand 2006).                                           locals in its use also facilitates long-term rehabil-
                      Another key recommendation that dovetails with         itation efforts and extends the beneficial effect of
                  the concept of continuous operations discussed ear-        U.S. assistance and presumably the goodwill so gen-
                  lier was that planning for the transition from mil-        erated. Of course, before handing over any equip-
                  itary-led to civilian-led relief activities – and for      ment, U.S. forces should confirm that local staffs are,
                  the eventual termination of all military operations        in fact, adequately trained and equipped to operate
                  – should occur as early as possible. A comprehen-          and maintain donated assets. Even the best inten-
                  sive transition plan should also define specific mile-     tions can have bad results, as demonstrated by the
                  stones, such as the restoration of public facilities and   inability of the Pakistanis (as discussed in chapter
                  the provision of adequate food, shelter, and medical       3) to sustain the U.S. Army’s 212th MASH unit once
                  care, that must be met prior to the termination or         it was donated.
                  hand-over of the mission. Toward that end, the JTF             Emphasis should be placed, moreover, on the
                  team should work in close cooperation with sup-            transfer of skills and techniques, not simply on the
                  porting COCOM staff, USAID/OFDA, and host nation           donation of equipment. Rather than introduce a lev-
                  and other participating agencies from day one to set       el of care that a host nation would not likely be able
                  in place a plan for the continuity of long-term relief     to continue on its own, transition and hand-over ac-
                  operations – including a shift from direct emergen-        tivities should be designed to local standards and
                  cy assistance to post-disaster capacity building and       aim to build up local capabilities gradually. What
                  development – once military forces have withdrawn          must be avoided at all costs is the creation of a tem-
                  from the operation. The UN cluster system, a frame-        porary infrastructure parallel to, and, to some ex-
                  work introduced in 2005 in which engaged humani-           tent, even competing with, indigenous capabilities
                  tarian agencies are grouped in particular sectors or       that would collapse soon after U.S. military teams
                  areas of activity (and discussed further in chapter 5),    are pulled out of country. In this sense, the “medical
                  provides a natural and logical structure for the mil-      ship plus” deployments described in chapter 3 and


                                                                                                                  Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
80
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                      the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

later in the COCOM section of this chapter, which call      ten led to confusion and misconceptions as to what
for considerable advance planning aimed at inte-            each community’s best capabilities are, how quickly
grating NGO and military-led humanitarian activities        (or not) each can respond in an evolving operation,
with a focus on capacity-building ashore (in addition       what the most effective division of labor between
to emergency medical treatment), are ideal models           them might be over time, and what, at any point in
to follow. Such deployments would be a perfect way,         time, either group is actually doing. Clearing away
moreover, to follow up on a disaster-triggered emer-        such confusion and correcting such misconceptions
gency response via a “return visit” to provide target-      will be key to achieving a more rapid and effective re-
ed assistance to sustain programs begun during the          sponse to future disasters and to encouraging a real
immediate post-disaster timeframe.                          unity of effort over the course of an operation.5 This
                                                            will require, in turn, a more concerted 5 Although technology can be helpful, the
                                                            effort to embed into practice civil-mili- 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy points
                                                                                                          out that a paramount element in effective
Ongoing Challenges to                                       tary lessons observed during past opera- emergency response “lies in achieving uni-
Civil-Military Coordination                                 tions, but still not fully learned, if future ty of effort across a range of agencies,” es-
                                                            operations are to go more smoothly. In- pecially ones that have not often had to
As the above discussion makes clear, many of the ad-                                                                    in years past       of
                                                            deed, thinking about and taking steps to collaborate United States(Office48).the Pres-
justments that could and should be made to improve                                                        ident of the                2006,
                                                            maintain CMCoord across the lifecycle of
future disaster relief operations, as well as follow-on
                                                            an event – from first response to last act of assistance
humanitarian assistance projects, revolve around ef-
                                                            – remains central to the concept of continuous oper-
forts to enhance civil-military coordination (or CM-
                                                            ations that is so vital to a well-managed relief effort,
Coord). This is the case in part because the civil and
                                                            since it is the military sprinters who buy the time that
military communities engaged in such efforts are
                                                            the civilian marathoners need to fully mobilize and
each essential contributors, and can not provide ef-
                                                            eventually assume command in the recovery and re-
fective relief entirely on their own. But it is also true
                                                            construction phase of an HA/DR operation.
because both communities adhere to very different
                                                                As for how best to organize and manage a major
operational cultures and priorities and operate un-
                                                            multinational, interagency relief effort once it is un-
der different codes of conduct. As a result, they can
                                                            derway, the institutional structure and CONOPS used
sometimes work at cross purposes.
                                                            in OUA after the Indian Ocean tsunami proved to be
    Military units are often referred to as the “sprint-
                                                            a successful framework. The initial JTF 536 that de-
ers,” first to respond when assistance is requested
                                                            ployed to Utapao, Thailand, drawn mainly from U.S.
and first to arrive with robust organizational and
                                                            Marine units based in Japan, transformed into Com-
managerial skills, though they usually have a rela-
                                                            bined Support Force (CSF) 536 as the military oper-
tively short- or near-term perspective, such as “just
                                                            ation became more multilateral. At the same time,
getting the job at hand done.” Military responders
                                                            a parallel organization known as the Combined Co-
also tend to work hierarchically, to worry about force
                                                            ordination Center (CCC) – composed of representa-
protection (which can inhibit the provision of as-
                                                            tives from the many UN agencies, State Department
sistance), and to prefer secure and controlled in-
                                                            and foreign ministry groups, and private NGOs that
formation flow (which may hamper CMCoord). On
                                                            eventually joined the operation – was set up to help
the other hand, civil humanitarian agencies, be they
                                                            coordinate the civilian aspects of the relief effort
governmental offices or NGOs, are the “marathoners,”
                                                            with the military aspects, with CSF 536 remaining
slow to arrive in force, but able in time to bring to
                                                            in charge of overall day-to-day operations. By and
bear enormous depth of expertise, which they gen-
                                                            large, this CSF-CCC model and the CONOPS devel-
erally prefer to apply according to a long-term relief
                                                            oped around it worked well, although the set-up was
and recovery perspective. In so doing, moreover, they
                                                            also highly ad hoc and “learn as you go” by nature in
tend to prefer flat organizational structures, reach-
                                                            the absence of a commonly agreed-to template on
ing decisions by consensus, open (non-secure) lines
                                                            how best to organize and manage such a multifac-
of communication, and a neutral, mediation-style
                                                            eted, combined, and interagency enterprise. More-
approach to resolving conflicts.
                                                            over, since the operational conditions that shape a
    These differences in culture, while not necessari-
                                                            relief effort will vary from disaster to disaster, it re-
ly incompatible in a disaster relief situation, have of-

Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                   Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                       81
                                                                                     Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  mains to be seen – as the DAC-PAK experience noted          strict their role to providing infrastructure or logisti-
                  earlier illustrated – how widely applicable the CSF-        cal support and “leave the relief work [that is, getting
                  CCC format will be to other relief efforts in the future.   critical supplies and care to communities in need]
                  It does provide, nonetheless, at least one practical        to the professionals” (Schoff 2007). Early agreement
                  example of how civil and military responses can be          on a common assessment, the appropriate level of
                  effectively coordinated, and why such coordination          response, and the best way to implement that re-
                  should be encouraged, whatever the specific oper-           sponse, therefore, could go a long way toward mini-
                  ational conditions.                                         mizing tensions over lead and supporting roles (and
                      Whether or not a CSF-CCC model is followed, get-        transitions between these roles).
                  ting an accurate joint needs assessment up front that           Of course, once an operation is underway, mili-
                  both military and civilian responders can agree on          tary personnel, many of whom may have little (if any)
                  is also critical to boosting the level of CMCoord in a      training specifically geared to HA/DR operations, may
                  disaster relief and humanitarian assistance opera-          be inclined to fill what they see as leadership vacu-
                  tion. One of the benefits that would result would be        ums by integrating NGO resources and capabilities
                  a far greater capacity for both sides to coordinate         into a “more orderly” military effort. In that event,
                  more effectively in managing the classic pull-push          however, the seemingly mundane issues of military
                  dynamic of disaster relief, where nations in need and       contracting and cross-servicing, lines of command
                  first responders try to reach back to assisting nations     and communication, bureaucratic approvals, liabil-
                  and aid organizations to pull needed capabilities for-      ity, and rules governing classified information can
                  ward, and then, as the magnitude of the problem be-         frequently frustrate otherwise productive collabora-
                  comes better understood based on a more precise             tion. Additionally, CMCoord can be hindered as well
                  assessment of needs, those same assisting nations           by the fact that nations struck by a sudden disaster
                  and aid organizations begin to push essential sup-          often find it easier to coordinate with a single, con-
                  plies and capabilities forward as fast as possible in       solidated JTF-type military organization than with
                  the volume and format required. Getting a better            the numerous and diverse IGOs and NGOs, which
                  handle on this “demand pull-supply push” dynamic            may well total as many as two hundred or three hun-
                  through improved civil-military assessment tech-            dred separate agencies during the surge and relief
                  niques – including a coordinated re-assessment of           phases of a major disaster response. Governments
                  changing needs at different points during a crisis –        also tend to prefer the strict hierarchical structures
                  would be a major step forward, since short circuits         of military units, which usually guarantee that re-
                  in the process have led to an unnecessary duplica-          quests made to the commander will filter down to
                  tion of effort and a waste of scarce resources in many      all relevant personnel and be followed (Wiharta et
                  past HA/DR operations.                                      al. 2008). So, quite apart from better dialogue be-
                      Assessments along these lines, however, remain          tween responders, fixing the CMCoord problem may
                  elusive. Efforts to develop more precise assessment         also require better channels for joint military and
                  tools and procedures have increased in recent years         civilian responder communication with local gov-
                  within the humanitarian community, particularly             ernment authorities, possibly via a strategic plan-
                  with respect to improving information sharing be-           ning cell that would bring all three groups together
                  tween different UN agencies and other aid organiza-         over the course of an operation.
                  tions. Still lacking is a consistent and wider-ranging          Following on from this last point, improved civil-
                  attempt on the part of the humanitarian sector to           military communications across the board as early
                  involve military responders – and vice versa – more         on in an operation as possible – and preferably well
                  directly and regularly in such collaborative assess-        before through pre-disaster training – will be vital to
                  ments, so as to avoid capability gaps or duplication        promoting more effective HA/DR responses. In this
                  of deployed assets in a joint HA/DR effort. Moreover,       context, moreover, the civil humanitarian commu-
                  while non-military responders and NGOs recognize            nity has much that it can contribute to the improve-
                  the value of contributions made by military forces          ment of military operations that is often overlooked.
                  in foreign disaster relief operations, they still would     For example, even though many key logistics-relat-
                  generally prefer that the military units involved re-       ed assets, such as cargo aircraft, supply ships, and


                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
82
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                 the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

specialized mapping and satellite imaging technol-        flict, and they are sensitive to any potential dam-
ogies, are concentrated in the military, military per-    age to this metaphysical space that may be caused
sonnel may not be very familiar with the best use of      by being too closely associated with a national mili-
such assets in civil disaster situations (Center of Ex-   tary force. One need look no further than the events
cellence in Disaster Management and Humanitari-           in Georgia in August 2008 for a contemporary ex-
an Assistance 2005). Integrating more experienced         ample of the misgivings humanitarian workers may
civilian responders, such as OCHA representatives         express when military units assume, in their view,
from the UN and/or OFDA experts from USAID, into          too direct a role in a relief effort at a time when the
military disaster assessment and planning activi-         security situation in the assisted nation remains
ties from the start, therefore, would probably help       unstable. In this specific case, rather than simply
to ensure quicker dissemination of the most urgent        authorizing DoD and military support for a relief
information on humanitarian needs to all potential        effort in Georgia led by USAID and OFDA, President
responders, as well as a more considered response to      Bush placed DoD and U.S. military forces directly in
those specific needs. It could also help to ensure that   charge of the relief operation. As a result, a num-
military assets assigned to HA/DR missions are bet-       ber of relief agencies already operating in Georgia
ter prepared to operate in a foreign disaster setting     expressed opposition to this decision, arguing that
where USG, IGO, and NGO civilians all play a leading      it would render their own efforts to help the Geor-
(if not the lead) role.                                   gian people less effective (and certainly more sus-
    That said, even with greater efforts to improve       pect in the eyes of Russian forces), as they would
communications and to prepare the military for            now be seen as part and parcel of an American mil-
operating more effectively in a disaster relief envi-     itary operation rather than as a non-partisan relief
ronment, concerns within the humanitarian com-            program (Wood 2008).
munity over a higher military profile in future relief         Even when the overall relief effort remains civil-
efforts will not be resolved over night. Indeed, as       ian-led, some NGOs, especially those with a long-
military forces become more comfortable in their          standing presence in a particular country, may
disaster relief role and are called upon more fre-        continue to fear that close cooperation with the mil-
quently to provide such assistance, many in the civil     itary could undercut their neutrality and increase
humanitarian relief community have become pro-            to an unacceptable level the risks they will inevita-
portionately more worried that the delivery of re-        bly face if conditions become unstable. Others may
lief supplies and emergency assistance will, in fact,     try to avoid military contact altogether, especially
become “overly militarized.” This, they fear, could       if it appears that their donor base and/or the local
then blur the traditional distinction that has been       authorities oppose the use of armed forces to pro-
maintained between the military and non-military          vide humanitarian relief. Further on this last point,
domains of emergency response, leading to a con-          officials in an assisted nation may complicate ef-
traction in what relief workers refer to as “human-       fective CMCoord by raising suspicions, however un-
itarian space.” When this happens, they go on to          founded, that military units engaged in relief work
argue, the neutrality of relief workers in the field      are actually conducting intelligence operations un-
may be compromised, and their physical security           der a humanitarian mantle. Fears along these lines
more seriously threatened.                                likely contributed to the reluctance of the junta in
    The concept of humanitarian space, of course,         Myanmar to endorse a full-fledged civil-military re-
does not refer to a physical space within which NGOs      lief after cyclone Nargis in May 2008. The potential
and UN agencies operate, but rather to the freedom        for host nation interference along these lines exists
they generally enjoy to deliver assistance without        as well even in planned humanitarian assistance ef-
interference and independently from national po-          forts approved in advance by the government of the
litical or strategic interests, adhering throughout to    assisted country. For example, even though he had
the three core humanitarian action principles of hu-      signed off on the visits, Nicaraguan President Dan-
manity, neutrality, and impartiality (UN General As-      iel Ortega called into question the “good deeds” di-
sembly 1991). Aid agencies and workers rely on this       mension of the USS Kearsarge’s humanitarian port
humanitarian space for their safety in areas of con-      visits to his country in August 2008 by suggesting


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                              Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                               83
                                                                                Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                     that personnel aboard the ship were probably en-           equipment, dug deep holes, and pushed all the de-
                                     gaged in espionage (Axe 2008).6                            bris into large pits. The job was done much faster, of
                                         According to CMCoord analysts, another factor          course, but it proved to be more expensive ( factor-
                                     that sometimes dampens the enthusiasm of the hu-           ing in the cost to mobilize the men and equipment),
                                     manitarian community for HA/DR efforts led large-          and it may well have undermined the village’s abil-
6           Most likely, Ortega was miffed that the ly by U.S. military forces is the rath-     ity (and desire) to mobilize in support of an overall
    Kearsarge deployment, like the USNS Comfort’s er high-intensity approach that it            recovery effort.
tour of Caribbean, Central, and South American
   countries in 2007, was generating considerable
                                                     believes the United States too often           In a similar example from the 2005 Pakistan
      good press for the U.S. military, and creating adopts when it gets involved in a com-     earthquake response, U.S. forces came under criti-
  much goodwill among the communities served plex civil support operation, including            cism from a number of NGOs for taking on projects,
    by medical teams on board the ship. Political-
  ly, it would have been unwise for him to oppose
                                                     the American preference to retain di-      such as the design and construction of local school
 such a visit, but he also probably wished to take rect command over all of its military        buildings, without consulting local relief workers,
        some of the glow off the project (Axe 2008). assets and to avoid relinquishing na-      thereby ignoring NGO efforts already underway to
                                                     tional control to any international or-    engage the local community in projects that would
                                     ganization or authority (Landon and Hayes). Such           help to build local capacity over the longer haul and
                                     an approach contrasts sharply with that proposed           provide cash-for-work opportunities (Schoff 2007).
                                     by the UN’s Oslo Guidelines and related documents,         Situations like this, whether they occur during a di-
                                     which argue that civil humanitarian agencies ought         saster relief operation or as part of a planned human-
                                     to retain the formal lead in disaster relief operations,   itarian mission undertaken by a COCOM, do little to
                                     at both the operational and policy levels, particularly    alter the view held by many NGO and other non-mil-
                                     when the disaster zone is also experiencing an out-        itary aid providers that their military counterparts
                                     break or threat of armed conflict (UNOCHA 2004).           often act in an arrogant manner, uninformed about
                                     Ongoing differences, therefore, in the way that U.S.       and insensitive to the socio-cultural dynamics of the
                                     military commanders, on the one hand, and UN or            communities they are trying to assist. In this sense,
                                     NGO officials, on the other, believe a foreign disaster    greater priority should be assigned in the future to
                                     relief effort ought to be led and managed could make       embedding foreign-area specialists and linguists
                                     it virtually impossible for both communities to agree      into the response teams organized by the military,
                                     on a standard approach to CMCoord that could be            including both military and non-military personnel
                                     followed in almost all joint relief operations.            with experience in humanitarian assistance. This
                                         Within the humanitarian community, however,            should include, experts on both sides of the civil-
                                     resistance to military involvement in disaster relief      military divide suggest, more serious efforts among
                                     activities is not so much about whether or not the         the American military services to develop a larger
                                     military should participate but rather about how           cadre of soldiers and sailors trained both in foreign
                                     and when it should do so. More specifically, just          language and foreign area studies and in HA/DR and
                                     because the military can do something, it is often         wider-ranging stability operations. Until that time,
                                     argued by civil relief workers, doesn’t mean that it       finding the right balance between and among mil-
                                     should. One example often noted in the humanitari-         itary and non-military contributions to relief op-
                                     an community relates to a village cleanup operation        erations – and maintaining proper CMCoord – will
                                     in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami. During the ear-       remain a very tricky business, especially in the case
                                     ly reconstruction phase of the relief effort, a group      of post-disaster reconstruction initiatives and good-
                                     of NGOs was assisting local villagers with the labor-      will missions aimed at the hearts and minds of com-
                                     intensive process of separating wreckage piece by          munities where the image of the United States (and
                                     piece, creating piles of different materials that could    the West, more generally) may be poor.
                                     be reused, recycled, burned, or discarded. The op-             The vast pool of unique capabilities and resourc-
                                     eration involved a large and diverse segment of the        es that the private sector can bring to foreign disas-
                                     village population, creating a communal sense of re-       ter relief operations presents yet another coordina-
                                     building, and each worker earned a small wage that         tion challenge to all participants, but a challenge
                                     contributed wealth to his or her family. Within a few      that could be converted, if handled properly, into
                                     days, however, a military detail came in with heavy        increased opportunities for success. In a number of


                                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix
                                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                84
                                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

operational sectors, for example, private companies          cation restrictions, limited distribution rules, and
can offer civilian emergency responders support ca-          software/hardware incompatibilities (See http://
pabilities similar to those provided by the military,        www.strongangel3.net/). Many of the recommen-
including in the areas of satellite communication            dations proposed involve relatively simple changes
links, airlift, warehousing, and ground transporta-          in communications technologies and use proto-
tion, as discussed in chapter 3. Moreover, business-         cols that exploit non-military, commercially avail-
es are relatively unburdened by chain-of-command,            able systems to create information networks that
legal red tape, and other bureaucratic hurdles that          both military teams and their civilian partners in an
can at times constrain effective military engagement         HA/DR operation could use, and that would be far
with civil authorities and non-military organizations.       better suited as well to the austere field conditions
Looking ahead, then, one of the more promising lines         common in foreign disaster operational environ-
of investigation for HA/DR planners, military and ci-        ments. Among other measures, the recommenda-
vilian alike, is to explore more fully how and under         tions include providing forward military elements
what circumstances private sector contributions can          with portable commercial satellite communications
supplement and stand in place of military support.           equipment and adequate bandwidth access to en-
At the same time, from a U.S. national perspective,          sure reliable communications with all responders,
USAID/OFDA and DoD officials need to put in place            using wireless networking technologies (such as Wi-
better mechanisms for working together with the              Max/Wi-Fi) to provide blanket internet coverage
corporate sector to identify specific areas of support       throughout a theater of operations that all parties
(such as logistics, transportation, communications,          could tap into, and distributing internationally com-
engineering, and medical services) where private-            patible GSM cell phones to military and civil person-
public collaboration can and should be further de-           nel (including host- and assisting-nation personnel)
veloped with an eye toward achieving greater CMCo-           with features that would allow economical bidirec-
ord (and better overall results) in the field.               tional (both local and international) calls (Strong
    Fortunately, some steps in this direction have           Angel Team 2006.)
been taken and produced positive, if still some-                 In addition to the Strong Angel initiatives, a num-
what limited, results. In the United States, the Strong      ber of other private sector efforts have sprung up in
Angel series of disaster management exercises and            recent years with the twin goals of 1) creating infor-
demonstrations, for example, has helped to identify          mation portals and data management systems to
and test new and emerging technologies developed             support CMCoord in HA/DR operations and 2) or-
in the private sector, by both nonprofit and com-            ganizing business community assets and expertise
mercial enterprises, that can help to facilitate in-         to provide targeted assistance to both civilian and
formation sharing and communications across the              military disaster response groups. This would in-
civil-military divide in crisis situations. This is a pri-   clude, as discussed in some detail in chapter 3, the
vate, unofficial activity that nonetheless includes the      work of the World Economic Forum and its Disas-
participation of military specialists, DoD civilian per-     ter Resource Network, the Partnership for Disaster
sonnel, first responders, corporate leaders, and NGO         Response of the Business Roundtable, and the Busi-
representatives. The most recent event, Strong Angel         ness Civic Leadership Center at the U.S. Chamber of
III, was held in San Diego in August 2006 and sim-           Commerce. Just as important as these and similar
ulated a worldwide viral pandemic that stretched             efforts to make sure that the best technologies and
emergency response efforts toward the breaking               business practices are available to disaster respond-
point, just as a terrorist network launched a wave           ers, however, are the steps now being taken by the
of cyber-attacks that disabled communications                UN, the U.S. State Department, DoD, the military
throughout the United States.                                commands, and even NGOs to bring military and
    Strong Angel III highlighted in particular a num-        non-military disaster relief practitioners together
ber of technical and procedural solutions to the             for face-to-face information exchanges, joint train-
problems forward military commanders often have              ing, and tabletop exercises. For in the end, it is re-
in getting crucial data to host nation officials and         lationships – not technologies or software – that
to non-military relief providers because of classifi-        may play the most critical role in maintaining bet-


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                 Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                  85
                                                                                   Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  ter coordination and communication between the           powerful impact HA/DR assistance can have on the
                  civil and military communities tasked with HA/DR         public attitudes of assisted communities and na-
                  responsibilities. Only by knowing “who’s who” and        tions, it is essential to frame a positive and accu-
                  “who does what” in both communities – and what           rate message about the operation and make sure it
                  their specific relevance is to the mission at hand –     is explained to and understood by various targeted
                  can future teams deployed in response to a foreign       audiences. Ignoring this task, moreover, would pro-
                  disaster have the best chance of avoiding the CM-        vide greater opportunities to those who might be
                  Coord problems that have complicated past opera-         opposed to such efforts – and, more specifically, to
                  tions, including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and       the accumulation of goodwill by the United States
                  2005 Pakistan earthquake responses.                      and its allies/partner states that their contributions
                      In many ways, the most useful type of activity       may generate – to shape the story that surrounds
                  to develop better relationships would be a regular       the operation. An active public outreach program is
                  series of multilateral and multinational disaster        important as well to clear away the confusion and
                  management exercises with both planning and op-          uncertainty that often arises in a disaster response
                  erational components that would bring all the likely     situation about the level of damage, the status of
                  participants together, both military and civilian, on    the relief effort, and developments to come. It also
                  an annual or biannual basis. This has, in fact, been     may be needed to dispel wild rumors that sometimes
                  the intent behind PACOM’s annual Cobra Gold exer-        are passed along when military units are seen un-
                  cise (discussed further under “COCOM Platforms and       dertaking a task that seems odd to the local popu-
                  Programs to Promote Collaboration,” below), which        lation, as happened when well-digging teams from
                  is held each year in and around Thailand and was         CENTCOM’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Af-
                  credited with helping to lay the operational ground-     rica (CJTF-HOA) were thought to be building mis-
                  work for the OUA tsunami response in 2004. Going         sile silos. So, too, when responding to rumors and,
                  forward, the objective of future events in the same      more importantly, providing up-to-date reports to
                  vein must be to rehearse HA/DR planning and oper-        the public on a relief effort that is underway, the best
                  ations as often and realistically as possible, and to    results, from a credibility perspective, are likely to
                  include as many first responders and relief agencies     be achieved when the information streams from civ-
                  as possible. For military participants, a key priority   il and military responders are carefully coordinated
                  should be to become more fully familiar with, and        and as fully in synch as possible.
                  develop closer ties to, USAID/OFDA, UN, IGO, and NGO         To the extent that HA/DR operations provide le-
                  personnel, as they are the people to whom the mil-       gitimate vehicles for U.S. public diplomacy cam-
                  itary will hand the long-term recovery and recon-        paigns (that is, efforts to influence foreign attitudes
                  struction roles. In the words of one U.S. expert with    about America as whole), the public affairs strategies
                  experience in both the military and civil response       and statements of the State Department, USAID, and
                  worlds, these people represent, in no small measure,     DoD must clearly be integrated and synchronized.
                  the “the military’s ticket home.” (Baltazar 2006). For   Special care must be taken as well to transmit the
                  civilian responders, a primary goal should be to learn   common message or messages without distortion
                  as much as they possibly can about how the military      down the chain of command to the operators in the
                  does adaptive planning, given that very few non-mil-     field – principally, local USAID and OFDA operatives
                  itary disaster relief planners are as skilled as their   on the civilian side, and COCOM commanders and
                  military counterparts are in reacting to unanticipat-    forward-deployed units on the military side. If CM-
                  ed events or in adjusting to (and creating) alterna-     Coord like this at the national level can be expand-
                  tive courses of action. But again, the main point for    ed to include public affairs coordination with the
                  all parties would be to rehearse as often, as realis-    UN, OCHA, and other appropriate organizations at
                  tically, and as inclusively as possible.                 the international level, so much the better. The key,
                      Finally, CMCoord could benefit enormously from       however, is to have a properly prepared message or
                  closer attention by civil and military responders        set of messages to deliver.
                  alike to the public affairs and strategic communi-
                  cations dimension of a joint operation. Given the


                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
86
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                                          ter event (as it may take time for U.S. and allied first
COCOM Platforms and Programs to                           responders to reach these rather distant lands in
Promote Collaboration                                     force), and then to cooperate on a smoother interop-
                                                          erable basis with external assistance efforts once
The regional COCOMs provide some of the most use-
                                                          foreign military assets, international agencies, and
ful collaborative platforms and programs for help-
                                                          NGOs arrive on the scene (see http://www.combine-
ing civilian and military responders get to know
                                                          dendeavor.net and Kuecra 2006).
each other better, thereby creating the personal
                                                              Finally, NORTHCOM, which includes Canada, Mex-
relationships and real-world experiences that will
                                                          ico, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as well
minimize tensions and misunderstandings across
                                                          as the continental United States (CONUS), in its AOR,
the civil-military divide. An in-depth review of all
                                                          has played an active role in the promotion of disaster
COCOM efforts that might apply, of course, is beyond
                                                          relief preparedness on a North American-wide scale,
the scope of this study, and, in any event, unneces-
                                                          and it is now turning its attention to closer coopera-
sary to the main point being made – namely, that
                                                          tion with SOUTHCOM on a similar initiative for the Ca-
the regional COCOMs provide some of the best lab-
                                                          ribbean region. As the COCOM responsible for provid-
oratories for developing HA/DR skills and for refin-
                                                          ing defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) in the
ing them through real-world practice. This section
                                                          event of a CONUS-based disaster, NORTHCOM has also
of the chapter, therefore, focuses on the activities of
                                                          been quite forward-leaning in developing innovative
three COCOMs – namely, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AF-
                                                          mechanisms – such as the PSMAs described earlier
RICOM – that have emerged as particularly skilled
                                                          in this chapter – for improving civil-military coordi-
practitioners in the realm of HA/DR planning and
                                                          nation well before a disaster ever strikes. NORTHCOM
operations.
                                                          has taken a lead as well in encouraging public-pri-
    Of course, while PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AFRI-
                                                          vate sector collaboration in disaster relief manage-
COM stand out in this area (as discussed further be-
                                                          ment, and it was one of the first COCOMs to recognize
low), other commands are also active in the HA/DR
                                                          the need for a specific directorate at the command
field, and are developing useful platforms and pro-
                                                          level to help promote a whole-of-government, inter-
cedures to facilitate relief operations. For example,
                                                          agency approach to disaster relief planning, as well
EUCOM has sponsored fourteen annual Combined
                                                          as homeland defense writ large.
Endeavor exercises that have brought together NATO
                                                              For PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and AFRICOM in partic-
and Partnership for Peace members to test com-
                                                          ular, however, the HA/DR mission remains central,
munications and information systems interoper-
                                                          and each has undertaken or is considering sever-
ability in the context of HA/DR and peacekeeping
                                                          al especially useful and promising activities. These
operations. It has also helped to sponsor the an-
                                                          three are excellent examples of what some in DoD
nual Southeast European Disaster Relief Prepared-
                                                          call “engagement commands,” meaning that their
ness Conference organized by the George C. Marshall
                                                          focus is primarily on peacetime engagement with
Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany.
                                                          countries in their areas of responsibility (or AORs)
On a more operational note, as of January 2008, EU-
                                                          rather than on active combat operations. Such en-
COM is hosting four-month rotational deployments
                                                          gagement, moreover, is based principally on their
of C-17 Globemaster III cargo planes at Ramstein Air
                                                          theater security cooperation programs, and these,
Base in Germany as a way to expedite rapid response
                                                          in turn, continue to accord HA/DR operations (and
missions – including HA/DR-related airlift – within
                                                          preparations to undertake them) top priority. What
and beyond EUCOM’s AOR. For its part, CENTCOM es-
                                                          follows is a selective survey of plans and undertak-
tablished a regional disaster management center of
                                                          ings being pursued by these three commands.
excellence for the Horn of Africa in Nairobi in 2006,
and it has plans for similar centers in Kazakhstan to
                                                          U.S. Pacific Command
cover Central and South Asia and in Jordan to cov-
                                                          PACOM’s AOR, which covers the largest geograph-
er the Middle East/Arab Gulf region. The principal
                                                          ic area of all COCOM AORs, remains especially sus-
thrust of the centers will be to improve the ability
                                                          ceptible to a range of devastating natural disasters.
of countries involved to respond more effectively on
                                                          Typhoons, earthquakes, and tsunamis, which in
their own during the initial phase of a local disas-

Finding the Right Mix
                                                                               Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                87
                                                                                 Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  turn can cause additional crises such as mudslides            PACOM’s ability to respond promptly to regional
                  or flooding, have greatly affected the region in re-      disasters such as Fengshen, and to work effectively
                  cent years, causing numerous deaths, injuries, and        with civil and military authorities in countries that
                  displaced persons, as well as substantial damage          it assists, owes much to the emphasis successive PA-
                  to local infrastructure. As a result, PACOM has in-       COM commanders have placed on advance planning
                  creasingly emphasized HA/DR missions and capaci-          for such events. As a result, PACOM has emerged over
                  ty building in its joint exercises with partner nations   the years as a pioneer in disaster preparedness pro-
                  and in the military training of its component com-        grams, developing a number of multilateral initia-
                  mands. More specifically, through multilateral ini-       tives and cooperative mechanisms to help facilitate
                  tiatives, joint and combined exercises, and direct        rapid and well-coordinated disaster relief respons-
                  responses to regional disasters, PACOM builds part-       es. Among the more successful efforts in this regard
                  ner-nation capabilities for responding to disasters,      is the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
                  improves U.S. HA/DR interoperability with these na-       (MPAT), a grouping of experts from some thirty-three
                  tions, and provides its military personnel with in-       Asia-Pacific countries who meet regularly to discuss
                  valuable operational experience in the HA/DR realm.       and test ways to improve crisis response capabilities
                  At the same time, by providing both emergency and         and interoperability. In existence since 1999, MPAT
                  longer-term assistance to communities in need, PA-        conducts exercises, workshops, and seminars that
                  COM efforts in that regard help to promote goodwill       attract senior personnel from a number of UN, IGO,
                  toward the United States within its AOR.                  regional, and NGO agencies, such as the World Health
                      In June 2008, for example, PACOM provided a wide      Organization, Doctors Without Borders, the Inter-
                  range of assistance to the Republic of the Philippines    national Committee of the Red Cross, and OCHA, as
                  as it struggled to recover from the effects typhoon       well as representatives from MPAT member states.
                  Fengshen (Frank). Fengshen hit the Philippines on         The MPAT program is staffed by a core group of ex-
                  June 20, leaving torrential rain, flooding, and mud-      perienced military and non-military personnel, and
                  slides in its wake. The typhoon affected thousands        in the event of a major relief effort PACOM can draw
                  of people, leaving hundreds dead and injured. PA-         on the MPAT framework to rapidly augment a mul-
                  COM responded to a request from the Filipino gov-         tinational force headquarters with the requisite ex-
                  ernment for urgent help by sending the USS Ronald         pertise in communications, intelligence, medicine,
                  Reagan Carrier Strike Group (CSG), which arrived          engineering, and logistics.
                  in the Sulu Sea on June 25, 2008. The CSG support-            The MPAT team, in fact, provided critical oper-
                  ed national and provincial Filipino authorities, the      ational elements to OUA in response to the Indian
                  Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Di-         Ocean tsunami, and it is poised to do the same for
                  saster Coordinating Council, and the Philippine Na-       future large-scale relief efforts in the Asia-Pacific re-
                  tional Red Cross, by conducting search and rescue         gion. Additionally, all non-U.S. military liaison offi-
                  missions and a variety of disaster recovery opera-        cers assigned to OUA’s CSF 536 force in Utapao, and
                  tions, all of which were coordinated closely with lo-     most of the non-military representatives housed in
                  cal USAID representatives (Embassy of the United          the CCC, were MPAT-trained. The personal relation-
                  States in Manila 2008). From the USS Ronald Reagan,       ships and habits of cooperation developed during
                  Carrier Air Wing 14 provided relief workers with crit-    MPAT training expedited the stand-up of both head-
                  ical heavy lift capability, including C-2A Greyhound      quarters, and assured a higher degree of military-to-
                  cargo aircraft, while Helicopter Anti-Submarine           military and civil-military cooperation than would
                  Squadron 4 supplied HH-60H and SH-60F Seahawk             otherwise have been the case. MPAT seeks to con-
                  helicopters to reach less accessible areas. Also fly-     tinue and to improve the facilitation of cooperation
                  ing humanitarian missions were Seahawk helicop-           through MPAT’s annual scenario-driven exercises,
                  ters dispatched from the USS Chancellorsville, USS        where attendees gather to practice and refine a se-
                  Howard, USS Thach, and USS Gridley. Altogether, air-      ries of common operating procedures for multilat-
                  craft and helicopters from the CSG flew 332 sorties       eral operations, thereby gaining valuable training
                  and delivered over five hundred thousand pounds           experience and taking major steps toward broader
                  of supplies (Flanders 208).                               multinational interoperability. Indeed, the overall


                                                                                                                 Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
88
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

success of the CSF-CCC structure can be traced in         files and after-action reports on all major disaster
large part to the lessons learned and relationships       response efforts in the region, and it appears to be
forged in Cobra Gold, an annual, multilateral civ-        evolving toward becoming a one-stop repository for
il-military MPAT exercise that focuses on humani-         Asia-Pacific disaster management case studies. As
tarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping.     such, APAN stands out as a potentially invaluable
Begun in 1982 as a bilateral exchange between the         tool for sharing key lessons observed and/or learned
Royal Thai Armed Forces and the U.S. military, Co-        with regional military and non-military registered
bra Gold now draws together more than a dozen             users (see www2.apan-info.net/apan).7
countries for an annual series of command post ex-            The only resource that could compete with APAN
ercises, field training, and civic action projects (Co-   to become the repository of choice within PACOM’s
bra Gold 2008).                                           AOR on disaster relief matters is the website main-
    MPAT planners also developed and continue to          tained by PACOM’s Center of Excellence (COE) in
update a document entitled the Multinational Force        Disaster Management and Humanitar- 7 Additional disaster response information-
Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP) in order          ian Assistance, commonly referred to sharing networks that may also prove useful
                                                                                                       in the future include, among others, the UN’s
to help guide future combined operations other            as simply the COE. As an organization, OCHA-managed Relief Web, the web of the UN
than war, including HA/DR contingencies, within           the COE focuses a bit more specifically Inter-Agency Secretariat of the Internation-
the Asia-Pacific region. The document, which tar-         than APAN does on civil-military coor- al Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR),
gets commanders and staffs who plan and execute                                                                        Disaster Information Network
                                                          dination and the promotion of greater the AustralianJapan-based International Re-
                                                                                                       (AusDIN), the
MNF missions within UN, coalition, and/or smaller         awareness among military, civil gov- covery Platform (IRP), and the Thailand-based
combined force frameworks, is intentionally broad         ernmental, IO, IGO, and NGO disaster Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC).
in nature to allow for flexibility in application. As     responders regarding their respective roles and ca-
such, the MNF SOP serves as a guide for the establish-    pabilities. Toward that end, it publishes a profession-
ment of a generic combined joint task force (CJTF),       al journal called Liaison dedicated to the analysis of
integrating doctrine, processes, lessons learned, and     current developments in the HA/DR world that may
other inputs from nations participating in the MPAT       help to facilitate effective civil-military collabora-
program. In short, the MNF SOP aims to reduce the         tion in support of humanitarian relief. The COE also
ad hoc nature of multinational crisis action planning     sponsors independent research on CMCoord-relat-
and to increase the speed of response, while boosting     ed matters, including with respect to peacekeeping,
as well interoperability, unity of effort, and mission    consequence management (in response to nuclear,
effectiveness. It is also worth noting that the docu-     biological, or chemical events), and counter-terror-
ment is not a binding international agreement be-         ism, as well as disaster relief. It is the COE’s website,
tween the participating nations, but merely a set of      however, that stands out as the most useful resource
standing procedures and guidelines.                       for educating the relief community as a whole and
    The Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) represents       keeping it up to date regarding recent policy re-
another PACOM-sponsored initiative that proved            forms, relevant experiences in the field, and prom-
beneficial during the 2004 tsunami relief effort. As      ising technology trends. Like the APAN website, the
noted briefly in chapter 3, APAN is an interactive        COE site posts detailed case histories of recent relief
website allowing registered subscribers to share in-      efforts in the region, but it also posts daily reports
formation relevant to the planning and execution of       on current and developing disasters and the various
multilateral operations. During OUA, APAN main-           national and international responses they have trig-
tained a world-class site with the most up-to-date        gered. Its reports on the Myanmar and Sichuan relief
and comprehensive information available on an un-         efforts in 2008, for example, were among the most
classified basis on all aspects of the operation. As a    comprehensive available on an open-source basis.
result, it became a primary source for the many reg-          In addition to the COE, two other Hawaii-based
istered NGOs and business groups involved in the re-      institutions have emerged as increasingly valuable
lief effort, and it has since triggered the creation of   platforms that PACOM can (and does) draw on to
a number of other internet-based information por-         become better prepared for HA/DR missions and to
tals and technical resource centers (Dorsett 2005,        promote preparedness among potential Asia-Pacif-
15). APAN has also established detailed electronic        ic partners. The first is the Asia-Pacific Center for


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                  89
                                                                                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  Security Studies (APCSS), a DoD-funded academic            operations in PACOM’s AOR, providing a common pic-
                  institute based in Honolulu that sponsors a range          ture of disaster response needs and requirements
                  of security studies-oriented training programs and         that can be viewed (and discussed online) by all us-
                  workshops for senior military and civilian officials       ers, including NGOs, businesses, and others not tra-
                  from the United States and Asia-Pacific nations.           ditionally seen as working with or within military
                  The focus is on building relationships among future        commands and structures. Not surprisingly, a sim-
                  leaders and decision-makers, and pursuing this goal        ilar model is envisioned for the George C. Marshall
                  with an eye on the rising importance of multilateral       Center for Security Studies in Europe as a way to
                  SSTR missions, including international HA/DR op-           promote HA/DR cooperation within (and around)
                  erations, is seen by the APCSS as a top priority. The      EUCOM’s AOR (King 2007, USPACOM 2007).
                  second is the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), which             In addition to collaborative mechanisms dis-
                  is managed by the University of Hawaii and focuses         cussed above, PACOM also relies on regular joint
                  more on the science and technology aspects of di-          exercises and field training activities with key Asia-
                  saster preparedness, providing hazard risk and vul-        Pacific partner countries to boost regional expertise
                  nerability assessments, hazard mitigation planning,        and interoperability in the HA/DR realm. As noted
                  geospatial data and information sharing, and inter-        in earlier chapters, PACOM, like other regional CO-
                  net-based communications technology to clients at          COMs, makes a special effort to build into its TSC
                  the state, national, regional, and international levels.   program each year a number of bilateral and mul-
                  Both groups address more fully a community of in-          tilateral exercises that center on honing U.S. and
                  terest and influence – the broader national security       allied skills in the conduct of disaster relief and var-
                  community in the case of APCSS, and the more tech-         ious humanitarian assistance operations. This in-
                  nology-minded element within the disaster manage-          cludes practice in providing emergency relief on a
                  ment community for the PDC – that the COE is less          collaborative basis in the face of a sudden onset nat-
                  able to reach with its NGO and civil-military coor-        ural disaster (such as an earthquake or typhoon), as
                  dination focus.                                            well as more binational and multinational civic ac-
                      Further on this last point, it is worth noting as      tion programs scheduled well in advance that in-
                  well that DoD has sought in recent years to maxi-          volve road construction, the building of schools and
                  mize the separate contributions of all three orga-         clinics, and training local medics, among other ca-
                  nizations, as well as those of other HA/DR-relevant        pacity-building initiatives. Taken together, such ex-
                  groups with a link to PACOM (e.g., MPAT, APAN, and         ercises help to establish personal relationships and
                  the Maui High Performance Computing Center, or             habits of cooperation that will be essential to actu-
                  MHPCC), by combining them into an integrated, in-          al relief efforts in the future, while creating a knowl-
                  ternet-based “network of networks.” One result of          edge base among likely responders on appropriate
                  this effort was the creation of the Asia-Pacific Collab-   procedures to follow that would apply to a range of
                  orative Security Consortium (APCSC), which hosts           contingencies. The importance of the Cobra Gold
                  an online information portal that gives registered         series in building the personal ties and testing the
                  users from the governmental, NGO, and academic             operational procedures that underwrote the OUA ef-
                  communities of Asia-Pacific countries more imme-           fort in 2004-05 is, as noted earlier, but one clear ex-
                  diate access to the analyses generated and tools de-       ample (Elleman 2006, 28).
                  veloped by consortium members, including those                 At times, moreover, joint exercises can transform
                  listed above. The data provided, of course, ranges         themselves into actual HA/DR operations. As not-
                  across a spectrum of critical security issues, but the     ed in chapter 3, in February 2006 the annual U.S.-
                  importance and challenge of preparing for and, if re-      Philippine Balikatan exercise – which was designed
                  quired, conducting timely and effective disaster re-       specifically as a humanitarian assistance training
                  lief is one of the key issues addressed at the specific    program – shifted directly into a real-life relief effort
                  request of DoD. In near future, the APCSC, often re-       as a devastating series of mudslides wrought havoc
                  ferred to as the “Hawaii model” for data fusion and        on the island of Leyte just as U.S and Filipino forces
                  information sharing, is likely to become a one-stop        were assembling to begin the exercise (GlobalSecuri-
                  source for advice and guidance on HA/DR plans and          ty.org). Within hours of arriving in Subic Bay on Feb-


                                                                                                                  Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
90
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

ruary 17, forward-deployed U.S. Marine forces and         Zealand, and the Repub- Pacific Partnership
amphibious ships assigned to Balikatan 2006 were          lic of Korea. This time,
dispatched to Leyte to provide immediate assistance       the Mercy made sched-
(water, food, shelter, medical supplies, and search       uled stops in the Phil-
and rescue teams) to the area’s mudslide victims.         ippines, Vietnam, the                  Vietnam          Phillipines    Micronesia
Had it not been for the Balikatan deployments and         Federated States of Mi-
the habits of U.S.-Filipino cooperation established       cronesia, Timor-Leste,
                                                                                                                          Papua New Guinea
through previous exercises in the series, the loss-       and Papua New Guinea
es sustained would surely have been worse and the         in support of numerous
relief as a whole much slower to materialize. Sim-        pre-planned medical
                                                                                                      Timor Leste
ilarly, Cobra Gold 2008, also designed primarily as       and engineering proj-
a HA/DR-type exercise, was almost perfectly timed         ects (Horvath 2008), but
and structured to help support initial U.S. and re-       it was ready and able as
                                                                                        2007        USS Peleliu
gional efforts to respond to the damage caused by         well – as it was on previ-
                                                                                        2008        USNS Mercy
cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. As it happened, resis-         ous tours – to meet un-
tance by the ruling junta in Myanmar to outside as-       expected calls for emer-
sistance slowed the provision of foreign emergency        gency aid, as it did after typhoon Fengshen hit the
relief and minimized its overall scale, but the fact      Philippines (Kruzel 2008).
that HA/DR-related military forces were already in
the area as part of the Cobra Gold exercise certain-      U.S. Southern Command
ly helped to speed the supply of aid that was even-       Just as PACOM does, Southern Com- 8 SOUTHCOM has stopped using the tradi-
tually approved.                                          mand (SOUTHCOM) places consider- tional COCOM term “area of responsibility” (or
                                                                                                      “AOR”) and replaced it with the term “area of
    Finally, PACOM’s ongoing series of medical ship       able emphasis on the conduct of HA/ focus” (“AOF”). Apparently, “AOR” was viewed
deployments deserve brief mention. These deploy-          DR operations within its sprawling area rather unfavorably by many regional partner
ments are now organized as part of the command’s          of focus (AOF)8, which is as prone to a countries, as it implied (in their eyes) an un-
new Pacific Partnership initiative and constitute a       variety of natural disasters as the Asia- welcome degree of U.S. military responsibili-
                                                                                                      ty and control in the region as a whole. “AOF”
core element of its theater security cooperation, or      Pacific region is. In 2007, for example, is seen as a more appropriate term at a time
TSC, program. They have already been discussed at         SOUTHCOM launched no fewer than sev- when SOUTHCOM’s primary focus is on build-
length in chapters 2 and 3, with special attention giv-   en substantial disaster relief efforts in ing cooperative partnerships with Caribbe-
                                                                                                      an, Central, and South American states.
en to their utility in building local capacity to man-    response to February floods in Bolivia,
age future disasters while creating substantial good-     an August earthquake in Peru, the impact of hurri-
will toward the United States and its military forces.    cane Felix in Nicaragua in September, and the dam-
Suffice it to say here that the latest deployment, cen-   age inflicted by tropical storm Noel in the Dominican
tered around a five-month tour of the Western Pa-         Republic in November. Specific operations covered
cific and Southeast Asia by the USNS Mercy hospital       the gamut from a single (though still vital) C-130 Her-
ship, was a perfect example of the collaborative ca-      cules cargo flight to Bolivia carrying USAID relief sup-
pacity-building missions now favored by the region-       plies to flood-damaged communities to multi-unit
al COCOMs and the U.S. Navy, involving a diverse ar-      joint force operations conducted over several days
ray of military, civil, NGO, and allied/partner nation    in support of a much larger-scale effort, such as the
experts performing a variety of medical, veterinary,      response to Felix. Moreover, given the frequency of
engineering, and broader humanitarian assistance          such disasters and the disruption they often cause
tasks. In addition to navy, air force, and army per-      to local infrastructure, many of SOUTHCOM’s lon-
sonnel, this particular crew included, for example,       ger-term capacity-building projects in the AOF are
representatives from the U.S. Public Health Service,      focused on disaster risk reduction and the promo-
nonprofit and NGO groups like the San Diego-based         tion of disaster prevention measures. Toward that
International Relief Team and the Pre-Dental Society      specific end, in 2007 SOUTHCOM initiated as many as
of University of California at San Diego, and a host      one hundred separate projects in twenty-five coun-
of countries from the greater Asia-Pacific region, in-    tries (USSOUTHCOM 2008a).
cluding Australia, Canada, Chile, India, Japan, New


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                   91
                                                                                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                      As for the scope of a larger-scale SOUTHCOM-          gency operations centers, relief supply warehouses,
                  led disaster response, the command’s efforts in the       and potable water production facilities. Once a di-
                  wake of hurricane Felix provide, as implied above, a      saster strikes, HAP funds may also be used to pro-
                  useful illustration. After Felix hit Nicaragua’s north-   cure and/or transport critical equipment that may
                  east coast on September 4, 2007, a humanitarian as-       be in short supply, such as the heavy engineering
                  sessment team from SOUTHCOM’s JTF-Bravo – about           and excavation equipment it provided to help Nica-
                  which more is said later – arrived on September 5         raguan communities dig out from the massive mud-
                  with two CH-47 Chinook helicopters that flew fif-         slide triggered by hurricane Stan in October 2005.
                  teen sorties, airlifted 126,000 pounds of relief sup-     The HAP program has been extremely useful as well
                  plies, and evacuated twenty-four people. The next         in promoting regional efforts to strengthen cooper-
                  day the amphibious ship USS Wasp arrived with sev-        ation and collaboration in the disaster relief field,
                  eral MH-53 Sea Dragon and SH-60 Seahawk helicop-          supporting a number of projects sponsored by the
                  ters that flew fifty-one sorties, ferrying more than      Central American Natural Disaster Prevention Co-
                  89,000 pounds of aid supplies and evacuating ten          ordination Center, the Andean Committee for Disas-
                  people. On September 8 an air force C-130 airlifted       ter Management and Prevention, and the Caribbean
                  26,000 pounds of USAID supplies (including plastic        Disaster Emergency Response Agency.
                  sheeting used for shelter, hygiene kits, and blankets),       Another carefully planned initiative that helps to
                  on September 9 the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts          build local capacity to manage and reduce the im-
                  relieved the Wasp, and between September 9 and            pact of disasters, while also addressing immediate
                  14 two SH-60 Seahawk helicopters from the Rob-            humanitarian needs, is the series of “medical ship
                  erts transported 45,000 pounds of aid and evacu-          plus” deployments conducted as part of SOUTHCOM’s
                  ated twenty-four people. From September 12 to 18 a        Continuing Promise program. Similar to PACOM’s
                  marine corps KC-130 transported 93,000 pounds of          Pacific Partnership, these cruises have become ex-
                  aid and substantial amounts of fuel for the JTF-Bra-      traordinarily useful test-beds for improving and
                  vo helicopters. Finally, between September 14 and         extending civil-military and public-private collabo-
                  18, two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters that arrived         ration in support of foreign humanitarian assistance,
                  with a second JTF-Bravo team (the first having de-        building a cadre of relief providers who will have a
                  parted on September 9) flew fifty-four sorties, air-      much better idea of how and with whom to cooper-
                  lifting more than 110,000 pounds of relief supplies       ate when disasters arise that require their support.
                  and evacuating six people. So, even though SOUTH-         To the extent that the activities ashore – which, as
                  COM has very few assigned forces regularly under its      noted in chapter 3, have become an increasingly im-
                  command, it has acquired a great deal of experience       portant component of these deployments – help to
                  in cobbling together, on short notice, a diverse mix      build local defenses against the effects of sudden
                  of available units tailored to the task at hand.          disasters, these cruises can also go a long way to-
                      As for SOUTHCOM’s more programmed initiatives         ward reducing (as the HAP projects do) the overall
                  in the HA and HCA realms, one of the most success-        cost and socio-economic disruption that may result
                  ful efforts is the Humanitarian Assistance and Di-        from such disasters, which in turn can hold down
                  saster Preparedness Program, commonly known as            the level of overall assistance required from outside
                  HAP. With a primary focus on building prepared-           agencies. On occasion, programmed tours can pro-
                  ness before disasters strike, HAP managers assigned       vide as well real-world experience in disaster relief
                  to SOUTHCOM’s country-specific security coopera-          when a disaster unexpectedly erupts in the midst
                  tion teams work closely with partner nation offi-         of a deployment, as happened in September 2008
                  cials to build up local disaster response capabilities    when USS Kearsarge was diverted from its sched-
                  and to develop local infrastructure that will help        uled port visits as part of SOUTHCOM’s Continuing
                  to minimize the impact of disasters that do occur.        Promise 2008 program to provide emergency hur-
                  HAP funds are made available, for example, for first      ricane relief to Haiti.
                  responder, firefighter, search and rescue, and inci-          With regard to the deployments planned for Con-
                  dent command training (often conducted in concert         tinuing Promise 2008, they involve, as touched on
                  with OFDA), as well as for the construction of emer-      briefly in chapter 3, separate Pacific and Atlantic


                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
92
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                                  the   InstItute     for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

   Continuing Promise 2008 (April-November)
  USS Boxer                                                                                                             USS Kearsarge
  Pacific Phase (April-June) – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru                                                         Atlantic Phase (August-November) –
  The USS Boxer’ s medical and dental team consisted of more than 150 mil-                                              Nicaragua, Colombia, Panama, Domini-
  itary medical professionals and NGO personnel.                                                                        can Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and
  60 Seabees from the Navy’s Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit                                                    Guyana
  (CBMU) 303 provided robust construction capabilities                                                                     Crew of about 1,200 sailors, more than
  Treated 24,000 Patients                                                                                                  150 embarked air and sealift personnel
  Completed 127 Surgeries                                                                                                  150 military and Public Health Ser-
  Dispensed 40,000 medications                                                                                             vice medical professionals
  Completed 14,000 dental procedures
                                                                                                                           Representatives from Brazil, Canada, France,
  66 repairs to biomedical equipment in the various clinics and hospitals
  Provided veterinarian treatment to 2,900 animals                                                                         Netherlands, and Spain also participated
  Provided training, such as CPR, nutrition, and first aid, to 18,000 students                                             60 military engineering and construction troops
  Seabees from CBMU 303 renovated eight schools, a church, and repaired roads                                              20 Seabees from CBMU 202 and 40 Air-
  Health Care Services                                                                Engineering Services                 men from Air Force 5th Civil Engineer Squad-
                                                                                                                           ron Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force
  Medical Care                               Public Health Initiatives                Building repairs and
  General and specialty surgical care        Immunizations                            improvements                         Treated 47,000 Patients
  Primary and consultative care for children De-worming                               New construction                     Completed 221 Surgeries
  and adults                                 Food and water systems assessments       Utility system repairs and construc- Dispensed 81,300 medications
  OB/GYN consultative care                   Structural assessments                   tion/technical assistance            Completed 198,600 dental, medi-
  Dental care                                Assistance in establishing public health Pier, road, and bridge repair or
  Ophthalmologic services                    systems                                  construction                         cal and optometric procedures
  Optometric services                        Epidemiologic/Public Health consultation Drainage projects                    Provided veterinarian treat-
  Medical/nursing education                  Veterinary Services                      Infrastructure Support               ment to 5,600 animals
  Mutual education                         Large animal focus-livestock/food chain   Basic biomedical repair
  Mid-wife training                        Care and immunizations                    Engineering assessments
  Basic nursing skill training             Working animals                           Water/sewer system assessments
                                                                                     Structural assessments


Ocean tours by two different Wasp-class amphibious                    for the LHDs are longer (averaging about two weeks)
assault ships, the USS Boxer and the Kearsarge, each                  and involve more activity ashore than was the case
of which sailed with about 60 military engineering                    with the Comfort’s tour. Whether grey- or white-hull
and construction troops and some 150 military and                     based, however, future Continuing Promise deploy-
civilian medical and dental professionals (including                  ments will continue to offer a unique platform for
NGO and foreign experts). The San Diego-based Box-                    practicing cooperative skills across the civil-mili-
er conducted the Pacific leg of the operation from                    tary divide that will be sorely needed in the event
April to June and visited El Salvador, Guatemala,                     of a real HA/DR emergency.
and Peru, treating some 24,000 patients, complet-                         To some degree, similar skills, especially in the
ing 127 surgeries, performing 14,000 dental proce-                    medical support and construction sectors, can be
dures, providing veterinary care to 2,900 animals,                    nurtured as well by SOUTHCOM’s ongoing humani-
and offering CPR, nutrition, and first aid training to                tarian assistance exercises, most notably via the New
18,000 students in 123 classes. In addition, a team of                Horizons and Beyond the Horizons exercise series.
60 Seabees from the Navy’s Construction Battalion                     New Horizons, conducted successfully for more than
Maintenance Unit (CBMU) 303 completed a number                        two decades now, is an annual series of joint and
of construction projects, including the renovation                    combined exercises that SOUTHCOM conducts in Lat-
of eight schools and a church and various road re-                    in American and Caribbean nations, the primary aim
pairs. The Norfolk-based Kearsarge was assigned the                   being to improve joint training readiness among U.S.
Atlantic leg, leaving in early August on a cruise that                engineer, medical, and combat service support units
lasted through November and took it to Nicaragua,                     through humanitarian and civic assistance, or HCA,
Colombia, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Trin-                       activities. Program-wise, each New Horizons deploy-
idad and Tobago, and Guyana. No doubt, the Kear-                      ment tends to last three to four months and to focus
sarge trip provided services and built goodwill equal                 on the construction of needed infrastructure, such
in scale (if not higher) than that provided by the                    as schools, clinics, and water wells, and on providing
Boxer and by the USNS Comfort in 2007 (USSOUTH-                       medical and public health services to rural, under-
COM 2008b). In fact, the Boxer and Kearsarge tours                    privileged communities. Every effort is made, more-
are likely to have a broader and more lasting effect                  over, to pair the U.S. troops involved (generally some
than the Comfort did in 2007, as the country visits                   three hundred to four hundred personnel) with coun-


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                              Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                                        93
                                                                                                Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  terpart units in the host nation, as a way (again) to nities for follow-up projects and support activities
                  build local expertise and to develop habits of cooper- in the same countries over a three-year period. Un-
                  ation that may prove handy in future joint and com- der this new framework, much greater emphasis
                  bined operations, including HA/DR missions.            will be placed on careful advance planning among
                      The medical components of New Horizon exer- participating CONUS-based contingents (principally
                  cises are often (though not always) conducted as National Guard and reserve units) and within host
                  medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs), nations to produce a phased plan of action. Typi-
                  which, as discussed briefly in chapter 3, bring to- cally, this would include a year or two of prepara-
                  gether teams of military doctors, nurses, dentists, tory work, a year of initial activities, and a year or
                  and veterinarians for targeted, short duration train- two of follow-up efforts to sustain, expand, and/or
                  ing in real-world settings. Given their interaction refurbish what was done before. Most U.S. person-
                  with local medical care providers and host nation nel will deploy for only a two-week period (which
                  health-related ministries, as well as with the com- accords with normal Guard and reserve training cy-
                  munities served, MEDRETEs often have a very pos- cles), though some reserves will stay longer. Individ-
                  itive public relations and goodwill impact. In 2007, ual exercises, however, will usually last for several
                  SOUTHCOM conducted sixty-six MEDRETEs in thir- months. Moreover, for certain types of activities for
                  teen countries throughout Central and South Ameri- which it makes sense (such as the medical and pub-
                  ca and the Caribbean, at an estimated cost of nearly lic health initiatives), projects may be pursued on a
                  $3 million. Combined, these exercises provided med- regional, as well as a country-specific, basis.
                  ical care to more than two hundred thousand indi-          For the U.S. personnel involved, the end result of
                  viduals, completed some three thousand surgical the Beyond the Horizons approach should be broad-
                  procedures, and treated over seventy-five thousand er familiarity with the overall process of deploying
                  animals (See USSOUTHCOM 2008a).                        and redeploying to the countries they are assist-
                      The chart below provides a snapshot of the types ing, a better feel for the operational environment
                  of activities likely to be undertaken by New Horizons and the potential challenges that could arise with-
                  overall in any one year; it summarizes the five exer- in these countries, and closer relationships with the
                  cises conducted in 2007 in Nicaragua, Belize, Guate- local civilian and military personnel with whom they
                  mala, Panama and Bolivia (USSOUTHCOM 2007a). work. All of this, of course, would also improve the
                      In 2008, SOUTHCOM also began a new HAC ex- prospects for a successful multinational operation,
                  ercise program known as Beyond the Horizon that including a disaster response, sometime in the fu-
                  builds on and integrates New Horizons with the dual ture within the assisted country and/or involving its
                  objectives of boosting the training benefits for U.S. troops and experts who have participated in Beyond
                  troops involved and extending the level of assistance the Horizons exercises in an operation elsewhere in
                  provided to host nations via HAC activities. In con- the region. In the meantime, the countries hosting
                  trast to New Horizons exercises, which focus on a the exercises will receive more comprehensive sup-
                  series of new individual events in different countries port and greater opportunities for capacity building.
                  each year, Beyond the Horizons provides opportu- Inaugural activities in 2008 are slated to include the
                  5 exercises in 5 countries: a snapshot of New Horizons in 2007
                               Dates        Main Location        ~ U.S. Troops Building Projects       Executive agent
                                                                               Two-room school
                  Nicaragua    Feb. – May Santa Teresa           250           Five-room clinic        12 AF (Air Forces Southern)
                  Belize       Mar. – May District of Orange Walk 450          4 two-room schools      U.S. Army South
                                                                               Three-room school
                                                                               Two-room school
                                                                               2 clinics
                  Guatemala Mar. – Jun. San Marcos               450           Dig 3 wells             U.S. Army South
                                                                               Add 7 classrooms on 3
                                                                               schools
                                          Province of Bocas                    2 health facilities
                  Panama       Mar. – May Del Toro               450           Improve 2 rural roads   U.S. Army South
                  Bolivia      July – Sept. Villa Bush           TBD           3 MEDRETEs              12 AF (Air Forces Southern)




                                                                                                                Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
94
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

construction of schools and clinics and the conduct          As noted briefly in chapter 3, in its role as the host
of MEDRETEs in Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, and        COCOM for the global fleet station (GFS) pilot project9,
Suriname, together with the opening phases of the        SOUTHCOM has also had access to the High Speed
program’s very first three-year project efforts in Be-   Vessel (HSV)-2 Swift catamaran, one of the world’s
lize, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Pan-        most advanced naval vessels and one that has prov-
ama (USSOUTHCOM 2008c).                                  en to be quite useful as a platform for humanitari-
    As for specific SOUTHCOM-tied military units that    an assistance (as well as for training partner nation
have been central to HA/DR operations in the AOF         military personnel). Over a six-month period in 2007,
(or may be in the future), the most noteworthy is        for example, the Swift visited Belize, the Dominican
JTF-Bravo. This unit of six hundred troops was for-      Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicara-
mally established in 1984 at Soto Cano Air Base (a       gua, and Panama, completing close to forty thou-
C-5-capable airfield) in Honduras in response to a       sand hours of expert-level exchanges in such areas
1983 request from the Honduran government to in-         as leadership, small-boat operations, port security,
crease the size and number of U.S.-Honduran com-         and small-unit tactics. At the same time, in collabo-
bined training exercises conducted in Honduras.          ration with Project Handclasp (a Navy humanitarian
JTF-Bravo was originally given command and con-          assistance project that transports aid on Navy ships
trol of U.S. forces and exercises based in the coun-     on a space-available basis), it delivered to these coun-
try, but over the years its mission has expanded to      tries some twenty thousand pounds of medical and
include HA/DR, counter-narcotics, and counter-ter-       food supplies (USSOUTH- 9 GFS is part of the chief of naval operations’ vision for the
rorism operations, among others. The unit has de-        COM 2007b). So, while future, where navies, coast guards, and civilian services join
                                                                                     together to promote common interests as well as cross-train-
ployed repeatedly in recent years throughout the         not assets over which ing. More specifically, GFS is a proposal to use ships and riv-
Caribbean and both Central and South America in          SOUTHCOM currently erine boats around the world to establish a persistent sea
response to a wide variety of natural and manmade        enjoys permanent con- base of operations that would allow U.S. Navy personnel to as-
disasters, including tropical storm Noel in November                                                                 other nations’ maritime ser-
                                                         trol, the Swift and oth- sist and promote goodwill withashore. Focusing primarily on
                                                                                     vices with a minimal footprint
2007, hurricane Felix in September 2007, and hur-        er ships participating peacetime operations, GFS platforms can help to increase re-
ricane Dean in August 2007. With an organic army         in GFS proof-of-concept gional maritime security through cooperative efforts with
battalion, medical element (MEDEL), and air force        activities – such as the joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as well as
                                                                                     with NGOs. From its offshore sea base, each GFS can serve as a
aviation battalion, including access to as many as       USNS Grasp rescue and self-contained headquarters for regional operations with the
fourteen Black Hawk helicopters and six Chinooks,        salvage ship – will pro- capacity to repair and service all ships, small craft, and air-
JTF-Bravo teams are among SOUTHCOM’s most ca-            vide at least an occa- craft assigned. For partner nation engagement purposes, a
                                                                                     GFS could also provide classroom space, limited medical fa-
pable and responsive HA/DR assets. As one of the         sional means by which cilities, an information fusion center, and some combat ser-
few forward-deployed units permanently assigned to       to advance the com- vice support capability (see U.S. Southern Command 2007c).
the command, JTF-Bravo teams are also quite often        mand’s HA/DR priori- 10 The 2008 GFS deployment involved a four-month de-
the first troops on the scene, sometimes even pro-       ties.10 Of course, should ployment in SOUTHCOM’s AOF by the USNS Grasp, a res-
                                                                                     cue and salvage ship maintained by the Military Sealift
viding the initial damage assessment as a SOUTH-         a GFS be deployed in Command (MSC). Apart from building U.S.-partner-coun-
COM HAST. When disasters occur at some distance          SOUTHCOM’s AOF on a try working relationships, the training provided by Grasp
from Honduras and/or require a larger-scale first        more regular basis after personnel in the mission areas of dive operations, un-
response, JTF-Bravo can call on CONUS-based cargo        the pilot project phase, derwater construction, underwater wreck assessment,re-
                                                                                     and maritime rescue should be useful both to disaster
planes to airlift its helicopters, medical personnel,    it would almost certain- sponse and post-disaster recovery and reconstruction.
support troops, and relief supplies forward, as hap-     ly emerge as a more valu-
pened during tropical storm Noel when a C-5 Gal-         able and consistently utilized tool for promoting
axy from the New York Air National Guard flew two        these same priorities.
JTF Black Hawks and nineteen soldiers to the Do-             Finally, it is worth noting that SOUTHCOM as a
minican Republic. Moreover, when not engaged in          whole is transforming into a new, interagency-ori-
emergency missions, JTF-Bravo teams are regularly        ented command structure that should help to facil-
engaged in SOUTHCOM’s HA/DR-oriented exercises,          itate HA/DR-focused collaboration in the AOF and
such as the New Horizons and Beyond the Horizons         make future operations more effective. The result
series already discussed.                                of a study begun in early 2006 by former SOUTHCOM
                                                         commander General Bantz Craddock, USA, this shift


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                                    95
                                                                                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  is aimed at making the command more responsive            AFRICOM (which is discussed below). Within the
                  to the security challenges of the post-Cold War and       SOUTHCOM structure, the real-world model for this
                  post-9/11 world in which stability operations and         whole-of-government approach can be found in the
                  “prosperity-generating activities” – including, once      command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South (JI-
                  again, HA/DR operations and a broad range of civil        ATF-South) based in Key West, which has overseen
                  support missions – are as important as classic con-       air and maritime support for counter-drug missions
                  ventional warfighting operations (Miles 2008, 3). Or-     in the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the east-
                  ganizationally, this has led to the appointment of two    ern Pacific for almost two decades. JIATF-South in-
                  deputies to the commander – a three-star military         tegrates DoD and military staff with personnel from
                  deputy focused on military operations and an am-          the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Cus-
                  bassador-rank civilian deputy focused on civil-mil-       toms and Border Protection, the CIA, the FBI, and the
                  itary operations. Below the senior commanders, the        National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, among oth-
                  traditional J-coded staff structure (J-2, J-3, J-5, and   er groups, and it has become, in many ways, a “post-
                  so on) has been realigned to reflect a more strate-       er child” for interagency collaboration. So, while not
                  gy-focused structure tied to current operations in        specifically focused on HA/DR-type missions, JIATF-
                  the AOF (such as security cooperation, humanitari-        South is pointing the way to new frameworks and
                  an assistance, and counter-terrorism) rather than to      operational platforms that could (and likely will) be
                  supporting large troop movements ( for which the J-       adapted to these missions as SOUTHCOM (and oth-
                  codes were ideally designed). These new mission-ori-      er regional COCOMs) prepare more deliberately for
                  ented directorates are led by both senior executive       the growing number of non-traditional security risks
                  service (SES) civilians and general-rank officers, and    with which they must grapple.
                  the directorates themselves are staffed (or will be) as
                  much by civilian experts (many of whom come from          U.S. Africa Command
                  the broader interagency community) as by military         As noted above, AFRICOM, which became DoD’s new-
                  personnel. The formation of the new Interagency (IA)      est regional COCOM in October 2007 (and reached
                  Directorate, moreover, is meant to ensure broader         full operational capacity in October 2008), will also
                  and smoother public-private collaboration in SOUTH-       function as an interagency-focused, civil-military
                  COM operations (including with NGOs and the corpo-        command. As such, its primary focus will be on
                  rate world), as well as cooperation with non-military     peacetime engagement with African partner coun-
                  governmental organizations at the national, region-       tries as a way to help promote stability, build local
                  al, and international levels, all of which is (or may     security capabilities, and eradicate poor living con-
                  be) critical to effective HA/DR operations.               ditions – such as the lack of clean water and food,
                      Operationally, the increased focus on civil-mili-     inadequate health care, and limited educational fa-
                  tary relations and on civilian staff drawn from non-      cilities – that may breed civil unrest and possibly
                  DoD agencies affirms the fact – underscored in DoD’s      even create opportunities for terrorist activities. For
                  newly updated National Defense Strategy document,         AFRICOM, as for PACOM and SOUTHCOM, innovative
                  released in June 2008 – that the challenges of the        theater security cooperation, or TSC, is likely to be-
                  twenty-first century cannot be addressed by DoD and       come the key tool for pursuing peacetime engage-
                  the military alone, but require a “whole-of-govern-       ment as the new command becomes more active.
                  ment” approach (U.S. Department of Defense 2008,          Just as they are in PACOM’s AOR and SOUTHCOM’s
                  17-18). Such an approach, according to the new Na-        AOF, moreover, TSC projects in AFRICOM’s AOR will
                  tional Defense Strategy, “is only possible when every     be aimed largely at strengthening the capacity of
                  government department and agency understands              local states to collaborate with U.S. and other mil-
                  the core competencies, roles, missions, and capa-         itary forces in support of common security tasks,
                  bilities of its partners and works together to achieve    including patrolling coastal waters, protecting crit-
                  common goals.” The document goes on to note that          ical economic infrastructure, halting piracy, stanch-
                  major steps in this direction have been taken with        ing weapons proliferation, and uncovering terrorist
                  the expansion of SOUTHCOM’s interagency compo-            networks. At the same time, TSC efforts led by AF-
                  sition and the creation of U.S. Africa Command, or        RICOM, like similar efforts undertaken by the oth-


                                                                                                                Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
96
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

er COCOMs, will also provide useful opportunities        networks that have sought to establish safe havens
to boost the ability of the states so engaged to re-     in two of Africa’s most vulnerable regions – namely,
spond to and weather the consequences of sudden          the Sahel (with a focus on Mauritania, Mali, Niger,
onset crises, including natural and manmade disas-       and Chad) and the Horn of Africa (encompassing Ke-
ters, both of which are fairly common on the Afri-       nya, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Ethiopia).
can continent.                                           Apart from helping those states with which the Unit-
   In time, therefore, cooperative security activities   ed States is actively engaged to improve their over-
managed by AFRICOM should yield platforms for im-        all CT capabilities, OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA programs
proving HA/DR readiness and operations that are as       try to address as well the root causes of local dis-
useful as those already developed and being lever-       satisfaction that often provide an opening for radi-
aged to good effect by PACOM and SOUTHCOM. AFRI-         calization by terrorist groups. Hence, as suggested
COM’s ability to move in this direction will no doubt    above with regard to AFRICOM as a whole, OEF-TS
be helped by the fact that it will begin operations      and CJTF-HOA teams on the ground are as likely to
with an interagency- and CMCoord-based organiza-         be found digging wells, building schools, and provid-
tional structure designed from the start to encour-      ing emergency medical assistance as they are to be
age and support stability operations (of which HA/       interdicting terrorist supply lines, and this non-mil-
DR operations are an integral part) and civic aid mis-   itary, HA/DR-oriented dimension of their missions
sions (which generally improve local capabilities in     will certainly be maintained now that both efforts
the HA/DR realm). Like SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM will            have been transferred to AFRICOM control.
have a deputy commander for civil-military activi-           The first truly AFRICOM-launched mission to test
ties and a staff structure optimized in part for pre-    the new command’s commitment to building rela-
cisely those types of activities. When fully staffed,    tionships with key countries on the continent – and
the command will have more civilians in key posi-        developing, in the process, new platforms for con-
tions than any other command (one Joint Staff gen-       ducting HA/DR operations – was the seven-month
eral has called it “combatant command plus”), and it     deployment (beginning in October 2007) of the USS
will focus as much on non-military means, such as        Fort McHenry dock landing ship and the USS Swift
humanitarian assistance and community relations          catamaran to the Gulf of Guinea in support of a GFS
(COMREL) in African partner nations, as it will on the   deployment dubbed the Africa Partnership Station
military tools at its disposal to support joint and/or   (APS). Similar to the Swift and Grasp deployments by
combined military exercises and operations (Aero-        SOUTHCOM, the aim of APS was to confirm the feasi-
space Daily & Defense Report 2007). Indeed, as one       bility and value of using at-sea platforms to provide
AFRICOM officer has described it, “our mission is        training to the maritime services of the countries vis-
95 percent at least civil affairs,” and military forc-   ited, and to conduct civic aid, community relations
es assigned to the command will spend much of            missions, and emergency assistance (when neces-
their time drilling wells, building hospitals, train-    sary), with a minimal footprint ashore. Apart from
ing medics, and responding to local tragedies, such      U.S. military and Coast Guard personnel, participat-
as a collapsed building in Kenya or a capsized ferry     ing ships carried troops and sailors (as trainers or
in Djibouti (Kristof 2007).                              observers) from Cameroon, Denmark, France, Ger-
   Given that its AOR is cobbled together from ele-      many, Ghana, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal, Spain, and the
ments of the EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM AORs,             United Kingdom, plus civilian experts from USAID,
AFRICOM has inherited a number of military mis-          the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
sions and support roles previously managed by these      tion (NOAA), and Project HOPE (among other NGOs).
commands – including EUCOM’s operation Endur-            As the primary APS platform, the Fort McHenry alone
ing Freedom Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) and CENTCOM’s          visited eighteen ports of call in ten countries (in-
CJTF-HOA – that bring to AFRICOM a good deal of          cluding Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia,
experience in the civil support realm. Established       Sao Tome and Principe, and Senegal); trained more
as post-9/11 counter-terrorist (CT) initiatives, both    than seventeen hundred maritime professionals in
OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA focus on detecting, disrupt-         skills ranging from small-boat handling, port secu-
ing, and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist    rity, and maritime law and damage control to non-


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                             Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                              97
                                                                               Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                       commissioned officer leadership; and helped Project       ed for HA/DR operations and other less tradition-
                                       Handclasp deliver more than one million high-nu-          al contingencies.
                                       tritional meals, twenty-five pallets of medicine, hy-         In summary, then, while AFRICOM at the mo-
11         Amphibious ships like the Fort McHen- giene, and educational supplies, and over       ment has a limited track record compared to those
  ry are particularly well suited to perform sus- $100,000 worth of hospital beds and med-       of PACOM and SOUTHCOM, it is poised, based on the
tained operations on a regional basis in coastal
       waters, as well as crisis responses to sud-
                                                   ical equipment (Stratchko 2008, 1-2).11 In    command’s structure, mission priorities, and APS ex-
      den events that may occur on land, as they this sense, Fort McHenry performed su-          perience, to become a more prominent player with
  have substantial berthing for students, space perbly as the lead ship for precisely the        regard to HA/DR planning and operations. Moreover,
       for classrooms, helicopters and air-cush-
   ioned landing craft for transporting person-
                                                   type of multinational, interagency, civil-    given its much larger and (presumably) more influ-
    nel and supplies to and from the ship, and a military operation one might expect to see      ential civilian staff, it may actually be able to achieve
  shallow draft that facilitates operations close in response to a major foreign disaster.       the higher levels of civil-military coordination that
      to shore when required (Stratchko 2008 1).
                                                      When in port, moreover, crew from          virtually all HA/DR specialists (in and out of govern-
                                       both the Fort McHenry and the Swift completed over        ment) agree are needed to improve future relief oper-
                                       twenty community relations and special construc-          ations, but which none of the other regional COCOMs
                                       tion projects in the countries visited, ranging from      have yet been able to reach, or are likely to reach any
                                       the replacement of a school roof in Gabon, major          time soon. As a result, even though AFRICOM is a
                                       renovations to a shelter in Senegal for runaway chil-     brand new contributor to the HA/DR field, it could
                                       dren, and the vaccination of the local pet population     very well end up being the most influential.
                                       against rabies in Monrovia, Liberia, to the building
                                       of picnic tables for a school Sao Tome and Princi-
                                       pe (USS Fort McHenry Public Affairs 2007). Of even        Conclusion
                                       more direct relevance to this study, in a late March      Perhaps the most fundamental conclusion to draw
                                       2008 APS-tied exercise off the coast of Monrovia, the     from the themes discussed in this chapter is one that
                                       Fort McHenry and Swift joined up with two U.S. cargo      was stated at the very beginning: that while there is
                                       and maritime pre-positioning force ships – namely,        no single playbook for HA/DR operations that would
                                       the USNS 2nd Lieutenant John P. Bobo and the USNS         apply for all scenarios in all settings, the U.S. mili-
                                       Lance Corporal Roy M. Wheat – to test a new ship-         tary and its civilian counterparts in the foreign hu-
                                       to-shore delivery system for transferring vehicles,       manitarian assistance world have amassed enough
                                       heavy equipment, and humanitarian relief supplies         experience on what works and what doesn’t to de-
                                       ashore in the event of a large-scale disaster or oth-     velop some fairly specific guidelines that would hold
                                       er emergency when traditional harbor facilities may       up in most situations. There is, for example, broad
                                       not be available. During the exercise, sailors from the   agreement on both sides of the civil-military divide
                                       Bobo and the Wheat assembled an advanced roll-on/         regarding the key phases in a relief effort ( from first
                                       roll-off delivery platform made up of barges and fer-     response to reconstruction), how transitions from
                                       ries, cargo from the Bobo, the Wheat, and the Fort        one phase to another should ideally be handled, and
                                       McHenry was transferred to the Swift, and the Swift       various organizational structures and procedures
                                       transported it to Monrovia for distribution to var-       that can facilitate CMCoord in each phase. A thread
                                       ious schools and medical clinics in Liberia (Sealift      that runs through all operationally minded discus-
                                       Logistics Command Europe 2008). One interesting           sions, moreover, is the overarching importance of
                                       result of the exercise was a decision by AFRICOM          building and maintaining personal relationships
                                       to become more actively involved in DoD studies           among all the key players. Second only to that is
                                       now reviewing the content and location of pre-po-         the need for the civilian responder community and
                                       sitioned war reserve material (PWRM) deployed on          the military responder community each to more ful-
                                       ships like the Bobo and the Wheat with an eye to-         ly understand what the other can provide by way of
                                       ward ensuring that the supplies on board – which are      critical skills and capabilities, the procedures that
                                       now optimized for supporting conventional combat          govern their availability, and the unique institution-
                                       operations – will be reconfigured to include addi-        al cultures that define how they are used. If this lev-
                                       tional supplies and equipment that would be need-         el of civil-military understanding can be achieved
                                                                                                 at the national level (and there really is no reason


                                                                                                                                      Finding the Right Mix
                                    Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                  98
                                    Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

why it can’t), then the prospects of achieving it will   and organizations. It is to this topic that we now
be that much higher at the broader bi-national and       turn in chapter 5.
multinational levels with key international partners




References
Aerospace Daily & Defense Report. 2007. African command like-
ly to have more civilians, but not more troops. February 8.
David Axe. 2008. Soft power for hard problems. Washington Times, September 7.
Tom Baltazar, Office of Military Affairs, USAID. 2006. Unpublished briefing on relations between the
military and NGOs, presented at a workshop organized by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and
the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, in Washington, D.C., December 12.
Lt. General Robert R. “Rusty” Blackman, USMC. 2005. Presentation at Cobra Gold 2005 disaster re-
lief workshop, May 8. As reported in PACOM’s Executive Summary Report on the workshop, 6-9.
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.
2005. Record of Discussion from the Senior Leaders Symposium on Civil, Mili-
tary and Interagency Cooperation, Honolulu, Hawaii, February 22-23.
Cobra Gold 2008. History. Cobra Gold ’08.
http://www1.apan-info.net/cobragold/History/tabid/2811/Default.aspx.
Rear Admiral David “Jack” Dorsett, USN. 2005. Tsunami! Information shar-
ing in the wake of destruction. Joint Force Quarterly, no. 39 (October).
Bruce A. Elleman. 2006. Waves of hope: The U.S. Navy’s response to the tsunami in northern In-
donesia. Naval War College Newport Papers 28. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press.
Embassy of the United States in Manila. 2008. U.S. continues to support Philippine disaster relief in ty-
phoon Frank aftermath. June 27.
http://manila.usembassy.gov/wwwhs476.html.
Ron Flanders. 2008. USS Ronald Reagan carrier group departs Philippines after helping typhoon victims.
Navy.mil, July 3.
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=38237.
GlobalSecurity.org. Balikatan.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm.
Bailey Hand, OSD Stability Operations. 2006. Pakistan earthquake response: Af-
ter action trip: Recommendations. Unpublished briefing. March.
Damien Horvath. 2008. USNS Mercy deploys for Pacific Partnership 2008. Navy NewsStand, May 2.
Joint Staff. 2006. Joint operations. Joint Publication 3-0. 17 September.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf, p. IV-25.
Stephen Jordan, ed. 2006. From relief to recovery: The 2005 U.S. business response to the Southeast Asia tsu-
nami and Gulf Coast hurricanes. Business Civil Leadership Center.
http://www.uschamber.com/bclc/media/newsletter/mar_apr.




Finding the Right Mix
                                                                            Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                             99
                                                                              Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  James J. Landon and Richard E. Hayes. National approaches to civil-military coordination in peace and
                  humanitarian assistance operations.
                  http://www.dodccrp.org/files/landon_hayes.htm.
                  Colonel Charles King, USA. 2007. Unpublished point paper on the Hawaii Model study. February.
                  Nicholas D. Kristof. 2007. Aid workers with guns. New York Times, March 4.
                  John J. Kruzel. 2008. USNS Mercy provides relief in Southeast Asia. American Forces Press Service, June 27.
                  Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service. 2005. US military, partners making ‘real difference’ in Indi-
                  an Ocean. GlobalSecurity.org, January 7.
                  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/01/mil-050107-afps01.htm.
                  ———. 2008. SOUTHCOM transformation promotes new approach to regional challenges. August 26.
                  http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/news.php?storyId=1323.
                  Office of the President of the United States. 2006. The National Secu-
                  rity Strategy of the United States of America. March.
                  James L. Schoff. 2007. In times of crisis: Global and local civil-military disaster relief coordina-
                  tion in the United States and Japan. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, interim report. April.
                  Sealift Logistics Command Europe. 2008. Military Sealift Command ships prepare for sea-basing exer-
                  cise in Africa. Navy.mil, March 20.
                  http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=35884.
                  Joel Selanikio, M.D. 2006. What we have here is a failure to coordinate: Lessons learned, problems ob-
                  served in the response to the tsunami. Liaison 3, no. 3. Center of Excellence DMHA.
                  http://coe-dmha.org/Liaison/Vol_3No_3/Dept10.htm.
                  Specialist 2nd Class R.J. Stratchko. USN. 2008. USS Fort McHenry returns from Africa Partnership Station
                  maiden deployment. May 5. Milcom Monitoring Post.
                  http://mt-milcom.blogspot.com/2008/05/uss-fort-mchenry-returns-from-africa.html.
                  Strong Angel Team. 2006. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruc-
                  tion: Observations and recommendations from the field. Version 20061107:1.1nc.
                  http://www.strongangel3.net/files/sstr_20061107_web.pdf.
                  UN General Assembly. 1991. Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian agency as-
                  sistance of the United Nations. A/RES/46/182, 78th plenary meeting, December 19.
                  UNOCHA. 2004. Civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. An IASC Reference Paper. June 28.
                  UNOCHA. 2007 Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief - “Oslo
                  Guidelines.” Updated Nov. 2006, rev. 1.1, Nov. 2007.
                  http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/Civil-
                  MilitaryCoordinationSection/PolicyGuidanceandPublications/tabid/1403/Default.aspx.
                  U.S. Department of Defense. 2006. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Feb-
                  ruary 6. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
                  ———. 2008. National Defense Strategy. June.
                  http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf.
                  USAID. 2007. Bangladesh – Cyclone. November 23.
                  http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/documents/cyclone_sidr/112307-bangladesh_fs3.pdf.
                  USNORTHCOM. 2008. Prescripted mission assignments. Unclassified briefing. August.
                  USPACOM. 2005. USPACOM: Operation Unified Assistance les-
                  sons learned, Unpublished Powerpoint presentation. June. 7.
                  USPACOM. 2007. The Hawaii Model study: an unclassified infor-
                  mation brief for Commander, USPACOM. April 6.


                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix
                  Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
100
                  Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                             the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

USS Fort McHenry Public Affairs. 2007. Africa partnership station kicks off. Navy.mil, October 30.
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=32899.
USSOUTHCOM 2007a. New Horizons 2007. September 12.
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=11.
———. 2007b. U.S. Navy’s global fleet station deployment to region complete. October 2.
http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/news.php?storyId=837.
———.2007c. Global fleet station pilot 2007 deployment (April - Sept.). April 30.
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=393.
———. 2008a. Humanitarian assistance. June 13.
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/humanitarianAssistance.php.
———. 2008b. Continuing Promise. July 1.
http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/factFiles.php?idA=53.
———. 2008c. Beyond the Horizon. July 8.
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=46.
Sharon Wiharta, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randal, 2008. The effective-
ness of foreign military assets in a natural disaster response. Stockholm International Peace Research In-
stitute (SIPRI).
http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=358#.
David Wood. 2008. Relief agencies decry military role. Baltimore Sun, August 28.




Finding the Right Mix
                                                                          Operational Challenges, Civil-Military
                                                                                                                          101
                                                                            Coordination, & COCOM Platforms
                                                                                                                 5
                                                                                                               ChaPter




Key Partnerships and Platforms
     for International Cooperation
    Leveraging Existing Mechanisms and
                            Relationships in Support of HA/DR Operations

            As emphasized in preceding chapters, the United          can be used to facilitate relief operations, highlight-
            States will rarely be acting alone when it becomes       ing where appropriate recent reforms that have been
            involved in – and deploys military forces to – HA/DR     made – as well as additional adjustments that still
            activities overseas. Larger-scale disasters, for exam-   could be made – to promote more effective inter-
            ple, invariably require a multilateral, multination-     national cooperation. With regard to individual
            al, and intergovernmental response across the full       countries with which the United States may coor-
            spectrum of operations, including the recovery and       dinate, the focus is on America’s key non-Europe-
            reconstruction phase as well as the emergency relief     an friends and allies, namely, Australia, Singapore,
            phase. In these circumstances, the key to success        the ROK, Japan, and Canada, as opportunities for
            may rest as much in America’s ability to coordinate      European partnership will be covered adequately
            effectively and develop a sensible division of labor     in the NATO and EU sections of this chapter. A brief
            with other contributing nations and organizations        discussion of the opportunities for collaborating on
            (be they governmental, NGO, civilian, or military) as    HA/DR matters with India and China is also includ-
            it does in improving the overall response capabili-      ed, given the strategic importance of both countries
            ties of the United States. This may be the case even     and their growing interest in contributing to for-
            with respect to small- or medium-sized efforts in        eign HA/DR missions, at least at the Asia-Pacific re-
            which the United States is acting alone and/or is        gional level. Taken as whole, these separate lines
            the predominant national contributor, as the UN,         of inquiry should provide a reasonably complete
            regional organizations, and even private sector or       picture of the main players in future relief efforts
            volunteer agencies often have important niche roles      to which the United States might contribute. It is
            to play in such situations. Having a better sense be-    hoped that the analysis will also shed light on the
            forehand, therefore, of the other likely contributors,   prospects for integrating the individual (and poten-
            their comparative strengths and weaknesses, and          tially competing) efforts of the many agencies and
            the ways in which U.S. responders can best integrate     institutions that now tend to get involved in such
            with and/or leverage the capabilities of these vari-     efforts into a more concerted and, hence, more ef-
            ous groups should be a top priority for HA/DR plan-      fective approach.
            ners and decision makers in Washington.
                This chapter provides a summary assessment of
            the primary organizations and partner countries          UN Structures and Procedures
            with which the U.S. HA/DR community is likely to         Of course, the UN system as a whole – and the Of-
            collaborate. It includes a review of the mechanisms      fice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
            now in place at the UN, NATO, the EU, and the Asso-      (OCHA) in particular – stands out as the primary
            ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (or ASEAN) that       international organization with which and through


                                                                                                        Finding the Right Mix

    102     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

which the United States and other donor nations co-       and regional disaster response ad- 1 Membership on the IASC includes all UN oper-
ordinate their HA/DR activities. Various UN agencies      visors in Africa, the Caribbean and ational humanitarian agencies, with standing in-
                                                                                                   vitations to participate sent to the International
have long been in the business of providing human-        Latin America, the Middle East, and Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Internation-
itarian assistance and coordinating member state          the Asia-Pacific area. All told by 2008 al Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent So-
responses in the event of natural disasters and           OCHA maintained a staff of close to cieties (IFRC), the International Organization of
complex emergencies that are beyond the capaci-                                                               (IOM),                        Commis-
                                                          sixteen hundred in forty countries, MigrationHumanthe Office of the High representa-
                                                                                                   sioner for         Rights (OHCHR), the
ties of the affected nation, but OCHA itself was not      located principally at fifty field of- tive of the secretary-general on the human rights
established until 1998. To lead OCHA, the UN creat-       fices and six regional offices.          of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the World
ed an under secretary generalship for humanitari-            Though a disaster-affected nation Bank, and three primary NGO consortia: the In-
                                                                                                   ternational Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA),
an affairs, and the person who holds this post also       receiving UN assistance always re- the American Council for Voluntary Internation-
serves as the UN’s overall emergency relief coordina-     tains the formal lead in a relief opera- al Action (or InterAction), and the Steering Com-
tor (ERC). At the UN Secretariat level, the ERC chairs    tion, OCHA assumes the primary role mittee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR).
the key policy-making mechanisms in the HA/DR             in soliciting financial support from 2 The decision on whether and who to ap-
realm, including the Inter-Agency Standing Com-           the international community and in point as humanitarian coordinator is made by
                                                                                                   the emergency relief coordinator (ERC), in con-
mittee (IASC)1, which develops common guidelines          organizing and coordinating the dis- sultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Com-
and standards for humanitarian operations, and            tribution of UN-solicited donor sup- mittee (http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/
the Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs          port via the HC and the appropriate content/about/default.asp?print=True). As not-
(ECHA), which develops common UN positions on                                                          the RC and HC roles
                                                          country team. OCHA support to the ed,the same person (seemay also be performed
                                                                                                   by                       UNOCHA 2007, 4).
humanitarian issues. Operations in the field, how-        HC, who might also be the RC who
ever, are managed through a network of field offic-       heads the country team, could include technical as-
es that support UN humanitarian coordinators (or          sistance in identifying specific relief needs, match-
HCs) appointed to lead a particular relief effort and     ing available donors to those needs, and developing
country teams led by a resident coordinator (RC),         an overall contingency plan from initial relief to re-
as well as by a number of regional support offices        covery and reconstruction.2 Donor support is raised

    Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

                                             Under-Secretary-General/
                                             Emergency Relief Coordinator
                 ISDR Secretariat                                                                    Executive Office/
                                             Assistant Secretary-General/                            Administrative Office
                                             Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator



     Director, OCHA New York           Coordination and Response                         Director, OCHA Geneva
     CERF Secretariat                  Division (CRD)                                    Disaster preparedness
     Secretariat for the Trust         Country desks work with CMCS and PHA              Displacement and protection support
     Fund for Human Security           Field Management and Support                      Humanitarian reform support
     Donor & External Relations        Support to humanitarian coordinators              IASC Secretariat
     IASC/ECHA Secretariat



      Policy Development & Studies Branch    OCHA Field and              External Relations &         Emergency Services Branch
      Field Action and Coordinator Policy    Regional offices              Support Mobilization         field coordination
      Promotion of the Humanitarian Agenda   regional disaster relief    Branch                       support section
      Unit (PHA) works with CMCS on policy   advisors UN CMCoord                                      logistics support unit
      and legal aspects of CMCoord           officers                                                   civil military coordination
                                                                                                      section (CMCS)
                                                                                                      CMCS is the OHCA focal
                                                                                                      point for civil military
      Advocacy and Information                                                                        coordination. CMCS con-
      Management Branch                                                                               ducts UN CMCoord courses,
                                                                                                      participates in military
      Integrated Regional                                                                             exercises, and maintains a
                                                                                                      central register.
      Information Networks




Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                    103
                                                                                           International Cooperation
                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                           by OCHA headquarters via the consolidated appeals               OCHA also funds the Global Disaster Alert and
                                           process (CAP), a part of the UN’s consolidated hu-          Coordination System (GDACS), a web-based platform
                                           manitarian action plan (CHAP), which allows the             that consolidates in one place a broad array of on-
                                           UN to appeal directly to the international commu-           line disaster information management systems, in-
                                           nity on behalf of a country (or countries) in need. On      cluding those referenced above, but integrating as
                                           average some fifteen appeals are launched annual-           well those developed by other partner organizations,
                                           ly, and these may be supplemented, in the case of           such as the United States Geological Survey (USGS).
                                           sudden-onset disasters, by special flash appeals that       Pooling these diverse data streams, GDACS alerts the
                                           generally cover a three- to six-month period. OCHA          international community to natural, technological,
                                           also manages the Central Emergency Response Fund            or environmental disasters that occur worldwide,
                                           (CERF), composed of voluntary contributions from            and provides information sharing and updating
                                           member states, the private sector, foundations, and         tools that are useful to response coordination dur-
                                           individuals, that can be used to help jump-start a          ing the immediate relief phase. This includes capa-
                                           relief effort to ensure a timely response.                  bilities for tracking media reports, producing and
                                                In response to a sudden disaster or humanitari-        cataloguing maps of the disaster zone and surround-
                                           an emergency, OCHA can deploy a special team of di-         ing areas, and linking to V-OSOCC discussion threads
                                           saster management personnel within twelve to for-           to allow disaster managers to exchange information,
                                           ty-eight hours. Managed by the Field Coordination           coordinate relief efforts, and ensure interoperability
                                           Support Section (FCSS), a UN disaster assessment            in near-real time. In addition to its information por-
                                           and coordination (UNDAC) unit would rush to the site,       tals, OCHA also maintains and manages, via its Civ-
                                           assess the situation, and assist local authorities in co-   il-Military Coordination Section (CMCS), the Central
                                           ordinating international response efforts. Most im-         Register of Disaster Management Capacities, a data-
                                           portantly, UNDACs run an on-site operations coordi-         base of potentially available personnel and disaster
                                           nation center (OSOCC) and an internet-based virtual         management assets within the UN system and from
3       OCHA’s Central Register is actually composed OSOCC (V-OSOCC) to facilitate the imme-           contributing governments and NGOs.3 Last but not
      of five directories listing specific disaster man- diate exchange of information between         least, OCHA offers OCHA Online, an internet platform
     agement assets and three personnel directories
  for key points of contact (POCs). The asset-orient-
                                                          responding governments and organiza-         that (among other things) helps businesses identi-
ed directories include a search and rescue directo- tions during the relief operation. OCHA            fy ways in which they can help UN-sponsored re-
  ry, a directory of military and civil defense assets also administers ReliefWeb, which is an         lief efforts.
   (MCDA), a list of emergency stockpiles of disaster
    relief items, a roster of disaster management ex-
                                                          open, online gateway to relevant infor-          As noted in earlier chapters, ready access to
  pertise, and a directory of advanced technologies mation, including documents and digi-              detailed satellite images and related geographic
  for disaster response (ATDR). The POC directories tal maps, on complex emergencies and               information is of enormous importance to first re-
   include one that lists focal points and legislation
                                                          natural disasters worldwide. ReliefWeb       sponders as they struggle to understand and mea-
     for customs facilitation in the event of an inter-
        national emergency response, a list of nation- provides as well twenty-four hour cov-          sure the scale and scope of a disaster. Largely for
      al and international POCs for disaster response erage of current relief, preparedness,           this reason, the UN introduced its own satellite data
     information, and a list of major donors of emer- and prevention activities as they unfold.        service in the 1990s called UNOSAT to provide the
       gency humanitarian assistance (see UNOCHA).
                                                          Moreover, the site’s map center moni-        international community – especially developing
                                           tors ongoing HA/DR operations with satellite and            countries with limited national means – with pre-
                                           digital images, and then sorts (and catalogues) the         cisely this type of support. Based since 2002 at the
                                           data so developed by country, region, or issue, in-         European Organization for Nuclear Research (com-
                                           cluding damage and needs assessments, food securi-          monly referred to by its French acronym, CERN) near
                                           ty, refugee movement, and security. Additional OCHA         Geneva to take advantage of CERN’s IT infrastruc-
                                           online information exchange tools include its Inte-         ture and network connectivity, UNOSAT works close-
                                           grated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) news            ly with UN field workers, satellite imagery experts,
                                           website and HumanitarianInfo.org, both of which             geographers, database programmers, and internet
                                           post daily situation updates to keep relief workers         communications specialists to deliver images twen-
                                           and decision makers fully abreast of developments           ty-four hours a day through a web-based geograph-
                                           across various disaster zones.                              ic interface or imagery data bank. On December
                                                                                                       29, 2004, for example, three days after the tsuna-


                                                                                                                                          Finding the Right Mix
                                     Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                   104
                                     International Cooperation
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

mi tragedy, UNOSAT posted online and distributed           humanitarian cargo and relief workers within the
to the field local and region-wide damage assess-          crisis area; managing the import, receipt, dispatch,
ment maps retrieved from thirteen different satel-         and tracking of relief commodities; coordinating
lites. These maps provided detailed measurements           the use of available warehouse capacity; and, upon
of the topography of the affected coastal areas, as-       request, assessing the condition of roads, bridges,
sisting relief workers in planning their responses. A      airports, ports, and other logistical infrastructure.
UNOSAT report on roads and bridges damaged by the          Generally, the UNJLC website posts up-to-date in-
tsunami also proved to be extremely helpful in sub-        formation about the accessibility of entry points,
sequent efforts to rebuild transportation networks,        customs and visa requirements, in-country ware-
so UNOSAT can be a useful collaborator in the re-          housing availability, and appropriate contact in-
covery phase of a disaster relief operation as well        formation for commercial partners involved in the
as in the initial emergency response phase (Ham-           relief operation. The UNJLC also maintains an air-
merle and Cremel 2005).                                    operations cell to coordinate the use of all air assets
    During a relief operation, OCHA’s Logistics Sup-       made available under UN auspices for the common
port Unit (LSU) is responsible for the actual procure-     use of UN agencies, international organizations, and
ment and delivery of emergency relief goods from           NGOs. When necessary, the United Nations Human-
donor countries and organizations and from OCHA            itarian Air Service (UNHAS), which, like the UNJLC,
stockpiles, which are located in the United Nations        is administered by the WFP, charters aircraft for ei-
Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) in Brindisi,           ther passenger or cargo operations. During the ear-
Italy. The LSU also supports the broader internation-      ly stages of an emergency, UNHAS headquarters in
al community with logistics-related support, such          Rome sends out an assessment team to evaluate
as customs facilitation, establishing common ware-         the situation and assess local aviation infrastructure
housing, identifying delivery routes, and managing         and fuel support. If the decision to engage UNHAS is
transport schedules. Toward that end, it is responsi-      made, the WFP, in close cooperation with the UNJLC,
ble for managing two sections of the OCHA Central          compiles the needs of participating humanitarian
Register, namely those related to emergency relief         organizations and charters the necessary aircraft
stockpiles and customs facilitation ( for shipping re-     to transport personnel and commodities, includ-
lief supplies via different countries). In addition to     ing MCDA.
the LSU, the United Nations Joint Logistics Center             The WFP drew on both the UNJLC and the UNHAS
(UNJLC), created in 2002 by the IASC under the custo-      to launch two major operations during the 2004 tsu-
dianship of the World Food Program (WFP), provides         nami to relieve airport congestion and to coordinate
logistical and supply chain support to UN agencies         the receipt and delivery of relief supplies from the
and to other humanitarian organizations respond-           airfields to distribution points farther afield. The
ing to large-scale emergencies, such as the 2004 In-       first operation provided logistical support to set
dian Ocean tsunami and 2005 Pakistan earthquake.           up mobile storage tents and a base camp for relief
If it seems that logistical activities will make up a      workers in Banda Aceh, to facilitate the delivery of
significant part of an HA/DR mission, OCHA may de-         landing craft and water purification units, and to
ploy UNJLC staff within twenty-four hours of a cri-        transport a mine action team to Sri Lanka. The sec-
sis to help organize the logistics of the various relief   ond operation provided air support to the disaster          4 Staffing is primari-
organizations involved and to help coordinate with         region as a whole, including teams to manage aid            ly handled through sec-
                                                                                                                       onded staff from other
non-humanitarian agencies, such as the military.4          distribution at key air terminals and a passenger ser-      humanitarian agencies
The decision to send UNJLC staff depends on the            vice to ferry humanitarian personnel from country           within the UN system.
scale of the crisis, the capabilities of relief agencies   to country. In a similar vein, after the Pakistan earth-
already involved, preliminary situation assessments,       quake, WFP aviation experts established a main of-
the extent of bottlenecks, and the possible use of         fice in Islamabad and sub-offices in Muzaffarabad,
military or civil defense assets (MCDA).                   Bagh, and Chattaplain, all of which helped UNHAS
    That said, once it becomes involved, UNJLC pri-        to provide passenger service and air transport ca-
marily serves as an information provider. Its re-          pacity for the delivery of food, medicine, and sup-
sponsibilities include scheduling the movement of          port equipment. Given the constraints on road and


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                105
                                                                                          International Cooperation
                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                     rail access to isolated communities, UNHAS played         ples of humanitarian assistance (humanity, neutral-
                                     an especially useful role in securing additional trans-   ity, and impartiality), and they offer useful advice
                                     port helicopters, including sixteen MI8s, two MI26s,      regarding the types of humanitarian activities that
                                     two KA-32s, and four CH-47 Chinooks from the U.S.         are most appropriate to support with internation-
                                     Army, two CH-53 H Super Stallions from Germany,           al military resources. For example, the guidelines
                                     and two UH-60 Black Hawks from the Australian             encourage military forces to provide infrastructure
                                     Army (UNJLC; UNJLC 2006).                                 support such as road repair, power generation, and
                                         When MCDA are deployed for use in humanitari-         airspace management, but they discourage the di-
                                     an emergencies, OCHA’s Civil-Military Coordination        rect distribution of goods and services by military
5      MCDA include standby re-      Section (CMCS) usually serves as the focal point for      personnel to the affected population, fearing that
      lief personnel, equipment,     integrating these assets into the overall relief mis-     such actions may erode the traditional lead role
       supplies, and even servic-
    es (such as weather reports)
                                     sion.5 To ensure effective civil-military coordination    that humanitarian relief organizations play in this
    provided by foreign govern-      (or CMCoord) in the field, the unit regularly conducts    respect. To avoid confusion as to who is in charge,
    ments and militaries during      CMCoord courses and participates in military train-       the guidelines recommend as well that humanitar-
      a disaster relief operation.
                                     ing exercises with other civil humanitarian actors.       ian actors maintain the lead role in humanitarian
                                     The unit also embeds CMCoord officers within de-          relief operations as a whole (particularly in areas
                                     ployed teams to serve as liaisons for governments,        also seized in conflict), and that military support
                                     organizations, and militaries contributing to or re-      only be solicited and provided when comparable
                                     quiring MCDA support during an operation. During          civilian alternatives are unavailable.
                                     the tsunami response, for example, OCHA had CM-               It is with respect to this last point – that military
                                     Coord officers in Sri Lanka (Colombo), Indonesia          support be, in fact, a last resort – that some difficul-
                                     (Banda Aceh, Meuleboh, Medan, and Jakarta), and           ties still arise. First, there is considerable confusion
                                     Thailand (Bangkok and Utapao). Not surprisingly,          and some degree of disagreement over what precise-
                                     the CMCS also manages the OCHA Central Register           ly “last resort” means. If it means last to be asked
                                     discussed earlier, which includes the list of MCDA        no matter what the conditions, many countries,
                                     assets that could theoretically be made available         donors and recipients of aid alike, would probably
                                     by various member states that participate in that         find such a definition unacceptable and downright
                                     particular register. In this particular arena, howev-     dangerous, especially in cases of extreme emergency.
                                     er, the CMCS has enjoyed little real-world success, as    For them, an ability to provide the necessary assis-
                                     contributing nations almost always prefer to chan-        tance as soon as possible, particularly in the initial
                                     nel their provision of military and civil defense as-     phase of a relief effort, should be the primary crite-
                                     sets to a disaster area via pre-negotiated bilateral      rion for selecting a civil or military option. Viewed
                                     arrangements with the countries to which these as-        from this angle, it is often the military that is bet-
                                     sets will be deployed or via standby agreements they      ter able to respond in a timely manner, given its in-
                                     may have established with regional organizations or       herent capacity to take decisive action with little
                                     even UN agencies.                                         advance warning and the likelihood that it may al-
                                         Another activity in which the CMCS has so far had     ready be forward-deployed in a high state of readi-
                                     only partial success is its work in support of updat-     ness close to the scene of a disaster. In contrast, it
                                     ing the UN’s 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Foreign        could take an unnecessarily long time to locate, mo-
                                     Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief      bilize, and deploy civilian alternatives. Second, given
                                     (or the Oslo Guidelines), for which the CMCS serves       the time it could take to ensure (in the words of the
                                     as custodian. Given the steady increase in recent         Oslo Guidelines) that “all possible civilian options”
                                     years in national military participation in HA/DR         have been exhausted and that military assets real-
                                     operations (which brought with it a blurring of civ-      ly offer “unique capability and availability,” urgently
                                     il and military roles in such operations), the idea of    needed assistance could be delayed for largely bu-
                                     updating the 1994 Guidelines certainly made sense,        reaucratic reasons at the very time it is most need-
                                     and the final product – released by OCHA in Novem-        ed. For both reasons, a military option may be best
                                     ber 2007 – has much to recommend it. The revised          in time-urgent situations, even if it is not a “last re-
                                     guidelines continue to emphasize the core princi-         sort.” It may well be advisable, however, to apply the


                                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix
                                     Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                   106
                                     International Cooperation
                                                                                      the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

last-resort principle more strictly in the later recov-      manitarian agencies to respond in particular sectors
ery and reconstruction phases of a disaster response,        or areas of activity, with each cluster having a clear-
when civilian alternatives have had sufficient time          ly designated and accountable lead. In this way, it
to mobilize and deploy, and the humanitarian com-            was hoped that much of the freelancing and dupli-
munity as a whole generally assumes the leading role         cation of effort that occurred far too often during
(Wiharta et al. 2008).                                       the tsunami response could be avoided. By map-
    Together with the earlier mentioned desire of con-       ping the response capacities of national, region-
tributing nations to channel their military aid in HA/       al, and international actors, the UN grouped civil
DR operations directly to the country in need (pref-         and military stakeholders into those clusters deal-
erably on a bilateral basis), national reservations re-      ing with either services (logistics, emergency tele-
garding last resort have in practice tended to limit         communications, and data communications), relief
the UN’s role in CMCoord activities, despite its ex-         and assistance (emergency shelter, health, nutrition,
pertise in this arena. Hence, while the UN would pre-        water, sanitation, and hygiene), or cross-cutting is-
fer that member states allow their military assets to        sues (early recovery, camp coordination and man-
be directed by OSOCC personnel and procedures in             agement, and protection). The first real opportunity
order to facilitate coordination, this rarely happens.       to implement this concept at the field level and to
Of the approximately thirty-five countries providing         test its viability as a framework for coordinating an
                                                                                                                             6 Switzerland provid-
military assets during the 2004 tsunami relief effort,       emergency response came with the Pakistani earth- ed three Super Puma helicop-
only Switzerland and Denmark agreed to place their           quake in October 2005. Within the first twenty-four ters, flight crew, logistics, and
military assets under UN direction (Hobson 2005).6           hours of the operation, OCHA established ten clus- ground personnel, and Den-
                                                                                                                             mark offered a C-130 Her-
Unfortunately, while it may speed the provision of           ters in Islamabad: Food and Nutrition, Water and cules aircraft, flight crew,
assistance, the reluctance of donor states to put mil-       Sanitation, Health, Emergency Shelter, Early Re- and some support per-
itary assets under UN direction can also complicate          covery and Reconstruction, Logistics, IT Telecom- sonnel (Hobson 2005).
relief efforts, since national contributions to human-       munications, Camp Management and Protection,
itarian operations are often not known to the UN in          and Education. Each of the four regional UNDAC
the initial stages of the disaster response, making it       field presences also established cluster sites, called
difficult for UN officials to accurately assess evolv-      “humanitarian hubs.” Ac- UN Response To Pakistan Earthquake
ing requirements, including the most effective mix           cording to a U.S. military       The Cluster Approach
of civilian and military support. As a result, relief op-    after-action assessment,
                                                                                             UN Cluster                       Managing UN Agency
erations have often suffered from what would seem            the cluster system was Relief and Assistance
to be avoidable logistical bottlenecks, duplication          useful in that while the Emergency Shelter                       IOM, UNHCR, UNDP
of assistance efforts in some locations, and supply         “regular [cluster] meet- Health                                   WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA
                                                                                             Nutrition                        WFP, UNICEF
shortages in other places. Moreover, protracted ne-          ings allowed for the rais- Water, Sanitation & Hygiene UNICEF
gotiations between contributing and assisted na-             ing of issues that could not Services
tions over such matters as landing authorizations            wait for the appropriate Logistics                               WFP
and customs clearance for supplies transported by            forum…high-level direct Emergency
                                                                                             Telecommunications               WFP
military platforms have delayed the transit of goods         contacts were also estab- Cross-cutting Issues
and equipment for emergency assistance. The tsu-             lished and maintained to Early Recovery                          UNDP
nami response experience in particular revealed a            troubleshoot urgent prob- Camp Coordination and                  UNHCR,
number of troubling weaknesses in the coordina-              lems.” The report further Management                             IOM, UNDP
                                                                                             Protection                       UNHCR, UNICEF
tion of military and civilian assets and logistics, as       noted that the cluster sys- Education                            UNICEF, UNESCO
well as gaps in capacity and communication in sec-           tem appeared to establish Operational Hubs
tors such as water and sanitation, shelter and camp          a multinational/multilat- Bagh                                    Mansehra
                                                                                              Batagram                         Muzaffarabad
management, and recovery planning.                           eral structure that mili- Logistics Hubs
    In response, the UN conducted a series of reviews        tary components would            Abbotabad                        Islamabad
                                                                                              Bagh                             Kahuta
on humanitarian action, which led to the develop-            normally find it easier to       Batagram                         Mansehra
ment of the UN cluster system in September 2005.             plug into.                       Chatter Plain                    Muzaffarabad
                                                                                              Garhi Habibullah
The new framework divided different aspects of a re-             Of course, the Pakistan Source: “Pakistan: UN achievements – One Year Later,” re-
                                                                                           liefWeb, October 9, 2006, available at http://www.reliefweb.
lief operation into clusters of similarly engaged hu-        experience also revealed a int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/eGUa-6UeLKY?OpenDocument


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                     Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                    107
                                                                                              International Cooperation
                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                          number of shortfalls in the cluster approach that          tic geographic area, and, on an exceptional basis, in
                                         will need to be (and are being) fixed. An internal          areas outside NATO’s boundaries, as was the case
                                         UN evaluation pointed to a near universal lack of           with respect to Pakistan in 2005.8 Headed by NATO’s
7              Created in 1997, the EAPC brings to- clarity among both responders and host           director of civil emergency planning (CEP), the EAD-
            gether twenty-six NATO member states nation authorities over what the clus-              RCC includes seconded staff from NATO and partner
         and twenty-four partner countries for di-
                 alogue and consultation on politi-
                                                       ter approach really entailed, a tendency      countries. A permanent UN liaison officer works in
                    cal and security-related issues. towards “over-clusterization” in which          EADRCC to ensure close cooperation with OCHA in
8                   On May 29, 1998, the EAPC min- some clusters were established where              times of crisis. Additional personnel from NATO or
               isters endorsed the EAPC policy, En- there was no need for assistance, and the        from EAPC delegations to NATO may join EADRCC
               hanced Practical Cooperation in the
              Field of International Disaster Relief.
                                                       traditional danger of imposing yet anoth-     staff as needed to help during ongoing disaster re-
                                                       er layer of bureaucracy and coordination      lief operations. In close coordination with OCHA’s
9          NATO currently maintains the EAPC In-
      ventory of National CBR Consequence Man- onto an already complicated organiza-                 CMCS, the EADRCC also maintains a directory of des-
 agement Capabilities, which lists key response tional setting. This same UN assessment              ignated national experts in disaster response who
  capabilities that participating EAPC countries concluded, nonetheless, that despite the            can be called on to support the center in the event
       might volunteer to a NATO operation in the
event of a CBRN attack against civilian popula-
                                                      “teething problems” experienced dur-           of a major crisis.
  tions. Inventory categories have for some time ing its first application, the “cluster ap-             Since its creation, EADRCC has organized and co-
   included predictable assets in the areas of de- proach did successfully provide a single          ordinated a wide variety of assistance from NATO
      tection, decontamination, protective equip-
                                                       and recognizable framework for coordi-        members to disaster zones in, among other coun-
  ment, communications, and medical care, but
      recent additions include cargo/airlift, aerial nation, collaboration, decision-making,         tries, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, the For-
    firefighting and spillage containment, inland and practical solutions in a chaotic oper-         mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),
       transport, and ocean shipping capabilities. ational environment.” UN authorities and          Turkey, Portugal, Greece, and, more recently, the
  This is, it must be stressed, only a list of possi-
 ble options, and an incomplete one at that. The the broader humanitarian relief commu-              United States (after Katrina) and, of course, Paki-
    fact that it exists and is occasionally updated nity (including HA/DR experts in the mili-       stan. The EADRCC also organizes a variety of NATO
    in no way means that the assets so listed will tary), therefore, will continue to refine the     workshops, exercises, and related training opportu-
actually be available for any given catastrophe.
                                                       cluster concept and to promote it as an in-   nities, all of which may offer quite useful vehicles for
                                          tegral tool for improving disaster responses in the        improving the planning and conduct of future disas-
                                         years ahead. Indeed, as noted in the section on pri-        ter response operations, including the more effective
                                         vate sector support in chapter 3, the clusters now          integration of non-NATO partner nations, including
                                          authorized by the IASC – all of which have been as-        Russia, into future NATO-led relief efforts. Recent ac-
                                          signed a specific UN agency (such as the WPF, UNDP,        tivities have included a series of field exercises, the
                                         UNHCR, or WHO) – have emerged as logical points of          latest of which, dubbed exercise UUSIMAA 2008, was
                                          entry into the HA/DR network for U.S. and foreign          held in early June 2008 in Finland. The goal of exer-
                                          companies that seek a more prominent and effec-            cise UUSIMAA 2008 was to test NATO consequence
                                          tive role in disaster relief.                              management capabilities, especially with regard to
                                                                                                     containing potential damage from a chemical, bi-
                                     NATO Structures and Procedures                                  ological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident.9
                                     NATO too contains a relatively mature and insti-                In addition to the EADRCC (which is largely a head-
                                     tutionalized framework for international disaster               quarters-based coordination body), the EAPC also
                                     relief efforts (see NATO 2001). Impressed by UN ar-             established the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
                                     guments that the end of the Cold War opened new                 Unit (EADRU) to deploy to a disaster site in support
                                     opportunities to use military assets in support of              of a disaster-affected country and relevant inter-
                                     disaster relief operations, NATO developed policy               national organizations. EADRU is a non-standing,
                                     guidance on a range of civil emergency prepared-                multinational mix of civilian and military elements,
                                     ness topics throughout the 1990s, and in 1998, un-              such as search and rescue specialists, medical teams,
                                     der the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership               and transport assets, which are volunteered by EAPC
                                     Council (EAPC)7, it created the Euro-Atlantic Di-               countries in response to an emergency. While de-
                                     saster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) to                 ployed, national elements of EADRU remain under
                                     direct NATO disaster relief efforts in response to nat-         their respective national control.
                                     ural and man-made disasters within the Euro-Atlan-


                                                                                                                                         Finding the Right Mix
                                     Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                   108
                                     International Cooperation
                                                                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

    When a major disaster strikes in the Euro-Atlantic      abad, jointly led by Pakistani government officials
area, EADRCC maintains a twenty-four-hour watch             and the UN.
and stands ready to respond to the crisis if requested          In addition to EADRU, the NATO Response Force
to do so by the disaster-stricken nation. According         (NRF), declared fully operational in November 2006,
to EADRCC guidelines, requests for assistance should        has emerged as an agile, deployable unit that is avail-
include an initial assessment of the damage, a de-          able to assist in the conduct of a NATO-supported
scription of all available national assets, and a list of   disaster relief operation. Elements of the NRF, in-
the type and quantity of relief items needed, includ-       cluding command and control structures (centered
ing requests for specialized personnel and services.        around a deployable joint task force headquarters),
Once the affected country reaches out to EADRCC for         engineering units, transport helicopters, and field
assistance, and after consulting with OCHA, EADRCC          hospitals, were deployed to the United States and
forwards the request for assistance to all NATO and         Pakistan to assist with the aftermath of hurricane
partner countries, which communicate their offers           Katrina and the Pakistan earthquake, though the
of assistance to EADRCC. Since the primary role of          first real operational deployment was the latter ef-
EADRCC is to coordinate rather than direct the in-          fort. Designed as a multinational rapid reaction and
ternational response, individual nations may choose         technologically advanced force made up of land, air,
to provide assistance directly to the affected coun-        sea, and special forces components (with logisticians,
try rather than through EADRU. Either way, EADRCC           medical units, and communications specialists at-
coordinates NATO’s disaster response and keeps a            tached), the NRF is expected to total some twenty-
record of the relief items delivered and the type of        five thousand troops at full strength, able to begin
assistance still required to avoid later duplications       deployment after five days’ notice and to sustain it-
in assistance efforts or supply shortages. Moreover,        self for operations lasting thirty days or longer if re-
EADRCC publishes daily situation reports on the di-         supplied. It is meant, moreover, to be capable of per-
saster and posts them on the NATO web site.                 forming a wide spectrum of combat and non-combat
    Standing operating procedures (SOPs) for EAD-           missions, including evacuations, disaster manage-
RCC and EADRU were developed to define the Al-              ment, humanitarian assistance, and counterterror-
liance’s roles and responsibilities throughout the          ism operations. In time, the NRF could also be called
lifecycle of a disaster relief operation, including         upon to deploy with NATO’s Multinational Chemical,
guidance on the deployment of national military             Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense 10 See Pfaltzgraff and Weitz
and civilian assets in accordance with status of forc-      Battalion in the event of disasters involving the re- (2004, 12-24) for a detailed
                                                                                                                            discussion of various NATO
es agreements and cross-border arrangements. The            lease of hazardous materials, but currently the battal- plans and capabilities rele-
SOPs also describe the types of disaster response ca-       ion itself is rather poorly equipped and inadequately vant to disaster response op-
pabilities donor countries should expect to provide         prepared.10 Moreover, while the Pakistan deployment erations in general and CBRN
in the event of a major crisis, such as aerial map-         has lent the NRF a relatively high profile insofar as incidents in particular.
ping, communications (via cable, satellite, and sig-        HA/DR-type operations are concerned, Allied plan-
nal means), medical help, logistics support, air and        ners at SHAPE are quick to add that it is still meant to
sea transport, search and rescue, and assistance            serve as a high-inten-         Requests for Assistance to NATO-EADRCC
with water and sanitation. Moreover, the SOPs high-         sity combat unit when                                  consults with UN/OCHA regarding
light the primary role of the UN in coordinating the        necessary, and should                Host Nation the action to be taken by the EADRCC
international disaster relief operation. Since EAD-         not be unduly pegged                   request for assistance                UN/OCHA
RCC is intended only to complement and support              as a force keyed princi-
UN efforts regardless of the type or degree of NATO         pally to lesser contin-              EADRCC
involvement in the relief operation, it consults with       gencies and civil sup-
                                                                                                     offers of
and informs OCHA of its actions prior to and during         port missions.                                         forward RFA
                                                                                                     assistance
a disaster response, and recognizes UN Oslo Guide-              That said, to iron               NATO and Partner Countries
lines on the use of military and civil defense assets       out a number of glitch-
                                                                                          NATO members and partner countries
in disaster relief. During the Pakistan earthquake          es first revealed in the      may provide assistance directly
relief operation, for instance, NATO personnel par-         Pakistan deployment,                                              EADRU DEPLOYMENT
ticipated in the coordination meetings held in Islam-       NATO officials are now


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                     Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                   109
                                                                                             International Cooperation
                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 11         NATO owns a fleet of Airborne Warn-   contemplating creating a single NRF lo-                   sial) lesson learned for the NRF, however, is the need
        ing and Control System (AWACS) E-3A ra-   gistics command that would be respon-                     for NATO to raise some common funding (at the Al-
     dar aircraft and three trainer/cargo planes.
   The E-3A radar aircraft conduct airborne sur-
                                                  sible for deploying material and person-                  liance level) for NRF deployments, since, according
   veillance and provide command, control, and    nel and for coordinating transport and                   current procedures, the nation that is in command
       communications support for NATO opera-     supply storage. It would also be tasked                  of the NRF rotation when a disaster strikes would be
     tions, while the TCAs support the NAEW&CF
          and are used for pilot training and car-
                                                  with upgrading NRF training and certi-                    largely responsible for covering the costs of any de-
             go and passenger transport support.  fication exercises to include more realis-                ployments. In the words of NATO Secretary General
                                                  tic contingencies in the areas of logistics,             Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, this arrangement seemed “like
                                    transportation, information sharing, host nation sen-                  a reverse lottery…if your numbers come up [while
                                    sitivities, and the eventual transfer of authority (in                 you happen to be in the rotation], you actually lose
                                    a disaster relief setting) from military to civil agen-                 money,” and it must be more forthrightly addressed
                                    cies. Perhaps the most important (and controver-                        if NATO countries are to remain committed to the
                                                                                                           NRF and its core missions, among them response to
  NATO Contributions To Pakistan Relief
                                                                                                                        disasters outside the NATO region.
 Capability          Country            Activity                                      Notes
                                                                                                                             Apart from (and before) sending the
 Air Bridge          Denmark            3,500 tons of aid delivered to Pakistan Airfields used:
                     France             with 170 flights:                             - Ramstein (Germany)              NRF, NATO also deployed in Pakistan its
                     Germany            - 4 water purifiers                           - Incirlik (Turkey)               Trainer Cargo Aircraft (TCA) from the
                     Greece             - 34 tons of medical supplies                 Incirlik mainly carried sup-
                     Italy              - 1,840 kitchens                              plies donated by UNHCR            NATO Airborne Early Warning and Con-
                     Turkey             - 16,820 stoves                               Transportation cost roughly        trol Force (NAEW&CF) to establish an air
                     United Kingdom - 17,941 tents                                    $20 million
                     United States      - 31,504 mattresses                                                              bridge from the Ramstein Air Base in Ger-
                                        - 49,800 sleeping bags                                                           many to Pakistan to deliver critical re-
                                        - 345,000 vaccines
                                        - 505,272 blankets                                                               lief items, including food, first-aid kits,
 Field Hospital Netherlands             Field Hospital:                               One Mobile Field Hospital          medical supplies, power generators, and
 and Mobile          Czech Republic     - 4,890 patients treated                      from the Netherlands              water purification units.11 On October 16,
 Units               France             - 160 major surgeries                         4 Ambulances
                     United Kingdom Mobile Units:                                                                       2005, two days after the first NATO air-
                     Portugal           - 3,424 patients treated                                                         lift landed in Islamabad with over seven
                                                                                                                         tons of supplies, NATO chartered an AN-
 Air Support – Germany                  Helicopters transported 1,750 tons for 4 German CH-53 helicopters
 In Theatre          Luxembourg         relief aid                                    1 Luxembourg medical              124-100 aircraft to deliver an additional
                     France             Helicopters evacuated 7,650 disaster          helicopter                         forty-five tons of relief material (SHAPE
                                        victims                                       French ground handling
                                        Aviation fuel farm (operated by a             team                              2006). Three days later, NATO established
                                        French unit) in Abbottabad carried            Helicopters from the US and       a second air bridge from Turkey to Islam-
                                        out over 1,000 military and civilian          UK were diverted from Af-
                                        refuelings                                    ghanistan to assist with re-
                                                                                                                        abad and immediately deployed C-130s
                                                                                      lief efforts                       from France, the United Kingdom, Ita-
 Engineers           Italy              Constructed 110 shelters in support of Brought 30 medium- and 25                 ly, and Greece. Together, the air bridges –
                     Poland             the Pakistani Army Operation Win-             heavyweight vehicles into
                     Spain              ter Race                                      the area                          which constituted the largest airlift oper-
                     United Kingdom Repaired 60 kilometers of road and re- Canadian DART team start-                    ation in NATO history – were utilized by
                     Canada             moved 41,500 cubic meters of debris in ed under bilateral agreement
                     Lithuania          the cities of Arja and Bagh                   but became part of the NATO
                                                                                                                         both EAPC and non-EAPC nations (Mal-
                     Slovenia           Distributed 267 cubic meters of drink- mission                                   ta and Bosnia and Herzegovina), as well
                                        ing water                                                                       as by the UNHCR, WFP, and OCHA, and
                                        Upgraded a spring water distribution
                                        and storage system                                                              airlifted over 3,500 tons of relief aid to Is-
                                        Repaired schools and medical facilities                                          lamabad. From there, NATO helicopters
 NATO HQ                                A Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF),         17 NATO countries sent over
                                                                                                                        flew to remote mountainous villages to
 In Theatre                             known as the NATO Disaster Relief             1,200 persons to Pakistan
                                        Team (NDRT), comprised of personnel                                             deliver donated goods, stopping to pick
                                        from Joint Command (JC) Lisbon, to-                                              up and evacuate victims when possible.
                                        gether with NATO Response Force (NRF)
                                        Land Component Command (LCC) HQ                                                 In the end, NATO helicopters transport-
                                        Valencia were in theatre                                                        ed more than 1,750 tons of relief goods to
 Donations           All 26 NATO                                                      Donations consisted of mon-
                                                                                                                         remote mountain villages and evacuated
                     nations                                                          ey and/or material
                                                                                                                        over 7,650 disaster victims (NATO 2007).
Source: NatO, “all NatO Countries Contribute to Pakistan relief,” February 8, 2006, avail-
able from http://www.nato.int/ShaPe/news/2005/pakistan_contributions.htm                                                In total, over seventeen NATO countries


                                                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix
                                    Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                  110
                                    International Cooperation
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

sent twelve hundred forces and one thousand engi-         inition of what types of MCDA support could qualify
neers and other specialists to assist in relief efforts   as official development assistance, such an approach
in Pakistan, and EADRCC worked closely with the           is unlikely to appeal to other member states.
host country and with relevant national aid-coor-             In addition to funding constraints, few guidelines
dinating bodies and military authorities to help en-      or institutional mechanisms are in place to direct
sure a coordinated response.                              NATO’s involvement or coordination with other or-
    Eager to enhance NATO airlift capacity in the         ganizations, namely the UN and EU, in humanitarian
wake of the air bridge operation, in 2006 the Alliance    and disaster relief activities. Other than a UN liaison
approved a multinational contract, referred to as the     officer stationed at EADRCC, collaboration between
Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS), to allow      the two organizations in response to a 12 SALIS participating countries in-
participating countries (led by Germany) to char-         large-scale disaster or humanitarian clude Canada, the Czech Republic, Den-
                                                                                                      mark, Germany, Finland, France, Hungary,
ter up to six AN-124-100 transport aircraft capable       crisis is quite informal and ad hoc. True, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Po-
of handling cargo weighing up to 120 tons.12 In June      NATO recognizes the primary role of the land, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Swe-
2007, NATO allies agreed as well to set up a second       UN in international response, but how den, and the United Kingdom.
program, the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) ini-      closely do NATO military planners or 13 SAC participating countries in-
tiative, to acquire and manage C-17 strategic trans-      EADRU staffers really coordinate their clude the Czech Republic, Denmark, Es-
                                                                                                      tonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia,
port aircraft on behalf of fifteen NATO countries and     efforts with UN staff on the ground, es- Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Po-
two NATO partner countries.13 Under the plan, three       pecially since NATO military assets re- land, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slo-
C-17s will be purchased and based at Papa Air Base        main under the command and control venia, Sweden, and the United States.
in Hungary, with delivery of the first aircraft planned   of the contributing nation? Similarly, the relation-
for November 2008 and the remaining two by mid-           ship between NATO and EU disaster response mecha-
2009. The C-17s will be used for national airlift pur-    nisms lacks clarity. As each organization seeks ways
poses, but could also be allocated for NATO, EU, and      to develop its own rapid reaction capabilities and to
UN-led operations, or for other international purpos-     improve its civil-military responses to sudden cri-
es, with (again) humanitarian airlift and disaster re-    ses, existing ties between NATO, UN, and EU mecha-
lief missions being a likely contingency.                 nisms, along with other regional and international
    Finally, other than the SOPs mentioned above, few     organizations, should be strengthened to avoid di-
guidelines or institutional mechanisms are in place       vergent operating procedures, wasted resources, and
to direct NATO’s involvement in humanitarian and          competition.
disaster relief activities, or to address the necessary       Fortunately, there is an emerging consensus
funding requirements for the use of military capabil-     among NATO policy makers and defense planners
ities during such operations. At present, each mem-       on the need to develop a broader and more coop-
ber country contributing military assets bears the        erative approach to international relief and recon-
financial burden of its engagement, just as the ro-       struction efforts that can maximize (and render
tation leader must for NRF deployments (whatever          more effective) the contributions of diverse inter-
the mission). However, unless an appropriate fund-        agency and intergovernmental organizations. This
ing mechanism is developed, the costs of deploying        has led, in turn, to serious discussion among the
national military assets (such as transport helicop-      allies of what is now called the “comprehensive ap-
ters) in support of NATO-approved HA/DR missions          proach,” according to which the diverse array of na-
could be too great for all but a few NATO countries,      tional, international, and NGO institutions that find
nearly all of whom face the prospect of declining bud-    themselves increasingly involved in stability oper-
gets for defense operations. Only one or two NATO         ations and civil support missions (including HA/
members (principally the United Kingdom and the           DR efforts) take more concrete steps to coordinate
Netherlands) have been able to draw upon their bud-       and integrate their individual efforts in support of
gets for international development assistance to help     a common plan. The basic idea here is that conflict
cover disaster relief-related military expenses, and      resolution, disaster recovery, and post-conflict re-
such support could certainly be justified when the        construction require a far more sustained effort at
UN calls for or endorses the HA/DR effort in question.    civil-military collaboration than has generally been
However, without a much broader NATO-wide redef-          the case so far, and that more vigorous NATO efforts


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                111
                                                                                          International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  to promote such collaboration in concert with the   steadily more active in the crisis management and
                  UN, the EU, and the OSCE (at a minimum) should be   disaster response realms, undertaking a range of civ-
                  encouraged. Ideally, this would allow a more sensi- il support and humanitarian missions in a widening
                  ble and concerted division of labor among security- array of global hot spots, including Iraq, Afghani-
                  minded organizations, with NATO bringing to bear    stan, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Darfur,
                  its comparative advantages in the military response Colombia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. But the
                  spheres and the others assuming lead roles in the   EU has been in the HA/DR business for some time
                  areas of socio-economic development and political   now, having established the European Community
                  reform, including the strengthening of civic societ-Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) department in 1992 to de-
                  ies in countries in transition.                     liver rapid emergency assistance to victims of natu-
                                                                      ral disasters or conflict-induced crises outside the
                      So far, little progress has been made toward set-
                                                                      EU. Since ECHO lacks the resources and equipment
                  ting in place an institutional architecture for a com-
                  prehensive approach, in part because not all allies necessary to transport emergency relief supplies on
                  want to see NATO move in this direction. That said, its own, it has partnered over the years with over
                                                                      two hundred NGOs and specialized agencies, such
                  to facilitate CMCoord in the context of a multi-agen-
                  cy, international HA/DR operation, a number of NATO as CARE, Aviation Sans Frontières, Oxfam, the Inter-
                  member states (with Denmark, the Netherlands, and   national Red Cross, the World Health Organization
                  the United States leading the pack) have begun to   (WHO), and the World Food Program (WFP), to deliv-
                  suggest a series of steps that could be taken to at er assistance to regions hit by unexpected disasters.
                                                                      ECHO funds facilitate the delivery of aid, support
                  least lay the foundations for such a structure. In the
                  relative near-term, this could include the appoint- short-term rehabilitation and recovery programs,
                  ment of liaison officers (LNOs) and other staff ex- and finance disaster prevention and training pro-
                  changes between and among the various institutions  grams. Moreover, to help coordinate efforts on the
                  noted above, and the regular organization of train- ground in response to a crisis, ECHO may deploy a
                  ing programs and exercises that would include rep-  team of experts to the disaster site to monitor the
                  resentatives from each group. Efforts along these   activities and interaction of its partners in order to
                  lines to build a cadre of staff officers drawn from avoid any duplication of activities in some areas and
                  NATO, the EU, the OSCE, and the UN who understand   funding gaps in others.
                  the capabilities and procedures of each other’s or-     The European Commission recently adopted the
                  ganizations could be reinforced with a wider pub-   Primary Emergency procedure, which allows the
                  lic information campaign to explain the advantages  Commission to release ECHO funds to partner orga-
                  of a comprehensive-approach strategy. More ambi-    nizations through fast-track budgetary procedures
                                                                      within twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the on-
                  tious initiatives further down the line might include
                                                                      set of a humanitarian crisis for the purchase and
                  creating a standing multilateral staff of all the ma-
                  jor international security organizations, developingdelivery of emergency relief supplies, such as food,
                  a permanent assembly (similar to the UN’s IASC) of  clothing, shelter, medical provisions, and water sup-
                  these organizations and key NGOs and other private- plies. Within hours of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake,
                  sector groups that are active in HA/DR efforts and  for example, ECHO donated €3.6 million (or almost
                  stability operations, and convening annual multi-   $4.5 million at 2005 exchange rates) in fast-track aid
                  lateral meetings to discuss current operations, les-for immediate emergency relief, focusing especially
                  sons learned, and future requirements (Yost 2007;   on medical services and supplies, shelter, food and
                  Petersen and Binnendijk 2007).                      blankets (European Commission 2005a). Four days
                                                                      later, an additional €10 million (almost $12.5 million
                                                                      at the 2005 rate) was allocated to partner organi-
                  European Union Structures and                       zations to provide urgent relief supplies, including
                  Procedures                                          winterized shelters, primary healthcare, hygiene
                                                                      kits, and communications systems. One of ECHO’s
                  The attitude of the EU leadership toward the com-
                                                                      NGO partners, Télécoms sans Frontières (TSF), ar-
                  prehensive-approach concept will be critical to its
                                                                      rived in Islamabad within a day of the disaster and
                  success or failure as the EU, like NATO, has become

                                                                                                         Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
112
                  International Cooperation
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

established a telecommunications center near the           sponders, both military and civilian, to move in with
heliport with internet connection, telephone, fax,        “self-contained and self-sustaining capabilities” was
and technical assistance (European Commission              critical. According to the report, “the anticipated
2005b). TSF also helped rescuers from other agen-          second and third wave of casualties was prevent-
cies exchange information and coordinate activities        ed as a result of the well coordinated team efforts
in the hard-hit areas of Muzaffarabad, Balakot, and        by the civilian, military, national and internation-
Mansehra (European Commission 2005c). In addi-             al medical and public health actors on the ground”
tion, ECHO supported relief logistics by financing the     (Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and
WFP’s helicopter operations, as well as efforts by the     Humanitarian Assistance 2006a). EU 14 As discussed earlier, the UNJLC is an in-
UNJLC and Atlas Logistique to provide road trans-          funding was central to the success of teragency logistics coordination facil-
                                                                                                       ity for emergency response established
port and storage to local and international human-         these efforts. In later stages of the re- in 2002 under the custodianship of the
itarian organizations.14 The total financial package       lief efforts in Pakistan, when cases of World Food Program (WFP). Atlas Logis-
in response to the Pakistan earthquake, channeled          diarrhea emerged in refugee camps, the tique is a nonprofit organization special-
through thirty-six operational partners, reached           UN high commissioner for refugees de- izing in logistics and technical support.
€98.6 million, or some $124 million at the 2006 ex-        ployed mobile teams funded by ECHO
change rate (European Commission 2006). Overall            and the United Kingdom’s Department for Interna-
EU funding (by the Commission and member states)           tional Development (DFID) to fix water and sanita-
reached around €600 million ($753.4 million at the         tion problems, preempting a potential outbreak of
2006 rate) of which €171 million ($215 million) was        more serious water-borne diseases (Center of Ex-
for humanitarian actions .                                 cellence in Disaster Management and Humanitari-
    In addition to funding relief activities during the    an Assistance 2006b).
initial rescue phase, ECHO supports long-term reha-            The ECHO-DIPECHO structure, of course, is fo-
bilitation and recovery projects such as camp man-         cused solely on responding to foreign disasters
agement, potable water and sanitation projects, and        and humanitarian crises. In order to mobilize EU
disaster prevention. ECHO’s disaster preparedness          resources more effectively for incidents 15 Membership in the Mechanism is open
program, DIPECHO, promotes disaster prevention             within EU territory, as well as beyond to all EU member states. In addition to the
                                                                                                       twenty-seven EU member states already in-
projects in high-risk countries and regions prone to       it, the EU established the Civil Protec- volved in the Mechanism, Iceland, Liech-
earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, or droughts, pro-         tion Mechanism (CPM) within the EU tenstein, and Norway also have joined.
viding technical assistance and funds for capaci-          Commission in 2001.15 At the heart of
ty-building, training, and early warning projects.         the Mechanism is the Civil Protection Unit (CPU)
DIPECHO has also helped to establish the EU’s Glob-        and its Monitoring and Information Center (MIC),
al Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES)          which serves as a twenty-four/seven communica-
system, which monitors natural and man-made ca-            tions hub for participating states to access and share
tastrophes to improve an EU-wide capacity to pre-          information on the availability of resources and the
dict and respond to environmental emergencies, as          types of assistance offered and required at any given
well as the EU’s Global Disaster Alert and Coordina-       point in time. At the sudden onset of a disaster ei-
tion System (GDACS), which provides real-time alerts       ther inside or outside the EU, the MIC can respond
on natural disasters and information tools to facili-      by appointing a coordination and assessment team
tate response coordination, including media moni-          to travel to the disaster site to identify local needs,
toring and map catalogues.                                 once it has received a formal written request for as-
    ECHO’s support of WHO’s disease early warning          sistance via a fax or email. The MIC then informs the
system, established in the aftermath of the Paki-          countries participating in the Mechanism of the type
stan earthquake, will help international health of-        of assistance needed. These countries in turn noti-
ficials to respond more promptly and effectively to        fy the MIC what resources they can provide, includ-
potential communicable-disease outbreaks. In the           ing both supplies and expert personnel. Serving as a
specific case of Pakistan, eleven health-related proj-     one-stop clearinghouse for information on EU sup-
ects were supported throughout the affected regions        port options, the MIC helps to establish a direct line
(Cosgrave and Nam 2007, 29-31). A U.S. military as-        of communication between the affected and assist-
sessment later noted that the ability of medical re-       ing countries, and it monitors the delivery and dis-


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                   Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                 113
                                                                                           International Cooperation
                     the                              InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

   Requests for Assistance to EU Civil Protection Mechanism                                                             there is no agreement among EU members on com-
                                                           Host Nation                                                  mon warning signs for either type of disaster that a
                   request for                                                                                          new warning system can be built to monitor.
                   assistance                                                                                               Following the tsunami tragedy, the EU proposed
                                                                                        Country accepts or rejects
     EU President                                                                       offer; sends further requests.   various measures to improve the Mechanism and
                                                            MIC sends offer
consult if crisis outside the EU                             to host nation                                             maximize the impact of its assistance, such as im-
                                                                                                                        proving access to EU military and civil defense assets
                                                                                                                        for disaster relief and pre-positioning equipment for
                      EU Civil Protection Mechanism




                                                         Monitoring and Information Center                              immediate deployment upon request for assistance.
                                                                                              appoints team             The European Commission is already funding United
                                                                          forwards             on the ground
                                                             offers of
                                                                                                                        Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and WHO efforts
                                                                          request for      EU assessment team
                                                          assistance      assistance                                    to pre-position basic emergency items in regional
                                                                                                                        hubs, and discussions are underway to develop sim-
                                                         EU Member States
                                                                                                                        ilar programs with the International Federation of
                                                                                                                        Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Addi-
                                                                                                                        tional measures along these lines to build up the di-
                                                                                                                        saster prevention and relief capabilities of both the
                                                                                                                        CPU/MIC network and individual member states can
                                       tribution of all civil protection assistance, such as                            be expected following the EU’s approval of a new Civ-
                                       water pumps, firefighting equipment, sand bags, dis-                             il Protection Financial Instrument in March 2007,
                                       infectants, blankets, and technical experts. For di-                             which set aside €4 million (about $5.6 million at
                                       sasters within EU territory, the CPU and MIC can act                             the 2007 exchange rate) for this particular purpose
                                       on their own (operating in an “in community” sta-                                in the EU’s 2008 budget (European Union 2007a).
                                       tus for the Commission), but for non-EU incidents                                Beyond these efforts, the European Union Military
                                       they must consult closely with the EU presidency to                              Staff (EUMS) is attempting to identify and catalogue
                                       secure formal approval (given the potential politi-                              which military skills and assets of EU member states
                                       cal implications of a foreign operation).                                        are ideal for disaster response operations overall,
                                          Since the different response methodologies                                    based on the transportability, all-terrain adaptabil-
 16 These and related efforts to track and orga- used by individual EU member states                                    ity, and practicality of such assets, as well as on the
   nize EU-country military assets that would be may hamper multilateral coordination                                   conditions of their availability and deployment.16 To
  useful in a range of plausible disaster scenarios
   were first outlined at the EU’s informal defense
                                                     in the field, the CPU and MIC sponsor                              this end, the EUMS has established air transport and
    ministerial in Innsbruck on March 6, 2006, by a variety of civil protection (CP) im-                                maritime transport coordination centers in Eind-
    Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative for provement projects aimed at boosting                                hoven and Athens, but they have not yet been ful-
  common foreign and security policy (CFSP). See
    Solana (2006). Both military and non-military
                                                     coordination through broader expe-                                 ly tested in the context of real-world operations. So,
   EU initiatives of note are summarized in Com- rience sharing, better early warning                                   too, the EUMS has participated in several meetings
    mission of the European Communities (2005). procedures, investment in up-to-date                                    with CPU and MIC staff to clarify procedures and de-
                                       logistical capabilities, and the selective advance ne-                           velop agreed templates for forwarding requests for
                                       gotiation of airlift and other transport support. Both                           military support from EU civil authorities to EUMS
                                       groups also sponsor regular training programs, sim-                              officials (interview 2007c).
                                       ulation exercises, and expert exchanges in an effort                                 During the summer of 2007, the CP Mechanism
                                       to enhance member state interoperability and to                                  was activated thirteen times within a two-month pe-
                                       advance a common culture of emergency response.                                  riod in response to a series of devastating wildfires
                                      With regard to early warning more specifically, the                               that raged through Cyprus, Italy, the Former Yugo-
                                      CPU is pushing for a new multi-hazard alert system                                slav Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, and
                                       stationed within the MIC that would be patterned                                 Greece. At the time, the response to the wildfires
                                       on Japan’s early warning system and designed to pro-                             on Greece’s Peloponnese peninsula was the largest
                                       vide earlier and more accurate warnings of potential                             operation ever undertaken by the Mechanism in an
                                       earthquakes and tsunamis in the southern and Med-                                EU member state. Mechanism-participating states
                                       iterranean regions of the EU zone. As yet, however,                              (along with Israel, Russia, and Turkey) contributed


                                                                                                                                                           Finding the Right Mix
                                                                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                     114
                                                                  International Cooperation
                                                                                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

Canadair water-tanker planes, water-carrying heli-2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2006 mudslides in
                                                  the Philippines, and the 2008 cyclone that struck
copters, firefighting all-terrain vehicles, and rescue
workers. However, despite the Mechanism’s timely  Myanmar, point to the need for greater prepared-
and overwhelming support to Greece, the response  ness, better reaction time, and smoother coordina-
                                                  tion among vulnerable states in the region. With
identified significant shortcomings in Europe’s crisis
management capabilities. For one thing, coordina- this objective in mind, therefore, the Association
tion between and among various national civil pro-of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a key regional
tection structures appeared to be quite low, whichplatform that marked its fortieth anniversary in 2007,
                                                  has stepped up its efforts to encourage multilateral
remains a potential problem area. In an effort to im-
                                                  cooperation on disaster relief and more effective ef-
prove Europe’s collective response capacity, there-
fore, EU parliamentarians increasingly have calledforts at disaster preparedness (includ- 17 In May 2006, Michel Barnier, former
                                                  ing improved capabilities for better French minister for foreign affairs and for-
for the creation of a permanent civil protection rap-
                                                                                             mer member of the European Commission,
                                                  emergency response) among its mem- issued a report, “For a European Civil Protec-
id reaction force maintained at the EU level to tackle
                                                  ber states. Indeed, the inaugural ASE- tion Force: Europe Aid” (also known as the
natural disasters, and possibly terrorist attacks and
                                                  AN defense ministers’ meeting held in Barnier Report), that outlined twelve propos-
industrial accidents.17 Critics of this proposal argue
nonetheless that EU efforts should focus first and                                                               EU
                                                  Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in May 2006 als for improvingthe crisis response capaci-
                                                                                             ties. Specifically,    report advocated a more
foremost on prevention and preparedness at the na-identified disaster risk reduction as an integrated European approach to crisis man-
                                                  immediate security challenge and re- agement and the creation of a European civil
tional and local levels rather than on the creation of
a European civil protection force with region-widegional relief cooperation as one of the protection force. This idea was revisited af-
                                                                                             ter the 2007 wildfires in Greece. However, the
responsibilities.                                 core issues on which defense officials Greek initiative for enhancing European coop-
    By way of a compromise measure, however, the  should focus (Caballero-Anthony 2006). eration for the prevention of and response to
European Council did approve in November 2007 a   More recently, in July 2008, the ASEAN natural disasters and emergencies was with-
                                                                                             drawn after several EU member states, name-
                                                  Regional Forum (ARF), a broader group ly Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands,
plan to develop (with funds from the new Civil Pro-
                                                  composed of ASEAN members and other Sweden, and the UK, called for a greater fo-
tection Financial Instrument) up to thirteen disaster
response modules based on deployable units in key countries (including the United States) cus on prevention and preparedness at the na-
capability areas (European Union 2007b). Modules  interested in the security of the region, tional and local (as opposed to EU) level.
                                                                                             18 Current ARF members include all ten ASE-
now being organized include special units for wa- agreed on the need for common guide- AN members, plus Australia, Bangladesh, Can-
                                                  lines and cooperative mechanisms to ada, China, the European Union, India, Japan,
ter pumping/purification, aerial firefighting, earth-
quake response, urban search and rescue, medical  promote and direct joint relief opera- Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Paki-
                                                                                             stan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea,
assistance and evacuation, emergency shelter, CBRNtions (Tang 2008).18                       Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, and the United States.
detection and sampling, and search and rescue in     ASEAN HA/DR initiatives, however,
CBRN conditions. The modules will be maintained   have been in the works for some time now, although
at the national level, but kept ready to deploy onthey are still inadequately supported. These efforts
short notice anywhere in the EU zone (and even    received a significant boost in member support af-
beyond) and capable of self-sufficient operations ter the Indian Ocean tsunami. At a special meet-
once deployed. Particular emphasis in this first  ing convened in January 2005, for example, in the
round of module development is being given to re- immediate aftermath of the tsunami, ASEAN mem-
                                                  ber countries signed the Joint Declaration on Action
sponse capabilities that would be especially useful
                                                  to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Re-
in the event of cross-border disasters that would af-
                                                  construction, and Prevention, which was followed
fect more than one country (such as forest fires, oil
                                                  in July 2005 by the adoption of the seminal ASEAN
spills, and earthquakes). In this way, near-term in-
tra-EU improvements will also advance the EU’s ca-Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergen-
pacity and that of its member states to respond incy Response (or the AADMER). The agreement aims
areas beyond the EU zone.                         to provide a comprehensive regional framework for
                                                  joint response and cooperation across the full life
                                                  cycle of disaster management and to encourage an
ASEAN Initiatives                                 integrated, multi-hazard approach that involves all
Recent large-scale humanitarian relief efforts in stakeholders, links national initiatives with regional
Southeast Asia, such as those launched after the and international networks, and establishes region-


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                               Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                             115
                                                                                        International Cooperation
               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                   al structures and mechanisms, such as the ASEAN           to the entire ASEAN region, operating together with
                                   Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance           an improved, real-time seismographic network and
                                   on Disaster Management (the AHA Center) and the           Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
                                   ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief            (DART)19 sensors (UNESCO 2006).
19           This particular DART, of course, has Fund (ASEAN Secretariat 2006).                 Under the AADMER agreement, ASEAN mem-
          nothing to do with the various first re-    Although the AADMER agreement          ber nations have also started formulating region-
       sponder units referred to by the same ac-
          ronym that are currently fielded by the
                                                   will only enter into force following      al standby arrangements and standard operating
          United States, Singapore, and Canada. ratification by all ten ASEAN member         procedures (called SASOPs) for joint disaster relief
20        Created in 2003, the ASEAN Committee states, many of the provisions are al-        operations that would use both military and civil-
 on Disaster Management (ACDM) is composed ready being implemented. For exam-                ian personnel and assets. Work also proceeds on
   of the heads of agencies and organizations in
    each ASEAN country that are responsible for
                                                   ple, ASEAN has launched the Disaster      efforts to establish a network of pre-designated en-
   disaster management. The ACDM formulates Information Sharing and Communica-               try points to facilitate the movement of relief items
   programs and organizes regional emergency tions Network (DISCNet) in collabora-           across borders and to expedite customs and immi-
   response activities, such as the ARDEX exer-
   cises, as part of the AADMER agreement and
                                                   tion with the Maui-based Pacific Disas-   gration clearance (ASEAN Committee on Disaster
   with the assistance of the ASEAN Secretariat. ter Center (PDC), a center for applied      Management). In addition, a regional online data-
                                                   science, information, and technology      base and inventory of member-state disaster relief
                                   mentioned in chapter 4 as a component of the Ha-          skills and assets, including a search and rescue di-
                                   waii model. As part of DISCNet, all disaster-related      rectory, called the ASEAN Standby Arrangements
                                   websites from each ASEAN country were successful-         for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response, is be-
                                   ly linked together in early 2005 (Pacific Disaster Cen-   ing compiled. Data on the regional standby arrange-
                                   ter 2005). To further enhance strategic information       ments will be managed, updated, and coordinated
                                   sharing, in 2005 ASEAN and PDC completed a com-           by the AHA Center, scheduled to be operational by
                                   prehensive information and communications tech-           2009 (ASEAN 2005).
                                   nology (ICT) assessment of all ten ASEAN states as a          In a concerted effort to further improve region-
                                   way to help identify regional information and tech-       al preparedness and networking capabilities, and
                                   nology gaps, strengthen national ICT infrastructures,     to test the applicability of the SASOPs, ASEAN has
                                   and determine the minimum investment required for         initiated regular series of regional disaster emer-
                                   regional interconnectivity on disaster management         gency response simulation exercises, code-named
                                   (GSDI 2006). In a related achievement of the DISCNet      ARDEX. The first-ever ASEAN field simulation expe-
                                   collaboration, ASEAN launched the Online Southeast        rience (ARDEX-05) based on a major earthquake
                                   Asia Disaster Inventory (OSADI) database in late Oc-      scenario was held in Malaysia in September 2005,
                                   tober 2007. The web-based system, the first of its kind   followed by an exercise in 2006 (ARDEX-06) simu-
                                   in the region, compiles historical records of disasters   lating a flashflood in Cambodia and a third disas-
                                   in ASEAN member states, as well as hazard maps and        ter exercise (ARDEX-07) that mobilized area search
                                   other disaster-related spatial data, and it would al-     and rescue teams in response to the simulated col-
                                   low emergency personnel throughout Southeast Asia         lapse of a high-rise apartment building in Singapore.
                                   to catalogue and share critical disaster relief infor-    Following on from a tabletop simulation hosted by
                                   mation. Another region-wide endeavor, the Indian          Indonesia in May 2008, the ARDEX-08 disaster ex-
                                   Ocean Tsunami Warning System (IOTWS), became              ercise, held in Thailand in late August 2008, tested
                                   active in 2006, and boasts the capability to receive      ASEAN’s capacity to respond to a potentially devas-
                                   and distribute tsunami advisories around the clock        tating typhoon. The ASEAN Committee on Disaster
                   ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster                                   Management (ACDM)20 conducts the field simula-
                   Relief and Emergency Response                                             tion events in collaboration with the UN’s OCHA net-
                Categories of information required to establish and                          work, including participants from the UN Disaster
                maintain the inventory of earmarked assets and ca-
                pacities for the regional standby arrangements                               Assessment and Coordination team, the Internation-
                Emergency Response /                                                         al Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soci-
                Search and Rescue                     Military and Civilian Assets
                                                                                             eties, the UN International Strategy for Disaster
                Emergency Stockpiles of               Disaster Management Expertise
                Disaster Relief Items                 and Technologies                       Reduction (ISDR), and other longstanding partners
               Source: aSeaN Secretariat                                                     and support agencies. In addition, ASEAN receives


                                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix
                                 Key Partnerships and Platforms for
               116
                                 International Cooperation
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

    ASEAN Institutional Arrangements
    meetings of heads
    of government/state


    ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM)        ASEAN Ministerial Meetings                   ASEAN Secretary-General
    of Foreign Ministers                    on Disaster Management (AMMDM)


    ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC)          ASEAN Committee on Disaster                  ASEAN Secretariat
                                            Management (ACDM)                            (Bureau for Resources
                                                                                         Development)


regular technical support from the Thailand-based          in the development of more robust HA/DR capabil-
Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), a di-           ities among ASEAN countries. A current initiative
saster response information sharing network. Tak-          in this regard is the U.S. proposal, first presented in
en together, these various planning and simulation         August 2007, for the creation of a joint disaster re-
exercises provide useful opportunities for increas-        lief force under the auspices of the ARF, to be estab-
ing emergency preparedness and building mobiliza-          lished within eighteen months and aimed at moving
tion capabilities in this disaster-prone part of the       the forum “away from seminars to actual coopera-
world. So, too, they have generated important op-          tion” (Christopher Hill 2007). According to the pro-
erationally minded lessons on multilateral cooper-         posal, American military forces would collaborate
ation that will help facilitate the implementation of      directly with the forces of member countries (some
AADMER objectives.                                         of which have not yet had the opportunity to work
   As noted briefly already, the ASEAN Regional Fo-        together) in actual exercises, based on challenging
rum, or ARF, is another regional instrument that           scenarios (such as a 2004-like tsunami crisis), to ad-
could become quite useful for disaster relief plan-        dress the region’s top disaster response needs. As a
ning, especially with respect to potential military        key first step a U.S.-developed ARF live exercise on
support. Established to foster more direct dialogue        disaster relief (using ARF Standard Operating Pro-
on security-related matters among ASEAN members            cedures) has been scheduled for early 2009 in the
and other key Asia-Pacific nations, the ARF has en-        Philippines.
couraged broader exchanges on, and coordination                That said, the Plan of Action to Implement the
with respect to, national disaster response, emergen-      ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership 2006-2011, signed
cy relief, and maritime search and rescue capabili-        in July 2006, constitutes the most comprehensive
ties (Australian Government Department of Foreign          initiative to strengthen bilateral relations between
Affairs and Trade). Specific achievements of the ARF       ASEAN and the United States (Pitsuwan 2008). Ac-
include organizing a series of training activities, con-   cording to the agreement, the United States will
ducting an inventory of early warning systems, de-         supply ASEAN member countries with training and
veloping a matrix of past cooperation in disaster          simulation support based on the Incident Command
relief among member countries, and drafting guide-         System (ICS) developed for U.S. homeland security
lines for post-disaster roles and responsibilities (In-    purposes. Washington will also provide regular sup-
ternational Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2004). By      port to ASEAN members in the information and com-
drawing participation in its annual meetings from          munications technology (ICT) realm, and it pledged
senior levels of the various ministries of foreign af-     to invest in a capacity-building program to improve
fairs, defense, and disaster management, among oth-        ASEAN member capabilities to prevent, respond to,
ers, the ARF has provided a unique and authoritative       and recover from natural disasters (White House Of-
platform for discussing the multiple aspects of HA/        fice of the Press Secretary 2007a; BBC Asia Pacific
DR planning in a multilateral setting.                     2006). Toward this end, the U.S. Agency for Interna-
    In this context, the ARF has emerged as a partic-      tional Development (USAID) announced in Septem-
ularly useful vehicle for promoting U.S. participation,    ber 2007 an indefinite quantity contract capped at
and that of its closest regional allies and partners,      $150 million to support ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Part-

Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                 Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                               117
                                                                                          International Cooperation
               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                     nership activities over the near term future (Pitsu-       mar following tropical cyclone Nargis, which struck
                                    wan 2008).                                                  the country in May 2008. ASEAN continues to steer
                                         It will take some time, of course, for these pro-      the response activities of the so-called ASEAN-Myan-
                                     posed improvements to take shape. The 2004 Indi-           mar-UN Tripartite Core Group (TCG) that was estab-
                                    an Ocean tsunami exposed the lack of preparedness           lished after the cyclone to coordinate, facilitate, and
                                    of ASEAN countries for large-scale calamities, as           monitor the flow of international assistance into
                                    well as their limited ability to respond in a collec-       Myanmar. In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat dis-
                                     tive manner. More specifically, the tsunami demon-         patched a special emergency rapid assessment team
                                     strated that a key reason why a regional emergency         (ERAT) to the disaster zone. Comprised of experts
                                     response could not be deployed rapidly and effec-          in the fields of relief coordination, water and san-
                                     tively was the lack of a regional coordination sys-        itation, health, logistics, and food, the assessment
21       Despite the 9.0 magnitude of the earth- tem to identify and mobilize available         team has helped to target aid provided by the ASEAN
       quake that caused the tsunami, no coun- resources in support of a coherent re-           countries to areas where it was most needed (Asian
        try in the region issued an international
          warning, and Indonesia’s meteorologi-
                                                   sponse effort, ranging from problem          Development Bank 2008). ASEAN members Indone-
        cal department was reportedly not even recognition to problem solution. Sim-            sia, Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore alone mobilized
                                                                                      21

         aware of it until informed by local resi- ilarly, the Philippine mudslide relief ef-   several tons of emergency relief items such as food,
             dents (Pacific Disaster Center 2006).
                                                   fort in early 2006 underscored the need      blankets, water and water purification tablets, tents,
                                     for closer coordination among a complex communi-           groundsheets, clothing, and medical supplies for the
                                     ty of international responders, as well as the impor-      hardest-hit areas. The Philippines dispatched C-130
                                     tance of incorporating the participation of foreign        transport planes with over $300,000 in desperately
                                     military forces and assets in disaster relief opera-       needed relief goods, and Thailand, which emerged
                                     tions to bolster the speed and efficiency of response.     as the main logistical and organizational hub for the
                                     Indeed, the recently launched AADMER specifically          relief effort, donated $12.3 million in cash and in-
                                     recognizes that establishing regional protocols to         kind aid to Myanmar, provided medical teams, and
                                    expedite the deployment of foreign military forces          airlifted more than $400,000 worth of food, drink-
                                     to help ASEAN nations cope with major disasters            ing water, and medical and shelter supplies (Center
                                    could be a key to future relief efforts.                    for Excellence in Disaster Management and Human-
                                         In terms of its capacity to respond effectively to     itarian Assistance 2008a).
                                    disasters, ASEAN has also received criticism in re-             Looking ahead, ASEAN is exploring the experi-
                                    cent years for being “mostly an enterprise for region-      ence, applicability, and transferability of successful
                                    al reconciliation,” and for having a loosely structured     European disaster response mechanisms, such as
                                     institutional framework mainly geared towards fa-          NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordina-
                                    cilitating an environment for trust and confidence          tion Center and its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
                                     building among its members, rather than the devel-         Unit, as it considers how best to strengthen existing
                                    opment of robust, disaster-driven, specialized exper-       institutions and cooperative frameworks in the di-
                                     tise (Hew 2005). Despite their limited capabilities        saster preparedness realm. The hope is that the EAD-
                                    and ad hoc responses to past crises, however, ASE-          RCC/EADRU network, as well as the EU’s MIC and CPM
                                    AN members did demonstrate that they could act              structure, will point the way to reforms that ASEAN
                                    and work together during the relief efforts following       could take to help identify disaster relief needs at a
                                     the May 2006 Central Java (Indonesia) earthquake.          regional level and to encourage a closer coordina-
                                    Assisting teams from the ASEAN member countries             tion of member state response capabilities (Cabal-
                                    were among the first to respond to the area with            lero-Anthony 2006). In that respect, the first-ever
                                     search and rescue teams, food, medical assistance,         ASEAN charter, adopted in November 2007, would
                                    and other emergency supplies, as well as with cash          (if implemented) formalize and transform the As-
                                    contributions (ASEAN 2006).                                 sociation from a consensus-based organization to
                                         Perhaps more impressively, ASEAN recently took         a rules-based one. In so doing, it could strengthen
22 The current ASEAN Secretariat lacks suffi- the lead in organizing the delivery of            the ASEAN Secretariat22 to such a degree that ASEAN
 cient staff and funding to address its burgeon- aid to an estimated 2.5 million survi-         might evolve into a more responsive and effective
 ing agenda of activities, thus undermining the
     overall effectiveness of ASEAN’s initiatives.
                                                   vors in the devastated areas of Myan-        regional union, particularly with respect to disas-


                                                                                                                                   Finding the Right Mix
                                 Key Partnerships and Platforms for
               118
                                 International Cooperation
                                                                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

ter preparedness, planning, and response capaci- assets of the Australian Defense Force (ADF) in re-
ties (Manila Times 2007a).                                   sponse to disasters occurring in the Asia-Pacific and
                                                             Melanesian regions, including the 2004 Indian Ocean
                                                             tsunami, but farther afield as well, as in the case of
Key Non-European Allied and Partner the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.
Country Capabilities                                             Australia’s response to international contingen-
                                                             cies is managed by Emergency Management Austra-
In addition to existing regional and multinational
                                                             lia (EMA), located in the Ministry of Defense, under
platforms for HA/DR collaboration, there are a num-
                                                             the direction of the Australian Agency for Interna-
ber of non-NATO and non-EU national programs for
                                                             tional Development (AusAID), which normally funds
foreign disaster assistance that could provide (and,
                                                             the Australian response to an overseas disaster. In
in fact, have provided) effective mechanisms for bi-
                                                             the aftermath of an emergency, EMA activates the
lateral cooperation with the United States and its
                                                             Commonwealth Government Overseas Disaster As-
military forces, as well as with other countries and
                                                             sistance Plan (AUSASSIST Plan), which details the
their military forces. Not surprising, many of the
                                                             principles and procedures involved in coordinating
more robust programs in this context have been
                                                             the provision of humanitarian aid (Australian Gov-
developed by American allies and partner states in
                                                             ernment Emergency Management Australia 2004).
the Asia-Pacific region, most of which have become
                                                             ADF assets are often mobilized under the plan and
increasingly interested in building up their HA/DR
                                                             made available to transport resources and to pro-
capabilities in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean
                                                             vide equipment, personnel, and expertise, such as
tsunami and, more recently, cyclone Nargis in Myan-
                                                             medical assistance. In the absence of a dedicated
mar and China’s Sichuan earthquake in May 2008.
                                                             ADF disaster relief unit to call upon in times of cri-
As detailed in the country reviews that follow, Aus-
                                                             sis, units and task forces are drawn directly from
tralia, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and
                                                             the ADF, with the early-entry elements of the Austra-
Canada are likely to remain the most attractive and
                                                             lian Army’s three health support battalions of three
competent partners in the near to mid-term, given
                                                             hundred troops each typically the first to deploy to
their longstanding traditions of collaboration with
                                                             the scene of a disaster, followed soon by combat en-
the United States and, to some extent, with each
                                                             gineering and other military units (Hobson 2005).
other. Understanding more fully the extent of their
                                                             The chart below provides a graphic overview of Aus-
HA/DR capabilities at the national level, then, is the
                                                             tralia’s overall decision process for overseas HA/DR
first step to developing a more realistic sense of what
                                                             operations.
they may be willing to do in cooperation with the
United States, be it in a bilateral,
trilateral, mini-lateral, or broader         Decision Process for Australia’s AUSASSIST Plan
multilateral framework.                      request for assistance               request forwarded to              Minister for foreign
                                              from affected country               AusAID for assessment                   affairs or delegate
                                              to Australian head                 and approval                            approval is sought
Australia                                     of mission
Australia, long a leader in providing
                                                                                 if physical or technical
humanitarian assistance and emer-                                                response approved, Emergency            attorney general
gency relief, maintains the capacity                                             Management Australia (EMA)              approval sought
                                                                                 requested to coordinate
to respond rapidly to international
disasters, especially when they oc-
cur in countries within Australia’s          EMA advises AusAID                  the appropriate Commonwealth            Commonwealth agencies
                                                                                 or other agencies are tasked to         seek ministerial approval
immediate vicinity. Australia is per-                                            carry out requests
haps the most proactive contributor
                                             AusAID will usually fund
of military assets to international          approved response
humanitarian missions in the Asia-                                               tasked agency is provided with          EMA provides AusAID with
Pacific region (Wiharta et al. 2008).                                            contact details of point of             regular situation reports
                                                                                 contact affected country
As such, it has frequently deployed
the wide-ranging capabilities and

Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                    Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                     119
                                                                                             International Cooperation
             the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                   Among the factors that determine activation of         needed to provide essential relief, is seen in Can-
                               the AUSASSIST Plan are the extent and nature of the        berra as an especially important contribution, and
                               foreign crisis, its likely effect on long-term develop-    one that is central to ensuring that only those mil-
                               ment efforts, the scale of existing local capacity to      itary assets that are truly necessary and appropri-
                               cope with the emergency, Australia’s comparative ad-       ate to the task at hand are actually deployed. During
                               vantage in providing assistance, the level of response     the tsunami responses, for example, it was through
                               from other donors, and the scope of local commu-           such an assessment that the Australians were able
                               nity involvement (Commonwealth Secretariat 1999).          to determine that using the army’s UH-1H Iroquois
                               Special focus and the highest priority are allocated to    (Huey) helicopters would be more effective than
                               emergency situations in the Asia-Pacific region, and       the more sophisticated and combat-capable S-70-
                               in particular those countries where Canberra already       A-9 Black Hawks, because the former required less
                               has an ongoing bilateral assistance program.               time to prepare for dispatch, were quicker to pre-
                                   Australia quickly emerged as a member of the so-       pare for air transport once in theater, and required
                               called core group of nations (along with the United        a smaller logistics support footprint (Hobson 2005).
                               States, Japan, and India) that took the lead in pro-       Moreover, the Iroquois produced less downward air
                               viding the critical direction and organizational mo-       turbulence (or downwash), which proved to be an
                               mentum that launched the international response            important feature when operating close to the af-
                               to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Within a week            fected populations.
                               after the disaster, Australia had established a pres-          Beyond Australia’s crucial response to the Indian
                               ence in the hardest-hit areas and ultimately ranked        Ocean tsunami, the country has contributed signifi-
                               as the second-largest donor government (after the          cantly to other recent emergency response efforts. It
                               United States) in the tsunami relief effort, pledging      launched a large relief operation in the wake of the
                               nearly $1 billion in assistance (Jordan 2006). As part     massive March 2005 earthquake in Sumatra, provid-
                               of operation Sumatra Assist, the formal name for           ing a range of emergency supplies (infant formula,
                               Canberra’s support for the tsunami relief effort, the      cooking sets, hygiene kits, kerosene fuel), along with
                               ADF provided critical emergency provisions (water,         food, water, shelter equipment, medical personnel,
                               tents, medical supplies, blankets, etc.), a water pu-      and malaria prevention services, and transport
                               rification plant, a field hospital, air traffic control-   and logistical support (Australian Government Au-
                               lers, logisticians, Australian Army helicopters and        sAID). Furthermore, following the devastating 2005
                               engineers, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) C-130         earthquake in Pakistan, the Australian military de-
                               Hercules and Boeing 707 transport aircraft ( for ferry-    ployed helicopters, tanker and cargo aircraft, and
                               ing equipment, stores, and personnel to the stricken       ADF medical and support personnel who focused on
                               areas), and the Royal Navy’s HMAS Kanimbla am-             vital health care assistance to those affected. RAAF
                               phibious landing ship, later converted into a floating     B-707 and C-130 Hercules aircraft conducted the ini-
                               logistics base from which food and fresh provisions        tial strategic airlift, while army-owned Black Hawk
                               were delivered ashore in landing craft or via helicop-     helicopters provided essential transport of teams
                               ter (Hobson 2005). Within a month, over one thou-          and supplies into Pakistan’s more remote and diffi-
23         The ADF official-   sand ADF troops had delivered an estimated twelve          cult-to-reach areas, undeterred by the mountainous
     ly withdrew its assets    hundred tons of humanitarian aid by air to tsuna-          terrain and limited road access (Aerospace Daily and
        on March 25, 2005.
                               mi victims in the most heavily affected areas (Rob-        Defense Report 2005).
                               ert Hill 2005).23                                             As part of Canberra’s response to disasters in 2008,
                                   The Australian government relies considerably on       Australia pledged some $24 million in financial assis-
                               the ADF in responding to overseas relief operations        tance to meet the humanitarian needs of the people
                               because of the timeliness, special skills and training,    of Myanmar following the devastating cyclone that
                               capacity for quick reaction, and relative self-suffi-      struck that country in May 2008 (Sydney Morning
                               ciency of its military personnel in a disaster environ-    Herald 2008). In addition, an RAAF C-17 Globemas-
                               ment. The ability of the military forces to provide a      ter aircraft transported two SA330J Puma helicop-
                               time-urgent and accurate assessment of the situa-          ters to be used by the WFP’s UNHAS effort aimed at
                               tion within the disaster zone, and of the capabilities     delivering aid to the most heavily affected areas in


                                                                                                                             Finding the Right Mix
                               Key Partnerships and Platforms for
             120
                               International Cooperation
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

Myanmar. By late June 2008, moreover, the ADF had          operation, which would “cut through the bureaucra-
provided over thirty tons of emergency provisions          cy so that we can transform our forces better, share
for the cyclone victims, including much-needed wa-         technology better,” and take military collaboration
ter containers, water purification tablets, bedding,       between the two countries even further (White
blankets, tarpaulins, and medical supplies (Austra-        House Office of the Press Secretary 2007b). One
lian Government Dept. of Defense 2008). Australia          important component of U.S.-Australian defense
also contributed a team of medical specialists to          ties, according to the new treaty, would include en-
work in partnership with a 250-member joint as-            hanced cooperation on humanitarian assistance
sessment team brought together by ASEAN under              and disaster relief, possibly involving the pre-posi-
a UN-brokered agreement with the junta in Myan-            tioning in Australia of stores, provisions, and equip-
mar (PDMIN 2008).                                          ment that would be available for ready use in U.S.
    After the catastrophic May 2008 earthquake in          and/or joint disaster relief missions within the re-
China’s Sichuan Province, the Australian govern-           gion (Ferguson and Matthews 2007).
ment was quick as well to donate some $2 million               The Australian government already maintains an
to the Red Cross and the Red Cross Society of Chi-         ongoing liaison with the United States and the U.S.
na to help underwrite emergency relief efforts. As in      Navy, whereby the two countries frequently work
Myanmar, Canberra’s contribution was used to pro-          and exercise together to enhance the interopera-
vide essential supplies, such as tents, blankets, jer-     bility standards between Australian and U.S. forc-
ry cans, and water purification tablets, and to help       es. The joint Australia-U.S. Talisman Sabre exercise,
fund Red Cross medical teams and critical medi-            Australia’s largest annual military training activity,
cal supplies (Smith 2008a). Additionally, the Aus-         involves a wide range of maritime operations, and
tralian government offered the practical assistance        in 2007 it focused on the need for joint training and
and proven capabilities of its expert urban search         effective interoperability in the realm of humani-
and rescue teams.                                          tarian assistance (Hetherington 2007). The bilater-
    Complementing its national framework and ar-           al exercise allows Australia and the United States
rangements for overseas disaster assistance is Aus-        to deploy rapidly together and on very short notice
tralia’s leading role in the ASEAN Regional Forum          for operational missions, as in the case of the 2004
(ARF), which acts as the principal platform for se-        tsunami response (Lockwood 2007). In March 2007,
curity dialogue in Asia and whose focus has evolved        moreover, Australia concluded the breakthrough Ja-
to include cooperation in the areas of disaster re-        pan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooper-
sponse, emergency relief, and marine search and res-       ation (JDSC) in which each country recognized the
cue. In 2007, Australia elected to serve as a “shepherd”   other as an indispensable partner in the region and
(along with the United States, China, the EU, Indone-      laid out priority areas for practical cooperation be-
sia, and Malaysia) to coordinate all interim efforts       tween Australia and Japan, including disaster relief
and take forward the ARF’s work on disaster relief         (Kamiol 2007). The Australian government is also
capabilities (Salvosa 2007). As part of this initia-       deepening its close trilateral partnership with the
tive, Australia and Indonesia are preparing to estab-      United States and Japan, and in June 2008, Washing-
lish standard operating procedures (SOPs) through          ton, Canberra, and Tokyo agreed to a new disaster
a desktop exercise in 2008, to be followed in early        relief pact that aims to ensure a “coordinated and
2009 (as noted in the ASEAN section of this chap-          instantaneous” response (including the best use of
ter) by the planned first-ever live ARF disaster re-       their respective military assets) to future disasters
lief exercise, which will be developed by the United       in the Asia-Pacific region (Smith 2008b). The specif-
States and the Philippines (Australian Government          ic guidelines of the disaster accord are scheduled for
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade).                  completion in late 2008.
    Australia is also involved in a number of other            Canberra is an active member as well of the Five
bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral strategic coop-    Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), a maritime se-
eration initiatives focused on disaster relief. In Sep-    curity and air defense initiative linking it with Ma-
tember 2007, Canberra and Washington signed the            laysia, Singapore, New Zealand, and the United
Australia-United States Treaty on Defense Trade Co-        Kingdom, whose focus has grown to include the


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                 Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                               121
                                                                                          International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  development of readiness, capacity building, and          capable assets in the provision of effective HA/DR
                  interoperability among its members in the area of         assistance (Jane’s Defence Weekly 2007).
                  HA/DR operations (Kamiol 2006). So, too, Austra-
                  lia works closely with France and New Zealand un-         Singapore
                  der a trilateral arrangement known as FRANZ to            While taking part in several recent multilateral ef-
                  respond to a range of emergencies in the South Pa-        forts, Singapore has demonstrated a special aptitude
                  cific. FRANZ ensures that resources (such as relief       for HA/DR operations and a growing willingness to
                  transportation and finances for reconstruction) are       participate in such missions. Although Singapore
                  deployed effectively and without duplication, and it      focuses its HA/DR capabilities on crises occurring
                  has proved to be a useful tool for improving disas-       in Southeast Asia, the wealthy city-state also engag-
                  ter preparedness and coordination within the region       es when necessary (and requested) in HA/DR opera-
                  (Commonwealth Secretariat 1999). Further, Emer-           tions beyond this geographic perimeter, venturing
                  gency Management Australia maintains an active            into nearby regions such as South Asia, Central Asia,
                  partnership with Indonesia’s disaster coordination        and the Middle East. Although the Singapore Armed
                  authority, BAKORNAS, to provide Australian techni-        Forces (SAF) and the Singapore Civil Defense Force
                  cal assistance and expertise in the areas of disaster     (SCDF), the main tools the government employs dur-
                  response, recovery, and prevention.                       ing disaster situations, are small in number, their
                      Australia’s forces offered immediate support and      capabilities have proven to be robust, flexible, and
                  humanitarian relief to the Philippines following the      professional.
                  Southern Leyte floods and typhoon Reming in 2006.             Singapore can provide multilateral disaster relief
                  In addition, the ADF has provided important disaster      efforts with capabilities spanning a wide spectrum
                  management training to the Filipino armed forces          of competencies, from experienced liaison officers
                  (Manila Times 2007b). In this regard, Australia re-       to forensic specialists, peacekeepers, and elite di-
                  cently concluded a Status of Visiting Forces Agree-       saster assistance and rescue teams (DARTs). Singa-
                  ment (SOVFA) with the Philippines. The agreement          pore’s political structure allows the government to
                  codifies a bilateral security cooperation initiative      make decisions and execute directives quickly, thus
                  that is expected to facilitate closer military collabo-   enabling its well-trained military and relevant gov-
                  ration between the two countries on crisis response       ernment agencies to respond to disasters on a case-
                  planning and preparedness, including, among other         by-case basis with streamlined coordination, all of
                  tasks, capacity building, training, and exercises fo-     which results in greater efficiency. As stated by Sin-
                  cused on strengthening regional disaster relief ca-       gapore’s former chief of defense force, Rear Admiral
                  pabilities and expertise.                                 Lui Tuck Yew, “Over the years, the Singapore Armed
                      Recent defense-related developments in Austra-        Forces (SAF) and the Singapore Civil Defense Force
                  lia have centered as well on a re-posturing of the ADF    (SCDF) have built up their disaster relief capabilities
                  to make it a more agile, responsive, and multifunc-       and are well trained to respond to any eventualities”
                  tional expeditionary force that is no longer focused      (MINDEF Singapore 2002). Moreover, Singapore’s
                  on continental defense, but can be called upon to         emergency services remain on constant alert. The
                  respond quickly to a wide range of missions beyond        SAF, for example, maintains a force at “minimal ca-
                  Australia’s shores, from antiterrorism and interna-       pabilities at a high readiness level” composed of pre-
                  tional peace operations to regional assistance and        packed medical and humanitarian supplies and two
                  disaster relief missions. As part of the ongoing devel-   to three medical teams (Hobson 2005).
                  opment and improvement of significant capacities             As a result, Singapore has emerged as a leader and
                  to support this re-posturing, the Australian military     pioneer in HA/DR operations, and the government
                  has begun upgrading its amphibious force and is in        continuously seeks to improve its capabilities. The
                  the process of acquiring two new landing helicopter       military, for instance, is currently exploring various
                  dock (LHD) ships. No doubt, in addition to respond-       ways to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in di-
                  ing to security challenges in the region, the LHDs will   saster relief operations (Boey 2008). Singapore also
                  serve, as the U.S. Navy’s LHDs already do, as highly      hosted the ASEAN ARF seminar on humanitarian as-
                                                                            sistance and disaster relief, and has co-hosted with


                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
122
                  International Cooperation
                                                                                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

the United States since August 2000 the ARF Com-                The personnel Singapore dispatched to Indone-
bined Humanitarian Assistance Response Training             sia included a medical team trained and equipped
Course. The international community has taken               to provide surgical, pediatric, and public health ser-
note of Singapore’s emerging role in HA/DR opera-           vices and advice, as well as combat engineers and
tions and its tested expertise in the field. As a result,   civil-military relations teams in order to facilitate
nations around the world increasingly look to Singa-        civil-military coordination (CMCoord). Singapore
pore for training purposes, prompting the SCDF to           opened up its air and naval installations to relief
establish the Civil Defense Academy to train person-        agencies and the UN, along with office space, ware-
nel for HA/DR operations. The academy has trained           houses, and other facilities used for logistical pur-
rescue units from Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Cape            poses. Singapore also provided generators, a crane,
Verde, Cyprus, Ghana, Jordan, Laos, Malaysia, the           and ambulances (Singapore Ministry of Foreign Af-
Maldives, Malta, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Tai-           fairs 2005). The approximately fifteen hundred in-
wan, among others.                                          dividuals working on behalf of Singapore exhibited
    Singapore has also signed memoranda of under-           professionalism and sensitivity. According to Lieu-
standing (MoUs) with China and Japan in the hope            tenant Colonel Leonard Tan, Singapore’s highly
of facilitating joint training and unit exchanges with      trained troops and relief personnel made a great
both countries (Singapore Civil Defense Force). In          effort to understand Indonesia’s unique needs and
addition to engaging in bilateral joint training re-        emphasized the importance of connecting in a sen-
gimes, Singapore has also participated in past Co-          sitive and appropriate manner with tsunami survi-
bra Gold exercises, the annual multilateral training        vors. For example, personnel never threw food off
exercise managed by USPACOM and hosted by Thai-             of trucks, and SAF soldiers were instructed to re-
land that aims to improve regional interoperability         move their sunglasses when speaking to an individ-
and enhance cooperative working relationships. As           ual victim (Tan 2006).
noted in earlier sections of this study, Cobra Gold             Singapore also sent relief aid and personnel to
has played a central role in laying the foundation          several tsunami-hit areas and/or relief coordination
for effective multinational HA/DR operations in the         centers. In addition to the SAF liaison officer sta-
Asia-Pacific region.                                        tioned in Banda Aceh in Sumatra, Singapore sta-
    Surveying past HA/DR operations to which Sin-           tioned an additional SAF liaison officer, complying
gapore contributed helps as well to identify the            with a PACOM-made request, at the headquarters of
capabilities Singapore is likely to bring to future mul-    Combined Support Force (CSF) 536 in Utapao, Thai-
tilateral HA/DR efforts. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsu-         land, serving as a coordinator and planner within
nami disaster, in response to which the SAF engaged         the Combined Coordination Center, or CCC (Koh
on an unprecedented scale, provides perhaps the             2006). Singapore supplied Thailand with two Chi-
best and most comprehensive example. All branch-            nook helicopters and two Super Puma helicopters,
es of the military were involved as well as the SCDF.       as well as with an SCDF team, a forensic expert team,
Soon after the tsunami hit the beaches of Indone-           and other specialists. Singapore also provided sub-
sia, the government of Singapore contacted the In-          stantial aid to other nations struggling in the di-
donesian government and established direct lines            saster’s wake, including Sri Lanka and the Maldives.
of communication. Following a day of coordination,          Indeed, the government of Singapore, joined by the
an air force C-130 loaded with relief supplies flew         private sector and longstanding relief groups such
to Indonesia, followed the next day by two Chinook          as the Singapore Red Cross Society, Temasek Hold-
and two Super Puma helicopters (Tan 2006). Singa-           ings, the Salvation Army (Singapore), YMCA (Singa-
pore later provided six Chinook helicopters, the use        pore), Mercy Relief, Bright Hill Monastery, World
of three helicopter landing ships, two mobile field         Vision (Singapore), Habitat for Humanity (Singa-
hospitals, and a mobile air traffic control tower ac-       pore), and the Singapore Scout Association, donat-
companied by two air traffic control coordination           ed millions for disaster relief (Singapore Ministry of
teams (Hobson 2005). Singapore also donated sub-            Foreign Affairs 2005). NGOs also physically and ma-
stantial relief and medical supplies (Singapore Min-        terially engaged in HA/DR operations. For example,
istry of Foreign Affairs 2005).


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                123
                                                                                           International Cooperation
               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                 the Singapore Sinhala Association built homes in          manitarian assistance… Since Korea had assistance
                                 Sri Lanka (Yap 2006).                                     from the international community, it’s right to give
                                     But the tsunami disaster is not the only major ca-    something back” (Kang 2007). For example, among
                                 tastrophe that Singapore has responded to in recent       the thirty countries that claimed membership in the
                                 years. When the 2005 earthquake struck Kashmir,           Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
                                 Singapore immediately sent a DART along with oth-         opment (OECD) in 2004, the ROK contributed $7.6 per
                                 er medical specialists. NGOs based in Singapore and       capita in overseas assistance, compared with the av-
                                 branches of the government and military were also         erage of $80 per capita contributed by the twenty-
                                 heavily involved. So, too, the SAF has sent medical       two-members of the OECD’s Development Assistance
                                 and engineer teams to central Afghanistan as part         Committee (Korea Times 2005a). Furthermore, the
                                 of the New Zealand-run Provincial Reconstruction          government only increased its assistance for victims
                                 Team (PRT), and the medical unit took the initia-         of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami from the initial
                                 tive to establish a dental clinic in Bamiyan (Pereira     offer of $600,000 following significant public pres-
                                 2007). Moreover, in addition to operational involve-      sure to do so (Korea Times 2005a).
                                 ment, Singapore, having established relations with             Given the ROK’s elevated geopolitical stature, ROK
                                 Afghanistan in June 2006, has aided in the buttress-      officials have begun to take note of the increased
                                 ing of Afghanistan’s academic institutions. Singa-        pressure on Seoul to contribute and the country’s
                                 pore’s International Centre for Political Violence and    heightened sense of international responsibilities.
                                 Terrorism Research, for example, helped establish         During an IFPA workshop in 2006, for example, a
                                 the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies in Kabul,       South Korean government official asserted that,
                                 Afghanistan’s first independent research institution      since South Korea was now one of the largest econ-
                                 (Karzai n.d.).                                            omies in the world, South Koreans were finally real-
                                                                                           izing they need to be less parochial in their interests
                                 The Republic of Korea (ROK)                               and government leaders were making a more con-
                                 Given its understandable focus on the stability of the    certed effort to think globally (IFPA 2005). Similarly,
                                 Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea (ROK) tra-        at the fifteenth-anniversary celebration of the Korea
                                 ditionally has maintained a rather arms-length at-        International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in 2006,
                                 titude toward participating in international HA/DR        the government expressed an interest in achieving
                                 operations, especially if the operations require mil-     a level of overseas humanitarian assistance that ri-
                                 itary deployments outside the Asia-Pacific region.        valed that of other developed countries. The ROK gov-
                                 As the ROK economy has grown to become the elev-          ernment in fact confirmed in that same year its in-
24      ROK presently deploys    enth-largest in the world, however, this attitude has     tention to raise the ratio of assistance to national
   peacekeepers on the India-    begun to change to one of welcoming greater partic-       income from 0.06 percent to 0.1 percent by 2009 and
 Pakistan border and in Geor-
    gia, Lebanon, East Timor
                                 ipation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions         to 0.25 percent by 2015 (Lee 2006). Officials have gone
     and other conflict-prone    both within the Asia-Pacific region and well beyond       on to suggest that the government examine not just
       countries and regions.    it (Ministry of National Defense of the ROK).24           the volume of assistance provided, but also the quali-
                                     The case for a greater effort on the ROK’s part was   ty. In an interview with the Korea Herald, KOICA pres-
                                 recently put forward rather forcefully by UN Under-       ident Shin Jang-bum made the point that “[while] we
                                 secretary General John Holmes, who spoke in 2007          cannot compete in quantity with advanced coun-
                                 at Kyung Hee University in Seoul in his capacity as       tries with the limited amounts available for official
                                 humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordi-         development assistance, we must instead differenti-
                                 nator at the UN. Noting that only 0.06 percent of         ate ourselves by giving tailor-made and high-quality
                                 the ROK’s “income” was allocated for official devel-      assistance to third countries” (Lee 2006).
                                 opment assistance, Holmes argued that Seoul, giv-              With that goal in mind, the ROK has taken a num-
                                 en its current wealth, could clearly do much better       ber of steps in recent years to improve its ability to
                                 (Lee 2006). “I’m here,” Holmes made clear, “to host       contribute effectively to HA/DR missions overseas.
                                 donors to establish a new partnership in Asia for         The ROK is a member of the Multinational Planning
                                 humanitarian assistance. Considering Korean eco-          Augmentation Team (MPAT) managed by USPACOM,
                                 nomic power, Korea can play a significant role in hu-     and it has participated in numerous MPAT-spon-


                                                                                                                              Finding the Right Mix
                                 Key Partnerships and Platforms for
               124
                                 International Cooperation
                                                                                          the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

sored and/or -supported HA/DR exercises, includ- the political turmoil that surrounded Kenya’s con-
ing Cobra Gold (see MPAT). In 2006, the ROK was tentious elections (Yonhap News Agency 2008), and
participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum when on May 2, 2008, after cyclone Nargis struck Myan-
the ARF drafted a statement regarding the need for mar, South Korea responded by pledging $2.5 million
better advance planning to deal with crisis manage- in aid and sending a thirty-member medical team
ment and rapid response during disasters and emer- that was still active in Myanmar in late June (Cen-
gencies. At that time, Seoul endorsed the ARF’s ef- ter for Excellence in Disaster Management and Hu-
forts to develop standard operating procedures for manitarian Assistance 2008b). Finally, the ROK of-
civil-military coordination during HA/DR operations, fered immediate assistance to China following the
and to construct a database of military assets ASEAN May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province, sending
members can in theory supply to assist overseas HA/ a disaster relief team, money, and aid packages con-
DR (ChinaDaily.com 2006). In a similar vein, the ROK sisting of tents and blankets (Associated Press 2008).
donated $5 million in 2006 and $2 million 2007 to Some of the equipment was delivered by ROK mil-
the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), itary cargo planes (Korea.net 2008). Dispatched by
which was launched in March 2006 in order to expe- the National Emergency Management Agency, the
dite urgently needed relief anywhere in the world. In forty-one-person disaster relief team received help
the past two years, CERF effectively distributed $600 from two sniffer dogs and worked with state-of-the-
million in funds to fifty-nine countries experiencing art technology, including digital endoscope camer-
a variety of humanitarian crises (Park 2007).              as (Agence France-Presse 2008). Furthermore, Pres-
    In response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, ident Lee Myung-bak visited Sichuan Province, the
the ROK government eventually pledged $50 million first foreign president to tour the site of the devas-
to aid tsunami victims, as well as to assist the ROK tation (Korea.net 2008).
Ministry of Health and Welfare in dispatching medi-            But examples of the ROK’s expanding ability to re-
cal and epidemic control teams to the region. By Jan- spond to natural disasters swiftly and effectively can
uary 2005, ROK medical teams were treating an av- also be found closer to home. In late 2007, for exam-
erage of 410 patients per day (Yonhap News Agency ple, Seoul was faced with the need to contain with-
2005a), while ROK military aircraft and ships helped out delay an off-shore oil spill that posed a risk of
to transport rescue teams and to resupply them in significant ecological damage. On December 7, 2007,
the field (Yonhap News Agency 2005b). In response to the Hebei Spirit, a 146,000-ton oil tanker registered in
the tsunami, the ROK also        Major ROK Disaster Relief and Reconstruction Assistance
pledged to donate $1 mil-                      Damage                                    assistance
lion to the WHO fund for                       Casualties       Displaced Damage         Relief             Assistance                   Reconstruction
tsunami relief efforts, the Earthquake                                                   24 emergen-
                                                                                         cy rescuers        $400,000 in cash
seventh-largest donation in Iran,                                                        16 reconstruc-     $50,000 for res-             $0.75 million for
                                December 2003 41,000 deaths                              tion workers       cue team                     house construction
by a country to WHO’s tsu-
                                                                                                                                         $34.35 million in
nami-targeted aid budget                                                                 31 emergency                                    bilateral assistance
(Korea Times 2005b). Lat- Tsunami                                                         rescuers          $2 million in cash           $6 million in multi-
                                                                                         32 medical staff   $500,000 for res-            lateral assistance
er in 2006, following the in Indian Ocean,                                               34 member facili-  cue team                     $4.65 million for
                                December 2004
massive earthquake in In-                                                                ties recovery team $500,000 for                 NGO and oth-
donesia, the ROK deployed                      230,000 deaths 5 million   $10.73 billion 96 volunteers      NGO support                  er support
                                                                                                            $500,000 in cash
a fifteen-member medical                                                                                    $200,000 for res-
team to the disaster zone Earthquake                                                                        cue team
                                                                                         4 pilots           $500,000 in kind
(Bang 2006). Additional- in Pakistan,                                                    12 rescuers        $450,000 for multi-
ly, in 2008 the ROK pro- October 2005                                                    10 medical staff   lateral assistance
                                               73,000 deaths                             39 emergency       $300,000 for
vided $200,000, delivered                      67,000 injured 280,000     $4-5 billion workers              NGO support                  $2.05 million
through the World Food Landslide
Program and the UN De- in Philippines,                          6,697                                       $500,0o0 in cash
                                February 2006 1,700 deaths      evacuated                                   $100,000 in kind             $400,000
partment of Humanitari-                                                                                     $500,000 in cash
an Affairs, to Kenya during Earthquake                          151,068                                     $100,000 for
                                in Indonesia,   6,217 deaths     houses                         19 emergency re-      rescue team
                                May 2006        18,372 injured   destroyed   $3 billion         lief workers          $400,000 in kind   $1 million
Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                      Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                         125
                                                                                                  International Cooperation
                   the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

 Types of ROK Assistance for Disaster Relief and Reconstruction                              six new frigates (Ulsan-I class FFX) that will also be
                             Amount         Percentage                                       capable of operating helicopters. Moreover, the na-
Type of Assistance           $USthousands (%)           Remarks                              vy’s amphibious capability will improve significant-
Training                     4,749          6.8         53 training for two countries
                                                        Two experts of IT and economy to
                                                                                             ly once the new thirteen-thousand-ton LPX landing
Dispatch of experts          78             0.1         Afghanistan                          ship Dokdo becomes fully operational and outfitted.
Development studies          81             0.1         Design of a roundabout road in Arbil The ship is designed to carry seven hundred marines,
Aid in kind                  26,903         38          Support to three countries
Infrastructure support       31,815         46          26 projects in 8 countries
                                                                                             ten helicopters, ten main battle tanks, and two high-
Partnerships with NGOs       1,313          2           13 projects in 3 countries           speed air-cushioned landing craft, and two more LPX
                                                        16 projects for 15 countries and one ships in addition to the Dokdo are expected to en-
Emergency relief             4,907          7           international organization
                                                                                             ter service within the next few years. Together with
                                                                                             the KHP systems, the KDX destroyers, and the heli-
                                    Hong Kong, collided with an 11,800-ton barge owned
                                                                                             copter-compatible frigates, the LPXs will greatly en-
                                    by Samsung Heavy Industries five miles off the Kore-
                                                                                             hance the ROK’s ability to support long term, over-
                                    an coast and ninety-three miles southwest of Seoul.
                                                                                             seas HA/DR operations (Dorschner 2007).
                                    As a result of the accident, 10,500 tons of crude oil
                                    leaked into the Yellow Sea. The ROK government de-
                                                                                             Japan
                                    clared the event a disaster and responded quick-
                                                                                             The Japanese government’s involvement in HA/DR
                                    ly. The accident occurred at 7:15 a.m., and by noon
                                                                                             operations began in 1953, when Japan contributed
                                    twelve coast guard patrol ships and three contami-
                                                                                             to UN aid for Palestinian refugees (Watanabe). Since
                                    nation control ships had arrived on the scene (MO-
                                                                                             then, Japan has steadily increased and broadened its
                                    MAF 2007). Over the course of the next three days,
                                                                                             participation in the HA/DR realm, with funds allo-
                                    the ROK government mobilized thousands of troops,
                                                                                             cated for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping
                                    volunteers, and specialists, and an array of heavy
                                                                                             still rising in recent years despite decreases in the
                                    equipment, including some one hundred ships, six
                                                                                             total Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget.
                                    helicopters, and oil absorbing equipment (Guk jeong
                                                                                             For example, Japan’s commitment to humanitari-
                                    2007). The participation of a number of foreign re-
                                                                                             an assistance in 2001 was $212 million out of ODA’s
                                    sponse teams (including one from Japan and one
                                                                                             $9.8 billion. In 2004-05, humanitarian assistance
                                    from the EU) provided Seoul with a useful oppor-
                                                                                             and post-conflict reconstruction aid was pegged
                                    tunity to improve as well its ability to coordinate a
                                                                                             at $735 million, while the total ODA budget fell to
                                    multilateral and multinational operation.
                                                                                             $7.8 billion (Watanabe). The Ministry of Foreign Af-
                                        Based on lessons learned from these and other
                                                                                             fairs (MOFA), which oversees the government’s con-
                                    recent HA/DR responses, the ROK Ministry of Nation-
                                                                                             tribution to international humanitarian assistance,
                                    al Defense (MND) is slowly taking steps to acquire
                                                                                             has also adjusted its organizational structure to ex-
                                    additional capabilities that will boost the military’s
                                                                                             pedite ODA decisions, including those related to for-
                                    utility and effectiveness in future HA/DR operations,
                                                                                             eign disaster assistance. In 2006, MOFA created the
                                    be they conducted close to home territory and fur-
                                                                                             International Cooperation Bureau out of the Eco-
                                    ther afield. Such expansion is part of the MND’s De-
                                                                                             nomic Cooperation Bureau and certain elements of
                                    fense Reform 2020 initiative, a program that seeks to
                                                                                             MOFA’s Global Issues Department, and the Overseas
                                    modernize the military and prepare it for a broader
                                                                                             Disaster Assistance Division (similar to OFDA in the
                                    range of off-peninsula operations. Platform acquisi-
                                                                                             United States) was placed within the Internation-
                                    tions that could prove to be especially helpful in this
                                                                                             al Cooperation Bureau. Additional adjustments are
                                    regard include the Korean Helicopter Program (KHP),
                                                                                             planned for the coming year, all of which will lend
                                    a $1.38 billion partnership between EADS Eurocop-
                                                                                             HA/DR programming a higher profile.
                                    ter and Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI), focused at
                                                                                                 Japanese disaster relief teams, trained and man-
                                    present on developing an eight-ton utility helicopter.
                                                                                             aged by the Japan International Cooperation Agency
                                    So, too, the ROK Navy is undergoing a massive over-
                                                                                             (JICA) and dispatched by MOFA, are critical to Japan’s
                                    haul, steadily building up a more robust blue-water
                                                                                             response capabilities. These are pre-registered, vol-
                                    capability. By 2015, the navy plans to concentrate
                                                                                             unteer-based civilian teams of medical and search-
                                    the fleet around thirteen KDX destroyers, each ca-
                                                                                             and-rescue (SAR) professionals who are prepared to
                                    pable of operating two helicopters, as well as at least

                                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix
                                     Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                   126
                                     International Cooperation
                                                                                    the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

be dispatched anywhere in the world within forty-         units to call upon in times of crisis, they can request
eight hours. JICA’s disaster relief program divides the   support from the nation’s self-defense forces. Japan’s
teams into three types: 1) rescue teams, to search for    SDF averaged well over eight hundred domestic di-
missing people, rescue victims, and provide first aid;    saster relief operations annually from 2002 to 2007,
2) medical teams; and 3) non-medical expert teams,        demonstrating how often it assists local responders
often including engineers or other specialists who        with emergency transportation, search and rescue
can assist with stopgap measures to help protect the      operations, and firefighting activities.
population and speed recovery, and whose expertise            It was only in 1996 that disaster relief support ac-
corresponds to specific types of disasters.               tivities were first designated as one of three primary
    Because of post-war security frameworks and le-       roles for the SDF. SDF involvement in international
gal considerations, Japan’s involvement in HA/DR op-      disaster relief operations will no doubt continue and
erations was long limited primarily to responding         will likely grow over time, not only because politi-
to natural disasters. The 1987 law governing the de-      cians and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) want to see
ployment of disaster relief teams, formerly known         this happen, but also because the public increasing-
as the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Di-           ly approves of this trend. Cabinet Office polls from
saster Relief Teams (or the JDR Law), set forth the       1991, 1998, and 2006 tested public support for the
conditions under which Japan could provide assis-         SDF’s activities in international disaster relief, dem-
tance in an international HA/DR setting and lim-          onstrating a growth in support from about 54 per-
ited as well the scale and scope of that assistance.      cent in 1991 to over 90 percent in 2006. Opposition
In 1992, however, the Japanese government passed          dropped from just over 30 percent to less than 6 per-
the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Na-             cent (Yoshizaki 2006). As a result, the MOD and SDF
tions Peacekeeping Operations (the so-called PKO          have been rigorously studying CMCoord issues over
Law), enabling Japan to participate in UN peace-          the past few years, knowing civil-military coordina-
keeping and international humanitarian relief op-         tion is crucial to effective HA/DR operations. The two
erations. More importantly for the purposes of this       most recent (annual) Tokyo Defense Fo- 25 The annual Tokyo Defense Forum involves
study, the law also permits Japan for the first time      rum conferences, for example, were fo- military and defense officials from roughly two
                                                                                                       dozen countries (including Australia, Cam-
to deploy SDF forces under special circumstances          cused exclusively on CMCoord and di- bodia, Canada, China, India, Pakistan, Korea,
and arrangements (Watanabe). Then, in 2003, Japan         saster relief operations.25 The same was Russia, the United States), as well as represen-
revised the Official Development Assistance Char-         true for the Asia Pacific Security Semi- tatives from the UN OCHA, the European Union,
ter, originally approved by the Cabinet in 1992, to in-                                                    the ASEAN Secretariat. See Japan
                                                          nar hosted in 2005 by Japan’s National andof Defense (2006) for a summary ofMinis-
                                                                                                       try                                    the Elev-
clude post-conflict humanitarian relief operations.       Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), as enth Tokyo Defense Forum in October 2006.
The charter reads, “The objectives of Japan’s ODA are     well as for recent initiatives organized
to contribute to the peace and development of the         by Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). In this
international community, and thereby to help en-          context, Japan’s SDF is creating a new central read-
sure Japan’s own security and prosperity” (Ministry       iness force as part of the GSDF that would presum-
of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003).                        ably speed an overseas deployment. An interesting
    Working within the political constraints noted        point from an alliance perspective is that this new
above, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have none-       rapid reaction force will eventually be co-located
theless proved themselves to be well equipped to          with U.S. military personnel at Camp Zama in Ja-
tackle some of the world’s most complex HA/DR op-         pan, after new facilities are constructed a few years
erations. The SDF as a whole has gained consider-         from now, offering unique U.S.-Japanese coordina-
able experience executing missions at home when           tion opportunities.
responding to the many domestic natural disasters             Recent diplomatic overtures and defense acqui-
that occur yearly in Japan. Emergency services are        sitions suggest that Japan is looking to expand its
highly centralized in Japan, meaning that local po-       role in international disaster relief even further. For
lice and fire department personnel operate under a        example, in March 2007, Japan and Australia signed
national administrative and policy-making umbrel-         the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Co-
la. Although Japan’s forty-seven prefecture govern-       operation. The document mentions various aspects
ments do not have their own national guard-type           of human security multiple times throughout the


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                   Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                    127
                                                                                            International Cooperation
             the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                         text, including disaster relief. One section states, “Ja-        operations in 2001, largely at the initiative of MOFA,
                         pan and Australia will also strengthen their coop-               and it offers a system to provide emergency relief in
                         eration through the United Nations and other in-                 natural disasters and refugee situations more quick-
                         ternational and regional organizations and through               ly and efficiently than had previously been possible.
                         activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian re-             It serves as a platform for NGOs to mobilize and to
                         lief operations” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan           carry out immediate relief activities, and it provides
                         2007a). Japan is also readying its navy for the entry            a way for these NGOs to pool resources for initial as-
                         of its new helicopter-carrying destroyer. Beginning              sessments at a disaster site and for operational- and
                         in 2009, four new 13,500-ton DDH Hyuga-class ships               policy-oriented interaction with UN agencies and
                         will come into service. Japan’s new flagships, which             international organizations. Its activities are fund-
                         many consider similar to a light carrier or an am-               ed primarily through support from the government
                         phibious assault ship because of their flat-top con-             and, to a smaller extent, by contributions from cor-
                         figuration and size, include the FCS-3, a smaller vari-          porations and individuals.
                         ant of the AEGIS radar system, and can service up                    Japan Platform members have provided assis-
                         to eleven aircraft. The Hyuga-class destroyer, set to            tance in Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan,
                         replace the Haruna-class and Shirane-class destroy-              and Iraq, as well as during the Indian Ocean tsuna-
                         ers, is armed with surface-to-air missiles, ASW tor-             mi. Their ability to organize collectively in close as-
                         pedoes, and two Phalanx air defense systems (Min-                sociation with MOFA has been critical to improving
                         nick 2007). The expansion of the SDF’s naval fleet to            their overall capabilities, in particular their capacity
                         include more sophisticated ships capable of launch-              to respond quickly. This collective approach, however,
                         ing multiple aircraft, thereby enhancing its air capa-           also means that a consensus is often hard to achieve
                         bilities over greater distances, indicates an interest           among its members with regard to CMCoord and the
                         in increasing SDF participation in international and             SDF. A number of Japanese NGOs are ideologically
                         expeditionary-minded operations.                                 opposed to SDF involvement in missions overseas,
                             Japanese NGOs also engage in both domestic and               whatever their configuration, which limits the de-
                         international HA/DR. The primary mechanism by                    gree of direct dialogue between Japan Platform and
                         which Japanese NGOs participate in overseas disas-               the SDF. This is problematic because most Japanese
                         ter relief missions is through Japan Platform and its            NGOs possess limited financial and logistical strength,
                         NGO unit, consisting of about twenty-four participat-            and some form of partnership with the SDF in terms
                         ing NGOs, such as Peace Winds Japan, Japan Mine Ac-              of logistics and communications could be particu-
                         tion Service, the Japanese Red Cross Society, JEN, and           larly helpful to Japanese civilian actors. The leader-
                         Shanti Volunteer Association. Japan Platform began               ship at Japan Platform is trying to bridge this gap by
Structure of Japan Platform                                                                                working with MOFA, the MOD, and the
                                   beneficiaries (refugees, afflicted people)                                 SDF to identify certain specific disas-
                                                                                                           ter relief scenarios that would be least
                                                                                                           controversial and hence could bene-
                                           Japan Platform ( JPF)
                                                                                                           fit in the nearer-term from closer civ-
                     government                Board of Directors          business community
                     ministry of                                           Japan Business Federation
                                                                                                           il-military and interagency coordina-
                     foreign affairs            Standing Committee          private corporation             tion and cooperation.
                                               decide on activities
                                               to promote                                                       To provide a sense of scale re-
          intellectual circle                                              private foundations             garding some of the Japanese gov-
          area studies consortium              Secretariat                 Japan Foundation Center
                                                                                                           ernment’s recent relief contribu-
             local governments                  NGO unit                   citizens, students              tions, Japan responded to the tsunami
             Hiroshima prefecture               (25 organizations)         student networks                by pledging $540 million, donating
                                                implementation of
                                                emergency relief                                           twenty thousand tons of rice, sending
 international aid organizations                                           mass media
 (United Nations)                                                          media advisory panel            twelve medical and relief teams, and
                                                                                                           deploying its largest-ever disaster re-
                                    aid communities in Japan and abroad                                    lief contingent. The Japan Defense
                                                                                                           Agency (or JDA, before it became the


                                                                                                                              Finding the Right Mix
                               Key Partnerships and Platforms for
             128
                               International Cooperation
                                                                                  the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

MOD in 2007) and the SDF quickly understood the            ed swiftly to support South Korea in its fight to min-
scope of the U.S. military response to the tsunami di-     imize the damage, and Japan participated in this
saster as it was being ramped up in Honolulu, since        response by dispatching a team of seven experts
a Japanese liaison officer is permanently stationed        to advise South Korea on oil removal. Additional-
at PACOM. The United States was seeking Japanese           ly, Japan provided key supplies and equipment, in-
participation in the operation, and the JDA was keen       cluding oil-absorbents (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to join. The JDA could immediately order three Mari-       of Japan 2007b).
time Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships, which were in            On May 2, 2008, when tropical cyclone Nargis dec-
the region already, to assist with rescue operations,      imated southwestern Myanmar (affecting over two
but it needed a request from the affected country to       million people one way or another), Japan was also
enable deployment within sovereign borders, and            quick to respond with both financial and material as-
that required help from MOFA.                              sistance (Center for Excellence in Disaster Manage-
    In addition, the SDF could not be dispatched with-     ment and Humanitarian Assistance 2008c), eventu-
out a request to the JDA chief by the foreign minister,    ally pledging some $12.7 million in relief aid (Center
as per Japan’s JDR Law. In the end, more than sixteen      for Excellence in Disaster Management and Human-
hundred SDF personnel were sent to the affected re-        itarian Assistance 2008b). Days after the cyclone hit
gion, including three senior military officers ( from      Myanmar’s coast, moreover, Japan sent supplies to
the Joint Staff Office) tasked with helping to organize    Myanmar, such as tents and electric generators (Min-
the aid effort on the ground. A C-130 cargo plane was      istry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008a). On May 11,
also sent to Indonesia with forty SDF personnel to         Japan sent a second batch of supplies consisting of
transport relief supplies. To coordinate with the U.S.     blankets, plastic sheeting, and jerry cans. A third de-
military and other governments in the operation, Ja-       livery arrived on May 17, and Myanmar received addi-
pan sent about twenty individuals to the regional op-      tional blankets, power generators, and water tanks
erating headquarters at Utapao, Thailand. Similarly,       (JICA 2008a). In addition to supplies and financial
in response to the Pakistan earthquake, Japan provid-      aid, Japan also sent a medical team. The JDR-spon-
ed about $20 million in emergency grant assistance         sored medical team, which consisted of four doc-
and dispatched four SDF helicopters, two C-130 car-        tors, seven nurses, one pharmacist, five medical co-
go planes, and over one hundred SDF personnel to           ordinators, and five logistical coordinators, treated
help with relief deliveries, among other assistance.       twelve hundred patients in Labutta, which is locat-
The government also followed up with a $100 million        ed in the southern region of the Irrawaddy district.
loan for recovery and rehabilitation efforts.              When the medical team returned to Japan, it left be-
    Since its involvement in Southeast Asia and Pak-       hind equipment that could be used by other medi-
istan, Japan has made significant contributions to         cal professionals still operating in the country (Min-
several other disaster relief operations. It was quick     istry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008b).
to respond, for example, to the December 2007 oil              Japan’s tsunami relief efforts also benefited great-
spill off the coast of South Korea caused by the colli-    ly from JICA’s global infrastructure, which proved
sion of the Hong Kong-registered tanker, Hebei Spirit,     instrumental in aiding Japanese planes en route to
and an 11,800-ton barge owned by Samsung Heavy             Myanmar. Japanese planes delivering supplies load-
Industries, which was being towed at the time by a         ed their cargo at a permanent JDR-arranged base fa-
tugboat. As noted earlier, the accident caused 10,500      cility in Singapore (JICA 2008b). JICA also maintains
tons of crude oil to leak into the Yellow Sea, thereby     an office in Myanmar, staffed by more than thirty
creating an ecological disaster of major proportions.      professionals charged with coordinating coopera-
Kim Jong-sik, an official with the ROK’s Ministry of       tive humanitarian efforts (JICA 2008a). Although the
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, expressed the anxi-        medical team redeployed back home in June 2008,
ety many Koreans harbored when he professed to a           Japan remains engaged, and is working through a
French news agency, “We are worried about an eco-          number of NGOs, such as the UN Children’s Fund,
logical disaster…If we fail to contain the spread, it      the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refu-
is feared [it will] inflict serious damage to the coast”   gees, and the World Food Program (Ministry of For-
(BBC News 2007). The international community act-          eign Affairs of Japan 2008c).


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                               129
                                                                                          International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                      Japan also aided China after the devastating May       more than $3 billion budget intended for aid. Fur-
                  2008 earthquake in Sichuan Province. With over six-        thermore, on specific interagency assignments, CIDA
                  ty thousand confirmed dead, tens of thousands more         often controls the largest budget and serves as the
                  missing, and hundreds of thousands injured, this           principal facilitator and distributor of Canada’s for-
                  particular earthquake remains one of the most dev-         eign assistance. For example, in addition to CIDA’s
                  astating in China’s recent memory. Japan’s chief gov-      contribution to feed 1.3 million victims of the 2004
                  ernment spokesman, Nobutaka Machimura, spoke               Indian Ocean tsunami through the WFP and the in-
                  days after the earthquake occurred to announce that        ternational community, CIDA also coordinated aid
                  China had requested assistance and that Japan was          and several humanitarian groups during the recon-
                  ready to help. The first JDR team arrived in China on      struction process, managing $383 million of Canada’s
                  May 15, just three days after the event, and it included   total $425 million commitment (CIDA 2008).
                  specialists from the Fire and Disaster Management              Canada often employs its military, the Canadi-
                  Agency, the National Police Agency, the Coast Guard,       an Forces (CF), to execute HA/DR operations over-
                  and the Foreign Ministry, as well as medical profes-       seas. The CF proves well equipped to conduct such
                  sionals (International Herald Tribune 2008). Perhaps       operations and highly experienced in the full spec-
                  more significantly, this team was the first foreign as-    trum of HA/DR efforts, performing missions with
                  sistance team China permitted to enter the coun-           professionalism and demonstrating a high level of
                  try (Toy 2008). A second team, consisting of twenty-       competency. The CF’s long track record includes en-
                  nine specialists, arrived in China shortly thereafter      gagement in Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Italy, and Sri
                  to complement the first team, consisting of thirty-        Lanka. Following a severe hurricane season in the
                  one specialists, already on the ground (JICA 2008c).       United States, the CF provided Florida with assis-
                  In addition to the JDR teams, Japan also sent a med-       tance (National Defense and the Canadian Forces
                  ical team of twenty-three doctors, nurses, pharma-         1998). At present, the military remains committed
                  cists, and medical coordinators (JICA 2008d). Aside        to assisting NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Cana-
                  from sending personnel, Japan donated as well large        da’s Expeditionary Force Command (EFC) is active-
                  volumes of relief supplies, including seven hundred        ly involved in reconstruction efforts. In August 2005,
                  tents provided by JICA in addition to the one hundred      Canada assumed command of 330 staff members
                  supplied by the MOD and SDF (People’s Daily Online         as part of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction
                  2008). JICA also provided blankets, plastic sheeting,      Team (PRT). The team, in concert with twenty-five
                  sleeping mats, generators, water purification equip-       other PRTs in Afghanistan, aims to provide secu-
                  ment, and water cans (JICA 2008c). Finally, Japan do-      rity, improve governance, and support sustainable
                  nated some $1.7 million in emergency grants to the         development projects – civil support missions that
                  China-directed efforts of the International Federa-        require skills and capabilities similar to those need-
                  tion of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Min-         ed for HA/DR operations (Foreign Affairs and Inter-
                  istry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2008d).                  national Trade Canada 2005).
                                                                                 Canada’s Disaster Assistance Response Team
                  Canada                                                     (DART), which maintains a troop of approximately
                  In the world of HA/DR operations, Canada retains           two hundred Canadian soldiers and specialists avail-
                  a multitude of capabilities and considerable expe-         able to respond to a disaster occurring anywhere
                  rience in the field resulting from its involvement in      in the world, constitutes the CF’s premier unit ded-
                  both domestic emergency situations and its respons-        icated to tackling the most difficult HA/DR opera-
                  es to disasters overseas. On the international front,      tions. DART engages in HA/DR operations by first
                  the Canadian International Development Agency              dispatching a twelve-person reconnaissance team.
                  (CIDA), formed in 1968 with the objective of helping       Once committed, DART’s headquarters, composed
                  to reduce global poverty, serves as Canada’s princi-       of about forty-five staff members, draws upon its en-
                  pal distributor of aid and as a key interagency coor-      gineer, medical, and defense and security platoons,
                  dinator. Canada allocates the largest percentage of        each consisting of approximately forty professionals,
                  its total international aid contribution to CIDA. In       and its twenty-person logistics platoon, to provide
                  FY 2005-06, CIDA received 78 percent of Canada’s           aid and support in a disaster area. DART, which is


                                                                                                               Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
130
                  International Cooperation
                                                                                      the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

based out of Canadian Forces Base Trenton in Ontar-           7,620 medical patients, transported approximately
io, can sustain itself on assignment in a disaster area       70,000 individuals across a river to safety, and helped
for up to forty days. Established in 1996 in response         to repair local infrastructure damaged caused by
to the Rwanda genocide, DART receives an annual               the disaster (CBC News 2005). Later on, in the fall of
budget of $500,000 as well as additional funding for          2005, Canada deployed DART to Pakistan to aid in
specific missions, such as the $15 million supplemen-         that relief effort, distributing in a period of less than
tal to support its work in Turkey in 1999. When DART          two months some five hundred tons of humanitari-
enters a disaster area, the team works to provide             an aid supplies. The team also purified and distrib-
basic medical care (the team can serve 250 outpa-             uted more than 3 million liters of water and treated
tients and 10 inpatients per day as well as provide a         more than 11,000 patients for a variety of medical
lab, a pharmacy, preventive care, and limited obstet-         conditions (Foreign Affairs and International Trade
rics and hydration services); produce safe drinking           Canada 2007).
water (the team can produce fifty thousand liters of              In addition to the HA/DR assets provided by the
water per day); repair basic infrastructure; and im-          government and the CF, other facilitators of human-
prove communications (CBC News 2005).                         itarian assistance, such as the Canadian Red Cross
    Canada’s rapid-response team has proven itself            (CRC), greatly bolster Canada’s capabilities. The CRC
capable of successfully handling difficult missions.          has participated in many disaster relief operations
When Canada sent a DART contingency to Serdivan,              and crises overseas, including emergencies in Mo-
Turkey, to help the Turkish people recover from the           zambique and El Salvador, as well as aiding the re-
aftermath of the August 1999 earthquake that killed           lief efforts in the United States following hurricane
over ten thousand people and caused immense in-               Katrina. In recent months, the CRC has become in-
frastructure damage, the DART staff treated more              volved in numerous relief efforts, including those re-
than 5,000 patients, produced more than 2.5 million           lated to cyclones striking Eastern Africa, the Chadian
liters of purified water, helped to repair damaged            refugee crisis, the China snow disaster, the Darfur
infrastructure, and provided temporary immediate              crisis in Sudan, and floods in Bangladesh. In order
shelter to displaced persons (National Defense and            to support CRC efforts, the organization created the
the Canadian Forces 2007). Responding to the 2004             Rapid Response Centre’s Emergency Operations Sup-
Indian Ocean tsunami, DART personnel established              port Centre (EOSC) in October 1999 to help facili-
a base in Ampara, Sri Lanka, and treated more than            tate and deliver emergency relief services globally.
   Chain of Command for Disaster Relief within Canadian Forces
                                             Minister National Defense

                                                               Chief of the Defense Staff

                                                          Vice Chief of
                                                          the Defense Staff                              Strategic Environment Chiefs
                 Dir, Joint Staff
                                                                          Deputy Chief                   Chief of the Chief of the
                                                                          Defense Staff                   Land Staff Maritime Staff
  Op         Special Operation Group Canada Command
  support                                                            Deputy Minister                            Chief of the
                 JTF 2                 DComd CANCOM
                                                                     National Defense                           Air Staff
                 JNBCD Coy             HQ staff
                                                                                             Canadian Expeditionary
                                   Joint Air TF
                                             6 regional HQs                                  Forces Command
                 JATF

                 SOF Aviation                             Assistant Deputy                     J-Staff
                                                          Ministers
                 SOF Trg Unit                                                                  Mission Specific
                                                                                               Task Forces
                                                                Assistant Deputy Minister
                 SOF CSS Unit                                   (human resources-              Standing Contingency
                                                                military)                      Task Forces
                 SOF Reserves
                                                                                               DART


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                     Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                       131
                                                                                              International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  The EOSC, funded by CIDA’s International Human-            ally help to create new networks for even wider co-
                  itarian Assistance Program, offers training cours-         operation. Any assessment of cooperative ties and
                  es for international relief workers and maintains a        platforms that might be more fully developed as a
                  warehouse filled with disaster relief supplies, ready      means to advance disaster preparedness and set in
                  to be shipped anywhere in the world within twen-           place better response options would therefore be in-
                  ty-four hours. EOSC also provides logistical support       complete without at least a cursory reference to In-
                  for CIDA assessment teams by operating a database          dia’s and China’s perspectives on these matters.
                  cataloguing the resources available to Canada in spe-          Having acquired substantial experience in the
                  cific countries that remain susceptible to natural di-     HA/DR realm based on years of managing a host of
                  sasters (Canadian Red Cross 2006).                         domestic disasters, India, for example, has become
                      The CRC also participates in several forums ded-       a more frequent contributor to foreign disaster re-
                  icated to resolving challenges associated with pro-        lief efforts, at least at the regional level. Along with
                  viding disaster relief. One such forum is the Policy       Australia, the United States, and Japan, India was
                  Action Group on Emergency Response, which aims             a founding member of the core group of nations
                  to improve information sharing and analysis regard-        that took the lead in organizing the international re-
                  ing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Several       sponse to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
                  NGOs and government agencies have joined the CRC           A few months later, in July 2005, New Delhi joined
                  in this forum to create a network of partners. Some        Washington in launching the U.S.-India Disaster Re-
                  of the primary participants include Alternatives, Ca-      lief Initiative, which aims to provide a framework for
                  nadian Foodgrains Bank, Canadian Lutheran’s World          the two nations to “strengthen their military capa-
                  Relief, Canadian Red Cross, CARE Canada, Médecins          bilities to respond effectively to future disasters by
                  Sans Frontières Canada, Mennonite Central Com-             conducting joint and combined military exercises”
                  mittee, Oxfam Canada, Save the Children Canada,            (U.S. Department of State 2005). Since then, among
                  the Canadian Centre for International Studies and          other efforts, India has deployed ships from the In-
                  Cooperation, World Vision Canada, the CIDA’s In-           dian navy with relief supplies and other assistance
                  ternational Humanitarian Assistance Program, and           to Bangladesh in November 2007 after cyclone Sidre
                  the Department of Foreign Affairs and Internation-         and to Myanmar in May 2008 after cyclone Nargis.
                  al Trade’s Humanitarian Affairs Section (Canadian          Current plans to expand its naval capacity over the
                  Red Cross 2006).                                           next several years, to include the activation of a re-
                                                                             furbished Russian aircraft carrier, the acquisition of
                  A Final Note on India and China                            ASW and troop transport helicopters, the construc-
                  The five countries reviewed above –Australia, Singa-       tion of an indigenously developed carrier, and the
                  pore, the ROK, Japan, and Canada – stand out as the        fielding of new long-range patrol boats and mari-
                  most likely non-European national-level partners           time surveillance aircraft, should substantially im-
                  for the United States in the organization and exe-         prove India’s overall response capability, as well as
                  cution of joint HA/DR operations, whether they are         its ability to contribute usefully to multilateral HA/
                  conducted on a bilateral, trilateral, or broader mul-      DR missions (India Defence 2007a, 2007b). Expand-
                  tilateral basis. This is especially true with respect to   ing U.S.-Indian naval cooperation, which has encom-
                  operations in the Asia-Pacific region, though Can-         passed multilateral exercises in the Bay of Bengal
                  ada has partnered with the United States (and will         to which Australia, Singapore, and Japan have also
                  likely do so again) on a more global level, including,     contributed, should provide a practical framework
                  not surprisingly, in North and South America. That         for exercises and training regimes that have an HA/
                  said, a number of countries of rising strategic impor-     DR component (Herman 2007).
                  tance – most notably, India and China – are emerg-             In time, China’s newfound interest in HA/DR
                  ing as more prominent players in regional HA/DR            collaboration could have an even more profound
                  planning activities, and future bilateral and multi-       impact, especially with respect to the potential pro-
                  lateral cooperation with these – and possibly other        vision of Chinese military support to relief opera-
                  countries that profess a growing interest in boosting      tions overseas. Until quite recently, authorities in
                  local capabilities in the HA/DR arena – may eventu-        Beijing have consistently opposed the deployment


                                                                                                                 Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
132
                  International Cooperation
                                                                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units in support         finally got under way in 2005 with a U.S. delegation
of foreign HA/DR missions, despite the fact that the       visiting Chengdu. This led to at least two additional
PLA, like its Indian counterpart, has a long and quite     exchanges, including a 2006 visit by PLA officers to
extensive history of responding to domestic disas-         U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) headquar- 26 China provided relief supplies and cash to-
ters.26 Prompted perhaps by its own experience as a        ters in Hawaii and a 2007 return visit to taling some $83.1 million to the countries af-
                                                                                                        fected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, some
recipient of quite useful foreign military assistance      China by the American side. According $6.2 million to Pakistan after the 2005 earth-
after the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, as well as          to U.S. military officers involved in the quake, and some $11 million to Myanmar af-
by a growing recognition that improving its capac-         meetings, PLA participants have been ter cyclone Nargis. On the other hand, it did
ity to provide such assistance could boost its dip-                                                                                            now
                                                           quite positive about future Chinese mil- not offer to send any PLA ships (whichotherin-
                                                                                                        clude a Type 920 hospital ship) or any       mil-
lomatic profile in the region and pave the way to          itary support (when requested) for in- itary units that have gained some experience
broader military cooperation with other nations on         ternational relief efforts, support that over the years in disaster relief operations by
a relatively non-controversial set of activities, Chi-     could include the dispatch of a special participating in responses to disasters within
                                                                                                        China. Since the 2004 tsunami relief effort, how-
na has begun to change its tune. At a mid-June 2008        PLA urban rescue team that was demon- ever, Chinese authorities, including senior PLA
workshop in Shijiazhuang, China, sponsored by the          strated for the American visitors during commanders, have begun to question this tra-
PLA’s Field Army Commanding Academy, for exam-             the discussions held in China. Chinese ditional reluctance to deploy military forces in
                                                                                                        support of foreign HA/DR missions, fearing that
ple, Chinese officials floated the idea of developing      interest in collaborating in the HA/DR it may give the impression that China is unwill-
SOPs for organizing and coordinating military sup-         arena was also confirmed in talks held ing to do all that it can to assist neighboring
port for disaster relief operations by the armed forc-     in Beijing in April 2007 between an IFPA countries in the throes of a humanitarian cri-
es of the ASEAN member states, China, Japan, and                                                                too,
                                                           delegation and various PLA experts, as sis. So,have in view of the goodwill such deploy-
                                                                                                        ments        generated for the United States and
the ROK, or the so-called “10 plus 3” countries (Xin-      part of the field research for this study other countries that have provided military sup-
hua News Agency 2008). At approximately the same           (interview 2007a, 2007b).                    port to foreign HA/DR missions, officials in Bei-
time, the foreign ministers of China, South Korea,             Clearly, given the broad maritime ex- jing increasingly appear to recognize that such
                                                                                                        support could play an important role in China’s
and Japan agreed at a meeting in Tokyo on the need         panses of the Asian-Pacific region, both broader diplomatic initiatives in the region.
to develop a mechanism to encourage trilateral co-         Sino-American and U.S.-Indian cooper-
operation on disaster prevention and management.           ation on HA/DR matters could be advanced as well
Toward that end, senior officials from the disaster        by the participation of China and India in the Glob-
management agencies of all three countries are ex-         al Maritime Partnership (GMP) championed by the
pected to meet soon to discuss concrete measures           U.S. Navy (discussed in chapter 3). The HA/DR mis-
for closer cooperation, including standing arrange-        sion area, it will be recalled, has been singled out in
ments for the dispatch of rescue teams to assist one       the Navy’s New Maritime Strategy as an ideal set of
another in the event of an earthquake, typhoon, or         activities around which to build GMP initiatives, and
similar calamity (Chosun Ilbo 2008).                       there is no denying that China and India could use-
    China’s efforts to encourage HA/DR collabora-          fully pursue HA/DR-relevant training and exercises,
tion at the 10-plus-3 and trilateral levels could get a    should they wish to do so, via a GMP format as they
welcome boost as well from ongoing dialogues be-           field more robust naval capabilities. Obviously, given
tween China and the United States on HA/DR les-            the rising level of U.S.-Indian naval cooperation al-
sons learned and potential areas for bilateral col-        ready in train, this will be easier for India to do than
laboration. Initial discussions in this vein apparently    it will be for China, and, as noted above, first steps
were begun in 1998 when Presidents Clinton and Ji-         in this direction have already been taken. The more
ang Zemin agreed that the PLA and the U.S. military        limited character of Sino-American naval cooper-
should “share information and discuss issues relat-        ation and the PLA’s cautious approach to GMP col-
ed to their respective experiences in the areas of hu-     laboration almost certainly guarantee slower prog-
manitarian assistance and disaster relief ” as part of a   ress on this particular front. That said, when briefed
broader series of military-to-military exchanges (PRC      in 2007 on the GMP by U.S. Admiral Michael Mullen,
Embassy in the United States 1998). Sino-American          then the chief of naval operations, the commander
cooperation on the HA/DR front was put on hold (as         of the PLA Navy (PLAN), Vice Admiral Wu Shengli, ex-
were military exchanges overall) following the May         pressed interest in further discussions on how Chi-
1999 bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade and            na might usefully participate. Future Navy and PLAN
the March 2001 EP-3/F-8 incident, but the program          exchanges on the GMP, therefore, could provide an


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                                    Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                                     133
                                                                                             International Cooperation
               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                                    especially productive platform from which to pro- but they need to be institutionalized and accorded
                                    mote Chinese readiness to deploy military forces in higher priority.
                                    support of bilateral and multilateral HA/DR opera-         Of course, the absence of a NATO-like security or-
                                    tions (McVadon forthcoming).                           ganization in the Asian-Pacific region would make
                                                                                           a similar initiative harder to advance with Ameri-
                                    Conclusion                                             ca’s Asian-Pacific friends and allies, but even here
                                    Based on the analysis set forth in this chapter, much
                                                                                           there are signs of progress on which to build. As
                                    could and should be done to improve U.S. collabo-
                                                                                           mentioned earlier in this chapter, at the fifteenth-
                                    ration with key foreign partners, including the UN,
                                                                                           anniversary meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum
                                    NATO, the EU, ASEAN, and longstanding allies, as
                                                                                           in July 2008, the foreign ministers of the member
                                    well as emerging regional powers. For example, if
                                                                                           states, which include the United States, agreed on
                                    the roadblocks that now prevent closer NATO-EU col-
                                                                                           the need to use the ARF framework to better coor-
                                    laboration in the HA/DR arena could be removed
                                                                                           dinate their responses to regional disasters, such as
                                    (roadblocks that are largely rooted in the EU dis-
                                                                                           cyclone Nargis and the Sichuan earthquake. More
                                    pute over allowing Turkey some level of participation
                                                                                           specifically, they agreed to “explore the feasibility”
                                    in the European Defense Agency, or EDA),27 Ameri-
                                                                                           of creating an ARF mechanism for promoting HA/
                                    ca’s ability to deploy its national assets and exper-
                                                                                           DR civil-military coordination, and they endorsed a
27       For useful background on the nature of tise in concert with both organizations
     this dispute and its impact on NATO-EU se- would be vastly improved. Whether or proposal by the Philippines and the United States
            curity collaboration, see Hall (2008).                                         to conduct an ARF-wide disaster relief exercise be-
                                                   not a solution to the EDA problem can
                                                                                           fore the ARF’s 2009 ministerial meeting (Tang 2008).
                                    be found remains to be seen, but a more vigorous
                                                                                           In conjunction with various bilateral and trilater-
                                    U.S. diplomatic effort to help broker such a solution
                                                                                           al efforts already supported by the United States to
                                   – and thereby open the door to broader NATO-EU-U.S.
                                                                                           help encourage regional collaboration, these new
                                    cooperation on HA/DR and other civil support ac-
                                                                                           ARF initiatives could be of immense value in help-
                                    tivities – would certainly seem appropriate. Failing
                                                                                           ing to build HA/DR capabilities – including steps
                                    that, a more regular series of exchanges on national
                                                                                           to enhance disaster preparedness and prevention
                                    HA/DR policies, procedures, and capability needs at
                                                                                          – in a part of the world where they are still sore-
                                    the NATO level alone would likely lead to improved
                                                                                           ly needed.
                                    transatlantic coordination and collaboration. Inter-
                                    mittent dialogues along these lines have been held,




                                 References
                                 Aerospace Daily and Defense Report. 2005. Australia deploys aircraft to aid Pakistan. November 11.
                                 Agence France-Presse. 2008. Foreign rescue teams arrive in China. May 16.
                                 ASEAN. 2005. ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emer-
                                 gency Response. Article 9. Vientiane, July 26.
                                 ———. 2006. ASEAN in action: Coordinated emergency response for earth-
                                 quake victims in Indonesia. Press release. June 7.
                                 ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM). Agreements and declarations.
                                 http://acdm-online.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39.
                                 ASEAN Secretariat. 2006. ASEAN regional security: The threats facing it and the way forward. April 10.
                                 Asian Development Bank. 2008. Myanmar: Second information note to the board. June 10.
                                 Associated Press. 2008. South Korea to send rescue team to help Chinese quake victims. May 16.
                                 Australian Government AusAID. Indonesia earthquake. http://www.au-
                                 said.gov.au/hottopics/topic.cfm?ID=9266_4812_2319_9931_3162.

                                                                                                                             Finding the Right Mix
                                 Key Partnerships and Platforms for
               134
                                 International Cooperation
                                                                             the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

Australian Government Department of Defense. 2008. C-17A Globemaster transports Puma helicopters
from Johannesburg. May 27.
http://www.defence.gov.au/media/download/2008/May/20080527a/index.htm.
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. ASEAN Regional Forum.
http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/.
Australian Government Emergency Management Australia. 2004. Australian Government emergency
management plans.
http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/ema/emaInternet.nsf/Page/RWP68102
7A85934D67CCA256C4B001AAFAC?OpenDocument.
Annie Bang. 2006. Korea dispatches disaster relief team to Indonesia. Korea Herald, May 29.
Michel Barnier. 2006. For a European civil protection force: Europe aid (also known as the Barnier Report).
BBC Asia Pacific. 2006. ASEAN, U.S. reportedly agree on enhanced partnership, November 20.
BBC News. 2007. S. Korea declares slick ‘disaster.’ December 9. http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7134967.stm.
David Boey. 2008. Unmanned aircraft ‘key in air combat and relief work’; UAVs are the fo-
cus of a top-level defense meeting on air power. Straits Times (Singapore), February 19.
Mely Caballero-Anthony. 2006. Learning from the Europeans. Straits Times (Singapore), June 30.
CBC News. 2005. Disaster relief: Canada’s rapid-response team. October 17.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/dart.html.
Canadian Red Cross. 2006. Rapid Response Centre (EOSC): Responding rapidly when disasters strike.
September 19.
http://www.redcross.ca/article.asp?id=005477&tid=036.
Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitari-
an Assistance. 2008a. Cyclone Nargis update. May 27.
———. 2008b. Cyclone Nargis update. June 18.
———. 2008c. Cyclone Nargis update. June 12.
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. 2006a. Pakistan
earthquake: A review of the civil-military dimensions of the international response. April.
———. 2006b. South Asia earthquake update. Pacific Disaster Management Information Network.
March 2.
http://www.coe-dmha.org/Pakistan/SAEU030206.htm.
ChinaDaily.com. 2006. Asia to strengthen disaster co-operation. July 29.
http://www.chinadaily.cn/cndy/2006-07/29/content_652420.htm.
Chosun Ilbo. 2008. Korea, China, Japan FMs meet. June 16.
http://english.chosun.com/cgi-bin/printNews?id=200806160025.
CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency). 2008.
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/acdicida.nsf/En/Home.
Commission of the European Communities. 2005. Reinforcing EU disaster and cri-
sis response in third countries. COM(2005) 153 final. April 20.
Commonwealth Secretariat. 1999. Review of international mechanisms for disaster relief, rehabilitation,
and reconstruction.
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BE4049D36-
92C9-4800-B47B-08067BF23EDB%7D_CCGE992.pdf.
John Cosgrave and Sara Nam. 2007. Evaluation of DG ECHO’s actions in re-
sponse to the Pakistan earthquake of 2005. Channel Research. August.

Finding the Right Mix
                                                                             Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                          135
                                                                                     International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  Jim Dorschner. 2007. South Korea – Widening horizons. Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 20.
                  European Commission. 2005a. South Asia earthquake (Pakistan, India, Afghanistan).
                  http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/asia/south_asia_2005_en.htm.
                  ———. 2005b. Communicating to save lives. October 12. http://
                  ec.europa.eu./echo/whatsnew/ip_2005_10_13_en.htm.
                  ———. 2005c. Humanitarian support for earthquake victims: Commission’s immediate re-
                  sponse. October 10. http://ec.europa.eu/external_realtions/pakistan/intro/earthquake.htm.
                  ———. 2006. One year on: The European Commission’s response to
                  the South Asia earthquake. Press release. September 22.
                  European Union. 2007a. Council decision of 5 March 2007 establishing a civil protection financial instru-
                  ment. Official Journal of the European Union.
                  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_071/l_07120070310en00090017.pdf.
                  ———. 2007b. Council decision of 8 November 2007establishing a community civil protection mecha-
                  nism (recast). Official Journal of the European Union.
                  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_314/l_31420071201en00090019.pdf.
                  Gregory Ferguson and William Matthews. 2007. Austra-
                  lia, U.S. sign ITAR Treaty. Defense News, September 10.
                  Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. 2005. Pakistan earthquake relief operation. October 8.
                  http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/nato_pakistan-en.asp.
                  ———. 2007. Pakistan earthquake relief operation. August 6.
                  http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/nato/nato_pakistan-en.asp.
                  GSDI (Global Spacial Data Infrastructure). 2006. Online Southeast Asia disaster inventory. Spatial Data
                  Infrastructure—Asia and the Pacific Newsletter 3, no.11 (November).
                  http://www.gsdi.org/newsletters/SDIAPv3n11.pdf.
                  Guk jeong [ROK Government Information Agency]. 2007. Government, soldiers, and civilians do utmost
                  to remove crude oil [in Korean]. Briefing. December 10.
                  http://www.korea.kr/newsWeb/appmanager/portal/news2?_nfpb=true&portlet_categorynews2_2_
                  actionOverride=%2Fpages%2Fbrief%2FcategoryNews2%2Fview&_windowLabel=portlet_
                  categorynews2_2&portlet_categorynews2_2newsDataId=148644570&portlet_ca.
                  Ben Hall. 2008. NATO seeks better EU-Turkey defence ties. Financial Times, July 8.
                  Hannelore Hammele and Nicole Cremel. 2005. UNOSAT tackles tsunami challenge. CERN Courier, March 30.
                  http://cerncourier.com/cws/artcle/cern/29295.
                  Steve Herman. 2007. Indian, US naval exercises herald new era. Voice of America, September 10, as posted at
                  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/09/mil-070910-voa01.htm.
                  Andrew Hetherington. 2007. Navy puts weight into Talisman Sabre. Royal Australian Navy News, July.
                  Denis Hew. 2005. Roadmap to an ASEAN economic community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
                  Christopher Hill, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. 2007. Quoted in
                  D. Pereira, ARF: The United States calls for a joint relief force, Straits Times (Singapore), August 1.
                  Robert Hill, Australian Government Department of Defense. 2005.
                  More ADF troops return home from Aceh. March 4.
                  Sharon Hobson. 2005. Briefing – disaster relief – welcome relief? Jane’s Defence Weekly 42, no. 20 (May 18).
                  IASC. About the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
                  http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/about/default.asp?print=True.




                                                                                                             Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
136
                  International Cooperation
                                                                                the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

IFPA. 2005. Trilateral tools for managing complex contingencies: U.S.-Japan-Ko-
rea cooperation in disaster relief and stabilization/reconstruction missions. Sem-
inar report. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. November 2005.
India Defence. 2007a. Indian Navy modernization: 6 new submarines, 33 ships to be acquired. January 7.
http://www.india-defence.com/reports-3384.
———. 2007b. Indian Navy to float global tender for maritime patrol aircraft. March 12.
http://www.india-defence.com/reports/3640.
International Herald Tribune. 2008. Japan dispatches disaster relief team to China to join effort to rescue
quake victims. May 15.
http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=12907883.
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. Inter-Agency Secretariat. 2004. Living with
risk: A global review of disaster reduction initiatives, 2004 version. Vol. 1. United Nations.
interview 2007a. Major General (Ret.) Pan Zhenqiang, director, Internation-
al Security Program, China Reform Forum, Beijing, China. April 26.
———. 2007b. Major General (Ret.) Gong Xianfu, vice chairman, China Insti-
tute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing, China. April 30.
———. 2007c. Asta Mackeviciute, policy officer, Civil Protection Unit, Eu-
ropean Commission, Brussels, Belgium. December 14.
Jane’s Defence Weekly. 2007. Royal Australian Navy: Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Russ Shalders. May 2.
JICA. 2008a. JDR medical team dispatched to Myanmar. May 28.
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/resources/field/2008/may28_02.html.
———. 2008b. Japanese emergency assistance reaches Myanmar to help cyclone survivors. May 7.
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/resources/field/2008/may07.html.
———. 2008c. Japan sends additional rescue workers to Chinese earthquake epicenter. May 16, 2008.
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/resources/field/2008/may16.html.
———. 2008d. Japan sends medical team to help in China earthquake cleanup. May 20.
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/resources/field/2008/may20.html.
Japan Ministry of Defense. 2006. The 11th Tokyo Defense Forum summary by the chair.
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/t_d_forum/2006.html.
Stephen Jordan, ed. 2006. From relief to recovery: The 2005 U.S. business response to the Southeast
Asia tsunami and Gulf Coast hurricanes. Washington, D.C.: Business Civic Leadership Center.
Kang Shin-who. 2007. UN wants more humanitarian aid from
South Korea: Top official. Korea Times, June 14.
Robert Karniol. 2006. FPDA countries agree to step-up disas-
ter relief readiness. Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 21.
———. 2007. Australia, Japan commit to further defense cooperation. Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 13.
Hekmat Karzai. N.d. Singapore’s capacity building efforts in Afghanistan, Nanyang Technological University.
http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/others/Singapore’s%20Ca-
pacity%20Building%20Efforts%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf.
Mark Koh. 2006. Operation Unified Assistance – A Singapore liaison offi-
cer’s perspective. Liaison 3, no. 3. Center of Excellence DMHA.
Korea Times. 2005a. Korea ranks lowest in overseas assistance. January 21.
———. 2005b. Efforts underway to help victims of tidal waves. February 3.




Finding the Right Mix
                                                                               Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                             137
                                                                                        International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  Korea.net. 2008. Lee visits quake-hit Sichuan Province. May 30.
                  http://www.korea.net/news/news/newsView.asp?serial_no=2
                  0080530013&part=103&SearchDay=&source=.
                  Lee Joo-hee. 2006. Interview: KOICA aims to boost overseas assistance. Korea Herald, March 30.
                  Peter Lockwood, combined force maritime component com-
                  mander CDRE. 2007. Quoted in Hetherington 2007.
                  Manila Times. 2007a. 40 years on, the ASEAN reviews itself. January 10.
                  ———. 2007b. A major security pact. June 2.
                  RADM Eric A. McVadon, USN (Ret.) Forthcoming. Humanitarian operations and U.S.-China na-
                  val cooperation: Prospects and problems. In Defining a Maritime Security Partnership with Chi-
                  na, ed. Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Nan Li (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press).
                  MINDEF Singapore. 2002. Speech by acting chief of defense force and chief of navy, Rear-Ad-
                  miral Lui Tuck Yew, at the opening ceremony of the ASEAN Regional Forum’s humani-
                  tarian assistance and disaster relief seminar. November 4. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/
                  imindef/news_and_events/nr/2002/dec/04dec02_nr1/04dec02_speech1.html.
                  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2003. Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter. August 29.
                  http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf.
                  ———. 2007a. Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. March 13.
                  http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html.
                  ———. 2007b. Emergency aid to the Republic of Korea for oil spill accident. December 14.
                  http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2007/12/1176716_840.html.
                  ———. 2008a. Emergency assistance for the cyclone disaster in the Union of Myanmar. May 5.
                  http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/5/1179757_1010.html.
                  ———. 2008b. Cyclone disaster in Myanmar (return of Japan disaster relief medical team). June 9.
                  http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/6/1180679_1020.html.
                  ———. 2008c. Emergency assistance to the Union of Myanmar. May 9.
                  http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/5/1179856_1010.html.
                  ———. 2008d. Earthquake disaster in Sichuan Province (humanitarian assistance to the government of
                  the People’s Republic of China through the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soci-
                  eties). May 21.
                  http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/5/1180169_1010.html.
                  Ministry of National Defense of the ROK, PKO overview.
                  http://www.mnd.go.kr/.
                  MPAT (Multinational Planning Augmentation Team). Focus and objectives.
                  http://www1.apan-info.net/mpat/Events/PastEvents/TE03Home/tabid/5131/Default.aspx.
                  Wendell Minnick. 2007. Japan’s new ship: Destroyer or carrier? Defense News, September 2.
                  MOMAF (ROK Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries). 2007. Press re-
                  lease: This is the truth [in Korean]. December 15.
                  National Defense and the Canadian Forces. 1998. Backgrounder: Canadian Forces participation in hu-
                  manitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. November 8.
                  http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=574.
                  ———. 2007. Operation Torrent: August 24, 1999-September 25, 1999. April 16.
                  http://www.mdn.ca/site/Operations/torrent_e.asp.
                  NATO. 2001. NATO’s role in disaster assistance. November.
                  http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/mcda-e.pdf.


                                                                                                          Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
138
                  International Cooperation
                                                                               the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

———. 2007. Pakistan earthquake relief operation. June 26. http://www.
nato.int/issues/pakistan_earthquake/practice.html.
Pacific Disaster Center. 2005. Supporting disaster information sharing in Southeast Asia.
http://apnhin.org/PDCNewsWebArticles/2005ASEAN/.
———. 2006. Senior policy forum: Mega disaster—a global “tipping point” in nat-
ural disaster policy, planning and development. Maui, Hawaii, August.
Park Soo-gil. 2007. Soft power and Korean diplomacy. Korea Herald, December 28.
People’s Daily Online. 2008. Japan sends 800 more tents to China’s quake-hit areas. June 4.
http://www.english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6424438.html.
PRC (People’s Republic of China) Embassy in the United States. 1998. China-U.S military exchanges and
agreements reached since the visit by Chinese defense minister General Chi Haotian to the U.S. in Dec.
1996.
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zmgx/Military%20Relationship/t35738.htm.
Marcel Lee Pereira. 2007. SAF to send two teams to help in Afghan reconstruction. Straits Times, March 6.
Friis Arne Petersen and Hans Binnendijk. 2007. The Comprehensive Approach Initiative: Fu-
ture options for NATO. Defense Horizons, no. 58 (September). A publication of the Center for Tech-
nology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard Weitz. 2004. Emerging threats, plan-
ning, and responses, vol. 1, Consequence management and NATO Europe since
9/11. IFPA report for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. August.
S. Pitsuwan, 2008. U.S.-ASEAN cooperation. PacNet, no. 15. Pacific Forum CSIS. March 3.
Felipe Salvosa. 2007. Disaster relief setup pushed. BusinessWorld, August 3.
SHAPE. 2006. NATO disaster relief operation in Pakistan: Octo-
ber 2005- January 2006. SHAPE News, February 22.
Singapore Civil Defence Force. Organizational structure: International co-operation,
http://www.scdf.gov.sg/General/About_Us/Organisation_Structure/international_cooperation.html.
Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2005. Singapore’s international disaster relief efforts to tsunami-
hit countries. Fact sheet. January 14.
http://www.app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,4154.
The Hon. Stephen Smith, foreign minister of Australia. 2008a. Media release. May 16.
———. 2008b. Media release. June 27.
Javier Solana. 2006. Suggestions regarding ESDP assets for improving the Europe-
an Union’s disaster response capacities. Document SO63/06. March 6.
Sydney Morning Herald. 2008. Australia to monitor its $25m Burma aid. May 26.
Leonard Tan. 2006. Saving lives and delivering hope: Singapore Armed Forces’ involve-
ment in tsunami relief operation. Liaison 3, no. 3. Center of Excellence DMHA.
Janice Tang. 2008. Asia-Pacific nations agree to boost maritime secu-
rity, disaster relief. Kyodo World Service (Tokyo), July 24.
Mary-Anne Toy. 2008. Japan sends in military to help China. The Age, May 29.
UNESCO. 2006. Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System up and running. Science Daily, July.
UNJLC. Air operations. http://www.unjlc.org/airoperations/.
UNJLC. 2006. Pakistan earthquake 2005-2006. Consolidated weekly sitreps.
http://www.unjlc.org/23003/pakistan/sitreps/.



Finding the Right Mix
                                                                               Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                            139
                                                                                       International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                  UNOCHA. Central register of disaster management capacities.
                  http://ocha.unog.ch/cr/.
                  ———. 2007. Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief - “Oslo
                  Guidelines.” Updated Nov. 2006, rev. 1.1, Nov. 2007.
                  http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/Civil-
                  MilitaryCoordinationSection/PolicyGuidanceandPublications/tabid/1403/Default.aspx.
                  U.S. Department of State. 2005. U.S.-India Disaster Relief Initiative. July 18.
                  http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49730.htm.
                  Makiko Watanabe. Japan’s humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian Practice Network.
                  http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2617.
                  White House Office of the Press Secretary. 2007a. Fact sheet: Unit-
                  ed States cooperation with Southeast Asia. September.
                  ———. 2007b. President Bush and Australian prime minister Howard discuss U.S.-Australia de-
                  fense trade cooperation treaty in joint press availability. InterContinental Sydney. Sydney, Austra-
                  lia. September 4. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/print/20070904-10.html.
                  Sharon Wiharta, Hassan Ahmad, Jean-Yves Haine, Josefina Lofgren, and Tim Randal. 2008. The effective-
                  ness of foreign military assets in a natural disaster response. Stockholm International Peace Research In-
                  stitute (SIPRI).
                  http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=358#.
                  Xinhua News Agency. 2008. China proposes disaster relief cooperation plan at 10+3 workshop. June 13.
                  Yap Su-Yin. 2006. Singapore steadfast in post-tsunami aid push; Groups, volun-
                  teers tireless in ongoing effort to rebuild. Straits Times, December 25.
                  Yonhap News Agency. 2005a. South Korea donates $500,000 to
                  NGO for Indian Ocean tsunami victims. June 10.
                  ———. 2005b. South Korea to send military aircraft, ships to tsunami-aid hit areas. January 4.
                  ———. 2008. South Korea to provide additional aid to Kenya. January 30.
                  Yoshizaki Tomonori. 2006. Japan’s approach to civil-military coordina-
                  tion for overseas disasters. Presentation at IFPA Workshop 2006.
                  David S. Yost. 2007. Enhancing NATO’s cooperation with inter-
                  national organizations. NATO Review, Autumn.




                                                                                                           Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
140
                  International Cooperation
  6
ChaPter




                              Summary Conclusions &
                                Recommendations
 Given the prospect of more frequent foreign disas-         address the grievances that often lie at the heart of
 ters and humanitarian crises in the years ahead, and       insurgencies and fuel the discontent of communi-
 considering the astronomical costs they could im-          ties on which terrorists depend and prey (U.S. De-
 pose – approaching $300 billion per year by 2050           partment of Defense 2008).
– unless major steps are taken to reduce current vul-           In his July 15, 2008, speech, Secretary Gates also
 nerabilities, military support for HA/DR operations        warned against what he described as a “creeping
 will remain a key component of American diploma-           militarization” of American foreign policy, as the
 cy and national security planning for some time to         U.S. military becomes more involved in a range of
 come. Apart from their very specific roles in disas-       activities overseas that were viewed in the past as
 ter prevention and management, moreover, HA/DR            “the exclusive province of civilian agencies and or-
 planning and training initiatives undertaken by DoD        ganizations.” Faced with this trend, it is perhaps
 and the military services should help as well to de-       understandable, he went on to suggest, that civil-
 fine an overarching national security strategy better      ian experts at the State Department and USAID, for
 suited to the challenges of the twenty-first century       example, might express resentment over the larger
 than relying on the direct application of military         role now being assumed by America’s armed forces
 force alone. This is especially true with respect to       in stability operations and the civil support realm
 the challenges of global terrorism, irregular warfare,     overall, including HA/DR operations. But civil-mil-
 and other less traditional threats, given the empha-       itary discord based on the military’s perceived in-
 sis of HA/DR initiatives on CMCoord, civil support         trusion into the civil sector, he added, need not and
 missions, and both interagency and multilateral col-       should not be the end result, so long as there is ef-
 laboration. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates           fective coordination between the two communities
 stressed in a speech to the U.S. Global Leadership         and a “clear understanding…of how they fit, or in
 Campaign on July 15, 2008, America and its friends         some cases don’t fit, together.” In addition, Secretary
 and allies “cannot kill or capture [their] way to vic-     Gates pointed to the new interagency structure of
 tory” in the battles against transnational terrorists      SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM – and to the civil-support
 and other extremists, many of whom find safe ha-           focus of their current operations – as examples of
 vens and pools of willing recruits in failed or failing    the kind of collaborative organization and program-
 states (which are often the result, it might be added,     ming that are needed in today’s world where “the
 of natural or man-made disasters.) What is needed,         lines separating war, peace, diplomacy, and devel-
 he went on to suggest, is a more integrated strategic      opment have become more blurred, and no longer
 approach that pulls together military, civilian, gov-      fit the neat organizational charts of the twentieth
 ernmental, private sector, national, and internation-      century.” He didn’t explicitly say so, but an obvious
 al capabilities in a combined, multifaceted effort to      implication of his statements is that the efforts now


Finding the Right Mix

                                                                     the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs   141
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

               being made by DoD, the military services, and the          civil and military HA/DR communities, each of the
               COCOMs – and examined in-depth throughout this             chapters in this study identified a number of poli-
               study – to prepare for and contribute more effective-      cy and organizational reforms, operational adjust-
               ly to foreign disaster relief and humanitarian assis-      ments, and capability developments that, if adopted,
               tance missions are entirely consistent with and, to        could lead to more cost-effective HA/DR operations
               some extent, leading this shift toward a new par-          in the future. At this point, repeating each and every
               adigm in civil-military relations to address future        recommendation would be unnecessarily tedious
               security risks.                                            and duplicative. What follows, therefore, is a sum-
                   A key conclusion to draw from this study, there-       mary and synthesis of several of the study’s more
               fore, is that continued debate across the civil-mil-       important and broadly applicable findings and pol-
               itary divide over who should or shouldn’t take the         icy suggestions.
               lead in any particular HA/DR mission will miss the
               main point – namely, that both civil and military              Process for Requesting Military Aid
               responders have much to contribute, and that the               Clearly, current efforts to reform and institution-
               primary question to answer is how their joint contri-          alize the State-DoD process for requesting mil-
               butions can be maximized in the context of a com-              itary support in the event of a foreign disaster
               mon effort, not who has (or should have) the leading           must be sustained. This is the best way to make
               role. Based on the analyses presented in the pre-              sure that future requests are in fact necessary
               ceding chapters, it also safe to conclude that the             and properly framed, and that the support re-
               answer to this question rests as much on the rela-             quested is provided in as expeditious a manner
               tionships that have been (or will be) built between            as possible. Operationally, this also means that
               the civil and military HA/DR communities – and                 the dual-track Executive Secretariat and letter
               on the insight these ties provide each communi-                of commitment process discussed in chapter 2
               ty into the strengths and weaknesses of the other              should be retained in order to provide prompt
              – as on the actual skills and capabilities that either          coverage across the full spectrum of small-, me-
               can bring to bear on a specific HA/DR-related task.            dium-, and large-scale disasters. At the same
               If the right relationships can be established and              time, given the current emphasis on not undu-
               maintained between civil and military responders               ly taxing DoD agencies and military units that
               by means of regular and realistic joint training, ex-          may already be overstretched, it would be use-
               ercises, and education, then the issue of “who does            ful as well to find a way factor into the official
               what when” will become far less compelling. Hence,             decision process a better sense for how the pri-
               as emphasized in chapter 4, creating more opportu-             vate sector might also be able to contribute to
               nities to train, exercise, and learn together in ways          a disaster response beyond its traditional sup-
               that attract robust interagency, public-private, mul-          port in the air- and sealift sectors.
               tilateral, and multinational participation should be
               viewed by the entire HA/DR community as perhaps                Local Capacity Building
               the single most important step it could take to make           Apart from emergency relief once disaster
               sure that future relief efforts are as effective as pos-       strikes, military assistance programs focused
               sible. Moreover, given that DoD’s funding levels are           on local capacity building in disaster-prone re-
               far higher than State’s, and given the importance              gions both before and after any disaster occurs
               of integrated civil support missions to current and            are becoming an increasingly important com-
               emerging security challenges (over and above grow-             ponent of HA/DR operations as a whole. For
               ing and more specific demands for military support             this reason alone, additional efforts to coordi-
               to HA/DR efforts), it might be the better part of wis-         nate growing levels of military aid more closely
               dom for DoD and the regional COCOMs to provide                 with State Department foreign assistance pro-
               the money to make civil-military exchanges along               grams aimed at building up local capabilities to
               these lines a reality.                                         prevent and/or manage future disasters will be
                   Beyond more vigorous and sustained initiatives             essential to help minimize (if not eliminate) pro-
               to build deeper and stronger bonds between the                 grammatic duplication and other inefficiencies


                                                                                                             Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
142
                  International Cooperation
                                                                             the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

    that have bedeviled past DoD and State efforts        for American conventional force management
    to provide civil support overseas to the same         under the GFM system. On the other hand, sim-
    recipients concurrently. DoD’s decision to pro-       ply assuming, as many DoD and military plan-
    vide USAID and other State Department officials       ners still do, that a business-as-usual approach
    with opportunities to review via the internet CO-     to the management of U.S. general purpose forc-
    COM security cooperation plans has been espe-         es will be sufficient to ensure the availability of
    cially helpful in this regard, and further efforts    the right mix of assets when, where, and in the
    should be encouraged to improve transparen-           scale and format needed once a disaster occurs,
    cy between both departments insofar as emer-          would be equally misguided. More dedicated ef-
    gency relief and development assistance plans         forts should be made, therefore, to prepare in ad-
    are concerned.                                        vance military platforms and units that might
         In the same vein, increases in the FY 09 OH-     be tasked with HA/DR duties, given their unique
    DACA budget to support both capacity-building         operational attributes, location, readiness lev-
    programs in partner countries and foreign di-         els, and past deployments in support of similar
    saster relief, together with projected increases      non-warfighting missions. Establishing a ros-
    for DoD-funded humanitarian assistance (HA)           ter of DoD and service personnel experienced
    in FY 10, should help to ensure that HA/DR-re-        in HA/DR operations that all COCOMs could tap
    lated activities continue to play a central role      into and that would be regularly updated also
    in COCOM security cooperation programs. That          makes a good deal of sense.
    said, financial support is still not sufficient to        At the COCOM level, it might also be pos-
    allow the COCOMs to do all that they could and        sible to attach to the HA/DR concept plans
    should do in this arena. Hence, boosting over-        (CONPLANs) and operational plans (OPLANs) de-
    all OHDACA funding to a level of $100 million to      veloped by the COCOM staffs a detailed check-
    $120 million per year – still a small amount in       list of the types of military units and assets that
    terms of the overall DoD budget – would go a          would be required to effectively execute these
    long way toward eliminating the shortfalls CO-        plans. If one wished to take this approach one
    COMs continue to confront in trying to cover the      step further, such lists could be generated in
    costs of programmed projects, while responding        what is called TPFDL (time-phased force deploy-
    as well to emergencies and to useful opportu-         ment list) format, which would include details
    nities for collaboration with allies and partner      on the transportation requirements for moving
    countries that arise somewhat unexpectedly. In-       certain units or types of units (and the supplies
    deed, unscheduled and unanticipated opportu-          and equipment they may need) to a designat-
    nities to collaborate with other countries in the     ed port of debarkation. Attaching such a list to
    HA/DR realm are sometimes more promising              an HA/DR CONPLAN or OPLAN should not in
    than scheduled events, but current DoD bud-           any way suggest that the units and items listed
    geting policies and planning cycles provide lit-      would actually be assigned to (or programmed
    tle financial support or flexibility to underwrite    for) the mission described. It would, howev-
    or take advantage of such options.                    er, get the COCOMs to begin to think more con-
                                                          cretely and in realistic operational terms well
    Planning and Preparing for the Unexpected             beforehand about what might be needed, in-
    Since every relief effort is a situation-specific     cluding items and expertise ( for example, family
    event requiring a fairly tailored response (based     healthcare specialists) that would not be readi-
    on the nature and location of the disaster that       ly available as a matter of standard planning for
    has occurred), maintaining some form of pre-          combat operations.
    ordained inventory or earmarked list of essen-            Approached from a more mission-specific
    tial military capabilities and skills that might be   angle, military readiness could also be advanced
    held in reserve or kept in standby status for HA/     via the development of pre-scripted mission as-
    DR operations makes little sense. This is especial-   signments (PSMAs) for specific capability sets
    ly true given the current procedures established      with a high likelihood of being tapped to sup-


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                            Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                          143
                                                                                     International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                        port a foreign relief effort. Developed by NORTH-      any disaster response, whatever the exact na-
                        COM and FEMA as a way to simplify and facilitate       ture and scale of the disaster and wherever it
                        the process of providing defense support to civ-       may have occurred (although the exact mix of
                        il authorities (DSCA) for particular emergency         forces deployed will vary, of course, from inci-
                        tasks during a U.S. homeland-defense contin-           dent to incident). Most of these assets and ar-
                        gency, there is no reason why the PSMA con-            eas of expertise have proven their worth as well
                        cept could not be applied more broadly to              in supporting the non-emergency humanitar-
                        foreign HA/DR scenarios. As outlined in chap-          ian assistance and civil support projects that
                        ter 4, each PSMA includes a detailed statement         have become so central to the TSC and theater
                        of work, a description of the assets and person-       engagement programs of the regional COCOMs.
                        nel required to perform that work, and an esti-        Indeed, given their utility across the spectrum of
                        mate of the costs involved, all of which is agreed     military operations, these same capabilities are
                        upon in advance by those requesting military           often referred to in the military as the “key en-
                        support and those providing it so that both par-       ablers,” meaning that they provide the key sup-
                        ties understand well before any request is actu-       porting capabilities that enable combat forces
                        ally made what is required capability-wise, and        to operate and achieve their objectives, and they
                        what the probable cost would be, when the mil-         are equally essential to HA/DR missions, often
                        itary is asked to perform a specific emergency-        comprising the bulk of military capabilities
                        related mission. Tasks covered under current           deployed in these missions. Assuring the ready
                        PSMA agreements that would be relevant to              availability of key enablers where and when they
                        disaster relief overseas include such typical          are needed, therefore, should be a primary fo-
                        emergency support missions as providing heli-          cus of HA/DR planners and operators alike at
                        copter or fixed-wing airlift, conducting airborne      DoD and the COCOMs, as well as among the var-
                        or ground-based air control, supplying various         ious service staffs.
                        communications packages to first responders,               Unfortunately, that particular task may not
                        removing debris from emergency routes, setting         be as easy as it sounds, since the supply of key
                        up fuel distribution centers, and organizing and       enablers is frequently not sufficient to meet de-
                        supplying temporary housing. If they adopted           mand, given their importance to virtually all
                        a PSMA-type approach similar to NORTHCOM’s,            mission assignments. Maintaining adequate in-
                        other regional COCOM commanders in charge              ventories and facilitating their use in non-war-
                        of military capabilities and units likely to be        fighting contingencies may be more difficult still
                        called upon to support HA/DR operations be-            at a time when American forces are engaged in
                        yond North America would at least have a bet-          ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghan-
                        ter feel for the deployment packages required          istan, as well as in significant civil support ac-
                        and projected costs involved to perform mis-           tivities in both countries. Indeed, for these very
                        sions similar to those listed above within their       reasons, key enablers are often viewed by com-
                        own AORs or AOFs. If experts from USAID’s Of-          manders in the field as “high demand, low den-
                        fice of Foreign Disaster Assistance could be con-      sity” assets and skill sets that by definition may
                        vinced to serve as the FEMA equivalents in this        not be available in the numbers or at the level re-
                        process, so much the better.                           quired. There are also certain types of enabling
                                                                               capabilities – such as heavy transport helicop-
                        Key Enablers                                           ters with a sling load capacity, medical teams
                        As for particular military skills, capabilities, and   skilled in pediatric care and women’s health
                        platforms that might be requested for HA/DR-           issues, deployable communications networks
                        related duties, this study has highlighted several     that both civil and military operators can use –
                        basic categories of assets and expertise – large-      that are critical to HA/DR operations, but may
                        ly in the lift, logistics, engineering, communica-     not be readily accessible based (again) on a busi-
                        tions, and medical support sectors – that are          ness-as-usual force management approach. Go-
                        likely to prove essential at some level for almost     ing forward, therefore, a more concerted effort


                                                                                                              Finding the Right Mix
                  Key Partnerships and Platforms for
144
                  International Cooperation
                                                                             the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

    should be made across the services and the CO-         disaster, for example, corporate assistance has
    COMs to identify well before they are ever need-       been and will continue to be especially valu-
    ed HA/DR-specific enablers that might not be           able in the areas of sophisticated supply chain
    adequately covered by existing procedures for          management, innovative warehouse and dis-
    assessing (and requesting) future force struc-         tribution logistics, and advanced mobile com-
    ture requirements.                                     munications technologies, as well as in less
                                                           glamorous (but still vital) realms, such as long-
    HA/DR-friendly Planning and Programming                distance transport, construction and engineer-
    To some extent, initiatives now being taken by         ing support, and air traffic control. As noted in
    the individual services to strengthen their abil-      chapter 3 with respect to the CARE-UPS rela-
    ities to undertake theater engagement activ-           tionship, very effective partnerships are being
    ities and to build global partnerships should          formed between businesses and key relief-mind-
    help to identify and generate wider support            ed NGOs, and joint corporate teams are being
    for platforms, technologies, and skill sets that       organized in critical areas of expertise (such as
    would also be especially useful in HA/DR-ori-          global logistics) to provide emergency help to
    ented missions. For example, based in part on          both national and international civil authorities.
    a shared desire to re-posture forces to handle         Integrated teams from TNT, UPS, and Agility, for
    more effectively the rising demands of irreg-          example, were instrumental in providing a wide
    ular warfare and stability operations, the Na-         range of additional logistical support needed to
    vy’s global fleet station (GFS) concept, the Air       move essential aid supplies expeditiously into
    Force’s development of a stand-alone hospital          Myanmar after cyclone Nargis, and similar team
    package that can be airlifted to any crisis or         efforts from the private sector can be expect-
    disaster zone in twenty-four hours (and then           ed when disasters like this strike in the future.
    left behind for the host country to keep), and         Commercial support was particularly welcome
    the Army’s renewed emphasis on counterinsur-           in the Nargis case, it is well to remember, given
    gency training all place a premium on the type         the reluctance of the junta in Myanmar to sanc-
    of civil support and interagency collaboration         tion too prominent a role for the U.S. military.
    capabilities that are also essential for an effec-     Tapping more fully into the private sector’s ca-
    tive HA/DR effort. No doubt, the release of DoD        pabilities – and integrating the corporate world
    directive 3000.5 in 2005 (which placed stabil-         more directly into official governmental plan-
    ity operations on par with traditional combat          ning procedures, as suggested earlier – could
    operations), together with the approval of the         provide a welcome degree of insurance against
    secretary of defense’s new Guidance for the            potential gaps that might emerge in the sup-
    Employment of Forces in 2008 (which put se-            ply of military assets and expertise to HA/DR
    curity cooperation on equal footing with warf-         operations.
    ighting), should help to encourage this trend
    toward an HA/DR-friendly approach to service           Allies and Partners
    planning and programming. They should also             Of course, as detailed in chapter 5, addition-
    help to give it doctrinal legitimacy.                  al support from allies, partner countries, and
                                                           relief-minded international organizations and
    The Private Sector                                     NGOs will also be important, as the United States
    For certain operational sectors, it is also increas-   will rarely be operating alone, especially in the
    ingly apparent that the private sector – especial-     wake of larger-scale disasters. This is why it re-
    ly, though not exclusively, American companies         mains so important for American HA/DR plan-
   – can serve as an alternative source for a num-         ners and operators, civil and military alike, to
    ber of skills, supplies, and capabilities that are     develop a keener appreciation for, and to help
    needed most for HA/DR operations, but which            build an institutional architecture in support
    the military may not always be able to provide         of, the comprehensive approach championed
    in sufficient quantity. In response to a foreign       by NATO (but applicable beyond Europe). The


Finding the Right Mix
                                                                             Key Partnerships and Platforms for
                                                                                                                          145
                                                                                     International Cooperation
the   InstItute   for   foreIgn PolIc y AnAlysIs

                      basic idea here is that conflict resolution, disas-       of PACOM’s Pacific Partnership and SOUTHCOM’s
                      ter recovery, and post-conflict reconstruction            Continuing Promise programs stand out as par-
                      require a far more sustained effort at civil-mil-         ticularly instructive examples of how theater en-
                      itary collaboration than has generally been the           gagement and health diplomacy with an HA/DR
                      case so far, and that more vigorous NATO ef-              focus can leverage in a coordinated way con-
                      forts to promote such collaboration in concert            tributions from the military, civilian, national,
                      with the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, at a mini-             international, governmental, and nongovern-
                      mum, should be encouraged. Ideally, this would            mental sectors in support of a common program.
                      allow a more sensible and concerted division              In combination with COCOM-directed medical
                      of labor among security-minded organizations              readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs) and
                      operating in the Euro-Atlantic zone, with NATO            other humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA)
                      bringing to bear its comparative advantages in            projects, the Pacific Partnership and Continu-
                      the military response spheres and the others as-          ing Promise tours – both of which utilize the
                      suming lead roles in the areas of socio-econom-           Navy’s two hospital ships and selected amphib-
                      ic development and political reform, including            ious assault ships specifically reconfigured for
                      the strengthening of civil societies in countries         the mission – have helped to boost opinions of
                      in transition. To be sure, there are those in Eu-         America and to improve local living conditions
                      rope who oppose this approach, arguing that               in strategically important regions, while also
                      the EU alone should take the lead in civil-sup-           enhancing to one degree or another in-coun-
                      port missions (including in disaster relief), but         try defenses against future disasters. To the ex-
                      they often go on to propose a similar multilater-         tent that these tours and training programs can
                      al approach under a different name that simply            offer, as do SOUTHCOM’s Beyond the Horizon
                      leaves out NATO. In any event, whatever name              and AFRICOM’s APS efforts described in chap-
                      it is eventually given, an operational strategy           ter 4, additional opportunities for return vis-
                      that integrates the collective efforts of multiple        its to build upon and sustain projects ashore
                      contributors behind a common plan – and that              completed during earlier visits, they can con-
                     “coordinates the coordinators,” in the words of            tribute to the well-being and self-sufficiency of
                      one HA/DR practitioner – is the best way ahead,           the communities visited in ways that will last
                      and it is one that should be transferable to oth-         long after the ships and troops once deployed
                      er regions as well, such as Northeast and South-          there have departed. Needless to say, this is
                      east Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Central and         the effect that future service and COCOM ini-
                      South America, where there is at least a rudi-            tiatives should seek to achieve via a “diplomacy
                      mentary level of regional organization.                   of deeds” conducted in cooperation with other
                                                                                HA/DR contributors.
                     New Organizational Approach
                                                                                In conclusion, then, while there is no single for-
                      There is, moreover, a good deal of similarity
                                                                            mat for organizing a successful HA/DR mission that
                      between the comprehensive approach advo-