Truman and Eisenhower: Launching the Process

Intelligence support Truman and Eisenhower: John Launching the Process Helgerson draft of an Getting informed better than before. In Editors Note: This article is drawn from the historical ever a rather back study prepared by the author entitled handed have an To Know the President: CIA Briefings of Presidential compliment, intelligence information Truman said he believed that we service now that I think Candidates From 1952 to 1992. is not inferior to any in the Truman world.2 On 22 November 1952 the newspapers reported that President Harry Truman, shortly after noon the previ was responsible day, had stolen away from the White House to give an impromptu speech at the Central Intelligence Truman had come to CIA at the invitation of Agency. the fourth Director of Central Intelligence, Gen. Walter ous intelligence ident, in January 1946, he formed the Central Intelli gence Group (CIG). Iii the Presidents mind, its key responsibility was to ensure that he personally received intelligence reports on a timely basis. On 15 February the CIG launched the service. Within for the very existence of that a year of his becoming Pres Bedell Smith, to address ment a training course of govern officials. In that speechdelivered on a Friday Daily Sumnzary~ and in June a counterpart Weekly Summary was produced for the first time. Both of these afternoon almost two weeks after the national election Truman revealed publications to were sent to the White founding provide intelligence briefings to elect, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. great deal about his motives in the CIA and his aims in having the Agency a House for the President. Both the daily and weekly pub lications continued became the CIA in be published after the CIG the new President September 1947. There The President reminisced with his audience about how was much bureaucratic wrangling throughout the there had been no CIA when he had succeeded to the early years of the CIG and the CIA about their proper role in the production of current intelligence. Almost all key players involved with intelligence in the military ser vices, the War (later Defense) Department, and the State Department had serious reservations about the new intel ligence agency duplicating their work in current intelli gence. The President was virtually alone in expecting to receive a daily current intelligence product, whatever the formal charters of the CIG and CIA less to say, his presidency by had been surprised to discover how much information relating to intelligence and national security matters had been withheld from him. The how ill-informed he when most in 1945. At that time, many accounts, he dramatic evidence of was came on his 12th day in office Secretary on of War Henry Stimson briefed him for the first time the Manhattan about which Truman had heard as Vice President and on (atomic bomb) Project, only hints while serving Senate committees) key expectations carried the might day. say. Need To consolidate the Truman also recalled how difficult it had been for him to CIA in production of current intelligence, January 1951 formed the Office of Current Intel which existed until the late l970s, when assumed obtain information from the various government depart ments, each of which seemed walled off from the oth ers. ligence (OCI), its functions were by other offices. On various occasions Truman had lamented to to after the establishment of OCI, the the Shortly previous daily and Smith that he used do all this myself. The Presi over dent noted that this situation had been corrected weekly publications were discontinued, and two new publications were inaugurated. The daily publication intervening years, saying that the CIAs global intelli gence operations and procedures for forwarding infor mation had made it possible to keep the President 65 Truman and Eisenhower 28 Intelligence Bulletin, first issued on August a companion weekly publica tion, the Current intelligence Weekly Review, was begun. A more sensitive version of the weekly publica February; in was became the Current Governor Adlai Stevenson, There were so remarking at the time, things I did not know when I many became President. Smith suggested to Truman that Davidson might be the proper individual to brief both Eisenhower and Stevenson to ensure tion that contained material from communications inter they were receiv cepts called the Situation Summary. It focused in Korea. on ing the same information. developments Managers early vacationing in Key West, flor ida, wrote of the new publication, Dear Bedel sici, I have been reading the intelligence bulletin and I am highly impressed with it. I believe you have hit the jack pot with this one. Sincerely, Harry Truman.3 The Cur rent Intelligence Bulletin continued largely unchanged rewarded when Truman, of OCI felt their efforts had been Later, during his speech at the Agency on 21 Novem ber, Truman explained his rationale in providing brief ings to the President-elect. He observed that the office carries of the President of the United States now power beyond parallel in history, adding that is the principal reason why I am so anxious that it be a con tinuing proposition and that the successor to me and the successor to him I am can for the next 25 years. taken place. giving carry on as if no election had ever this presidentthis new presi dentmore While Truman received, read, and information than any other president had ciation for the Agencys daily over and expressed his appre weekly publications, when he went into office. it had become clear ued the oral briefings The President experimented with various procedures for these briefings, and in the early years there were periods when he received them on a daily basis. What finally proved most satisfactory, however, were weekly worldwide the years that he especially val delivered by the directors of CIA. Referring policy was to a widely publicized meeting same he had held with Eisenhower at the White House to discuss foreign issues earlier that my privilege January. on a week, Truman said, It few days ago (18 November) to brief the General who is 20th of going to take over the office on the Truman did not mention in his intelligence updates. worked best address that a that occasion he had given Eisenhower The weekly briefings period when Beedle briefed Truman each House during as the extended Smith served DCI. Smith at Friday, accompanied the White Intelligence Digest prepared by the CIA. Keyed to an NSC policy outline, the Digest summarized, in Smiths words, the most important national intelligence on a worldwide basis.5 Eisenhower later that his wrote in comprehensive National by a CIA officer, Meredith Davidson. Davidson would assist the Director in the preparation of his mate his memoirs more than a decade to my rial (a notebook was left behind with the President each week), but he did not normally go into the Oval Office. The briefing was based primarily on the Situation Sum was meeting . . with Truman added little mary, which prepared with the Presidents needs in knowledge. He recalled that Truman received me cor the conversations. were necessar dially; however. ily general and official in nature. So far as defense . . reward was to join the DCI and the Special Consultant for National Security Affairs, Sidney Souers (who had served as the first DCI for a five-month period in 1946), for coffee and a post mind. Davidsons Presidents affairs were concerned, under the instructions of the President, I had been briefed periodically by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and his assistants in the Central Intelligence Agency War and on on developments kept it in the Korean to on mortem on the Presidents reactions and followup national security.6 According general Davidson, purpose, requests.4 Mindful of how useful the Truman determined that be Truman told Smith he had for political reasons. weekly briefings were intelligence information to him, should soon as provided to the candidates in the 1952 election as they were selected. In the summer of 1952 the Agency to President raised this idea with Smith. He indicated he wanted the brief General Eisenhower and 66 Truman and Eisenhower Strained Relations Complicate the Arrangements In his remarks at the indicating he would welcome weekly reports from the CIA, but he wanted it understood that his possession of those reports would not limit his freedom as to discuss or himself to a Agency, Truman could not bring be completely deferential to his successor. In analyze foreign programs he wanted.9 dig, he observed that Eisenhower had been appalled at all that the President needs to know in order to reach decisions. In private, the President was bitingly critical of his elected successor. The press, for its part, was reporting that the meeting of the two formal. The men at the White House had been coolly New York Times, for example, noted there was some mild rather evidence of tension between Mr. Truman and his suc obviously irritated that Eisenhower personal invitation, released the texts of the telegrams from both men. What was not released to the public nor, so far as I can tell, known to The White House, had declined Trumans senior CIA managers at the time was that Truman had written by hand and at a sent to on very direct note Eisenhower 16 his campaign headquarters in Denver was August. cessor, observing also that the President-elect looked serious and was sorry if he had caused Eisenhower embarrassment with the luncheon In that note Truman indicated he somewhat brusque when he left the invitation, but he underscored that his intention was to Presidents office.7 provide permit uninterrupted foreign policy despite the change a information that would continuous, of motives appear to have been straight forward in providing information to enable Eisenhower While Trumans administrations. presidency fully informed, the implemen something to be desired and on the part of Eisenhower and his prompted suspicions to assume the In tation of his intentions left language only Truman would use, he wrote, Parti politics should stop at the boundaries of the United States. I am extremely sorry that you have allowed a san staff. Indeed, tensions between the two the came close to bunch of screwballs to come a between us. Truman undermining Agencys access to the President-elect during the impor tant transition period. Ironically, the ultimate result was to elicit from Eisenhower a statement making clear he saw the CIA as a relatively apolitical provider of infor mation. In the end he was willing to hear from the CIA things he was unwilling to hear from others. private exchange between the President and his eventual successor had begun shortly after the Republican convention, when Truman sent telegrams to A difficult planned briefing process and with it the added, You it wont been one have made bad mistake, and Im hoping injure this great Republic. There has like it and I want to see it continues never of the the you man who occupies the most history of the world. May God regardless important position in guide you and give light.0 reading Trumans was no After note, Eisenhower in decided there sent point on back to Truman, 19 obviously responding in kind and August, a relatively concil and in the absence of iatory reply, also handwritten. Eisenhower reiterated the Eisenhower and Stevenson his Cabinet on inviting August. them to lunch with Truman to thought that, for political reasons Tuesday, 19 proposed that he ask Smith and other CIA officers the brief on any national emergency, he should not meet with the outgoing President and Cabinet and thus had declined foreign on situation and have the White House staff as the invitation. He to send report other issues an well. In his also extended offer of telegram, Truman weekly intelligence briefings him would be ments repeated his appreciation for the offer weekly CIA reports, opined that those sufficient to keep him up to date on develop a for both candidates.8 abroad, and assured Truman of his support for bipartisan foreign policy.1 Eisenhower declined the invitation. In Truman he thought to he should receive reply, he told only those com Eisen Although tone in Eisenhower had taken to a relatively moderate was munications from the outgoing Administration that his could be known all the American people. bothered reply by the overall exchange Trumans outburst, he clearly and indicated as hower added that, The for discussion many are which you suggest those with which I have lived for problems years. The General concluded with a paragraph 67 Truman and Eisenhower much in separate correspondence with Smith. The Gen Eisenhowers turning over of command ceremony eral felt free to be open with Smith; they had worked as had been held at SHAPE Powers closely together for many years during the war in Europe when Smith served for an extended period chief of staff. Europe) the in Paris (Supreme Headquarters Allied on 30 May 1952. The follow his ing day howers General, Mrs. Eisenhower, and Eisen Following Eisenhowers nomination, Smith had sent a note of congratulations that Eisenhower had not acknowledged before the exchange with Truman over the briefings in mid-August. In a letter stamped Per sonal and Confidential personal staff departed for Washington. Although he had been on leave without pay from his post as President of Columbia University since early 1951, Eisenhower had continued to use the University home at 60 Morningside Drive in Manhattan when he was in the city. This residence became his headquarters for the next and dated 14 August, Eisen several months, and it was here that the hower thanked Smith for his note of previous month, some but then launched congratulations immediately into the first briefing by the CIA occurred. on his exchange with Truman. The days my whole headquarters has been in a little bit of a steaming stew over an incident in which, according to the papers, you were at least briefly involved. It was the meeting that Governor Stevenson had with the President and the Cabinet. According to the reports reaching here, you were brought in to help brief the Governor on the world situation.12 Eisenhower observations past two Pre-Election The first Briefings briefing was given on Saturday morning, 30 August, by Melvin Hendrickson, then head of the mili tary branch in OCIs Agency years of tant Indications Staff. Like many officers at the time, Hendrickson had several understanding that the briefing of Steven son had taken only a very few minutes but underscored that, To the political mind it looked like the outgoing Administration was canvassing all its resources in order expressed to his Army experience; his last post had been assis military attachØ in Oslo.4 With military precision, Eisenhower entered the library of his residence exactly at 7:45 to receive Hendrickson and an accompanying security officer, the two being introduced as the gentle men support Stevensons election. The General the went on from CIA. Eisenhower suggested that they move to stress the importance of doing what is right, recalling challenges he and Smith had faced together in the war. to an adjoining smaller room. Europe during The General took about 20 minutes to read The lecture from Eisenhower caused great pain to his longtime friend and admirer (one former Agency officer recalls that it upset the hell out of less, in made a reply to Eisenhower dated 18 Beedle). Neverthe August, Smith that Smith had no mention of the critical note. Rather, he offered in rather formal language the briefings discussed with the President and which the President in turn had offered to Eisenhower. Smith Eisenhower information on proposed that he carefully paid scant attention to the information on the disposition of Soviet and satel lite armed forces after confirming with Hendrickson that there had been no significant changes in their deployment since his briefings by the US Army in Europe some months earlier. There was more extended discussion of the situation in Iran, of Frances growing difficulties in North Africa, and regarding trade between Japan and China. The latter subject was dis through the briefing material but provide the world situation cussed in the context of the war in Korea and the ongo like that the President received each and that this information should be officer of the CIA. Smiths Friday morning, delivered by an delivered to letter was Eisen hower in Denver.13 Fortunately to of the tension that had Agency, in light developed, Eisenhower accepted for the specifically, powerful weapons, it seems to me that we should employ it to its maximum. Where are the Japanese going to get their materials if ing Since trade is one armistice talks. Eisenhower commented of our most the invitation receive CIA briefings. 68 Truman and Eisenhower they African situation, the Generals cant get them from China? Concerning the North bottom line was a cryp do comments on a wide spectrum of issues, primarily the Soviet, Korean, and Iranian situations, which were at the tic If the French dont something fairly on soon, they forefront of US Government attention in 1952. Eisen hower also read materials will have another Indo-China their hands. At the conclusion of this first substantive discussion, Eisen hower indicated that he would like similar to carefully and commented on Agency relating to security arrangements for the pro receive future briefings.5 the spective ation.16 The Middle East command then under consider During remaining weeks before the election on 4 November, Eisenhower received three additional brief Eisenhower included 20 in package of written briefing materials presented to (and Stevenson) at each meeting typically or more ings 25 from CIA. The second in the series took when the General was place flown on an short itemsone or two paragraphs a September, in the midst of lengthsummarizing the current situation in spe extended whistle-stop campaign tour. He had from New York to Moline, Illinois, and from there had cific country of interest. Events in the USSR, Iran, Korea, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Japan were included in almost all sessions, but in the more traveled towns in virtually nonstop through numerous small course of the briefings Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, West Vir than 50 countries was were addressed. In addition, article on a ginia, and boarded the train in Silver briefed finally Maryland. CIAs Hendrickson Spring, Maryland, and Eisenhower during the short trip into Baltimore. a During rest. subsequent period of Eisenhower blocked was paigning, One almost nonstop cam out two weekends for were priority coun package also contained the Conclusions of one or two recently pub lished National Intelligence Estimates. The latter typi cally assessed the prospects for Communist expansionism in different regions of the world. one there normally longer try, Iran being the most common. Each when the Eisenhowers staying at the Brown Palace Hotel in Denver, Mrs. Eisenhowers pre-election provided briefing at the couples Brown Palace suite on ii Octo ber, again a Saturday morning. On this occasion Eisen hower, in turn, provided Hendrickson one of the more unusual experiences intelligence officers have had. Hen drickson recalls being invited to join the General and Mrs. Eisenhower at The Eisenhowers in a a hometown. Hendrickson the third appreciative of the pre-election briefings, commenting that they had been very helpful. At the conclusion of the fourth session, however, he addedclearly referring to the Soviet The a General, while candidate, was Union and Koreathat he missed the G-3 informa tion, (military operations) essential for a which he observed was of those situa complete understanding rodeo in Denver that weekend. tions. were driven around the rodeo grounds job, the Eisenhower also commented that if he got the some other arrangement would have to be made for He mentioned stagecoach. Hendrickson rode shotgun, up top with briefings. for the driver. ances some of his staff fit from the information The fourth and final specifically securing clear so that they, too, could bene being provided. men pre-election briefing and had taken an was on 25 In an days campaigning in Detroit train to October, 10 before the vote. Eisenhower had been intriguing parting to comment, Eisenhower overnight Station, tioned Hendrickson, When you get back to Bedell New York. This time Hendrickson boarded the train in the campaign early morning at Hannon as Smith, tell him if! get elected Ive got ajob for him. Decades after the fact, it has proved impossible to estab lish whether this comment was New York, and briefed Eisenhower they traveled to passed to the DCI per Grand Central in New York City. pre-election minutes studying on sonally. the In an interesting coincidence of a timing, 1 however, Smith, less than week later a on November, During period, each of the briefings during forwarded to President Truman written request to written material and, Eisenhower spent 15 to 20 the typically, another 10 to 15 minutes that material and other items his mind. resign his post service.17 as DCI and to retire from active military discussing He asked few specific factual questions but did make 69 Truman and Eisenhower Support One to the President-elect8 elected President, Eisenhower on Because the DCI himself ings, and because of the was now conducting the brief pre-existing relationship day after he was between Eisenhower and Smith, the session involved Augusta, Georgia, for two weeks vacation. When the CIA briefings resumed late in the month, the most significant thing that had changed was that they were no longer given by Hen drickson but by Smith, accompanied by Davidson. The first session following the election was held on 21 November, this time again on the train as the Presidentelect traveled from New York to Washington for a reunion dinner of his US Military Academy classmates at the Army-Navy Club. The President-elects train stopped at Baltimore to permit Smith and Davidson to 5 November 1952 traveled to substantially more give and take than had been the case prior to the election. A more serious analysis of the issues was also to be expected because Eisenhower, like all presidents-elect, realized he would have to grapple with the worlds problems within a matter of weeks. Eisenhower asked a number of questions, particularly about the political aspects of the Korean quagmire. He especially wanted to clarify in his own mind what China role was up to and to understand better that countrys and motivations in the conflict. Eisenhower asked, for example, nuances I never did know In why we let the Chinese call board in order to talk with the President-elect on the themselves volunteers? remaining leg By into Washington. Army working couple of war. of the situation, to didnt have explained the concluding by saying, We bomb Pekingthats why we acqui reply, Smith coincidence, Davidson, while still had briefed Eisenhower the at in esced. Intelligence, occasions sons on a Pentagon just Eisenhower after the To David Well after midnight, Smith and Davidson took their at astonishment, when he car, was escorted into the Presi as leave of the President-elect Union Station. General dent-elects he recognized jocular exchange, Davidson served in Europe as Eisenhower had, rather been fighting the big war in the Pacific. Smith cautioned Eisenhower that the him and extended immediately brightened a warm greeting. In a explained that he had not he had and Mrs. Eisenhower spent the car on night in their Pullman an the train. Mrs. Eisenhower had been active participant throughout that she the discussions. Davidson recalls political gave me the than Ike. impression of being much more you had better watch briefing opposition, referring to Davidsons sessions with Stevenson in Springfield, Illi nois. This joking remark caused Eisenhower to turn deadly serious. Davidson was impressed that Eisen hower wanted to hear no jokes about Stevenson and was very positive about the Agencys briefings of the Gover nor. Eisenhower observed that he thought very highly of Stevenson because he had kept the campaign on a high plane and demonstrated mastery of foreign affairs. out, he has been In Eisenhowers on memoirs he recalls that In a Detroit October 24, 1 announced my intention, if speech to go to Korea before the following January and elected, myself what the conditions were in that unhappy country. For some days Eisenhower and his closest advisers had been discussing the wisdom of mak ing this dramatic proposal public)9 Once it was to determine for very well received and, in fact, observers as having clinched the by many Eisenhower victory in the vote 10 days later. announced, the idea has been cited was The relaxed social exchange with the Eisenhowers (both were in dressing gowns) continued almost until the train had completed its late evening run to Washington. The substantive part of the briefing, therefore, continued while they were parked at Union Station. Subjects of particular interest again General and Mrs. Eisenhower After the election, while Eisenhower was preparing to travel to Korea, included to an events in Korea and the an negotiations under way bring the conflict to end. But Smith also provided telephoned relying exclusively on US Army information regarding what was going on in Korea. He asked the DCI to New York to give him the Agencys independent assessment. The President-elect called at virtually the last moment and emphasized that their visit should be given no publicity. not Smith to inform him that he comfortable overview of the general world situation. 70 Truman and Eisenhower In keeping with their interpretation of Eisenhowers carrying didnt cir a a a instructions, Army security officers took Smith and Davidson to the he? weapon and challenged, Edwards got to you, The DCIs reaction was mild, however, with that of the Secret Service, which discov briefing location in New York via compared cuitous route. The two were led in the front door of in a drugstore example, telligence maneuver that served only to enrage the always-impatient Smith. Ironically, they reached Eisen howers office in the Commodore Hotel for that had been an and out the back, for counterin was carrying a weapon during inci dental conversation in the President-elects outer office. ered that Davidson The private meeting two to between Eisenhower and Smith on afternoon 28 November went allowed the on for more than an hour and wedged into a day filled with a dozen other well-publicized visitors. Smith and Davidson were waiting in an outer office as a luncheon group hosted by Eisenhower broke up. Smith was sur appointment prised to see intelligence business their discussion of Korea. During that session, beyond Smith secured Eisenhowers approval of a proposal that CIA should establish a briefing facility in New York conduct some Gen. William Donovan, the founder of the among those City to Office of Generals Strategic Services, office. leaving the his staff. The turned as provide continuous support to Eisenhower facility was subsequently set up but be in an and out not to office as close to Eisenhowers recall that Smith would have liked. was Agency officers ensure Because the President-elect had requested of the Smiths frank Sherman Adams, who to become Eisenhowers and personal two generals assessment were of the situation in Korea, the most Chief of Staff, intervened to was that the CIA office alone for briefing session. to a broom closet some distance from the Presidents Near the end of the answer two or three session, Davidson factual was called in office. Adams the obviously the did not want Smith to have questions. Eisenhower same access to new president that he enjoyed departed secretly November. for Korea early the following day, 29 with Truman. The Smith took very Agency in maintained its office in the Commodore seriously his responsibility to provide an independent US assessment. He had insisted that his CIA from the staff derive facts about and military developments Army guarded his preroga Navy tives as DCI to make assessments and estimates based on By chance, Smith and Davidson ran into lobby of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel shortly after they had seen Eisenhower at the Com modore. Dulles elicited confirmation that they had seen Eisenhower and asked what they told him. Smith responded with a curt, Thats between him and me. John Foster Dulles in the The late-November visit to the President-elects also created a but jealously those facts. through the end of the transition period January. briefing officer representing the DCI was present at all times. For most of the period the officer was Ed Beatty, a former newsman who was editor of CIAs Current Intelligence Bulletin. Each day a courier from Washington would bring to the New York office the latest current intelligence products for use by from 28 November A CIA the President-elect and his staff. Eisenhowers utilize this staff did facility, on and Adams himself one on came by seeking the information ever, at least occasion. Eisenhower, how the relied exclusively briefings provided by DCI. office bit of momentary tension with the Secret Service. Smith was sometimes reluctant to have a pro tective officer from the During the transition period in late 1952, the press occa sionally wrote of the DCIs weekly briefings of the President-elect. But in fact the Generals schedule did not permit briefings on any regular schedule. His trip to Korea and the Pacific took more than two weeks, with Agencys Office of by CIAs rity, Sheffield Edwards. In this case, the DCI adamantly opposed having additional people accompany him to New York, given the ground rules Eisenhower had set regarding secrecy. Edwards earlier had approached Davidson, insisting that he become weapons-qualified so he could protect the DCI. On the train from Washing ton to New accompany him, mendations to the contrary and would override Security vigorous recom Director of Secu briefing did not occur until accompanied at that meeting by Adams, and Smith by Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) Robert Amory. Specifically labeled next the result that the CIA 19 December. Eisenhower was York, the DCI learned that Davidson was 71 Truman and Eisenhower off the record on Eisenhowers calendar, it but was a ses CIA experts. As had been his sion Smith would rather not have attended. He entered Eisenhowers crushed. office in sition high spirits came out period, high-level briefings. The the the President relied instead preference during the tran on periodic Sitting in morose silence all the way back to Washington, he finally muttered, And I thought that it Smith never explained what had was going to be great. happened. He had offered his Truman some resignation in writing to President a six weeks before, obviously hoping for challenging appointment from his old friend and col league. It was widely known at the time that Smith aspired, perhaps unrealistically, to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Agency historians have surmised that Eisenhower informed Smith he would not be appointed Chairman of the Joint Staff, asking him instead to serve as Under Secretary of State. Smith did, in fact, serve practice that developed and continued throughout eight years of the Eisenhower presidency involved DCI Allen Dulles providing weekly briefings to the National Security Council. Eisenhower chaired these NSC meetings, and under his leadership they were more regular and more formal than under any President before or since. He told President-elect Kennedy in 1960 that the NSC had become the most important weekly meeting of the government.20 The NSC met every Thursday morning at 9:00 a.m. and, with rare exceptions, opened its meetings with an in the number-two job at the Department Eisenhowers not of State during first term. the first year and a half of But it was no secret that he did enjoy being the Under Secretary. He felt uncomfort able with the nonmilitary way the Department func tioned, did not like John Foster Dulles, and was uneasy intelligence briefing by the DCI. The briefing addressed subjects mutually agreed with Lay of the NSC Staff, representing the interests of the Presidents Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Gen. Robert Cutler. If the President, Cutler, or Lay did not have spe cific subjects they wanted addressed, CIA was free to propose its own agenda, although the Agencys ideas were always vetted with Lay before the briefing. Agency veterans remember at a about Allen Dulless appointment as DCI. wide variety of subjects The last occasion on which Smith is known to have met 14 Janu being ters addressed the NSC with Eisenhower while serving as DCI was on Presidents broad interests. meetings, reflecting the He was intrigued with mat to ary 1953 in New York City. There, Smith joined John Foster Dulles and other Eisenhower advisers and ranging to from Italian elections the battle of Dien Bien Phu appointees January, for an extended foreign policy a conference on with the President-elect. Less than Eisenhower was week later, 20 inaugurated. Agency covert action opera tions. Eisenhower would interrupt periodically with questions and, within limits, permit questions from oth ers as well. When his patience ran out, however, he was not at all reluctant to cut off discussion, saying OK, updates on Allen, lets go ahead. The New President Consumer To ones as Intelligence According to General Andrew Goodpaster, who served as Secretary of the White House Staff, Eisenhower expected Dulles to provide the latest intelligence on the crisis of the moment but, more important, to concen trate primarily on providing the intelligence back ground to whatever larger or longer term planning issue was on the agenda. Because of this long-term focus, most of the briefing materials used by the DCI were pre pared by CIAs Office of National Estimates. Goodpas ter recalls that Eisenhower frequently would ask, How solid is that informationwhere does it come no he should receive once surprise, Eisenhowers preferences on how intelligence support did not change he became President. CIA histories indicate that day after his inauguration in 1953 the Agencys Director of Current Intelligence, Huntington Sheldon, sent to James Lay, Jr., the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, a list of publications the Agency could furnish the White House. It quickly became apparent, however, that the President did not want to receive written intelligence materials on a regu lar basis and had no the from? interest in frequent briefings by 72 Truman and Eisenhower Dulles was reluctant to answer with and fourteen people in wrote in his memorandum for the record, I had made a the room. one Eisenhower, Dulles, (sometimes Goodpaster and sometimes Senior Staff Assistant Gordon Gray) would then hold a smaller, fol staff aide several months ago to discuss with my successor intelligence briefings in the Council. I believe that these note should be low-on meeting after the regular NSC to answer the Presidents more probing questions.2 The briefing process during the l950s had several important advantages from the Agencys point of view. these was Among vide the fact that the DCI was on a able to pro by more jun special briefing competence.. I acknowledged to Mr. Bundy that this would cause seri ous personal problems and I was not sure I would advise him to tackle it. It was simply a question I left with him. In that same conversation, however, Gray asserted that the practice of having the DCI brief the ior officers with a . crisper and should be conducted intelligence a on important matters not predictable Council every week was a very useful device.22 a only the President, but also the Chairman of the Joint Staff, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other key players in the for eign policy decision making process. The single most schedule in forum that included Goodpaster during the recalls that Eisenhower out had lot of work respect for Allen Dulles growing war. of Dulless important advantage of the system, however, was that it unambiguously obvious each week whether the President was interested in, and well served by, the intelligence he was receiving. With this feedback, CIA was able to be responsive to his needs and those of the was thought he was very skilled at top-level intelligencecollecting it and ana lyzing it. Eisenhower would read enough of the Intelli Communitys estimates to get the point and the highlights and, according to Goodpaster, felt the formal estimates and papers were the genuine view, meaning they were not politicized. gence But there were some The President NSC. Senior Agency officers believed the system worked well. Sheldon summed it up by saying, The Director got used to the procedure and was happy with problems. at a Eisenhower had been it, and everybody was happy with it; it simply remained struck, for example, how the bomber gap of the that way until the next administration. mid-1950s turned out to be false alarm. When the The vast majority of the briefings was of the NSC were pro vided by the DCI himself. It was clear to all involved, however, that Dulles much more comfortable with political and economic subjects than with scientific and military issues. Quite often the Director would permit a specialist to brief on such subjects, always designating personally the individual he wanted to do the job. Her bert Scoville, Jr., the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence Community and the US military began writ ing of the Soviets great progress in missile production during the late 1950s, Eisenhower was more than skep tical; he was unconvinced, challenging repeatedly, What do they base this on? According were to Goodpaster, reasons Eisenhower believed there at least two why the bomber and missile issues turned into serious political problems. One diffi Intelligence, gave many of the briefings on scientific subjects, and the Agencys nuclear specialist, Herbert Miller, distinguished himself with briefings in that spe-~ cialized field. Amory from time to time would brief on military matters. White House records make clear that attendees at the NSC culty was that there was a lot of contact between ele delivered meetings noticed the difference between briefings by the DCI and those delivered by the sub Intelligence Community, particularly the Congress heard this continual drumbeat about how we were falling behind. The other problem, in Eisenhowers view, was that there was a lot of self-interest in the intelligence assessments of the military servicesthey were out to promote their own programs. ments of the Air Force, and the Hill, in which stantive experts. Gray addressed this subject in a meet ing on 11 January 1961, when he discussed transition McGeorge Bundy, representative of Presi Kennedy. Responding to questions by Bundy about whether the President should have daily briefings and, if so, who should deliver them, Gray matters with Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower avoided read ing daily intelligence reports from any one agency. In fact, he normally read no daily reports. Instead, Good- dent-elect John 73 Truman and Eisenhower paster, with the help of the Presidents son, Lt. Cot. John ments about the material he read. It was clear from the Eisenhower, each morning would review the separate reports from CIA, State, Defense, and the Joint Chiefs. outset that They would meld this material into one early morning oral briefing. In those sessions, Eisenhower occasion ally would ask to see a specific raw report or analytic paper, or background and the intel lect to take full advantage of the intelligence the Agency was providing. Thinking back on the briefings more than four decades later, Davidson still commented with awe, I was was Stevenson had the impressed with the questions he asked. He task additional work. well ahead of all of us. Agency veterans recall that Sheldon and DDI Loftus Becker in early March 1953 did discuss the idea of pro current Of the many substantive issues that arose during the intelligence briefings in 1952, the single one in which ducing came lication intelligence pub exclusively Agency to understand Eisenhowers preferences, however, a brief, all-source, daily Stevenson was most interested was Iran. Mohammed for the President. As the this idea was never publication was followed up. In the event, no such actually produced until the Kennedy was administration. One innovation that begun in the early Eisenhower years and continued throughout his administration was the practice of cabling a daily intelli gence report to April 1951, shortly thereafter he had secured passage of a law nationalizing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In the succeeding months, tensions between Iran and the United Kingdom grew steadily and were at a high point during the fall of 1952. Diplomatic relations were sev Mossadeq and ered in October. had become Prime Minister in the President while he was traveling The UK was abroad. That practice has continued to the present. concerned about oil, was prestige, sation, and the US worried that and compen Mossadeq might be As a deposed by the Tudeh (Communist) party. result, Briefing During siderably Governor Stevenson in 1952 it Stevenson, like Eisenhower, wanted to follow the situa tion very carefully. Serious discussions between the US and the UK about a covert action program to remove presidential campaign, proved con briefings of Stevenson than it was to arrange the briefings of Eisenhower. For a start, the Governor accepted the Presidents invitation to lunch and an initial round of discussions on 19 August easier to arrange the 1952 Mossadeq did not begin until after the election in 1952. Therefore, whether to brief a presidential candidate, at the White House. Thereafter, he two to sion in on 30 by Springfield, Illinois. Those sessions took place August, 15 September, and 1 and 20 October. labor, it was three weeks was briefed every the CIA at the Governors Man prior to the election, on a covert action program as important as the one that was implemented in Iran the following year was a question that did not arise. In addition to ing to the 1952 which the one briefings Stevenson received dur campaign, he asked a number of questions Agency responded with written memoran the CIA case, for In the initial division of decided that to dums. In sent a example, Davidson would travel to son. Springfield brief Steven memorandum to the Governor address to the 19th The as plan had been for him to brief both candidates, Stalins personally analyzing Josef Communist Party Congress, a DCI Smith but luck would have it they requested same as their first brief held the on 15 October. In addition to factual account of an ing on the same day. The material Davidson took to illi the that points Stalin had made, Smith included in retrospect as a analysis nois exactly provided Eisenhower. The exceptiona distinction not observed in subsequent yearswas that Eisenhower received was almost that comes across policy to lecture to the candidate. The memorandum concluded with the obser vation that, It is extremely unwise underestimate the material that included information derived from nications commu intelligence. Stevenson lacked not experience importance of any of Stalins statements, although sometimes it is not as easy as in the present instance to highlight their actual with this sensitive material and did receive it. meaning. The significance of the above is unmistakable.23 gracious host and a more During their Saturday afternoon sessions, he invariably offered his CIA visitor refreshments and had numerous questions and cornStevenson was an even more careful reader than Eisenhower. 74 Truman and Eisenhower The Challenger Briefed Again in 1956 versy, the Aswan Dam situation, and the failure of the Menzies mission. As the crisis continued to build, During the 1956 presidential campaign, President Eisen hower continued to receive routine ings at NSC meetings just as he had for the intelligence previous brief Nassers four years. Without hesitation, Eisenhower authorized the resumption of support to Stevenson during the 1956 campaign along the lines of the briefing support he and legal aspects of position Egyptian leaders ability to maintain his government against expected economic sanctions. And he was interested in regional aspects of the problem, including tensions between Israel and Jor dan and the buildup of British forces on Cyprus. Stevenson evinced interest in the and in the On 29 October, McMahan, in his own the Governor had received four years earlier. words, for an was The responsibility keeping 1956 fell primarily to the Agencys Deputy Director of Current Intelligence, Knight McMahan. This time the logistics of the briefings were not as simple as they had been in 1952, when the candidate worked out of location in 10 on for Stevenson informed in caught in the worst situation possible intelli gence briefer: briefing Stevenson in Boston on the day Israel attacked Egypt. McMahan had taken the train one Springfield. McMahan briefed Stevenson on September at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City, 17 September and 1 October at the Sheraton Park Washington, of the 17 and on Washington to Boston the previous day while the inter-Agency Watch Committee was reviewing newly available intelligence confirming that Israel was com pleting its mobilization and would attack Egypt. Because the evidence came from intercepted communi cations, the decision was from Hotel in 29 October in Boston. not to include this sensitive materials to briefings September occasion in Washington exception when he was joined by DDCI Gen. Charles Cabell. Like his McMahan conducted these alone, with the material in the written briefing Stevenson. McMahan intended handle this prepared for breaking story orally. To McMahans more predecessor was a observed, One could not four years earlier, McMahan help being impressed with chagrin a one and embarrassment, he had no than settled into chair to begin his briefing of to Stevenson; he read very informed man, but what he Stevenson when of the Governors aides burst in brought him up to date and included things he didnt know anything about.24 Much of the informa inform him that the press was reporting Israel had attacked. McMahan had not yet said anything. In 1993, McMahan still remembered this encounter provided Stevenson in 1956 addressed the crisis in Hungary. Beyond that issue, the Governor studied very carefully material presented to him on Soviet disarma ment policy. He was also interested in developments in India and in the warming relationship between India and China. He had questions on the Sino-Burmese relation ship, the Sakhalin-Kuril situation, and regarding devel opments in Malaysia, Singapore, and the islands off tion China. recalling, us. Stevenson took the news in stride, clearly, surprised that he had heard it first from the media rather than from But he reacted with consternation and concern. was more Stevenson Sen. Estes Kefauver. ver gracious than his running mate, According to McMahan, Kefau (who was briefed time. He couldnt ish had shut us separately) gave me a very hard believe that the French and the Brit of the out planning process.26 Stevensons however, was the Hungary and the Asian issues, secondary to his primary concern, which developing Suez crisis. Agency memorandums were a num interests in Looking son back on the in 1956, it is clear that he asked the Agencys exchanges with Steven right probing for the record make clear that Stevenson asked ber of questions about the Suez situation For during the first example, specifically on the nature of President Gamal Abdel Nassers violation of existing agreements, the convention of 1888, Israeli shipping, developments in McMahan three briefings.25 he crossexamined questions concerning the Suez crisis as it unfolded. He wanted to know not only about the situation in Egypt but also about developments in Israel, Jordan, and Cyprus that were key to understanding the intentions of the parties involved. McMahan discussed with Steven son all aspects of the intelligence reporting but was not at liberty to review with Stevenson the politics of intelli the UN, the attitudes of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, possible solutions to the contro 75 Truman and Eisenhower gence collection and policy support that had been unfolding as well. Agency officers had noted, for exam NOTES I. ple, that Secretary of State Dulles did not want to David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and regarding the UK buildup on Cyprus lest the knowledge of the US Government, accompanied by its silence, represent approval. Particu larly in the early stages of the crisis, there had been a clear assumption by key policyniakers that Israel and others, knowing of Eisenhowers opposition to a mili tary In move, receive detailed information Shuster, 1992), pp. 376-378. 2. The New York Ti,nes, 22 November I952, pp. 1, 10. 3. Harry Truman letter to Bedell Smith, 8 March 1951. would somehow hold back. 4. Meredith Davidson, interviews by the author in Fre derick, Md., 26 March and 25 October 1993. Unless fact, the US Intelligence Community did not was unaware of otherwise indicated, the numerous references that alland report on someof the details of the The increase in follow concerning Davidsons briefings of Stevenson Israeli, French, and British cooperation. and Eisenhower come from these interviews. tensions had been documented well in the intelligence how attack 5. reporting. ever, were Clear issued warnings of coming hostilities, only a week ahead. When the European allies and handling of the crisis. Walter Bedell Smith, Memorandum for the President, 9 January 1953. 6. occurred, the President and the Democratic candidates were furious with the of their own less than proud Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 19531956 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 85. The New York Times, 19 November 1952, pp. 1, 18. Thus, from the Agencys point of view, the briefings for Stevenson in 1956 ended on an awkward note owing to the Suez crisis. In all other respects, however, the ses sions with Stevenson and Kefauver cess. were a 7. 8. great suc Harry Truman telegram to Dwight Eisenhower, 14 August 1952. A similar telegram was sent to Adlai Stevenson. personally wrote Acting DCI Cabell thank him for the briefings provided by McMahan, observing that they were excellent and I found him very well informed.27 Stevenson met with Stevenson to 9. Dwight Eisenhower telegram 14 August 1952. to Harry Truman, Agency officers who two campaigns came away during his deeply impressed with his 10. knowledge of foreign affairs and his interest in and appreciation of the intelligence product. More than that, it had been a great personal pleasure to deal with him. McMahan recalls, He was a very courteous, polite man. I remember thinking it was a blessing he was not elected, in light of the public and personal attacks to which our presidents are subjected. Harry Truman letter to Dwight Eisenhower, 16 August 1952. Maintained in the holdings of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. 11. Dwight Eisenhower letter to Harry Truman, 19 August 1952. Eisenhower Library. Dwight Eisenhower letter to Walter Bedell Smith, 14 August 1952. Eisenhower Library. WaIter Bedell Smith letter 18 to 12. 13. Dwight Eisenhower, August 1952. 14. Melvin Hendrickson, interview by the author in McLean, Va., 23 March 1993. Unless otherwise indi cated, the references to his briefings of Eisenhower 76 Truman and Eisenhower come from this interview. In discussing that first 19. Eisenhower, Mandate for 20. Change, p. 72. briefing, was Hendrickson said his most vivid memory of Eisenhowers powerful welcoming had to be careful off. or hand shake, saying, You squeeze your he would Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New Doubleday and Co., 1965), p. 712. York: fingers 21. Andrew 15. Melvin Hendrickson, Memorandum for the Record, Briefing of General Eisenhower30 August 1952, 5 September 1952. As a reminder of how things change in 40 years, one cannot help noting that the Agencys New York office provided the visiting CIA team a Goodpaster, interview by the author in Washington, DC, 26 September 1993. Unless other wise indicated, all references to Goodpasters obser vations come from this interview. 22. Gordon 17 Gray, Memorandum for the Record, chauffeur-driven Cadillac for their 20-minute January 1961. Eisenhower Library. trip from midtown to Columbia University on the up per west side. Conversely, some things never change. The team reported in their memorandum for the record that, when they returned later that day to New Yorks LaGuardia Airport for their flight to Was hing ton, they discovered their reservations were for a flight departing from Idlewild (now JFK) Airport. They changed their reservation and arrived back at CIAs Que building in Washington by midafter noon. Among the stories Hendrickson told his col leagues was an account of his pleasure at having met not only General Eisenhower but also Mrs. Eisen hower and their grandchildren. 16. Hendrickson the record 23. Walter Bedell Smith, Memorandum for Governor Stevenson, 16 October 1952 24. Knight McMahan, interview by the author in Hanover, New Hampshire, 18 April 1993. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to McMahans briefings of Stevenson come from this interview. 25. McMahan drafted memorandums for the record fol lowing his first three sessions with Stevenson, dated 12 September, 18 September, and 2 October 1956. No record is available of his fourth session, held 29 October in Boston. on prepared very brief memorandums for concerning the second and fourth brief ings, dated 29 September and 28 October, respective ly; no written record has been found of the third 26. Memorandums for the record, dated I and 8 October 1956, are available for only two early briefings of Kefauver. briefing, 17. held in Denver. 27. Adlai Stevenson letter to C. P. Cabell, Il 1956. September Walter Bedell Smith letter to vember 1952. Eisenhower Harry Truman, Library. 1 No 18. Memorandums for the record have not been found in CIA files regarding the postelection briefings of Eisenhower, and there is reason to doubt that any ex ist. Davidson, who accompanied Smith to the first two sessions, remembers asking the DCI after the first me meeting if whether there was anything he wanted to write. He said No. Beedle would have been nothing had been written. This attitude of explains why the memorandums written Davidson and Hendrickson, even about briefings by in which Smith did not participate, were so cryptic. happy the DCI also 77