Operation Plans [OPLAN]
An Operation Plan is any plan, except the SIOP, for the conduct of military operations in a hostile environment
prepared by the commander of a unified or specified command in response to a requirement established by the joint
chiefs of staff. Operation plans are prepared in either complete or concept format. An Operation Plan in Complete
Format (OPLAN) is an operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development
of an OPORD. Complete plans include deployment/employment phases, as appropriate. An Operation Plan in
Concept Format (CONPLAN) is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable
expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD.
The general criteria for approval of an operation plan are adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and consistency with
joint doctrine. Combining the criteria of feasibility and acceptability, the review ensures the mission can be
accomplished with available resources and without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, material, time,
The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and
will accomplish the mission. The review assesses the validity of assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance
and joint doctrine.
The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks can be accomplished using available resources
within the time frames contemplated by the plan. The primary considerations are whether the resources made
available for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are used effectively or are insufficient to satisfy
The review for acceptability ensures the plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. Additionally, this criteria
ensures plans are consistent with domestic and international law, including the law of war, and are militarily and
An OPLAN represents the full development of the concept of operations of the commander in chief (CINC) of a
unified command. It specifies the forces and support needed to execute the plan and the transportation schedule
required to move those resources. In developing a plan, the CINC and service-component staffs develop a detailed
flow of resources into the theater to support the approved OPLAN concept. After forces are selected, time-phased
support requirements are determined, and transportation feasibility is established, the detailed planning information is
generated and stored as a ―time-phased force and deployment data‖ (TPFDD) file.
Reference days used for planning are:
D-day: Unnamed day on which a particular operation begins when describing a concept of operations. H- hour is the
reference with this day for what time that operation begins.
C-day: Deployment planning is based on C-day. This is the unnamed day on which movement for forces, support,
and transportation from origin begins. The L- hour is the specific time associated with C-day.
M-day: Unnamed day on which mobilization of reserve forces begin and F-hour is the specific time associated with
the mobilization announcement by the SECDEF.
Much of the detailed work of deployment planning is done by Service components after the CINC issues a detailed
Letter of Instruction with technical guidance. Employment planning, which is ―how‖ forces are to be used, is worked
by the JTF and component commanders, after the supported commander‘s plan has been approved by the CJCS,
remember though that an understanding of the employment plan is necessary to ensure that the deployment plan is
appropriate. The ―where‖ and ―when‖ were determined in concept development as part of the final product; the
concept of operations. Much of the CINC‘s work is deployment: getting the resources there for them to be eventually
Operation Plans [OPLAN], operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs) with and without Time-Phased Force and
Deployment Data (TPFDD), and FUNCPLANs are prepared by commanders to fulfill tasks assigned in the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or otherwise directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They conform
to standardized formats and content in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database. To
facilitate communications concerning operation planning among military headquarters, commanders standardize the
format and content of other appropriate plans.
As the all-encompassing warfighting document for a theater, the CINC‘s deliberate plans associated with each MTW
provides the basis from which to delineate the logistics responsibilities, and its corresponding TPFDD provides the
base document to capture logistics data requirements.
The TPFDDs only establish the initial movement requirements in the theater, e.g., PODs to initial staging areas.
Consequently, not all-subsequent phases of theater campaign plans that require additional movement of equipment,
supplies, and personnel can be calculated from the TPFDD database. While current TPFDDs do not account for
these subsequent movement requirements, planners in both theaters were aware of this deficiency and were working
to address the issue. In NEA, US Forces Korea (USFK) planners have developed a Wartime Movements Plan (WMP)
which lists the subsequent movement requirements in Korea for the first 30 days. This subsequent movement data is
important in determining overall transportation requirements throughout the campaign.
The TPFDD would provide the population statistics by number of personnel, time periods, and locations throughout
the theater. Using the simple Rapid Query Tool (RQT) application that operates with pertinent portions of the Global
Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) databases,
theater planners could determine the needed data elements.
There are significant differences between the two theaters, the most noticeable being the level of centralization. In
NEA, for example, the planning staffs for both USFK and EUSA worked within walking distances from each other.
The large forward-presence force maintained on the Korean peninsula has allowed planners a greater insight into
how an MTW would be fought and supported. However, close proximity does not always eliminate confusion. For
instance, the relationship between PACOM and USFK as it pertains to complying with the Army‘s process for
determining joint land-based support is not well understood. SWA on the other hand, is an austere theater, with the
CENTCOM staff thousands of miles away from their theater, and hundreds of miles removed from their subordinate
Service staffs. However, for this MTW campaign, there is only one centralized planning staff, i.e., CENTCOM. Its
Army component, ARCENT, had been assigned land operation responsibilities throughout the potential areas of
operation. CENTCOM planning staff responsibilities, therefore, were more clearly understood.
In 1999 SAIC was contracted by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Logistics (ODCSLOG) to develop a data call process that captured the Army‘s Logistics Support to Other Services
(ALSOS) responsibilities and associated requirements (previously known as Wartime Executive Agent
Responsibilities [WEAR]) in the event of two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW). SAIC was unable to
locate an appropriate Air staff element to discuss the Army's support to other Services responsibilities and
This review included DOD/Joint doctrine, MTW deliberate and concept plans (CONPLAN), joint regulations agreed to
by two or more Services and ISAs and responsibilities identified in previous HQDA, ODCSLOG studies. The review
centered on only those ALSOS responsibilities, e.g., executive agent, that had support implications to the warfighting
CINCs. Based on limited availability of pertinent documents - not all applicable deliberate plans/CONPLANs were
made available by the Government - MTWs tailored ALSOS Responsibilities List were developed for each theater.
This review covered a number of Southwest Asia (SWA) OPLANs [ CENTCOM OPLAN 1003-96, CENTCOM OPLAN
1002-96, CENTCOM CONPLAN 1015-96, ARCENT OPLAN 1003-96, ARCENT OPLAN 1002-95, and ARCENT
CONPLAN 1015-96] as well as Northeast Asia (NEA) OPLANs [ PACOM OPLAN 5027-96, EUSA OPLAN 5027-95,
UNC/CFC OPLAN 5027-98, and PACOM CONPLAN 5028-96]
In reviewing the various MTW deliberate plans in 1999, SAIC found contradictions and gaps in the various CINC and
Service Components plans. This situation was partially understandable due to current ongoing deliberate plan
revision efforts, but did cause confusion during this study. In SWA for example, the CENTCOM and ARCENT
deliberate plans were integrated and the tasks in the CENTCOM plan were well nested in the subordinate ARCENT
document. In NEA on the other hand, the PACOM, USFK and EUSA MTW deliberate plans were not always
synchronized. In fact the EUSA OPLAN 5027-95 pre-dated its superior deliberate plan, USFK OPLAN 5027-96.
Tasks delineated to EUSA by the PACOM OPLAN 5027-96 could not always be found in the USFK OPLAN 5027-96,
and the actual in-theater chain of command that assigns and executes ALSOS responsibilities was confusing. In
addition, the OPLANs did not clearly delineate if they supported single or dual MTW scenarios.
During the 1999 SAIC study, the transportation data submitted for each Service was segregated into two parts. The
first part appeared to be a TPFDD - generated sort as described earlier in this report. The second part consisted of
Wartime Movements Plan (WMP) data compiled by EUSA. The TPFDD generated data, while in the proper
spreadsheet format, did not have valid destinations for many of the records. For example, the majority of United
States Air Force (USAF) data records had a destination of Contingency Operating Base/Mobilization Operating Base
(COB/MOB) and USMC records had a destination of Theater Assembly Area (TAA).
The 1999 SAIC study noted that differences in Service‘s consumption rates could have a major impact on the Army‘s
force structure determination process. For example, the review indicated a wide variance in the USMC‘s Class I
planning factors versus the Army‘s rate, i.e., 4.4 pounds per day (ppd) in their OMFTS study to 5.7 ppd in their TAA
005 submission as compared to the Army‘s 8.09 ppd. Other classes of supply appeared to have similar wide
differences in consumption factors.
The Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, 1 March 2002, recognizes that ―transformed training‖ is the key
enabler to transforming the Department of Defense. A significant influence on the principal determinants is the shift in
defense strategy from a ―threat-based‖ to a ―capabilities-based‖ approach. The capabilities-based approach requires
leaders to identify capabilities that Army forces need now to deter and defeat a broad range of potential adversaries.
The impact of that shift is that Army training and education systems must produce well-trained soldiers and self-
aware, adaptive leaders who can develop versatile, lethal, agile, deployable, responsive, sustainable, and survivable
units. While those qualities describe the Objective Force, they are already needed.
In late 2003 it was reported ["Military Alters Plans For Possible Conflicts" By Bradley Graham Washington Post
November 18, 2003, pg. 18] that regional military commanders and the the Joint Staff had revised OPLANs "based
on assumptions that conflicts could be fought more quickly and with fewer American troops than previously thought ...
The study, called Operational Availability, is analyzing how changes not only in technology but also in foreign basing
of troops, pre-positioning of combat equipment abroad and routine rotations of U.S. forces overseas can increase the
U.S. military's speed in achieving victory.... A series of war-gaming exercises last year  ... found that timelines
for U.S. victories could be shortened significantly.... The speedier wars meant that many of the forces called for in the
plans -- up to two-thirds in some instances -- would never have fought."
The short title of each plan is UNCLASSIFIED and denotes the supported commander, the type of plan, and the Plan
Identification Number (PID). The basic PID is a command-unique four-digit number and a two-digit suffix. As specified
by the JSCP, the suffix represents the fiscal year of the JSCP for which the plan is written or reprinted; for example,
USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99. The supported command assigns a PID for the life of the plan. To the maximum
extent possible, PID changes should be limited to those dictated by security/ operations security (OPSEC)
requirements. All PID changes must be coordinated with the Joint Staff.
The four-digit number in the PID does not change when the OPLAN is revised or converted into an OPORD. Also, the
four-digit number is not reused when the requirement for the plan is canceled. The two-digit suffix is assigned to the
OPLAN, and is used throughout. This includes new plans and complete reprints of plans. When an OPLAN is revised
in part or approved for a subsequent period of the JSCP, there is no requirement to change the suffix throughout the
plan. However, changes and related documents will reference the fiscal year of the JSCP to which the change or
related document applies.
OPORDs prepared by the CINCs to fulfill Chairman requirements will be assigned PIDs selected from the block of
numbers allocated above when the OPORD is not a conversion of an existing OPLAN. The UNCLASSIFIED short
title will be derived in the manner described in subparagraph 3a above. Thus, an OPORD prepared by USJFCOM
might be designated USJFCOM OPORD 2000-92. (The two-digit suffix represents the calendar year or fiscal year in
which the order is published.)
Supporting plans are assigned a PID identical to that of the supported plan. However, when a supporting command
or agency prepares a single OPLAN to support two or more plans of other commanders, the plan is assigned a PID
without regard to the PIDs of the supported plans. PIDs will be established by using the command-unique four-digit
number, followed by the two-digit fiscal year designation.
OPLAN 774FM is a fictitious OPLAN used by USTRANSCOM for training.
Operation Plan [OPLAN]
CONPLAN 0500–02 NORTHCOM
(CBRNE Consequence Management)
OPLAN 1002 - CENTCOM
OPLAN 1003 - CENTCOM
OPLAN 1004 - CENTCOM
CONPLAN 1015 - CENTCOM
OPLAN 1019 - CENTCOM
CONPLAN 1025 Radar Threat Update
OPLAN 2200 - LANT
OPLAN 2370 - LANT
OPLAN 2380 - LANT
OPLAN 2400 AGILE PROVIDER
OPLAN 2400 - LANT
CONPLAN 2400 NORTHCOM
(Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region)
CONPLAN 2501 NORTHCOM
(Defense Support of Civil Authorities)
CONPLAN 2502 NORTHCOM
(Civil Disturbance Operations)
FUNCPLAN 2505 NORTHCOM
(Nuclear Weapons Accident Response)
CONPLAN 2591 NORTHCOM
CONPLAN 2707 NORTHCOM
(Caribbean Mass Migration)
OPLAN 4102 - EUCOM
OPLAN 4112 - EUCOM
CONPLAN 4311 - EUCOM
CONPLAN 4402 - EUCOM
OPLAN 5000 - PACOM
OPLAN 5001 - PACOM
OPLAN 5026 - PACOM
OPLAN 5027 - PACOM
OPLAN 5028 - PACOM
OPLAN 5029 - PACOM
OPLAN 5030 - PACOM
OPLAN 5055 - PACOM
CONPLAN 5040 - PACOM
CONPLAN 5053 - PACOM
CONPLAN 5060 - PACOM
CONPLAN 5070 - PACOM
CONPLAN 5077 - PACOM
OPLAN 10412 JOINT GUARANTOR
OPLAN 10413 JOINT GUARDIAN
OPLAN 10414 ALLIED HARBOUR
OPLAN 10601 ALLIED FORCE
OPLAN 31001 V Corps GDP
OPLAN 31402 Consistent Effort
OPLAN 40-104 Determined Effort
OPLAN 1648 - CENTCOM
OPLAN 774FM - USTRANSCOM
OPLAN 9518 PROTECTION OF US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND SUPPORT FOR THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA CFC (KOREA)
Plan Identification Number (PID)
0001 through 0999 CJCS
1000 through 1999 USCINCCENT
2000 through 2999 USCINCJF
3000 through 3399 CINCNORAD
3400 through 3999 USCINCSPACE
4000 through 4999 USCINCEUR
5000 through 5999 USCINCPAC
6000 through 6999 USCINCSO
7000 through 7499 COMFORSCOM
7500 through 7999 USCINCSOC
8000 through 8999 USCINCSTRAT
9000 through 9599 USCINCTRANS
9600 through 9699 Reserved
9700 through 9799 COMDT COGARD
U.S. Army Logistics Related DoD Executive Agents, ALSOS 28 Jan 2000 (Word document) The Army
needed a more comprehensive look at the potential impacts on its capabilities as a result of having to meet its current
assigned, implied and specified Army Logistics Support to Other Services (ALSOS) responsibilities.
OPLAN 1002 Defense of the Arabian Peninsula
Through the end of the 1980s, the United States had no forces, bases, supplies, or infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.
Forces, their equipment, and their sustainment stocks of fuel, ordnance, spare parts, and a million other things would
have to be deployed into the theater, and bases established for them. Through the end of the Cold War the
CENTCOM operation plan OPLAN 1002 involved Iran.
In 1987 students in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth [Kansas] participated in an
eight-day Southwest Asia war game. The pertinent part of the scenario portrayed a takeover by anti-American rebel
forces of several key cities in Iran, mostly in the southern part of the country. The rebels threatened to seize the
Persian Gulf ports, and thereby shut down oil cargo out of the Persian Gulf. Twenty-three Soviet divisions from three
fronts entered Iran in support of the rebels.
In response to the threat to its national interests as expressed by the Carter Doctrine, the United States deployed a
joint task force to assist the loyalist Iranian forces. Ground forces consisted of roughly five and one-half Army
divisions under the control of a field army headquarters plus one Marine amphibious force.
SAMS students decided early in the planning that their mission, to ―defeat‖ rebel and Soviet forces in Iran and to
facilitate the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf, needed clarification. What was the defeat criterion? Restore Iran‘s
national borders? Destroy all Soviet and rebel forces within the borders of Iran? Or should they emphasize the
second part of the mission statement, to facilitate the West‘s and Japan‘s access to Persian Gulf oil? In the absence
of a national command authorities (NCA)-player cell, the students judged that NCA intent was to optimize chances for
the uninterrupted flow of oil, consistent with means.
With this understanding, they concentrated on securing the vital Gulf ports of Chah Bahar, Bushehr, and Bandar
Abbas. The ground commander (in this exercise, the notional US Ninth Army commander) determined that he would
attempt to drive out, or prevent from entering, any enemy forces in an area centered on Bandar Abbas and
circumscribed by an arc running roughly through Shiraz, Kerman, and Bam, some 250 miles away.
This decision made sense in four important respects. First, in the ground commander‘s opinion, the US force was too
small to fight much-superior enemy forces across the vast entirety of Iran itself. Second, with almost no infrastructure
from which to establish supply operations, to move farther than 250 miles inland would have been logistically
unsupportable. Third, this course of action permitted friendly forces to exploit the excellent defensible terrain of the
Zagros Mountains. Fourth, a secure enclave would be available from which to launch attacks to the northwest should
the NCA subsequently decide upon a more ambitious and aggressive course.
The principal Army war plan in the fall of 1989, OPLAN 1002-88, assumed a Soviet attack through Iran to the Persian
Gulf. The plan called for five and two-thirds US divisions in the defense, mostly light and heavy forces at something
less than full strength (apportioned to it by the Joint Strategic Capability Plan [JSCAP]). The strategy of the original
plan called for these five and two-thirds divisions to march from the Arabian Gulf to the Zagros Mountains and
prevent the Red Army from seizing the oil fields of Iran. Less than two divisions were apportioned to the separate
plan then in place for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula.
On November 23, 1988, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, became USCENTCOM‘S third commander-in-
chief (USCINCCENT). Spurred by the rapid diminution of Soviet aggressiveness under Mikhail Gorbachev, Gen.
Schwarzkopf worked to supplant USCENTCOM‘s primary war plan, which involved a war against the Soviets in Iran,
with a more realistic scenario.
In his FY 1990 Annual Report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci defined maintaining access to
regional oil supplies and promoting the security and stability of friendly states to be US regional goals in SWA. The
report cited the continuing need for US rapid force deployment and resupply, access to local facilities, and assistance
from local military forces to respond adequately to regional threats.
In May 1989 CENTCOM conducted the CINCCENT War Game to review and examine newly revised Operations
Plan OPLAN 1002 for SWA. During 1988-89 CENTCOM revised its OPLAN 1002, originally to plan operations to
counter an intra-regional conflict, without Soviet involvement, to specifically address the US capability to counter an
Iraqi attack on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
In October 1989 President Bush stated that "access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the
area are vital to US national security. Accordingly, the US remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region,
if necessary and appropriate through the use of US military force." He further stated that the US is also committed to
"support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more
active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral US military intervention."
Following the guidance provided by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1989, USCINCCENT began
planning for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula against a strong regional threat. In October 1989 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) had directed that a major revision of this plan be prepared, with Iraq as the opponent.
In January 1990 the Secretary of Defense's guidance made the US central objective for SWA the prevention of a
hostile power from gaining control over a share of oil supplies or shipment routes sufficient to provide it with leverage
over the US and its allies.
Even before Schwarzkopf changed Central Command's planning priorities, ARCENT began adjusting to the idea that
Iraq constituted the major regional threat. Third Army also held that any U.S. response to the potential danger would
require a significantly larger and heavier force than had been anticipated. As early as March 1989, Third Army began
to coordinate with the Army Concepts and Analysis Agency (CAA) in Bethesda, Maryland, to conduct a war game
simulation of the existing war plan for the Arabian Peninsula to examine this hypothesis. CAA ran Wargame Persian
Tiger 89 in February 1990, as planning for a revised defensive concept got under way. Persian Tiger posited a
defensive force of three Army light brigades (one airborne, two airmobile), a battalion of the Ranger regiment, an air
defense artillery brigade, corps aviation, and artillery. Two Marine expeditionary brigades and aviation forces
allocated under the existing plan were also portrayed. The findings of the game, which began to emerge in February
but which were not published until August 1990, were that U.S. forces could not arrive in theater in time to resist an
Iraqi invasion if deployment were ordered only upon outbreak of hostilities. It was learned also that the allocated U.S.
force structure was too light to do what was required of it, in any event.
The focus of Third Army and CENTCOM (and the rest of the US military) was shifting to a different type of
contingency in Southwest Asia. CENTCOM was moving away from a supporting theater in a Central European
conflict to a primary theater of war fighting in mid-1990. In April 1990 the outline for USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90
had been published; the plan would be completed in April 1991, after DESERT STORM ended.
In March 1990, over 500 military and civilian staff from CENTCOM and other US agencies began work at Fort
McPherson, Georgia, to develop a detailed blueprint for a U.S.-Iraqi war in the Kuwait/Saudi Arabia area. Known as
Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90, the document covered major aspects of a future conflict. The plan detailed which
US divisions would go to Saudi Arabia, what radio frequencies they would use, where they would get their water, how
they would treat their casualties, and how they would handle the news media.
As Saddam Hussein increased tensions in the region throughout the spring, US assistance to Iraq (which dated back
to the Iran-Iraq War) would become a political issue. In April, CENTCOM planners were directed to drop the country's
identifications in their planning documents and to substitute the less politically sensitive color codes of RED (Iraq),
ORANGE (Iran), and YELLOW (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).
CENTCOM draft OPLAN 1002-90 (Defense of the Arabian Peninsula) had the highest CENTCOM planning priority in
the Spring of 1990. The second draft of OPLAN 1002-90 was published in July 1990 with a third draft scheduled to be
published in October 1990 in preparation for a Phase I Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) conference in
A number of features of the draft Third Army plan (1002-90), published in July 1990, show how prewar planning
guided Third Army's actions during Operation Desert Shield. The plan was intended to direct the Army's contribution
to Central Command's broader-objective regional plan "designed to counter an intra-regional conflict on the ARABIAN
PENINSULA to protect UNITED STATES (U.S.) and allied access to ARABIAN PENINSULA oil." Central Command's
strategy for a regional contingency spelled out its strategy this way: "The USCENTCOM regional contingency
strategy to counter an intraregional threat initially seeks to (secure] U.S. and allied interests through deterrence.
Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy additional U.S, combat forces to assist friendly states in
defending critical ports and oil facilities on the ARABIAN PENINSULA. Once sufficient combat power has been
generated and the enemy has been sufficiently attrited, the strategy is to mass forces and conduct a counteroffensive
to recapture critical port and oil facilities which may have been seized by enemy forces in earlier stages of conflict."
The plan portrayed an Iraqi attack through Kuwait and into Saudi Arabia. The attack force consisted of sixty brigades,
supported by 640 fighter/ground-attack aircraft and a minimum of 3,200 tanks. The plan assumed four days would be
needed to take Kuwait and another five to reach the port of Al Jubayl. It credited Iraq with an operational reach no
longer than Al Hufuf-enough grasp to occupy the main Persian Gulf ports and key oil facilities. The plan also
assumed three to six months' increased regional tension and up to thirty days' strategic warning.
The corresponding Third Army plan assumed a deployment decision at least nineteen days prior to hostilities, an
immediate 200,000-man selected Reserve call-up, and availability of assigned National Guard roundout brigades and
necessary combat service support units.19 In the pre-Desert Storm Army force structure, roundout brigades were
National Guard formations that were expected to fill out incomplete Regular Army divisions and deploy with them to
war. In the event, Third Army would enjoy neither the advanced warning nor have the benefit of an early selected
Reserve call-up. The absence of both would influence significantly how Third Army went to war.
The Third Army plan was designed for the defense of critical port and oil facilities in the vicinity of Al Jubayl and
Abqaiq, the operation of common-user seaports, and the provision of combat support and combat service support
(logistics) to Central Command forces in theater. The concept of operations called for a three-phase deployment.
Phase one addressed the introduction of "deterrent forces," the Third Army and XVIII Corps' forward headquarters,
an aviation brigade task force, and troops from the 82d Airborne Division. These forces, along with Marine units, were
to establish a deterrent force north of Al Jubayl to secure the points of debarkation at Jubayl, Ad Dammam, and
Dhahran and, upon arrival of the Marines, to establish a defense of the Abqaiq oil facilities. The deterrent effect of
ground forces would be greatly enhanced, of course, by the simultaneous arrival of air and naval forces. Indeed, in
the first month of any deployment, the U.S. and Saudi air threat to extended Iraqi lines of communication was the
Phase two of the Third Army deployment was to involve the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry
Division (Mechanized) and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with their reserve component "roundout" brigades,
a brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) (then undergoing deactivation), and the 197th Separate Infantry
Brigade (Mechanized). Arrival of these heavier forces would permit the establishment of a defense in depth behind
Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces to the north along the Saudi border and forward of the ports and oil
facilities. Should the enemy attack at this point, the Air Force component (principally Central Command Air Forces
[CENTAF]) was assigned to contest the offensive. The Army aviation task force of attack helicopters would link the
ground forces with the theater air interdiction program. The brigade of the 9th Division (Motorized) was to be held in
Phase three called for a coordinated counteroffensive involving Saudi, U.S. Army, and Marine forces to restore lost
territory and facilities.
CENTCOM scheduled Exercise Internal Look 90 in late July 1990 to test the validity of operational and logistic
support concepts in OPLAN 1002-90. Focused on an Iraqi incursion on the Arabian peninsula, the exercise revealed
the need for a revised troop list, and an armor heavy and highly mobile force to fight a high-speed tank battle in the
expanses of the Arabian desert.
From 20-28 July 1990 CENTCOM conducted the INTERNAL LOOK 90 command post exercise to examine new
Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1002, "Defense of the Arabian Peninsula," to validate operational and logistical support
concepts. The initial Third Army plans drawn up to support Internal Look and operations plan (OPLAN) 1002-90 for
CENTCOM took on a different character. Planners recommended a heavier armored force whose closure would be in
question due to sea-lift limitations. However, this force offered more combat power and an offensive capability that
Army planners believed previous planning forces lacked.
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within hours, U.S. Naval forces responded to that crisis. That same morning,
the Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT), briefed the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on available military options. One option involved deployment of forces
according to the Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) Strategic Concept for OPLAN 1002-90, a deliberate plan in-the-
making. In response to the situation, USCINCCENT modified existing deliberate planning and began immediate
execution planning. The initial order deploying U.S. forces came on 6 August 1990, four days after the invasion.
During that time, USCINCCENT and the rest of the Joint Planning and Execution Community had used the crisis
action planning process to plan and execute Operation Desert Shield.
US Central Command's Desert Storm planning for support from DoD and national space forces was reflected in
OPLAN 1002-90, "USCENTCOM Operations to Counter an Intra-Regional Threat to the Arabian Peninsula." Dated
13 July 90 and in its second draft, US Central Command was forced to use this immature and uncoordinated plan to
begin its initial deployments to Saudi Arabia on 7 August 1990. OPLAN 1002-90 should have represented the
commander's concept of operations and identified the forces and supplies required to execute the plan and a
movement schedule of the resources into the theater. For integrated planning within the theater, US Central
Command had developed supporting annexes to the OPLAN. These annexes provided detailed guidance to US
Central Command's component commands, subordinate commanders and supporting commanders. In the case of
space forces, detailed guidance and a statement of operational need was included in multiple annexes. However, the
primary annex for space remained Annex N: Space Operations.
Annex N to OPLAN 1002-90 was supposed to describe the concept of operations and explain theater-wide space
forces support required by US Central Command's employment plan. However, the level of detail reflected the
relative immaturity of the space mission. Some space force functional areas, such as communications, weather, and
intelligence, contained enough detail to be of use. On the other hand, navigation, early warning, and geodesy lacked
even basic information. Any good planning found in Annex N can be largely attributed to the fact that there were
separate, detailed annexes in some functional areas, such as communications, intelligence, and weather.
Nevertheless, even in these areas pre-planning was not totally acceptable. For example, SATCOM communications
links had to be altered at least 75 times, and the intelligence dissemination network worked backwards. The lack of
planning for interoperability between service dissemination systems forced intelligence data collected by one service
to be routed from the theater back to the Pentagon, then transmitted back to the theater. Consequently, throughout
the Gulf War operations space support took on an ad hoc character because of inadequate planning for the use of
Iran has become the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in August
1988, Iran has been steadily rebuilding its forces. Initially, Tehran relied on equipment captured from the Iraqis or
repaired through cannibalization. In 1990, Iran began to purchase high-tech weapons using hard currency from oil
profits. Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait and the resultant oil price increase provided Iran with unexpected revenues to
accelerate an already ambitious rearmament program. Even after oil prices fell, Iran has been able to continue its
Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has been rebuilding its military at an increasing pace in an effort to
reestablish itself as a prominent regional military power. Iran has demonstrated its capability to threaten neutral
shipping and the Gulf Cooperation Council states by conducting offensive naval and amphibious exercises in the
Arabian Gulf. It is attempting to modernize its air and ground forces by purchasing arms from the Commonwealth of
Independent States, China, North Korea, and East European countries. Iran has also sought to purchase military and
industrial items from Germany, Italy, France, and Japan to facilitate its modernization efforts. However, high domestic
inflation, a mounting foreign debt, and reduced oil revenues from an aging oil production infrastructure have
combined to reduce Iran‘s ability to modernize as rapidly as desired. If this situation should change, Iran will find
many nations willing to provide sophisticated arms in exchange for petro-dollars.
The warfighting element of USCENTCOM's strategy is an extension of the peacetime element. Partnerships and
regional access established under the peacetime programs of prepositioned war ready material, combined exercises,
and security assistance are the foundations for either a gradual buildup in response to increasing tensions or a rapid
introduction of U.S. and coalition combat power in the event of an attack with little or no advance warning. The
USCENTCOM strategy gives the command the ability to respond in a timely manner throughout the range of
operational possibilities and provides the framework for appropriate action.
The strategy for employing the military element of national power is to deter, defend, and if necessary, conduct
offensive actions to protect U.S. and allied interests. Deterrence is the result of ongoing Tier I self-defense and Tier II
regional security, combined with the Tier III ability to rapidly project U.S. and other Western combat power.
USCENTCOM'S Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) provide the NCA with a menu of options to deter hostile actions
while building up the requisite combat power. With access to Arabian Gulf oil at stake, rapid power projection using
active component forces is vital in the early stages of a U.S. response. Should deterrence fail, USCENTCOM's
strategy calls for overwhelming U.S. and allied combat power to quickly defeat the enemy and end the conflict on
terms favorable to the U.S. and her allies.
While rebuilding its conventional forces, Iran is concentrating on improving its missile and chemical weapons
capabilities. It currently possesses SCUD and NODONG missiles provided by North Korea. Iran developed offensive
chemical weapons and employed them in response to Iraqi chemical use during the Iran-Iraq War. Tehran is pursuing
improved chemical agents and delivery means and is bolstering its chemical stockpiles. Iran appears to have
embarked on a nuclear weapons program. There has been civilian nuclear cooperation between Iran and a number
of other countries, with possible weapons cooperation with North Korea and Pakistan. Iran could develop a viable
nuclear weapons capability within the next several years.
USCENTCOM‘s theater strategy consists of integrated strategic concepts that are represented by five pillars: forward
presence, combined exercises, security assistance, power projection, and readiness to fight. The first three pillars
describe overseas activities. The fourth pillar deals with the rapid projection of US forces to the region. The fifth pillar
focuses on the ability to conduct wartime operations within the theater. The fourth pillar of the theater strategy, power
projection, defines activities and qualities of US military forces that support the rapid projection of
CENTCOM wartime strategy builds on the framework implemented by a peacetime strategy of deterrence. Should
deterrence fail, CENTCOM would transition to a wartime strategy of deterring/defeating aggression. This strategy
encompasses the full operational continuum from regional to global operations and capitalizes on US technological
superiority. It is based on coalition warfare and is designed to achieve the following wartime objectives:
To deter or defeat further aggression.
To control escalation of hostilities.
To terminate hostilities early, on terms favorable to the United States and regional coalition partners.
Force movements and planning activities will generate a great deal of interest from potential adversaries and allies.
Hostile collection assets will be active. Sound OPSEC procedures will be exercised. Essential Elements of Friendly
Information to be protected are: (1) When, where, and in what strength will US forces be deployed to the gulf region.
(2) Which types of deployment systems and lines of communication will be used by deploying forces? (3) Will the US
deploy forces to the region? (4) Will the US be willing to use force to deter aggression? (5) Will the US. be willing to
commit forces to the defense of Gulf Coordination Council [GCC] territory? (6) What actions will the US. take if
attacked? (7) Will the US commit to offensive operations if unprovoked? (8) Which objectives in the region will the US
pursue? (9) When, where, and in what strength will US special forces be employed?
CENTCOM's wartime strategy envisions three phases of operations which are embodied in all operational
contingency planning. These phases are:
Early flexible response/deterrent options. These are preplanned, initial response options to any crisis,
encompassing all of the instruments of national power (diplomatic/political, economic, and military). They are
designed a series of flexible actions to be employed sequentially or simultaneously, as needed, meet the Iranian
threat. These options demonstrate US resolve and bolster the confidence and self-defense capabilities of friendly
nations. The goal of these options is to forestall conflict by demonstrating to Iran the price to be paid for aggresive
Defensive operations. If deterrence should fail, CENTCOM's initial focus will be on operations designed to
defend critical facilities, lines communication, and rear areas. These operations could also be used to create the
conditions necessary for the next stage, offensive operations. US operations may include but not be limited to the
following tasks: establish air superiority in the region, open and maintain air, sea, and ground LOCs in the region,
protect and defend air and sea ports in the region, conduct defensive operations, conduct sea denial operations,
protect and defend essential military and civilian resources and facilities in the region, conduct deployment and
sustainment operations, special and psychological operations focused on discrediting Iran and fomenting rebellion
among insurgent forces within Iran's borders.
Offensive operations. The actions in this stage would be focused on Iran‘s centers of gravity. These
operations would be designed to break the Iranian will to continue fighting and to achieve an early termination of the
conflict on terms favorable to the US and its allies. For warfighting operations CENTCOM would: destroy Iranian
offensive capability; eliminate Iranian WMD programs; restore pre-conflict international boundaries; eliminate Iranian
military alliances; establish regional stability on terms favorable to US interests; and restore free flow of oil. The
current Iranian government regime would be replaced.
The CENTCOM strategy emphasizes that friends and allies will assume their fair share of the responsibility and
burden for maintaining the region‘s sta-bility and security. This approach allows the US to concentrate on those
actions necessary achieve a speedy, favorable end to any crisis while reducing risks to national interests.
OPLAN 1002-04 - The Khuzestan Gambit?
Forward presence of US forces in Iraq cements US credibility, strengthens deterrence, and facilitates transition from
peace to war. Although ground forces provide the bulk of the long-term forward presence in Iraq, access to ports and
airfields is essential to project other forces into the area. The continued presence of US forces in Iraq sends a strong
visible message of the US commitment to defend this region. Presence is enhanced through on-going military-to-
military interaction, cooperative defense measures, and prepositioning of equipment and supplies critical to US
responsiveness and warfighting flexibility.
The term gambit comes from the Italian word gambetto, which was used for a tricky manoeuvre in wrestling. A chess
gambit is a exotic way to enjoy a chess game -- there is a touch of recklessness necessarily to become a gambiteer.
The term gambit applies to the opening of the game, involving an early sacrifice to achieve later superior attacking
chances. The sacrifice is usually speculative, but hard to refuse.
During the Cold War there was speculation that the Soviet Union's war planning included the Hamburg Gambit, in
which the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany would seize the port city of Hamburg, and then use this hostage in war-
OPLAN 1002-04 has probably been revised to reflect the American occupation of Iraq, and the power projection
opportunities this provides against Iran. The Zagros Mountains form a natural pallisade defending Iran from
incursions from Iraq. The Iranian province of Khuzestan is the one large piece of flat Iranian terrain to the west of the
Zagros Mountains. American heavy forces could swiftly occupy Khuzestan, and in doing so seize control of most of
Iran's oil resources, and non-trivial portions of the country's water supply and electrical generating capacity.
Khuzestan [Khouzestan] is the most important pivot of Iran's economy.
The existence of such huge resources as oil, gas and water in
Khuzestan have changed the economic appearance of Iran. Oil first
erupted from a well in the Massjed e Soleyman area, located in the
southern Khuzestan province.
The two principal mountain ranges, the Zagros and the Elburz,
diverge from a point of intersection in the Caucasus mountains; the
former crosses Iran in a south-easterly direction toward the Persian
Abadan is a large (pop. 308,000) oil-refinery boomtown, located at the
junction of the Karun and Arvandrud rivers. It was largely destroyed
during the Iran-Iraq War. Before the war, Abadan had a fairly good
museum, but little else worth seeing; now it has even less. It is located
420 mi/675 km south-southwest of Tehran. Like Abadan, Ahvaz is a commercial city (pop. 580,000) that was heavily
bombed during the Iran-Iraq War. The city's main attraction is its proximity to several historic sites: Choga Zambil
(Elamite ruins and well-preserved ziggerat), Haft Tappe (ruins) and Shush 70 mi/115 km north of Abadan. Once Iran's
largest port, Khorramshahr was almost destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War and is being rebuilt. The port, which lies
near the Iraqi border on the Karun waterway, dates from ancient times (Alexander the Great founded a city nearby).
Khuzestan was home to one of the oldest human civilizations dating back at least 6000 years to Shoosh (Susa). In
ancient tiems, such people as the Uxians (who gave their name to Khuzestan in southern Iran) were part of the
Caucasic race of people. In the 17th century, in spite of their general poverty and rejection from public life, there were
still a good number of Zoroastrians left throughout Persia, from Ahwaz in Khuzestan, to Kandehar in the east.
Hautboy is occasionally used in Ashura ceremony in some provinces such as Khuzestan and Khorassan.
Generally, the Iranians whose mother tongue is Persian is estimated at more half of the total population of the country.
Close to a quarter of the population speaks languages and dialects connected with the Persan one and which form
part of the Iranian languages (guilaki, lori, mazandarani, Kurdish, baloutche). Another quarter of the Turkish
languages (Azeri, turkmene, qashqhaï). There is also a minority Arabic-speaking person (less than 2 % of the
population) living mainly in the province of Khuzestan and the coastal areas of the Persian Gulf.
The vast majority of Iran's crude oil reserves are located in giant onshore fields in the
southwestern Khuzestan region near the Iraqi border and the Persian Gulf. Iran has
32 producing oil fields, of which 25 are onshore and 7 offshore. Major onshore fields
include the following: Ahwaz-Asmari (700,000 bbl/d); Bangestan (around 245,000
bbl/d current production, with plans to increase to 550,000 bbl/d), Marun (520,000
bbl/d), Gachsaran (560,000 bbl/d), Agha Jari (200,000 bbl/d), Karanj-Parsi (200,000
bbl/d); Rag-e-Safid (180,000 bbl/d); Bibi Hakimeh (130,000 bbl/d), and Pazanan
(70,000 bbl/d). Major offshore fields include: Dorood (130,000 bbl/d); Salman
(130,000 bbl/d); Abuzar (125,000 bbl/d); Sirri A&E (95,000 bbl/d); and
Soroush/Nowruz (60,000 bbl/d).
According to the Oil and Gas Journal (1/1/04), Iran holds 125.8 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves, roughly 10% of the world's total, up from 90 billion barrels in
2003. In October 1999, Iran announced that it had made its biggest oil discovery in
30 years, a giant onshore field called Azadegan located in the southwestern province
of Khuzestan, a few miles east of the border with Iraq. Reportedly, the Azadegan field contains proven crude oil
reserves of 26 billion barrels. In July 2004, Iran's oil minister stated that the country's proven oil reserves had
increased again, to 132 billion barrels, following new discoveries in the Kushk and Hosseineih fields in Khuzestan
Iran's energy generation capacity has risen to about 26,000 megawatts. The share of Khuzestan in total amount of
energy produced in the country was 3,800 mega watts. The figure is expected to increase following operationing of
three dams in Khuzestan province. Water resources are unevenly spread; 30 percent of surface water resources are
concentrated in one province (Khuzestan), while many other populated provinces fully exploit their scarce available
Following the downfall of the Shah, the new government in Iran used the army and other military forces to put down
the movements of national minorities in Kurdistan, Turkman Sahra and the Arabs of Khuzestan province.
The main thrust of Iraq's attack on 22 September 1980, was in the south, where five armored and mechanized
divisions invaded Khuzestan on two axes, one crossing over the Shatt al Arab near Basra, which led to the siege and
eventual occupation of Khorramshahr, and the second heading for Susangerd, which had Ahvaz, the major military
base in Khuzestan, as its objective. Iraqi armored units easily crossed the Shatt al Arab waterway and entered the
Iranian province of Khuzestan. Dehloran and several other towns were targeted and were rapidly occupied to prevent
reinforcement from Bakhtaran and from Tehran. By mid-October 1980, a full division advanced through Khuzestan
headed for Khorramshahr and Abadan and the strategic oil fields nearby. Other divisions headed toward Ahvaz, the
provincial capital and site of an air base. Supported by heavy artillery fire, the troops made a rapid and significant
advance--almost eighty kilometers in the first few days. In the battle for Dezful in Khuzestan, where a major air base
is located, the local Iranian army commander requested air support in order to avoid a defeat. President Bani Sadr,
therefore, authorized the release from jail of many pilots, some of whom were suspected of still being loyal to the
shah. With the increased use of the Iranian air force, the Iraqi progress was somewhat curtailed.
OPLAN 1003 Major Theater War - East
Operations Plan [OPLAN] 1003 has been CENTCOM's primary war plan for the
past decade. OPLAN 1003 is really not a strategy or a campaign plan, but is
rather a time-phased deployment plan for moving a sufficient number of troops
into the theater to enable the US to defeat the entire Iraqi army, should the need
arise. Allied forces, under the XVIII Airborne Corp, could include the US 4th
Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air Assault
Division, and a MEF.
This is a unilateral USCINCCENT OPLAN which provides for the US defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against an
Iraqi attack. This OPLAN would probably be implemented upon receipt of unambiguous warning of an Iraqi attack
through Kuwait into Saudi Arabia or an attack into Kuwait only. This OPLAN is in response to Strategic Capabilities
Plan, Part V, tasking to prepare an OPLAN for the unilateral support of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the event of future
aggression and for the support of US interests therein. This OPLAN also could provide for the security of US forces,
citizens, installations, and resources in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
US objectives are to coordinate and establish an effective force to deter and, if necessary, to counter aggression,
prevent military coercion of friendly states, protect resources and facilities in the region, deny enemy access to the
same, and ensure access to the regional lines of communication. The strategy of the US is designed to: deter war,
improve regional stability, demonstrate a commitment to the region, counter hostile expansion and influences, and
prepare for war. Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy US forces to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
Once adequate combat power has been generated and an adequate defense has been conducted, the strategy is to
mass forces and to counterattack to restore the territorial integrity and legitimate governments of Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia if they have been violated.
USCENTCOM forces will conduct operations in three phases in order to: (a) deter Iraqi aggression into Kuwait and/or
Saudi Arabia, (b) rapidly deploy defensive forces as far forward as possible to confront Iraq with a formidable defense,
and (c) conduct an effective defense should Iraq choose to attack. The phases of the operation may overlap.
Phase I. Deterrence (C-Day thru D-Day). At the first sign of ambiguous warning (threatening Iraqi activity),
USCENTCOM will initiate Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to deter Iraqi aggression into Kuwait and/or Saudi
Arabia. FDOs, designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve and confront Iraq with the prospect of unacceptable costs for
aggression, include all of the instruments of national power (economic, diplomatic, informational, and military).
Phase II. Deployment/Force Build-Up (C+5 through C+90). In the deployment phase, emphasis is placed upon rapidly
deploying from CONUS and OCONUS locations into the main APODS and SPODS at Dhahran, King Khalid Military
City, Ad Dammam, Kuwait City, and Al Jubayl IAW the time-phased force and deployment list. Priority of deployment
is to those forces necessary to defend the US initial center of gravity, which is the capability to deploy combat forces
into theater. In order, those forces are fighter aircraft and electronic surveillance aircraft to conduct defensive counter-
air operations; light, airborne, airmobile, or amphibious ground forces to protect PODS from ground attack; and
command and control assets. Naval assets will deploy as rapidly as possible to the Arabian Gulf, North Arabian Sea,
and the Red Sea in order to establish immediate control over the sea LOCs into the theater. Priority of deployment
after the initial defensive forces (those that are critical to protecting the continued deployment) will be based upon the
principle of providing (a) antiarmor forces, (b) long-term support forces, and (c) offensive-oriented forces, in that order.
USCENTAF will be responsible for reception at APODS; movement from APODS will be the responsibility of
USARCENT. The deployment phase will continue until all forces have arrived in theater IAW the TPFDL, but is
expected to be complete NLT C+90. Priority of initial defense will be to: (1) APODS and SPODS that provide for
continued deployment; (2) C2 facilities; (3) force assembly and build-up areas; and (4) forward defensive positions.
Space systems will be positioned to provide support to the initial deployment. Priority will be intel/recon,
communications, weather, multispectral imagery, and position/navigation systems.
Phase III. Defensive (C+45 thru Indefinite). The defensive phase is designed to repel an Iraqi attack into Kuwait
and/or Saudi Arabia. During this phase, the US center of gravity will shift to become our ground combat forces. This
phase is sub-divided into three sub-phases designed to: (1) improve and strengthen defensive postures; (2) blunt and
defeat an invasion; and (3) restore international boundaries with counter-offensive operations if required. This phase
will terminate upon direction of the NCA based upon a decrease in the threat of aggression or the defeat of hostile
Sub-Phase IIIa. Defensive Posturing (C+45 thru D-Day). This subphase is designated to strengthen and improve the
theater defensive posture established not later than C+45. This phase consists of the time between establishment of
an effective defense and the commencement of hostilities. This phase may be as short as a matter of hours, or as
long as a period of months. During this phase initial, alternate, and final ground defensive positions will be
established well forward and improved to the maximum extent possible. Defensive air operations will be maintained
at heightened levels commensurate with sustained operations capabilities. Naval operations will continue to insure
the unhindered use of sea LOCs and prevent any Iraqi offensive naval operations in the Arabian Gulf. Theater
logistics will be improved as rapidly as possible, and joint training will be conducted on a continuous basis. This sub-
phase will continue until Iraqi attack commences, or until so directed by the NCA.
Sub-Phase IIIb. Defensive Combat (D-Day thru D+7). This phase is implemented when an Iraqi attack is initiated
against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. During this phase U.S. air forces initiate theater counterair operations, interdictions,
and close air support to gain air superiority, destroy, delay, disrupt, or divert attacking Iraqi ground forces.
USARCENT and USMARCENT, supported by tactical air and naval surface fire support, will delay and attrite
attacking enemy forces as far forward as possible, and establish in-depth defenses on suitable terrain. In the
MARCENT portion of the theater of operations, defensive operations will focus primarily on critical ports, oil facilities,
major population centers, and key terrain along the Arabian Gulf coast. In the ARCENT portion of the theater of
operations, defensive operations will focus primarily on major population centers and resources of potential military
value at King Khalid Military City, Hafar Al Batan, and the approaches to Riyadh. The ability to withstand chemical
attack on friendly forces is dependant upon active chemical defense and through ATBM assets. This phase will
continue until the enemy has been sufficiently attrited to allow counteroffensive operations, estimated to occur on or
about D+7. If this phase commences prior to C+45, major combat forces will continue to deploy to the theater of
operations and will be employed to reinforce the defense or to conduct counteroffensive operations, depending upon
the theater operational situation.
Sub-Phase IIIc. Counteroffensive (D+7 thru D+20). This phase will be implemented once force ratios favor
counteroffensive operations. During this phase the ground forces of USARCENT and USMARCENT will initiate
supporting counteroffensives to fix and destroy Iraq forces in their respective sectors. The theater reserve
(designated by ARCENT), comprised of at least two heavy mechanized Div‘s, an ACR, and an aviation brigade, will
then conduct the main theater counteroffensive to destroy the Iraqi center of gravity, which is the operational reserve,
if it has penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi territory. If the Iraqi operational reserve has not penetrated into Kuwait or
Saudi Arabia, the U.S. theater reserve will either be held in reserve and not committed, or will be committed in
support of USARCENT or USMARCENT to destroy those Iraqi forces that have penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi
Arabia. Only upon the direction of the NCA will offensive ground operations be conducted in Iraq. This phase will be
terminated when all Iraqi forces have been expelled from Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia and U.S. forces are again
postured into adequate defense positions along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders as per sub-phase IIIb
(Defensive Combat) of this OPLAN. U.S. forces will remain in consolidated defensive positions until so directed to
redeploy by the NCA. Post conflict operations will be conducted as required with USARCENT serving as the
USCENTCOM executive agent for post-conflict operations.
USMARCENT. Marine forces will initially establish a screen to provide early warning. Defenses along the FEBA will
be established. Units in the defense will engage enemy forces as far forward as possible causing Iraqi units to deploy
into attack formations and slow their advance. The movement to subsequent defensive positions will be delayed for
as long as possible and must be coordinated with USARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENTAF, and SOCCENT and
must not occur until given permission by USCINCCENT. If required, a strong point defense will be established around
Kuwait City as a last ditch defensive effort to save this facility.
USARCENT. Army forces will initially establish a screen along the border to provide early warning. Defenses along
the FEBA will be established. Army forces will also establish a security force of at least air assault division size and
capability to guard and secure the theater flank. In addition, ARCENT will provide a heavy mechanized division as the
theater reserve. Units in the defense will engage enemy forces as far forward as possible causing Iraqi units to
deploy into attack formations and slow their advances. The movement to subsequent defensive positions will be
delayed for as long as possible and must be coordinated with USAMARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENTAF, and
USSOCCENT and must not occur until given permission by USCINCCENT. If required, strong point defenses will be
established around KKMC and Hafar Al Batin as a last ditch effort to save these critical facilities.
USCENTAF (JFACC). The JFACC is the supported commander for counter air, interdiction and strategic attack
missions throughout the theater in accordance with the JFC concept of operations. The JFACC will support land
component commanders with close air support and interdiction within their areas of operation. During the defensive
combat phase (phase IIIb), air operations will be focused on gaining air superiority, destroying WMD capability and
destroying, delaying or disrupting Iraqi heavy forces. When the counteroffensive phase (phase IIIc) begins, air
operations will focus on maintaining air superiority, close air support and interdiction.
USNAVCENT. Naval forces will support the land battle by gaining maritime superiority, conducting coastal defense
along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian coast line, providing naval fire support, and participating in the air effort as
coordinated by JFACC. Naval forces will make available to the JFACC all sorties in excess of those required for naval
COMSOCCENT. SOF will support the overall operations to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Special operations
forces will deploy along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders and conduct special reconnaissance and electronic
surveillance to provide early warning to friendly forces. These forces will conduct operations within designated special
operations areas (SOAs). Operations will not be conducted into Iraq without the permission of CINCCENTCOM.
Upon initiation of hostilities, the SOAs will be terminated and the SOF forces withdrawn. The focus of SOF operations
after an Iraqi attack will be against enemy C3 modes and line of communications. COMSOCCENT will also conduct
and coordinate the theater CSAR efforts as required and will be prepared to conduct foreign internal defense
operations with friendly nations in theater.
OPLAN 1003 - Offensive Operations
There are three likely sequels to OPLAN 1003. The first involves a unilateral redeployment similar to what was done
following Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, and the second involves a long-term defensive posture along the
secured boarders. The third involves counteroffensive operations to include termination of the Iraqi regime. During
the 1990s it is not evident that OPLAN 1003 included counter offensive operations into Iraq. By the late 1990s the
Korean war plan, OPLAN 5027, had been revised to include counter offensive operations to terminate that North
Korean regime. If this option was not included in OPLAN 1003 at that time, it was probably included in OPLAN 1003
by the Bush Administration.
OPLAN 1003 is the basis for the widely discussed plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein. This large American military
ground offensive would consist of over 200,000 troops and require a three-month buildup. This is not a new plan
formulated in response to the Administration's call for regime change in Iraq, but is rather CENTCOM's long
established war plan.
Apart from the physical destruction of the Iraqi Army, one division at a time, and the aerial bombardment of every
identifiable aimpoint in Iraq, OPLAN 1003 does not in and of itself contain a theory of victory that is focused on
As is well known, the three month buildup required for OPLAN 1003 would provide ample time for Saddam to
reposition his troops to complicate the American campaign, and to engage in diplomatic and terrorist activities to
discourage American military action.
According to Kenneth M. Pollack, a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for National Security Studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations who served as Director for Gulf Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council From 1999 to
2001, " ... it would make sense to plan for a force twice that size. Some light infantry will be required in case
Saddam's loyalists fight in Iraq's cities. Airmobile forces will be needed to seize Iraq's oil fields at the start of hostilities
and to occupy the sites from which Saddam could launch missiles against Israel or Saudi Arabia. And troops will have
to be available for occupation duties once the fighting is over. All told, the force should total roughly 200,000 --
300,000 people: for the invasion, between four and six divisions plus supporting units, and for the air campaign, 700 -
- 1,000 aircraft and anywhere from one to five carrier battle groups (depending on what sort of access to bases
turned out to be possible). Building up such a force in the Persian Gulf would take three to five months, but the
campaign itself would probably take about a month, including the opening air operations."
In July 2002 it was reported that the "CENTCOM Courses of Action" plan called for air, land and sea-based forces to
attack Iraq from three directions — the north, south and west. Tens of thousands of marines and soldiers would
invading from Kuwait. Hundreds of warplanes based in up to eight countries, including Turkey and Qatar, would
conduct an air campgain against thousands of targets in Iraq, including airfields, roadways and fiber-optics
communications sites. Special operations forces and covert CIA teams would strike facilities associated with Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction and the missile capabilities. Special operations troops and airstrikes would seek to
destroy chemical and biological weapons sites before the weapons can be used against an invading American force.
The source who described the plan The New York Times expressed "frustration that the planning reflected at least in
this set of briefing slides was insufficiently creative, and failed to incorporate fully the advances in tactics and
technology that the military has made since the Persian Gulf war in 1991."
In late August 2002, Michael O´Hanlon estimated that the deployment of combat forces to the Gulf would require the
movement of perhaps 10 wings of land-based fighter aircraft, 30 to 50 ships, including three to five aircraft carriers,
and four to five divisions of ground forces. Initial U.S. capabilities would consist of the 30,000 American troops
already in place. By Day 15 another 50,000 more troops might have arrived. By the end of the first month of the
buildup, another 25,000 troops might have arrived, mostly consisting of additional airpower and Naval forces. Another
100,000 troops could arrive within 60 days, bringing the grand total to about 200,000 troops. By O´Hanlon's estimate,
the entire deployment could be completed in about 90 days, for a total of about 250,000 troops.
The notional OPLAN 1003 counteroffensive operation regime change campaign plan would probably be to first seize
Basra, and then attack up either the Tigris or Euphrates River valleys to Baghdad. Iraqi forces might be assumed to
be arrayed to delay the seizure of Basra and to disrupt an advance toward Baghdad. Iraq would seek to buy as much
time as possible, and to use his mobile forces to cut off Allied supply lines.
Iraq might commit six divisions to the defense of Basra. In addition, three divisions might guard the border between
Kuwait and Iraq, whose mission was to slow the Allied advance. Another three divisions, along with an armored
division, might guard the highway south of An-Nasiriyah to delay and disrupt the advance along the Euphrates. Two
motorized divisions might patrol the highway from Rafah north, in order to deny logistical support from bases in Saudi
Arabia. To use the Rafah highway would require several days of military operations to clear Iraqi forces, thus buying
Hussein time. The remainder of Iraqi forces might be arrayed to block key choke points along the major approaches
It might require many days of offensive operations to take Basra. It could require several more days to open up an
attack route up the Euphrates or Tigris. Operations in the vicinity of As-Suwayrah could require at least another week,
during which time Iraqi diplomatic efforts would focus on bring the campaign to a halt on terms not un-favorable to
In mid-September 2002 one British news report [London Daily Telegraph, September 13, 2002] suggested that US
war plans would require a five-division assault on Iraq's southern flank, including four of its US divisions and one UK
division. In the north, US airborne troops [possibly supported by Britain's 16 Air Assault Brigade] would occupy
Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. A Marine Expeditionary Force would mount an amphibious attack from the northern
Gulf, which could involve the Royal Marines' 3 Commando Brigade. The British division was expected to be the HQ of
1 Armoured Division, with 4 Armoured Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade [the so-called Desert Rats]. With logistical
support, this would amount to a total of about 20,000 troops. The number of RAF aircraft in the region would be
tripled, with the six Jaguars based at Incirlik in Turkey increased to 20, which would move to bases in northern Iraq
prepared by US engineers. The number of Tornado GR4s would increase to about 30 aircraft based in Kuwait, and
the number of RAF personnel would rise to about 5,000. The Royal Navy was expected to provide an amphibious
carrier task force led by Ark Royal, which is on its way to the Mediterranean. The group would include the amphibious
assault carrier Ocean, which is in the Indian Ocean, and would involve a total of about 4,000 servicemen and women.
OPLAN 1004 MTW East [Major Theater War - East]
OPLAN 1004 MTW East [Major Theater War - East] is the Middle East plan that starts with MTW West (OPLAN 5027)
in progress. The primary differences between OPLAN 1003 and OPLAN 1004 is the forces available. Since many
stateside units are dual tasked for both contingencies, OPLAN 1003 and OPLAN 1004 have some differences in the
OPLAN 1019 Arabian Gauntlet
On 06 January 2008 three US Navy vessels took evasive actions after five
Iranian boats buzzed the ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian
Gulf. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman called the Iranian provocation ―a
serious incident.‖ The fast Iranian boats approached at ―distances and speed
that showed reckless, dangerous and potentially hostile intent,‖ he said. The
incident lasted about 15 to 20 minutes. The Navy ships were going into the
Persian Gulf when the Iranian boats confronted them. ―Small, Iranian fast
boats made some aggressive maneuvers against our vessels and indicated
some hostile intent,‖ Whitman said. ―This required our vessels to issue
warnings and conduct some evasive maneuvers. The U.S. Navy vessels were
prepared to take appropriate actions, but there was no engagement of the
vessels.‖ The ships were the USS Port Royal (CG 73), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS Ingraham (FFG 61). U.S.
warships will take all the precautions needed to safely transit the open waters of the straits, the Pentagon spokesman
Iranian officials called the buzzing by five Revolutionary Guard speedboats of three U.S. Navy ships "normal," but
American officials insisted the behavior was reckless and needlessly provocative. Iranian senior Revolutionary
Guards commander Ali Reza Tangsiri told the Mehr news agency that Iran has the right to ask any ships to identify
themselves upon entering or leaving the Persian Gulf. "It is a basic responsibility of patrolling units of the
Revolutionary Guards to take necessary interception measures toward any vessels entering into the waters of the
Persian Gulf," Tangsiri said.
The San Diego element of the Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) departed 05 November 2007 for a six-
month deployment to the U.S. 5th and 7th Fleet areas of operations. Units from San Diego include Amphibious
Squadron 1, USS Tarawa (LHA 1), USS Cleveland (LPD 7), USS Germantown (LSD 42), 11th Marine Expeditionary
Unit and elements of Naval Beach Group 1. USS Port Royal (CG 73), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS Ingraham
(FFG 61) joined the Tarawa ESG in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
The Strait Of Hormuz [SOH, much less commmonly termed Straits
of Hormuz] is the world‘s second busiest international strait. The
key to the Central Command area is to maintain uninterrupted
access to energy resources. The Persian Gulf region contains
roughly 68% of the world's known oil and natural gas reserves.
Nearly 25% of the world‘s oil supply flows through the Strait of
Hormuz on a daily basis. Over 75% of Japan's oil passes through
the Strait of Hormuz. Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz -- daily
oil flow of 16.5-17 million barrels (2006E) -- is roughly two-fifths of
all seaborne traded oil. The Energy Information Administration
projects that oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz will double to
30-34 million barrels per day by 2020, suggesting that ensuring the
free flow of oil through the Strait will continue to be an important
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway separating the Arabian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian
Sea, is only about 40 miles wide, and is 34 miles wide at its narrowest point. By far the world's most important oil
chokepoint, the Strait consists of 2-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a 2-mile
wide buffer zone.
The Persian Gulf is a shallow, semienclosed basin with a mean depth of only 25 to 40 m. The circulation of this basin
is driven primarily by the local wind stress and secondarily by thermohaline forcing. The prevailing wind in the Persian
Gulf is from the northwest and is called the shamal. A wind-driven generally cyclonic circulation results. The lands
surrounding the Persian Gulf are dry so there is strong excess evaporation over the Persian Gulf. This results in a
surface inflow of relatively fresh water and an outflow of deeper, more-saline water at the Strait of Hormuz.
The Strait of Hormuz has a very small sill and thus a classic inverse-estuarine circulation dominates the Gulf.
Relatively freshwater flows in through the Straits and the more saline water flow uninhibited out of the straits at depth.
Some of the highest current speeds are in the inflow through the southern side of the Strait of Hormuz. This inflow
feeds the eastward coastal current along the south edge of the Gulf, which is strongest near Qatar. Along the Iranian
coast, there is another eastward current where it terminates and
its remnant turns south into the interior.
The majority of oil exported from the Strait of Hormuz travels to
Asia, the United States, and Western Europe. Currently, three-
quarters of all Japan‘s oil needs pass through this Strait. Most of
the crude exported through the Strait travels long distances by
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) which can carry over two
million barrels of oil per voyage.
If access to the Gulf were denied, assuming pipelines would flow
at maximum capacity, the world would lose about one-fifth of its
oil supply. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require use of
longer alternate routes (if available) at increased transportation
costs. Such routes include the 5 million-bbl/d capacity Petroline
(East-West Pipeline) and the 290,000-bbl/d Abqaiq-Yanbu
natural gas liquids line across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea.
Theoretically, the 1.65-million bbl/d Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA) also could be utilized, more oil could be
pumped north to Ceyhan (Turkey), and the 0.5 million-bbl/d Tapline to Lebanon could be reactivated.
A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report of October 5, 2006 concluded that the US Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR) was "insufficient" to replace the oil lost from a severe supply disruption, including a global Iranian oil
embargo, Strait of Hormuz closure, or a shutdown of the Saudi oil fields due to terrorism. The report noted that an
Iranian embargo could cause oil prices to increase by $16 per barrel and up to $200 billion in GDP damage to the US
economy, of which $132 billion could be offset by the SPR. A Saudi shutdown could cause $832 billion in damage to
the US GDP, of which only $77 billion could be offset by the SPR. GAO estiamted that Strait of Hormuz closure could
cause oil prices to increase by $175 per barrel.
Some say it would be foolish for Iran to seek to disrupt oil traffic in the Gulf because all of its oil flows through the Gulf.
The US Government doesn't anticipate that Iran would try to do something like that because it would be the first
victim of any such program.
Strait of Hormuz Legal Status
In a December 1982 declaration accompanying signature on the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
Iran appeared to require prior authorization for warships to enter
territorial sea and limited transit passage right in Strait of Hormuz to
signatories of 1982 Convention. Iran's declaration stated: "In the
light of customary international law, the provisions of article 21,
read in association with article 19 (on the Meaning of Innocent
Passage) and article 25 (on the Rights of Protection of the Coastal
States), recognizes (though implicitly) the rights of the Coastal
States to take measures to safeguard their security interests
including the adoption of laws and regulations regarding, inter alia,
the requirements of prior authorization for warships willing to
exercise the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."
Under the 1982 LOS Convention, a coastal state may claim a territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles from the coastline.
Each nautical mile is equal to 1852 meters. While the territorial sea is part of the sovereign territory of the state, ships
of all states have a right of innocent passage through the territorial. Warships which do not comply with the laws and
regulations of the coastal state concerning passage through the territorial sea can be ordered to leave the territorial
On May 2, 1993, the Government of Iran completed legislative action on an "Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea." The legislation provides a reasonably comprehensive set of
maritime claims to a territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf, and Iran's
jurisdictional claims within those areas. Many of these claims do not comport with the requirements of international
law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). Warships and
certain other ships are, contrary to international law, required to receive prior approval to engage in innocent passage.
Iran's requirement for prior approval is not recognized by the US. The LOS Convention does not permit a coastal
State to require a foreign vessel to seek the prior authorization of, or notification to, the coastal State as a condition of
conducting innocent passage through its territorial sea. Warships representing a wide variety of nations pass through
Iran's territorial sea in innocent passage without objection from Iran, despite Iran's requirement that prior authorization
be obtained for each transit. These examples of State practice, shared in by many nations and fully consistent with
international law, appear to outweigh Iran's claims to restrict freedom of navigation. The US protested this stated
requirement in 1983 and 1987, conducted operational assertions in 1989 and 1992 of prior permission requirement,
and conducted regular transits of the Strait of Hormuz starting in 1983.
As of 2007 the United States remained a non-signatory of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention
(USCLOS), yet strongly supports the navigational causes contained therein. The U.S. Freedom of Navigation
program has ensured that excessive coastal state claims over the world‘s oceans and airspace are repeatedly
challenged. By diplomatic protests and operational assertions, the United States has insisted upon adherence by the
nations of the world to the international law of the sea, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea Convention.
Iran‘s rearmament program in the 1990s invited an array of interpretations of its military capability to close or interdict
the Strait of Hormuz (SOH). The fighting in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), drove Iran‘s military forces down to
minimal levels of equipment while increasing institutional disorganization. Air and ground assets ended the war in the
poorest condition. Iran chose to rearm these forces first. However, in 1992, the focus widened to include the
rebuilding of the Navy and those military assets physically near the Strait of Hormuz. This enlarged emphasis
expanded Iranian military capacity to again challenge shipping transiting the SOH. With its new naval acquisitions,
Iran is an increased threat to the interests of its neighbors and the West, particularly the United States.
In 1992 Iran began a military buildup on several small gulf islands close to the Strait of Hormuz. They added several
thousand additional troops to those islands, artillery, and anti-ship missiles. Iran occupies two islands in the Persian
Gulf claimed by the UAE: Lesser Tunb (called Tunb as Sughra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Kuchek in
Persian by Iran) and Greater Tunb (called Tunb al Kubra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Bozorg in Persian
by Iran); Iran jointly administers with the UAE an island in the Persian Gulf claimed by the UAE (called Abu Musa in
Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Abu Musa in Persian by Iran).
UAE and other Arab Gulf states are seeking to reverse Iran's occupation of three small islands near the Strait of
Hormuz: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb Island, and Lesser Tunb Island, all strategically located in the Strait of Hormuz.
The three islands were effectively occupied by Iranian troops in 1992. In 1995, the Iranian Foreign Ministry claimed
that the islands were "an inseparable part of Iran." Iran rejected a 1996 proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council for
the dispute to be resolved by the International Court of Justice, an option supported by the UAE. On December 31,
2001, the GCC issued a statement reiterating its support for the UAE's sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Tunbs,
declared Iran's claims on the islands as "null and void," and backed "all measures...by the UAE to regain sovereignty
on its three islands peacefully."
The Iranians have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the rest of the world does not do what Iran
wishes it to do in a variety of ways. There was such a threat in May 1997, with the Iranians saying that if the
Americans were to try to take any kind of retaliatory action against Iranian terrorism, they would close this Strait of
Hormuz. During a 18 December 1997 press conference, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki stated that
Iran supports "the free flow of oil" through the Strait of Hormuz, but reserved the option of closing off the shipping
route if it is threatened. Iran has admitted to deploying anti- aircraft and anti- ship missiles on Abu Musa, an island
strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz‘s shipping lanes.
In one possible scenario for an area-denial strategy, Iran might be able to prevent the US Navy from operating in the
Persian Gulf by mining the Strait of Hormuz and then guarding it with antiship cruise missiles and small submarines
to thwart mine-clearing operations.
The US intelligence community judges that Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy
using predominately naval, air, and some ground forces. During 2004 Iran purchased North Korean torpedo and
missile-armed fast attack craft and midget submarines, making marginal improvements to this capability. Tehran's
ability to interdict the Strait of Hormuz with air, surface and sub-surface naval units, as well as mines and missiles
remains a concern. Additionally, Iran's asymmetrical capabilities are becoming more robust. These capabilities
include high-speed attack patrol ships, anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and hardened facilities for
surface-to-surface missiles and command and control.
The American Military & the Strait of Hormuz
The US Navy's presence in the Gulf has grown steadily since 1879, when Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt sailed
USS Ticonderoga through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the first American man-of-war to visit the Gulf. Because the
free flow of trade in the region was threatened as Iran and Iraq staged a "tanker war," a stronger US stance became
necessary. In 1987, after the Iran-Iraq War resulted in several military incidents in the Persian Gulf, the United States
increased U.S. Navy forces operating in the Persian Gulf and adopted a policy of reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti oil
tankers through the Gulf. President Reagan reported that U.S. ships had been fired upon or struck mines or taken
other military action on September 23, October 10, and October 20, 1987 and April 19, July 4, and July 14, 1988.
During the Iran-Iraq War, one of China's most controversial arms transfers involved the HY-2 antiship missile,
commonly [and improperly] referred to in the media as the "Silkworm." The first of several HY-2 shipments was
delivered in the summer of 1986, and in October 1987 an American-owned tanker under the Liberian flag and a
Kuwaiti tanker under the US flag, the Sea Isle City, were hit by Iranian HY-2 missiles. The United States gradually
reduced its forces after a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq on August 20, 1988. Operation Earnest Will proved
The United States reacted to Iran's military buildup in the 1990s by an increased military presence, economic
sanctions, and continued political rallying against the Islamic Republic. Simultaneously, the Gulf Cooperation Council
reacted by implementing efforts to improve military strength through the acquisition of weapons from the United
States and others.
A "spiraling effect" arms race is taking place between Iran and the GCC, in which each side attempts to gain military
advantage over the other. The growth of the Iranian forces, specifically the navy and those components next to the
SOH, have resulted in mixed threat interpretations. The challenge for decision-makers and strategic planners alike
lies in accurately assessing the ability of Iranian forces to attempt to and, if possible, keep the Strait of Hormuz closed.
On many occasions since 1989 U.S. warships exercised the right of innocent passage through the Iranian territorial
sea without notice to or reaction from Iran.
Exercise Arabian Gauntlet
Multinational forces gather to participate in the world's largest mine countermeasures exercise, "Arabian Gauntlet."
Arabian Gauntlet is a joint multinational military exercise to maintain the vital sea lines in and out of the Persian Gulf.
Arabian Gauntlet is a multilateral exercise that integrates mine warfare with surface warfare. The purpose of the
exercise is to refine coalition warfare capabilities, specifically in the area of mine warfare, surface warfare and off-
shore infrastructure protection. It also promotes military to military relationships and improves the tactical proficiency
of the coalition as well as enhances regional security in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility.
Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot (FBE-F) FBE Foxtrot [30 Nov - 8 Dec 1999] was shifted from C6F to C5F due to
operations in Kosovo and occured 30 November-8 December 1999. Focus areas included Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Coastal Domanance. Networked combined force required 62% less time to restore mine free
shipping in Strait of Hormuz (FBE Foxtrot, December 1999). FBE-Foxtrot investigated coordinated joint naval and
land fires (including those provided by SOF and U.S. Army Apache helicopters) through an experimental Joint Fires
Element. It explored time-critical targeting of a coordinated, multi-layered enemy at a naval chokepoint. The
experiment also explored using distributed, collaborative planning to enhance understanding of the undersea
environment and operational situation in countermine warfare. A battle management cell for defense against chemical
and biological weapons was established to seek improvements in chemical/biological defense readiness and
vulnerability assessment, warning and reporting of chem/bio events, and coordination of intra-theater support and
initial responses to chemical/biological attacks.
USS PAUL F. FOSTER (DD 964) departed for its eleventh deployment on January 27, 1999. While serving as part of
the Pacific Middle East Force, PAUL F. FOSTER participated in OPERATION IRON SIREN, EAGER SENTRY, and
ARABIAN GAUNTLET. In addition, the ship conducted boarding's in support of United Nations Sanctions against Iraq.
The Shipboard Deployable Surface Target (SDST) -- also known as "Roboski" -- provides an enhanced gunfire
training capability against highly maneuverable, high speed surface targets. As such, Roboski offers an inexpensive,
expendable target for Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection small arms training and supports 76mm, 5-inch/54caliber, and
Phalanx CIWS training. SDST's are presently maintained by the Fleet Composite Squadron Six (VC-6),
COMFIFTHFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, and the Southern California Offshore Range Extension (SCORE) in support of
COMTHIRDFLT. SDST was used for gunfire training in the Arabian Gauntlet exercise.
During 2000 in Neon Falcon and Arabian Gauntlet, LAKE CHAMPLAIN improved interoperability and fostered good
will with forces from Europe as well as Arabian Gulf coalition partners. USS Elliot (DD 967) was one of eight U.S.
naval ships participating in Exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2000.
The Harry S Truman Battle Group participated in numerous international exercises during 2001, including Arabian
Gauntlet, an 11-nation exercise that involved more than 20 ships. Fleet ocean-going tug USNS Catawba conducted a
simulated distressed diver drill during the multi-nation operation Arabian Gauntlet 2001. Patrol Squadron 47's
"Golden Swordsman" took part in the Arabian Gauntlet exercise in the Persian Gulf. VP-47 combat aircrews flew
missions in support of the Arabian Gauntlet exercise, while operating out of Masirah, Oman and the Kingdom of
Bahrain. The P-3 Orions of VP-47 participated with ships and aircraft from the British, German, French, Saudi
Arabian, Omani, Kuwaiti, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan and U.S. military forces. The exercise lasted 21 days,
with VP-47's P-3s flying both day and night missions for a majority of the exercise's duration.The event ended on
April 1 and VP-47 buckled back down to finish out the last two months of a six month deployment, with a Bravo Zulu
from the commodore, DESRON 50, under their belt.
For the first time in its country‘s history, the Iraqi Navy has joined with coalition forces to participate as observers
during exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2005 in the Persian Gulf 22-30 March 2005. More than 3,000 people and 19 ships
from the United States, Iraq, Pakistan and other coalition and regional allies participated in Arabian Gauntlet 2005.
Sixteen ships from 14 coalition and regional allies concluded Exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2007, the world‘s largest
mine countermeasures exercise, 30 April 2007 in the Arabian Gulf. The biennial Arabian Gauntlet is a two-phase
evolution. Two days of training seminars precede an eight-day underway phase. USS Shreveport (LPD 12) served as
the flagship for commander, Mine Countermeasures Squadron (MCMRON) 3 during Exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2007.
Throughout the exercise, Shreveport and MCMRON 3 hosted a multinational command element aboard. The
exercise consisted of dive operations, mine hunting and sweeping, and the establishment of safe lanes of navigation.
It culminated in a simulated merchant vessel‘s transit through an area that had been swept by coalition ships and
aircraft. Shreveport launched its Landing Craft Unit (LCU) early every morning to provide a forward dive platform to
conduct underwater countermeasure operations. The mine countermeasure ships not directly involved in diving
operations focused their efforts on mine detection, mine sweeping, the establishment of routes for safe passage and
a number of simulated oil infrastructure defense and force protection exercises.
Operation Uphold Democracy
In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won 67% of the vote in a
presidential election that international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office in February 1991,
but was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army and forced to leave the country in September of the same
year. From October 1991 to June 1992, Joseph Nerette, as president, led an unconstitutional de facto regime and
governed with a parliamentary majority and the armed forces. In June 1992, he resigned and Parliament approved
Marc Bazin as prime minister of a de facto government with no replacement named for president. In June 1993,
Bazin resigned and the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo, bringing the Haitian military to the negotiating table.
President Aristide and Gen. Raoul Cedras, head of the Haitian armed forces, signed the UN-brokered Governors
Island Agreement on July 3, 1993, establishing a 10-step process for the restoration of constitutional government and
the return of President Aristide by October 30, 1993. The military derailed the process and the UN reimposed
economic sanctions. The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the military and the de facto
government sanctioned repression, assassination, torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community's
In May 1994, the military selected Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint to be provisional president of its third de
facto regime. The UN and the U.S. reacted to this extraconstitutional move by tightening economic sanctions (UN
Resolution 917). On July 31, 1994, the UN adopted Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use all necessary
means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule and Aristide's presidency.
In the weeks that followed, the United States took the lead in forming a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the
UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY US objectives were fostering
democratic institutions and reducing the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States. Despite the pledges of a
military-backed regime in Haiti to return power to the democratically elected government it had ousted, the regime did
not relinquish authority but became increasingly repressive and presided over a deteriorating economy. As the result
of deteriorating conditions, tens of thousands of impoverished Haitians fled the country, many attempting to enter the
The United States responded with Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the movement of forces to Haiti to support the
return of Haitian democracy. The U.S.-led Multinational Force for Haiti (MNF) began on September 19, 1994 with the
approval of the Security Council, which, at the same time, approved the follow-on U.N. operation.
The American road back to Haiti began in early 1994 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Eustis, Virginia; and Camp
LeJeune, North Carolina. At these installations, during the XVIII Airborne Corps' Super Thrust I and Super Thrust II
exercises in April and June 1994, units formed a concept of operations for Haiti. These exercises laid a framework for
synchronizing critical operations tasks. The US began planning for Operation Uphold Democracy in August 1994. The
group had to simultaneously plan for two contingencies: a permissive entry in Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy) or
a forced entry (Operation Restore Democracy). Crisis action planning for Operation Restore Democracy stopped
when former President Jimmy Carter's negotiations with Haiti's General Raoul Cedras proved successful.
In preparation for this contingency, DOD simultaneously planned for an invasion and for the peaceful entry of forces
into Haiti, and executed portions of both scenarios. The US Army today is "offensive minded." Hence, the concept of
Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370 was offensive violence inflicted suddenly, from air and sea, with overwhelming but
appropriate force. By contrast, OPLAN 2380 was developed for a permissive entry but still sought to land large
numbers of well-armed troops in an offensive, combat-ready posture. OPLAN 2375 took a position somewhere in
between, and when it was further modified and executed as 2380+, it retained the offensive capabilities inherent in
OPLANs 2370 and 2380. There were numerous problems in joint planning, especially in the integration of OPLAN
2380 with 2370. The latter was the product of the XVIII Airborne Corps as Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 while OPLAN
2380 was being developed by the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)] as JTF 190.
For the invasion, an airdrop was planned involving 3,900 paratroopers. Most of this force was airborne when Haitian
officials agreed to a peaceful transition of government and permissive entry of American forces. With U.S. troops
prepared to enter Haiti in a matter of hours, President Clinton dispatched a negotiating team led by former President
Jimmy Carter to discuss with the de facto Haitian leadership the terms of their departure. As a result, the MNF
deployed peacefully, Cedras and other top military leaders left Haiti, and restoration of the legitimate government
began, leading to Aristide's return on October 15.
Air refueling was used extensively for reconnaissance and combat air patrol missions, with 297 sorties and 1,129
flying hours logged by KC-135 and KC-10 tankers. To transport personnel and materiel from the continental United
States to the Caribbean basin, strategic airlift relied on three stage bases close to onload locations: C-5s staged at
Dover AFB, Delaware, primarily, and also at Griffiss AFB, New York, while C-141s staged at McGuire AFB, New
Jersey. In Haiti, Port-au-Prince was the destination of the strategic airlifters. Airfield conditions at another offload site,
Cap Haitien, precluded its use by C-5s and C-141s. C-5s and C-141s delivered troops and cargo to Roosevelt Roads,
Puerto Rico, where the personnel and supplies were transloaded to C-130s for movement to Cap Haitien and other
The credible threat of overwhelming force--combined with skillful, eleventh-hour diplomacy--enabled U.S. forces to
land unopposed and avoid the negative consequences that combat would have brought. The MNF initially employed
over 20,000 U.S. military personnel, plus some 2,000 personnel from a dozen other countries. The mission was to
restore democracy by removing the de facto military regime, return the previously elected Aristide regime to power,
ensure security, assist with the rehabilitation of civil administration, train a police force and judiciary, help prepare for
elections, and turn over responsibility to the U.N. A prior but unfulfilled political agreement between the parties on
Governor's Island (New York) in 1991 served as a template to shape objectives. There was a major commitment to
peace-building by civilian agencies of the U.S. government, particularly USAID, closely coordinated with the U.N. and
numerous other international, regional, and non-governmental organizations.
U.S. special operations forces played an essential role in establishing security and assuring de facto public
administration in rural areas.
The Maritime Administration activated 14 of its Ready Reserve Force vessels, this time to support UPHOLD
DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The ships transported military cargo from various U.S. ports to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. All were
fully crewed by a total of more than 400 civilian American seafarers and were operational within four days of being
requested, ahead of the military's activation requirement. General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, praised the "flawless, timely response" of everyone involved in activating the RRF ships to support American
troops serving in Haiti.
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded both in restoring the democratically elected government of Haiti and in stemming
emigration, thanks to well-executed political, military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities. On March 31, 1995 the
United States transferred the peacekeeping responsibilities to United Nations functions. Advanced planning and
coordination for the transition were well managed by the U.S. and the U.N., as were the selection and training of
senior leaders to sustain continued cooperative international action. In contrast to the Somalia transition, the U.N.
deployed an advance headquarters element to Haiti six months prior to the change of command. On March 31, 1995,
a smaller U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti (UNMIH) succeeded the powerful MNF, with a March 1996 deadline for
completion, after a newly-elected President is scheduled to take office.
Operations Plan 4102 [with Annexes] is a top secret road map from peace to war by the US Europen Command. It
described in minute detail how the US forces would react, almost hourly, to a Soviet attack across the inter-German
border, including detailed plans for bringing in reinforcements from the United States, equipping them, and putting
them under NATO command. The plan included descriptions of where each unit will go upon the outbreak of war, and
now individual combat units would use the hills and valleys of the rugged West German terrain to conduct a defense
in depth, including nuclear-release procedures.
During the Cold War NATO's sole focus was on territorial collective defense, and the need for simplicity overrode any
initiatives towards greater military efficiency among its members. NATO organized the General Defense Plan of
Germany into eight national corps, whose commanders retained crucial command authorities, e.g. authority over
training, logistics, task organization, and mission assignments, among others.
The European General Defense Plan (GDP 31001) was tested annually during Return of Forces to Germany
(REFORGER) exercises. The US Army's mission in Germany was to man the the General Defense Plan line, which
cut north-south across the Fulda Gap, the break in the Vogelsberg mountains through which the Iron Curtain ran.
Every piece of artillery, every machine gun, rifle, mortar, tank, and anti-tank weapon in the 3d Armored Division was
intended to hit the Russians the moment they came pouring through the gap.
During the 1980s, V Corps included the 3d Armored Division, 8th Infantry Division, and 11th Armored Cavalry. The
VII Corps included the 1st Armored Division, 3d Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), and 2d Armored
Cavalry. The separate 2d Armored Division (Forward) was stationed in northern Germany. These forces were
arrayed, in line with the NATO General Defense Plan, in an essentially static forward defense of the traditional, critical
eastern approaches to Western Europe. Their mission was to hold off an attack from the East until reinforcements
could arrive from the United States. Against the increasing numerical superiority of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact
forces, USAREUR concentrated its energy on improving its equipment and training, reefing reinforcement plans,
building up prepositioned and war reserve stocks, and increasing interoperability with other NATO forces.
As a result of Project CHASE the 709th MP Bn (C) formulated and published the new General Defense Plan (GDP-1-
75) to support V Corps. During the Cold War, an outstanding leader development tool for Cold War commanders in
Europe was the General Defense Plan briefing. Leaders were required to take a higher command‘s written and oral
plan, develop the defense plan for their unit, and then brief it back to their commanders.
Retired Sgt. Clyde Lee Conrad who, while living in Bad Kreutznach, Germany, passed sensitive NATO information to
the Hungarian State Defense Authority. Conrad supplied the Hungarian government with the General Defense Plan
(GDP) for essentially every allied unit assigned to Europe. He was a key player in what is generally regarded as one
of the most successful Soviet Bloc spy rings of recent times. Conrad was tried in Germany and convicted of high
treason. Conrad was arrested in 1988 and two years later, a West German court sentenced him to life in prison for
espionage. He received the first life sentence ever given by the Federal Republic of Germany for espionage activities.
Conrad died in 1998.
The V Corps‘s 130th Engineer Brigade‘s roots are firmly entrenched in the General Defense Plan days of Germany‘s
forward-deployed heavy divisions. In those days, units didn‘t have to be strategically responsive or rapidly deployable
beyond border assembly areas in eastern Germany.
Throughout the Cold War, mobilization to execute USAREUR's OPLAN 4102, plus the possibility of concurrent
hostilities in Korea, was planned much on the model of World War II. It was expected that if the Soviet-led Warsaw
Pact attacked North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, full mobilization would quickly be directed by the
President. Full mobilization meant that all of the ARNG and USAR TPFDL units would be mobilized and deployed as
required by the CINCs. For most RC units that would have entailed prolonged periods of post-mobilization training
and issuance of additional equipment and personnel fill from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and/or Selective
Service. Units could be deployed when they reached a Command, Control and Communication (C3) readiness
category if necessary.
Events since the end of the Cold War have indicated that although mobilization can be readily invoked by the
National Command Authority (NCA) as in Operation DESERT STORM, the scope and magnitude of the use of
reserve forces will most likely be less than that envisioned to deal with a Warsaw Pact style threat. Although such a
scenario must remain a possibility, smaller scale mobilization is more likely for the Army XXI. It is essential that Army
leaders engage public affairs to create a climate where necessary community support and acceptance can be
initiated and sustained through a series of PA programs.
No longer can commanders memorize General Defense Plan battle positions at the Fulda Gap and know who and
where they will fight. Field grade officers must now be capable of thinking through the most difficult situation, adapting
to changes in their operational environment and ensuring the continued success and freedom of our nation. The
Army expects it will take time before our officer corps is comfortable with the notion of having no ―school solution,‖ but
as seen in Afghanistan, Iraq and other hotspots throughout the world, there is no General Defense Plan, and the
enemy is constantly changing, thinking and adapting.
Garden Plot / CONPLAN 2502 (Civil Disturbance Operations)
Use of the military to support civil authorities stems from core national values as expressed in the Constitution. Article
I, Section 8 states, ―Congress shall have power... to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.‖ Article II, Section 3 states the President, ―...shall take care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.‖ The 10th Amendment reads, ―The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it, are reserved to the States respectively...,‖ providing the basis that Federal
government support, including DoD assistance, is provided in support of State and local authorities.
The President is authorized by the Constitution and Title 10 (10 USC 331–334) to suppress insurrections, rebellions,
and domestic violence. After issuing a Cease and Desist Order, the President issues an executive order that directs
the Attorney General and the SECDEF to take appropriate steps to disperse insurgents and restore law and order.
The Attorney General is then responsible to coordinate the federal response to domestic civil disturbances. The
restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act no longer apply to federal troops executing the orders of the President to quell
the disturbance in accordance with Rules of the Use of Force (RUF) approved by the DoD General Counsel and the
USNORTHCOM Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 2502 (Civil Disturbance Operations), is the plan for supporting state and
local authorities during civil disturbances. This plan serves as the foundation for any CDO operation and standardizes
most activities and command relationships. Tasks performed by military forces may include joint patrolling with law
enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction
force. The JTF commander, a general officer, coordinates all DoD support with the Senior Civilian Representative of
the Attorney General (SCRAG). DoD will usually establish a JTF headquarters near where the Attorney General‘s
local representative is based.
Garden Plot is the DoD Civil Disturbance Plan, the generic Operations Plan [OPLAN] for military support related to
domestic civil disturbances. The department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan (DA GARDEN PLOT), is the
governing publication for planning, deployment, employment, and redeployment of federal military resources involved
in countering domestic civil disturbances. Military assistance to Federal, State, and local government (including
government of U.S. territories) and their law enforcement agencies for civil disturbances and civil disturbance
operations, including response to terrorist incidents, are referred to cumulatively as "Military Assistance for Civil
The DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (2005) defines Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA) as, ―DoD support, including federal military forces, the Department‘s career civilian and contractor personnel,
and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other
activities.‖ It notes that DSCA is also often referred to as Civil Support. There has been discussion in some DoD
offices of distinguishing between the two terms: Civil Support as a total force construct with DSCA involving Federal
support only and not include the National Guard in Title 32 or State Active Duty status. But as of 2008 they remained
Until the 2005 DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the term Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
(MACA) was essentially synonymous with Civil Support and served as an overarching construct that included three
subordinate mission sets: Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances
(MACDIS) and Military Assistance to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA). Defense Support of Civil Authority
(DSCA) has replaced MACA. The term MACDIS has been replaced by Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO).
Civil disturbances are riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders
prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to
require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10, United States Code.
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA), subsequent amendments and policy decisions prohibits the use of federal
military forces (to include Reserve forces) to perform internal police functions. PCA thus restricts the type of support
DoD can provide domestic law enforcement organizations. There are a wide variety of exceptions to the PCA and the
law essentially gives the President all the authority he needs to employ DoD forces inside the U.S. although there
may appropriately be political consequence that would inhibit such employment.
The term posse comitatus [po.si komitei.tAs, -tius , [med. (Anglo) L., force of the county: see prec. and county.]
applies to the 'The force of the county‘; the body of men above the age of fifteen in a county (exclusive of peers,
clergymen, and infirm persons), whom the sheriff may summon or ‗raise‘ to repress a riot or for other purposes; also,
a body of men actually so raised and commanded by the sheriff.
In the United States the posse comitatus was perhaps most important on the Western frontier (there known as a
posse), but it has been preserved as an institution in many states. Sheriffs and other peace officers have the authority
to summon the power of the county. In some counties it is a crime to refuse assistance. In general, members of a
posse comitatus have been permitted to use force if necessary to achieve a posse‘s legitimate ends, but state laws
differ as to the legal liability of one who in good faith aids an officer himself acting beyond his authority.
Congress sought to terminate the prevalent use of federal soldiers in civilian law enforcement roles in the South
during the Reconstruction Period following the Civil War. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 created general
prohibition against use of military personnel in civilian law enforcement. The most renowned statutory exception has
been traditionally referred to as The Insurrection Acts (10 USC 331–334) that were modified and renamed to
Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order by the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The new
language clarifies Presidential authority to invoke the acts for situations resulting from natural disasters and other
The President is authorized by the Constitution and laws of the United States to employ the Armed Forces of the
United States to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence under various conditions and
circumstances. Planning and preparedness by the Federal Government and the Department of Defense for civil
disturbances are important due to the potential severity of the consequences of such events for the Nation and the
Military resources may be employed in support of civilian law enforcement operations in the 50 States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories and possessions only in the parameters of the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, including
delegations of that authority through this Directive or other means.
The primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is
vested in the State and local governments. Supplementary responsibility is vested by statute in specific Agencies of
the Federal Government other than the Department of Defense. The President has additional powers and
responsibilities under the Constitution of the United States to ensure that law and order are maintained.
The mission at NORTHCOM is to anticipate events in the homeland and to be prepared to respond, to either prevent
the attacks or defeat them if they occur and then to mitigate the consequences of those attacks should they occur. In
addition, NORTHCOM has a secondary mission to provide defense support to civil authorities. It's an old mission that
the Army used to lump together under the Garden Plot scenario, in that there was always a brigade that was
prepared to respond to civil disturbances.
The secretary of the Army is the Executive Agent for DOD in matters pertaining to civil disturbances. The U. S. Army
Director of Military Support (DOMS) is the action agent and the DOD point of contact in all such matters. The
Secretary of the Army as the DOD Executive Agent, will, in the event of a civil disturbance within CONUS, exercise
through the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the direction of those forces committed to him by the military services. In the
event of civil disturbances in U. S. territories and possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico outside
CONUS, the DOD Executive Agent exercises the direction of those forces assigned or committed to the commanders
of unified or specified commands.
The Coast Guard, as well as the other Services, is required to maintain support plans. GARDEN PLOT is the name
applicable to such service plans. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of operational commanders should reflect
guidance herein. Military assistance to civil authorities is a peacetime matter, not to be confused with military support
of civil defense (MSCD), which is a wartime function.
DOD task force operations to quell civil disturbances off military property can be initiated only by Presidential order.
Cases of such initiation in the past occurred during the urban political and racial unrest in the Vietnam era when
federal troops were deployed on a number of occasions. GARDEN PLOT operations may include terrorist incidents,
though the FBI, not the Army, will then be the lead agent. In the event of civil unrest upon the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, where in the Coast Guard has standing statutory responsibility, Coast
Guard units will in all likelihood be legitimately involved in law enforcement operations well before any Presidential
invocation of civil disturbance plans. The Coast Guard character for law enforcement and cooperation with civil
authorities is much broader than that of DOD services. DOD services are subject to law enforcement restrictions that
are not applicable to the Coast Guard. For policy reasons (i.e., to ensure unity of command and control), there may
be instances when these restrictions are imposed upon Coast Guard personnel under a DOD task force
commander's operational control.
Cooperation with other services in GARDEN PLOT operations is paramount and requires particular understanding of
task force constitution and chains of command. Civil disturbance planning cannot be deliberate in that force mix and
locales are obviously indeterminate. Guidance herein will provide a basis for Coast Guard participation and related
area and district supplemental instructions or other directives. Actual Coast Guard participation will in all likelihood be
the logical extension of traditional law enforcement functions.
The right of the United States to use federal forces to protect federal property and functions is an accepted principle
of government. However, this use of federal forces is warranted only when the need for protection of Federal property
or functions clearly exists and State or local authorities cannot or will not give adequate protection. Prior to the
designation of a civil disturbance objective area and employment of federal forces by Presidential order, the Army
may reinforce other federal forces defending federal property.
Elements of the U. S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM) maintain liaison with federal, state,
and municipal investigative and police agencies and on order of Department of the Army, collect and report civil
disturbance information in response to requests from DA, the Personal Liaison Officer for the Chief of Staff, Army
(PLOCSA), task force commanders, CONUS Army commanders, and other specified commands.
Military intelligence units have a very limited role during domestic support operations other than civil disturbance
operations. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Reg. 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence
Components that Affect United States Persons (Dec. 1982)[hereinafter DOD 5240.1-R], does not apply to DOD
intelligence components when they perform authorized law enforcement activities, including civil disturbance activities.
In such cases, DOD intelligence components may collect, report, process, and store information on the activities of
persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department in accordance with U.S. Dep't of Defense, Dir. 5200.27,
Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense (7
Jan. 1980) and U.S. Dep't of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT) (15 Feb. 1991).
The Insurrection Act permitted the President to call the militia into Federal service to suppress insurrections and to
enforce the law, including when State authorities were unable or unwilling to secure the Constitutional rights of their
citizens. Rarely in U.S. history has this authority been employed. In fact, the National Guard has been federalized
under the provisions of the Insurrection Act only ten (10) times since World War II.
U.S. Presidents invoked the Insurrection Act when a Governor requested such a decree or when State authorities
were clearly unable or unwilling to secure the Constitutional rights of their citizens. When this authority is employed it
takes control of a state‘s National Guard from the Governor and places command and control within the Federal
government. This requires the federalized National Guard forces to perform missions assigned by the federal
government, where and when specified, which may not be consistent with a Governor‘s direction that these forces
conduct lifesaving, law enforcement or other critical emergency functions in support of the State emergency
management agencies and incident commanders.
Controversy over civil rights and the unpopular war in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s resulted in one of the
most turbulent periods in American histry. During this same time, major riots occurred in Los Angeles in 1965; Detroit
in 1967; Chicago in 1968 during the Democratic National Convention; Santa Barbara, California, in 1970; East Los
Angeles, California, in 1970 and 1971; and Attica, New York, in 1971, during a major prison riot. Violent rioting once
again erupted across the country on April 29,1992, when four police officers were acquitted after being accused of
beating a black suspect (Rodney King). Also in recent years, issues such as abortion, gay rights, immigration, and
gun control have generated great public debate and resulted in many mass assemblies and demonstrations.
The Active Army has often led federalized forces of the various state ARNGs during periods of domestic disturbance,
such as the several Garden Plot operations to restore order in major urban areas in the 1960s.
The ability of the Reserve Components to conduct operations to control civil disturbances was increased during fiscal
year 1970; 375,000 National Guardsmen and 14,000 Army Reservists had been trained in riot control as the year
closed. The Army National Guard conducted, at the expense of regular training, sixteen hours of refresher civil
disturbance training. Some states also carried out civil disturbance command post exercises in conjunction with local
and state civil authorities. The Army Reserve had three infantry brigades which were part of the federal military
contingency force for the control of civil disturbances. These units also conducted sixteen hours of refresher civil
disturbance training at the expense of primary training. This additional responsibility of the Reserve Components
called for their immediate availability in times of natural disasters, civil disturbances, and other emergencies. The
Army National Guard bore the brunt of these requirements because of its responsibility to the respective state
governments. From July 1, 1969, to June 30, 1970, individual National Guard units were called in by state governors
on ninety-two different occasions in thirty-one states and the District of Columbia. These included civil disturbances at
Chicago, Illinois; Madison, Wisconsin; Charleston, South Carolina; Berkeley, California; and Columbus and Kent,
In response to the US invasion of Cambodia, student unrest broke out. Under Operation "Garden Plot," from 30 April
through 04 May 1970 9th Air Force airlift units transported civil disturbance control forces from Ft Bragg to various
locations throughout the eastern US. Such deployments were commonplace during the unrest of the late 1960s and
The 943d Rescue Group participated in Operation Garden Plot in support of Republican and Democratic conventions
The anti-war and civil right protests picked up momentum in 1968. On 20 May 1972, the 10th Transportation Battalion
assumed a secondary mission and provided 650 for a civil disturbance task force. The task force conducted garden
Plot exercise on 6 and 7 September 1972 and 1st US Army commended the Soldiers for their professionalism. It
conducted another Garden Plot Exercise from 18 to 20 January 1973. In February 1973, the US and North
Vietnamese sign the Peace Accords in Paris and the US agreed to withdraw ground units from Vietnam. With troops
out of the war, the need for a civil disturbance task force diminished. They conducted another Garden Plot Exercise
on 28 June and 19 December 1973.
OPLAN 5026 - Air Strikes
OPLAN 5026/CONPLAN 5026 has been associated, in the available literature, with surgical strikes against North
Korea that would take out crucial targets but would not constitute the initiation of a major theater war.
One scenario for dealing with North Korea's nuclear program would consist of surgical strikes against facilities
believed to be involved with the production, storage, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Such strikes might resemble
the Israeli preemptive strike on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.
Using B-2 stealth bombers and F-117 stealth fighters the United States could strike multiple targets throughout North
Korea, including the reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon. The deployment of F-117s from the 49th Fighter Wing to
South Korea and the deployments of B-52s and B-1Bs to Guam brought a significant degree of capability to the
region that might have handled contingencies.
During the 1993-1994 Nulear Crisis, defense officials within the Clinton Administration began developing contingency
plans for conducting surgical strikes on Yongbyon. Those plans consisted of deploying additional squadrons of
aircraft to South Korea, including F-117s, the deployment of several battalions of ground troops to reinforce elements
of the 2nd Infantry Division, and the deployment of an additional aircraft carrier battle group with its strike aircraft and
Tomahawk cruise missiles. The plan, which had been developed by the USFK commander General Gary Luck, was
designed so that it could be executed within a very short timeframe, a couple of days.
There are a variety of factors that could complicate military strikes against North Korea. First, while there a number of
facilities that would be obvious targets there is a high degree of probability that there are more locations than may
have been previously identified making it unlikely that a single round of surgical strikes could eliminate the DPRK
capability. Enough plutonium to produce roughly two nuclear bombs is still unaccounted for and the materials have
most likely been located at different installations.
The abundance of deeply buried underground targets is another issue as a number of suspect sites appear to be
under mountains. This limits the type of munitions that could be used as some conventional warheads may not be
powerful enough to reach sensitive areas. Entrances to these facilities, once identified, may be targeted resulting in
the collapse of those entrances.
The impacts associated with air strikes could be quite significant ranging from the release of radiation to a North
Korean retaliation. Strikes on the Yonbyon reactor and other suspected nuclear production facilities could release
radiation that could have negative consequences on the region as a whole.
Tailoring the strikes in such a way as to maximize returns but to limit the likelihood of a North Korean retaliation would
be extremely difficult. The North Korean leadership is already acutely paranoid and sensitive to US military actions
and might be predisposed to respond any air strikes by initiating a full-scale war.
To prevent or minimize a North Korean response the United States might also opt to strike command and control
locations as well as artillery emplacements that threaten US troops and South Korean targets including Seoul. Missile
garrisons could also be targeted to remove the threat to Japan and the southern areas of the ROK. Depending on the
aircraft used, the United States might also have to suppress North Korean air defenses surrounding critical targets,
an effort that would be difficult. This presents an additional problem of creating a target list so large that it might be
just as simple for the United States to aim for the liberation of North Korea rather than the more limited strikes.
The deployment of additional assets to the South Korea and Guam in early March 2003 brough a great deal of
capability to the region that would be usefull if the United States were to conduct surgical strikes. On February 28,
2003 twelve B-52Hs and twelve B-1Bs were ordered to deploy to Andersen Air Force Base at Guam. On March 10
the 3rd Fighter Wing deployed roughly twenty-four F-15Es and 800 airmen from the 90th Fighter Squadron to Osan
Air Force Base. On March 14 six F-117s from the 49th Fighter Wing arrived at Kunsan Air Base.
These forces would be sufficient to carry out a number of strikes. Each of the above aircraft have the ability to deliver
precision guided munitions, specifically the Joint Direct Attack Munition. The twenty-four F-15E Strike Eagle's could
deliver a total of 96 JDAMs (4 per aircraft), the F-117s could deliver 12 JDAMs (2 per aircraft), the B-1B Lancer's
could deliver 288 JDAMs (24 per aircraft), and the B-52H's could deliver 216-360 JDAMs (18 per aircraft and
depending on the use of external implacements). If all of these assets are used the United States would have had the
ability to strike between 612 and 756 aim points.
This of course does not include the B-2 Spirit, deploying either from Whiteman Air Force Base or from Guam. Each
B-2 can carry 16 2,000lb JDAMs. As the B-2 is usually involved in the first strikes of a campaign it is likely that the
aircraft would be used. Any estimates on the number of B-2s that would be used in a strike against North Korea
would be highly speculative. Previous operations, specifically Afghanistan and Iraq used anywhere from 2 to 4 aircraft.
The inclusion of assets normally stationed at Kunsan and Osan Air Bases will only slightly increase the total number
of JDAMs that could be used as only two of the three F-16 squadrons, the 35th Fighter Squadron at Kunsan, is an F-
16CD Block 40 that has been updated so that it can use the JDAM. The 80th Fighter Squadron at Kunsan flies the
Block 30 F-16CD but has been upgraded so that it can use laser-guided munitions and on July 8, 2003 the 80th
demonstrated upgrades that allow its aircraft to deliver JDAMs. The 36th Fighter Squadron has no such capability.
The inclusion of the 35th Fighter Squadron and 80th Fighter Squadrons in any surgical strike will add 192 JDAMs to
the total of 800 to 944 aim points.
Finally, the US has a number of ships and submarines available that can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles. As of
mid-June the United States had two carrier strike groups in the Asia-Pacific region consisting of roughly 15 ships.
Exluding the aircraft carriers there are two Ticonderoga class cruisers, three Arleigh Burke class guided missile
destroyers, two Spruance class destroyers, and four Oliver Hazard Perry guided missile frigates. [This does not
include the ships at Pearl Harbor.]
The Kitty Hawk and elements of its strike group returned to Yokosuka in early May and has since begun an extended
period of maintenance making the Kitty Hawk unavailable until sometime in November at the earliest. The readiness
of the rest of the strike group is difficult to determine as some ships have undoubtedly begun yard periods while
others have not. There are 466 VLS cells capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles.
The USS Carl Vinson and an element of its strike group are currently deployed to insure a credible deterrent while the
Kitty Hawk was deployed supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and while it undergoes repairs. During its deployment
the Carl Vinson has conducted operations in multiple areas in the Pacific including off the coast of South Korea.
While it might conduct operations in the South Pacific elements of its strike group can be retasked for maritime
interdiction operations. The Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group has 307 VLS cells capable of launching Tomahawk
Determining what strikes against North Korea would look like or consist of is dependent on whether the target list is
limited to WMD facilities or if it includes other targets such as surface-to-air missile batteries, air defense radars, and
command and control locations. The degree of risk to the pilots may also play a role in deciding how large or small
the raids will be.
A strike against North Korea could consist of a number of land attack missile being launched by cruisers, destroyers
and submarines striking fixed targets throughout the country. With EA-6B Prowlers, staging from either of the two
aircraft carriers, suppressing North Korean radar emissions and communications B-2 and F-117 stealth aircraft could
penetrate North Korean airspace proceeding to strike high priority targets as other heavy bombers, such as B-1Bs
and B-52s, begin striking other targets.
By late May to early June 2003 nearly all of the aircraft that had been sent to South Korea or Guam in support of
exercises or to bolster the US deterrent had returned to the United States.
OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West
OPLAN 5027 is the US-ROK Combined Forces Command basic warplan. Under Operations Plan 5027
(CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027), the United States plans to provide units to reinforce the Republic of Korea in the
event of external armed attack. These units and their estimated arrival dates are listed in the Time Phased Force
Deployment List (TPFDL), Appendix 6, to Annex A to CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027. The TPFDL is updated biennially
through U.S./ROK agreements. CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027 is distributed with a SECRET-U.S./ROK classification.
Pyongyang can credibly threaten the prompt destruction of Seoul with conventional arms alone. The North Korean
military could also establish a shallow foothold across the DMZ. However, the DPRK's ability to sustain these
offensive operations, or advance its forces further to the south, is questionable. South Korean and American air
forces could quickly establish air supremacy and destroy North Korean ground forces. The ensuing buildup of US
forces in Korea could reverse any remaining North Korean advances into the South, and unlease offensive
operations into the North. North Korea does not require long-range missiles with nuclear, chemical, or biological
warheads to devastate Seoul or to make a land grab across the DMZ. Such weapons are needed to deter or defeat
an American counteroffensive into North Korea.
Pyongyang has the ability to start a new Korean War, but not to survive one.
North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within range of Seoul, double the levels of a the mid-1990s.
Seoul is within range of the 170mm Koksan gun and two hundred 240mm multiple-rocket launchers. The proximity of
these long-range systems to the Demilitarized Zone threatens all of Seoul with devastating attacks. Most of the rest of
North Korea's artillery pieces are old and have limited range. North Korea fields an artillery force of over 12,000 self-
propelled and towed weapon systems. Without moving any artillery pieces, the North could sustain up to 500,000
rounds an hour against Combined Forces Command defenses for several hours.
North Korea's short-term blitzkrieg strategy envisions a successful surprise attack in the early phase of the war to
occupy some or all of South Korea before the arrival of US reinforcements on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean
ground forces, totaling some 1 million soldiers, are composed of some 170 divisions and brigades including infantry,
artillery, tank, mechanized and special operation forces. Of the total, about 60 divisions and brigades are deployed
south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. North Korea has deployed more than half of its key forces in forward bases
near the border. Seventy percent of their active force, to include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000
tanks, is garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Much of this force is protected by underground
facilities, including over four thousand underground facilities in the forward area alone. From their current locations
these forces can attack with minimal preparations. This means a surprise attack on South Korea is possible at any
time without a prior redeployment of its units.
The North Korean navy has also deployed 430 surface combatants and about 60 percent of some 90 submarine
combat vessels near the front line in forward bases. With about 40 percent of its 790 fighter planes deployed near the
front line, the North Korean air force could launch a surprise attack on any part of South Korea within a short period of
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea possesses larger forces than Iraq, and they are already deployed along
South Korea's border. A war could explode after a warning of only a few hours or days, not weeks. Unlike in the
Persian Gulf, this attack would be prosecuted along a narrow peninsula on mountainous terrain. It would probably be
accompanied by massed artillery fire, commando raids, and chemical weapons. Initially, the primary battlefield would
be only about 125 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. The DPRK attack would be conducted against well-
prepared ROK forces in fortified positions and against larger US forces than in the Persian Gulf. Most probably, the
DPRK attack would aim at seizing nearby Seoul by advancing down the Kaesong-Munsan, Kumwa, and Chorwon
corridors. If successful, North Korean forces might also try to conquer the entire peninsula before large US
The South Barrier Fence is the Southern part of the DMZ. The South Koreans have a series of Defensive lines that
cross the entire peninsula, but with the exception of the South Barrier Fence, they aren't connected completely across
the peninsula. They are designed to withstand an attack and allow a minimum force to hold a line while
reinforcement/counter attack forces are assembled and sent to destroy any penetrations.
The basic goal of a North Korean southern offensive is destruction of allied defenses either before South Korea can
fully mobilize its national power or before significant reinforcement from the United States can arrive and be deployed.
The primary objective of North Korea's military strategy is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean control
within 30 days of beginning hostilities. A secondary objective is the defense of North Korea.
To accomplish these ambitious objectives, North Korea envisions fighting a two-front war. The first front, consisting of
conventional forces, is tasked with breaking through defending forces along the DMZ, destroying defending CFC
forces, and advancing rapidly down the entire peninsula. This operation will be coordinated closely with the opening
of a second front consisting of SOF units conducting raids and disruptive attacks in CFC's rear.
The DPRK offensive against the ROK will consist of three phases. The objective of the first phase will be to breach
the defenses along the DMZ and destroy the forward deployed forces. The objective of the second phase will be to
isolate Seoul and consolidate gains. The objective of the third phase will be to pursue and destroy remaining forces
and occupy the remainder of the peninsula.
Approximately forty percent of the South Korean population resides within 40 miles of Seoul. While the terrain north
of Seoul is dominated by rice paddies offering limited off-road mobility, the terrain west of Seoul is a wide coastal plan
with the main invasion routes to Seoul. North Korean forces attacking Seoul through the Chorwon or Munsan
corridors would have to cross the Han or Imjin rivers (while these rivers freeze in the winter, the ice is not strong
enough to support heavy armor). The narrow eastern coastal plain is lightly settled and less heavily defended, though
mountains make movement of forces from the east coast difficult.
The US plans are based on the belief that the North Koreans would not be successful in consolidating their gains
around Seoul and could be pushed back across the DMZ -- though the plans assume the North may break through
the DMZ in places. A critical issue is strategic warning of unambiguous signs that North Korea is preparing an attack.
The warning time has reportedly been shortened from about ten days to about three days as North Korea has
covered its military activities.
The US-ROK defense plan would be shaped not only by the threat but also by the mountainous terrain. Korea is
commonly regarded as rugged infantry terrain that invites neither mobile ground warfare nor heavy air bombardment,
but North Korea has assembled large armored forces that are critical to exploiting breakthroughs, and these forces
would pass down narrow corridors that are potential killing zones for U.S. airpower. A new Korean War would bear
little resemblance to the conflict of 195053.
During Phase 1, US-ROK forces would conduct a vigorous forward defense aimed at protecting Seoul. Their
campaign would be dominated by combined-arms ground battles waged with infantry, artillery, and armor. US air and
naval forces would conduct close air support, interdiction, and deep strike missions. After Phase 1, US-ROK
operations in Phase 2 would probably focus on seizing key terrain, inflicting additional casualties on enemy forces,
and rebuffing further attacks. Phase 3, to start when the US ground buildup was complete and ROK forces were
replenished, would be a powerful counteroffensive aimed at destroying the DPRK's military power. The war plan
envisions amphibious assaults into North Korea by US Army and Marines at the narrow waist of North Korea. The
entire resources of the US Marine Corps would flow there to establish a beachead, with substantial Army resources
quickly conducting over-the-shore operations.
The the forward defense strategy in OPLAN 5027 was developed by Combined Forces Commander US General
James F. Hollingsworth in 1973 [this discussion is based on "Winning in Korea Without Landmines," by Caleb
Rossiter]. Prior to this time, OPLAN 5027 focused primarily on defeating a North Korean invasion. It envisioned the
allies staging a 50-mile fighting retreat along the primary armored invasion route from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ),
and taking up strong positions [the "Hollingsworth Line"] south of the broad Han River where it bisects the South
Korean capital of Seoul. There, allied forces would wait for US reinforcements before counter-attacking.
Concerned that the US withdrawal from Vietnam might lead the DPRK to question American commitment to defend
South Korea, Hollingsworth altered the focus of OPLAN 50-27 to a forward-based offensive strategy. The goal was to
convince North Korea that an invasion could bring an end to its regime. The new posture moved most allied artillery,
tanks,and infantry forward toward the Military Control Zone (MCZ), which runs five miles south of the DMZ. General
Hollingsworth announced plans to strike north after these forces defeated the invasion. He assigned two brigades of
the US 2nd Division to seize the North Korean staging city of Kaesong just across the DMZ, and promised around-
the-clock raids on the North by B-52 bombers and a ―violent,short war ‖ to capture the capital of Pyongyang.
It was unclear whether Hollingsworth's plans included the use of the US tactical nuclear weapons then on the Korean
peninsula if the North Korean invasion forces overwhelmed the allies. At the time, the Congressional Budget Office
predicted that without nuclear weapons,the new strategy could result in the initial loss of Seoul. In 1975 Gen.
Hollingsworth stated that the US had a '9-day war plan', according to which North Korea would be defeated in a few
days in a violent clash with 700-800 air sorties.
As of 1994 it was reported that a variant OPLAN 5027 under consideration by CINCPAC focused on a scenario under
which ROK forces were able to blunt a DPRK offensive and stabilize a defensive line at FEBA Bravo (20-30 miles
below the DMZ). Subsequently, US-ROK Combined Forces Command would execute a retaliatory offensive once US
reinforcements arrived. A major air campaign against northern forces would be required before the counteroffensive
could begin. A US Marine Expeditionary Force (in division strength) and the 82nd Air Assault Division, along with
ROK divisions, would launch an overland offensive north toward Wonsan from the east coas. Soon thereafter, a
combined US-ROK force would stage an amphibious landing near Wonsan, and advance to Pyongyang.
Subsequently, a combined US-ROK force would execute a major counteroffensive from north of Seoul aimed at
seizing Pyongyang. This would be achieved either by linking up with the force at Wonsan, or meeting it at Pyongyang.
A favorable outcome for the South depends on two conditions. First, the ROK forces must withstand DPRK forces
during the initial 5-15 days of North Koean offensive actions. Second, they must hold the line while US and ROK
forces are mobilized for the counteroffensive, which could take another 15-20 days.
The ROK and US war plan included a counteroffensive that would destroy the North Korean regime. South Korean
state television reported on 24 March 1994 that Seoul and Washington planned to topple the North Korean
government if the Stalinist state attacks the South. The Korean Broadcasting System said that rather than simply
driving back the North‘s troops, the plan provides for a counteroffensive to seize Pyongyang and try to topple the
government of Kim Il Sung [―KBS reports plan to topple Kim Il Sung,‖ Washington Times , March 25, 1994, p. 16]. In
1994, the South Korean president, Kim Young-sam, said: ―Once a major military confrontation occurs, North Korea
will definitely be annihilated‖ [Ranan R. Lurie, ―In a Confrontation, ‗North Korea Will Definitely Be Annihilated,‘‖ Los
Angeles Times (Washington Edition), March 24, 1994, p. 11].
The battlefield coordination line (BCL) first appeared in MEF operations during Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) 94. It was
employed as a workaround "MEF internal fire support coordination line (FSCL)" since the combatant commander
approved theater FSCL was too distant from the Marine close fight to be of any value. The extended placement of the
combatant commander's FSCL was due mostly to cultural and programmatic conflicts between the Army and the Air
Force (read JFACC or in Korea, the CFACC). The point of contention has always centered on the area between the
FSCL and the ground commander's forward boundary. The Air Force has historically demanded that the Army
"coordinate" strikes forward of the FSCL with the CFACC prior to execution. The Army doesn't like the idea of having
to coordinate (thus delay operations) with another component inside its own assigned area of operation, so to avoid
the problem, they push the FSCL out to a point beyond their area of influence, ATACMS soliloquies notwithstanding.
In effect, the FSCL became a de facto forward boundary.
After the nuclear crisis of 1994, OPLAN 5027 was completely overhauled, including a new agreement to ensure
Japanese bases are available if the US goes to war with North Korea. The updated Japan-US defense cooperation
guidelines, which the Japanese parliament approved 24 May 1999, allow the US to prepare for a Korean war by
stationing its military forces in Japan and the Pacific region.
Further revisions to the concept of operations were elaborated in OPLAN 5027-98, which was adopted in late 1998.
Previous versions of OPLAN 5027 had called for stopping a North Korean invasion and pushing them back across
the Demilitarized Zone. The new version of the plan was more clearly focused on offensive operations into North
Korea. A senior US official was reported to have said: "When we're done, they will not be able to mount any military
activity of any kind. We will kill them all." The goal of the revised plan was to "abolish North Korea as a functioning
state, end the rule of its leader, Kim Jong Il, and reorganize the country under South Korean control."
New priorities also focused on countering sudden chemical and biological attacks against Seoul. The South Korean
military reportedly estimates that 50 missiles carrying nerve gas could kill up to 38 percent of Seoul's 12 million
The new plan called for a campaign against North Korean armed forces and government involving "defeating them in
detail." The operation would be conducted in four phases: activities prior to a North Korean attack, halting the initial
North Korean assault, regrouping for a counter-attack, and finally a full scale invasion of North Korea to seize
According to reports, the new military plan included preemptive attacks against North Korea's military bases,
including long-range artillery and air forces bases, if intellitence detected a hard evidence that North Korea was
preparing to wage war. US and South Korean military leaders included pre-emptive strikes in this revised war plan. If
the North Koreans showed unmistakable signs of preparing to strike, and the US decided not to wait until South
Korea had been attacked, US forces had targets in North Korea already picked out and weapons assigned to destroy
Tasks performed during the Destruction Phase of the OPLAN reportedly involve a strategy of maneuver warfare north
of the Demilitarized Zone with a goal of terminating the North Korea regime, rather than simply terminating the war by
returning North Korean forces to the Truce Line. In this phase operations would include the US invasion of North
Korea, the destruction of the Korean People‘s Army and the North Korean government in Pyongyang. The plan
includes the possibility of a Marine amphibious assault into the narrow waist of North Korea to cut the country in two.
US troops would occupy north Korea and "Washington and Seoul will then abolish north Korea as a state and
‗reorganize‘ it under South Korean control.
When this new war plan leaked to the press in November 1998, it escalated tensions between the United States and
North Korea. North Korea sharply criticized OPLAN 5027-98, charging that it was a war scenario for the invasion of
North Korea. Pyongyang blamed Seoul for the revision of OPLAN 5027, and a North Korean Army spokesman stated
02 December 1998 that North Korea had the right to take a containment offensive while holding mass rallies of
military units and various social organizations to criticize OPLAN 5027. Such incidents illustrated North Korea's
sensitive reaction to the OPLAN 5027.
On 02 December 1998 the General Staff of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) issued a lengthy and authoritative
statement warning that the United States was instigating a new war. The statement stressed that the KPA would rise
to the challenge. "We neither want nor avoid a war. If a war is imposed, we will never miss the opportunity," the
statement read. The unique aspect of Pyongyang's public statements is the preoccupation with "US war-plan # 5027"
as an imminent threat. Official Pyongyang is adamant that "war-plan # 5027" is already being implemented, and
public statements frequently focus on OPLAN 5027.
According to the 04 December 2000 South Korean Defense Ministry White Paper, the United States would deploy up
to 690,000 troops on the Korean peninsula if a new war breaks out. The United States apparently had considerably
increased the number of troops that would be deployed in any new Korean conflict. The figure had risen from 480,000
in plans made in the early 1990s and 630,000 in the mid-1990s. The latest Time Phased Forces Deployment Data for
any contingency on the Korean Peninsula is comprised of 690,000 troops, 160 Navy ships and 1,600 aircraft
deployed from the U.S. within 90 days.
The South Korean defense ministry described the increase as the result of a new US "win-win strategy," which would
require the United States to have the capability to fight two wars simultaneously, such as in the Middle East and East
Asia. Along with equipment to counter weapons of mass destruction, the US plan focused on the deployment of
aircraft carriers and advanced aircraft to attack enemy artillery units in the early stages of any war.
US augmentation forces, including the army, navy, air force, and the marine corps, are composed of approximately
690,000 troops. The augmented forces comprise army divisions, carrier battle groups with highly advanced fighters,
tactical fighter wings, and marine expeditionary forces in Okinawa and on the US mainland. The US augmentation
forces have contingency plans for the Korean peninsula to execute the Win-Win Strategy in support of United Nations
Command (UNC)/Combined Forces Command (CFC) operation plans.
There are three types of augmentation capability: Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs), Force Module Packages
(FMPs), and the Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data (TPFDD). These are executed through a unit integration
process, when the commander of CFC requests them and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff orders them in case of a crisis
on the Korean peninsula.
FDOs are ready to be implemented when war is imminent. They can be classified into political, economic, diplomatic,
and military options. Approximately 150 deterrence options are ready to be employed.
FMPs are measures that augment combat or combat support units that need the most support in the early phase of
the war should war deterrence efforts through FDOs fail. Included in the FMPs are elements such as strong carrier
Under TPFDD, in which FDO and FMP are included, the key forces are planned ahead of time to be deployed in case
of an outbreak of war. There are three types of forces under TPFDD: in-place forces, or forces currently deployed to
the peninsula; pre-planned forces, or forces of time-phased deployment in a contingency; and on-call forces, which
could be deployed if needed.
CFC Pub 3-1 (Deep Operations Korea) of 1 May 99 requires pre-planned fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) 26
hours prior to ITO execution, and immediate FSCL changes (inside the ITO cycle) 6 hours from transmittal to
implementation with nominal FSCL placement 12 to 20 kilometers from the FLOT. The publication discusses the
need to avoid confusion and fratricide via frequent FSCL changes, yet still retain the ability to accommodate rapid
maneuver. Ground and amphibious force commanders will recommend placement of the FSCL, but the combatant
commander is the approving authority.
In February 2002 it was reported that the US military was updating OPLAN 5027 in the wake of the September 11
terrorist attacks. This includes a military calculation of the force needed to remove North Korean leader Kim Jung Il.
In mid-2002 a top aide to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld briefed a concept of operations for striking North
Korea's weapons of mass destruction. This case study in the application of the Bush administration's new doctrine of
pre-emptive military action envisioned a swift attack, carried out without consulting South Korea, America's ally on the
peninsula. Soon after word of the briefing spread, administration officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell
and Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of US forces in the Pacific, worked to stifle further discussion of the scheme.
In late 2003 it was reported ["Military Alters Plans For Possible Conflicts" By Bradley Graham Washington Post
November 18, 2003, pg. 18] that " ... the new plans would allow the United States to respond without waiting for as
many ground forces to arrive, by substituting air power for artillery and getting such critical equipment as counter-
battery radars -- for pinpointing enemy mortar and artillery fire -- on scene ahead of the rest of their divisions. The
resulting force might not be as "elegant" as planners would like, but "it will certainly be capable... "
While Patriot is the only missile defense system deployed by the US military, the Defense Department expected that
three "emergency capabilities" for missile defense would begin to emerge in the year 2004. Those capabilities are
ground-based midcourse interceptors being installed in Alaska as part of a Pacific test bed; sea-based midcourse
interceptors on one or two Navy Aegis ships; and an Airborne Laser prototype. These could provide an emergency
capability against a North Korean missile attack, but it was extremely limited. Five anti-missile interceptors will be
deployed at the site.
During fiscal year 2003, MDA achieved a 50-percent success rate on hit-to-kill intercepts—one success out of two
attempts for each of the GMD and Aegis BMD elements. The actual defensive system to be fielded by 30 September
2004 will have fewer components than planned. MDA could not meet its upper-end goal of fielding 10 GMD
interceptors by September 2004. Rather, MDA expected to field 5 interceptors by September 2004 and complete the
goal of 10 interceptors by February 2005. In addition, the agency was be hard-pressed to achieve its goal of
producing and delivering an inventory of 20 GMD interceptors by December 2005, because GMD contractors had yet
to meet the planned production rate by mid-April 2004. The first BMDS block will cost more and deliver fewer fielded
components than originally planned. As reported in DOD budget submissions for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the
Aegis BMD interceptor inventory decreased from 20 to 9, the number of Aegis BMD ships upgraded for the long-
range surveillance and tracking mission decreased from 15 to 10. An intercept capability by Aegis BMD was not part
of the September 2004 Initial Defensive Operations (IDO). By April 2005, two upgraded cruisers with an inventory of
five interceptors were expected to be available for engaging short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The potential
operational use of Airborne Laser [ABL] and the sea-based radar as sensors was no longer part of Block 2004. The
SBX was fielded as a test asset at the end of Block 2004 (December 2005), and it would be placed on alert as an
operational asset during Block 2006.
Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, USFK held a conference for senior military leaders at Osan Air Force Base to
evaluate the air component of OPLAN 5027. The conference was held on May 22-23, 2003 and was to adapt lessons
learned from the use of UAVs and ground tactics and to "apply them in plans and strategies for 2003" according to
7th Air Foce commander Lt. General Lance Smith. The Air Boss conference discussed specific targets and the
impact of new technologies. According to General Smith, as quoted by Stars and Stripes on May 24, 2003 the battle
plan has changed considerably.
Missile Defense Agency Block 2004, represents calendar years 2004-2005. The ground-based Midcourse Defense
will consist of 18 total Ground-based Interceptors, with 2 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. and 16 at Ft. Greely,
Alaska. The Navy's Aegis will consist of 10 sea-based Surveillance and Track Destroyers, 2
Engagement/Surveillance and Track Cruisers, all equiped with 8 Standard Missile-3 sea-based interceptors. A total of
281 Patriot Advanced Capablility-3 missiles will be operated by the US Army. The Sea-based X-band radar will be
introduced to the Missile Defense Test Bed in 2005 to provide more realistic sensor information in tests using long-
range targets and countermeasures, and will also enhance operational capability.
In June 2003 US and Republic of Korea officials agreed to a plan to realign American forces stationed in "The Land of
the Morning Calm." In June 4-5 meetings held in the South Korean capital city of Seoul, according to a joint US-South
Korean statement, it was decided the operation would consist of two phases. During Phase 1 US forces at
installations north of the Han River would consolidate in the Camp Casey (Tongduchon) and Camp Red Cloud
(Uijongbu) areas. Both bases are north of Seoul and the Han, but well south of the demilitarized zone that separates
North and South Korea. The 14,000-strong US Army 2nd Infantry Division, which provides troops to bases near the
DMZ, is headquartered at Camp Red Cloud. During Phase 2 US forces north of the Han River would move to key
hubs south of the Han River. US and Korean officials agreed to continue rotational US military training north of the
Han even after Phase 2 is completed. The realignment operation would take several years to complete.
Most American troops will be moved out of Seoul by the end of 2007, and all of the US 2nd Infantry Division that's
currently patrolling the region north of Seoul will be moved south of Seoul by 2008. Existing military facilities at Osan
Air Base and Camp Humphreys, both located south of Seoul, are being expanded and upgraded to accept the
Missile Defense Agency Block 2006 represents the period of development for calendar years 2006 and 2007. Block
2006 will be the first block in which the Ballistic Missile Defense System will have the ability to intercept an incoming
enemy missile in every phase of flight. Up to 10 additional Ground-based Interceptors will be deployed at Ft. Greely,
Alaska (for a total of 28 Ground-based Interceptors between Ft. Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA). The
Army will have 231 additional PAC-3 missiles (for a total of 512). The Navy will convert the 10 Aegis Surveillance and
Track Destroyers to full Engagement/Surveillance and Track, add up to five additional Aegis Surveillance and Track
Destroyers, and add an additional Aegis Engagement/Surveillance and Track Cruiser. By that time the fleet will have
up to 20 additional Standard Missile-3 interceptors.
OPLAN 5028 / CONPLAN 5028
The fact of the existance of OPLAN 5028 is very poorly attested, and the very few attestations of such a plan are in
connection with OPLAN 1003. This suggests that some indicia of "OPLAN 5028" may simply be a typographic error,
a mistake for OPLAN 5027.
The fact of the existence of PACOM CONPLAN 5028-96 is well established, although the details of this CONPLAN
are entirely un-attested in the open literature.
OPLAN 5028 MTW West [Major Theater War - West] is the North East Asis plan that starts with MTW East (OPLAN
1003) in progress. The primary differences between OPLAN 5027 and OPLAN 5028 is the forces available. Since
many stateside units are dual tasked for both contingencies, OPLAN 5027 and OPLAN 5028 have some differences
in the forces available.
OPLAN 5029 - Collapse of North Korea
In late October 2008 the United States proposed developing a detailed Operations Plan [OPLAN] in case of the
collapse of the North Korean regime. Yonhap News reported that the proposal came at a meeting between the heads
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea and the United States, known as the Military Committee Meeting (MCM).
This would convert CONPLAN 5029 into OPLAN 5029. "The U.S. side proposed the countries develop CONPLAN
5029 into an operational plan at the MCM," the source was quoted as saying. The annual meeting of military chiefs
was held in Washington on 16 October 2008. Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert
Gates agreed to closely cooperate to materialize CONPLAN 5029 (Operation Plan in Concept Format 5029).
On 17 October 2008 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Lee
Sang-hee issued a joint communiqué following the 40th Republic of Korea U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).
It stated in part that "The Minister and the Secretary praised the substantial progress for the transition of wartime
operational control (OPCON) of ROK military forces in accordance with the Strategic Transition Plan (STP), and
reconfirmed the commitment for the April 17, 2012 wartime OPCON transition date. Secretary Gates offered firm
assurances that the transition of wartime OPCON will be carried out in a manner that strengthens deterrence and
maintains a fully capable U.S.-ROK combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula, noting that the U.S. remains
committed, both now and into the future, to respond quickly with appropriate military power to restore peace and
stability to the Korean Peninsula. The Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S. will continue to provide significant bridging
capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities."
On 29 October 2008 the DPRK's Korean Central News Agency responded that "The U.S. and the south Korean war-
like forces openly held an anti-DPRK military confab at which they agreed to "rapidly dispatch reinforcements in
contingency." This was a dangerous move aimed to provoke a new war on the Korean Peninsula and an
unpardonable military challenge to the DPRK, to all intents and purposes ... Some days ago, the commander of the
U.S. armed forces in south Korea kicked off war hysteria, crying out for "boosting the capability for perfect retaliation."
This indicates that his outbursts are not an empty talk but are being put into practice.... These war servants who go
reckless to attack fellow countrymen with arms provided by their American master will not escape from the fate of a
tiger-moth as they are cursed and denounced by all the fellow countrymen.... The U.S. belligerent forces would be
well advised not to misjudge the army of Songun [ie, Kim-jong Il] and the will of the DPRK but stop their reckless
moves for a new war. "
CONPLAN 5029 is the US-ROK Combined Forces Command to prepare for the collapse of North Korea. The plan is
reported to feature preparations by the South Korean and US forces to manage an inflow of North Korean refugees
and other unusual situations if the North Korean regime collapses.
In August 1999 Gen. John H. Tilelli, commander-in-chief of U.S. Forces Korea, acknowledged that the CFC has
mapped out a scenario to prepare for the collapse of North Korea. "It would be unusual if we didn't have one, and we
are preparing for any course of action," he said. But he refused to disclose details.
In January 2005 the ROK National Security Council rejected an American proposal transform Concept Plan
CONPLAN 5029 into an Operational Plan, OPLAN 5029. The OPLAN would provide much more specific military
course of action to repsond to various types of internal instability in North Korea, such as regime collapse, mass
defection and revolt. In June 2005 ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung and US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld agreed to "improve and develop" the Concept Plan, stopping short of turning it into an Operation Plan. The
improved Concept Plan will include measures for "various types of contingencies" other than military operations.
The United States had asked that the plan be approved in 2004. It would have given the United States command
over South Korean military assets in the event of rioting, mass defections or a government collapse in the
impoverished North. US officials reportedly had argued that the contingency plan was necessary to secure sensitive
nuclear and military facilities, and for overall public safety.
In April 2005 South Korean Defense Authorities rejected a contingency plan that would give command authority to the
United States military in the event of a North Korean collapse. South Korea's National Security Council on 15 April
2005 said it had vetoed a joint military plan with the United States on how to handle serious turmoil in North Korea,
should it arise. South Korean officials said they were dropping the plan because it could limit "South Korea's exercise
of its sovereignty."
These are the kind of things that would normally come out of alliance negotiations. But when the South Korean NSA
(NSC) made unilateral announcements like this, they're clearly not consulting with the Americans beforehand. South
Korean President Roh Moo Hyun was pursuing a policy of greater independence from its Cold War alliance with the
United States. His government planned to increase military cooperation with China, and for South Korea to become
what he calls a "balancing power" in Asia.
Washington had been a South Korean ally since the peninsula was divided at the end of World War Two. The United
States led the United Nations force that supported South Korea in its war against the communist North in the 1950s,
and US troops have remained in the South since. Under their alliance, should hostilities resume with North Korea, the
United States would have overall command of both its own and South Korean forces. The two Koreas technically
remain at war, because no peace treaty was signed at the end of the war in 1953. However, during 2004, the United
States began to reduce its force in South Korea - to around 32,000 troops.
The announcement was another sign of strain in the alliance. One significant strain had been their different
approaches in dealing with North Korea, which has declared that it has nuclear weapons. Washington distrusts the
North and wants it to give up its nuclear weapons, or risk further isolation. Seoul, however, concerned about a
possible collapse of its neighbor, had a policy of engaging with Pyongyang, in the hope of encouraging peaceful
reforms in the Stalinist state.
The costs of Korean reunification have been estimated by some sources [including the World Bank] to be as high as
$2–3 trillion, about five or six times South Korea‘s gross domestic product.
South Korea has a population of 48.6 million with an annual income of $19,200 per capita. North Korea has about 23
million people with a per capita income of $1,400. Were the two countries to reunify, the resulting country would have
a combined population of over 70 million, but with an average per capita income of about $13,500. That is, in some
sense the cost of reunification to South Koreans could be a one-third reduction in annual income.
The population of East Germany was only a quarter that of West Germany, while the per capita GDP of East
Germany was believed by the West in 1991 to be somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters that of West
Germany. By some estimates the East German per capita income turned out to be only a quarter that of West
Germany. Thus, the overall burden of Korean reunification might be as much as ten times greater than that of
In late May 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed military commanders to develop a new approach
for conflict with North Korea, Operations Plan 5030. The fact of the existence of OPLAN 5030 as well as details of
this plan were first revealed in the 21 July 2003 edition of US News and World Report, in an article by Bruce B.
Auster and Kevin Whitelaw.
Critics of the plans provisions claim that it blurs the line between war and peace. Under the draft plan, US Forces
Korea would conduct pre-conflict maneuvers to draw down North Korea's limited military resources. This might place
such stress on the North's military that it might provoke a military coup against the country's leader, Kim Jong Il.
According to Auster and Whitelaw, options available under OPLAN 5030 include flying RC-135 surveillance aircraft
closer to North Korean airspace, provoking the DPRK to wear out scrambled interceptor aircraft and burn up jet fuel.
Under another gambit, US commanders might stage a surprise or short-notice military exercises, provoking North
Korean forces to disperse to [or from] bunkers. This could disclose details of DPRK war plans, and deplete reserse of
food, water, and other materiel.
The initial draft of 5030 included a variety of operations not included in traditional operational war plans, such as
disrupting financial networks and strategic disinformation activities. Indeed, the entire OPLAN 5030 story might be
part of such offensive information operations, creating a bewildering wilderness of mirrors for the historically paranoid
Operation Joint Guardian
Kosovo Force (KFOR)
The UN Security Council 10 June 1999 adopted a detailed resolution outlining the civil administration and
peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paving the way for peaceful settlement of the conflict and the safe return
home of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced persons. The resolution was passed
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows the security forces to carry weapons to protect themselves and use
force in carrying out the resolution's directives. The resolution "authorizes member states and relevant international
organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo" as set out in the military agreement between
NATO and the FRY. That peacekeeping operation will enforce the cease-fire, demilitarize the KLA and other Kosovo
Albanian groups, and establish a secure environment for the return of the refugees.
The force has a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in
consultation with non-NATO force contributors. The NATO countries were united that in the absence of the NATO
Joint Guardian force at the core of any international security presence in Kosovo, the refugees would not return and
the other NATO objectives would not be met. A NATO force at the core of an international security presence was
regarded as the magnet to attract the refugees back. In the absence of a NATO force with American participation, it
was the view of the US Government that it was unrealistic to think the Kosovar Albanians would disarm the KLA,
something of great interest to Russia. The US believed that if NATO forces deploy, the rationale for the Kosovar
Liberation Army having an armed force to protect itself against Serbs would disappear. The Rambouillet envisaged
something like 2,500 Serb military and 2,500 police for a year, though with the commencement of Operation Allied
Force NATO required all of those forces going, in views of the probability that the Kosovar Albanians would not come
home to a situation where those same forces remain at their posts. NATO envisaged the standing up of thousands of
Kosovar Albanian police, including possibly people from the KLA, who would be trained by the international
community and could serve police functions.
NATO did not contemplating partition of Kosovo. It had been unofficially suggested that one possible fix was a de
facto partition of Kosovo whereby the Russians would patrol the north, the mineral-rich areas, and NATO would patrol
Before Allied Force began NATO had plans to put in a peacekeeping force of 28,000 people. Of that, 4,000 people
would have been Americans. As of mid-May 1999 NATO reassessed its Op Plan for the Joint Guardian mission to
see to what degree they would need reinforcement beyond the level that was originally foreseen for the KFOR
[Kosovo force] international security presence in Kosovo. NATO had 16,000 troops deployed in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia training for their mission as well as dealing with the enormous refugee inflow. Certain
reinforcements from the UK and from Germany were arriving as of mid-May.
The NATO pre-deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was conducted to be in a position to move
very quickly into Kosovo to set up an initial military command structure and an initial infrastructure to get the basic
functions going not only for other NATO troops to come in quickly but also for the transition authority and for the
humanitarian relief organisations that in the very early stages would need a great deal of military back-up to establish
themselves so once the NATO core element was on the ground in Kosovo.
The military force had several primary tasks. The first one was to make sure that the routes of entry were safe. That
meant demining, taking out booby traps, taking explosive charges away from bridges. This was done by NATO troops,
with some help from Serbs, who had maps of where the mines are. As the troops came in, they first established their
own outposts, their headquarters, and decided where they were going to set up their camps. They then set up their
protective arrangements and began to build their own infrastructure.
Early on there was, through non-government organizations and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
some accounting done of the internally displaced people, their health, how hungry they are, their general status. In
addition, NATO began working with NGOs and other groups to begin to rebuild crucial infrastructure -- first the
bridges and the roads and the transportation facilities needed to get people back. Then shelters where they can stay
when they get back.
NATO worked with people in the refugee camps to stress that a certain amount of security has to be established
before it's safe for them to go back, and there had to be a certain amount of work done on demining to make sure
they could go back safely. So there was some reasonable, but relatively short, delay before people start returning in
order to make sure that the area is secure and stable for them to go back to. This corresponded with many of the
desires being expressed by refugees themselves, that they wanted to make sure that Kosovo is stable and secure
before they returned home.
Operation Joint Guardian will include forces from Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States.
UK: 12,000 troops, including the commander of the international force, who set up a headquarters in Pristina,
and the major part of the British contingent is based in this area.
GERMANY: 8,500 troops deployed in the southwest part of Kosovo with the HQ in Prizren. This was the first
time after WW II that so many German troops are being deployed somewhere.
FRANCE: 7,000 troops were stationed in the western sector with the HQ in Kosovska Mitrovica. The French
troops were reinforced with a contingent of 1,200 troops from the United Arab Emirates.
ITALY: 2,000 troops in the west part of Kosovo with the HQ in Pec.
RUSSIA: Russia announced that it was preparing up to 10,000 troops to be deployed in the northern part of
Kosovo, alongside the French troops, though in fact a much smaller number actually deployed.
USA - The United States agreed to provide a force of approximately 7,000 U.S. personnel as part of the
NATO KFOR to help maintain a capable military force in Kosovo and to ensure the safe return of Kosovar refugees.
The US supports KFOR by providing the headquarters and troops for one of the four NATO sectors. The US also
provides personnel, units and equipment to other components of the KFOR organization. The majority of US forces
are in southeast Kosovo. The sector headquarters is at Gnjilane. Approximately 4,000 US troops were part of the
initial force. This included the 1,900 Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 1,700 Army troops from
Task Force Hawk and 200 soldiers from Germany to set up a headquarters for US forces. Ultimately, there were
approximately 7,000 US troops from Germany as a more permanent force.
By late 1999 KFOR had reached its full strength of 50,000 men and women. Nearly
42,500 troops from 28 countries are deployed in Kosovo and another 7,500 provide
rear support through contingents based in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, in Albania, and in Greece. KFOR contingents are grouped into five
multinational brigades. Although brigades are responsible for a specific area of
operations, they all fall under a single chain of command under the authority of
Commander KFOR. This means that all national contingents pursue the same
objective, which is to maintain a secure environment in Kosovo. Approximately one-
half of KFOR's total available personnel is directly committed to protection tasks,
including protection of the ethnic minorities.
In Kosovo, the US forces are assigned to a sector principally centered around
Gnjilane in the eastern portion of Kosovo. The forces within MNB(E) are referred to
as Task Force Falcon, and were built around the First Infantry Division's Assault
Command Post and 2nd Brigade. The 13th Tactical Group (Russian), 501st
Mechanized Infantry Battalion (Greek), 18th Air Assault Battalion (Polish), the 14th Squadron Helicopter Detachment
and the 37th Support Company (Ukrainian), a composite platoon from Lithuania, and a composite battalion from the
United Arab Emirates complete the Brigade's operational forces. There are 5,500 U.S. service members throughout
MNB East, as well as 830 Russian, 559 Polish, 429 Greek, 240 Ukrainian, 30 Lithuanian, and 115 soldiers from the
United Arab Emirates.
Keeping the peace in Multinational Brigade East (MNB(E)) is a complex endeavor that encompasses a wide variety of
missions, often as diverse as the region's geographic and demographic features. The brigade's soldiers patrol
through both cities and hamlets scattered across approximately 2000 square kilometers. The geography within
MNB(E) is quite dramatic, encompassing both mountains and open plain. The variations in ethnicity can be equally
dramatic. While a few towns are comprised exclusively of one ethnic group, some communities can include up to five
different groups. One of the best examples of this would be Gnjilane, a town of nearly 70,000 people that is
represented by Albanians, Serbs, Romas, and Turks. This wide variation in both the people and the land provides
new challenges for soldiers every day.
As of mid-2000 the US contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 7,500 US military personnel. This number
once again will decrease to approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel when ongoing troop rotations are completed.
In addition, other US military personnel are deployed to other countries in the region to serve in administrative and
logistics support roles for the U.S. forces in KFOR. Specifically, approximately 1,000 US military personnel are
operating in support of KFOR in Macedonia, Greece, and Albania.
As of 11 June 1999:
Country Current Total Future Total
United Kingdom 7,600 13,000
Germany 4,200 8,500
United States ~1,800 7,000
France 3,100 7,000
Others 600 11,000
Task Force Falcon was formed Feb. 5, 1999, when the 1st Infantry Division(ID) was notified of a possible deployment
to conduct peace support operations in Kosovo. The task force, after conducting a command post exercise and a
mission rehearsal exercise during February and March, was declared mission-ready and deployed a command and
control element forward to Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia. Following the signing of the Military Technical
Agreement(MTA) on June 9, 1999, Task Force Falcon deployed forces from Central Region in the largest combined
air-rail-sea-road movement since Operation Desert Storm. Task Force Falcon advance elements entered Kosovo on
June 12, 1999, as part of Operation Joint Guardian, a NATO-led peacekeeping force. The Task Force Falcon
headquarters was operational at the future Camp Bondsteel on June 16, 1999.
Forces from the U.S. and Greece composed the Initial Entry Force(IEF), with the headquarters built around the
assault command post from the 1st ID and the Big Red One's Schweinfurt-based 2nd ("Dagger") Brigade Combat
Team(2nd BCT). Operating under the command and control of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil and the Operational
Control of KFOR, the IEF consisted of forces from the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment from Fort
Bragg, N.C; the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Camp Lejune, N.C.; the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment
from Schweinfurt Germany, Echo Troop, 4th Cavalry Regiment, also from Schweinfurt, Germany; and the 501st
Mechanized Infantry Battalion from Greece. Task Force 12, built around the 12thAviation Group from Wiesbaden,
Germany, and the 16th Corps Support Group from Hanau, Germany supported operations from Camp Able Sentry.
As the VJ/MUP forces redeployed out of Kosovo in accordance with the MTA, Task Force Falcon soldiers, airmen
and marines monitored their withdrawal and ensured compliance with the agreement. Withdrawal was complete on
June 20, and the focus of operations shifted to enforce the undertaking of demilitarization and transformation of the
UCK, which was signed on June, 21. Additional forces arrived from Central Region, principal elements of the BRO's
2nd BCT from Schweinfurt, Germany, including the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, the 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, the
9th Engineer Battalion, and the 299th Forward Support Battalion. Other major units were the 94th Engineer Battalion
from Vilseck, Germany and the 18th Air Assault Battalion from Poland. On July 10, the 1st Bn, 26th Inf. Regt.
conducted a relief in place to allow the 26th MEU to re-deploy. Throughout the next week, both the 1st Bn., 77th
Armor and the 18th Air Assault Battalion relieved the 2nd Bn., 505th Parachute Inf. Regt. of portions of its sector. The
13th Russian Tactical Group relieved the 1 Bn., 26th Inf. Regt. of portions of its sector on July 28 and the 2nd Bn., 1st
Avn. from Katterbach, Germany, relieved Task Force 12 on Aug. 2.
In September 1999, 2nd Bn. 505th Parachute Inf. Regt., re-deployed to the U.S. and was replaced by a sister
battalion, the 3rd Bn. 504th Parachute Inf. Regt. Recognizing a need in October to increase the available combat
power in the vicinity of Gnjilane, the leadership of Task Force Falcon reorganized the battalion task force sectors in
the MNB(E) area of responsibility. The 501st Mechanized Greek Battalion assumed a larger portion of the Urosevac
Opstina, which enabled 3rd Bn. 504th Parachute Inf. Regt. to enlarge their sector to include the Vitina Opstina. Task
Force 1st Bn.-77th Armor then conducted a relief in place with Task Force 1st Bn. 26th Infantry and assumed
responsibility for the Opstina of Novo Brdo and the northern half of the Gnjilane Opstina. This enabled Task Force 1st
Bn. 26th Inf. to concentrate their force in the southern half of the Opstina.
Following months of deliberate planning and detailed rehearsals, KFOR 1B built around the 3rd BCT from the 1st Inf.
Div., conducted relief in place operations and assumed responsibility for the MNB(E) area of responsibility on
December 12. The transition saw Task Force 1 Bn., 63rd, Armor replace Task Force 1st Bn., 77th, Armor and Task
Force 2nd Bn., 2nd Infantry fell in on what was Task Force 1st Bn., 26th Infantry's sector in southern Gnjilane. During
this same period, Task Force 1st Bn., 1st Aviation relieved Task Force 2nd Bn., 1st Aviation, 1st Bn. 6th , Field
Artillery Battalion replaced 1 Bn. 7th FA, and the 201st FSB replaced the 299th FSB. Also on Dec. 12, as part of the
transfer of authority ceremony, Brig. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez assumed command of MNB(E) from Brig. Gen. Craig
Peterson. Today, Task Force Falcon continues to conduct Peace Operations in Kosovo in support of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1244 under the Operational Control of the NATO-led KFOR, to ensure a safe and secure
environment is maintained to enable the establishment of a stable society. The Falcon, a well-trained and equipped
multinational force of allies, remains ever vigilant and ready to act with all means available to successfully carry out
its peacekeeping mission.
In July 2000, command of MNB(E) was transferred to Brig. Gen. Dennis Hardy who finished his rotation on Dec. 15,
2000. Task Force Falcon is currently the responsibility of the 1st Armored Division under the command of Brig. Gen.
Task Force Falcon is in Kosovo to enforce all aspects of the Military Technical Agreement, with a primary function of
providing a safe and secure environment to the residents.
No timeline for Operation Joint Guardian has been established. The mission will be assessed periodically and the
force commitment will be adjusted as needed.
The U.S. is committed to supporting peace in Kosovo by implementing the Military Technical Agreement and
participating in the NATO-led military force. NATO's aim is to achieve a secure environment to ensure peace and
stability in Kosovo without the presence of a NATO-led military force.
On July 28, 2003 elements of the 1st Infantry Division handed over KFOR duties to the 28th Infantry Division.
Multi-National Brigade (East) [MNB (East)] is part of the NATO led KFOR and is comprised of soldiers from the
United States, Greece, Armenia, Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania. The mission of KFOR and MNB (East) is to provide
a safe and secure environment in the region.
In a ceremony held 26 February 2004, Brig. Gen. Jerry Beck and the 28th Infantry Division officially handed over
authority of Multi-national Brigade (East) to Brig. Gen. Rick Erlandson and the 34th Infantry Division. After serving in
a six-month rotation that began in July, Beck and the 28th ID left Kosovo for the state of Pennsylvania where it is
The UN-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping force for Kosovo (KFOR) continued to carry out its mandate to maintain
a safe and secure environment and defend against external threats. UNMIK Civilian Police continued to transfer basic
police authority and functions to the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),
comprised largely of demilitarized former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members, continued to develop its capacity
as a civilian civil emergency response agency. UNMIK international civilian authorities and KFOR leadership
generally maintained effective control over security forces; however, there were reports that elements of the security
forces acted independently of their respective authority.
The reported phenomenon of "strategic sales" of property persisted in 2004. There was evidence that Kosovo
Albanians in several ethnically mixed areas used violence, intimidation, and offers to purchase property at inflated
prices in order to break up and erode Kosovo Serb neighborhoods. Some cases of violence against Serbs may have
been attempts to force persons to sell their property. An UNMIK regulation prevents the wholesale buy out of Kosovo
Serb communities and seeks to prevent the intimidation of minority property owners in certain geographic areas;
however, it was rarely enforced.
The 16 March 2004 drowning of three Kosovo Albanian children from Cabra village in Zubin Potok Municipality
ignited the March riots; the surviving child claimed Kosovo Serbs had chased them into the Ibar River with a dog. The
media, prior to police and judicial investigations, reported this story. In addition, the drive-by shooting on March 15 of
a 19 year old Kosovo Serb male in the Serb village of Caglavica in the Pristina region caused local Serbs to block the
main Pristina Skopje highway.
On 16 March 2004, approximately 18,000 Albanians attended prescheduled demonstrations against the arrests of ex
KLA members by UNMIK Police. On March 17, demonstrations by Albanians started in Mitrovica to protest the
drownings and in Pristina against the Serb roadblocks in Caglavica and Gracanica. Unrest soon spread to other parts
of Kosovo and became increasingly violent.
Violence errupted on 17 March 2004 in an attack on an observation post at the Serbian Church of Saint Uros in
Ferizaj/Urosevac by a crowd of approximately 500 rioters. One US Soldier and 17 Greek soldiers received minor
injuries from items the crowd was throwing. The crowd began attacking the observation post with rocks and bricks.
Then the crowd began attacking the Greek soldiers with grenades and improvised incendiary devices. The crowd
began setting fire to the first of three unoccupied military vehicles while the soldiers waited for the Greek Army‘s
Quick Reaction Force that had been called to assist the soldiers. Then the rioters attempted to enter the church and
stopped when they were confronted by the soldiers inside, but continued to attack the church with grenades and
incendiary devices. The soldiers fired their weapons in the air in an attempt to disperse the crowd, which had grown
to approximately 1,000 to 3,000 people, and was still underway when the QRF arrived in armored vehicles to
evacuate the soldiers at approximately 10 p.m. The rioters began throwing incendiary devices at the QRF vehicles
and were not dispelled until U.S. helicopters began dropping tear gas on the crowd, dispersing them enough for the
evacuation to take place. During the evacuation, rioters fired at the soldiers and their vehicles. Once the evacuation
was complete U.S. military police and members of the Kosovo Police Service arrived to secure the church site. The
crowd, reduced to about 150 people, did not continue the attack. By the end of the night an estimated 200 incendiary
devices, 15 grenades, and numerous rocks were thrown at the soldiers and the church during the attack, resulting in
the destruction of three military vehicles and damage to two others.
It appeared that there was a pattern to destroy Serb property and to expel the Serb population from enclaves in
southern Kosovo. As a result of the riots, 20 persons were killed, including 8 Kosovo Serbs and 12 Kosovo Albanians,
more than 900 were injured, more than 900 Serb, Romani, and Ashkali houses and 30 orthodox churches or
monasteries were burned or severely damaged, and over 4,000 Serbs, Ashkalis, and Roma were made homeless.
The March 2004 riots involved an estimated 50,000 to 75,000 demonstrators over 2 days in every major city in
Kosovo. Numerous serious attacks on Serbian Orthodox churches and cemeteries occurred during the March riots,
resulting in extensive property damage, including the destruction or damage of 30 Orthodox religious sites and over
900 houses and businesses of ethnic minorities. The March riots resulted in the 20 deaths including of 8 ethnic Serbs
and 12 ethnic Albanians.
The March riots, which targeted Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, were the most serious outburst of violence and destruction
since the 1999 conflict. During the March riots, the Ashkali neighborhood in Vushtrri/Vucitrn was burned and looted,
and its inhabitants took shelter at a KFOR base. Many refused to return by year's end. Many of those displaced in
March, including Ashkali residents and Serbs, were displaced and had their homes burned for the second time.
Increased violence, particularly during the March riots, may have been politically motivated and to some extent
coordinated by ethnic Albanian extremists. Some Kosovo government leaders were slow to condemn the violence,
exacerbating the problem and helping to legitimize the severe social abuse of minorities.
KFOR and UNMIK police were responsible for killing several protesters during riots in March 2004 after the protestors
failed to heed prior warnings and threatened the international security officials or those they were protecting.
During the March riots, measures taken by KFOR and UNMIK police to protect themselves and others as well as to
control the crowds resulted in several deaths of Albanian protesters and some allegations of police abuse. For
example, an UNMIK police officer shot and killed a protester in Peja/Pec municipality while defending Serbian
residents from Kosovar Albanian rioters. No legal charges were brought against KFOR soldiers or UNMIK police
related to their actions during the March riots.
Kosovo Serbs, and to a lesser extent other minority communities, had considerable difficulty moving about safely
without an international security escort. Following the March riots, KFOR and UNMIK police restricted movement in
most of the affected areas and selectively imposed temporary curfews. Kosovo Serbs were frequently subjected to
stonings and other low-level violence by Kosovo Albanians.
After public order was restored, police and KFOR commenced large-scale operations to apprehend those responsible
for the riots. By June, over 270 persons had been arrested on a wide range of charges related to the riots, including
murder, attempted murder, arson, and looting.
NATO‘s Kosovo Force continues to provide critical security to this region in support of the United Nations‘ Interim
Administration in Kosovo. As of early 2005 Task Force Falcon had approximately 1900 soldiers from both the active
and reserve components deployed as part of Multi-National Brigade - East to enforce the ―Military Technical
Agreement‖ and to conduct operations to further deter hostilities and promote a stable environment. NATO‘s troop
strength was reduced to 17,730 in 2004 with US forces contributing nearly 12 percent (2,010) of the personnel.
Commanders don't expect NATO troops to leave the province by the original departure date of 2006.
Life in the Multi-National Brigade (East) sector of Kosovo reflects how much progress has been made in maintaining
a safe and secure environment. While the mission always comes first, there are opportunities for off-duty soldiers to
study, work out or just relax on the base camps. The only time soldiers are outside of the base camps, though, is
when they are on missions. The variety of missions that KFOR performs is amazing. From patrolling city streets to
assessing the needs of remote villages and everything in between, KFOR soldiers can be found throughout the
Peacekeeping is a 24x7 mission, but there are opportunities for time off. The current pass policy states that after 30
days in theater soldiers are eligible, with their commander‘s permission, for a 4-day pass to Sofia, Bulgaria. While in
Sofia, soldiers are allowed to consume alcohol (in moderation) and engage in sight-seeing.
Kosovo is administered by the U.N. Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to UN Security
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244. UNMIK promulgates regulations to address the civil and legal responsibilities of
governmental entities and private individuals, and ratifies laws passed by the Kosovo Assembly. UNMIK promulgated
the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self Government in Kosovo (the Constitutional Framework), which
defined the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG). Kosovo has a multiparty political system with four
dominant ethnic Albanian parties and several minority parties and coalitions. In October 2004, Kosovo Assembly
elections were held that were determined to be generally free and fair.
In 2005 the United States presented three principles on which a solution for Kosovo would be based - no divisions, no
unifications with neighboring countries, and no return to the status quo. Talks on Kosovo's final status will be
launched in September 2005 and will last less than a year. Kosovo will become independent in July 2006, according
to Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi.
Operation Shining Hope
Operation Sustain Hope / Allied Harbor
Operation Provide Refuge
Operation Open Arms
The preparation for the deployment of a NATO
force to Albania to conduct a humanitarian mission
began on 7 April, when a NATO team led by Mag.
Gen. Pasqualino Verdecchia, ITA deployed from
Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe
(AFSOUTH) to co-ordinate NATO plans with
Albanian and international authorities. A team of
the AMF(L) (Allied Command Europe Mobile
Force/Land) led by the AMF(L) commander, Lt.Gen. John Reith, arrived in Tirana on
10 April to make final preparations for the deployment of this NATO Immediate
Reaction (Land) headquarters. Lt. Gen. Reith conducted meetings with senior
Albanian and international authorities while his staff conducted reconnaissance to
make final recommendations about the location of headquarters and deployment of the force. The AMF(L) is a NATO
Headquarters capable of readily deploying a land force at short notice. Ten nations contribute to its staff while all
NATO nations contribute forces. For Operation Allied Harbour the composition of the force was decided at a Force
generation conference at SHAPE.
Some elements of the force of Allied Harbour were already in place at the time of the reconnaissance as part of
national contingents deployed by NATO nations (for example 450 from France, 200 from Germany, 230 from Greece,
830 from the United States, 1,100 from Italy, while Belgium, Canadian and Dutch contingents were already en route.
On April 13, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) approved plans for Operation Allied Harbour, a 10,000-
troop NATO deployment to support humanitarian relief efforts for refugees resulting from the Serb expulsion of ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo. The AMF(L) Headquarters began deployment on 14 April 1999. On 15 April NATO
announced that rules of engagement for this Operation were approved by the North Atlantic Council and that,
following the reconnaissance mission by AFSOUTH in Albania, the number of forces to be assigned to Allied Harbour
were planned to be about 7,300. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe ordered the execution of Operation Allied
Harbour on 16 April 1999. In turn, the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe transferred to the
Commander of AMF(L), Lt. Gen. John Reith, authority over all NATO-led forces operating in Albania as part of this
operation. In this respect, Lt. Gen. Reith is the Commander, Albanian Force (AFOR). The AFOR Headquarters is
located at Plepa, near Durres (Albania). The mission of the operation is to provide humanitarian assistance in support
of, and in close coordination with, the UNHCR and Albanian civil and military authorities, to alleviate the suffering of
those who were forced to leave their homes in Kosovo and flee to Albania. As of 10 May 1999 forces were provided
by Albania, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary,
Luxemburg, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.
On 15 April NATO announced that rules of engagement for this Operation were approved by the North Atlantic
Council and that, following the reconnaissance mission by AFSOUTH in Albania, the number of forces to be
assigned to Allied Harbour were planned to be about 7,300.
The force (approximately 8,000) has been divided into task groups and a leading nation was appointed for each of
Task Force N (Italy)
Task Force S: (France)
Task Force R: (Netherlands/Belgium)
Task Force W: (Spain)
Task Force Shining Hope (US)
Projects considered by the Force include:
Costruction of Camps, providing interim shelter.
Engineer support to repair selected roads, airfield, or other appropriate infrastruture.
Provide transportation for refugee movement by both ground vehicles and in special cases by air (to include
emergency medical evacuation).
Assist in transportation and distribution of food, water and supplies.
Electronic communication support as required.
In particular, ongoing projects include:
Fier: US engineers opened on 12 May a camp. Refugee flow is 400 per day the first week, 800
per day the second week. Total capacity will be up to 20.000 (by June).
Elbasan: French troops work in aid of British camp.
Korce: French troops are preparing the site for a camp for up to 9,000.
Poiske: Greek engineers are completing construction of a camp.
Vlore: Ducth units and Red Cross finished a camp for 4,500.
Rrashbull: Italian engineers are constructing two camps for 4,000 and 400 refugees.
North of Durres: Spanish engineers will open a camp at Hamallaj.
Road, infrastructure repairs:
Kukes: Italian engineers repairing road collapses. Dutch trucks transport WFP aid to Kukes and
help UNHCR in relocating refugees.
Tirana: US engineersto repair access road to Rinas airport.
Durres: Dutch troops to construct harbour logisitc base.
The United States contribution to Allied Harbour is Joint Task Force (JTF) Shining Hope. The mission of JTF Shining
Hope is to conduct foreign humanitarian assistance operations in support of US government agencies and non-
governmental and international organizations engaged in providing humanitarian relief to Kosovar refugees in Albania
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). JTF Shining Hope is commanded by Major General
William S. Hinton Jr., United States Air Force.
The United States continues to work closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other relief organizations to ensure a comprehensive and adequate response to the humanitarian crisis caused by the
ethnic cleansing and atrocities now being conducted by Serb forces.
US and other NATO military forces provide support for humanitarian operations in a variety of ways, to include air and
surface transportation of relief supplies and equipment, camp preparation, shelter construction, security, and other
tasks uniquely suited to military forces. To date, the Department of Defense has pledged over $25 million in
humanitarian assistance, which, in addition to the above, also includes food (humanitarian daily rations), shelter
(tents), bedding, medical supplies, and vehicles.
Operation Sustain Hope is the US humanitarian effort to bring in food, water, medicine and relief supplies for the
refugees fleeing from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia into Albania and Macedonia. The overall objective of
Operation Sustain Hope is to maintain stability in the region and prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from the
ongoing offensive against the people of Kosovo. The specific military mission of the forces deployed is to support
disaster relief operations to aid in the care and protection of Kosovar refugees and to provide for their own security.
The number of U.S. personnel who will be deployed for these purposes was initially uncertain, since planning for the
deployment is ongoing, but at a minimum a deployment of 1,000 personnel was anticipated. Headquarters elements,
air crews, airlift control elements, selected transport and rotary wing aircraft, security personnel, civil affairs and
psychological operations personnel, medical and engineer forces, and logistics support forces may become involved
in the operation. These forces will operate under U.S. and NATO operational control.
Before the Serbian offensive began, the United States pre-positioned 36,000 metric tons of food in the region --
enough to feed half a million people for three months. The US worked with the United nations to ready life-saving
supplies at Kosovo's borders with Albania and Macedonia. President Clinton authorized an additional $50 million in
emergency aid to augment U.S. contributions to the U.N. High Commission on Refugees and other relief
organizations. It will also ensure the military can help them get aid to the people in need. Throughout the week,
civilian contract 747 aircraft are slated to carry more rations to Europe where they will be transferred to U.S. military
aircraft for transport to the Balkans. In Europe, U.S. European Command officials are shipping 80 U.S. military trucks
and 30 State Department trucks to Albania to help move supplies from ports and airports to the people who need
them. The Defense Department is airlifting 500,000 humanitarian daily rations to the Balkans, and more are ready to
go if needed. The flights were bound for Italy, where the supplies would be transported to Albania. The plan is to
move the rations into Tirana, Albania. The US will be flying ten missions daily by C-130 aircraft to Italy -- from Italy to
Tirana, and taking supplies from there to the border by helicopter.
"Task Force Open Arms" is a $100-million effort to airlift as many as 20,000 Kosovo refugees to safety in the United
States until they can return to their homes. The refugees arrive at the Ft. Dix army base in New Jersey, where they
stay for about three weeks to complete legal processing before being placed with host families around the country. At
Ft. Dix, American Red Cross relief workers are providing care and comfort for the refugees by registering families as
they arrive and providing translation services, mental health support, beverages, snacks, childcare and recreational
Sources and Methods
Operation Allied Harbour / JTF Shining Hope @ EUCOM
Operation Allied Harbour @ AFSOUTH
Operation Provide Refuge @ DefenseLink
Operation Provide Refuge
Statement by the President on Kosovo April 5, 1999
TEXT: CLINTON LETTER TO CONGRESS ON REFUGEE RELIEF FOR THE BALKANS 03 April 1999 --
President Clinton has informed Congress that he plans to send at least 1,000 U.S. military support personnel to
Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to support efforts to provide disaster relief to the thousands
of refugees who have poured into those countries from Kosovo.
Ramstein supports humanitarian efforts for Kosovar refugees 5 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- Six 86th Airlift Wing C-
130s from Ramstein Air Base, Germany carried humanitarian aid and personnel in the early hours of Easter Sunday
to Tirana, Albania, and Skopje, Macedonia, to support further relief operations for Kosavar Albanian refugees.
Air Force flies relief supplies to Macedonia, Albania 5 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- Air Force cargo planes began
airlifting supplies and people early Easter Sunday in an effort to bring relief to the growing number of displaced
Kosovar Albanians in Macedonia and Albania.
Airlift under way for 'Shining Hope' 5 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- Thousands of tons of food and tents made their
way to Kosovar refugees as part of Joint Task Force Shining Hope. Air Force military and contract aircraft carried
about half a million humanitarian daily rations and 700 large tents to people in Macedonia and Albania, who have fled
from Serb attacks in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update 05 April 1999 - The total number of Kosovars who have left the province
since March 24 is nearly 400,000, including 226,000 in Albania, 120,000 in Macedonia, 35,700 in Montenegro, 7,900
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 6,000 in Turkey.
'Sustain Hope' spearheads refugee relief 6 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- With thousands of refugees crowding into
enclaves on embattled Kosovo's borders, NATO has responded with Joint Task Force Sustain Hope. Many Air
Mobility Command missions have delivered, or will soon deliver, large quantities of food and shelter for distribution to
'Sustain Hope' spearheads refugee relief 6 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- With thousands of refugees crowding into
enclaves on embattled Kosovo's borders, NATO has responded with Joint Task Force Sustain Hope.
Travis supports NATO operations April 14, 1999 (AMCNS) -- In Shining Hope, Kosovar refugees will be
airlifted from Europe to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sustain Hope involves the delivery of relief supplies to those
refugees while they are still in Europe.
JTF Shining Hope lifeline for Kosovar refugees Released: 20 Apr 1999 U.S. Air Forces in Europe News
Service Joint Task Force Shining Hope continues to be a lifeline for hundreds of thousands of Kosovars seeking
refuge in Albania and Macedonia.
At Fort Dix, a New Ellis Island Embraces Kosovo's Refugees New York Times 09 May 1999 -- In less than a
week, Fort Dix has been transformed from an Army base into a kind of sprawling Ellis Island, gearing up to be the
gateway to America for almost 20,000 Albanian refugees. The military has named the relief operation Open Arms.
Operation Allied Force
Operation Noble Anvil
The Kosovo crisis began in early 1998 when large-scale fighting broke out, resulting
in the displacement of some 300,000 people. A ceasefire was agreed in October
1998 which enabled refugees to find shelter, averting an impending humanitarian
crisis over the winter. A Verification Mission was deployed under the auspices of the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, violence
continued and the situation worsened significantly in January 1999. A peace
conference, held in Paris, broke up on 19 March with the refusal of the Yugoslav
delegation to accept a peaceful settlement.
Operation Allied Force was a NATO contingency response aiming at ensuring full compliance with UN Security
Council Resolution 1199 (Sept. 23rd 1998). Operation Noble Anvil was the American component of this NATO action
to promote regional stability, cooperation and security, in support of the international community. At 1900 hours GMT
on 24 March 1999, NATO forces began air operations over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These air strikes
against Serbian military targets in the Former Yugoslavia sought to:
1. Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo;
2. Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police and para-military forces;
3. Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
4. Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered
access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; and
5. Provide credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the
establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the
Charter of the United Nations.
NATO was prepared to suspend its air strikes once Belgrade unequivocally accepted the above mentioned conditions
and demonstrably began to withdraw its forces from Kosovo according to a precise and rapid timetable. This would
follow the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution requiring the withdrawal of Serb forces and the
demilitarisation of Kosovo and encompassing the deployment of an international military force to safeguard the swift
return of all refugees and displaced persons as well as the establishment of an international provisional
administration of Kosovo.
The multinational force was tasked by NATO to bring a swift end to hostilities committed by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia against ethnic Albanians in the southern province of Kosovo. The military objective of Operation Allied
Force was to degrade and damage the military and security structure that Yugoslav President President Milosevic
has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) delegated authority for the implementation of Operation Allied Force to the Commander in Chief of Allied
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), whose headquarters is in Naples, Italy. CINCSOUTH delegated control of
the operation to the Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), also based in Naples.
Operational conduct of day-to-day missions was delegated to the Commander 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, at
The Yugoslavs apparently thought that they could wipe out the Kosovar Liberation
Army in five to seven days as part of Operation Horseshoe. They thought thought
once they did that, they could negotiate an arrangement for peace. The Serbian
leadership apparently also assumed that NATO would never launch airstrikesm, and that once
the airstrikes were launched they would be pinpricks lasting a few days. And they assumed that
NATO would not remain unified long enough to carry out significant air attacks, which would
quickly end due to political divisions within NATO.
Operation plan OPLAN 10601 "Allied Force" covered altogether five phases,
which went from the transfer over a possible application outside of and within the
air space of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia up to redeployment. The
Application instruction (ACTORD) was effective from 13 October 1998, with
simultaneous approval and preparatory exercises. The decision by NATO of 27
October 1998 was to maintain the ACTORD with execution dependent on further
a NATO council decision. Constrained by the directive that collateral damage
was to be avoided as far as possible, the concept of operations envisoned
targeting based on a phasewise gradual, situation-adjusted application of NATO
air forces, depending upon political and military developments. Operation Allied
Force implemented, when ordered by the North Atlantic Council, phased
operations which differ according to the attack targets and their geographical
Phase Zero - During Phase 0, released on 20 January 1999 as political
signal, air forces of NATO were shifted for the accommodation of practice flight
operation to their operational airfields.
Phase One -- Conduct limited air operations, such as air strikes against
designated militarily significant targets. Phase 1 began on 24 March 1999 with attacks on the integrated air-defense
system (e.g. weapon systems, radar facilities, control devices, airfield/aircraft) in the entire Federal Republic of
Phase Two -- Since the authorization of this phase on 27 March 1999 attacks extended to the security
forces infrastructure military in Kosovo and reinforcement forces (e.g. headquarters, telecommunication installations,
material and ammunition depot, systems for production and storage of fuel, barracks). The authorization of this phase
took place with the unanimous resolution of the NATO allies.
Phase Three - The focus of this phase, which was not authorized, was the expansion of the air operations
against a broad range of particularly important targets of military importance north of the 44th parallel in the entire
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [24 Apr. 1999 NATO Press Conference] By a month into the air campaign it became
apparent to NATO that a constrained, phased approach was not effective. At the insistence of US leaders, NATO
widened the air campaign to produce the strategic effects in Serbia proper. At the April NATO Summit SACEUR was
given the flexibility to strike at additional targets, within the existing authority of phase 1 and phase 2 of the operation
that were necessary to keep the pressure up, both on the tactical side in Kosovo and on the strategic side elsewhere
Phase Four -- [support of stabilization operations?]
Phase Five -- [redeployment operations?]
The Phase One "Limited Air Response" provided a fast available, temporally limited and supported with small
strength feasible air operations against military targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - exclusive to the use of
precision standoff weapons. Additional operations outside of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were provided for
observation and for the air defense of the air space of NATO nations and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as to the
protection of SFOR. The selection of target categories with the target of the minimization of collateral damage with at
the same time high political and military significance. Operation execution was required within 48 hours after decision
of the NATO advice possible. This Operations Concept was approved on 21 August 1998, with application instruction
ACTORD from 13 October 1998; the decision NATO advice of 27 Octover 1998 for maintenance ACTORD with
execution dependent on further NATO council decision.
The early goal of Phase One of the campaign was to attempt to force Yugoslavia to the bargaining table. Some
countries in NATO argued that it might be possible to do that with a few days or a week of attacks, without
demolishing the whole country. Some of the NATO partners were initially prepared to wage only a phased air
operation to show NATO's resolve in the hope of achieving an early settlement. The campaign did not begin the way
that America normally would apply air power -- massively, striking at strategic centers of gravity that support Milosevic
and his oppressive regime. The phased concept of operations of Operation Allied Force did not apply principles of
military operations such as surprise and the use of overwhelming force, and this cost time, effort and potentially
additional casualties, the net result being that the campaign was undoubtedly prolonged. NATO did not succeed in
this initial attempt to coerce Milosevic through airstrikes to accept its demands, nor did it succeed in preventing the
FRY pursuing a campaign of ethnic separation.
Initial air operations started at an altitude that was estimated to be appropriate for the air defense threat that was
expected, which allowed attacks against fixed targets with guided munitions in Kosovo and around Belgrade. Flying
at or above 15,000 feet, attack aircraft were flying only at night and were instructed not to make multiple passes or
other maneuvers that would entail unnecessary risks. NATO gained air superiority over Kosovo and the rest of
Yugoslavia by degrading Milosevic's integrated air defence system. After allied planes mistakenly bombed two
refugee convoys on the same day near the Kosovo town of Djakovica, new tactics were implemented with pilots flying
lower to identify targets better. The net result was increased risk to allied pilots. Three NATO fighter-bombers were hit
by ground fire in early May, and an American F-16 crashed with engine failure over Serbia as a result of Yugoslav
As Yugoslavia demonstrated that it was completely unmoved and intransigent, the pressure and the tempo of the
attacks grew, with the decision at the NATO Summit here on 23 April 1999 to expand the campaign. As the campaign
continued, the target list expanded into so-called sustainment targets -- petroleum, lines of communication, electrical
grids, and command and control targets.
Air operations did not attack some strategic targets because of anxiety among NATO's 19 governments that further
accidental civilian casualties could erode public support for the operation. On 07 May 1999 NATO bombed the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The planned target was the Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement in
Belgrade but the wrong building was attacked. Following NATO's mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy, the
alliance stopped hitting targets in the city for nearly two weeks while NATO authorities sought to ensure that another
such mistake would not occur.
By mid-May NATO pilots had grown increasingly familiar with Kosovo's terrain and with the tactics of the Serbian
Armed Forces on the ground. Pilots increasingly knew where Serbian forces were concentrated, which explained the
change in the tactics of Serbian forces. They were operating in smaller and smaller units to make them harder to
detect from the air. The downside for the Serbian forces is that this made them increasingly vulnerable to KLA
ambushes, and it also made Serb forces less mobile to the benefit of those Kosovars still living within Kosovo.
Responsive or "Flex" targets were targets in the fielded forces, and normally not targets that would be a static target
like a bridge or a petroleum area or a building. Such targets move around, and would be located by various means,
such as a pilot report or JSTARS. NATO had aircraft in the area that can respond rapidly to attack such "Flex" targets.
Quick response options for targets that may pop up via different means included aircraft holding on a tanker outside
the area waiting for a target to occur, aircraft on the ground waiting on alert, or aircraft diverted from another
engagement zone to a target of opportunity.
During the first two months of air operations the majority of days the weather was unfavorable or marginal. Persistent
low cloud cover over Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia forced the cancellation of many planned strikes. NATO had
the capability to operate through solid cloud cover, however for a variety of reasons there were restrictions on
operations in bad weather. The single biggest reason was the commitment to ensuring strikes against only military
and military-related targets. Flying below the clouds is more dangerous from a technical standpoint, putting NATO air
crews down into the range of tactical surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery and small arms fire. It also highlights
aircraft against the clouds, making them easier to see and target from the ground. Kosovo is a very mountainous area,
and with the peaks of mountains frequently enveloped by the clouds, air crews were careful about avoiding terrain.
The weather also provided some cover for the Serbian military to continue their attacks, and they took advantage of
these times to conduct ground and air operations.
At the beginning of the operation, the weather was so poor that NATO could operate against fielded forces only about
15% of the time. Since those early days NATO adapted its tactics to take maximum advantage of its comprehensive
array of intelligence gathering capabilities. By early May NATO was able to collect and distribute information
efficiently so that air crews were able to react quickly to targets of opportunity. NATO also adjusted flying patterns to
ensure a continuous presence of combat air power that is able to operate in the directed attacks against Serbian
ground forces. NATO had planes circling, awaiting the call to strike from other aircraft flying forward air control spotter
The fundamental factor in the conclusion of ALLIED FORCE was NATO's unity and resolve. NATO acted in a way
that was tough, progressively tougher throughout the campaign. It failed to be deflected from its goals. This lesson
was very clear to Milosevic, who had hoped he could outwait NATO. Secondly, both the precision and the persistence
of the air campaign were fundamental factors in convincing Milosevic that it was time to end the fight. The air
campaign, which started slowly but gathered momentum as it went on, became systematically damaging to his entire
military infrastructure, not just the forces in the field in Kosovo, but throughout the entire country. The pounding his
forces took during the last week had to have a huge impact on his determination to continue the fight. It had a big
impact on the morale of the forces. Desertions were increasing, and there were increasing reports of lack of food,
lack of fuel, lack of equipment, lack of will, lack of morale, and increasing dismay with the leadership not only of the
forces but of the country, and an increasing feeling that they just saw no way out. And they realized, because of
NATO's persistence, the situation was just going to get steadily worse.
On 3 June, President Slobodan Milosevic finally accepted peace terms presented by EU envoy President Martti
Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. With the authorisation of the United Nations on 10 June 1999,
NATO forces deployed into Kosovo.
Chronology of Events
March 24 -- NATO launches air campaign, with the goal of crippling the Serbian war machine in Kosovo and
enforcing compliance with the international peace plan drawn up at Rambouillet, France.
March 26 -- The first of a massive tide of refugees arrive in Albania.
March 27 -- A US F-117 Nighthawk Stealth fighter is lost near Belgrade but the pilot is recovered.
March 31 -- Three US soldiers are snatched by Serb forces after an incident on the Macedonian border.
April 1 -- Moderate Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova is shown on Serb television talking with Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic.
April 13 -- Yugoslav forces mount a cross-border attack on a village in northern Albania.
April 14 -- Yugoslavia claims that rockets fired by allied jets killed 75 people in two separate refugee
columns. NATO later admits accidentally hitting a civilian vehicle.
April 20 -- Russian President Boris Yeltsin says Moscow "cannot break with leading world powers" over
April 21 -- Two NATO missiles smash into the headquarters of Yugoslavia's ruling Socialist Party.
April 23 -- NATO bombs the headquarters of Serbian state television. NATO leaders in Washington rebuff
as inadequate an offer by Milosevic to accept an "international presence" in Kosovo.
April 28 -- Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic is dismissed after he accuses the country's rulers
of "lying to the people."
May 1 -- Forty-seven bus passengers are killed when NATO bombs a bridge in Kosovo.
May 2 -- Three captured US soldiers are released into the custody of US civil rights leader Jesse Jackson.
May 5 -- NATO suffers its first losses when the two-man crew of a US Apache attack helicopter die in a
crash in Albania. Rugova is released by the Yugoslav authorities and flies to Rome.
May 6 -- Foreign ministers from the Group of Eight (G8) agree on a framework for a peace plan which calls
for the return of all refugees and the deployment of an international "security" force in Kosovo.
May 8 -- The Chinese embassy in Belgrade is hit by NATO missiles which kill three people. NATO describes
the bombing as a "tragic mistake" caused by "faulty information."
May 10 -- Yugoslavia begins proceedings before the UN International Court of Justice in the Hague,
accusing NATO of genocide. Belgrade says it has begun pulling troops out of Kosovo.
May 13 -- NATO dismisses as insignificant a reported pullout by 250 Yugoslav troops.
May 14 -- At least 79 people are killed and 58 wounded when NATO missiles hit Korisa, a village in southern
May 19 -- Milosevic and Russia's Balkans envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin back a settlement of the Kosovo
conflict within the framework of the United Nations.
May 21 -- Russia says mediation efforts with the West are deadlocked. A NATO bomb kills 10 inmates in a
May 22 -- A UN humanitarian mission visits Kosovo, as NATO admits bombing a position held by the KLA.
May 23 -- Fighting flares on border between Serb forces and Albanian police. President Bill Clinton says he
no longer rules out "other military options".
May 26 -- NATO agrees to boost the number of troops in a future Kosovo peacekeeping mission from
28,000 to 45,000.
May 27 -- Milosevic and four other top officials are indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal
Tribunal in The Hague.
May 29 -- Yugoslavia says it has accepted the Group of Eight principles for a peace deal in Kosovo.
May 30 -- NATO says it wants a clear, personal statement from Milosevic that he accepts alliance conditions
before it will halt air raids. A German soldier dies when a tank crashes off a bridge in Albania.
May 31 -- At least 20 people are killed at a sanatorium at Surdulica, southern Serbia. NATO denies that its
missles are responsible.
June 1 -- Belgrade says in a letter to Bonn that it "has accepted the G8 principles." European, US and
Russian envoys meet in Bonn to hammer out a common policy for a peace mission to Belgrade.
June 2 -- The International Court of Justice rejects Yugoslavia's petition to order an end to NATO airstrikes.
EU and Russian envoys travel to Belgrade for talks with Milosevic and hand him a peace plan worked out in Bonn
with US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott.
June 3 -- Talks in Belgrade resume for a second session. A Russian spokesman in Moscow says
Yugoslavia viewed the peace plan as a "realistic" way out of the Kosovo crisis.
June 9 -- NATO and Yugoslav military authorities sign an agreement on the withdrawal of Yugoslav security
forces from Kosovo.
June 10 -- NATO suspends air strikes.
Collateral Damage Incidents
NATO has repeatedly denied that it deliberately attacks non-military buildings and insists that all possible precautions
are taken to avoid civilian casualties. Serb officials put the death toll from the following incidents, most of which but
not all NATO acknowledges as errors, at more than 460. Overall, they say, some 2,000 civilians have been killed
since the start of the air campaign on March 24.
April 5 -- A 550-pound NATO bomb aimed at Yugoslav army barracks in Aleksinac in southern Serbia
misses its target and lands in a residential area. Serbs put death toll at 17.
April 9 -- NATO hits homes near a telephone exchange in the Kosovo capital, Pristina. NATO said civilian
casualties were possible but neither side provided a death toll.
April 12 -- A NATO pilot fires two missiles into a train crossing a bridge at Grdelicka Klisura in southern
Serbia, killing 55 people, according to Belgrade. NATO insists the bridge, a key supply line for Yugoslav forces in
Kosovo, was the target and that the pilot saw the train too late.
April 14 -- NATO bombs refugee convoys in the Djakovica region of south-east Kosovo, leaving 75 dead,
according to Belgrade. NATO, without confirming the civilian toll, said it was targeting military vehicles but admitted
hitting two convoys.
April 28 -- NATO, aiming for an army barracks in the Serb village of Surdulica (250 kms/150 miles south of
Belgrade), bombs a residential area, leaving at least 20 civilians dead.
May 1 -- NATO bombs a bridge at Luzane near Pristina, killing 47 people aboard a bus which was travelling
along it. NATO, without confirming the figure, admitted the following day having targetted the bridge without the
intention of causing civilian casualties.
May 7 -- A NATO air raid hits central Nis in southeast Serbia, leaving at least 15 dead and 70 injured. NATO
said its planes were aiming for a landing strip and a radio transmitter but that a cluster bomb had missed its mark.
May 8 -- NATO mistakenly attacks the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three journalists. The United
States and NATO said the intended target was a Yugoslav building with military use, but US maps used in the
planning of the operation were old and marked the embassy at a previous address.
May 13 -- NATO bombs the village of Korisa, leaving 87 civilians dead according to the Serbs. The allies
claim that the civilians were being used as "human shields" and that Korisa was a legitimate military target.
May 20 -- A Belgrade hospital is hit by a missile at around 1 -- 00 a.m., killing three patients. NATO
attributes the accident to a missile which went astray during an attack on a nearby military barracks.
May 21 -- NATO bombs Istok prison in north-west Kosovo. Alliance officials insist the prison was being used
as an assembly point for Serb forces in the province. Serbs say at least 100 inmates and a prison officer were killed.
May 22 -- NATO admits bombing by mistake positions of the Kosovo Liberation Army at Kosare, near the
border with Albania. Sources close to the KLA say seven guerillas were killed and 15 injured.
May 30 -- NATO bombs a highway bridge at Varvarin in a daytime raid in central Serbia. The Serbs claim 11
people died while attempting to cross the bridge in their cars. NATO has not confirmed whether there were cars on
the bridge and insists the bridge was a legitimate military garget.
May 31 -- Missiles strike a sanatorium at Surdulica, southern Serbia, killing at least 20 people, according to
the Serb authorities. NATO says it successfully attacked a military barracks in the town but refuses to confirm, or
categorically deny, hitting the hospital.
May 31 -- A NATO bomb aimed at a military compound strikes a four-storey apartment block in the town of
Novi Pazar. NATO confirms one of its bombs went astray and landed in a residential area. Serb authorities report 23
1 June -- A NATO bomb landed in a residential neighbourhood in the Serbian town of Novi Pazar.
Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report 31 January 2000 --
"This report presents the results of the Department of Defense review of the conduct of Operation Allied Force and
associated relief operations as required by Congress." [PDF 2.23 Mb]
RAMBOUILLET ACCORDS TEXT - Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in
Kosovo (February 23, 1999)
Statement on Kosovo Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of
the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC 23 April 1999
TEXT: G-8 FOREIGN MINISTERS PROPOSE SOLUTION FOR KOSOVO USIA 06 May 1999
Sources and Methods
Intelligence Collection Systems
Cloud Cover - Current Conditions
Cloud Cover - Archive
Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment by General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team
Maps and Aerial Views of post- and pre-strikes used during the Press Conference by General Wesley K.
Clark 16 Sept. 1999
KOSOVO: An Account of the Crisis - By Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary of State for Defence - 07
JOINT STATEMENT ON THE KOSOVO AFTER ACTION REVIEW presented by Secretary of Defense
William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, October 14, 1999
"After Kosovo: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Coalition Warfare" 1999 Topical Symposium,
National Defense University, November 16-17, 1999, Fort McNair, Washington D.C.
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORTS ON OPERATION ALLIED FORCE February 7, 2000 -- A
new Department of Defense report released today provides more detailed information on NATO's
78-day air campaign, Operation Allied Force, to end Serbian atrocities in Kosovo.
Press Conference by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana and General Wesley K. Clark, SACEUR 1st
Almost All U.S. Airstrikes Involve 'Smart' Bombs PAUL RICHTER, Los Angeles Times Tuesday, April 13,
NATO HQ Press Conference Speech of Brigadier General Daniel P. Leaf 19 April 1999
NATO HQ Transcript of Press Conference given by General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the Military
Committee 4 May 1999
PSYOPs Leaflets dropped by NATO airplanes above Kosovo and Serbia 07 May 1999
Operation " horseshoe " (Potkova)
Clinton Kosovo Intervention Appears Imminent Bombing, or Ground Troops -- or Both US Senate
Republican Policy Committee February 22, 1999 -- The Clinton Administration appears to be on the verge of military
intervention in Kosovo. Depending on the outcome of the talks currently underway in France, the intervention -- the
result of a course set by the Administration several months ago -- might involve NATO airstrikes against Serbia
and/or a NATO ground force to police a settlement.
Senate to Vote Today on Preventing Funding of Military Operations for Kosovo US Senate Republican
Policy Committee March 23, 1999 -- Once again, the Clinton Administration appears to be on the verge of military
intervention on behalf of Kosovo, in the form of airstrikes against Yugoslavia (now comprised of two republics, Serbia
and Montenegro), which could begin at any time.
KOSOVO: RUSSIA'S RESPONSE (OB66) Mark A Smith & Henry Plater-Zyberk Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Sandhurst UK April 1999
SOME GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT (O.B.67) C J Dick Conflict Studies
Research Centre, Sandhurst UK May 1999
REACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS, 14 MARCH-31
MAY 1999 CJ Dick Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK
Russian & Ukrainian perceptions of events in Yugoslavia James Sherr & Dr Steven Main Conflict Studies
Research Centre, Sandhurst UK (F64) May 1999
The Legality of NATO‘s attack on Serbia, 1999 Lt Cdr (Retd) N F Bradshaw Conflict Studies Research
Centre, Sandhurst UK (G76) June 1999
MASKIROVKA IN YUGOSLAV MILITARY THINKING (A100) C J Dick Conflict Studies Research Centre,
Sandhurst UK July 1999
RUSSIAN THINKING ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER KOSOVO Dr M A Smith Conflict Studies
Research Centre, Sandhurst UK (F65) August 1999
NATO Intervention in Kosova - Questions without answers Dr TR Waters Conflict Studies Research Centre,
Sandhurst UK (G79) November 1999
Operation Determined Effort
Operation Determined Effort was a plan [OPLAN 40-104] for a NATO operation for withdrawing UN forces should
such a contingency have arisen. The detailed planning for this operation by several NATO countries prepared the
groundwork for Operation Joint Endeavor. In July 1995 NATO planners estimated that the number of troops needed
for the successfull evacuation of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia-Hercegovina would total up to 80,000 troops for a
possible evacuation mission, with the US portion of the operation limited to 25,000. The operation involved securing
routes into Sarajevo and into the other enclaves and bringing out the UN troops and their equipment.
The two options initially under consideration were Operation Determined Effort, a gradual evacuation that would take
months, and Operation Daring Lion, which could be executed in a matter of days, though the UN would leave behind
equipment that would have to be destroyed so it did not fall into the hands of the warring sides.
Operation Determined Effort evolved as the designation for the prelude to and planning for Operation Joint Endeavor.
In response to orders in November 1995 from President Bill Clinton, a handful of US troops moved into Bosnia and
Croatia as part of a small multinational force of logisticians who prepared for the anticipated arrival of an
implementation force (IFOR) of about 60,000 troops from the U.S. Army, its sister services, and other NATO- and
non-NATO nations. The IFOR would enforce provisions of the peace agreement formally signed on 14 December in
Paris by the warring parties of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
In the United States, guardsmen and reservists were sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, or Fort Dix, New Jersey, for a
NATO orientation before moving on to Germany for the special training. Many reservists were deployed to areas in
Europe to fill in for active-duty troops who deployed to Bosnia.
The 1st Armored Division is the major element of the U.S. military contingent in Bosnia. The 13,000-man force is
equipped with M1A1 Abrams tanks, M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles, AH-64 Apache helicopters, and extra radar
detectors to identify and attack hostile mortar and artillery fire. The division's intelligence analysts monitored terrorist
activities worldwide that could target American troops in Bosnia. U.S. forces were instructed to patrol in small units,
never alone; enforce tight security around base camps; and not to socialize with local residents.
Twenty-two Active Army units in the United States were identified for potential deployment in support of the NATO
IFOR in Bosnia. Among logistics units that deployed were the 54th Quartermaster Company, a mortuary affairs unit
from Fort Lee, Virginia; the 102d Quartermaster Company, a petroleum, oils, and lubricants unit from Fort Campbell,
Kentucky; and the 403d Transportation Company, from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that would be responsible for
transshipping cargo at highway, rail, barge, and air terminals.
In addition, 49 Army National Guard and Army Reserve units based in the continental United States and Puerto Rico
were notified to begin training for possible deployment to the European Theater to support U.S. forces that would
participate in NATO peace IFOR operations in the former Yugoslavia. Among these were units that perform
transportation, public affairs, medical, military police, postal, materiel management, military history, and civil affairs
BEFORE KOSOVO UNDERWENT ALLIED FORCE, NATO ALMOST UNDERTOOK DETERMINED
EFFORT IN BOSNIA
BOSNET July 15, 1995
Army Reservists mobilized to support Operation Determined Effort (Jan. 23)
Logistics: Spearhead for Operation Joint Endeavor
CFC (KOREA) OPLAN 9518X-XX
Protection of US National Security Interests and
Support for the Republic of South Korea
CFC Classification Guidance Baseplan
CFC OPLN base-highlighted
CFC OPLN base
A - TASK ORGANIZATION
CFC Annex A
CFC Annex A; Appendix 1
CFC Annex A; Appendix 2
CFC Annex A; Appendix 3
B - INTELLIGENCE
CFC Annex B
CFC Annex B; Appendix 1
CFC Annex B; Appendix 2
CFC Annex B; Appendix 2; Tab A
CFC Annex B; Appendix 2; Tab B
CFC Annex B; Appendix 3
CFC Annex B; Appendix 3; Tab A
CFC Annex B; Appendix 4
CFC Annex B; Appendix 4; Tab A
CFC Annex B; Appendix 4; Tab B
CFC Annex B; Appendix 5
CFC Annex B; Appendix 5; Tab A
CFC Annex B; Appendix 5; Tab B
CFC Annex B; Appendix 6
CFC Annex B; Appendix 7
CFC Annex B; Appendix 8
CFC Annex B; Appendix 9
CFC Annex B; Appendix 9; Tab B
CFC Annex B; Appendix 9; Tab B
CFC Annex B; Appendix 10
C - OPERATIONS
CFC Annex C
CFC Annex C; Appendix 1
CFC Annex C; Appendix 2
CFC Annex C; Appendix 3
CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab A
CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab B
CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab C
CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab D
CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab E
CFC Annex C; Appendix 4
CFC Annex C; Appendix 5
CFC Annex C; Appendix 6
CFC Annex C; Appendix 7
CFC Annex C; Appendix 8
CFC Annex C; Appendix 10
CFC Annex C; Appendix 11
CFC Annex C; Appendix 15
D - LOGISTICS
CFC Annex D; Appendix 4
CFC Annex D; Appendix 4; Tab A
CFC Annex D; Appendix 4; Tab A1
CFC Annex D; Appendix 4; Tab A2
CFC Annex D; Appendix 4; Tab B
CFC Annex D; Appendix 5
CFC Annex D; Appendix 5; Tab A
CFC Annex D; Appendix 5; Tab A1
E - PERSONNEL
CFC Annex E
CFC Annex E; Appendix 1
CFC Annex E; Appendix 2
CFC Annex E; Appendix 3
CFC Annex E; Appendix 4
CFC Annex E; Appendix 5
CFC Annex E; Appendix 5; Tab A
CFC Annex E; Appendix 5; Tab B
CFC Annex E; Appendix 6
F - PUBLIC AFFAIRS
CFC Annex F
CFC Annex F; Appendix 1
CFC Annex F; Appendix 2
CFC Annex F; Appendix 3
CFC Annex F; Appendix 4
CFC Annex F; Appendix 5
CFC Annex F; Appendix 6
CFC Annex F; Appendix 6; Tab F
G - CIVIL AFFAIRS
CFC Annex G
H – METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
CFC Annex H
J - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
CFC Annex J
CFC Annex J; Appendix 1
CFC Annex J; Appendix 1; Tab B
K – COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
CFC Annex K
L – ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
CFC Annex L
M - MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY
CFC Annex M
CFC Annex M; Appendix 1
N - SPACE OPERATIONS
CFC Annex N
P - HOST-NATION SUPPORT
CFC Annex P
Q – MEDICAL SERVICES
CFC Annex Q
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 1
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab A
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab B
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab C
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab D
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab E
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 3
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 4
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 5
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 6
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 7
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 8
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 9
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 10
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 11
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 12
CFC Annex Q; Appendix 13
S – SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
CFC Annex S
X - EXECUTION CHECKLIST
CFC Annex X
1 - Joint Medical Regulating System
2 - Joint Blood Program
3 - Hospitalization
4 - Patient Evacuation
5 - Returns To Duty
6 - Medical Logistics (Class VIII-A) System
7 - Preventive Medicine
8 - Medical Command, Control, and Communications
9 - Host-Nation Medical Support
10 - Medical Sustainability Assessment
11 - Medical Intelligence Support to Military Operations
12 - Veterinary Medicine
13 - Medical Planning Responsibilities and Task Identification