VIEWS: 6 PAGES: 56 CATEGORY: US Government Reports POSTED ON: 8/5/2011
Army plans for major civil disturbances occurring with various scenarios such as pandemics, massive earthquakes.
Operation Plans [OPLAN] An Operation Plan is any plan, except the SIOP, for the conduct of military operations in a hostile environment prepared by the commander of a unified or specified command in response to a requirement established by the joint chiefs of staff. Operation plans are prepared in either complete or concept format. An Operation Plan in Complete Format (OPLAN) is an operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an OPORD. Complete plans include deployment/employment phases, as appropriate. An Operation Plan in Concept Format (CONPLAN) is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. The general criteria for approval of an operation plan are adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and consistency with joint doctrine. Combining the criteria of feasibility and acceptability, the review ensures the mission can be accomplished with available resources and without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, material, time, or position. The review for adequacy determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission. The review assesses the validity of assumptions and compliance with CJCS guidance and joint doctrine. The review for feasibility determines whether the assigned tasks can be accomplished using available resources within the time frames contemplated by the plan. The primary considerations are whether the resources made available for planning by the JSCP and Service planning documents are used effectively or are insufficient to satisfy plan requirements. The review for acceptability ensures the plans are proportional and worth the expected costs. Additionally, this criteria ensures plans are consistent with domestic and international law, including the law of war, and are militarily and politically supportable. An OPLAN represents the full development of the concept of operations of the commander in chief (CINC) of a unified command. It specifies the forces and support needed to execute the plan and the transportation schedule required to move those resources. In developing a plan, the CINC and service-component staffs develop a detailed flow of resources into the theater to support the approved OPLAN concept. After forces are selected, time-phased support requirements are determined, and transportation feasibility is established, the detailed planning information is generated and stored as a ―time-phased force and deployment data‖ (TPFDD) file. Reference days used for planning are: D-day: Unnamed day on which a particular operation begins when describing a concept of operations. H- hour is the reference with this day for what time that operation begins. C-day: Deployment planning is based on C-day. This is the unnamed day on which movement for forces, support, and transportation from origin begins. The L- hour is the specific time associated with C-day. M-day: Unnamed day on which mobilization of reserve forces begin and F-hour is the specific time associated with the mobilization announcement by the SECDEF. Much of the detailed work of deployment planning is done by Service components after the CINC issues a detailed Letter of Instruction with technical guidance. Employment planning, which is ―how‖ forces are to be used, is worked by the JTF and component commanders, after the supported commander‘s plan has been approved by the CJCS, remember though that an understanding of the employment plan is necessary to ensure that the deployment plan is appropriate. The ―where‖ and ―when‖ were determined in concept development as part of the final product; the concept of operations. Much of the CINC‘s work is deployment: getting the resources there for them to be eventually employed. Operation Plans [OPLAN], operation plans in concept format (CONPLANs) with and without Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), and FUNCPLANs are prepared by commanders to fulfill tasks assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or otherwise directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They conform to standardized formats and content in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database. To facilitate communications concerning operation planning among military headquarters, commanders standardize the format and content of other appropriate plans. As the all-encompassing warfighting document for a theater, the CINC‘s deliberate plans associated with each MTW provides the basis from which to delineate the logistics responsibilities, and its corresponding TPFDD provides the base document to capture logistics data requirements. The TPFDDs only establish the initial movement requirements in the theater, e.g., PODs to initial staging areas. Consequently, not all-subsequent phases of theater campaign plans that require additional movement of equipment, supplies, and personnel can be calculated from the TPFDD database. While current TPFDDs do not account for these subsequent movement requirements, planners in both theaters were aware of this deficiency and were working to address the issue. In NEA, US Forces Korea (USFK) planners have developed a Wartime Movements Plan (WMP) which lists the subsequent movement requirements in Korea for the first 30 days. This subsequent movement data is important in determining overall transportation requirements throughout the campaign. The TPFDD would provide the population statistics by number of personnel, time periods, and locations throughout the theater. Using the simple Rapid Query Tool (RQT) application that operates with pertinent portions of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) databases, theater planners could determine the needed data elements. There are significant differences between the two theaters, the most noticeable being the level of centralization. In NEA, for example, the planning staffs for both USFK and EUSA worked within walking distances from each other. The large forward-presence force maintained on the Korean peninsula has allowed planners a greater insight into how an MTW would be fought and supported. However, close proximity does not always eliminate confusion. For instance, the relationship between PACOM and USFK as it pertains to complying with the Army‘s process for determining joint land-based support is not well understood. SWA on the other hand, is an austere theater, with the CENTCOM staff thousands of miles away from their theater, and hundreds of miles removed from their subordinate Service staffs. However, for this MTW campaign, there is only one centralized planning staff, i.e., CENTCOM. Its Army component, ARCENT, had been assigned land operation responsibilities throughout the potential areas of operation. CENTCOM planning staff responsibilities, therefore, were more clearly understood. In 1999 SAIC was contracted by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG) to develop a data call process that captured the Army‘s Logistics Support to Other Services (ALSOS) responsibilities and associated requirements (previously known as Wartime Executive Agent Responsibilities [WEAR]) in the event of two nearly simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW). SAIC was unable to locate an appropriate Air staff element to discuss the Army's support to other Services responsibilities and requirements. This review included DOD/Joint doctrine, MTW deliberate and concept plans (CONPLAN), joint regulations agreed to by two or more Services and ISAs and responsibilities identified in previous HQDA, ODCSLOG studies. The review centered on only those ALSOS responsibilities, e.g., executive agent, that had support implications to the warfighting CINCs. Based on limited availability of pertinent documents - not all applicable deliberate plans/CONPLANs were made available by the Government - MTWs tailored ALSOS Responsibilities List were developed for each theater. This review covered a number of Southwest Asia (SWA) OPLANs [ CENTCOM OPLAN 1003-96, CENTCOM OPLAN 1002-96, CENTCOM CONPLAN 1015-96, ARCENT OPLAN 1003-96, ARCENT OPLAN 1002-95, and ARCENT CONPLAN 1015-96] as well as Northeast Asia (NEA) OPLANs [ PACOM OPLAN 5027-96, EUSA OPLAN 5027-95, UNC/CFC OPLAN 5027-98, and PACOM CONPLAN 5028-96] In reviewing the various MTW deliberate plans in 1999, SAIC found contradictions and gaps in the various CINC and Service Components plans. This situation was partially understandable due to current ongoing deliberate plan revision efforts, but did cause confusion during this study. In SWA for example, the CENTCOM and ARCENT deliberate plans were integrated and the tasks in the CENTCOM plan were well nested in the subordinate ARCENT document. In NEA on the other hand, the PACOM, USFK and EUSA MTW deliberate plans were not always synchronized. In fact the EUSA OPLAN 5027-95 pre-dated its superior deliberate plan, USFK OPLAN 5027-96. Tasks delineated to EUSA by the PACOM OPLAN 5027-96 could not always be found in the USFK OPLAN 5027-96, and the actual in-theater chain of command that assigns and executes ALSOS responsibilities was confusing. In addition, the OPLANs did not clearly delineate if they supported single or dual MTW scenarios. During the 1999 SAIC study, the transportation data submitted for each Service was segregated into two parts. The first part appeared to be a TPFDD - generated sort as described earlier in this report. The second part consisted of Wartime Movements Plan (WMP) data compiled by EUSA. The TPFDD generated data, while in the proper spreadsheet format, did not have valid destinations for many of the records. For example, the majority of United States Air Force (USAF) data records had a destination of Contingency Operating Base/Mobilization Operating Base (COB/MOB) and USMC records had a destination of Theater Assembly Area (TAA). The 1999 SAIC study noted that differences in Service‘s consumption rates could have a major impact on the Army‘s force structure determination process. For example, the review indicated a wide variance in the USMC‘s Class I planning factors versus the Army‘s rate, i.e., 4.4 pounds per day (ppd) in their OMFTS study to 5.7 ppd in their TAA 005 submission as compared to the Army‘s 8.09 ppd. Other classes of supply appeared to have similar wide differences in consumption factors. The Strategic Plan for Transforming DOD Training, 1 March 2002, recognizes that ―transformed training‖ is the key enabler to transforming the Department of Defense. A significant influence on the principal determinants is the shift in defense strategy from a ―threat-based‖ to a ―capabilities-based‖ approach. The capabilities-based approach requires leaders to identify capabilities that Army forces need now to deter and defeat a broad range of potential adversaries. The impact of that shift is that Army training and education systems must produce well-trained soldiers and self- aware, adaptive leaders who can develop versatile, lethal, agile, deployable, responsive, sustainable, and survivable units. While those qualities describe the Objective Force, they are already needed. In late 2003 it was reported ["Military Alters Plans For Possible Conflicts" By Bradley Graham Washington Post November 18, 2003, pg. 18] that regional military commanders and the the Joint Staff had revised OPLANs "based on assumptions that conflicts could be fought more quickly and with fewer American troops than previously thought ... The study, called Operational Availability, is analyzing how changes not only in technology but also in foreign basing of troops, pre-positioning of combat equipment abroad and routine rotations of U.S. forces overseas can increase the U.S. military's speed in achieving victory.... A series of war-gaming exercises last year  ... found that timelines for U.S. victories could be shortened significantly.... The speedier wars meant that many of the forces called for in the plans -- up to two-thirds in some instances -- would never have fought." Nomenclature The short title of each plan is UNCLASSIFIED and denotes the supported commander, the type of plan, and the Plan Identification Number (PID). The basic PID is a command-unique four-digit number and a two-digit suffix. As specified by the JSCP, the suffix represents the fiscal year of the JSCP for which the plan is written or reprinted; for example, USCINCEUR OPLAN 4999-99. The supported command assigns a PID for the life of the plan. To the maximum extent possible, PID changes should be limited to those dictated by security/ operations security (OPSEC) requirements. All PID changes must be coordinated with the Joint Staff. The four-digit number in the PID does not change when the OPLAN is revised or converted into an OPORD. Also, the four-digit number is not reused when the requirement for the plan is canceled. The two-digit suffix is assigned to the OPLAN, and is used throughout. This includes new plans and complete reprints of plans. When an OPLAN is revised in part or approved for a subsequent period of the JSCP, there is no requirement to change the suffix throughout the plan. However, changes and related documents will reference the fiscal year of the JSCP to which the change or related document applies. OPORDs prepared by the CINCs to fulfill Chairman requirements will be assigned PIDs selected from the block of numbers allocated above when the OPORD is not a conversion of an existing OPLAN. The UNCLASSIFIED short title will be derived in the manner described in subparagraph 3a above. Thus, an OPORD prepared by USJFCOM might be designated USJFCOM OPORD 2000-92. (The two-digit suffix represents the calendar year or fiscal year in which the order is published.) Supporting plans are assigned a PID identical to that of the supported plan. However, when a supporting command or agency prepares a single OPLAN to support two or more plans of other commanders, the plan is assigned a PID without regard to the PIDs of the supported plans. PIDs will be established by using the command-unique four-digit number, followed by the two-digit fiscal year designation. OPLAN 774FM is a fictitious OPLAN used by USTRANSCOM for training. Operation Plan [OPLAN] CONPLAN 0500–02 NORTHCOM (CBRNE Consequence Management) OPLAN 1002 - CENTCOM OPLAN 1003 - CENTCOM OPLAN 1004 - CENTCOM CONPLAN 1015 - CENTCOM OPLAN 1019 - CENTCOM CONPLAN 1025 Radar Threat Update OPLAN 2200 - LANT OPLAN 2370 - LANT OPLAN 2380 - LANT OPLAN 2400 AGILE PROVIDER OPLAN 2400 - LANT CONPLAN 2400 NORTHCOM (Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region) CONPLAN 2501 NORTHCOM (Defense Support of Civil Authorities) CONPLAN 2502 NORTHCOM (Civil Disturbance Operations) FUNCPLAN 2505 NORTHCOM (Nuclear Weapons Accident Response) CONPLAN 2591 NORTHCOM (Pandemic Influenza) CONPLAN 2707 NORTHCOM (Caribbean Mass Migration) CONPLAN 2810 CONPLAN 2820 OPLAN 4102 - EUCOM OPLAN 4112 - EUCOM OPLAN 4122 CONPLAN 4122 CONPLAN 4311 - EUCOM CONPLAN 4402 - EUCOM OPLAN 5000 - PACOM OPLAN 5001 - PACOM OPLAN 5026 - PACOM OPLAN 5027 - PACOM OPLAN 5028 - PACOM OPLAN 5029 - PACOM OPLAN 5030 - PACOM OPLAN 5055 - PACOM CONPLAN 5040 - PACOM CONPLAN 5053 - PACOM CONPLAN 5060 - PACOM CONPLAN 5070 - PACOM CONPLAN 5077 - PACOM OPLAN 10412 JOINT GUARANTOR OPLAN 10413 JOINT GUARDIAN OPLAN 10414 ALLIED HARBOUR OPLAN 10601 ALLIED FORCE OPLAN 31001 V Corps GDP OPLAN 31402 Consistent Effort OPLAN 40-104 Determined Effort training OPLAN 1648 - CENTCOM OPLAN 774FM - USTRANSCOM OPLAN 9518 PROTECTION OF US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA CFC (KOREA) Plan Identification Number (PID) 0001 through 0999 CJCS 1000 through 1999 USCINCCENT 2000 through 2999 USCINCJF 3000 through 3399 CINCNORAD 3400 through 3999 USCINCSPACE 4000 through 4999 USCINCEUR 5000 through 5999 USCINCPAC 6000 through 6999 USCINCSO 7000 through 7499 COMFORSCOM 7500 through 7999 USCINCSOC 8000 through 8999 USCINCSTRAT 9000 through 9599 USCINCTRANS 9600 through 9699 Reserved 9700 through 9799 COMDT COGARD References U.S. Army Logistics Related DoD Executive Agents, ALSOS 28 Jan 2000 (Word document) The Army needed a more comprehensive look at the potential impacts on its capabilities as a result of having to meet its current assigned, implied and specified Army Logistics Support to Other Services (ALSOS) responsibilities. OPLAN 1002 Defense of the Arabian Peninsula Through the end of the 1980s, the United States had no forces, bases, supplies, or infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. Forces, their equipment, and their sustainment stocks of fuel, ordnance, spare parts, and a million other things would have to be deployed into the theater, and bases established for them. Through the end of the Cold War the CENTCOM operation plan OPLAN 1002 involved Iran. In 1987 students in the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth [Kansas] participated in an eight-day Southwest Asia war game. The pertinent part of the scenario portrayed a takeover by anti-American rebel forces of several key cities in Iran, mostly in the southern part of the country. The rebels threatened to seize the Persian Gulf ports, and thereby shut down oil cargo out of the Persian Gulf. Twenty-three Soviet divisions from three fronts entered Iran in support of the rebels. In response to the threat to its national interests as expressed by the Carter Doctrine, the United States deployed a joint task force to assist the loyalist Iranian forces. Ground forces consisted of roughly five and one-half Army divisions under the control of a field army headquarters plus one Marine amphibious force. SAMS students decided early in the planning that their mission, to ―defeat‖ rebel and Soviet forces in Iran and to facilitate the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf, needed clarification. What was the defeat criterion? Restore Iran‘s national borders? Destroy all Soviet and rebel forces within the borders of Iran? Or should they emphasize the second part of the mission statement, to facilitate the West‘s and Japan‘s access to Persian Gulf oil? In the absence of a national command authorities (NCA)-player cell, the students judged that NCA intent was to optimize chances for the uninterrupted flow of oil, consistent with means. With this understanding, they concentrated on securing the vital Gulf ports of Chah Bahar, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. The ground commander (in this exercise, the notional US Ninth Army commander) determined that he would attempt to drive out, or prevent from entering, any enemy forces in an area centered on Bandar Abbas and circumscribed by an arc running roughly through Shiraz, Kerman, and Bam, some 250 miles away. This decision made sense in four important respects. First, in the ground commander‘s opinion, the US force was too small to fight much-superior enemy forces across the vast entirety of Iran itself. Second, with almost no infrastructure from which to establish supply operations, to move farther than 250 miles inland would have been logistically unsupportable. Third, this course of action permitted friendly forces to exploit the excellent defensible terrain of the Zagros Mountains. Fourth, a secure enclave would be available from which to launch attacks to the northwest should the NCA subsequently decide upon a more ambitious and aggressive course. The principal Army war plan in the fall of 1989, OPLAN 1002-88, assumed a Soviet attack through Iran to the Persian Gulf. The plan called for five and two-thirds US divisions in the defense, mostly light and heavy forces at something less than full strength (apportioned to it by the Joint Strategic Capability Plan [JSCAP]). The strategy of the original plan called for these five and two-thirds divisions to march from the Arabian Gulf to the Zagros Mountains and prevent the Red Army from seizing the oil fields of Iran. Less than two divisions were apportioned to the separate plan then in place for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula. On November 23, 1988, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, became USCENTCOM‘S third commander-in- chief (USCINCCENT). Spurred by the rapid diminution of Soviet aggressiveness under Mikhail Gorbachev, Gen. Schwarzkopf worked to supplant USCENTCOM‘s primary war plan, which involved a war against the Soviets in Iran, with a more realistic scenario. In his FY 1990 Annual Report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci defined maintaining access to regional oil supplies and promoting the security and stability of friendly states to be US regional goals in SWA. The report cited the continuing need for US rapid force deployment and resupply, access to local facilities, and assistance from local military forces to respond adequately to regional threats. In May 1989 CENTCOM conducted the CINCCENT War Game to review and examine newly revised Operations Plan OPLAN 1002 for SWA. During 1988-89 CENTCOM revised its OPLAN 1002, originally to plan operations to counter an intra-regional conflict, without Soviet involvement, to specifically address the US capability to counter an Iraqi attack on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In October 1989 President Bush stated that "access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security. Accordingly, the US remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of US military force." He further stated that the US is also committed to "support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral US military intervention." Following the guidance provided by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1989, USCINCCENT began planning for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula against a strong regional threat. In October 1989 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had directed that a major revision of this plan be prepared, with Iraq as the opponent. In January 1990 the Secretary of Defense's guidance made the US central objective for SWA the prevention of a hostile power from gaining control over a share of oil supplies or shipment routes sufficient to provide it with leverage over the US and its allies. Even before Schwarzkopf changed Central Command's planning priorities, ARCENT began adjusting to the idea that Iraq constituted the major regional threat. Third Army also held that any U.S. response to the potential danger would require a significantly larger and heavier force than had been anticipated. As early as March 1989, Third Army began to coordinate with the Army Concepts and Analysis Agency (CAA) in Bethesda, Maryland, to conduct a war game simulation of the existing war plan for the Arabian Peninsula to examine this hypothesis. CAA ran Wargame Persian Tiger 89 in February 1990, as planning for a revised defensive concept got under way. Persian Tiger posited a defensive force of three Army light brigades (one airborne, two airmobile), a battalion of the Ranger regiment, an air defense artillery brigade, corps aviation, and artillery. Two Marine expeditionary brigades and aviation forces allocated under the existing plan were also portrayed. The findings of the game, which began to emerge in February but which were not published until August 1990, were that U.S. forces could not arrive in theater in time to resist an Iraqi invasion if deployment were ordered only upon outbreak of hostilities. It was learned also that the allocated U.S. force structure was too light to do what was required of it, in any event. The focus of Third Army and CENTCOM (and the rest of the US military) was shifting to a different type of contingency in Southwest Asia. CENTCOM was moving away from a supporting theater in a Central European conflict to a primary theater of war fighting in mid-1990. In April 1990 the outline for USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002-90 had been published; the plan would be completed in April 1991, after DESERT STORM ended. OPLAN 1002-90 In March 1990, over 500 military and civilian staff from CENTCOM and other US agencies began work at Fort McPherson, Georgia, to develop a detailed blueprint for a U.S.-Iraqi war in the Kuwait/Saudi Arabia area. Known as Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90, the document covered major aspects of a future conflict. The plan detailed which US divisions would go to Saudi Arabia, what radio frequencies they would use, where they would get their water, how they would treat their casualties, and how they would handle the news media. As Saddam Hussein increased tensions in the region throughout the spring, US assistance to Iraq (which dated back to the Iran-Iraq War) would become a political issue. In April, CENTCOM planners were directed to drop the country's identifications in their planning documents and to substitute the less politically sensitive color codes of RED (Iraq), ORANGE (Iran), and YELLOW (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). CENTCOM draft OPLAN 1002-90 (Defense of the Arabian Peninsula) had the highest CENTCOM planning priority in the Spring of 1990. The second draft of OPLAN 1002-90 was published in July 1990 with a third draft scheduled to be published in October 1990 in preparation for a Phase I Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) conference in October/November 1990. A number of features of the draft Third Army plan (1002-90), published in July 1990, show how prewar planning guided Third Army's actions during Operation Desert Shield. The plan was intended to direct the Army's contribution to Central Command's broader-objective regional plan "designed to counter an intra-regional conflict on the ARABIAN PENINSULA to protect UNITED STATES (U.S.) and allied access to ARABIAN PENINSULA oil." Central Command's strategy for a regional contingency spelled out its strategy this way: "The USCENTCOM regional contingency strategy to counter an intraregional threat initially seeks to (secure] U.S. and allied interests through deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy additional U.S, combat forces to assist friendly states in defending critical ports and oil facilities on the ARABIAN PENINSULA. Once sufficient combat power has been generated and the enemy has been sufficiently attrited, the strategy is to mass forces and conduct a counteroffensive to recapture critical port and oil facilities which may have been seized by enemy forces in earlier stages of conflict." The plan portrayed an Iraqi attack through Kuwait and into Saudi Arabia. The attack force consisted of sixty brigades, supported by 640 fighter/ground-attack aircraft and a minimum of 3,200 tanks. The plan assumed four days would be needed to take Kuwait and another five to reach the port of Al Jubayl. It credited Iraq with an operational reach no longer than Al Hufuf-enough grasp to occupy the main Persian Gulf ports and key oil facilities. The plan also assumed three to six months' increased regional tension and up to thirty days' strategic warning. The corresponding Third Army plan assumed a deployment decision at least nineteen days prior to hostilities, an immediate 200,000-man selected Reserve call-up, and availability of assigned National Guard roundout brigades and necessary combat service support units.19 In the pre-Desert Storm Army force structure, roundout brigades were National Guard formations that were expected to fill out incomplete Regular Army divisions and deploy with them to war. In the event, Third Army would enjoy neither the advanced warning nor have the benefit of an early selected Reserve call-up. The absence of both would influence significantly how Third Army went to war. The Third Army plan was designed for the defense of critical port and oil facilities in the vicinity of Al Jubayl and Abqaiq, the operation of common-user seaports, and the provision of combat support and combat service support (logistics) to Central Command forces in theater. The concept of operations called for a three-phase deployment. Phase one addressed the introduction of "deterrent forces," the Third Army and XVIII Corps' forward headquarters, an aviation brigade task force, and troops from the 82d Airborne Division. These forces, along with Marine units, were to establish a deterrent force north of Al Jubayl to secure the points of debarkation at Jubayl, Ad Dammam, and Dhahran and, upon arrival of the Marines, to establish a defense of the Abqaiq oil facilities. The deterrent effect of ground forces would be greatly enhanced, of course, by the simultaneous arrival of air and naval forces. Indeed, in the first month of any deployment, the U.S. and Saudi air threat to extended Iraqi lines of communication was the deterrent. Phase two of the Third Army deployment was to involve the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with their reserve component "roundout" brigades, a brigade of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) (then undergoing deactivation), and the 197th Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). Arrival of these heavier forces would permit the establishment of a defense in depth behind Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council forces to the north along the Saudi border and forward of the ports and oil facilities. Should the enemy attack at this point, the Air Force component (principally Central Command Air Forces [CENTAF]) was assigned to contest the offensive. The Army aviation task force of attack helicopters would link the ground forces with the theater air interdiction program. The brigade of the 9th Division (Motorized) was to be held in theater reserve. Phase three called for a coordinated counteroffensive involving Saudi, U.S. Army, and Marine forces to restore lost territory and facilities. CENTCOM scheduled Exercise Internal Look 90 in late July 1990 to test the validity of operational and logistic support concepts in OPLAN 1002-90. Focused on an Iraqi incursion on the Arabian peninsula, the exercise revealed the need for a revised troop list, and an armor heavy and highly mobile force to fight a high-speed tank battle in the expanses of the Arabian desert. From 20-28 July 1990 CENTCOM conducted the INTERNAL LOOK 90 command post exercise to examine new Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1002, "Defense of the Arabian Peninsula," to validate operational and logistical support concepts. The initial Third Army plans drawn up to support Internal Look and operations plan (OPLAN) 1002-90 for CENTCOM took on a different character. Planners recommended a heavier armored force whose closure would be in question due to sea-lift limitations. However, this force offered more combat power and an offensive capability that Army planners believed previous planning forces lacked. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Within hours, U.S. Naval forces responded to that crisis. That same morning, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCCENT), briefed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on available military options. One option involved deployment of forces according to the Commander-in-Chief's (CINC's) Strategic Concept for OPLAN 1002-90, a deliberate plan in-the- making. In response to the situation, USCINCCENT modified existing deliberate planning and began immediate execution planning. The initial order deploying U.S. forces came on 6 August 1990, four days after the invasion. During that time, USCINCCENT and the rest of the Joint Planning and Execution Community had used the crisis action planning process to plan and execute Operation Desert Shield. US Central Command's Desert Storm planning for support from DoD and national space forces was reflected in OPLAN 1002-90, "USCENTCOM Operations to Counter an Intra-Regional Threat to the Arabian Peninsula." Dated 13 July 90 and in its second draft, US Central Command was forced to use this immature and uncoordinated plan to begin its initial deployments to Saudi Arabia on 7 August 1990. OPLAN 1002-90 should have represented the commander's concept of operations and identified the forces and supplies required to execute the plan and a movement schedule of the resources into the theater. For integrated planning within the theater, US Central Command had developed supporting annexes to the OPLAN. These annexes provided detailed guidance to US Central Command's component commands, subordinate commanders and supporting commanders. In the case of space forces, detailed guidance and a statement of operational need was included in multiple annexes. However, the primary annex for space remained Annex N: Space Operations. Annex N to OPLAN 1002-90 was supposed to describe the concept of operations and explain theater-wide space forces support required by US Central Command's employment plan. However, the level of detail reflected the relative immaturity of the space mission. Some space force functional areas, such as communications, weather, and intelligence, contained enough detail to be of use. On the other hand, navigation, early warning, and geodesy lacked even basic information. Any good planning found in Annex N can be largely attributed to the fact that there were separate, detailed annexes in some functional areas, such as communications, intelligence, and weather. Nevertheless, even in these areas pre-planning was not totally acceptable. For example, SATCOM communications links had to be altered at least 75 times, and the intelligence dissemination network worked backwards. The lack of planning for interoperability between service dissemination systems forced intelligence data collected by one service to be routed from the theater back to the Pentagon, then transmitted back to the theater. Consequently, throughout the Gulf War operations space support took on an ad hoc character because of inadequate planning for the use of space forces. OPLAN 1002-92 Iran has become the greatest threat to peace and stability in the region. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in August 1988, Iran has been steadily rebuilding its forces. Initially, Tehran relied on equipment captured from the Iraqis or repaired through cannibalization. In 1990, Iran began to purchase high-tech weapons using hard currency from oil profits. Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait and the resultant oil price increase provided Iran with unexpected revenues to accelerate an already ambitious rearmament program. Even after oil prices fell, Iran has been able to continue its arms build-up. OPLAN 1002-94 Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has been rebuilding its military at an increasing pace in an effort to reestablish itself as a prominent regional military power. Iran has demonstrated its capability to threaten neutral shipping and the Gulf Cooperation Council states by conducting offensive naval and amphibious exercises in the Arabian Gulf. It is attempting to modernize its air and ground forces by purchasing arms from the Commonwealth of Independent States, China, North Korea, and East European countries. Iran has also sought to purchase military and industrial items from Germany, Italy, France, and Japan to facilitate its modernization efforts. However, high domestic inflation, a mounting foreign debt, and reduced oil revenues from an aging oil production infrastructure have combined to reduce Iran‘s ability to modernize as rapidly as desired. If this situation should change, Iran will find many nations willing to provide sophisticated arms in exchange for petro-dollars. OPLAN 1002-96 The warfighting element of USCENTCOM's strategy is an extension of the peacetime element. Partnerships and regional access established under the peacetime programs of prepositioned war ready material, combined exercises, and security assistance are the foundations for either a gradual buildup in response to increasing tensions or a rapid introduction of U.S. and coalition combat power in the event of an attack with little or no advance warning. The USCENTCOM strategy gives the command the ability to respond in a timely manner throughout the range of operational possibilities and provides the framework for appropriate action. The strategy for employing the military element of national power is to deter, defend, and if necessary, conduct offensive actions to protect U.S. and allied interests. Deterrence is the result of ongoing Tier I self-defense and Tier II regional security, combined with the Tier III ability to rapidly project U.S. and other Western combat power. USCENTCOM'S Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) provide the NCA with a menu of options to deter hostile actions while building up the requisite combat power. With access to Arabian Gulf oil at stake, rapid power projection using active component forces is vital in the early stages of a U.S. response. Should deterrence fail, USCENTCOM's strategy calls for overwhelming U.S. and allied combat power to quickly defeat the enemy and end the conflict on terms favorable to the U.S. and her allies. OPLAN 1002-98 While rebuilding its conventional forces, Iran is concentrating on improving its missile and chemical weapons capabilities. It currently possesses SCUD and NODONG missiles provided by North Korea. Iran developed offensive chemical weapons and employed them in response to Iraqi chemical use during the Iran-Iraq War. Tehran is pursuing improved chemical agents and delivery means and is bolstering its chemical stockpiles. Iran appears to have embarked on a nuclear weapons program. There has been civilian nuclear cooperation between Iran and a number of other countries, with possible weapons cooperation with North Korea and Pakistan. Iran could develop a viable nuclear weapons capability within the next several years. OPLAN 1002-00 USCENTCOM‘s theater strategy consists of integrated strategic concepts that are represented by five pillars: forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, power projection, and readiness to fight. The first three pillars describe overseas activities. The fourth pillar deals with the rapid projection of US forces to the region. The fifth pillar focuses on the ability to conduct wartime operations within the theater. The fourth pillar of the theater strategy, power projection, defines activities and qualities of US military forces that support the rapid projection of OPLAN 1002-02 CENTCOM wartime strategy builds on the framework implemented by a peacetime strategy of deterrence. Should deterrence fail, CENTCOM would transition to a wartime strategy of deterring/defeating aggression. This strategy encompasses the full operational continuum from regional to global operations and capitalizes on US technological superiority. It is based on coalition warfare and is designed to achieve the following wartime objectives: To deter or defeat further aggression. To control escalation of hostilities. To terminate hostilities early, on terms favorable to the United States and regional coalition partners. Force movements and planning activities will generate a great deal of interest from potential adversaries and allies. Hostile collection assets will be active. Sound OPSEC procedures will be exercised. Essential Elements of Friendly Information to be protected are: (1) When, where, and in what strength will US forces be deployed to the gulf region. (2) Which types of deployment systems and lines of communication will be used by deploying forces? (3) Will the US deploy forces to the region? (4) Will the US be willing to use force to deter aggression? (5) Will the US. be willing to commit forces to the defense of Gulf Coordination Council [GCC] territory? (6) What actions will the US. take if attacked? (7) Will the US commit to offensive operations if unprovoked? (8) Which objectives in the region will the US pursue? (9) When, where, and in what strength will US special forces be employed? CENTCOM's wartime strategy envisions three phases of operations which are embodied in all operational contingency planning. These phases are: Early flexible response/deterrent options. These are preplanned, initial response options to any crisis, encompassing all of the instruments of national power (diplomatic/political, economic, and military). They are designed a series of flexible actions to be employed sequentially or simultaneously, as needed, meet the Iranian threat. These options demonstrate US resolve and bolster the confidence and self-defense capabilities of friendly nations. The goal of these options is to forestall conflict by demonstrating to Iran the price to be paid for aggresive actions. Defensive operations. If deterrence should fail, CENTCOM's initial focus will be on operations designed to defend critical facilities, lines communication, and rear areas. These operations could also be used to create the conditions necessary for the next stage, offensive operations. US operations may include but not be limited to the following tasks: establish air superiority in the region, open and maintain air, sea, and ground LOCs in the region, protect and defend air and sea ports in the region, conduct defensive operations, conduct sea denial operations, protect and defend essential military and civilian resources and facilities in the region, conduct deployment and sustainment operations, special and psychological operations focused on discrediting Iran and fomenting rebellion among insurgent forces within Iran's borders. Offensive operations. The actions in this stage would be focused on Iran‘s centers of gravity. These operations would be designed to break the Iranian will to continue fighting and to achieve an early termination of the conflict on terms favorable to the US and its allies. For warfighting operations CENTCOM would: destroy Iranian offensive capability; eliminate Iranian WMD programs; restore pre-conflict international boundaries; eliminate Iranian military alliances; establish regional stability on terms favorable to US interests; and restore free flow of oil. The current Iranian government regime would be replaced. The CENTCOM strategy emphasizes that friends and allies will assume their fair share of the responsibility and burden for maintaining the region‘s sta-bility and security. This approach allows the US to concentrate on those actions necessary achieve a speedy, favorable end to any crisis while reducing risks to national interests. OPLAN 1002-04 - The Khuzestan Gambit? Forward presence of US forces in Iraq cements US credibility, strengthens deterrence, and facilitates transition from peace to war. Although ground forces provide the bulk of the long-term forward presence in Iraq, access to ports and airfields is essential to project other forces into the area. The continued presence of US forces in Iraq sends a strong visible message of the US commitment to defend this region. Presence is enhanced through on-going military-to- military interaction, cooperative defense measures, and prepositioning of equipment and supplies critical to US responsiveness and warfighting flexibility. The term gambit comes from the Italian word gambetto, which was used for a tricky manoeuvre in wrestling. A chess gambit is a exotic way to enjoy a chess game -- there is a touch of recklessness necessarily to become a gambiteer. The term gambit applies to the opening of the game, involving an early sacrifice to achieve later superior attacking chances. The sacrifice is usually speculative, but hard to refuse. During the Cold War there was speculation that the Soviet Union's war planning included the Hamburg Gambit, in which the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany would seize the port city of Hamburg, and then use this hostage in war- termination negotiations. OPLAN 1002-04 has probably been revised to reflect the American occupation of Iraq, and the power projection opportunities this provides against Iran. The Zagros Mountains form a natural pallisade defending Iran from incursions from Iraq. The Iranian province of Khuzestan is the one large piece of flat Iranian terrain to the west of the Zagros Mountains. American heavy forces could swiftly occupy Khuzestan, and in doing so seize control of most of Iran's oil resources, and non-trivial portions of the country's water supply and electrical generating capacity. Khuzestan [Khouzestan] is the most important pivot of Iran's economy. The existence of such huge resources as oil, gas and water in Khuzestan have changed the economic appearance of Iran. Oil first erupted from a well in the Massjed e Soleyman area, located in the southern Khuzestan province. The two principal mountain ranges, the Zagros and the Elburz, diverge from a point of intersection in the Caucasus mountains; the former crosses Iran in a south-easterly direction toward the Persian Gulf. Abadan is a large (pop. 308,000) oil-refinery boomtown, located at the junction of the Karun and Arvandrud rivers. It was largely destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War. Before the war, Abadan had a fairly good museum, but little else worth seeing; now it has even less. It is located 420 mi/675 km south-southwest of Tehran. Like Abadan, Ahvaz is a commercial city (pop. 580,000) that was heavily bombed during the Iran-Iraq War. The city's main attraction is its proximity to several historic sites: Choga Zambil (Elamite ruins and well-preserved ziggerat), Haft Tappe (ruins) and Shush 70 mi/115 km north of Abadan. Once Iran's largest port, Khorramshahr was almost destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War and is being rebuilt. The port, which lies near the Iraqi border on the Karun waterway, dates from ancient times (Alexander the Great founded a city nearby). Khuzestan was home to one of the oldest human civilizations dating back at least 6000 years to Shoosh (Susa). In ancient tiems, such people as the Uxians (who gave their name to Khuzestan in southern Iran) were part of the Caucasic race of people. In the 17th century, in spite of their general poverty and rejection from public life, there were still a good number of Zoroastrians left throughout Persia, from Ahwaz in Khuzestan, to Kandehar in the east. Hautboy is occasionally used in Ashura ceremony in some provinces such as Khuzestan and Khorassan. Generally, the Iranians whose mother tongue is Persian is estimated at more half of the total population of the country. Close to a quarter of the population speaks languages and dialects connected with the Persan one and which form part of the Iranian languages (guilaki, lori, mazandarani, Kurdish, baloutche). Another quarter of the Turkish languages (Azeri, turkmene, qashqhaï). There is also a minority Arabic-speaking person (less than 2 % of the population) living mainly in the province of Khuzestan and the coastal areas of the Persian Gulf. The vast majority of Iran's crude oil reserves are located in giant onshore fields in the southwestern Khuzestan region near the Iraqi border and the Persian Gulf. Iran has 32 producing oil fields, of which 25 are onshore and 7 offshore. Major onshore fields include the following: Ahwaz-Asmari (700,000 bbl/d); Bangestan (around 245,000 bbl/d current production, with plans to increase to 550,000 bbl/d), Marun (520,000 bbl/d), Gachsaran (560,000 bbl/d), Agha Jari (200,000 bbl/d), Karanj-Parsi (200,000 bbl/d); Rag-e-Safid (180,000 bbl/d); Bibi Hakimeh (130,000 bbl/d), and Pazanan (70,000 bbl/d). Major offshore fields include: Dorood (130,000 bbl/d); Salman (130,000 bbl/d); Abuzar (125,000 bbl/d); Sirri A&E (95,000 bbl/d); and Soroush/Nowruz (60,000 bbl/d). According to the Oil and Gas Journal (1/1/04), Iran holds 125.8 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, roughly 10% of the world's total, up from 90 billion barrels in 2003. In October 1999, Iran announced that it had made its biggest oil discovery in 30 years, a giant onshore field called Azadegan located in the southwestern province of Khuzestan, a few miles east of the border with Iraq. Reportedly, the Azadegan field contains proven crude oil reserves of 26 billion barrels. In July 2004, Iran's oil minister stated that the country's proven oil reserves had increased again, to 132 billion barrels, following new discoveries in the Kushk and Hosseineih fields in Khuzestan province. Iran's energy generation capacity has risen to about 26,000 megawatts. The share of Khuzestan in total amount of energy produced in the country was 3,800 mega watts. The figure is expected to increase following operationing of three dams in Khuzestan province. Water resources are unevenly spread; 30 percent of surface water resources are concentrated in one province (Khuzestan), while many other populated provinces fully exploit their scarce available resources. Following the downfall of the Shah, the new government in Iran used the army and other military forces to put down the movements of national minorities in Kurdistan, Turkman Sahra and the Arabs of Khuzestan province. The main thrust of Iraq's attack on 22 September 1980, was in the south, where five armored and mechanized divisions invaded Khuzestan on two axes, one crossing over the Shatt al Arab near Basra, which led to the siege and eventual occupation of Khorramshahr, and the second heading for Susangerd, which had Ahvaz, the major military base in Khuzestan, as its objective. Iraqi armored units easily crossed the Shatt al Arab waterway and entered the Iranian province of Khuzestan. Dehloran and several other towns were targeted and were rapidly occupied to prevent reinforcement from Bakhtaran and from Tehran. By mid-October 1980, a full division advanced through Khuzestan headed for Khorramshahr and Abadan and the strategic oil fields nearby. Other divisions headed toward Ahvaz, the provincial capital and site of an air base. Supported by heavy artillery fire, the troops made a rapid and significant advance--almost eighty kilometers in the first few days. In the battle for Dezful in Khuzestan, where a major air base is located, the local Iranian army commander requested air support in order to avoid a defeat. President Bani Sadr, therefore, authorized the release from jail of many pilots, some of whom were suspected of still being loyal to the shah. With the increased use of the Iranian air force, the Iraqi progress was somewhat curtailed. OPLAN 1003 Major Theater War - East Operations Plan [OPLAN] 1003 has been CENTCOM's primary war plan for the past decade. OPLAN 1003 is really not a strategy or a campaign plan, but is rather a time-phased deployment plan for moving a sufficient number of troops into the theater to enable the US to defeat the entire Iraqi army, should the need arise. Allied forces, under the XVIII Airborne Corp, could include the US 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 82nd Airborne Division, the 101st Air Assault Division, and a MEF. This is a unilateral USCINCCENT OPLAN which provides for the US defense of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi attack. This OPLAN would probably be implemented upon receipt of unambiguous warning of an Iraqi attack through Kuwait into Saudi Arabia or an attack into Kuwait only. This OPLAN is in response to Strategic Capabilities Plan, Part V, tasking to prepare an OPLAN for the unilateral support of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the event of future aggression and for the support of US interests therein. This OPLAN also could provide for the security of US forces, citizens, installations, and resources in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. US objectives are to coordinate and establish an effective force to deter and, if necessary, to counter aggression, prevent military coercion of friendly states, protect resources and facilities in the region, deny enemy access to the same, and ensure access to the regional lines of communication. The strategy of the US is designed to: deter war, improve regional stability, demonstrate a commitment to the region, counter hostile expansion and influences, and prepare for war. Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to rapidly deploy US forces to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Once adequate combat power has been generated and an adequate defense has been conducted, the strategy is to mass forces and to counterattack to restore the territorial integrity and legitimate governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia if they have been violated. USCENTCOM forces will conduct operations in three phases in order to: (a) deter Iraqi aggression into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia, (b) rapidly deploy defensive forces as far forward as possible to confront Iraq with a formidable defense, and (c) conduct an effective defense should Iraq choose to attack. The phases of the operation may overlap. Phase I. Deterrence (C-Day thru D-Day). At the first sign of ambiguous warning (threatening Iraqi activity), USCENTCOM will initiate Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) to deter Iraqi aggression into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia. FDOs, designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve and confront Iraq with the prospect of unacceptable costs for aggression, include all of the instruments of national power (economic, diplomatic, informational, and military). Phase II. Deployment/Force Build-Up (C+5 through C+90). In the deployment phase, emphasis is placed upon rapidly deploying from CONUS and OCONUS locations into the main APODS and SPODS at Dhahran, King Khalid Military City, Ad Dammam, Kuwait City, and Al Jubayl IAW the time-phased force and deployment list. Priority of deployment is to those forces necessary to defend the US initial center of gravity, which is the capability to deploy combat forces into theater. In order, those forces are fighter aircraft and electronic surveillance aircraft to conduct defensive counter- air operations; light, airborne, airmobile, or amphibious ground forces to protect PODS from ground attack; and command and control assets. Naval assets will deploy as rapidly as possible to the Arabian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea in order to establish immediate control over the sea LOCs into the theater. Priority of deployment after the initial defensive forces (those that are critical to protecting the continued deployment) will be based upon the principle of providing (a) antiarmor forces, (b) long-term support forces, and (c) offensive-oriented forces, in that order. USCENTAF will be responsible for reception at APODS; movement from APODS will be the responsibility of USARCENT. The deployment phase will continue until all forces have arrived in theater IAW the TPFDL, but is expected to be complete NLT C+90. Priority of initial defense will be to: (1) APODS and SPODS that provide for continued deployment; (2) C2 facilities; (3) force assembly and build-up areas; and (4) forward defensive positions. Space systems will be positioned to provide support to the initial deployment. Priority will be intel/recon, communications, weather, multispectral imagery, and position/navigation systems. Phase III. Defensive (C+45 thru Indefinite). The defensive phase is designed to repel an Iraqi attack into Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia. During this phase, the US center of gravity will shift to become our ground combat forces. This phase is sub-divided into three sub-phases designed to: (1) improve and strengthen defensive postures; (2) blunt and defeat an invasion; and (3) restore international boundaries with counter-offensive operations if required. This phase will terminate upon direction of the NCA based upon a decrease in the threat of aggression or the defeat of hostile forces. Sub-Phase IIIa. Defensive Posturing (C+45 thru D-Day). This subphase is designated to strengthen and improve the theater defensive posture established not later than C+45. This phase consists of the time between establishment of an effective defense and the commencement of hostilities. This phase may be as short as a matter of hours, or as long as a period of months. During this phase initial, alternate, and final ground defensive positions will be established well forward and improved to the maximum extent possible. Defensive air operations will be maintained at heightened levels commensurate with sustained operations capabilities. Naval operations will continue to insure the unhindered use of sea LOCs and prevent any Iraqi offensive naval operations in the Arabian Gulf. Theater logistics will be improved as rapidly as possible, and joint training will be conducted on a continuous basis. This sub- phase will continue until Iraqi attack commences, or until so directed by the NCA. Sub-Phase IIIb. Defensive Combat (D-Day thru D+7). This phase is implemented when an Iraqi attack is initiated against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. During this phase U.S. air forces initiate theater counterair operations, interdictions, and close air support to gain air superiority, destroy, delay, disrupt, or divert attacking Iraqi ground forces. USARCENT and USMARCENT, supported by tactical air and naval surface fire support, will delay and attrite attacking enemy forces as far forward as possible, and establish in-depth defenses on suitable terrain. In the MARCENT portion of the theater of operations, defensive operations will focus primarily on critical ports, oil facilities, major population centers, and key terrain along the Arabian Gulf coast. In the ARCENT portion of the theater of operations, defensive operations will focus primarily on major population centers and resources of potential military value at King Khalid Military City, Hafar Al Batan, and the approaches to Riyadh. The ability to withstand chemical attack on friendly forces is dependant upon active chemical defense and through ATBM assets. This phase will continue until the enemy has been sufficiently attrited to allow counteroffensive operations, estimated to occur on or about D+7. If this phase commences prior to C+45, major combat forces will continue to deploy to the theater of operations and will be employed to reinforce the defense or to conduct counteroffensive operations, depending upon the theater operational situation. Sub-Phase IIIc. Counteroffensive (D+7 thru D+20). This phase will be implemented once force ratios favor counteroffensive operations. During this phase the ground forces of USARCENT and USMARCENT will initiate supporting counteroffensives to fix and destroy Iraq forces in their respective sectors. The theater reserve (designated by ARCENT), comprised of at least two heavy mechanized Div‘s, an ACR, and an aviation brigade, will then conduct the main theater counteroffensive to destroy the Iraqi center of gravity, which is the operational reserve, if it has penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi territory. If the Iraqi operational reserve has not penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, the U.S. theater reserve will either be held in reserve and not committed, or will be committed in support of USARCENT or USMARCENT to destroy those Iraqi forces that have penetrated into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Only upon the direction of the NCA will offensive ground operations be conducted in Iraq. This phase will be terminated when all Iraqi forces have been expelled from Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia and U.S. forces are again postured into adequate defense positions along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders as per sub-phase IIIb (Defensive Combat) of this OPLAN. U.S. forces will remain in consolidated defensive positions until so directed to redeploy by the NCA. Post conflict operations will be conducted as required with USARCENT serving as the USCENTCOM executive agent for post-conflict operations. USMARCENT. Marine forces will initially establish a screen to provide early warning. Defenses along the FEBA will be established. Units in the defense will engage enemy forces as far forward as possible causing Iraqi units to deploy into attack formations and slow their advance. The movement to subsequent defensive positions will be delayed for as long as possible and must be coordinated with USARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENTAF, and SOCCENT and must not occur until given permission by USCINCCENT. If required, a strong point defense will be established around Kuwait City as a last ditch defensive effort to save this facility. USARCENT. Army forces will initially establish a screen along the border to provide early warning. Defenses along the FEBA will be established. Army forces will also establish a security force of at least air assault division size and capability to guard and secure the theater flank. In addition, ARCENT will provide a heavy mechanized division as the theater reserve. Units in the defense will engage enemy forces as far forward as possible causing Iraqi units to deploy into attack formations and slow their advances. The movement to subsequent defensive positions will be delayed for as long as possible and must be coordinated with USAMARCENT, USNAVCENT, USCENTAF, and USSOCCENT and must not occur until given permission by USCINCCENT. If required, strong point defenses will be established around KKMC and Hafar Al Batin as a last ditch effort to save these critical facilities. USCENTAF (JFACC). The JFACC is the supported commander for counter air, interdiction and strategic attack missions throughout the theater in accordance with the JFC concept of operations. The JFACC will support land component commanders with close air support and interdiction within their areas of operation. During the defensive combat phase (phase IIIb), air operations will be focused on gaining air superiority, destroying WMD capability and destroying, delaying or disrupting Iraqi heavy forces. When the counteroffensive phase (phase IIIc) begins, air operations will focus on maintaining air superiority, close air support and interdiction. USNAVCENT. Naval forces will support the land battle by gaining maritime superiority, conducting coastal defense along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian coast line, providing naval fire support, and participating in the air effort as coordinated by JFACC. Naval forces will make available to the JFACC all sorties in excess of those required for naval warfare task. COMSOCCENT. SOF will support the overall operations to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Special operations forces will deploy along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders and conduct special reconnaissance and electronic surveillance to provide early warning to friendly forces. These forces will conduct operations within designated special operations areas (SOAs). Operations will not be conducted into Iraq without the permission of CINCCENTCOM. Upon initiation of hostilities, the SOAs will be terminated and the SOF forces withdrawn. The focus of SOF operations after an Iraqi attack will be against enemy C3 modes and line of communications. COMSOCCENT will also conduct and coordinate the theater CSAR efforts as required and will be prepared to conduct foreign internal defense operations with friendly nations in theater. OPLAN 1003 - Offensive Operations There are three likely sequels to OPLAN 1003. The first involves a unilateral redeployment similar to what was done following Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, and the second involves a long-term defensive posture along the secured boarders. The third involves counteroffensive operations to include termination of the Iraqi regime. During the 1990s it is not evident that OPLAN 1003 included counter offensive operations into Iraq. By the late 1990s the Korean war plan, OPLAN 5027, had been revised to include counter offensive operations to terminate that North Korean regime. If this option was not included in OPLAN 1003 at that time, it was probably included in OPLAN 1003 by the Bush Administration. OPLAN 1003 is the basis for the widely discussed plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein. This large American military ground offensive would consist of over 200,000 troops and require a three-month buildup. This is not a new plan formulated in response to the Administration's call for regime change in Iraq, but is rather CENTCOM's long established war plan. Apart from the physical destruction of the Iraqi Army, one division at a time, and the aerial bombardment of every identifiable aimpoint in Iraq, OPLAN 1003 does not in and of itself contain a theory of victory that is focused on regime change. As is well known, the three month buildup required for OPLAN 1003 would provide ample time for Saddam to reposition his troops to complicate the American campaign, and to engage in diplomatic and terrorist activities to discourage American military action. According to Kenneth M. Pollack, a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations who served as Director for Gulf Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council From 1999 to 2001, " ... it would make sense to plan for a force twice that size. Some light infantry will be required in case Saddam's loyalists fight in Iraq's cities. Airmobile forces will be needed to seize Iraq's oil fields at the start of hostilities and to occupy the sites from which Saddam could launch missiles against Israel or Saudi Arabia. And troops will have to be available for occupation duties once the fighting is over. All told, the force should total roughly 200,000 -- 300,000 people: for the invasion, between four and six divisions plus supporting units, and for the air campaign, 700 - - 1,000 aircraft and anywhere from one to five carrier battle groups (depending on what sort of access to bases turned out to be possible). Building up such a force in the Persian Gulf would take three to five months, but the campaign itself would probably take about a month, including the opening air operations." In July 2002 it was reported that the "CENTCOM Courses of Action" plan called for air, land and sea-based forces to attack Iraq from three directions — the north, south and west. Tens of thousands of marines and soldiers would invading from Kuwait. Hundreds of warplanes based in up to eight countries, including Turkey and Qatar, would conduct an air campgain against thousands of targets in Iraq, including airfields, roadways and fiber-optics communications sites. Special operations forces and covert CIA teams would strike facilities associated with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the missile capabilities. Special operations troops and airstrikes would seek to destroy chemical and biological weapons sites before the weapons can be used against an invading American force. The source who described the plan The New York Times expressed "frustration that the planning reflected at least in this set of briefing slides was insufficiently creative, and failed to incorporate fully the advances in tactics and technology that the military has made since the Persian Gulf war in 1991." In late August 2002, Michael O´Hanlon estimated that the deployment of combat forces to the Gulf would require the movement of perhaps 10 wings of land-based fighter aircraft, 30 to 50 ships, including three to five aircraft carriers, and four to five divisions of ground forces. Initial U.S. capabilities would consist of the 30,000 American troops already in place. By Day 15 another 50,000 more troops might have arrived. By the end of the first month of the buildup, another 25,000 troops might have arrived, mostly consisting of additional airpower and Naval forces. Another 100,000 troops could arrive within 60 days, bringing the grand total to about 200,000 troops. By O´Hanlon's estimate, the entire deployment could be completed in about 90 days, for a total of about 250,000 troops. The notional OPLAN 1003 counteroffensive operation regime change campaign plan would probably be to first seize Basra, and then attack up either the Tigris or Euphrates River valleys to Baghdad. Iraqi forces might be assumed to be arrayed to delay the seizure of Basra and to disrupt an advance toward Baghdad. Iraq would seek to buy as much time as possible, and to use his mobile forces to cut off Allied supply lines. Iraq might commit six divisions to the defense of Basra. In addition, three divisions might guard the border between Kuwait and Iraq, whose mission was to slow the Allied advance. Another three divisions, along with an armored division, might guard the highway south of An-Nasiriyah to delay and disrupt the advance along the Euphrates. Two motorized divisions might patrol the highway from Rafah north, in order to deny logistical support from bases in Saudi Arabia. To use the Rafah highway would require several days of military operations to clear Iraqi forces, thus buying Hussein time. The remainder of Iraqi forces might be arrayed to block key choke points along the major approaches to Baghdad. It might require many days of offensive operations to take Basra. It could require several more days to open up an attack route up the Euphrates or Tigris. Operations in the vicinity of As-Suwayrah could require at least another week, during which time Iraqi diplomatic efforts would focus on bring the campaign to a halt on terms not un-favorable to Iraq. In mid-September 2002 one British news report [London Daily Telegraph, September 13, 2002] suggested that US war plans would require a five-division assault on Iraq's southern flank, including four of its US divisions and one UK division. In the north, US airborne troops [possibly supported by Britain's 16 Air Assault Brigade] would occupy Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. A Marine Expeditionary Force would mount an amphibious attack from the northern Gulf, which could involve the Royal Marines' 3 Commando Brigade. The British division was expected to be the HQ of 1 Armoured Division, with 4 Armoured Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade [the so-called Desert Rats]. With logistical support, this would amount to a total of about 20,000 troops. The number of RAF aircraft in the region would be tripled, with the six Jaguars based at Incirlik in Turkey increased to 20, which would move to bases in northern Iraq prepared by US engineers. The number of Tornado GR4s would increase to about 30 aircraft based in Kuwait, and the number of RAF personnel would rise to about 5,000. The Royal Navy was expected to provide an amphibious carrier task force led by Ark Royal, which is on its way to the Mediterranean. The group would include the amphibious assault carrier Ocean, which is in the Indian Ocean, and would involve a total of about 4,000 servicemen and women. OPLAN 1004 MTW East [Major Theater War - East] OPLAN 1004 MTW East [Major Theater War - East] is the Middle East plan that starts with MTW West (OPLAN 5027) in progress. The primary differences between OPLAN 1003 and OPLAN 1004 is the forces available. Since many stateside units are dual tasked for both contingencies, OPLAN 1003 and OPLAN 1004 have some differences in the forces available. OPLAN 1019 Arabian Gauntlet On 06 January 2008 three US Navy vessels took evasive actions after five Iranian boats buzzed the ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman called the Iranian provocation ―a serious incident.‖ The fast Iranian boats approached at ―distances and speed that showed reckless, dangerous and potentially hostile intent,‖ he said. The incident lasted about 15 to 20 minutes. The Navy ships were going into the Persian Gulf when the Iranian boats confronted them. ―Small, Iranian fast boats made some aggressive maneuvers against our vessels and indicated some hostile intent,‖ Whitman said. ―This required our vessels to issue warnings and conduct some evasive maneuvers. The U.S. Navy vessels were prepared to take appropriate actions, but there was no engagement of the vessels.‖ The ships were the USS Port Royal (CG 73), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS Ingraham (FFG 61). U.S. warships will take all the precautions needed to safely transit the open waters of the straits, the Pentagon spokesman said. Iranian officials called the buzzing by five Revolutionary Guard speedboats of three U.S. Navy ships "normal," but American officials insisted the behavior was reckless and needlessly provocative. Iranian senior Revolutionary Guards commander Ali Reza Tangsiri told the Mehr news agency that Iran has the right to ask any ships to identify themselves upon entering or leaving the Persian Gulf. "It is a basic responsibility of patrolling units of the Revolutionary Guards to take necessary interception measures toward any vessels entering into the waters of the Persian Gulf," Tangsiri said. The San Diego element of the Tarawa Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) departed 05 November 2007 for a six- month deployment to the U.S. 5th and 7th Fleet areas of operations. Units from San Diego include Amphibious Squadron 1, USS Tarawa (LHA 1), USS Cleveland (LPD 7), USS Germantown (LSD 42), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit and elements of Naval Beach Group 1. USS Port Royal (CG 73), USS Hopper (DDG 70) and USS Ingraham (FFG 61) joined the Tarawa ESG in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Strait Of Hormuz [SOH, much less commmonly termed Straits of Hormuz] is the world‘s second busiest international strait. The key to the Central Command area is to maintain uninterrupted access to energy resources. The Persian Gulf region contains roughly 68% of the world's known oil and natural gas reserves. Nearly 25% of the world‘s oil supply flows through the Strait of Hormuz on a daily basis. Over 75% of Japan's oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz -- daily oil flow of 16.5-17 million barrels (2006E) -- is roughly two-fifths of all seaborne traded oil. The Energy Information Administration projects that oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz will double to 30-34 million barrels per day by 2020, suggesting that ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait will continue to be an important mission. The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway separating the Arabian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and the North Arabian Sea, is only about 40 miles wide, and is 34 miles wide at its narrowest point. By far the world's most important oil chokepoint, the Strait consists of 2-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a 2-mile wide buffer zone. The Persian Gulf is a shallow, semienclosed basin with a mean depth of only 25 to 40 m. The circulation of this basin is driven primarily by the local wind stress and secondarily by thermohaline forcing. The prevailing wind in the Persian Gulf is from the northwest and is called the shamal. A wind-driven generally cyclonic circulation results. The lands surrounding the Persian Gulf are dry so there is strong excess evaporation over the Persian Gulf. This results in a surface inflow of relatively fresh water and an outflow of deeper, more-saline water at the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz has a very small sill and thus a classic inverse-estuarine circulation dominates the Gulf. Relatively freshwater flows in through the Straits and the more saline water flow uninhibited out of the straits at depth. Some of the highest current speeds are in the inflow through the southern side of the Strait of Hormuz. This inflow feeds the eastward coastal current along the south edge of the Gulf, which is strongest near Qatar. Along the Iranian coast, there is another eastward current where it terminates and its remnant turns south into the interior. The majority of oil exported from the Strait of Hormuz travels to Asia, the United States, and Western Europe. Currently, three- quarters of all Japan‘s oil needs pass through this Strait. Most of the crude exported through the Strait travels long distances by Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC) which can carry over two million barrels of oil per voyage. If access to the Gulf were denied, assuming pipelines would flow at maximum capacity, the world would lose about one-fifth of its oil supply. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require use of longer alternate routes (if available) at increased transportation costs. Such routes include the 5 million-bbl/d capacity Petroline (East-West Pipeline) and the 290,000-bbl/d Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids line across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. Theoretically, the 1.65-million bbl/d Iraqi Pipeline across Saudi Arabia (IPSA) also could be utilized, more oil could be pumped north to Ceyhan (Turkey), and the 0.5 million-bbl/d Tapline to Lebanon could be reactivated. A US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report of October 5, 2006 concluded that the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was "insufficient" to replace the oil lost from a severe supply disruption, including a global Iranian oil embargo, Strait of Hormuz closure, or a shutdown of the Saudi oil fields due to terrorism. The report noted that an Iranian embargo could cause oil prices to increase by $16 per barrel and up to $200 billion in GDP damage to the US economy, of which $132 billion could be offset by the SPR. A Saudi shutdown could cause $832 billion in damage to the US GDP, of which only $77 billion could be offset by the SPR. GAO estiamted that Strait of Hormuz closure could cause oil prices to increase by $175 per barrel. Some say it would be foolish for Iran to seek to disrupt oil traffic in the Gulf because all of its oil flows through the Gulf. The US Government doesn't anticipate that Iran would try to do something like that because it would be the first victim of any such program. Strait of Hormuz Legal Status In a December 1982 declaration accompanying signature on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Iran appeared to require prior authorization for warships to enter territorial sea and limited transit passage right in Strait of Hormuz to signatories of 1982 Convention. Iran's declaration stated: "In the light of customary international law, the provisions of article 21, read in association with article 19 (on the Meaning of Innocent Passage) and article 25 (on the Rights of Protection of the Coastal States), recognizes (though implicitly) the rights of the Coastal States to take measures to safeguard their security interests including the adoption of laws and regulations regarding, inter alia, the requirements of prior authorization for warships willing to exercise the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea." Under the 1982 LOS Convention, a coastal state may claim a territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles from the coastline. Each nautical mile is equal to 1852 meters. While the territorial sea is part of the sovereign territory of the state, ships of all states have a right of innocent passage through the territorial. Warships which do not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state concerning passage through the territorial sea can be ordered to leave the territorial sea immediately. On May 2, 1993, the Government of Iran completed legislative action on an "Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea." The legislation provides a reasonably comprehensive set of maritime claims to a territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf, and Iran's jurisdictional claims within those areas. Many of these claims do not comport with the requirements of international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention). Warships and certain other ships are, contrary to international law, required to receive prior approval to engage in innocent passage. Iran's requirement for prior approval is not recognized by the US. The LOS Convention does not permit a coastal State to require a foreign vessel to seek the prior authorization of, or notification to, the coastal State as a condition of conducting innocent passage through its territorial sea. Warships representing a wide variety of nations pass through Iran's territorial sea in innocent passage without objection from Iran, despite Iran's requirement that prior authorization be obtained for each transit. These examples of State practice, shared in by many nations and fully consistent with international law, appear to outweigh Iran's claims to restrict freedom of navigation. The US protested this stated requirement in 1983 and 1987, conducted operational assertions in 1989 and 1992 of prior permission requirement, and conducted regular transits of the Strait of Hormuz starting in 1983. As of 2007 the United States remained a non-signatory of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (USCLOS), yet strongly supports the navigational causes contained therein. The U.S. Freedom of Navigation program has ensured that excessive coastal state claims over the world‘s oceans and airspace are repeatedly challenged. By diplomatic protests and operational assertions, the United States has insisted upon adherence by the nations of the world to the international law of the sea, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea Convention. Iranian Capabilities Iran‘s rearmament program in the 1990s invited an array of interpretations of its military capability to close or interdict the Strait of Hormuz (SOH). The fighting in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), drove Iran‘s military forces down to minimal levels of equipment while increasing institutional disorganization. Air and ground assets ended the war in the poorest condition. Iran chose to rearm these forces first. However, in 1992, the focus widened to include the rebuilding of the Navy and those military assets physically near the Strait of Hormuz. This enlarged emphasis expanded Iranian military capacity to again challenge shipping transiting the SOH. With its new naval acquisitions, Iran is an increased threat to the interests of its neighbors and the West, particularly the United States. In 1992 Iran began a military buildup on several small gulf islands close to the Strait of Hormuz. They added several thousand additional troops to those islands, artillery, and anti-ship missiles. Iran occupies two islands in the Persian Gulf claimed by the UAE: Lesser Tunb (called Tunb as Sughra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Kuchek in Persian by Iran) and Greater Tunb (called Tunb al Kubra in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Tonb-e Bozorg in Persian by Iran); Iran jointly administers with the UAE an island in the Persian Gulf claimed by the UAE (called Abu Musa in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Abu Musa in Persian by Iran). UAE and other Arab Gulf states are seeking to reverse Iran's occupation of three small islands near the Strait of Hormuz: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb Island, and Lesser Tunb Island, all strategically located in the Strait of Hormuz. The three islands were effectively occupied by Iranian troops in 1992. In 1995, the Iranian Foreign Ministry claimed that the islands were "an inseparable part of Iran." Iran rejected a 1996 proposal by the Gulf Cooperation Council for the dispute to be resolved by the International Court of Justice, an option supported by the UAE. On December 31, 2001, the GCC issued a statement reiterating its support for the UAE's sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Tunbs, declared Iran's claims on the islands as "null and void," and backed "all measures...by the UAE to regain sovereignty on its three islands peacefully." The Iranians have repeatedly threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if the rest of the world does not do what Iran wishes it to do in a variety of ways. There was such a threat in May 1997, with the Iranians saying that if the Americans were to try to take any kind of retaliatory action against Iranian terrorism, they would close this Strait of Hormuz. During a 18 December 1997 press conference, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki stated that Iran supports "the free flow of oil" through the Strait of Hormuz, but reserved the option of closing off the shipping route if it is threatened. Iran has admitted to deploying anti- aircraft and anti- ship missiles on Abu Musa, an island strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz‘s shipping lanes. In one possible scenario for an area-denial strategy, Iran might be able to prevent the US Navy from operating in the Persian Gulf by mining the Strait of Hormuz and then guarding it with antiship cruise missiles and small submarines to thwart mine-clearing operations. The US intelligence community judges that Iran can briefly close the Strait of Hormuz, relying on a layered strategy using predominately naval, air, and some ground forces. During 2004 Iran purchased North Korean torpedo and missile-armed fast attack craft and midget submarines, making marginal improvements to this capability. Tehran's ability to interdict the Strait of Hormuz with air, surface and sub-surface naval units, as well as mines and missiles remains a concern. Additionally, Iran's asymmetrical capabilities are becoming more robust. These capabilities include high-speed attack patrol ships, anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and hardened facilities for surface-to-surface missiles and command and control. The American Military & the Strait of Hormuz The US Navy's presence in the Gulf has grown steadily since 1879, when Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt sailed USS Ticonderoga through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the first American man-of-war to visit the Gulf. Because the free flow of trade in the region was threatened as Iran and Iraq staged a "tanker war," a stronger US stance became necessary. In 1987, after the Iran-Iraq War resulted in several military incidents in the Persian Gulf, the United States increased U.S. Navy forces operating in the Persian Gulf and adopted a policy of reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Gulf. President Reagan reported that U.S. ships had been fired upon or struck mines or taken other military action on September 23, October 10, and October 20, 1987 and April 19, July 4, and July 14, 1988. During the Iran-Iraq War, one of China's most controversial arms transfers involved the HY-2 antiship missile, commonly [and improperly] referred to in the media as the "Silkworm." The first of several HY-2 shipments was delivered in the summer of 1986, and in October 1987 an American-owned tanker under the Liberian flag and a Kuwaiti tanker under the US flag, the Sea Isle City, were hit by Iranian HY-2 missiles. The United States gradually reduced its forces after a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq on August 20, 1988. Operation Earnest Will proved successful. The United States reacted to Iran's military buildup in the 1990s by an increased military presence, economic sanctions, and continued political rallying against the Islamic Republic. Simultaneously, the Gulf Cooperation Council reacted by implementing efforts to improve military strength through the acquisition of weapons from the United States and others. A "spiraling effect" arms race is taking place between Iran and the GCC, in which each side attempts to gain military advantage over the other. The growth of the Iranian forces, specifically the navy and those components next to the SOH, have resulted in mixed threat interpretations. The challenge for decision-makers and strategic planners alike lies in accurately assessing the ability of Iranian forces to attempt to and, if possible, keep the Strait of Hormuz closed. On many occasions since 1989 U.S. warships exercised the right of innocent passage through the Iranian territorial sea without notice to or reaction from Iran. Exercise Arabian Gauntlet Multinational forces gather to participate in the world's largest mine countermeasures exercise, "Arabian Gauntlet." Arabian Gauntlet is a joint multinational military exercise to maintain the vital sea lines in and out of the Persian Gulf. Arabian Gauntlet is a multilateral exercise that integrates mine warfare with surface warfare. The purpose of the exercise is to refine coalition warfare capabilities, specifically in the area of mine warfare, surface warfare and off- shore infrastructure protection. It also promotes military to military relationships and improves the tactical proficiency of the coalition as well as enhances regional security in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility. Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot (FBE-F) FBE Foxtrot [30 Nov - 8 Dec 1999] was shifted from C6F to C5F due to operations in Kosovo and occured 30 November-8 December 1999. Focus areas included Weapons of Mass Destruction and Coastal Domanance. Networked combined force required 62% less time to restore mine free shipping in Strait of Hormuz (FBE Foxtrot, December 1999). FBE-Foxtrot investigated coordinated joint naval and land fires (including those provided by SOF and U.S. Army Apache helicopters) through an experimental Joint Fires Element. It explored time-critical targeting of a coordinated, multi-layered enemy at a naval chokepoint. The experiment also explored using distributed, collaborative planning to enhance understanding of the undersea environment and operational situation in countermine warfare. A battle management cell for defense against chemical and biological weapons was established to seek improvements in chemical/biological defense readiness and vulnerability assessment, warning and reporting of chem/bio events, and coordination of intra-theater support and initial responses to chemical/biological attacks. USS PAUL F. FOSTER (DD 964) departed for its eleventh deployment on January 27, 1999. While serving as part of the Pacific Middle East Force, PAUL F. FOSTER participated in OPERATION IRON SIREN, EAGER SENTRY, and ARABIAN GAUNTLET. In addition, the ship conducted boarding's in support of United Nations Sanctions against Iraq. The Shipboard Deployable Surface Target (SDST) -- also known as "Roboski" -- provides an enhanced gunfire training capability against highly maneuverable, high speed surface targets. As such, Roboski offers an inexpensive, expendable target for Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection small arms training and supports 76mm, 5-inch/54caliber, and Phalanx CIWS training. SDST's are presently maintained by the Fleet Composite Squadron Six (VC-6), COMFIFTHFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, and the Southern California Offshore Range Extension (SCORE) in support of COMTHIRDFLT. SDST was used for gunfire training in the Arabian Gauntlet exercise. During 2000 in Neon Falcon and Arabian Gauntlet, LAKE CHAMPLAIN improved interoperability and fostered good will with forces from Europe as well as Arabian Gulf coalition partners. USS Elliot (DD 967) was one of eight U.S. naval ships participating in Exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2000. The Harry S Truman Battle Group participated in numerous international exercises during 2001, including Arabian Gauntlet, an 11-nation exercise that involved more than 20 ships. Fleet ocean-going tug USNS Catawba conducted a simulated distressed diver drill during the multi-nation operation Arabian Gauntlet 2001. Patrol Squadron 47's "Golden Swordsman" took part in the Arabian Gauntlet exercise in the Persian Gulf. VP-47 combat aircrews flew missions in support of the Arabian Gauntlet exercise, while operating out of Masirah, Oman and the Kingdom of Bahrain. The P-3 Orions of VP-47 participated with ships and aircraft from the British, German, French, Saudi Arabian, Omani, Kuwaiti, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan and U.S. military forces. The exercise lasted 21 days, with VP-47's P-3s flying both day and night missions for a majority of the exercise's duration.The event ended on April 1 and VP-47 buckled back down to finish out the last two months of a six month deployment, with a Bravo Zulu from the commodore, DESRON 50, under their belt. For the first time in its country‘s history, the Iraqi Navy has joined with coalition forces to participate as observers during exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2005 in the Persian Gulf 22-30 March 2005. More than 3,000 people and 19 ships from the United States, Iraq, Pakistan and other coalition and regional allies participated in Arabian Gauntlet 2005. Sixteen ships from 14 coalition and regional allies concluded Exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2007, the world‘s largest mine countermeasures exercise, 30 April 2007 in the Arabian Gulf. The biennial Arabian Gauntlet is a two-phase evolution. Two days of training seminars precede an eight-day underway phase. USS Shreveport (LPD 12) served as the flagship for commander, Mine Countermeasures Squadron (MCMRON) 3 during Exercise Arabian Gauntlet 2007. Throughout the exercise, Shreveport and MCMRON 3 hosted a multinational command element aboard. The exercise consisted of dive operations, mine hunting and sweeping, and the establishment of safe lanes of navigation. It culminated in a simulated merchant vessel‘s transit through an area that had been swept by coalition ships and aircraft. Shreveport launched its Landing Craft Unit (LCU) early every morning to provide a forward dive platform to conduct underwater countermeasure operations. The mine countermeasure ships not directly involved in diving operations focused their efforts on mine detection, mine sweeping, the establishment of routes for safe passage and a number of simulated oil infrastructure defense and force protection exercises. Operation Uphold Democracy In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won 67% of the vote in a presidential election that international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office in February 1991, but was overthrown by dissatisfied elements of the army and forced to leave the country in September of the same year. From October 1991 to June 1992, Joseph Nerette, as president, led an unconstitutional de facto regime and governed with a parliamentary majority and the armed forces. In June 1992, he resigned and Parliament approved Marc Bazin as prime minister of a de facto government with no replacement named for president. In June 1993, Bazin resigned and the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo, bringing the Haitian military to the negotiating table. President Aristide and Gen. Raoul Cedras, head of the Haitian armed forces, signed the UN-brokered Governors Island Agreement on July 3, 1993, establishing a 10-step process for the restoration of constitutional government and the return of President Aristide by October 30, 1993. The military derailed the process and the UN reimposed economic sanctions. The political and human rights climate continued to deteriorate as the military and the de facto government sanctioned repression, assassination, torture, and rape in open defiance of the international community's condemnation. In May 1994, the military selected Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint to be provisional president of its third de facto regime. The UN and the U.S. reacted to this extraconstitutional move by tightening economic sanctions (UN Resolution 917). On July 31, 1994, the UN adopted Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule and Aristide's presidency. In the weeks that followed, the United States took the lead in forming a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. In Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY US objectives were fostering democratic institutions and reducing the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States. Despite the pledges of a military-backed regime in Haiti to return power to the democratically elected government it had ousted, the regime did not relinquish authority but became increasingly repressive and presided over a deteriorating economy. As the result of deteriorating conditions, tens of thousands of impoverished Haitians fled the country, many attempting to enter the United States. The United States responded with Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the movement of forces to Haiti to support the return of Haitian democracy. The U.S.-led Multinational Force for Haiti (MNF) began on September 19, 1994 with the approval of the Security Council, which, at the same time, approved the follow-on U.N. operation. The American road back to Haiti began in early 1994 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Eustis, Virginia; and Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. At these installations, during the XVIII Airborne Corps' Super Thrust I and Super Thrust II exercises in April and June 1994, units formed a concept of operations for Haiti. These exercises laid a framework for synchronizing critical operations tasks. The US began planning for Operation Uphold Democracy in August 1994. The group had to simultaneously plan for two contingencies: a permissive entry in Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy) or a forced entry (Operation Restore Democracy). Crisis action planning for Operation Restore Democracy stopped when former President Jimmy Carter's negotiations with Haiti's General Raoul Cedras proved successful. In preparation for this contingency, DOD simultaneously planned for an invasion and for the peaceful entry of forces into Haiti, and executed portions of both scenarios. The US Army today is "offensive minded." Hence, the concept of Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370 was offensive violence inflicted suddenly, from air and sea, with overwhelming but appropriate force. By contrast, OPLAN 2380 was developed for a permissive entry but still sought to land large numbers of well-armed troops in an offensive, combat-ready posture. OPLAN 2375 took a position somewhere in between, and when it was further modified and executed as 2380+, it retained the offensive capabilities inherent in OPLANs 2370 and 2380. There were numerous problems in joint planning, especially in the integration of OPLAN 2380 with 2370. The latter was the product of the XVIII Airborne Corps as Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 while OPLAN 2380 was being developed by the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)] as JTF 190. For the invasion, an airdrop was planned involving 3,900 paratroopers. Most of this force was airborne when Haitian officials agreed to a peaceful transition of government and permissive entry of American forces. With U.S. troops prepared to enter Haiti in a matter of hours, President Clinton dispatched a negotiating team led by former President Jimmy Carter to discuss with the de facto Haitian leadership the terms of their departure. As a result, the MNF deployed peacefully, Cedras and other top military leaders left Haiti, and restoration of the legitimate government began, leading to Aristide's return on October 15. Air refueling was used extensively for reconnaissance and combat air patrol missions, with 297 sorties and 1,129 flying hours logged by KC-135 and KC-10 tankers. To transport personnel and materiel from the continental United States to the Caribbean basin, strategic airlift relied on three stage bases close to onload locations: C-5s staged at Dover AFB, Delaware, primarily, and also at Griffiss AFB, New York, while C-141s staged at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. In Haiti, Port-au-Prince was the destination of the strategic airlifters. Airfield conditions at another offload site, Cap Haitien, precluded its use by C-5s and C-141s. C-5s and C-141s delivered troops and cargo to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, where the personnel and supplies were transloaded to C-130s for movement to Cap Haitien and other Haitian locations. The credible threat of overwhelming force--combined with skillful, eleventh-hour diplomacy--enabled U.S. forces to land unopposed and avoid the negative consequences that combat would have brought. The MNF initially employed over 20,000 U.S. military personnel, plus some 2,000 personnel from a dozen other countries. The mission was to restore democracy by removing the de facto military regime, return the previously elected Aristide regime to power, ensure security, assist with the rehabilitation of civil administration, train a police force and judiciary, help prepare for elections, and turn over responsibility to the U.N. A prior but unfulfilled political agreement between the parties on Governor's Island (New York) in 1991 served as a template to shape objectives. There was a major commitment to peace-building by civilian agencies of the U.S. government, particularly USAID, closely coordinated with the U.N. and numerous other international, regional, and non-governmental organizations. U.S. special operations forces played an essential role in establishing security and assuring de facto public administration in rural areas. The Maritime Administration activated 14 of its Ready Reserve Force vessels, this time to support UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The ships transported military cargo from various U.S. ports to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. All were fully crewed by a total of more than 400 civilian American seafarers and were operational within four days of being requested, ahead of the military's activation requirement. General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, praised the "flawless, timely response" of everyone involved in activating the RRF ships to support American troops serving in Haiti. UPHOLD DEMOCRACY succeeded both in restoring the democratically elected government of Haiti and in stemming emigration, thanks to well-executed political, military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities. On March 31, 1995 the United States transferred the peacekeeping responsibilities to United Nations functions. Advanced planning and coordination for the transition were well managed by the U.S. and the U.N., as were the selection and training of senior leaders to sustain continued cooperative international action. In contrast to the Somalia transition, the U.N. deployed an advance headquarters element to Haiti six months prior to the change of command. On March 31, 1995, a smaller U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti (UNMIH) succeeded the powerful MNF, with a March 1996 deadline for completion, after a newly-elected President is scheduled to take office. OPLAN 4102 Operations Plan 4102 [with Annexes] is a top secret road map from peace to war by the US Europen Command. It described in minute detail how the US forces would react, almost hourly, to a Soviet attack across the inter-German border, including detailed plans for bringing in reinforcements from the United States, equipping them, and putting them under NATO command. The plan included descriptions of where each unit will go upon the outbreak of war, and now individual combat units would use the hills and valleys of the rugged West German terrain to conduct a defense in depth, including nuclear-release procedures. During the Cold War NATO's sole focus was on territorial collective defense, and the need for simplicity overrode any initiatives towards greater military efficiency among its members. NATO organized the General Defense Plan of Germany into eight national corps, whose commanders retained crucial command authorities, e.g. authority over training, logistics, task organization, and mission assignments, among others. The European General Defense Plan (GDP 31001) was tested annually during Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises. The US Army's mission in Germany was to man the the General Defense Plan line, which cut north-south across the Fulda Gap, the break in the Vogelsberg mountains through which the Iron Curtain ran. Every piece of artillery, every machine gun, rifle, mortar, tank, and anti-tank weapon in the 3d Armored Division was intended to hit the Russians the moment they came pouring through the gap. During the 1980s, V Corps included the 3d Armored Division, 8th Infantry Division, and 11th Armored Cavalry. The VII Corps included the 1st Armored Division, 3d Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), and 2d Armored Cavalry. The separate 2d Armored Division (Forward) was stationed in northern Germany. These forces were arrayed, in line with the NATO General Defense Plan, in an essentially static forward defense of the traditional, critical eastern approaches to Western Europe. Their mission was to hold off an attack from the East until reinforcements could arrive from the United States. Against the increasing numerical superiority of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces, USAREUR concentrated its energy on improving its equipment and training, reefing reinforcement plans, building up prepositioned and war reserve stocks, and increasing interoperability with other NATO forces. As a result of Project CHASE the 709th MP Bn (C) formulated and published the new General Defense Plan (GDP-1- 75) to support V Corps. During the Cold War, an outstanding leader development tool for Cold War commanders in Europe was the General Defense Plan briefing. Leaders were required to take a higher command‘s written and oral plan, develop the defense plan for their unit, and then brief it back to their commanders. Retired Sgt. Clyde Lee Conrad who, while living in Bad Kreutznach, Germany, passed sensitive NATO information to the Hungarian State Defense Authority. Conrad supplied the Hungarian government with the General Defense Plan (GDP) for essentially every allied unit assigned to Europe. He was a key player in what is generally regarded as one of the most successful Soviet Bloc spy rings of recent times. Conrad was tried in Germany and convicted of high treason. Conrad was arrested in 1988 and two years later, a West German court sentenced him to life in prison for espionage. He received the first life sentence ever given by the Federal Republic of Germany for espionage activities. Conrad died in 1998. The V Corps‘s 130th Engineer Brigade‘s roots are firmly entrenched in the General Defense Plan days of Germany‘s forward-deployed heavy divisions. In those days, units didn‘t have to be strategically responsive or rapidly deployable beyond border assembly areas in eastern Germany. Throughout the Cold War, mobilization to execute USAREUR's OPLAN 4102, plus the possibility of concurrent hostilities in Korea, was planned much on the model of World War II. It was expected that if the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact attacked North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, full mobilization would quickly be directed by the President. Full mobilization meant that all of the ARNG and USAR TPFDL units would be mobilized and deployed as required by the CINCs. For most RC units that would have entailed prolonged periods of post-mobilization training and issuance of additional equipment and personnel fill from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and/or Selective Service. Units could be deployed when they reached a Command, Control and Communication (C3) readiness category if necessary. Events since the end of the Cold War have indicated that although mobilization can be readily invoked by the National Command Authority (NCA) as in Operation DESERT STORM, the scope and magnitude of the use of reserve forces will most likely be less than that envisioned to deal with a Warsaw Pact style threat. Although such a scenario must remain a possibility, smaller scale mobilization is more likely for the Army XXI. It is essential that Army leaders engage public affairs to create a climate where necessary community support and acceptance can be initiated and sustained through a series of PA programs. No longer can commanders memorize General Defense Plan battle positions at the Fulda Gap and know who and where they will fight. Field grade officers must now be capable of thinking through the most difficult situation, adapting to changes in their operational environment and ensuring the continued success and freedom of our nation. The Army expects it will take time before our officer corps is comfortable with the notion of having no ―school solution,‖ but as seen in Afghanistan, Iraq and other hotspots throughout the world, there is no General Defense Plan, and the enemy is constantly changing, thinking and adapting. Garden Plot / CONPLAN 2502 (Civil Disturbance Operations) Use of the military to support civil authorities stems from core national values as expressed in the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 states, ―Congress shall have power... to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.‖ Article II, Section 3 states the President, ―...shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.‖ The 10th Amendment reads, ―The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it, are reserved to the States respectively...,‖ providing the basis that Federal government support, including DoD assistance, is provided in support of State and local authorities. The President is authorized by the Constitution and Title 10 (10 USC 331–334) to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence. After issuing a Cease and Desist Order, the President issues an executive order that directs the Attorney General and the SECDEF to take appropriate steps to disperse insurgents and restore law and order. The Attorney General is then responsible to coordinate the federal response to domestic civil disturbances. The restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act no longer apply to federal troops executing the orders of the President to quell the disturbance in accordance with Rules of the Use of Force (RUF) approved by the DoD General Counsel and the Attorney General. USNORTHCOM Concept Plan (CONPLAN) 2502 (Civil Disturbance Operations), is the plan for supporting state and local authorities during civil disturbances. This plan serves as the foundation for any CDO operation and standardizes most activities and command relationships. Tasks performed by military forces may include joint patrolling with law enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction force. The JTF commander, a general officer, coordinates all DoD support with the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG). DoD will usually establish a JTF headquarters near where the Attorney General‘s local representative is based. Garden Plot is the DoD Civil Disturbance Plan, the generic Operations Plan [OPLAN] for military support related to domestic civil disturbances. The department of the Army Civil Disturbance Plan (DA GARDEN PLOT), is the governing publication for planning, deployment, employment, and redeployment of federal military resources involved in countering domestic civil disturbances. Military assistance to Federal, State, and local government (including government of U.S. territories) and their law enforcement agencies for civil disturbances and civil disturbance operations, including response to terrorist incidents, are referred to cumulatively as "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)." The DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (2005) defines Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) as, ―DoD support, including federal military forces, the Department‘s career civilian and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.‖ It notes that DSCA is also often referred to as Civil Support. There has been discussion in some DoD offices of distinguishing between the two terms: Civil Support as a total force construct with DSCA involving Federal support only and not include the National Guard in Title 32 or State Active Duty status. But as of 2008 they remained essentially synonymous. Until the 2005 DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, the term Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) was essentially synonymous with Civil Support and served as an overarching construct that included three subordinate mission sets: Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) and Military Assistance to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA). Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA) has replaced MACA. The term MACDIS has been replaced by Civil Disturbance Operations (CDO). Civil disturbances are riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10, United States Code. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA), subsequent amendments and policy decisions prohibits the use of federal military forces (to include Reserve forces) to perform internal police functions. PCA thus restricts the type of support DoD can provide domestic law enforcement organizations. There are a wide variety of exceptions to the PCA and the law essentially gives the President all the authority he needs to employ DoD forces inside the U.S. although there may appropriately be political consequence that would inhibit such employment. The term posse comitatus [po.si komitei.tAs, -tius , [med. (Anglo) L., force of the county: see prec. and county.] applies to the 'The force of the county‘; the body of men above the age of fifteen in a county (exclusive of peers, clergymen, and infirm persons), whom the sheriff may summon or ‗raise‘ to repress a riot or for other purposes; also, a body of men actually so raised and commanded by the sheriff. In the United States the posse comitatus was perhaps most important on the Western frontier (there known as a posse), but it has been preserved as an institution in many states. Sheriffs and other peace officers have the authority to summon the power of the county. In some counties it is a crime to refuse assistance. In general, members of a posse comitatus have been permitted to use force if necessary to achieve a posse‘s legitimate ends, but state laws differ as to the legal liability of one who in good faith aids an officer himself acting beyond his authority. Congress sought to terminate the prevalent use of federal soldiers in civilian law enforcement roles in the South during the Reconstruction Period following the Civil War. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 created general prohibition against use of military personnel in civilian law enforcement. The most renowned statutory exception has been traditionally referred to as The Insurrection Acts (10 USC 331–334) that were modified and renamed to Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order by the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The new language clarifies Presidential authority to invoke the acts for situations resulting from natural disasters and other emergencies. The President is authorized by the Constitution and laws of the United States to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence under various conditions and circumstances. Planning and preparedness by the Federal Government and the Department of Defense for civil disturbances are important due to the potential severity of the consequences of such events for the Nation and the population. Military resources may be employed in support of civilian law enforcement operations in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. territories and possessions only in the parameters of the Constitution and laws of the United States and the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, including delegations of that authority through this Directive or other means. The primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested in the State and local governments. Supplementary responsibility is vested by statute in specific Agencies of the Federal Government other than the Department of Defense. The President has additional powers and responsibilities under the Constitution of the United States to ensure that law and order are maintained. The mission at NORTHCOM is to anticipate events in the homeland and to be prepared to respond, to either prevent the attacks or defeat them if they occur and then to mitigate the consequences of those attacks should they occur. In addition, NORTHCOM has a secondary mission to provide defense support to civil authorities. It's an old mission that the Army used to lump together under the Garden Plot scenario, in that there was always a brigade that was prepared to respond to civil disturbances. The secretary of the Army is the Executive Agent for DOD in matters pertaining to civil disturbances. The U. S. Army Director of Military Support (DOMS) is the action agent and the DOD point of contact in all such matters. The Secretary of the Army as the DOD Executive Agent, will, in the event of a civil disturbance within CONUS, exercise through the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the direction of those forces committed to him by the military services. In the event of civil disturbances in U. S. territories and possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico outside CONUS, the DOD Executive Agent exercises the direction of those forces assigned or committed to the commanders of unified or specified commands. The Coast Guard, as well as the other Services, is required to maintain support plans. GARDEN PLOT is the name applicable to such service plans. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of operational commanders should reflect guidance herein. Military assistance to civil authorities is a peacetime matter, not to be confused with military support of civil defense (MSCD), which is a wartime function. DOD task force operations to quell civil disturbances off military property can be initiated only by Presidential order. Cases of such initiation in the past occurred during the urban political and racial unrest in the Vietnam era when federal troops were deployed on a number of occasions. GARDEN PLOT operations may include terrorist incidents, though the FBI, not the Army, will then be the lead agent. In the event of civil unrest upon the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, where in the Coast Guard has standing statutory responsibility, Coast Guard units will in all likelihood be legitimately involved in law enforcement operations well before any Presidential invocation of civil disturbance plans. The Coast Guard character for law enforcement and cooperation with civil authorities is much broader than that of DOD services. DOD services are subject to law enforcement restrictions that are not applicable to the Coast Guard. For policy reasons (i.e., to ensure unity of command and control), there may be instances when these restrictions are imposed upon Coast Guard personnel under a DOD task force commander's operational control. Cooperation with other services in GARDEN PLOT operations is paramount and requires particular understanding of task force constitution and chains of command. Civil disturbance planning cannot be deliberate in that force mix and locales are obviously indeterminate. Guidance herein will provide a basis for Coast Guard participation and related area and district supplemental instructions or other directives. Actual Coast Guard participation will in all likelihood be the logical extension of traditional law enforcement functions. The right of the United States to use federal forces to protect federal property and functions is an accepted principle of government. However, this use of federal forces is warranted only when the need for protection of Federal property or functions clearly exists and State or local authorities cannot or will not give adequate protection. Prior to the designation of a civil disturbance objective area and employment of federal forces by Presidential order, the Army may reinforce other federal forces defending federal property. Elements of the U. S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM) maintain liaison with federal, state, and municipal investigative and police agencies and on order of Department of the Army, collect and report civil disturbance information in response to requests from DA, the Personal Liaison Officer for the Chief of Staff, Army (PLOCSA), task force commanders, CONUS Army commanders, and other specified commands. Military intelligence units have a very limited role during domestic support operations other than civil disturbance operations. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Reg. 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons (Dec. 1982)[hereinafter DOD 5240.1-R], does not apply to DOD intelligence components when they perform authorized law enforcement activities, including civil disturbance activities. In such cases, DOD intelligence components may collect, report, process, and store information on the activities of persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department in accordance with U.S. Dep't of Defense, Dir. 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense (7 Jan. 1980) and U.S. Dep't of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT) (15 Feb. 1991). The Insurrection Act permitted the President to call the militia into Federal service to suppress insurrections and to enforce the law, including when State authorities were unable or unwilling to secure the Constitutional rights of their citizens. Rarely in U.S. history has this authority been employed. In fact, the National Guard has been federalized under the provisions of the Insurrection Act only ten (10) times since World War II. U.S. Presidents invoked the Insurrection Act when a Governor requested such a decree or when State authorities were clearly unable or unwilling to secure the Constitutional rights of their citizens. When this authority is employed it takes control of a state‘s National Guard from the Governor and places command and control within the Federal government. This requires the federalized National Guard forces to perform missions assigned by the federal government, where and when specified, which may not be consistent with a Governor‘s direction that these forces conduct lifesaving, law enforcement or other critical emergency functions in support of the State emergency management agencies and incident commanders. Controversy over civil rights and the unpopular war in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s resulted in one of the most turbulent periods in American histry. During this same time, major riots occurred in Los Angeles in 1965; Detroit in 1967; Chicago in 1968 during the Democratic National Convention; Santa Barbara, California, in 1970; East Los Angeles, California, in 1970 and 1971; and Attica, New York, in 1971, during a major prison riot. Violent rioting once again erupted across the country on April 29,1992, when four police officers were acquitted after being accused of beating a black suspect (Rodney King). Also in recent years, issues such as abortion, gay rights, immigration, and gun control have generated great public debate and resulted in many mass assemblies and demonstrations. The Active Army has often led federalized forces of the various state ARNGs during periods of domestic disturbance, such as the several Garden Plot operations to restore order in major urban areas in the 1960s. The ability of the Reserve Components to conduct operations to control civil disturbances was increased during fiscal year 1970; 375,000 National Guardsmen and 14,000 Army Reservists had been trained in riot control as the year closed. The Army National Guard conducted, at the expense of regular training, sixteen hours of refresher civil disturbance training. Some states also carried out civil disturbance command post exercises in conjunction with local and state civil authorities. The Army Reserve had three infantry brigades which were part of the federal military contingency force for the control of civil disturbances. These units also conducted sixteen hours of refresher civil disturbance training at the expense of primary training. This additional responsibility of the Reserve Components called for their immediate availability in times of natural disasters, civil disturbances, and other emergencies. The Army National Guard bore the brunt of these requirements because of its responsibility to the respective state governments. From July 1, 1969, to June 30, 1970, individual National Guard units were called in by state governors on ninety-two different occasions in thirty-one states and the District of Columbia. These included civil disturbances at Chicago, Illinois; Madison, Wisconsin; Charleston, South Carolina; Berkeley, California; and Columbus and Kent, Ohio. In response to the US invasion of Cambodia, student unrest broke out. Under Operation "Garden Plot," from 30 April through 04 May 1970 9th Air Force airlift units transported civil disturbance control forces from Ft Bragg to various locations throughout the eastern US. Such deployments were commonplace during the unrest of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 943d Rescue Group participated in Operation Garden Plot in support of Republican and Democratic conventions in 1972. The anti-war and civil right protests picked up momentum in 1968. On 20 May 1972, the 10th Transportation Battalion assumed a secondary mission and provided 650 for a civil disturbance task force. The task force conducted garden Plot exercise on 6 and 7 September 1972 and 1st US Army commended the Soldiers for their professionalism. It conducted another Garden Plot Exercise from 18 to 20 January 1973. In February 1973, the US and North Vietnamese sign the Peace Accords in Paris and the US agreed to withdraw ground units from Vietnam. With troops out of the war, the need for a civil disturbance task force diminished. They conducted another Garden Plot Exercise on 28 June and 19 December 1973. OPLAN 5026 - Air Strikes OPLAN 5026/CONPLAN 5026 has been associated, in the available literature, with surgical strikes against North Korea that would take out crucial targets but would not constitute the initiation of a major theater war. One scenario for dealing with North Korea's nuclear program would consist of surgical strikes against facilities believed to be involved with the production, storage, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Such strikes might resemble the Israeli preemptive strike on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981. Using B-2 stealth bombers and F-117 stealth fighters the United States could strike multiple targets throughout North Korea, including the reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon. The deployment of F-117s from the 49th Fighter Wing to South Korea and the deployments of B-52s and B-1Bs to Guam brought a significant degree of capability to the region that might have handled contingencies. During the 1993-1994 Nulear Crisis, defense officials within the Clinton Administration began developing contingency plans for conducting surgical strikes on Yongbyon. Those plans consisted of deploying additional squadrons of aircraft to South Korea, including F-117s, the deployment of several battalions of ground troops to reinforce elements of the 2nd Infantry Division, and the deployment of an additional aircraft carrier battle group with its strike aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles. The plan, which had been developed by the USFK commander General Gary Luck, was designed so that it could be executed within a very short timeframe, a couple of days. There are a variety of factors that could complicate military strikes against North Korea. First, while there a number of facilities that would be obvious targets there is a high degree of probability that there are more locations than may have been previously identified making it unlikely that a single round of surgical strikes could eliminate the DPRK capability. Enough plutonium to produce roughly two nuclear bombs is still unaccounted for and the materials have most likely been located at different installations. The abundance of deeply buried underground targets is another issue as a number of suspect sites appear to be under mountains. This limits the type of munitions that could be used as some conventional warheads may not be powerful enough to reach sensitive areas. Entrances to these facilities, once identified, may be targeted resulting in the collapse of those entrances. The impacts associated with air strikes could be quite significant ranging from the release of radiation to a North Korean retaliation. Strikes on the Yonbyon reactor and other suspected nuclear production facilities could release radiation that could have negative consequences on the region as a whole. Tailoring the strikes in such a way as to maximize returns but to limit the likelihood of a North Korean retaliation would be extremely difficult. The North Korean leadership is already acutely paranoid and sensitive to US military actions and might be predisposed to respond any air strikes by initiating a full-scale war. To prevent or minimize a North Korean response the United States might also opt to strike command and control locations as well as artillery emplacements that threaten US troops and South Korean targets including Seoul. Missile garrisons could also be targeted to remove the threat to Japan and the southern areas of the ROK. Depending on the aircraft used, the United States might also have to suppress North Korean air defenses surrounding critical targets, an effort that would be difficult. This presents an additional problem of creating a target list so large that it might be just as simple for the United States to aim for the liberation of North Korea rather than the more limited strikes. The deployment of additional assets to the South Korea and Guam in early March 2003 brough a great deal of capability to the region that would be usefull if the United States were to conduct surgical strikes. On February 28, 2003 twelve B-52Hs and twelve B-1Bs were ordered to deploy to Andersen Air Force Base at Guam. On March 10 the 3rd Fighter Wing deployed roughly twenty-four F-15Es and 800 airmen from the 90th Fighter Squadron to Osan Air Force Base. On March 14 six F-117s from the 49th Fighter Wing arrived at Kunsan Air Base. These forces would be sufficient to carry out a number of strikes. Each of the above aircraft have the ability to deliver precision guided munitions, specifically the Joint Direct Attack Munition. The twenty-four F-15E Strike Eagle's could deliver a total of 96 JDAMs (4 per aircraft), the F-117s could deliver 12 JDAMs (2 per aircraft), the B-1B Lancer's could deliver 288 JDAMs (24 per aircraft), and the B-52H's could deliver 216-360 JDAMs (18 per aircraft and depending on the use of external implacements). If all of these assets are used the United States would have had the ability to strike between 612 and 756 aim points. This of course does not include the B-2 Spirit, deploying either from Whiteman Air Force Base or from Guam. Each B-2 can carry 16 2,000lb JDAMs. As the B-2 is usually involved in the first strikes of a campaign it is likely that the aircraft would be used. Any estimates on the number of B-2s that would be used in a strike against North Korea would be highly speculative. Previous operations, specifically Afghanistan and Iraq used anywhere from 2 to 4 aircraft. The inclusion of assets normally stationed at Kunsan and Osan Air Bases will only slightly increase the total number of JDAMs that could be used as only two of the three F-16 squadrons, the 35th Fighter Squadron at Kunsan, is an F- 16CD Block 40 that has been updated so that it can use the JDAM. The 80th Fighter Squadron at Kunsan flies the Block 30 F-16CD but has been upgraded so that it can use laser-guided munitions and on July 8, 2003 the 80th demonstrated upgrades that allow its aircraft to deliver JDAMs. The 36th Fighter Squadron has no such capability. The inclusion of the 35th Fighter Squadron and 80th Fighter Squadrons in any surgical strike will add 192 JDAMs to the total of 800 to 944 aim points. Finally, the US has a number of ships and submarines available that can launch Tomahawk cruise missiles. As of mid-June the United States had two carrier strike groups in the Asia-Pacific region consisting of roughly 15 ships. Exluding the aircraft carriers there are two Ticonderoga class cruisers, three Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers, two Spruance class destroyers, and four Oliver Hazard Perry guided missile frigates. [This does not include the ships at Pearl Harbor.] The Kitty Hawk and elements of its strike group returned to Yokosuka in early May and has since begun an extended period of maintenance making the Kitty Hawk unavailable until sometime in November at the earliest. The readiness of the rest of the strike group is difficult to determine as some ships have undoubtedly begun yard periods while others have not. There are 466 VLS cells capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. The USS Carl Vinson and an element of its strike group are currently deployed to insure a credible deterrent while the Kitty Hawk was deployed supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and while it undergoes repairs. During its deployment the Carl Vinson has conducted operations in multiple areas in the Pacific including off the coast of South Korea. While it might conduct operations in the South Pacific elements of its strike group can be retasked for maritime interdiction operations. The Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group has 307 VLS cells capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. Determining what strikes against North Korea would look like or consist of is dependent on whether the target list is limited to WMD facilities or if it includes other targets such as surface-to-air missile batteries, air defense radars, and command and control locations. The degree of risk to the pilots may also play a role in deciding how large or small the raids will be. A strike against North Korea could consist of a number of land attack missile being launched by cruisers, destroyers and submarines striking fixed targets throughout the country. With EA-6B Prowlers, staging from either of the two aircraft carriers, suppressing North Korean radar emissions and communications B-2 and F-117 stealth aircraft could penetrate North Korean airspace proceeding to strike high priority targets as other heavy bombers, such as B-1Bs and B-52s, begin striking other targets. By late May to early June 2003 nearly all of the aircraft that had been sent to South Korea or Guam in support of exercises or to bolster the US deterrent had returned to the United States. OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West OPLAN 5027 is the US-ROK Combined Forces Command basic warplan. Under Operations Plan 5027 (CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027), the United States plans to provide units to reinforce the Republic of Korea in the event of external armed attack. These units and their estimated arrival dates are listed in the Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), Appendix 6, to Annex A to CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027. The TPFDL is updated biennially through U.S./ROK agreements. CINCUNC/CFC OPLAN 5027 is distributed with a SECRET-U.S./ROK classification. Pyongyang can credibly threaten the prompt destruction of Seoul with conventional arms alone. The North Korean military could also establish a shallow foothold across the DMZ. However, the DPRK's ability to sustain these offensive operations, or advance its forces further to the south, is questionable. South Korean and American air forces could quickly establish air supremacy and destroy North Korean ground forces. The ensuing buildup of US forces in Korea could reverse any remaining North Korean advances into the South, and unlease offensive operations into the North. North Korea does not require long-range missiles with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads to devastate Seoul or to make a land grab across the DMZ. Such weapons are needed to deter or defeat an American counteroffensive into North Korea. Pyongyang has the ability to start a new Korean War, but not to survive one. North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within range of Seoul, double the levels of a the mid-1990s. Seoul is within range of the 170mm Koksan gun and two hundred 240mm multiple-rocket launchers. The proximity of these long-range systems to the Demilitarized Zone threatens all of Seoul with devastating attacks. Most of the rest of North Korea's artillery pieces are old and have limited range. North Korea fields an artillery force of over 12,000 self- propelled and towed weapon systems. Without moving any artillery pieces, the North could sustain up to 500,000 rounds an hour against Combined Forces Command defenses for several hours. North Korea's short-term blitzkrieg strategy envisions a successful surprise attack in the early phase of the war to occupy some or all of South Korea before the arrival of US reinforcements on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean ground forces, totaling some 1 million soldiers, are composed of some 170 divisions and brigades including infantry, artillery, tank, mechanized and special operation forces. Of the total, about 60 divisions and brigades are deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. North Korea has deployed more than half of its key forces in forward bases near the border. Seventy percent of their active force, to include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Much of this force is protected by underground facilities, including over four thousand underground facilities in the forward area alone. From their current locations these forces can attack with minimal preparations. This means a surprise attack on South Korea is possible at any time without a prior redeployment of its units. The North Korean navy has also deployed 430 surface combatants and about 60 percent of some 90 submarine combat vessels near the front line in forward bases. With about 40 percent of its 790 fighter planes deployed near the front line, the North Korean air force could launch a surprise attack on any part of South Korea within a short period of time. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea possesses larger forces than Iraq, and they are already deployed along South Korea's border. A war could explode after a warning of only a few hours or days, not weeks. Unlike in the Persian Gulf, this attack would be prosecuted along a narrow peninsula on mountainous terrain. It would probably be accompanied by massed artillery fire, commando raids, and chemical weapons. Initially, the primary battlefield would be only about 125 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. The DPRK attack would be conducted against well- prepared ROK forces in fortified positions and against larger US forces than in the Persian Gulf. Most probably, the DPRK attack would aim at seizing nearby Seoul by advancing down the Kaesong-Munsan, Kumwa, and Chorwon corridors. If successful, North Korean forces might also try to conquer the entire peninsula before large US reinforcements arrive. The South Barrier Fence is the Southern part of the DMZ. The South Koreans have a series of Defensive lines that cross the entire peninsula, but with the exception of the South Barrier Fence, they aren't connected completely across the peninsula. They are designed to withstand an attack and allow a minimum force to hold a line while reinforcement/counter attack forces are assembled and sent to destroy any penetrations. The basic goal of a North Korean southern offensive is destruction of allied defenses either before South Korea can fully mobilize its national power or before significant reinforcement from the United States can arrive and be deployed. The primary objective of North Korea's military strategy is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean control within 30 days of beginning hostilities. A secondary objective is the defense of North Korea. To accomplish these ambitious objectives, North Korea envisions fighting a two-front war. The first front, consisting of conventional forces, is tasked with breaking through defending forces along the DMZ, destroying defending CFC forces, and advancing rapidly down the entire peninsula. This operation will be coordinated closely with the opening of a second front consisting of SOF units conducting raids and disruptive attacks in CFC's rear. The DPRK offensive against the ROK will consist of three phases. The objective of the first phase will be to breach the defenses along the DMZ and destroy the forward deployed forces. The objective of the second phase will be to isolate Seoul and consolidate gains. The objective of the third phase will be to pursue and destroy remaining forces and occupy the remainder of the peninsula. Approximately forty percent of the South Korean population resides within 40 miles of Seoul. While the terrain north of Seoul is dominated by rice paddies offering limited off-road mobility, the terrain west of Seoul is a wide coastal plan with the main invasion routes to Seoul. North Korean forces attacking Seoul through the Chorwon or Munsan corridors would have to cross the Han or Imjin rivers (while these rivers freeze in the winter, the ice is not strong enough to support heavy armor). The narrow eastern coastal plain is lightly settled and less heavily defended, though mountains make movement of forces from the east coast difficult. The US plans are based on the belief that the North Koreans would not be successful in consolidating their gains around Seoul and could be pushed back across the DMZ -- though the plans assume the North may break through the DMZ in places. A critical issue is strategic warning of unambiguous signs that North Korea is preparing an attack. The warning time has reportedly been shortened from about ten days to about three days as North Korea has covered its military activities. The US-ROK defense plan would be shaped not only by the threat but also by the mountainous terrain. Korea is commonly regarded as rugged infantry terrain that invites neither mobile ground warfare nor heavy air bombardment, but North Korea has assembled large armored forces that are critical to exploiting breakthroughs, and these forces would pass down narrow corridors that are potential killing zones for U.S. airpower. A new Korean War would bear little resemblance to the conflict of 195053. During Phase 1, US-ROK forces would conduct a vigorous forward defense aimed at protecting Seoul. Their campaign would be dominated by combined-arms ground battles waged with infantry, artillery, and armor. US air and naval forces would conduct close air support, interdiction, and deep strike missions. After Phase 1, US-ROK operations in Phase 2 would probably focus on seizing key terrain, inflicting additional casualties on enemy forces, and rebuffing further attacks. Phase 3, to start when the US ground buildup was complete and ROK forces were replenished, would be a powerful counteroffensive aimed at destroying the DPRK's military power. The war plan envisions amphibious assaults into North Korea by US Army and Marines at the narrow waist of North Korea. The entire resources of the US Marine Corps would flow there to establish a beachead, with substantial Army resources quickly conducting over-the-shore operations. OPLAN 5027-74 The the forward defense strategy in OPLAN 5027 was developed by Combined Forces Commander US General James F. Hollingsworth in 1973 [this discussion is based on "Winning in Korea Without Landmines," by Caleb Rossiter]. Prior to this time, OPLAN 5027 focused primarily on defeating a North Korean invasion. It envisioned the allies staging a 50-mile fighting retreat along the primary armored invasion route from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and taking up strong positions [the "Hollingsworth Line"] south of the broad Han River where it bisects the South Korean capital of Seoul. There, allied forces would wait for US reinforcements before counter-attacking. Concerned that the US withdrawal from Vietnam might lead the DPRK to question American commitment to defend South Korea, Hollingsworth altered the focus of OPLAN 50-27 to a forward-based offensive strategy. The goal was to convince North Korea that an invasion could bring an end to its regime. The new posture moved most allied artillery, tanks,and infantry forward toward the Military Control Zone (MCZ), which runs five miles south of the DMZ. General Hollingsworth announced plans to strike north after these forces defeated the invasion. He assigned two brigades of the US 2nd Division to seize the North Korean staging city of Kaesong just across the DMZ, and promised around- the-clock raids on the North by B-52 bombers and a ―violent,short war ‖ to capture the capital of Pyongyang. It was unclear whether Hollingsworth's plans included the use of the US tactical nuclear weapons then on the Korean peninsula if the North Korean invasion forces overwhelmed the allies. At the time, the Congressional Budget Office predicted that without nuclear weapons,the new strategy could result in the initial loss of Seoul. In 1975 Gen. Hollingsworth stated that the US had a '9-day war plan', according to which North Korea would be defeated in a few days in a violent clash with 700-800 air sorties. OPLAN 5027-94 As of 1994 it was reported that a variant OPLAN 5027 under consideration by CINCPAC focused on a scenario under which ROK forces were able to blunt a DPRK offensive and stabilize a defensive line at FEBA Bravo (20-30 miles below the DMZ). Subsequently, US-ROK Combined Forces Command would execute a retaliatory offensive once US reinforcements arrived. A major air campaign against northern forces would be required before the counteroffensive could begin. A US Marine Expeditionary Force (in division strength) and the 82nd Air Assault Division, along with ROK divisions, would launch an overland offensive north toward Wonsan from the east coas. Soon thereafter, a combined US-ROK force would stage an amphibious landing near Wonsan, and advance to Pyongyang. Subsequently, a combined US-ROK force would execute a major counteroffensive from north of Seoul aimed at seizing Pyongyang. This would be achieved either by linking up with the force at Wonsan, or meeting it at Pyongyang. A favorable outcome for the South depends on two conditions. First, the ROK forces must withstand DPRK forces during the initial 5-15 days of North Koean offensive actions. Second, they must hold the line while US and ROK forces are mobilized for the counteroffensive, which could take another 15-20 days. The ROK and US war plan included a counteroffensive that would destroy the North Korean regime. South Korean state television reported on 24 March 1994 that Seoul and Washington planned to topple the North Korean government if the Stalinist state attacks the South. The Korean Broadcasting System said that rather than simply driving back the North‘s troops, the plan provides for a counteroffensive to seize Pyongyang and try to topple the government of Kim Il Sung [―KBS reports plan to topple Kim Il Sung,‖ Washington Times , March 25, 1994, p. 16]. In 1994, the South Korean president, Kim Young-sam, said: ―Once a major military confrontation occurs, North Korea will definitely be annihilated‖ [Ranan R. Lurie, ―In a Confrontation, ‗North Korea Will Definitely Be Annihilated,‘‖ Los Angeles Times (Washington Edition), March 24, 1994, p. 11]. The battlefield coordination line (BCL) first appeared in MEF operations during Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) 94. It was employed as a workaround "MEF internal fire support coordination line (FSCL)" since the combatant commander approved theater FSCL was too distant from the Marine close fight to be of any value. The extended placement of the combatant commander's FSCL was due mostly to cultural and programmatic conflicts between the Army and the Air Force (read JFACC or in Korea, the CFACC). The point of contention has always centered on the area between the FSCL and the ground commander's forward boundary. The Air Force has historically demanded that the Army "coordinate" strikes forward of the FSCL with the CFACC prior to execution. The Army doesn't like the idea of having to coordinate (thus delay operations) with another component inside its own assigned area of operation, so to avoid the problem, they push the FSCL out to a point beyond their area of influence, ATACMS soliloquies notwithstanding. In effect, the FSCL became a de facto forward boundary. OPLAN 5027-96 After the nuclear crisis of 1994, OPLAN 5027 was completely overhauled, including a new agreement to ensure Japanese bases are available if the US goes to war with North Korea. The updated Japan-US defense cooperation guidelines, which the Japanese parliament approved 24 May 1999, allow the US to prepare for a Korean war by stationing its military forces in Japan and the Pacific region. OPLAN 5027-98 Further revisions to the concept of operations were elaborated in OPLAN 5027-98, which was adopted in late 1998. Previous versions of OPLAN 5027 had called for stopping a North Korean invasion and pushing them back across the Demilitarized Zone. The new version of the plan was more clearly focused on offensive operations into North Korea. A senior US official was reported to have said: "When we're done, they will not be able to mount any military activity of any kind. We will kill them all." The goal of the revised plan was to "abolish North Korea as a functioning state, end the rule of its leader, Kim Jong Il, and reorganize the country under South Korean control." New priorities also focused on countering sudden chemical and biological attacks against Seoul. The South Korean military reportedly estimates that 50 missiles carrying nerve gas could kill up to 38 percent of Seoul's 12 million inhabitants. The new plan called for a campaign against North Korean armed forces and government involving "defeating them in detail." The operation would be conducted in four phases: activities prior to a North Korean attack, halting the initial North Korean assault, regrouping for a counter-attack, and finally a full scale invasion of North Korea to seize Pyongyang. According to reports, the new military plan included preemptive attacks against North Korea's military bases, including long-range artillery and air forces bases, if intellitence detected a hard evidence that North Korea was preparing to wage war. US and South Korean military leaders included pre-emptive strikes in this revised war plan. If the North Koreans showed unmistakable signs of preparing to strike, and the US decided not to wait until South Korea had been attacked, US forces had targets in North Korea already picked out and weapons assigned to destroy them. Tasks performed during the Destruction Phase of the OPLAN reportedly involve a strategy of maneuver warfare north of the Demilitarized Zone with a goal of terminating the North Korea regime, rather than simply terminating the war by returning North Korean forces to the Truce Line. In this phase operations would include the US invasion of North Korea, the destruction of the Korean People‘s Army and the North Korean government in Pyongyang. The plan includes the possibility of a Marine amphibious assault into the narrow waist of North Korea to cut the country in two. US troops would occupy north Korea and "Washington and Seoul will then abolish north Korea as a state and ‗reorganize‘ it under South Korean control. When this new war plan leaked to the press in November 1998, it escalated tensions between the United States and North Korea. North Korea sharply criticized OPLAN 5027-98, charging that it was a war scenario for the invasion of North Korea. Pyongyang blamed Seoul for the revision of OPLAN 5027, and a North Korean Army spokesman stated 02 December 1998 that North Korea had the right to take a containment offensive while holding mass rallies of military units and various social organizations to criticize OPLAN 5027. Such incidents illustrated North Korea's sensitive reaction to the OPLAN 5027. On 02 December 1998 the General Staff of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) issued a lengthy and authoritative statement warning that the United States was instigating a new war. The statement stressed that the KPA would rise to the challenge. "We neither want nor avoid a war. If a war is imposed, we will never miss the opportunity," the statement read. The unique aspect of Pyongyang's public statements is the preoccupation with "US war-plan # 5027" as an imminent threat. Official Pyongyang is adamant that "war-plan # 5027" is already being implemented, and public statements frequently focus on OPLAN 5027. OPLAN 5027-00 According to the 04 December 2000 South Korean Defense Ministry White Paper, the United States would deploy up to 690,000 troops on the Korean peninsula if a new war breaks out. The United States apparently had considerably increased the number of troops that would be deployed in any new Korean conflict. The figure had risen from 480,000 in plans made in the early 1990s and 630,000 in the mid-1990s. The latest Time Phased Forces Deployment Data for any contingency on the Korean Peninsula is comprised of 690,000 troops, 160 Navy ships and 1,600 aircraft deployed from the U.S. within 90 days. The South Korean defense ministry described the increase as the result of a new US "win-win strategy," which would require the United States to have the capability to fight two wars simultaneously, such as in the Middle East and East Asia. Along with equipment to counter weapons of mass destruction, the US plan focused on the deployment of aircraft carriers and advanced aircraft to attack enemy artillery units in the early stages of any war. US augmentation forces, including the army, navy, air force, and the marine corps, are composed of approximately 690,000 troops. The augmented forces comprise army divisions, carrier battle groups with highly advanced fighters, tactical fighter wings, and marine expeditionary forces in Okinawa and on the US mainland. The US augmentation forces have contingency plans for the Korean peninsula to execute the Win-Win Strategy in support of United Nations Command (UNC)/Combined Forces Command (CFC) operation plans. There are three types of augmentation capability: Flexible Deterrence Options (FDOs), Force Module Packages (FMPs), and the Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data (TPFDD). These are executed through a unit integration process, when the commander of CFC requests them and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff orders them in case of a crisis on the Korean peninsula. FDOs are ready to be implemented when war is imminent. They can be classified into political, economic, diplomatic, and military options. Approximately 150 deterrence options are ready to be employed. FMPs are measures that augment combat or combat support units that need the most support in the early phase of the war should war deterrence efforts through FDOs fail. Included in the FMPs are elements such as strong carrier battle groups. Under TPFDD, in which FDO and FMP are included, the key forces are planned ahead of time to be deployed in case of an outbreak of war. There are three types of forces under TPFDD: in-place forces, or forces currently deployed to the peninsula; pre-planned forces, or forces of time-phased deployment in a contingency; and on-call forces, which could be deployed if needed. CFC Pub 3-1 (Deep Operations Korea) of 1 May 99 requires pre-planned fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) 26 hours prior to ITO execution, and immediate FSCL changes (inside the ITO cycle) 6 hours from transmittal to implementation with nominal FSCL placement 12 to 20 kilometers from the FLOT. The publication discusses the need to avoid confusion and fratricide via frequent FSCL changes, yet still retain the ability to accommodate rapid maneuver. Ground and amphibious force commanders will recommend placement of the FSCL, but the combatant commander is the approving authority. OPLAN 5027-02 In February 2002 it was reported that the US military was updating OPLAN 5027 in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This includes a military calculation of the force needed to remove North Korean leader Kim Jung Il. In mid-2002 a top aide to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld briefed a concept of operations for striking North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. This case study in the application of the Bush administration's new doctrine of pre-emptive military action envisioned a swift attack, carried out without consulting South Korea, America's ally on the peninsula. Soon after word of the briefing spread, administration officials, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Adm. Thomas Fargo, commander of US forces in the Pacific, worked to stifle further discussion of the scheme. OPLAN 5027-04 In late 2003 it was reported ["Military Alters Plans For Possible Conflicts" By Bradley Graham Washington Post November 18, 2003, pg. 18] that " ... the new plans would allow the United States to respond without waiting for as many ground forces to arrive, by substituting air power for artillery and getting such critical equipment as counter- battery radars -- for pinpointing enemy mortar and artillery fire -- on scene ahead of the rest of their divisions. The resulting force might not be as "elegant" as planners would like, but "it will certainly be capable... " While Patriot is the only missile defense system deployed by the US military, the Defense Department expected that three "emergency capabilities" for missile defense would begin to emerge in the year 2004. Those capabilities are ground-based midcourse interceptors being installed in Alaska as part of a Pacific test bed; sea-based midcourse interceptors on one or two Navy Aegis ships; and an Airborne Laser prototype. These could provide an emergency capability against a North Korean missile attack, but it was extremely limited. Five anti-missile interceptors will be deployed at the site. During fiscal year 2003, MDA achieved a 50-percent success rate on hit-to-kill intercepts—one success out of two attempts for each of the GMD and Aegis BMD elements. The actual defensive system to be fielded by 30 September 2004 will have fewer components than planned. MDA could not meet its upper-end goal of fielding 10 GMD interceptors by September 2004. Rather, MDA expected to field 5 interceptors by September 2004 and complete the goal of 10 interceptors by February 2005. In addition, the agency was be hard-pressed to achieve its goal of producing and delivering an inventory of 20 GMD interceptors by December 2005, because GMD contractors had yet to meet the planned production rate by mid-April 2004. The first BMDS block will cost more and deliver fewer fielded components than originally planned. As reported in DOD budget submissions for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, the Aegis BMD interceptor inventory decreased from 20 to 9, the number of Aegis BMD ships upgraded for the long- range surveillance and tracking mission decreased from 15 to 10. An intercept capability by Aegis BMD was not part of the September 2004 Initial Defensive Operations (IDO). By April 2005, two upgraded cruisers with an inventory of five interceptors were expected to be available for engaging short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The potential operational use of Airborne Laser [ABL] and the sea-based radar as sensors was no longer part of Block 2004. The SBX was fielded as a test asset at the end of Block 2004 (December 2005), and it would be placed on alert as an operational asset during Block 2006. Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, USFK held a conference for senior military leaders at Osan Air Force Base to evaluate the air component of OPLAN 5027. The conference was held on May 22-23, 2003 and was to adapt lessons learned from the use of UAVs and ground tactics and to "apply them in plans and strategies for 2003" according to 7th Air Foce commander Lt. General Lance Smith. The Air Boss conference discussed specific targets and the impact of new technologies. According to General Smith, as quoted by Stars and Stripes on May 24, 2003 the battle plan has changed considerably. OPLAN 5027-06 Missile Defense Agency Block 2004, represents calendar years 2004-2005. The ground-based Midcourse Defense will consist of 18 total Ground-based Interceptors, with 2 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. and 16 at Ft. Greely, Alaska. The Navy's Aegis will consist of 10 sea-based Surveillance and Track Destroyers, 2 Engagement/Surveillance and Track Cruisers, all equiped with 8 Standard Missile-3 sea-based interceptors. A total of 281 Patriot Advanced Capablility-3 missiles will be operated by the US Army. The Sea-based X-band radar will be introduced to the Missile Defense Test Bed in 2005 to provide more realistic sensor information in tests using long- range targets and countermeasures, and will also enhance operational capability. OPLAN 5027-08 In June 2003 US and Republic of Korea officials agreed to a plan to realign American forces stationed in "The Land of the Morning Calm." In June 4-5 meetings held in the South Korean capital city of Seoul, according to a joint US-South Korean statement, it was decided the operation would consist of two phases. During Phase 1 US forces at installations north of the Han River would consolidate in the Camp Casey (Tongduchon) and Camp Red Cloud (Uijongbu) areas. Both bases are north of Seoul and the Han, but well south of the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea. The 14,000-strong US Army 2nd Infantry Division, which provides troops to bases near the DMZ, is headquartered at Camp Red Cloud. During Phase 2 US forces north of the Han River would move to key hubs south of the Han River. US and Korean officials agreed to continue rotational US military training north of the Han even after Phase 2 is completed. The realignment operation would take several years to complete. Most American troops will be moved out of Seoul by the end of 2007, and all of the US 2nd Infantry Division that's currently patrolling the region north of Seoul will be moved south of Seoul by 2008. Existing military facilities at Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys, both located south of Seoul, are being expanded and upgraded to accept the redeployed forces. Missile Defense Agency Block 2006 represents the period of development for calendar years 2006 and 2007. Block 2006 will be the first block in which the Ballistic Missile Defense System will have the ability to intercept an incoming enemy missile in every phase of flight. Up to 10 additional Ground-based Interceptors will be deployed at Ft. Greely, Alaska (for a total of 28 Ground-based Interceptors between Ft. Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA). The Army will have 231 additional PAC-3 missiles (for a total of 512). The Navy will convert the 10 Aegis Surveillance and Track Destroyers to full Engagement/Surveillance and Track, add up to five additional Aegis Surveillance and Track Destroyers, and add an additional Aegis Engagement/Surveillance and Track Cruiser. By that time the fleet will have up to 20 additional Standard Missile-3 interceptors. OPLAN 5028 / CONPLAN 5028 The fact of the existance of OPLAN 5028 is very poorly attested, and the very few attestations of such a plan are in connection with OPLAN 1003. This suggests that some indicia of "OPLAN 5028" may simply be a typographic error, a mistake for OPLAN 5027. The fact of the existence of PACOM CONPLAN 5028-96 is well established, although the details of this CONPLAN are entirely un-attested in the open literature. OPLAN 5028 MTW West [Major Theater War - West] is the North East Asis plan that starts with MTW East (OPLAN 1003) in progress. The primary differences between OPLAN 5027 and OPLAN 5028 is the forces available. Since many stateside units are dual tasked for both contingencies, OPLAN 5027 and OPLAN 5028 have some differences in the forces available. OPLAN 5029 - Collapse of North Korea In late October 2008 the United States proposed developing a detailed Operations Plan [OPLAN] in case of the collapse of the North Korean regime. Yonhap News reported that the proposal came at a meeting between the heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea and the United States, known as the Military Committee Meeting (MCM). This would convert CONPLAN 5029 into OPLAN 5029. "The U.S. side proposed the countries develop CONPLAN 5029 into an operational plan at the MCM," the source was quoted as saying. The annual meeting of military chiefs was held in Washington on 16 October 2008. Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates agreed to closely cooperate to materialize CONPLAN 5029 (Operation Plan in Concept Format 5029). On 17 October 2008 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Lee Sang-hee issued a joint communiqué following the 40th Republic of Korea U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). It stated in part that "The Minister and the Secretary praised the substantial progress for the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) of ROK military forces in accordance with the Strategic Transition Plan (STP), and reconfirmed the commitment for the April 17, 2012 wartime OPCON transition date. Secretary Gates offered firm assurances that the transition of wartime OPCON will be carried out in a manner that strengthens deterrence and maintains a fully capable U.S.-ROK combined defense posture on the Korean Peninsula, noting that the U.S. remains committed, both now and into the future, to respond quickly with appropriate military power to restore peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula. The Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S. will continue to provide significant bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities." On 29 October 2008 the DPRK's Korean Central News Agency responded that "The U.S. and the south Korean war- like forces openly held an anti-DPRK military confab at which they agreed to "rapidly dispatch reinforcements in contingency." This was a dangerous move aimed to provoke a new war on the Korean Peninsula and an unpardonable military challenge to the DPRK, to all intents and purposes ... Some days ago, the commander of the U.S. armed forces in south Korea kicked off war hysteria, crying out for "boosting the capability for perfect retaliation." This indicates that his outbursts are not an empty talk but are being put into practice.... These war servants who go reckless to attack fellow countrymen with arms provided by their American master will not escape from the fate of a tiger-moth as they are cursed and denounced by all the fellow countrymen.... The U.S. belligerent forces would be well advised not to misjudge the army of Songun [ie, Kim-jong Il] and the will of the DPRK but stop their reckless moves for a new war. " CONPLAN 5029 is the US-ROK Combined Forces Command to prepare for the collapse of North Korea. The plan is reported to feature preparations by the South Korean and US forces to manage an inflow of North Korean refugees and other unusual situations if the North Korean regime collapses. In August 1999 Gen. John H. Tilelli, commander-in-chief of U.S. Forces Korea, acknowledged that the CFC has mapped out a scenario to prepare for the collapse of North Korea. "It would be unusual if we didn't have one, and we are preparing for any course of action," he said. But he refused to disclose details. In January 2005 the ROK National Security Council rejected an American proposal transform Concept Plan CONPLAN 5029 into an Operational Plan, OPLAN 5029. The OPLAN would provide much more specific military course of action to repsond to various types of internal instability in North Korea, such as regime collapse, mass defection and revolt. In June 2005 ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung and US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld agreed to "improve and develop" the Concept Plan, stopping short of turning it into an Operation Plan. The improved Concept Plan will include measures for "various types of contingencies" other than military operations. The United States had asked that the plan be approved in 2004. It would have given the United States command over South Korean military assets in the event of rioting, mass defections or a government collapse in the impoverished North. US officials reportedly had argued that the contingency plan was necessary to secure sensitive nuclear and military facilities, and for overall public safety. In April 2005 South Korean Defense Authorities rejected a contingency plan that would give command authority to the United States military in the event of a North Korean collapse. South Korea's National Security Council on 15 April 2005 said it had vetoed a joint military plan with the United States on how to handle serious turmoil in North Korea, should it arise. South Korean officials said they were dropping the plan because it could limit "South Korea's exercise of its sovereignty." These are the kind of things that would normally come out of alliance negotiations. But when the South Korean NSA (NSC) made unilateral announcements like this, they're clearly not consulting with the Americans beforehand. South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun was pursuing a policy of greater independence from its Cold War alliance with the United States. His government planned to increase military cooperation with China, and for South Korea to become what he calls a "balancing power" in Asia. Washington had been a South Korean ally since the peninsula was divided at the end of World War Two. The United States led the United Nations force that supported South Korea in its war against the communist North in the 1950s, and US troops have remained in the South since. Under their alliance, should hostilities resume with North Korea, the United States would have overall command of both its own and South Korean forces. The two Koreas technically remain at war, because no peace treaty was signed at the end of the war in 1953. However, during 2004, the United States began to reduce its force in South Korea - to around 32,000 troops. The announcement was another sign of strain in the alliance. One significant strain had been their different approaches in dealing with North Korea, which has declared that it has nuclear weapons. Washington distrusts the North and wants it to give up its nuclear weapons, or risk further isolation. Seoul, however, concerned about a possible collapse of its neighbor, had a policy of engaging with Pyongyang, in the hope of encouraging peaceful reforms in the Stalinist state. The costs of Korean reunification have been estimated by some sources [including the World Bank] to be as high as $2–3 trillion, about five or six times South Korea‘s gross domestic product. South Korea has a population of 48.6 million with an annual income of $19,200 per capita. North Korea has about 23 million people with a per capita income of $1,400. Were the two countries to reunify, the resulting country would have a combined population of over 70 million, but with an average per capita income of about $13,500. That is, in some sense the cost of reunification to South Koreans could be a one-third reduction in annual income. The population of East Germany was only a quarter that of West Germany, while the per capita GDP of East Germany was believed by the West in 1991 to be somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters that of West Germany. By some estimates the East German per capita income turned out to be only a quarter that of West Germany. Thus, the overall burden of Korean reunification might be as much as ten times greater than that of German reunification. OPLAN 5030 In late May 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed military commanders to develop a new approach for conflict with North Korea, Operations Plan 5030. The fact of the existence of OPLAN 5030 as well as details of this plan were first revealed in the 21 July 2003 edition of US News and World Report, in an article by Bruce B. Auster and Kevin Whitelaw. Critics of the plans provisions claim that it blurs the line between war and peace. Under the draft plan, US Forces Korea would conduct pre-conflict maneuvers to draw down North Korea's limited military resources. This might place such stress on the North's military that it might provoke a military coup against the country's leader, Kim Jong Il. According to Auster and Whitelaw, options available under OPLAN 5030 include flying RC-135 surveillance aircraft closer to North Korean airspace, provoking the DPRK to wear out scrambled interceptor aircraft and burn up jet fuel. Under another gambit, US commanders might stage a surprise or short-notice military exercises, provoking North Korean forces to disperse to [or from] bunkers. This could disclose details of DPRK war plans, and deplete reserse of food, water, and other materiel. The initial draft of 5030 included a variety of operations not included in traditional operational war plans, such as disrupting financial networks and strategic disinformation activities. Indeed, the entire OPLAN 5030 story might be part of such offensive information operations, creating a bewildering wilderness of mirrors for the historically paranoid North. Operation Joint Guardian Kosovo Force (KFOR) The UN Security Council 10 June 1999 adopted a detailed resolution outlining the civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paving the way for peaceful settlement of the conflict and the safe return home of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced persons. The resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which allows the security forces to carry weapons to protect themselves and use force in carrying out the resolution's directives. The resolution "authorizes member states and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo" as set out in the military agreement between NATO and the FRY. That peacekeeping operation will enforce the cease-fire, demilitarize the KLA and other Kosovo Albanian groups, and establish a secure environment for the return of the refugees. The force has a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. The NATO countries were united that in the absence of the NATO Joint Guardian force at the core of any international security presence in Kosovo, the refugees would not return and the other NATO objectives would not be met. A NATO force at the core of an international security presence was regarded as the magnet to attract the refugees back. In the absence of a NATO force with American participation, it was the view of the US Government that it was unrealistic to think the Kosovar Albanians would disarm the KLA, something of great interest to Russia. The US believed that if NATO forces deploy, the rationale for the Kosovar Liberation Army having an armed force to protect itself against Serbs would disappear. The Rambouillet envisaged something like 2,500 Serb military and 2,500 police for a year, though with the commencement of Operation Allied Force NATO required all of those forces going, in views of the probability that the Kosovar Albanians would not come home to a situation where those same forces remain at their posts. NATO envisaged the standing up of thousands of Kosovar Albanian police, including possibly people from the KLA, who would be trained by the international community and could serve police functions. NATO did not contemplating partition of Kosovo. It had been unofficially suggested that one possible fix was a de facto partition of Kosovo whereby the Russians would patrol the north, the mineral-rich areas, and NATO would patrol the south. Before Allied Force began NATO had plans to put in a peacekeeping force of 28,000 people. Of that, 4,000 people would have been Americans. As of mid-May 1999 NATO reassessed its Op Plan for the Joint Guardian mission to see to what degree they would need reinforcement beyond the level that was originally foreseen for the KFOR [Kosovo force] international security presence in Kosovo. NATO had 16,000 troops deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia training for their mission as well as dealing with the enormous refugee inflow. Certain reinforcements from the UK and from Germany were arriving as of mid-May. The NATO pre-deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was conducted to be in a position to move very quickly into Kosovo to set up an initial military command structure and an initial infrastructure to get the basic functions going not only for other NATO troops to come in quickly but also for the transition authority and for the humanitarian relief organisations that in the very early stages would need a great deal of military back-up to establish themselves so once the NATO core element was on the ground in Kosovo. The military force had several primary tasks. The first one was to make sure that the routes of entry were safe. That meant demining, taking out booby traps, taking explosive charges away from bridges. This was done by NATO troops, with some help from Serbs, who had maps of where the mines are. As the troops came in, they first established their own outposts, their headquarters, and decided where they were going to set up their camps. They then set up their protective arrangements and began to build their own infrastructure. Early on there was, through non-government organizations and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, some accounting done of the internally displaced people, their health, how hungry they are, their general status. In addition, NATO began working with NGOs and other groups to begin to rebuild crucial infrastructure -- first the bridges and the roads and the transportation facilities needed to get people back. Then shelters where they can stay when they get back. NATO worked with people in the refugee camps to stress that a certain amount of security has to be established before it's safe for them to go back, and there had to be a certain amount of work done on demining to make sure they could go back safely. So there was some reasonable, but relatively short, delay before people start returning in order to make sure that the area is secure and stable for them to go back to. This corresponded with many of the desires being expressed by refugees themselves, that they wanted to make sure that Kosovo is stable and secure before they returned home. Operation Joint Guardian will include forces from Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. UK: 12,000 troops, including the commander of the international force, who set up a headquarters in Pristina, and the major part of the British contingent is based in this area. GERMANY: 8,500 troops deployed in the southwest part of Kosovo with the HQ in Prizren. This was the first time after WW II that so many German troops are being deployed somewhere. FRANCE: 7,000 troops were stationed in the western sector with the HQ in Kosovska Mitrovica. The French troops were reinforced with a contingent of 1,200 troops from the United Arab Emirates. ITALY: 2,000 troops in the west part of Kosovo with the HQ in Pec. RUSSIA: Russia announced that it was preparing up to 10,000 troops to be deployed in the northern part of Kosovo, alongside the French troops, though in fact a much smaller number actually deployed. USA - The United States agreed to provide a force of approximately 7,000 U.S. personnel as part of the NATO KFOR to help maintain a capable military force in Kosovo and to ensure the safe return of Kosovar refugees. The US supports KFOR by providing the headquarters and troops for one of the four NATO sectors. The US also provides personnel, units and equipment to other components of the KFOR organization. The majority of US forces are in southeast Kosovo. The sector headquarters is at Gnjilane. Approximately 4,000 US troops were part of the initial force. This included the 1,900 Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 1,700 Army troops from Task Force Hawk and 200 soldiers from Germany to set up a headquarters for US forces. Ultimately, there were approximately 7,000 US troops from Germany as a more permanent force. By late 1999 KFOR had reached its full strength of 50,000 men and women. Nearly 42,500 troops from 28 countries are deployed in Kosovo and another 7,500 provide rear support through contingents based in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in Albania, and in Greece. KFOR contingents are grouped into five multinational brigades. Although brigades are responsible for a specific area of operations, they all fall under a single chain of command under the authority of Commander KFOR. This means that all national contingents pursue the same objective, which is to maintain a secure environment in Kosovo. Approximately one- half of KFOR's total available personnel is directly committed to protection tasks, including protection of the ethnic minorities. In Kosovo, the US forces are assigned to a sector principally centered around Gnjilane in the eastern portion of Kosovo. The forces within MNB(E) are referred to as Task Force Falcon, and were built around the First Infantry Division's Assault Command Post and 2nd Brigade. The 13th Tactical Group (Russian), 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion (Greek), 18th Air Assault Battalion (Polish), the 14th Squadron Helicopter Detachment and the 37th Support Company (Ukrainian), a composite platoon from Lithuania, and a composite battalion from the United Arab Emirates complete the Brigade's operational forces. There are 5,500 U.S. service members throughout MNB East, as well as 830 Russian, 559 Polish, 429 Greek, 240 Ukrainian, 30 Lithuanian, and 115 soldiers from the United Arab Emirates. Keeping the peace in Multinational Brigade East (MNB(E)) is a complex endeavor that encompasses a wide variety of missions, often as diverse as the region's geographic and demographic features. The brigade's soldiers patrol through both cities and hamlets scattered across approximately 2000 square kilometers. The geography within MNB(E) is quite dramatic, encompassing both mountains and open plain. The variations in ethnicity can be equally dramatic. While a few towns are comprised exclusively of one ethnic group, some communities can include up to five different groups. One of the best examples of this would be Gnjilane, a town of nearly 70,000 people that is represented by Albanians, Serbs, Romas, and Turks. This wide variation in both the people and the land provides new challenges for soldiers every day. As of mid-2000 the US contribution to KFOR in Kosovo was approximately 7,500 US military personnel. This number once again will decrease to approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel when ongoing troop rotations are completed. In addition, other US military personnel are deployed to other countries in the region to serve in administrative and logistics support roles for the U.S. forces in KFOR. Specifically, approximately 1,000 US military personnel are operating in support of KFOR in Macedonia, Greece, and Albania. KFOR Contributions As of 11 June 1999: Country Current Total Future Total United Kingdom 7,600 13,000 Germany 4,200 8,500 United States ~1,800 7,000 France 3,100 7,000 Italy 2,300 Others 600 11,000 Task Force Falcon was formed Feb. 5, 1999, when the 1st Infantry Division(ID) was notified of a possible deployment to conduct peace support operations in Kosovo. The task force, after conducting a command post exercise and a mission rehearsal exercise during February and March, was declared mission-ready and deployed a command and control element forward to Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia. Following the signing of the Military Technical Agreement(MTA) on June 9, 1999, Task Force Falcon deployed forces from Central Region in the largest combined air-rail-sea-road movement since Operation Desert Storm. Task Force Falcon advance elements entered Kosovo on June 12, 1999, as part of Operation Joint Guardian, a NATO-led peacekeeping force. The Task Force Falcon headquarters was operational at the future Camp Bondsteel on June 16, 1999. Forces from the U.S. and Greece composed the Initial Entry Force(IEF), with the headquarters built around the assault command post from the 1st ID and the Big Red One's Schweinfurt-based 2nd ("Dagger") Brigade Combat Team(2nd BCT). Operating under the command and control of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil and the Operational Control of KFOR, the IEF consisted of forces from the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment from Fort Bragg, N.C; the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Camp Lejune, N.C.; the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment from Schweinfurt Germany, Echo Troop, 4th Cavalry Regiment, also from Schweinfurt, Germany; and the 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion from Greece. Task Force 12, built around the 12thAviation Group from Wiesbaden, Germany, and the 16th Corps Support Group from Hanau, Germany supported operations from Camp Able Sentry. As the VJ/MUP forces redeployed out of Kosovo in accordance with the MTA, Task Force Falcon soldiers, airmen and marines monitored their withdrawal and ensured compliance with the agreement. Withdrawal was complete on June 20, and the focus of operations shifted to enforce the undertaking of demilitarization and transformation of the UCK, which was signed on June, 21. Additional forces arrived from Central Region, principal elements of the BRO's 2nd BCT from Schweinfurt, Germany, including the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, the 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, the 9th Engineer Battalion, and the 299th Forward Support Battalion. Other major units were the 94th Engineer Battalion from Vilseck, Germany and the 18th Air Assault Battalion from Poland. On July 10, the 1st Bn, 26th Inf. Regt. conducted a relief in place to allow the 26th MEU to re-deploy. Throughout the next week, both the 1st Bn., 77th Armor and the 18th Air Assault Battalion relieved the 2nd Bn., 505th Parachute Inf. Regt. of portions of its sector. The 13th Russian Tactical Group relieved the 1 Bn., 26th Inf. Regt. of portions of its sector on July 28 and the 2nd Bn., 1st Avn. from Katterbach, Germany, relieved Task Force 12 on Aug. 2. In September 1999, 2nd Bn. 505th Parachute Inf. Regt., re-deployed to the U.S. and was replaced by a sister battalion, the 3rd Bn. 504th Parachute Inf. Regt. Recognizing a need in October to increase the available combat power in the vicinity of Gnjilane, the leadership of Task Force Falcon reorganized the battalion task force sectors in the MNB(E) area of responsibility. The 501st Mechanized Greek Battalion assumed a larger portion of the Urosevac Opstina, which enabled 3rd Bn. 504th Parachute Inf. Regt. to enlarge their sector to include the Vitina Opstina. Task Force 1st Bn.-77th Armor then conducted a relief in place with Task Force 1st Bn. 26th Infantry and assumed responsibility for the Opstina of Novo Brdo and the northern half of the Gnjilane Opstina. This enabled Task Force 1st Bn. 26th Inf. to concentrate their force in the southern half of the Opstina. Following months of deliberate planning and detailed rehearsals, KFOR 1B built around the 3rd BCT from the 1st Inf. Div., conducted relief in place operations and assumed responsibility for the MNB(E) area of responsibility on December 12. The transition saw Task Force 1 Bn., 63rd, Armor replace Task Force 1st Bn., 77th, Armor and Task Force 2nd Bn., 2nd Infantry fell in on what was Task Force 1st Bn., 26th Infantry's sector in southern Gnjilane. During this same period, Task Force 1st Bn., 1st Aviation relieved Task Force 2nd Bn., 1st Aviation, 1st Bn. 6th , Field Artillery Battalion replaced 1 Bn. 7th FA, and the 201st FSB replaced the 299th FSB. Also on Dec. 12, as part of the transfer of authority ceremony, Brig. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez assumed command of MNB(E) from Brig. Gen. Craig Peterson. Today, Task Force Falcon continues to conduct Peace Operations in Kosovo in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 under the Operational Control of the NATO-led KFOR, to ensure a safe and secure environment is maintained to enable the establishment of a stable society. The Falcon, a well-trained and equipped multinational force of allies, remains ever vigilant and ready to act with all means available to successfully carry out its peacekeeping mission. In July 2000, command of MNB(E) was transferred to Brig. Gen. Dennis Hardy who finished his rotation on Dec. 15, 2000. Task Force Falcon is currently the responsibility of the 1st Armored Division under the command of Brig. Gen. Kenneth Quinlan. Task Force Falcon is in Kosovo to enforce all aspects of the Military Technical Agreement, with a primary function of providing a safe and secure environment to the residents. No timeline for Operation Joint Guardian has been established. The mission will be assessed periodically and the force commitment will be adjusted as needed. The U.S. is committed to supporting peace in Kosovo by implementing the Military Technical Agreement and participating in the NATO-led military force. NATO's aim is to achieve a secure environment to ensure peace and stability in Kosovo without the presence of a NATO-led military force. On July 28, 2003 elements of the 1st Infantry Division handed over KFOR duties to the 28th Infantry Division. Multi-National Brigade (East) [MNB (East)] is part of the NATO led KFOR and is comprised of soldiers from the United States, Greece, Armenia, Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania. The mission of KFOR and MNB (East) is to provide a safe and secure environment in the region. In a ceremony held 26 February 2004, Brig. Gen. Jerry Beck and the 28th Infantry Division officially handed over authority of Multi-national Brigade (East) to Brig. Gen. Rick Erlandson and the 34th Infantry Division. After serving in a six-month rotation that began in July, Beck and the 28th ID left Kosovo for the state of Pennsylvania where it is headquartered. The UN-authorized, NATO-led peacekeeping force for Kosovo (KFOR) continued to carry out its mandate to maintain a safe and secure environment and defend against external threats. UNMIK Civilian Police continued to transfer basic police authority and functions to the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), comprised largely of demilitarized former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members, continued to develop its capacity as a civilian civil emergency response agency. UNMIK international civilian authorities and KFOR leadership generally maintained effective control over security forces; however, there were reports that elements of the security forces acted independently of their respective authority. The reported phenomenon of "strategic sales" of property persisted in 2004. There was evidence that Kosovo Albanians in several ethnically mixed areas used violence, intimidation, and offers to purchase property at inflated prices in order to break up and erode Kosovo Serb neighborhoods. Some cases of violence against Serbs may have been attempts to force persons to sell their property. An UNMIK regulation prevents the wholesale buy out of Kosovo Serb communities and seeks to prevent the intimidation of minority property owners in certain geographic areas; however, it was rarely enforced. The 16 March 2004 drowning of three Kosovo Albanian children from Cabra village in Zubin Potok Municipality ignited the March riots; the surviving child claimed Kosovo Serbs had chased them into the Ibar River with a dog. The media, prior to police and judicial investigations, reported this story. In addition, the drive-by shooting on March 15 of a 19 year old Kosovo Serb male in the Serb village of Caglavica in the Pristina region caused local Serbs to block the main Pristina Skopje highway. On 16 March 2004, approximately 18,000 Albanians attended prescheduled demonstrations against the arrests of ex KLA members by UNMIK Police. On March 17, demonstrations by Albanians started in Mitrovica to protest the drownings and in Pristina against the Serb roadblocks in Caglavica and Gracanica. Unrest soon spread to other parts of Kosovo and became increasingly violent. Violence errupted on 17 March 2004 in an attack on an observation post at the Serbian Church of Saint Uros in Ferizaj/Urosevac by a crowd of approximately 500 rioters. One US Soldier and 17 Greek soldiers received minor injuries from items the crowd was throwing. The crowd began attacking the observation post with rocks and bricks. Then the crowd began attacking the Greek soldiers with grenades and improvised incendiary devices. The crowd began setting fire to the first of three unoccupied military vehicles while the soldiers waited for the Greek Army‘s Quick Reaction Force that had been called to assist the soldiers. Then the rioters attempted to enter the church and stopped when they were confronted by the soldiers inside, but continued to attack the church with grenades and incendiary devices. The soldiers fired their weapons in the air in an attempt to disperse the crowd, which had grown to approximately 1,000 to 3,000 people, and was still underway when the QRF arrived in armored vehicles to evacuate the soldiers at approximately 10 p.m. The rioters began throwing incendiary devices at the QRF vehicles and were not dispelled until U.S. helicopters began dropping tear gas on the crowd, dispersing them enough for the evacuation to take place. During the evacuation, rioters fired at the soldiers and their vehicles. Once the evacuation was complete U.S. military police and members of the Kosovo Police Service arrived to secure the church site. The crowd, reduced to about 150 people, did not continue the attack. By the end of the night an estimated 200 incendiary devices, 15 grenades, and numerous rocks were thrown at the soldiers and the church during the attack, resulting in the destruction of three military vehicles and damage to two others. It appeared that there was a pattern to destroy Serb property and to expel the Serb population from enclaves in southern Kosovo. As a result of the riots, 20 persons were killed, including 8 Kosovo Serbs and 12 Kosovo Albanians, more than 900 were injured, more than 900 Serb, Romani, and Ashkali houses and 30 orthodox churches or monasteries were burned or severely damaged, and over 4,000 Serbs, Ashkalis, and Roma were made homeless. The March 2004 riots involved an estimated 50,000 to 75,000 demonstrators over 2 days in every major city in Kosovo. Numerous serious attacks on Serbian Orthodox churches and cemeteries occurred during the March riots, resulting in extensive property damage, including the destruction or damage of 30 Orthodox religious sites and over 900 houses and businesses of ethnic minorities. The March riots resulted in the 20 deaths including of 8 ethnic Serbs and 12 ethnic Albanians. The March riots, which targeted Serbs, Roma and Ashkali, were the most serious outburst of violence and destruction since the 1999 conflict. During the March riots, the Ashkali neighborhood in Vushtrri/Vucitrn was burned and looted, and its inhabitants took shelter at a KFOR base. Many refused to return by year's end. Many of those displaced in March, including Ashkali residents and Serbs, were displaced and had their homes burned for the second time. Increased violence, particularly during the March riots, may have been politically motivated and to some extent coordinated by ethnic Albanian extremists. Some Kosovo government leaders were slow to condemn the violence, exacerbating the problem and helping to legitimize the severe social abuse of minorities. KFOR and UNMIK police were responsible for killing several protesters during riots in March 2004 after the protestors failed to heed prior warnings and threatened the international security officials or those they were protecting. During the March riots, measures taken by KFOR and UNMIK police to protect themselves and others as well as to control the crowds resulted in several deaths of Albanian protesters and some allegations of police abuse. For example, an UNMIK police officer shot and killed a protester in Peja/Pec municipality while defending Serbian residents from Kosovar Albanian rioters. No legal charges were brought against KFOR soldiers or UNMIK police related to their actions during the March riots. Kosovo Serbs, and to a lesser extent other minority communities, had considerable difficulty moving about safely without an international security escort. Following the March riots, KFOR and UNMIK police restricted movement in most of the affected areas and selectively imposed temporary curfews. Kosovo Serbs were frequently subjected to stonings and other low-level violence by Kosovo Albanians. After public order was restored, police and KFOR commenced large-scale operations to apprehend those responsible for the riots. By June, over 270 persons had been arrested on a wide range of charges related to the riots, including murder, attempted murder, arson, and looting. NATO‘s Kosovo Force continues to provide critical security to this region in support of the United Nations‘ Interim Administration in Kosovo. As of early 2005 Task Force Falcon had approximately 1900 soldiers from both the active and reserve components deployed as part of Multi-National Brigade - East to enforce the ―Military Technical Agreement‖ and to conduct operations to further deter hostilities and promote a stable environment. NATO‘s troop strength was reduced to 17,730 in 2004 with US forces contributing nearly 12 percent (2,010) of the personnel. Commanders don't expect NATO troops to leave the province by the original departure date of 2006. Life in the Multi-National Brigade (East) sector of Kosovo reflects how much progress has been made in maintaining a safe and secure environment. While the mission always comes first, there are opportunities for off-duty soldiers to study, work out or just relax on the base camps. The only time soldiers are outside of the base camps, though, is when they are on missions. The variety of missions that KFOR performs is amazing. From patrolling city streets to assessing the needs of remote villages and everything in between, KFOR soldiers can be found throughout the sector. Peacekeeping is a 24x7 mission, but there are opportunities for time off. The current pass policy states that after 30 days in theater soldiers are eligible, with their commander‘s permission, for a 4-day pass to Sofia, Bulgaria. While in Sofia, soldiers are allowed to consume alcohol (in moderation) and engage in sight-seeing. Kosovo is administered by the U.N. Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244. UNMIK promulgates regulations to address the civil and legal responsibilities of governmental entities and private individuals, and ratifies laws passed by the Kosovo Assembly. UNMIK promulgated the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self Government in Kosovo (the Constitutional Framework), which defined the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG). Kosovo has a multiparty political system with four dominant ethnic Albanian parties and several minority parties and coalitions. In October 2004, Kosovo Assembly elections were held that were determined to be generally free and fair. In 2005 the United States presented three principles on which a solution for Kosovo would be based - no divisions, no unifications with neighboring countries, and no return to the status quo. Talks on Kosovo's final status will be launched in September 2005 and will last less than a year. Kosovo will become independent in July 2006, according to Kosovo Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi. Operation Shining Hope Operation Sustain Hope / Allied Harbor Operation Provide Refuge Operation Open Arms The preparation for the deployment of a NATO force to Albania to conduct a humanitarian mission began on 7 April, when a NATO team led by Mag. Gen. Pasqualino Verdecchia, ITA deployed from Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) to co-ordinate NATO plans with Albanian and international authorities. A team of the AMF(L) (Allied Command Europe Mobile Force/Land) led by the AMF(L) commander, Lt.Gen. John Reith, arrived in Tirana on 10 April to make final preparations for the deployment of this NATO Immediate Reaction (Land) headquarters. Lt. Gen. Reith conducted meetings with senior Albanian and international authorities while his staff conducted reconnaissance to make final recommendations about the location of headquarters and deployment of the force. The AMF(L) is a NATO Headquarters capable of readily deploying a land force at short notice. Ten nations contribute to its staff while all NATO nations contribute forces. For Operation Allied Harbour the composition of the force was decided at a Force generation conference at SHAPE. Some elements of the force of Allied Harbour were already in place at the time of the reconnaissance as part of national contingents deployed by NATO nations (for example 450 from France, 200 from Germany, 230 from Greece, 830 from the United States, 1,100 from Italy, while Belgium, Canadian and Dutch contingents were already en route. On April 13, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) approved plans for Operation Allied Harbour, a 10,000- troop NATO deployment to support humanitarian relief efforts for refugees resulting from the Serb expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. The AMF(L) Headquarters began deployment on 14 April 1999. On 15 April NATO announced that rules of engagement for this Operation were approved by the North Atlantic Council and that, following the reconnaissance mission by AFSOUTH in Albania, the number of forces to be assigned to Allied Harbour were planned to be about 7,300. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe ordered the execution of Operation Allied Harbour on 16 April 1999. In turn, the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe transferred to the Commander of AMF(L), Lt. Gen. John Reith, authority over all NATO-led forces operating in Albania as part of this operation. In this respect, Lt. Gen. Reith is the Commander, Albanian Force (AFOR). The AFOR Headquarters is located at Plepa, near Durres (Albania). The mission of the operation is to provide humanitarian assistance in support of, and in close coordination with, the UNHCR and Albanian civil and military authorities, to alleviate the suffering of those who were forced to leave their homes in Kosovo and flee to Albania. As of 10 May 1999 forces were provided by Albania, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Luxemburg, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. On 15 April NATO announced that rules of engagement for this Operation were approved by the North Atlantic Council and that, following the reconnaissance mission by AFSOUTH in Albania, the number of forces to be assigned to Allied Harbour were planned to be about 7,300. The force (approximately 8,000) has been divided into task groups and a leading nation was appointed for each of them: Task Force N (Italy) Task Force S: (France) Task Force R: (Netherlands/Belgium) Task Force W: (Spain) Task Force Shining Hope (US) Projects considered by the Force include: Costruction of Camps, providing interim shelter. Engineer support to repair selected roads, airfield, or other appropriate infrastruture. Provide transportation for refugee movement by both ground vehicles and in special cases by air (to include emergency medical evacuation). Assist in transportation and distribution of food, water and supplies. Electronic communication support as required. In particular, ongoing projects include: Refugee camps: Fier: US engineers opened on 12 May a camp. Refugee flow is 400 per day the first week, 800 per day the second week. Total capacity will be up to 20.000 (by June). Elbasan: French troops work in aid of British camp. Korce: French troops are preparing the site for a camp for up to 9,000. Poiske: Greek engineers are completing construction of a camp. Vlore: Ducth units and Red Cross finished a camp for 4,500. Rrashbull: Italian engineers are constructing two camps for 4,000 and 400 refugees. North of Durres: Spanish engineers will open a camp at Hamallaj. Road, infrastructure repairs: Kukes: Italian engineers repairing road collapses. Dutch trucks transport WFP aid to Kukes and help UNHCR in relocating refugees. Tirana: US engineersto repair access road to Rinas airport. Durres: Dutch troops to construct harbour logisitc base. The United States contribution to Allied Harbour is Joint Task Force (JTF) Shining Hope. The mission of JTF Shining Hope is to conduct foreign humanitarian assistance operations in support of US government agencies and non- governmental and international organizations engaged in providing humanitarian relief to Kosovar refugees in Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). JTF Shining Hope is commanded by Major General William S. Hinton Jr., United States Air Force. The United States continues to work closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relief organizations to ensure a comprehensive and adequate response to the humanitarian crisis caused by the ethnic cleansing and atrocities now being conducted by Serb forces. US and other NATO military forces provide support for humanitarian operations in a variety of ways, to include air and surface transportation of relief supplies and equipment, camp preparation, shelter construction, security, and other tasks uniquely suited to military forces. To date, the Department of Defense has pledged over $25 million in humanitarian assistance, which, in addition to the above, also includes food (humanitarian daily rations), shelter (tents), bedding, medical supplies, and vehicles. Operation Sustain Hope is the US humanitarian effort to bring in food, water, medicine and relief supplies for the refugees fleeing from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia into Albania and Macedonia. The overall objective of Operation Sustain Hope is to maintain stability in the region and prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from the ongoing offensive against the people of Kosovo. The specific military mission of the forces deployed is to support disaster relief operations to aid in the care and protection of Kosovar refugees and to provide for their own security. The number of U.S. personnel who will be deployed for these purposes was initially uncertain, since planning for the deployment is ongoing, but at a minimum a deployment of 1,000 personnel was anticipated. Headquarters elements, air crews, airlift control elements, selected transport and rotary wing aircraft, security personnel, civil affairs and psychological operations personnel, medical and engineer forces, and logistics support forces may become involved in the operation. These forces will operate under U.S. and NATO operational control. Before the Serbian offensive began, the United States pre-positioned 36,000 metric tons of food in the region -- enough to feed half a million people for three months. The US worked with the United nations to ready life-saving supplies at Kosovo's borders with Albania and Macedonia. President Clinton authorized an additional $50 million in emergency aid to augment U.S. contributions to the U.N. High Commission on Refugees and other relief organizations. It will also ensure the military can help them get aid to the people in need. Throughout the week, civilian contract 747 aircraft are slated to carry more rations to Europe where they will be transferred to U.S. military aircraft for transport to the Balkans. In Europe, U.S. European Command officials are shipping 80 U.S. military trucks and 30 State Department trucks to Albania to help move supplies from ports and airports to the people who need them. The Defense Department is airlifting 500,000 humanitarian daily rations to the Balkans, and more are ready to go if needed. The flights were bound for Italy, where the supplies would be transported to Albania. The plan is to move the rations into Tirana, Albania. The US will be flying ten missions daily by C-130 aircraft to Italy -- from Italy to Tirana, and taking supplies from there to the border by helicopter. "Task Force Open Arms" is a $100-million effort to airlift as many as 20,000 Kosovo refugees to safety in the United States until they can return to their homes. The refugees arrive at the Ft. Dix army base in New Jersey, where they stay for about three weeks to complete legal processing before being placed with host families around the country. At Ft. Dix, American Red Cross relief workers are providing care and comfort for the refugees by registering families as they arrive and providing translation services, mental health support, beverages, snacks, childcare and recreational activities. Sources and Methods Operation Allied Harbour / JTF Shining Hope @ EUCOM Operation Allied Harbour @ AFSOUTH Operation Provide Refuge @ DefenseLink Operation Provide Refuge Statement by the President on Kosovo April 5, 1999 TEXT: CLINTON LETTER TO CONGRESS ON REFUGEE RELIEF FOR THE BALKANS 03 April 1999 -- President Clinton has informed Congress that he plans to send at least 1,000 U.S. military support personnel to Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to support efforts to provide disaster relief to the thousands of refugees who have poured into those countries from Kosovo. Ramstein supports humanitarian efforts for Kosovar refugees 5 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- Six 86th Airlift Wing C- 130s from Ramstein Air Base, Germany carried humanitarian aid and personnel in the early hours of Easter Sunday to Tirana, Albania, and Skopje, Macedonia, to support further relief operations for Kosavar Albanian refugees. Air Force flies relief supplies to Macedonia, Albania 5 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- Air Force cargo planes began airlifting supplies and people early Easter Sunday in an effort to bring relief to the growing number of displaced Kosovar Albanians in Macedonia and Albania. Airlift under way for 'Shining Hope' 5 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- Thousands of tons of food and tents made their way to Kosovar refugees as part of Joint Task Force Shining Hope. Air Force military and contract aircraft carried about half a million humanitarian daily rations and 700 large tents to people in Macedonia and Albania, who have fled from Serb attacks in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update 05 April 1999 - The total number of Kosovars who have left the province since March 24 is nearly 400,000, including 226,000 in Albania, 120,000 in Macedonia, 35,700 in Montenegro, 7,900 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 6,000 in Turkey. 'Sustain Hope' spearheads refugee relief 6 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- With thousands of refugees crowding into enclaves on embattled Kosovo's borders, NATO has responded with Joint Task Force Sustain Hope. Many Air Mobility Command missions have delivered, or will soon deliver, large quantities of food and shelter for distribution to the refugees. 'Sustain Hope' spearheads refugee relief 6 Apr 1999 (AFPN) -- With thousands of refugees crowding into enclaves on embattled Kosovo's borders, NATO has responded with Joint Task Force Sustain Hope. Travis supports NATO operations April 14, 1999 (AMCNS) -- In Shining Hope, Kosovar refugees will be airlifted from Europe to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Sustain Hope involves the delivery of relief supplies to those refugees while they are still in Europe. JTF Shining Hope lifeline for Kosovar refugees Released: 20 Apr 1999 U.S. Air Forces in Europe News Service Joint Task Force Shining Hope continues to be a lifeline for hundreds of thousands of Kosovars seeking refuge in Albania and Macedonia. At Fort Dix, a New Ellis Island Embraces Kosovo's Refugees New York Times 09 May 1999 -- In less than a week, Fort Dix has been transformed from an Army base into a kind of sprawling Ellis Island, gearing up to be the gateway to America for almost 20,000 Albanian refugees. The military has named the relief operation Open Arms. Operation Allied Force Operation Noble Anvil The Kosovo crisis began in early 1998 when large-scale fighting broke out, resulting in the displacement of some 300,000 people. A ceasefire was agreed in October 1998 which enabled refugees to find shelter, averting an impending humanitarian crisis over the winter. A Verification Mission was deployed under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). However, violence continued and the situation worsened significantly in January 1999. A peace conference, held in Paris, broke up on 19 March with the refusal of the Yugoslav delegation to accept a peaceful settlement. Operation Allied Force was a NATO contingency response aiming at ensuring full compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (Sept. 23rd 1998). Operation Noble Anvil was the American component of this NATO action to promote regional stability, cooperation and security, in support of the international community. At 1900 hours GMT on 24 March 1999, NATO forces began air operations over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. These air strikes against Serbian military targets in the Former Yugoslavia sought to: 1. Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo; 2. Withdrawal from Kosovo of Serbian military, police and para-military forces; 3. Agreement to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; 4. Agreement to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; and 5. Provide credible assurance of Serbian willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. NATO was prepared to suspend its air strikes once Belgrade unequivocally accepted the above mentioned conditions and demonstrably began to withdraw its forces from Kosovo according to a precise and rapid timetable. This would follow the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution requiring the withdrawal of Serb forces and the demilitarisation of Kosovo and encompassing the deployment of an international military force to safeguard the swift return of all refugees and displaced persons as well as the establishment of an international provisional administration of Kosovo. The multinational force was tasked by NATO to bring a swift end to hostilities committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against ethnic Albanians in the southern province of Kosovo. The military objective of Operation Allied Force was to degrade and damage the military and security structure that Yugoslav President President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) delegated authority for the implementation of Operation Allied Force to the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), whose headquarters is in Naples, Italy. CINCSOUTH delegated control of the operation to the Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), also based in Naples. Operational conduct of day-to-day missions was delegated to the Commander 5th Allied Tactical Air Force, at Vicenza, Italy. The Yugoslavs apparently thought that they could wipe out the Kosovar Liberation Army in five to seven days as part of Operation Horseshoe. They thought thought once they did that, they could negotiate an arrangement for peace. The Serbian leadership apparently also assumed that NATO would never launch airstrikesm, and that once the airstrikes were launched they would be pinpricks lasting a few days. And they assumed that NATO would not remain unified long enough to carry out significant air attacks, which would quickly end due to political divisions within NATO. Operation plan OPLAN 10601 "Allied Force" covered altogether five phases, which went from the transfer over a possible application outside of and within the air space of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia up to redeployment. The Application instruction (ACTORD) was effective from 13 October 1998, with simultaneous approval and preparatory exercises. The decision by NATO of 27 October 1998 was to maintain the ACTORD with execution dependent on further a NATO council decision. Constrained by the directive that collateral damage was to be avoided as far as possible, the concept of operations envisoned targeting based on a phasewise gradual, situation-adjusted application of NATO air forces, depending upon political and military developments. Operation Allied Force implemented, when ordered by the North Atlantic Council, phased operations which differ according to the attack targets and their geographical location. Phase Zero - During Phase 0, released on 20 January 1999 as political signal, air forces of NATO were shifted for the accommodation of practice flight operation to their operational airfields. Phase One -- Conduct limited air operations, such as air strikes against designated militarily significant targets. Phase 1 began on 24 March 1999 with attacks on the integrated air-defense system (e.g. weapon systems, radar facilities, control devices, airfield/aircraft) in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Phase Two -- Since the authorization of this phase on 27 March 1999 attacks extended to the security forces infrastructure military in Kosovo and reinforcement forces (e.g. headquarters, telecommunication installations, material and ammunition depot, systems for production and storage of fuel, barracks). The authorization of this phase took place with the unanimous resolution of the NATO allies. Phase Three - The focus of this phase, which was not authorized, was the expansion of the air operations against a broad range of particularly important targets of military importance north of the 44th parallel in the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [24 Apr. 1999 NATO Press Conference] By a month into the air campaign it became apparent to NATO that a constrained, phased approach was not effective. At the insistence of US leaders, NATO widened the air campaign to produce the strategic effects in Serbia proper. At the April NATO Summit SACEUR was given the flexibility to strike at additional targets, within the existing authority of phase 1 and phase 2 of the operation that were necessary to keep the pressure up, both on the tactical side in Kosovo and on the strategic side elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Phase Four -- [support of stabilization operations?] Phase Five -- [redeployment operations?] The Phase One "Limited Air Response" provided a fast available, temporally limited and supported with small strength feasible air operations against military targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - exclusive to the use of precision standoff weapons. Additional operations outside of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were provided for observation and for the air defense of the air space of NATO nations and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as to the protection of SFOR. The selection of target categories with the target of the minimization of collateral damage with at the same time high political and military significance. Operation execution was required within 48 hours after decision of the NATO advice possible. This Operations Concept was approved on 21 August 1998, with application instruction ACTORD from 13 October 1998; the decision NATO advice of 27 Octover 1998 for maintenance ACTORD with execution dependent on further NATO council decision. The early goal of Phase One of the campaign was to attempt to force Yugoslavia to the bargaining table. Some countries in NATO argued that it might be possible to do that with a few days or a week of attacks, without demolishing the whole country. Some of the NATO partners were initially prepared to wage only a phased air operation to show NATO's resolve in the hope of achieving an early settlement. The campaign did not begin the way that America normally would apply air power -- massively, striking at strategic centers of gravity that support Milosevic and his oppressive regime. The phased concept of operations of Operation Allied Force did not apply principles of military operations such as surprise and the use of overwhelming force, and this cost time, effort and potentially additional casualties, the net result being that the campaign was undoubtedly prolonged. NATO did not succeed in this initial attempt to coerce Milosevic through airstrikes to accept its demands, nor did it succeed in preventing the FRY pursuing a campaign of ethnic separation. Initial air operations started at an altitude that was estimated to be appropriate for the air defense threat that was expected, which allowed attacks against fixed targets with guided munitions in Kosovo and around Belgrade. Flying at or above 15,000 feet, attack aircraft were flying only at night and were instructed not to make multiple passes or other maneuvers that would entail unnecessary risks. NATO gained air superiority over Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia by degrading Milosevic's integrated air defence system. After allied planes mistakenly bombed two refugee convoys on the same day near the Kosovo town of Djakovica, new tactics were implemented with pilots flying lower to identify targets better. The net result was increased risk to allied pilots. Three NATO fighter-bombers were hit by ground fire in early May, and an American F-16 crashed with engine failure over Serbia as a result of Yugoslav anti-aircraft fire. As Yugoslavia demonstrated that it was completely unmoved and intransigent, the pressure and the tempo of the attacks grew, with the decision at the NATO Summit here on 23 April 1999 to expand the campaign. As the campaign continued, the target list expanded into so-called sustainment targets -- petroleum, lines of communication, electrical grids, and command and control targets. Air operations did not attack some strategic targets because of anxiety among NATO's 19 governments that further accidental civilian casualties could erode public support for the operation. On 07 May 1999 NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The planned target was the Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement in Belgrade but the wrong building was attacked. Following NATO's mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy, the alliance stopped hitting targets in the city for nearly two weeks while NATO authorities sought to ensure that another such mistake would not occur. By mid-May NATO pilots had grown increasingly familiar with Kosovo's terrain and with the tactics of the Serbian Armed Forces on the ground. Pilots increasingly knew where Serbian forces were concentrated, which explained the change in the tactics of Serbian forces. They were operating in smaller and smaller units to make them harder to detect from the air. The downside for the Serbian forces is that this made them increasingly vulnerable to KLA ambushes, and it also made Serb forces less mobile to the benefit of those Kosovars still living within Kosovo. Responsive or "Flex" targets were targets in the fielded forces, and normally not targets that would be a static target like a bridge or a petroleum area or a building. Such targets move around, and would be located by various means, such as a pilot report or JSTARS. NATO had aircraft in the area that can respond rapidly to attack such "Flex" targets. Quick response options for targets that may pop up via different means included aircraft holding on a tanker outside the area waiting for a target to occur, aircraft on the ground waiting on alert, or aircraft diverted from another engagement zone to a target of opportunity. During the first two months of air operations the majority of days the weather was unfavorable or marginal. Persistent low cloud cover over Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia forced the cancellation of many planned strikes. NATO had the capability to operate through solid cloud cover, however for a variety of reasons there were restrictions on operations in bad weather. The single biggest reason was the commitment to ensuring strikes against only military and military-related targets. Flying below the clouds is more dangerous from a technical standpoint, putting NATO air crews down into the range of tactical surface to air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery and small arms fire. It also highlights aircraft against the clouds, making them easier to see and target from the ground. Kosovo is a very mountainous area, and with the peaks of mountains frequently enveloped by the clouds, air crews were careful about avoiding terrain. The weather also provided some cover for the Serbian military to continue their attacks, and they took advantage of these times to conduct ground and air operations. At the beginning of the operation, the weather was so poor that NATO could operate against fielded forces only about 15% of the time. Since those early days NATO adapted its tactics to take maximum advantage of its comprehensive array of intelligence gathering capabilities. By early May NATO was able to collect and distribute information efficiently so that air crews were able to react quickly to targets of opportunity. NATO also adjusted flying patterns to ensure a continuous presence of combat air power that is able to operate in the directed attacks against Serbian ground forces. NATO had planes circling, awaiting the call to strike from other aircraft flying forward air control spotter missions. The fundamental factor in the conclusion of ALLIED FORCE was NATO's unity and resolve. NATO acted in a way that was tough, progressively tougher throughout the campaign. It failed to be deflected from its goals. This lesson was very clear to Milosevic, who had hoped he could outwait NATO. Secondly, both the precision and the persistence of the air campaign were fundamental factors in convincing Milosevic that it was time to end the fight. The air campaign, which started slowly but gathered momentum as it went on, became systematically damaging to his entire military infrastructure, not just the forces in the field in Kosovo, but throughout the entire country. The pounding his forces took during the last week had to have a huge impact on his determination to continue the fight. It had a big impact on the morale of the forces. Desertions were increasing, and there were increasing reports of lack of food, lack of fuel, lack of equipment, lack of will, lack of morale, and increasing dismay with the leadership not only of the forces but of the country, and an increasing feeling that they just saw no way out. And they realized, because of NATO's persistence, the situation was just going to get steadily worse. On 3 June, President Slobodan Milosevic finally accepted peace terms presented by EU envoy President Martti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. With the authorisation of the United Nations on 10 June 1999, NATO forces deployed into Kosovo. Chronology of Events March 24 -- NATO launches air campaign, with the goal of crippling the Serbian war machine in Kosovo and enforcing compliance with the international peace plan drawn up at Rambouillet, France. March 26 -- The first of a massive tide of refugees arrive in Albania. March 27 -- A US F-117 Nighthawk Stealth fighter is lost near Belgrade but the pilot is recovered. March 31 -- Three US soldiers are snatched by Serb forces after an incident on the Macedonian border. April 1 -- Moderate Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova is shown on Serb television talking with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. April 13 -- Yugoslav forces mount a cross-border attack on a village in northern Albania. April 14 -- Yugoslavia claims that rockets fired by allied jets killed 75 people in two separate refugee columns. NATO later admits accidentally hitting a civilian vehicle. April 20 -- Russian President Boris Yeltsin says Moscow "cannot break with leading world powers" over Kosovo. April 21 -- Two NATO missiles smash into the headquarters of Yugoslavia's ruling Socialist Party. April 23 -- NATO bombs the headquarters of Serbian state television. NATO leaders in Washington rebuff as inadequate an offer by Milosevic to accept an "international presence" in Kosovo. April 28 -- Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic is dismissed after he accuses the country's rulers of "lying to the people." May 1 -- Forty-seven bus passengers are killed when NATO bombs a bridge in Kosovo. May 2 -- Three captured US soldiers are released into the custody of US civil rights leader Jesse Jackson. May 5 -- NATO suffers its first losses when the two-man crew of a US Apache attack helicopter die in a crash in Albania. Rugova is released by the Yugoslav authorities and flies to Rome. May 6 -- Foreign ministers from the Group of Eight (G8) agree on a framework for a peace plan which calls for the return of all refugees and the deployment of an international "security" force in Kosovo. May 8 -- The Chinese embassy in Belgrade is hit by NATO missiles which kill three people. NATO describes the bombing as a "tragic mistake" caused by "faulty information." May 10 -- Yugoslavia begins proceedings before the UN International Court of Justice in the Hague, accusing NATO of genocide. Belgrade says it has begun pulling troops out of Kosovo. May 13 -- NATO dismisses as insignificant a reported pullout by 250 Yugoslav troops. May 14 -- At least 79 people are killed and 58 wounded when NATO missiles hit Korisa, a village in southern Kosovo. May 19 -- Milosevic and Russia's Balkans envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin back a settlement of the Kosovo conflict within the framework of the United Nations. May 21 -- Russia says mediation efforts with the West are deadlocked. A NATO bomb kills 10 inmates in a Pristina jail. May 22 -- A UN humanitarian mission visits Kosovo, as NATO admits bombing a position held by the KLA. May 23 -- Fighting flares on border between Serb forces and Albanian police. President Bill Clinton says he no longer rules out "other military options". May 26 -- NATO agrees to boost the number of troops in a future Kosovo peacekeeping mission from 28,000 to 45,000. May 27 -- Milosevic and four other top officials are indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. May 29 -- Yugoslavia says it has accepted the Group of Eight principles for a peace deal in Kosovo. May 30 -- NATO says it wants a clear, personal statement from Milosevic that he accepts alliance conditions before it will halt air raids. A German soldier dies when a tank crashes off a bridge in Albania. May 31 -- At least 20 people are killed at a sanatorium at Surdulica, southern Serbia. NATO denies that its missles are responsible. June 1 -- Belgrade says in a letter to Bonn that it "has accepted the G8 principles." European, US and Russian envoys meet in Bonn to hammer out a common policy for a peace mission to Belgrade. June 2 -- The International Court of Justice rejects Yugoslavia's petition to order an end to NATO airstrikes. EU and Russian envoys travel to Belgrade for talks with Milosevic and hand him a peace plan worked out in Bonn with US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. June 3 -- Talks in Belgrade resume for a second session. A Russian spokesman in Moscow says Yugoslavia viewed the peace plan as a "realistic" way out of the Kosovo crisis. June 9 -- NATO and Yugoslav military authorities sign an agreement on the withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces from Kosovo. June 10 -- NATO suspends air strikes. Collateral Damage Incidents NATO has repeatedly denied that it deliberately attacks non-military buildings and insists that all possible precautions are taken to avoid civilian casualties. Serb officials put the death toll from the following incidents, most of which but not all NATO acknowledges as errors, at more than 460. Overall, they say, some 2,000 civilians have been killed since the start of the air campaign on March 24. April 5 -- A 550-pound NATO bomb aimed at Yugoslav army barracks in Aleksinac in southern Serbia misses its target and lands in a residential area. Serbs put death toll at 17. April 9 -- NATO hits homes near a telephone exchange in the Kosovo capital, Pristina. NATO said civilian casualties were possible but neither side provided a death toll. April 12 -- A NATO pilot fires two missiles into a train crossing a bridge at Grdelicka Klisura in southern Serbia, killing 55 people, according to Belgrade. NATO insists the bridge, a key supply line for Yugoslav forces in Kosovo, was the target and that the pilot saw the train too late. April 14 -- NATO bombs refugee convoys in the Djakovica region of south-east Kosovo, leaving 75 dead, according to Belgrade. NATO, without confirming the civilian toll, said it was targeting military vehicles but admitted hitting two convoys. April 28 -- NATO, aiming for an army barracks in the Serb village of Surdulica (250 kms/150 miles south of Belgrade), bombs a residential area, leaving at least 20 civilians dead. May 1 -- NATO bombs a bridge at Luzane near Pristina, killing 47 people aboard a bus which was travelling along it. NATO, without confirming the figure, admitted the following day having targetted the bridge without the intention of causing civilian casualties. May 7 -- A NATO air raid hits central Nis in southeast Serbia, leaving at least 15 dead and 70 injured. NATO said its planes were aiming for a landing strip and a radio transmitter but that a cluster bomb had missed its mark. May 8 -- NATO mistakenly attacks the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three journalists. The United States and NATO said the intended target was a Yugoslav building with military use, but US maps used in the planning of the operation were old and marked the embassy at a previous address. May 13 -- NATO bombs the village of Korisa, leaving 87 civilians dead according to the Serbs. The allies claim that the civilians were being used as "human shields" and that Korisa was a legitimate military target. May 20 -- A Belgrade hospital is hit by a missile at around 1 -- 00 a.m., killing three patients. NATO attributes the accident to a missile which went astray during an attack on a nearby military barracks. May 21 -- NATO bombs Istok prison in north-west Kosovo. Alliance officials insist the prison was being used as an assembly point for Serb forces in the province. Serbs say at least 100 inmates and a prison officer were killed. May 22 -- NATO admits bombing by mistake positions of the Kosovo Liberation Army at Kosare, near the border with Albania. Sources close to the KLA say seven guerillas were killed and 15 injured. May 30 -- NATO bombs a highway bridge at Varvarin in a daytime raid in central Serbia. The Serbs claim 11 people died while attempting to cross the bridge in their cars. NATO has not confirmed whether there were cars on the bridge and insists the bridge was a legitimate military garget. May 31 -- Missiles strike a sanatorium at Surdulica, southern Serbia, killing at least 20 people, according to the Serb authorities. NATO says it successfully attacked a military barracks in the town but refuses to confirm, or categorically deny, hitting the hospital. May 31 -- A NATO bomb aimed at a military compound strikes a four-storey apartment block in the town of Novi Pazar. NATO confirms one of its bombs went astray and landed in a residential area. Serb authorities report 23 dead. 1 June -- A NATO bomb landed in a residential neighbourhood in the Serbian town of Novi Pazar. Basic Documents Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report 31 January 2000 -- "This report presents the results of the Department of Defense review of the conduct of Operation Allied Force and associated relief operations as required by Congress." [PDF 2.23 Mb] RAMBOUILLET ACCORDS TEXT - Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (February 23, 1999) Statement on Kosovo Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, DC 23 April 1999 TEXT: G-8 FOREIGN MINISTERS PROPOSE SOLUTION FOR KOSOVO USIA 06 May 1999 Sources and Methods Intelligence Collection Systems Cloud Cover - Current Conditions Cloud Cover - Archive Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment by General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Brigadier General John Corley, Chief, Kosovo Mission Effectiveness Assessment Team Maps and Aerial Views of post- and pre-strikes used during the Press Conference by General Wesley K. Clark 16 Sept. 1999 KOSOVO: An Account of the Crisis - By Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary of State for Defence - 07 October 1999 JOINT STATEMENT ON THE KOSOVO AFTER ACTION REVIEW presented by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, October 14, 1999 "After Kosovo: Implications for U.S. Strategy and Coalition Warfare" 1999 Topical Symposium, National Defense University, November 16-17, 1999, Fort McNair, Washington D.C. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORTS ON OPERATION ALLIED FORCE February 7, 2000 -- A new Department of Defense report released today provides more detailed information on NATO's 78-day air campaign, Operation Allied Force, to end Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. Press Conference by NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana and General Wesley K. Clark, SACEUR 1st April 1999 Almost All U.S. Airstrikes Involve 'Smart' Bombs PAUL RICHTER, Los Angeles Times Tuesday, April 13, 1999 NATO HQ Press Conference Speech of Brigadier General Daniel P. Leaf 19 April 1999 NATO HQ Transcript of Press Conference given by General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of the Military Committee 4 May 1999 PSYOPs Leaflets dropped by NATO airplanes above Kosovo and Serbia 07 May 1999 Operation " horseshoe " (Potkova) Clinton Kosovo Intervention Appears Imminent Bombing, or Ground Troops -- or Both US Senate Republican Policy Committee February 22, 1999 -- The Clinton Administration appears to be on the verge of military intervention in Kosovo. Depending on the outcome of the talks currently underway in France, the intervention -- the result of a course set by the Administration several months ago -- might involve NATO airstrikes against Serbia and/or a NATO ground force to police a settlement. Senate to Vote Today on Preventing Funding of Military Operations for Kosovo US Senate Republican Policy Committee March 23, 1999 -- Once again, the Clinton Administration appears to be on the verge of military intervention on behalf of Kosovo, in the form of airstrikes against Yugoslavia (now comprised of two republics, Serbia and Montenegro), which could begin at any time. KOSOVO: RUSSIA'S RESPONSE (OB66) Mark A Smith & Henry Plater-Zyberk Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK April 1999 SOME GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT (O.B.67) C J Dick Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK May 1999 REACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE KOSOVO CRISIS, 14 MARCH-31 MAY 1999 CJ Dick Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK Russian & Ukrainian perceptions of events in Yugoslavia James Sherr & Dr Steven Main Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK (F64) May 1999 The Legality of NATO‘s attack on Serbia, 1999 Lt Cdr (Retd) N F Bradshaw Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK (G76) June 1999 MASKIROVKA IN YUGOSLAV MILITARY THINKING (A100) C J Dick Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK July 1999 RUSSIAN THINKING ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER KOSOVO Dr M A Smith Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK (F65) August 1999 NATO Intervention in Kosova - Questions without answers Dr TR Waters Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst UK (G79) November 1999 Operation Determined Effort Operation Determined Effort was a plan [OPLAN 40-104] for a NATO operation for withdrawing UN forces should such a contingency have arisen. The detailed planning for this operation by several NATO countries prepared the groundwork for Operation Joint Endeavor. In July 1995 NATO planners estimated that the number of troops needed for the successfull evacuation of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia-Hercegovina would total up to 80,000 troops for a possible evacuation mission, with the US portion of the operation limited to 25,000. The operation involved securing routes into Sarajevo and into the other enclaves and bringing out the UN troops and their equipment. The two options initially under consideration were Operation Determined Effort, a gradual evacuation that would take months, and Operation Daring Lion, which could be executed in a matter of days, though the UN would leave behind equipment that would have to be destroyed so it did not fall into the hands of the warring sides. Operation Determined Effort evolved as the designation for the prelude to and planning for Operation Joint Endeavor. In response to orders in November 1995 from President Bill Clinton, a handful of US troops moved into Bosnia and Croatia as part of a small multinational force of logisticians who prepared for the anticipated arrival of an implementation force (IFOR) of about 60,000 troops from the U.S. Army, its sister services, and other NATO- and non-NATO nations. The IFOR would enforce provisions of the peace agreement formally signed on 14 December in Paris by the warring parties of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In the United States, guardsmen and reservists were sent to Fort Benning, Georgia, or Fort Dix, New Jersey, for a NATO orientation before moving on to Germany for the special training. Many reservists were deployed to areas in Europe to fill in for active-duty troops who deployed to Bosnia. The 1st Armored Division is the major element of the U.S. military contingent in Bosnia. The 13,000-man force is equipped with M1A1 Abrams tanks, M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicles, AH-64 Apache helicopters, and extra radar detectors to identify and attack hostile mortar and artillery fire. The division's intelligence analysts monitored terrorist activities worldwide that could target American troops in Bosnia. U.S. forces were instructed to patrol in small units, never alone; enforce tight security around base camps; and not to socialize with local residents. Twenty-two Active Army units in the United States were identified for potential deployment in support of the NATO IFOR in Bosnia. Among logistics units that deployed were the 54th Quartermaster Company, a mortuary affairs unit from Fort Lee, Virginia; the 102d Quartermaster Company, a petroleum, oils, and lubricants unit from Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 403d Transportation Company, from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that would be responsible for transshipping cargo at highway, rail, barge, and air terminals. In addition, 49 Army National Guard and Army Reserve units based in the continental United States and Puerto Rico were notified to begin training for possible deployment to the European Theater to support U.S. forces that would participate in NATO peace IFOR operations in the former Yugoslavia. Among these were units that perform transportation, public affairs, medical, military police, postal, materiel management, military history, and civil affairs functions. Documents BEFORE KOSOVO UNDERWENT ALLIED FORCE, NATO ALMOST UNDERTOOK DETERMINED EFFORT IN BOSNIA BOSNET July 15, 1995 Army Reservists mobilized to support Operation Determined Effort (Jan. 23) Logistics: Spearhead for Operation Joint Endeavor CFC (KOREA) OPLAN 9518X-XX Protection of US National Security Interests and Support for the Republic of South Korea CFC OPLAN CFC OPSM CFC Classification Guidance Baseplan CFC OPLN base-highlighted CFC OPLN base A - TASK ORGANIZATION CFC Annex A CFC Annex A; Appendix 1 CFC Annex A; Appendix 2 CFC Annex A; Appendix 3 B - INTELLIGENCE CFC Annex B CFC Annex B; Appendix 1 CFC Annex B; Appendix 2 CFC Annex B; Appendix 2; Tab A CFC Annex B; Appendix 2; Tab B CFC Annex B; Appendix 3 CFC Annex B; Appendix 3; Tab A CFC Annex B; Appendix 4 CFC Annex B; Appendix 4; Tab A CFC Annex B; Appendix 4; Tab B CFC Annex B; Appendix 5 CFC Annex B; Appendix 5; Tab A CFC Annex B; Appendix 5; Tab B CFC Annex B; Appendix 6 CFC Annex B; Appendix 7 CFC Annex B; Appendix 8 CFC Annex B; Appendix 9 CFC Annex B; Appendix 9; Tab B CFC Annex B; Appendix 9; Tab B CFC Annex B; Appendix 10 C - OPERATIONS CFC Annex C CFC Annex C; Appendix 1 CFC Annex C; Appendix 2 CFC Annex C; Appendix 3 CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab A CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab B CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab C CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab D CFC Annex C; Appendix 3; Tab E CFC Annex C; Appendix 4 CFC Annex C; Appendix 5 CFC Annex C; Appendix 6 CFC Annex C; Appendix 7 CFC Annex C; Appendix 8 CFC Annex C; Appendix 10 CFC Annex C; Appendix 11 CFC Annex C; Appendix 15 D - LOGISTICS CFC Annex D; Appendix 4 CFC Annex D; Appendix 4; Tab A CFC Annex D; Appendix 4; Tab A1 CFC Annex D; Appendix 4; Tab A2 CFC Annex D; Appendix 4; Tab B CFC Annex D; Appendix 5 CFC Annex D; Appendix 5; Tab A CFC Annex D; Appendix 5; Tab A1 E - PERSONNEL CFC Annex E CFC Annex E; Appendix 1 CFC Annex E; Appendix 2 CFC Annex E; Appendix 3 CFC Annex E; Appendix 4 CFC Annex E; Appendix 5 CFC Annex E; Appendix 5; Tab A CFC Annex E; Appendix 5; Tab B CFC Annex E; Appendix 6 F - PUBLIC AFFAIRS CFC Annex F CFC Annex F; Appendix 1 CFC Annex F; Appendix 2 CFC Annex F; Appendix 3 CFC Annex F; Appendix 4 CFC Annex F; Appendix 5 CFC Annex F; Appendix 6 CFC Annex F; Appendix 6; Tab F G - CIVIL AFFAIRS CFC Annex G H – METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS CFC Annex H J - COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS CFC Annex J CFC Annex J; Appendix 1 CFC Annex J; Appendix 1; Tab B K – COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS CFC Annex K L – ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS CFC Annex L M - MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY CFC Annex M CFC Annex M; Appendix 1 N - SPACE OPERATIONS CFC Annex N P - HOST-NATION SUPPORT CFC Annex P Q – MEDICAL SERVICES CFC Annex Q CFC Annex Q; Appendix 1 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab A CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab B CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab C CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab D CFC Annex Q; Appendix 2; Tab E CFC Annex Q; Appendix 3 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 4 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 5 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 6 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 7 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 8 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 9 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 10 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 11 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 12 CFC Annex Q; Appendix 13 S – SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS CFC Annex S X - EXECUTION CHECKLIST CFC Annex X Appendixes: 1 - Joint Medical Regulating System 2 - Joint Blood Program 3 - Hospitalization 4 - Patient Evacuation 5 - Returns To Duty 6 - Medical Logistics (Class VIII-A) System 7 - Preventive Medicine 8 - Medical Command, Control, and Communications 9 - Host-Nation Medical Support 10 - Medical Sustainability Assessment 11 - Medical Intelligence Support to Military Operations 12 - Veterinary Medicine 13 - Medical Planning Responsibilities and Task Identification
Pages to are hidden for
"Operation Plans"Please download to view full document