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Collision between the Tanker Martina and the Container Vessel

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					          REPORT

 Collision between the Tanker
     MARTINA - ELNF7
              and
      the Container Vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
        on 28 March 2000




                                2000-07-10
                                REPORT


          Collision between the Tanker
              MARTINA - ELNF7
                       and
               the Container Vessel
         WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6
                 on 28 March 2000




Our designation                 080202-0034611/0034610
Maritime Casualty               Sten Anderson, Head of Staff
Investigation Staff             Telephone: +46-11-191269

This report can also be found   www.sjofartsverket.se (Webbtjänsten-Press-
on our Internet Home Page       Rapporter/remisser
                                Reprinting is permitted upon disclosure of the orgin of
                                the text




THE SWEDISH MARITIME ADMINISTRATION                                          2000-07-10
SE - 601 78 NORRKÖPING
Tel:    +46-11-19 10 00
Fax:    +46-11-10 19 49
Table of Contents

1. Summary .................................................................................. 1

2. The basis of the investigation........................................................ 1

3. Factual account.......................................................................... 3
3.1 The Vessels .............................................................................. 3
 3.1.1 The Martina .......................................................................... 3
 3.1.2 The Werder Bremen ................................................................ 7
 3.1.3 Weather conditions on 28 March 2000 .......................................... 9
4. The rescue operation..................................................................10

5. Course of events accordning to the WB..........................................11

6. The Collision ............................................................................13

7. The Wreck................................................................................13
7.1 The stern part...........................................................................13
7.2 The bow part ............................................................................14
7.3 Planned action..........................................................................14
8. Observations from the VISCARIA .................................................15

9. Observations from the GREEN FLAKE ...........................................15

10. Plotting by means of the ARPA radar............................................16

11. Analysis.................................................................................17
11.1 Plotting on board the WB ............................................................17
11.2 The Ma's radar ........................................................................18
11.3 The Ma's actions......................................................................19
11.4 Propeller position of the wreck .....................................................20
11.5 Rudder position of the wreck .......................................................21
11.6 The collision angle....................................................................21
11.7 Passing distance - CPA .............................................................21
12. Cause of accident ....................................................................22

13. Comments..............................................................................22

14. General recommendations .........................................................23

15. Damages................................................................................24
15.1 Personal injuries ......................................................................24
15.2 Structural damages...................................................................24
 15.2.1 The Martina ........................................................................24
 15.2.2 The Werder Bremen .............................................................24
15.3 Environmental consequences ......................................................25
 15.3.1 The diesel fuel.....................................................................25
 15.3.2 The cargo ..........................................................................25
16. Conclusions of the investoigation................................................25

17. Additional information ..............................................................27
Annex 1: Detail of Chart
Annex 2: The Martina




This maritime incident investigation report was compiled jointly by
Söfartsstyrelsens Opklaringsenhed, Köpenhamn (the Investigation Division
of the Danish Maritime Administration) and Sjöfartsverkets
Utredningsstab, Norrköping (the Maritime Casualty Investigation Staff of
the Swedish Maritime Administration)




Sten Anderson                         Knud Skaareberg
Utredningsstaben                      Opklaringsenheden
Report
Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000




                      1. Summary
                      In the forenoon of Tuesday 28 March 2000, the containership WERDER
                      BREMEN (WB) was heading north in Öresund and was approaching the
                      Kullen light. The wind was brisk from the northeast and falling snow had
                      reduced the visibility to 1-3 cables (185 – 550 metres).

                      The master, who had the watch, plotted an approaching vessel at a distance
                      of 2.5 M (nautical miles) on the ARPA radar (Automatic Radar Plotting
                      Aid).

                      The approaching ship, which was the tanker MARTINA (MA), was
                      heading south, on a near counter course and at a close passing distance. On
                      the Martina as well, it was the ship's master who had the watch, but he had
                      probably been relieved for a short while by the chief mate.

                      The two ships collided at 1005 hrs in position N 56° 15'.8 E 12° 25'.0,
                      which is 208° 2.6 M from the Kullen light. When they collided, at an angle
                      of 35°- 40°, the MA was cut in two just forward of the bridge. The stern
                      part sank in a very short time, while the forward part portion kept afloat for
                      close to four hours and went down
                      1.9 M north of the stern section. The WB incurred only slight damage
                      above the waterline and could continue her journey after the rescue
                      operation.

                      Two of the seven persons on board the MA were saved by vessels coming
                      to the rescue, while the remaining five lost their lives.



                      2. The basis of the investigation
                      The sequence and analysis of the investigation are based on ROV
                      (Remotely Operated Vehicle) filming of the wreck, police interrogation of
                      the officer on watch on board the WB and his statement, police
                      interrogation of the officer on watch on board the GREEN FLAKE, police
                      interrogation of the officer on watch on board the VISCARIA, police
                      interrogation of the two survivors from the MA, the Göteborg MRCC's
                      (Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre) sound tape of the rescue
                      operation, and the observations of the divers in their search for the
                      drowned men. The analysis has also taken into account the examination of



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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      the salvaged radar units manufactured by Furuno. The examination was
                      undertaken by Furuno Sverige AB in Gothenburg. The police
                      interrogations were, for the most part, held by the County Criminal
                      Investigation Department in Malmö.

                      Whatever took place on the MA's bridge is shrouded in obscurity since the
                      OOW (officer of the watch) on the MA did not survive the accident. Thus,
                      the investigators have only the statement of one of the parties at their
                      disposal.

                      The tugboat VISCARIA, which at the time of the collision was approx. 4
                      M astern the MA, and the reefer GREEN FLAKE, which was approx. 1.75
                      M astern the WB, have contributed much valuable information, since these
                      two ships had observed the two vessels involved in the collision on there
                      respective radar screens.




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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000




                      3. Factual account

                      3.1 The Vessels

                      3.1.1 The Martina

                      Name of Ship                 MARTINA

                      Call sign                    ELNF7

                      Port of regsitry             Monrovia

                      Gross tonnage                696/386/393

                      Deadweight                   815 mts

                      Length over all              55 m

                      Breadth                      9.3 m

                      Draught                      3.5 m (even keel)

                      Classification Society       Bureau Veritas

                      Year built                   1968

                      Year rebuilt                 1990

                      Building materieal           Steel

                      Propulsion power             515 kW

                      Crew                         6

                      Passangers                   1



                      The Martina was built in 1968 at Baatservice Verft A/S in Mandal,
                      Norway and was named Jytte Dania. After delivery she operated as a
                      general cargo vessel of Danish registry for her first 22 years. After three
                      different name changes she was bought in 1990 by the same owners to
                      whom she belonged at the time of the accident.


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WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      The MA was constructed to Bureau Veritas (BV) class designation 1 3/3 E
                      Special Service/Chemical Carrier Deep Sea ICE III. "1" means that the
                      ship was constructed according to regulation requirements, "3/3" that the
                      ship was in satisfactory condition, "E" that the anchor equipment complied
                      with the requirements, "Special Service" that special features had been
                      built in, and "ICE III" that the vessel was of a certain ice class. "Chemical
                      Carrier" denoted her type of usage and "Deep Sea" meant that the vessel
                      was classed for operation in all waters.

                      In 1989 the ship was transferred from the Danish to the Liberian register,
                      and in 1990 she was converted from a general cargo vessel to a chemical
                      tanker. The flag State determined at that time that the difference in gross
                      tonnage before and after the rebuilding was not significant enough for the
                      change-over to be considered a "major conversion". Taking that point of
                      view, the ship did not need an IOPP certificate, since she was not a tanker
                      and the gross tonnage did not exceed 400.

                      According to an entry in the MA's tonnage certificate, her gross tonnage
                      was 386, but in the chemical certificate it was noted as 393. According to
                      the new tonnage calculation rules of 1969, which entered into force in
                      1982 for new ships and in 1994 for all ships, a gross tonnage of 696 had
                      been assigned to the ship. In order for the larger gross tonnage to be
                      applicable, a conversion constituting a "substantial variation of gross
                      tonnage" must have been made. The Liberian Administration was of the
                      opinion that a change according to that definition had not taken place.

                      The ship was constructed as a typical 60's general cargo vessel with the
                      deckhouse, containing the master's cabin, other crew accommodations and
                      the navigating bridge, placed furthest aft on the main deck. The cabins for
                      the rest of the crew and the engine room were located below this. The
                      cargo space was located forward of the engine room and consisted of two
                      cargo holds, separated by a bulkhead and covered by two cargo hatches of
                      the same size.

                      The double bottom below the cargo space was divided into three pairs of
                      tanks, all of them ballast tanks. In addition, there were three centre tanks,
                      starting at approx. midships (L/2) and extending aft to the forward
                      bulkhead of the engine room. Of these the two forward tanks were fuel
                      tanks, which, at the time of the accident, contained between 10 m3 and 15
                      m3 of diesel oil, and the third was a ballast tank. Two fuel oil day-tanks,
                      each with a capacity of 1000 litres, were located in the engine room.


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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      Forward of the cargo space was a forepeak ballast water tank and above
                      that a dry-storage compartment. Aft of the engine room was an afterpeak
                      tank and a tank in the overhang, both for fresh water (see annex 2).

                      At the time of the accident the most significant aids to navigation were one
                      daylight radar of the make KODEN MD 3751 F, Display Unit MRD-55,
                      another FURUNO, type 1832 RDP 18 daylight radar, one differential
                      operation GPS of the make KODEN KGP-931 D, and a NAVITRON type
                      NT920G autopilot, which was connected to a magnetic compass of the
                      make IVER C. WEILBACK, a liquid type compass. According to a
                      deviation table, prepared in 1998, the deviation was 0º on the course in
                      question, which was approx. 158º.

                      The Koden radar unit, manufactured in 1988, had been recently
                      reconditioned and had a new magnetron and a new cathode-ray tube. The
                      reconditioning had been done in August/September by Stella Marine
                      Skibselektronik. The other radar unit, the Furuno radar, was manufactured
                      in 1998.

                      The ship's main engine was a B&W ALPHA-DIESEL, type 407-26VO. It
                      had a power out-put of 551 kW, turned at 400 rpm, and was coupled to a
                      variable pitch propeller, which was also manufactured by ALPHA-
                      DIESEL. The operational controls, both revolutions and pitch stood at
                      slightly short of half astern when the ROV filming was carried out about a
                      week after the accident. The main engine was controlled from the bridge.

                      The steering engine was equipped with two hydraulic pumps. During
                      manoeuvring, when quick rudder action were needed, both pumps were in
                      operation, but only one pump was in use during normal running. The ROV
                      filming mentioned earlier could establish that the rudder was in position
                      hard to port.

                      As mentioned earlier, the MA was converted from a general cargo vessel
                      to a chemical tanker in 1990. Three cylindrical steel tanks were installed in
                      cradles in the cargo holds and bolted to the hull. The insides of two of the
                      tanks were lined with fibreglass and the third with rubber.

                      One tank of 188 m3 was placed in the forward cargo hold. The other two
                      were placed in the aft cargo hold; the forward of those tanks had a capacity
                      of 47 m3 and the aft had a capacity of 282 m3. Fixed ventilation systems
                      were installed as part of the conversion, as well as a fixed pipe and



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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      pumping system for cargo handling. The pump was placed in a small
                      compartment on the weather deck. It was in use only when unloading;
                      loading was done by means of a dock-side pump. When the tanks were
                      installed the cargo hatches were permanently welded to their coamings.

                      When the accident occurred, the MA was on her way from Sarpsborg in
                      Norway to Copenhagen in Denmark. The cargo consisted of approx. 600
                      tons of hydrochloric acid, which has IMDG class 8 and UN number 1789.
                      According to the IMDG Code, the substance poses only insignificant and
                      short-term hazard to the marine environment

                      The crew was made up of the master, the chief mate, three able seamen and
                      one cook-steward, all in compliance with the requirements of the Liberian
                      Administration. In addition, the master's father was on board as a
                      passenger. He was listed in the manning document as an electrician and
                      stayed in the salon, which was located on the starboard side of the main
                      deck. All persons on board were Polish nationals.

                      The diver-assisted search for the victims showed the master to be in the
                      salon and the very lightly clad chief mate on the bridge.

                      The ship's inflatable life raft of the make VIKING was located on the boat
                      deck port side and was equipped with a hydrostatic release device of the
                      make TANNER. A davit-launched lifeboat was located on the starboard
                      side of the boat deck.

                      The MA had been the subject of a port State control on 17 September 1999
                      in Aarhus, Denmark. The survey revealed no deficiencies.




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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000




                      3.1.2 The Werder Bremen

                      Name of Ship             WERDER BREMEN

                      Call sign                9HMW6

                      Port of regsitry         Valetta

                      Gross tonnage            6378

                      Deadweight               7114 mts

                      Length over all          121 m

                      Breadth                  18.4 m

                      Draught                  6.7 m

                      Classification Society   Germanischer Lloyd

                      Year built               1999

                      Building materieal       Steel

                      Propulsion power         5300 kW

                      Crew                     13



                      The WB was built in 1999 at the J.J. Sietas KG Schiffswerft GmbH & Co
                      in Hamburg as an "open top" container vessel with a cargo capacity of 700
                      TEU (in 20 foot entities). The WB was delivered just four months before
                      the accident occurred.

                      The WB was constructed to the Germanischer Lloyd (GL) class and was
                      designated +100 A 5 E3 ”Container Ship”, ”open-top”, SOLAS II-2,
                      Reg.54. "+" means that the construction had been supervised by GL, "100
                      A 5" means that the ship had been built entirely to GL's requirements, and
                      "E3" denotes ice class 1A. " Container Ship" denotes that the ship was
                      intended solely for container cargo, and "open top" that the ship was
                      allowed to sail, altogether or partially, without weather deck hatches. "


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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      SOLAS II-2, Reg. 54" specifies that the ship was equipped to carry
                      dangerous goods.

                      The deckhouse of the WB, which housed the crew accommodations and
                      the bridge, was typical for a container vessel, both as to of its height and
                      because it was extremely narrow, and also because it was located as far aft
                      as it could possibly be. The visibility from the bridge was excellent. At the
                      time of the accident the cargo consisted of 119 containers of 40 foot each
                      and 136 containers of 20 foot. Only a few were loaded on the weather
                      deck.

                      The cargo space contained four cargo holds, of which cargo hold number
                      3, which was the largest, was an open cargo hold. The remaining three
                      holds were covered by steel patent hatches. All four cargo holds were
                      provided with guider systems for loading the containers.

                      The engine room was located below the deckhouse. Forward of the engine
                      room and below the container cargo space was the double bottom
                      containing various tanks for bunker fuel and ballast water.

                      Forward of the cargo space and the double bottom was a forepeak tank.
                      Above that and below the forecastle was a storage compartment.

                      The ship was operated by an eight-cylinder main engine of the make MAN
                      B&W Maker. It had a power out-put of 5300 kW and was coupled via a
                      reduction gear box to a variable pitch propeller, allowing the ship a
                      maximum speed of 17 knots. Manoeuvring was done from the bridge and
                      the system was classed for unmanned machinery space. The WB was
                      equipped with a 550 kW YASTRAM bow thruster.

                      The rudder was a so-called flap rudder with a maximum rudder angle of
                      45º. With two steering engine pumps in operation, as was the case at the
                      time in question, the rudder could be shifted from the one extreme position
                      to the other in 18 seconds.

                      The turn radius of the ship, fully loaded, with the rudder turned to the limit
                      and the engine at full speed, was 1.2 cables.

                      The bows of the WB were prominently flared and the topmost portion of
                      the prow protruded approx. 2.5 metres in front of the very sturdily
                      constructed bulbous bow.




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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      A free-fall lifeboat was located aft of the superstructure and a MOB boat
                      (Man Over Board) was suspended from a davit on the starboard side.

                      The bridge was of the pilot-copilot type, arranged on the ship's centreline,
                      where two STN ATLAS 9600 radar units, were located; those aids to
                      navigation that are the most pertinent to this occurrence. The radar on the
                      starboard side was an ARPA radar with a wave length of 10 cm. The port
                      radar was also an ARPA radar, which had a wave length of 3 cm.

                      A display screen for a STN ATLAS 9300 electronic navigation chart,
                      which, according to the interrogation held on board, was not in operation at
                      the time of the accident, was located between the two radar units, and
                      behind each of these were the seats of the navigators. The steering
                      apparatus and the manoeuvring controls, located on a control panel
                      between the navigators' seats were easily accessible from these positions.
                      A gyrocompass of the make PLATH was also located on the control panel.

                      The WB sailed on a regular route between Russia and the Continent. All
                      her courses and waypoints were pre-programmed in a DGPS (Differential
                      Global Positioning System) of the make STN-ATLAS.

                      There were twelve Polish nationals and one German in the WB's 13-man
                      crew. The watches on board were arranged into four-hour passes, and the
                      master was on duty from 2000 hrs until 2400 hrs and between the hours of
                      0800 and 1200.

                      The WB had been the subject of a port State control in Antwerp, Belgium
                      on 19 January 2000. The survey revealed no deficiencies.

                      3.1.3 Weather conditions on 28 March 2000

                      According to the SMHI (Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological
                      Institute) there was a low-pressure area located over Central Europe and a
                      high-pressure area over mid-Scandinavia. Between these systems was a
                      northeasterly air current of 8-12 m/sec above the province of Skåne,
                      Sweden and the surrounding waters.

                      During the forenoon an area of snow mixed with rain was moving west
                      over Skåne towards Sjaelland, Denmark and the southern part of Kattegatt.
                      According to reports from the site of the accident, the visibility was only a
                      few cables, which is in keeping with such weather conditions.



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WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      For short periods the visibility may have been as low as a few hundred
                      metres, since heavy snowfall lowers visibility considerably.

                      According to statements from the rescue units participating in the
                      operation, the current was set north-northwest at 1-2 knots.

                      According to the SMHI's calculations, the wave height was only approx.
                      0.5 metres due to offshore winds.



                      4. The rescue operation
                      At 1008 hrs the WB hailed the Coast Guard and reported that she had
                      collided with an unknown vessel. As soon as the MRCC in Gothenburg
                      realized that it was a distress call, it took charge of the rescue action and
                      sent out a " May Day Relay", which was subsequently repeated at regular
                      intervals during the day.

                      Within a short time a large number of commercial ships, Navy vessels,
                      Coast Guard vessels, helicopters, and Coast Guard aircraft responded. The
                      first military unit, the HMS Östhammar, which arrived at the site of the
                      collision, rescued two of the MA's crewmembers.

                      Approx. 20 entities on the water or in the air participated in the search for
                      survivors throughout the day. Nine MRCC staff members were on duty
                      together with another five persons, who made up a support group. The
                      reason for the large number of people manning the MRCC was the very
                      intensive radio and telephone traffic and the mass media pressure.

                      The extensive rescue operation, which was carried out most satisfactorily,
                      was terminated at 2040 hrs.



                      5. Course of events according to the WB
                      On 28 March 2000 the master relieved the chief officer on the bridge at
                      0800 hrs, just as the ship was passing Copenhagen and was proceeding in
                      the Drogen Channel. He had been off duty for the preceding eight hours
                      and felt rested.

                      He sat down in the seat behind the 10-cm radar, which was in the "true
                      motion" mode, centred and set on the 3-M range. The other radar was also



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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      operating in the "true motion" mode and centred, but was set on the 6-M
                      range. The master stated that he had kept these settings during his whole
                      watch until the moment of collision. The ship was operated by means of
                      the autopilot, and thus the master was alone on the bridge at the beginning
                      of his watch.

                      At the time of the change of watch the wind was northeasterly at approx.
                      12 m/sec with a visibility of 3 M. At 0900 hrs the visibility deteriorated to
                      4-5 cables due to snow and the master called up the able seaman of the
                      watch to serve as look-out. He stationed himself on the port bridge wing.

                      After having passed the buoy M1 in the northern end of the traffic
                      separation scheme at Helsingborg, the course was laid at 334º and was
                      shortly thereafter changed to a course of 332º. According to the police
                      interrogation, the speed at that time was approx. 15.5-15.7 knots in a
                      following current of slightly more than one knot. At first the engine power
                      output was approx. 95%, but it was reduced to 88% because of the
                      visibility condition.

                      The master noticed an echo on his radar screen approx. 10º off the
                      starboard bow at a distance of 2.5 M. He plotted the echo on the ARPA
                      radar and could determine that the echo was heading 160º-162º at a speed
                      of 11 knots. CPA (Closest Point of Approach) for the echo showed 0.5 M
                      off starboard.

                      He then plotted another echo 20º to port, and then again plotted the first
                      echo, which still remained off the starboard bow, but now at a distance of
                      approx. 1.5 M. CPA was still 0.5 M off starboard, which, from a safety
                      standpoint, the master considered to be an adequate passing distance.

                      Since the master at this time felt certain that the two ships would meet
                      starboard to starboard at a safe distance, he no longer paid close attention
                      to the approaching ship.

                      Approximately three minutes later both the master and the outlook caught
                      visual sight through the snow fog of a ship close to starboard at a distance
                      of roughly 1-1.5 cables. The ship, which later turned out to be the Martina,
                      was making a starboard turn.




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WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      The MA's turn increased and the master realized that the other ship would
                      cross the WB's course line. The forward speed was immediately reduced to
                      zero and the rudder was pat hard to starboard.

                      The master observed that the aft section sank rapidly and that the forward
                      section turned over. He also noticed two men in the water, who were
                      rescued after about 20 minutes by a Swedish naval vessel, which had
                      hurried to the scene.

                      The master hailed the Coast Guard on the VHF Channel 16 immediately
                      after the collision, stated the name of his vessel, what had occurred, and
                      that assistance was needed. The crew was called up at once, the free-fall
                      lifeboat was manned and launched, and look-outs were posted on the
                      bridge.

                      According to the master, the WB gave the required acoustic signals for
                      operating in reduced visibility. He heard no signals from the other ship.

                      The questioning of the look-out did not reveal anything that was at
                      variance with the master's statement.

                      The WB participated throughout the day and evening in the continuing
                      search and rescue action.



                      6. The collision
                      The ROV films, which the Coat Guard made, show that the bulb and bow
                      of the WB struck the port side of the MA approx. three metres forward of
                      the bridge and that the bow penetrated the ship to approx. two thirds of her
                      width.

                      The depth of the penetration together with the MA's speed caused her to be
                      torn in two, with the stern portion dragging along the starboard side of the
                      WB, as evidenced by the scratches along the WB's hull.

                      The WB's bow opened the whole forward part of the deckhouse, both the
                      bridge and the crew accommodations, on the other ship. The topmost
                      railing of the flared prow plunged into the bridge approx. half a metre
                      under the roof of the wheelhouse, wrenching out or forcing aside the
                      equipment in the front portion of the bridge. A forward window with
                      windshield wipers, a clear-view pane, and some fragments of wood were



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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      found on the WB's forecastle after the collision. The forward engine room
                      bulkhead was also ripped off, which left the engine room entirely open. A
                      deformed steel plate folded over the liferaft so that the raft remained in
                      place.

                      The aft part of the MA was thus laid opened from the roof of the bridge to
                      the floor of the engine room, causing the ship to flood and sink in a matter
                      of seconds.

                      The bow continued moving slightly to port, as viewed from the WB, and
                      quickly overturned. Air pockets in the forepeak and some of the double
                      bottom tanks kept it afloat until it went down after almost four hours.



                      7. The wreck

                      7.1 The stern part

                      The aft part sank at the site of the collision at N 56° 15'.76 E 12° 25'.01
                      approx. 2.6 M bearing 208° from the Kullen light. The water depth at this
                      location is between 23 and 24 metres.

                      The ROV film that was made a week after the collision, showed that this
                      portion of the wreck stood on an almost even keel and that the stern mast
                      was intact. The mast was only a few metres below the surface of the water.

                      A new ROV filming a week later showed that the stern had settled into the
                      bottom sediment up to the loadline, which was 3.5 metres.

                      Sounding data after yet another week showed the water depth to be 10.7
                      metres above the funnel and 7.0 metres above the mast. This indicates that
                      the upper portion of the spliced mast had either broken off or was
                      overlooked when the sounding was done.

                      7.2 The bow part

                      The current brought the forward part of the ship to position N 56° 17'.66 E
                      12° 24'.29 approx. 1.7 M from the Kullen light, where it sank. The distance
                      between the two sections of the ship is 1.9 M.




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Collision between the tanker MARTINA - ELNF7 and the container vessel
WERDER BREMEN - 9HMW6            28 March 2000



                      The forward part lies at a depth of 24-26 metres and has a port list of
                      approx. 120º. The fore mast is embedded in the bottom sediment. The
                      cargo tanks proved to be intact.

                      The water depth above this part of the wreck is 17.7 metres.

                      7.3 Planned action

                      The water depth above the wreckage to the north is somewhat more than
                      17 metres and does not pose any navigational hazard.

                      Regarding the wreckage to the south, which consists of the engine room,
                      the crew accommodations and the bridge, the police has determined that,
                      any bodies which may remain in the ship shall be removed, if possible.
                      After that, the plan is to cut the wreckage down to the boat deck, so that the
                      water depth will be at least 15.0 metres at mean low water.

                      It is further planned to shift the sector boundary line between white and red
                      sectors at the Svinbådan light by 3º. The wreckage will then lie within the
                      red sector of the Svinbådan light.



                      8. Observations from the VISCARIA
                      The Swedish tugboat Viscaria was heading south and had set a course of
                      approx. 158º towards the M1 buoy in the traffic separation scheme in
                      northern Öresund. The visibility was very poor with heavy snow falling.

                      An echo of a ship heading in the same direction, which subsequently
                      turned out to be the MA, was observed on the heading marker on the radar
                      screen. The mate on watch had observed the echo for several hours and
                      noticed that it held approximately the same course. The distance was
                      shortening since the Viscaria's speed was about a knot faster than the
                      MA's.

                      When the distance was approx. 4 M an approaching echo appeared at a
                      distance of 6 M, on which the mate put the electronic bearing cursor. The
                      calculated starboard to starboard passing distance of this echo, which
                      turned out to be the WB, seemed to the mate to be so close that he was
                      prepared to turn starboard for passing port to port.




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                      The mate estimated that the passing distance would be 2-3 cables if each
                      ship kept its respective course.

                      The mate was distracted by a mechanical defect of the variable ring of the
                      radar and he did not notice whether or not the MA made a starboard turn.

                      The Viscaria participated in the search and rescue efforts throughout the
                      day and evening.



                      9. Observations from the GREEN FLAKE
                      The Maltese registered reefer Green Flake (GF) was heading north in
                      Öresund with her master on the bridge. The ship was equipped with a 3-cm
                      ARPA radar, which was set on the 3-M range, and a
                      10-cm radar which was operating on various ranges between 0.75 M and 3
                      M. Both radar units were manufactured by KELVIN-HUGHES.

                      While passing the east shore of the island of Ven, the GF was overtaken on
                      her port side by the WB which, according the master of the GF, was
                      proceeding at approx. 17 knots. The echo of the WB was visible on the
                      GF's radar the whole time until the collision. The master of the GF
                      estimated that the WB kept her speed constant during her northbound
                      voyage in Öresund.

                      Snow caused visibility to deteriorate during the voyage north and when the
                      ship passed the buoy M1 at 0940 hrs at a distance of 0.4 M it could not be
                      sighted visually. From the buoy the course was set at 324º and at that time
                      the WB was approx. 1.5 M ahead of the GF, approx. 20º off the starboard
                      bow on a slightly more easterly course.

                      When the GF was abeam the buoy Öresund Norra the master saw a new
                      echo at a distance of 4 M on his 10-cm radar. He did not plot that echo,
                      which subsequently turned out to be the MA, since the passing distance as
                      judged from the echo tracks on the screen, was adequate. However, he
                      estimated the course of the echo to be on a counter course to the WB,
                      which at that time was 1.75 M distant from the GF.

                      In the opinion of the GF's master it appeared that the WB and the MA
                      would meet bow to bow or possibly port to port. He made this judgement
                      with the aid of the tracks left by each echo on the radar screen. Based on
                      these tracks he anticipated that, if the two ships kept their respective


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                      courses, the meeting would occur bow to bow or possibly very close port
                      to port. At this point the WB was approx. 20º on the GF's port bow.

                      Shortly thereafter the WB's distress call was heard on the VHF. The GF
                      headed towards the place of the accident and was the first vessel to arrive
                      there in 8-9 minutes. The WB was then in the process of launching her
                      MOB boat.

                      The GF participated in the search and rescue efforts throughout the day and
                      evening.



                      10. Plotting by means of the ARPA radar
                      As noted earlier, the WB was equipped with a 10-cm ARPA radar. The
                      master used the radar functions, among other things, to determine the
                      courses of the target echoes, speed and CPA by plotting specific echoes.

                      To do so, the radar cross hairs are placed on a selected echo and ”target
                      acquire” is first activated, whereby an electronic cross marks the echo.
                      Then the "target select" is activated and after a while, when the radar has
                      made the necessary calculations, the result is presented on a menu on the
                      radar screen at the same time as a direction vector and a speed vector are
                      created by the selected echo. After a short while, when the vector has
                      become stabilized, it indicates the course of the echo and becomes longer
                      the faster the echo moves.

                      When one echo has been plotted it is possible to proceed with the next
                      echo. In this way a large number of echoes can stay plotted and
                      subsequently, by using the cross hairs, any echo can be selected and the
                      result immediately be displayed on the menu.

                      The vector mentioned above shows simultaneously on the radar screen for
                      each of the selected echoes. This makes it possible to visually determine
                      how different echoes move in relation to ones own ship and it allows a
                      rough estimate of how "dangerous" an echo may be. It is also possible to
                      detect any changes in the direction of the other echoes. If more precise data
                      is needed, the procedure described in the paragraph above must be
                      followed for each individual echo.




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                      When an echo is no longer of interest and does not need to stay plotted, the
                      cross hairs are placed on it, the "cancel" key is pressed, and the ARPA
                      function drops the echo and its up-dating mode.



                      11. Analysis

                      11.1 Plotting on board the WB

                      The master of the WB plotted the echo, which turned out to be the MA, at
                      a distance of 2.5 M. On the menu he found the information regarding
                      course, speed and CPA that he needed. This data did not at all trouble him
                      and he cancelled the plotting in order to start plotting another vessel. A
                      couple of minutes later he repeated the procedure for the first echo and got
                      the same data. After yet another few minutes the MA appeared out of the
                      snow fog under a starboard turn on a crossing course, and directly
                      thereafter the collision occurred.

                      By using the ARPA function of his radar in this manner the master
                      deprived himself of the option of continually following an approaching
                      echo's course and speed changes by means of watching the vector that a
                      plotted echo presents. According to the master's statement, the ARPA
                      function of the radar performed poorly or not at all at distances of less than
                      1 M.

                      The master was asked if he realized that it is possible to have maybe as
                      many as 20 different echoes activated at the same time, and why he had
                      cancelled the "old" echo before he plotted a new one. He replied that he
                      "usually always does it that way".

                      11.2 The MA's radar

                      Divers brought up the MA's newly renovated Koden radar one week after
                      the collision. It proved to be set on "stand by" with the brilliance turned
                      down to zero and the gain set at 25%. This means that the Koden radar was
                      not in operation around the time when the accident occurred.

                      The Furuno radar had its place on the port side of the bridge and was torn
                      off by the WB's bow in the collision. It was salvaged later than the Koden
                      radar since it had been difficult to find among the debris. It was
                      subsequently sent to Furuno Sverige AB to be examined.



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                      Except for water damage, there were no visible external damages.
                      Verdigris and rust damages were found on mechanical parts when the unit
                      was dismantled. The power unit contained components that had been
                      singed when they came into contact with the seawater. The processor also
                      showed verdigrital damages.

                      After cleaning and repairs the printed circuit card could be restarted and
                      the electronic menu selections could be accessed. This type of radar was so
                      designed that it saved the last settings that had been in use before a power
                      failure. The examination showed that the Furuno radar was supplied with
                      electric power when the ship foundered.

                      It seemed improbable that the control knobs on the face of the panel had
                      been effected by external forces at the time of the accident. It took a certain
                      effort to turn the three turn-knobs "gain", "anti-clutter sea", and "anti-
                      clutter rain" and they were not mechanically damaged. Other knobs were
                      set into the panel and did not protrude from the face of the frame. To alter
                      the menu selection required at least two keystrokes.

                      The examinations further showed that the "gain" setting was 0%, the "anti-
                      clutter sea" setting was 80%, and the "anti-clutter rain" setting was 95%. It
                      could not be determined whether or not the radar had been in the "stand-
                      by" or "send" mode at the time of the accident.

                      The radar picture, which could be displayed in the sending mode by using
                      the settings that were found, has not, on the whole, shown any echoes
                      within the set range, which was 2 M.

                      11.3 The MA's actions

                      Since there were only two officers on board, the watches were most likely
                      divided into six-hour passes and the master had probably come on duty at
                      0600. According to the two survivors, the master was on the bridge, which
                      indicates that the collision occurred on his watch.

                      In the dives for the drowned men, the master was found in the salon and
                      the lightly clad chief mate was found on the bridge. It seems probable that
                      the chief mate had been called to the bridge or come there of his own
                      accord to relieve the master for one reason or another.




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                      It seems clear that one of the two officers was on the bridge at the time of
                      the accident.

                      Nobody knows what took place on the bridge of the MA. The settings of
                      the Furuno radar can not be determined with absolute certainty since, after
                      all, much could have happened to the unit at the time of the collision, when
                      it was torn off by the prow of the WB and the sea flooded the bridge with
                      great force as the ship very rapidly foundered.

                      The fact that the master and the look-out on the WB detected the MA in
                      the process of making a starboard turn indicates that the OOW on the MA
                      was aware of the WB, since he had started the turn before the ships were
                      able to sight each other visually. A starboard turn at this point was
                      probably not part of the voyage plan. The MA's turn to starboard before the
                      WB was sighted visually seems to contradict the settings found on the
                      Furuno radar when it was brought up by the divers, namely that the radar
                      had been in the "stand by" mode at the time of the collision, with brilliance
                      and gain set as described in section 11.2 of this report.

                      Considering the testimony by the mate of the Viscaria (see section 8) it
                      could be possible that the navigator of the MA also judged the passing
                      distance starboard to starboard to be too close and therefore altered his
                      course to starboard so that the ships would meet port to port.

                      He might have assumed that the WB would also change her course to
                      starboard. When he realized, too late, that this was not the case he
                      increased his turn since it was too late to steady the course.

                      The accident appears to have been a typical radar collision, where one
                      vessel, in reduced visibility, makes a judgement regarding the collision
                      threat, that is the entirely contrary to the other's.

                      11.4 Propeller position of the wreck

                      The ROV films, taken a week after the accident, showed the propeller
                      blades at a pitch of approx. zero, although the control lever on the bridge
                      showed almost half astern.

                      The main engine powered the hydraulic oil pump, which conveyed
                      hydraulic pressure to the propeller. When the main engine stopped it
                      caused the pump to stop and this could very well have caused the pitch of



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                      the propeller blades to change as the pump pressure ceased. That the
                      position of the propeller blades did not agree with the position of the
                      control lever is most likely a result of the collision, when the bow of the
                      WB tore off the forward bulkhead and dislodged the equipment on the
                      bridge

                      11.5 Rudder position of the wreck

                      The same ROV films showed that the rudder was in position hard to port.
                      According to the master of the WB, the MA was in the process of making a
                      starboard turn when she was sighted at 1-1.5 cables. It is possible that the
                      navigator on board the MA, when the collision was imminent, by altering
                      the rudder hard to port tried to swing the stern out of the way in a last
                      desperate attempt to avoid the collision.

                      11.6 The collision angle

                      The master of the WB stated that his ship struck the MA frontally at an
                      angle of 35º-40º, which could very well be the case. Because of the MA's
                      speed ahead, the bow of the WB was pushed to port, causing the vessels'
                      relative angle to increase. The starboard bow of the WB was pushed with
                      tremendous force against the bridge and forward bulkhead of the MA's
                      deckhouse until that ship was broken in two.

                      On the ROV films this made it appear as if the collision angle had been
                      close to 90º.

                      11.7 Passing distance - CPA

                      According to the interrogation of the master of the Werder Bremen on the
                      day of the accident, the ARPA radar showed the CPA of the MA to be 0.5
                      M to starboard.

                      The tug Viscaria, which was on approximately the same course as the MA
                      and had her on its heading on the radar screen, felt that its own passing
                      distance to the WB starboard to starboard would be uncomfortably close.
                      The tug was prepared to turn starboard and meet the WB port to port. The
                      Viscaria judged the CPA to be
                      0.2-0.3 M if the courses were maintained.




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                      The GF had been overtaken by the WB and had that ship 20º on her
                      starboard bow at a distance of approx. 1.75 M. The WB's course was
                      approx. 8º further east that the GF's. Based on the tracks left by the WB
                      and the MA on the radar screen, the master of the GF estimated that those
                      two ships would meet bow to bow or perhaps close port to port.

                      Taking into account the three different estimates, where two are
                      presumably entirely objective, it seems clear that the passing distance
                      between the WB and the MA would have been very close if the two ships
                      had maintained their courses.



                      12. Cause of the accident
                      The cause of the accident was the starboard turn of the MA in front of the
                      bow of the WB, which was executed without the master of the WB being
                      aware of the turn until he visually caught sight of the other ship as it
                      appeared out of the snow fog.

                      A contributing cause may have been that the master of the WB did not
                      optimally utilize his radar equipment.

                      There was no action taken on board the WB, although the passing distance
                      was close.

                      Some kind of technical malfunction on board the MA, which caused the
                      MA to unintentionally make the starboard turn when the two ships were
                      meeting each other, can not be eliminated.



                      13. Comments
                      •   Regulation 7(a) of the International Regulations for Preventing
                          Collisions at Sea (COLREG)
                          "Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing
                          circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If
                          there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist."

                      •   Regulation 7(b) of the COLREG
                          "Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational,
                          including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of
                          collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of


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                          detected objects."
                          The master of the WB had seemingly not made optimal use of his radar
                          equipment, as regulated by Regulation 7(a) and 7(b).

                      •   Regulation 8(a) of the COLREG
                          "Any action to avoid collision shall, if the circumstances of the case
                          admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the
                          observance of good seamanship."
                          The OOW of the MA does not appear to have executed his change of
                          course in a manner that was "positive and in ample time".

                      •   The requirement in Regulation 5 of the COLREG regarding a look-
                          out was not satisfied on board the MA.

                      •   Regulation 6 of the COLREG
                          "Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can
                          take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped
                          within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and
                          conditions."
                          Both ships were proceeding at full speed or nearly full speed, which
                          was not in compliance with Regulation 6.

                      •   The master of the WB very promptly hailed the Coast Guard. He ought
                          to have contacted the MRCC directly. However, this did not delay the
                          rescue action since the MRCC was listening in.


                      14. General recommendations
                      If any one of the regulations 7a, 7b, 8a and 6 of the International
                      Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, which are the bases for the
                      comments above, had been complied with more strictly, the accident might
                      possibly have been avoided. Thus, it is important to give proper attention
                      to these regulations at all times and in all situations.

                      Radar collisions have been a matter of reality ever since radar was first
                      installed on board ships, no matter how sophisticated the systems have
                      become. Therefore, it is imperative to remember that a navigator on
                      another bridge may come to a totally different conclusion than one's own,
                      especially when passing at a short CPA.




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                      15. Damages

                      15.1 Personal injuries

                      Two crewmembers managed to leave the MA and were rescued, much
                      chilled, by a Swedish naval vessel. The two survivors had served as cook-
                      steward and able seaman. They recovered quickly.

                      The remaining five men on board the MA lost their lives. All who drowned
                      were found in the living quarters and were brought up in a diving
                      operation, which was undertaken at the request of the police and the
                      Swedish Maritime Administration.

                      There were no reports of personal injuries on board the WB.

                      15.2 Structural damages

                      15.2.1 The Martina

                      The MA was broken in two and the ship with its cargo was lost.

                      15.2.2 The Werder Bremen

                      Two holes of 300 and 50 mm in diameter and surrounding indentations
                      were caused approx. 2.5 metres above the waterline in the hull plating on
                      the port side in the storage space near the first and the second frame from
                      the bow. The frames were also damaged.

                      There were also indentations in the plating of the storage compartment
                      immediately above the forepeak tank and the two forward frames were
                      damaged as well.

                      The third area of indentations was in the hull plating on the port side of the
                      upper portion of the forepeak tank and the adjoining frame.

                      The bulbous bow suffered some slight indentations.

                      The damages, which were examined by a surveyor of the Swedish
                      Maritime Safety Inspectorate, were considered of an art to allow the ship to
                      continue her voyage. However, the classification society was to make an
                      inspection in the next port of arrival.




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                      15.3 Environmental consequences

                      15.3.1 The diesel fuel

                      The oil in the two day-tanks in the engine room has most probably seeped
                      out. The Coast Guard, which has kept the area under observation, has not
                      been able to detect any damage to the environment.

                      The two double-bottom tanks, which together contained 10-15m3 of diesel
                      oil at the time of the accident, are believed to still hold most of the original
                      diesel oil. The Swedish Maritime Administration has requested the
                      shipowner to retrieve the oil.

                      15.3.2 The cargo

                      The ROV films show the three cargo tanks to be intact. The Swedish
                      Maritime Administration has requested the shipowner to remove the cargo,
                      which consists of 600 ton of hydrochloric acid.

                      Permission has been granted to discharge the hydrochloric acid into the sea
                      under controlled conditions. By so doing, the damage to the environment is
                      considered to be short-term and of a temporary nature.



                      16. Conclusions of the investigation
                      •   The weather conditions at the time of the accident were northeasterly
                          winds at 8-12 m/sec. with snow and visibility of 0.1-0.3 M.

                      •   The master of the WB was on her bridge, and the chief mate was on the
                          bridge of the MA.

                      •   A look-out was on duty on the WB, but the officer of the watch was
                          probably alone on the bridge of the MA.

                      •   After having plotted the MA at a distance of approx. 1.5 M, the master
                          of the WB cancelled the data, and the echo vector disappeared from the
                          radar screen.

                      •   The MA's oldest but newly renovated radar, the Koden radar, was not
                          in operation at the time of the accident.




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                      •   The settings on the MA's newest radar, the Furuno radar, can not be
                          determined.

                      •   If each ship had maintained her course the result would have been a
                          very short CPA distance.

                      •   The MA turned starboard in front of the WB's prow, and the WB tried
                          to avoid the collision by stopping the engine and make a starboard turn.

                      •   The bow of the WB struck the MA just forward of the deckhouse at an
                          angle of 35º-40º.

                      •   When they collided, the speed of the WB was approx. 15 knots and the
                          speed of the MA was approx. 11 knots.

                      •   The MA was cut in two and the two sections went down 1.9 M from
                          each other.

                      •   Two of the seven persons on board the MA were rescued and five lost
                          their lives.

                      •   An extensive search and rescue operation was initiated.

                      •   Soundings revealed that the aft section of the wreck, in contrast to the
                          forward section, constituted a hazard to shipping and certain measures
                          were taken.



                      17. Additional information
                      At the end of May the MA's bunker tanks were emptied of oil, which was
                      removed.

                      The valves of the tanks containing the acid were located and opened.
                      Seawater was pumped in by means of the existing pipe system and the
                      hydrochloric acid was forced out into the sea.

                      One empty drum of lubricating grease was found beyond the stern portion.

                      At the beginning of June the bodies of four of the victims were brought up.
                      Three of them were found in the salon and one in a toilet on the deck
                      below. According to the police, one of the persons found in the salon was



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                      identified as the master. The chief mate had been found on the bridge
                      during a previous dive.

                      The stern of the wreck was cut down so that the water depth above that
                      section now is 16.5 metres.




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