Executive Popularity in France: The Promise and Pitfalls of Time Series Data
Research and Methods Symposium, October 1st 2004
The problems
The substantive problem: how do macroeconomic conditions affect support for the dual executive (president and prime minister) in France? The methodological problem: What techniques are best suited to modeling timeseries data? Do any of these models have a reliable predictive component (forecasting)
Some hypothetical data series
Stationary series
Y(t) = α, where the estimated constant α is the sample mean
Linear trend
Y(t) = α + β(t), where α is the intercept and β the slope of the trend line
“Random walk”
Y(t) = Y(t-1) + α, where α is the mean of the first difference (i.e. average change from one period to the next)
France: Executive Popularity
France: the dual executive
In de Gaulle‟s formulation, the president has responsibility for „high politics‟, while the prime minister is responsible for „day to day affairs‟ The president is directly elected (since 1965), for a five year term (since 2002, seven years previously) The president appoints the prime minister, who is „responsible‟ to parliament The president has no constitutional authority to fire the prime minister, but has acquired the de facto capacity to do this The president may dismiss the national assembly and call for new elections (no more than once a year) The possibility exists that the president and prime minister may be drawn from different ideological camps (cohabitation) Cohabitation has occurred three times: 1986-88 (Mitterrand/Chirac), 1993-5 (Mitterrand/Balladur), and 1997-2002 (Chirac/Jospin).
Executive popularity in France
• Lewis-Beck (1980) finds that Prime Ministers suffer a greater decline in popularity than Presidents due to negative effects of inflation and unemployment • Hibbs (1981) finds negative effects of unemployment on presidential approval (but positive effect of inflation!) • Appleton (1986) finds negative relationship between unemployment and both presidential and prime ministerial approval, but no inflation effect • Anderson (1995) suggests that the relationship is more complex, and depends upon the ideological placement of the prime minister vis a vis the president • Lecaillon (1980) finds no impact of macroeconomic variables on executive popularity • Anonymous (2004) finds that: presidential approval linked to unemployment, prime ministerial approval suffers from higher inflation, and that presidential popularity rises during cohabitation
Executive Popularity Indicators in France
IFOP (Since 1958, aperiodic until 1968, then monthly): “Are you satisfied with [name] as [President, Prime Minister] of France?” June 2004: Chirac 45% Raffarin 32% SOFRES (Since 1978): “How reliable do you think [name] is in dealing with France‟s current problems?” (1974-78): “How effective do you think [name] is in dealing with France‟s current problems?” June 2004 Chirac 35% Raffarin 28%
Also BULL-BVA series (1982-1990‟s)
Presidential Popularity in France, 1978-2004
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Date
Giscard d‟Estaing
04 20 1/ 2 /0 00 02 1 /2 01 /0 0 10 1 /2 00 /0 0 06 1 /2 98 /0 9 02 1 /1 97 /0 9 10 1 /1 96 /0 9 06 1 /1 94 /0 9 02 1 /1 93 /0 9 10 1 /1 92 /0 9 06 1 /1 90 /0 9 02 1 /1 89 /0 9 10 1 /1 88 /0 9 06 1 /1 86 /0 9 02 1 /1 85 /0 9 10 1 /1 84 /0 9 06 1 /1 82 /0 9 02 1 /1 81 /0 9 10 1 /1 80 /0 9 06 1 /1 78 /0 9 02 1 /1 /0 10
Source: SOFRES
President Yes
Mitterrand
Chirac
Prime Ministerial Popularity in France, 1978-2004
7. Bérégovoy
8. Balladur
6. Cresson
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Date
PM Yes
1
04 20 1/ 2 /0 00 02 1 /2 01 /0 0 10 1 /2 00 /0 0 06 1 /2 98 /0 9 02 1 /1 97 /0 9 10 1 /1 96 /0 9 06 1 /1 94 /0 9 02 1 /1 93 /0 9 10 1 /1 92 /0 9 06 1 /1 90 /0 9 02 1 /1 89 /0 9 10 1 /1 88 /0 9 06 1 /1 86 /0 9 02 1 /1 85 /0 9 10 1 /1 84 /0 9 06 1 /1 82 /0 9 02 1 /1 81 /0 9 10 1 /1 80 /0 9 06 1 /1 78 /0 9 02 1 /1 /0 10
Source: SOFRES
10
11 8 4 5 2 3 6 7 9
11. Raffarin
2. Mauroy
5. Rocard
3. Fabius
10. Jospin
4. Chirac
9. Juppé
1. Barre
Executive Popularity in France, 1978-2004
President Yes
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Date
04 20 1 / 02 /0 20 02 1 / 001 /0 2 10 01 / 000 / 2 06 1 / 98 /0 19 02 1 / 997 /0 1 10 01 / 996 / 1 06 1 / 994 /0 1 02 01 / 993 / 1 10 1 / 992 /0 1 06 01 / 990 / 1 02 1 / 989 /0 1 10 1 / 88 /0 19 06 1 / 86 /0 19 02 1 / 985 /0 1 10 01 / 984 / 1 06 1 / 982 /0 1 02 01 / 981 / 1 10 1 / 980 /0 1 06 01 / 978 / 1 02 1 / /0 10
Source: SOFRES
PM Yes
Value
Executive Popularity in France – Giscard d‟Estaing
President Yes
70
60
50
40
30
20
Date
81 19 1/ /0 81 04 /19 1 /0 80 02 /19 1 /0 80 12 /19 1 /0 80 10 /19 1 /0 80 08 /19 1 /0 80 06 /19 1 /0 80 04 /19 1 /0 79 02 /19 1 /0 79 12 /19 1 /0 79 10 /19 1 /0 79 08 /19 1 /0 79 06 /19 1 /0 79 04 /19 1 /0 78 02 /19 1 /0 78 12 /19 1 /0 10
Source: SOFRES
PM Yes
Executive Popularity in France – Mitterrand
President Yes
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Date
94 19 1/ 4 /0 99 12 1 /1 3 /0 99 03 1 /1 2 /0 99 06 1 /1 1 /0 99 09 1 /1 1 /0 99 12 1 /1 0 /0 99 03 1 /1 9 /0 98 06 1 /1 8 /0 98 09 1 /1 8 /0 98 12 1 /1 7 /0 98 03 1 /1 6 /0 98 06 1 /1 5 /0 98 09 1 /1 5 /0 98 12 1 /1 4 /0 98 03 1 /1 3 /0 98 06 1 /1 2 /0 98 09 1 /1 2 /0 98 12 1 /1 1 /0 98 03 1 /1 /0 06
Source: SOFRES
PM Yes
Balladur Chirac
Executive Popularity in France – Chirac
President Yes
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Date
04 20 1/ 3 /0 00 06 1 /2 3 /0 00 12 1 /2 2 /0 00 06 1 /2 2 /0 00 12 1 /2 1 /0 00 06 1 /2 1 /0 00 12 1 /2 0 /0 00 06 1 /2 0 /0 00 12 1 /2 9 /0 99 06 1 /1 9 /0 99 12 1 /1 8 /0 99 06 1 /1 8 /0 99 12 1 /1 7 /0 99 06 1 /1 7 /0 99 12 1 /1 6 /0 99 06 1 /1 6 /0 99 12 1 /1 5 /0 99 06 1 /1 5 /0 99 12 1 /1 /0 06
Source: SOFRES
Jospin
PM Yes
Relating executive popularity to macroeconomic conditions
Inflation and Unemployment in France, 1978-2004
30
20
10
0
-10
Date
04 20 1/ 2 /0 00 02 1 /2 01 /0 0 10 1 /2 00 /0 0 06 1 /2 98 /0 9 02 1 /1 97 /0 9 10 1 /1 96 /0 9 06 1 /1 94 /0 9 02 1 /1 93 /0 9 10 1 /1 92 /0 19 06 01 / 90 / 9 02 1 /1 89 /0 9 10 1 /1 88 /0 9 06 1 /1 86 /0 9 02 1 /1 85 /0 9 10 1 /1 84 /0 9 06 1 /1 82 /0 9 02 1 /1 81 /0 9 10 1 /1 80 /0 9 06 1 /1 78 /0 9 02 1 /1 /0 10
Source: INSEE
Giscard
Mitterrand
Chirac
Unemployment
Inflation
Bivariate correlations of presidential and prime ministerial popularity, inflation, and unemployment
Correlations Unemplo President Yes PM Yes Inflation yment 1 .404** .211** -.388** . .000 .000 .000 311 308 292 299 .404** 1 -.293** .201** .000 . .000 .001 308 308 289 296 .211** -.293** 1 -.652** .000 .000 . .000 292 289 292 282 -.388** .201** -.652** 1 .000 .001 .000 . 299 296 282 300
President Yes
PM Yes
Inflation
Unemployment
Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Simple OLS predicting presidential popularity
Model Summary Model 1 R R Square .458 a .210 Adjusted R Square .199 Std. Error of the Estimate 7.979
a. Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment, Mitterrand, Inflation, Chirac
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error 74.613 4.272 8.624 2.327 9.919 2.641 -.094 .140 -3.424 .438 Standardized Coefficients Beta .476 .523 -.050 -.617
Model 1
(Constant) Mitterrand Chirac Inflation Unemployment
t 17.464 3.706 3.756 -.667 -7.825
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .505 .000
a. Dependent Variable: President Yes
Extended OLS predicting presidential popularity
Model Summary Model 1 R R Square a .697 .486 Adjusted R Square .473 Std. Error of the Estimate 6.475
a. Predictors: (Constant), Cohabitation, Time in Office (President), Unemployment, PM Yes, Mitterrand, Inflation, Chirac
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error 68.351 4.070 -.696 2.106 -5.685 2.627 -.341 .127 -2.974 .372 .365 .038 -.079 .012 2.511 1.021 Standardized Coefficients Beta -.038 -.300 -.183 -.538 .508 -.394 .138
Model 1
(Constant) Mitterrand Chirac Inflation Unemployment PM Yes Time in Office (President) Cohabitation
t 16.793 -.331 -2.164 -2.681 -7.988 9.663 -6.686 2.459
Sig. .000 .741 .031 .008 .000 .000 .000 .015
a. Dependent Variable: President Yes
Extended OLS predicting presidential popularity with lagged dependent variable as predictor
Model Summary Model 1 R R Square .919 a .844 Adjusted R Square .840 Std. Error of the Estimate 3.514
a. Predictors: (Constant), President Yes lagged, Cohabitation, Mitterrand, Inflation, Time in Office (President), PM Yes, Unemployment, Chirac
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error 13.117 3.122 -1.308 1.149 -2.945 1.432 -.137 .070 -.525 .226 .108 .023 -.021 .007 .889 .563 .794 .031 Standardized Coefficients Beta -.073 -.158 -.074 -.096 .151 -.103 .050 .805
Model 1
(Constant) Mitterrand Chirac Inflation Unemployment PM Yes Time in Office (President) Cohabitation President Yes lagged
t 4.202 -1.138 -2.056 -1.963 -2.326 4.686 -3.004 1.579 25.246
Sig. .000 .256 .041 .051 .021 .000 .003 .116 .000
a. Dependent Variable: President Yes
Alternative extended OLS predicting presidential popularity with lagged dependent variable as predictor
Model Summary Model 1 R .921 R Square .848 Adjusted R Square .843 Std. Error of the Estimate 3.480
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error 16.909 3.885 .782 .570 -.748 .729 .791 .032 -.030 .008 -2.261 1.327 -4.709 1.715 .119 .023 -.679 .245 -.323 .107 Standardized Coefficients Beta .044 -.027 .804 -.153 -.126 -.254 .166 -.119 -.152
Model 1
(Constant) Cohabitation Post-election President Yes lagged Time in Office (President) Mitterrand Chirac PM Yes PMA(UNEMPLOY,3) PMA(INFLAT,3)
t 4.353 1.371 -1.026 24.774 -3.897 -1.704 -2.745 5.072 -2.773 -3.021
Sig. .000 .171 .306 .000 .000 .090 .006 .000 .006 .003
a. Dependent Variable: President Yes
Extended OLS predicting prime ministerial popularity with lagged dependent variable as predictor
Model Summary Model 1 R .961 R Square .923 Adjusted R Square .918 Std. Error of the Estimate 3.548
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error 29.199 5.282 .155 .074 -3.553 .460 .508 .048 .221 .035 -.413 .032 15.567 1.413 29.161 2.170 19.828 2.238 26.562 2.129 10.758 1.843 30.285 2.304 44.613 2.955 24.909 2.563 40.557 2.687 25.238 2.120 Standardized Coefficients Beta .060 -.464 .364 .219 -.447 .428 .580 .459 .704 .177 .478 1.050 .566 1.349 .341
Model 1
(Constant) Inflation Unemployment President Yes PM Yes lagged Time in office (PM) Mauroy Fabius Chirac (PM) Rocard Cresson Beregovoy Balladur Juppe Jospin Raffarin
t 5.528 2.088 -7.722 10.674 6.282 -13.040 11.020 13.438 8.858 12.475 5.838 13.147 15.098 9.718 15.096 11.902
Sig. .000 .038 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
a. Dependent Variable: PM Yes
Alternative extended OLS predicting prime ministerial popularity with lagged dependent variable as predictor
Model Summary Model 1 R .964 R Square .929 Adjusted R Square .925
Coefficientsa Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error 40.486 5.889 -4.467 .482 -.010 .123 .513 .045 -.472 .033 .200 .034 14.785 1.369 29.287 2.116 20.088 2.204 26.626 2.120 8.985 1.913 29.333 2.290 46.180 2.854 25.764 2.472 42.138 2.649 22.987 2.184 Standardized Coefficients Beta -.558 -.004 .370 -.516 .199 .411 .591 .471 .714 .150 .469 1.102 .593 1.417 .334
Std. Error of the Estimate 3.388
Model 1
(Constant) PMA(UNEMPLOY,3) PMA(INFLAT,3) President Yes Time in office (PM) PM Yes lagged Mauroy Fabius Chirac (PM) Rocard Cresson Beregovoy Balladur Juppe Jospin Raffarin
t 6.875 -9.262 -.085 11.346 -14.311 5.910 10.803 13.841 9.114 12.558 4.696 12.808 16.180 10.421 15.905 10.527
Sig. .000 .000 .932 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
a. Dependent Variable: PM Yes
Predicted versus actual values from extended OLS model of presidential popularity
ARIMA predicted
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Date
04 20 1 / 02 /0 20 02 01 / 01 / 0 10 1 /2 00 /0 0 06 1 /2 98 /0 19 02 01 / 97 / 9 10 1 /1 96 /0 19 06 01 / 94 / 9 02 1 /1 93 /0 9 10 1 /1 92 /0 19 06 01 / 90 / 9 02 1 /1 89 /0 19 10 01 / 88 / 9 06 1 /1 86 /0 19 02 01 / 85 / 9 10 1 /1 84 /0 9 06 1 /1 82 /0 19 02 01 / 81 / 9 10 1 /1 80 /0 19 06 01 / 78 / 9 02 1 /1 /0 10
OLS predicted
Predicted versus actual values from extended OLS model of presidential popularity (Giscard)
70
60
50
40
30
Date
81 19 1/ /0 81 04 /19 1 /0 80 02 /19 1 /0 80 12 /19 1 /0 80 10 /19 1 /0 80 08 /19 1 /0 80 06 /19 1 /0 80 04 /19 1 /0 79 02 /19 1 /0 79 12 /19 1 /0 79 10 /19 1 /0 79 08 /19 1 /0 79 06 /19 1 /0 79 04 /19 1 /0 78 02 /19 1 /0 78 12 /19 1 /0 10
Predicted value
President Yes
Predicted versus actual values from extended OLS model of presidential popularity (Mitterrand)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Date
94 19 1/ 4 /0 99 12 1 /1 3 /0 99 03 1 /1 2 /0 99 06 1 /1 91 /0 9 09 1 /1 91 /0 9 12 1 /1 0 /0 99 03 1 /1 9 /0 98 06 1 /1 88 /0 9 09 1 /1 88 /0 9 12 1 /1 7 /0 98 03 1 /1 6 /0 98 06 1 /1 85 /0 9 09 1 /1 85 /0 9 12 1 /1 4 /0 98 03 1 /1 3 /0 98 06 1 /1 82 /0 9 09 1 /1 82 /0 9 12 1 /1 1 /0 98 03 1 /1 /0 06
Predicted value
President Yes
Predicted versus actual values from extended OLS model of presidential popularity (Chirac)
70
60
50
40
30
Date
04 20 1/ 3 /0 00 06 1 /2 03 /0 0 12 1 /2 2 /0 00 06 1 /2 2 /0 00 12 1 /2 1 /0 00 06 1 /2 01 /0 0 12 1 /2 00 /0 0 06 1 /2 0 /0 00 12 1 /2 9 /0 99 06 1 /1 9 /0 99 12 1 /1 98 /0 9 06 1 /1 98 /0 9 12 1 /1 7 /0 99 06 1 /1 7 /0 99 12 1 /1 6 /0 99 06 1 /1 96 /0 9 12 1 /1 95 /0 9 06 1 /1 5 /0 99 12 1 /1 /0 06
Predicted value
President Yes
Moving from OLS to ARIMA
The autoregressive integrated moving average model (ARIMA)
The model incorporates:
The autoregressive term p, which is the order of the autoregressive component The number of differences d, which is used to discount trends over time The moving average term q, which is the moving average of the prediction error
To fit the model, we need to examine the autocorrelation and the partial autocorrelation functions (ACF and PACF)
Differenced series for presidential popularity, 1978-2004
40
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
Date
Transforms: difference (1)
04 20 1/ 2 /0 00 02 1 /2 01 /0 0 10 1 /2 00 /0 0 06 1 /2 98 /0 9 02 1 /1 97 /0 9 10 1 /1 96 /0 9 06 1 /1 94 /0 9 02 1 /1 93 /0 9 10 1 /1 92 /0 9 06 1 /1 90 /0 9 02 1 /1 89 /0 9 10 1 /1 88 /0 9 06 1 /1 86 /0 9 02 1 /1 85 /0 9 10 1 /1 84 /0 9 06 1 /1 82 /0 9 02 1 /1 81 /0 9 10 1 /1 80 /0 9 06 1 /1 /0 02
Differenced series for prime ministerial popularity, 1978-2004
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
Date
Transforms: difference (1)
04 20 1/ 2 /0 00 02 1 /2 01 /0 0 10 1 /2 00 /0 0 06 1 /2 98 /0 9 02 1 /1 97 /0 9 10 1 /1 96 /0 9 06 1 /1 94 /0 9 02 1 /1 93 /0 9 10 1 /1 92 /0 9 06 1 /1 90 /0 9 02 1 /1 89 /0 9 10 1 /1 88 /0 9 06 1 /1 86 /0 9 02 1 /1 85 /0 9 10 1 /1 84 /0 9 06 1 /1 82 /0 9 02 1 /1 81 /0 9 10 1 /1 80 /0 9 06 1 /1 /0 02
PM Yes
ACF and PACF plots for presidential popularity
President Yes
1.0 1.0
President Yes
.5
.5
0.0
0.0
-.5
Partial ACF
-.5 Confidence Limits
Confidence Limits
ACF
-1.0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49
Coefficient
-1.0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49
Coefficient
Lag Number
Lag Number
ACF and PACF plots for presidential popularity (1 difference)
President Yes
1.0
1.0
President Yes
.5
.5
0.0
0.0
-.5
Partial ACF
Confidence Limits
-.5
Confidence Limits
ACF
-1.0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49
Coefficient
-1.0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49
Coefficient
Lag Number
Transforms: difference (1)
Lag Number
Transforms: difference (1)
ARIMA (1,0,1) model predicting presidential popularity
Number of residuals 279 Standard error 3.2791659 Log likelihood -724.93328 AIC 1469.8666 SBC 1506.1787 Analysis of Variance: DF Adj. Sum of Squares 269 2950.8636 Residual Variance 10.752929
Residuals Variable AR1 MA1 MITTERRA CHIRAC INFLAT UNEMPLOY PM YES Time in Office Cohabitation CONSTANT
B SEB T-RATIO APPROX. PROB. .939614 .021920 42.865332 .00000000 .225668 .065157 3.463472 .00062027 2.522298 4.175431 .604081 .54629903 .621881 7.942852 .078294 .93765206 -.059998 .059933 -1.001086 .31768488 -2.521530 1.267940 -1.988682 .04774939 .320467 . 037488 8.548599 .00000000 -.143606 .034891 -4.115908 .00005133 .486023 1.525982 .318498 .75035403 66.649067 10.639860 6.264092 .00000000
Alternative ARIMA (1,0,1) model predicting presidential popularity
Number of residuals 273 Standard error 3.2141376 Log likelihood -701.86056 AIC 1425.7211 SBC 1465.4253 Analysis of Variance: DF Adj. Sum of Squares Residuals 262 2732.3972 Variables in the Model: B AR1 .937443 MA1 .283545 MITTERRA -2.919352 CHIRAC -5.153437 TIO -.080188 COHAB .957904 POSTELEC 3.371065 PMYES .290923 UNEMPL_2 -1.903296 INFLAT_2 -.076970 CONSTANT 62.296313
Residual Variance 10.330681
SEB T-RATIO APPROX. PROB. .024247 38.661481 .00000000 .066458 4.266519 .00002776 4.294587 -.679775 .49724719 7.609262 -.677258 .49883955 .036839 -2.176729 .03039386 1.469957 .651655 .51519511 .881233 3.825394 .00016328 .037170 7.826751 .00000000 1.265069 -1.504500 .13365712 .141287 -.544777 . 58637056 11.302350 5.511802 .00000008
Predicted versus actual values of presidential popularity from ARIMA model
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Date
04 20 1/ 2 /0 00 02 1 /2 01 /0 20 10 01 / 00 / 0 06 1 /2 98 /0 19 02 01 / 97 / 9 10 1 /1 96 /0 9 06 1 /1 94 /0 19 02 01 / 93 / 9 10 1 /1 92 /0 9 06 1 /1 90 /0 19 02 01 / 89 / 9 10 1 /1 88 /0 19 06 01 / 86 / 9 02 1 /1 85 /0 9 10 1 /1 84 /0 19 06 01 / 82 / 9 02 1 /1 81 /0 9 10 1 /1 80 /0 19 06 01 / 78 / 9 02 1 /1 /0 10
Predicted values
President Yes
ARIMA prediction
ARIMA versus OLS predicted values
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Date
04 20 1 / 02 /0 20 02 01 / 01 / 0 10 1 /2 00 /0 20 06 01 / 98 / 9 02 1 /1 97 /0 19 10 01 / 96 / 9 06 1 /1 94 /0 19 02 01 / 93 / 9 10 1 /1 92 /0 19 06 01 / 90 / 9 02 1 /1 89 /0 19 10 01 / 88 / 9 06 1 /1 86 /0 19 02 01 / 85 / 9 10 1 /1 84 /0 19 06 01 / 82 / 19 02 01 / 81 / 9 10 1 /1 80 /0 19 06 01 / 78 / 9 02 1 /1 /0 10
OLS prediction
Predicted versus actual values of presidential popularity from ARIMA and OLS models (Giscard)
ARIMA predicted
70
60
50
40
30
Date
81 19 1/ /0 81 04 /19 1 /0 80 02 /19 1 0 /0 98 12 1 /1 /0 80 10 /19 1 /0 80 08 /19 1 /0 80 06 /19 1 /0 80 04 /19 1 9 /0 97 02 1 /1 /0 79 12 /19 1 /0 79 10 /19 1 /0 79 08 /19 1 /0 79 06 /19 1 9 /0 97 04 1 /1 /0 78 02 /19 1 /0 78 12 /19 1 /0 10
OLS predicted
President Yes
Predicted versus actual values of presidential popularity from ARIMA and OLS models (Mitterrand)
ARIMA predicted
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Date
94 19 1/ 4 /0 99 12 1 /1 93 /0 9 03 1 /1 92 /0 9 06 1 /1 91 /0 9 09 1 /1 91 /0 9 12 1 /1 90 /0 9 03 1 /1 89 /0 9 06 1 /1 88 /0 9 09 1 /1 88 /0 9 12 1 /1 87 /0 9 03 1 /1 86 /0 9 06 1 /1 85 /0 9 09 1 /1 85 /0 9 12 1 /1 84 /0 9 03 1 /1 83 /0 9 06 1 /1 82 /0 9 09 1 /1 82 /0 9 12 1 /1 81 /0 9 03 1 /1 /0 06
OLS predicted
President Yes
Predicted versus actual values of presidential popularity from ARIMA and OLS models (Chirac)
ARIMA predicted
70
60
50
40
30
Date
04 20 1/ 3 /0 00 06 1 /2 03 /0 0 12 1 /2 02 /0 0 06 1 /2 02 /0 0 12 1 /2 01 /0 0 06 1 /2 01 /0 0 12 1 /2 00 /0 0 06 1 /2 00 /0 0 12 1 /2 99 /0 9 06 1 /1 99 /0 9 12 1 /1 98 /0 9 06 1 /1 98 /0 9 12 1 /1 97 /0 9 06 1 /1 97 /0 9 12 1 /1 96 /0 9 06 1 /1 96 /0 9 12 1 /1 95 /0 9 06 1 /1 95 /0 9 12 1 /1 /0 06
OLS predicted
President Yes
ARIMA and OLS predicted versus actual values, 1980
ARIMA predicted
60
58
56
54
52
50
48
Date
80 19 1/ /0 80 12 19 1/ /0 80 11 19 1/ /0 80 10 19 1/ /0 80 09 19 1/ /0 80 08 19 1/ /0 80 07 19 1/ /0 80 06 19 1/ /0 80 05 19 1/ /0 80 04 19 1/ /0 80 03 19 1/ /0 80 02 19 1/ /0 01
OLS predicted
President Yes
ARIMA and OLS predicted versus actual values, 1999
ARIMA prediction
64
62
60
58
56
54
52
50
48
Date
99 19 1/ /0 99 12 19 1/ /0 99 11 19 1/ /0 99 10 19 1/ /0 99 09 19 1/ /0 99 08 19 1/ /0 99 07 19 1/ /0 99 06 19 1/ /0 99 05 19 1/ /0 99 04 19 1/ /0 99 03 19 1/ /0 99 02 19 1/ /0 01
OLS prediction
President Yes
Correlation matrix of predicted values with actual value of presidential popularity
Correlations ARIMA OLS predicted President Yes predicted 1 .912** .972** . .000 .000 280 280 277 .912** 1 .930** .000 . .000 280 311 279 .972** .930** 1 .000 .000 . 277 279 279
OLS predicted
Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N President Yes Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N ARIMA predicted Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Why choose ARIMA? Linear forecast
Random walk forecast
ARIMA forecast
Pitfalls of ARIMA
Complexities of model specification Difficulties of interpretation Sensitivity of data (e.g. missing values)