# Pv Cost of Bankruptcy

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```					                    Topic 6 – Capital Structure [Perfect Markets, Taxes, Bankruptcy costs]
(CWS – Chapter 15, primarily pages 557-573)

A firm’s value is the present value of the expected cash flows from its assets

Assuming perfect markets, the discount rate used to value these cash flows is the firm’s weighted average of the
cost of each source of funds (e.g., interest and capital gains payments to bondholders and dividend and capital
gain payments to stockholders)

In other words, the discount rate is the firm’s WACC

What if a firm can lower its cost of capital? What affect will this have on firm value?

The purpose of this topic is to explore whether there is some way to adjust the firm’s capital structure (how much
debt versus how much equity we use to finance the firm’s assets) such that the cost of capital is decreased –
thereby increasing firm value.

Modigliani and Miller, 1958, The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment, American
Economic Review 48, 261-297, provided the seminal paper addressing this topic. We will concentrate on pages
261-271.

Even though many papers have been published since that address capital structure (many with different
conclusions), it is very important to have a solid understanding of the M&M paper.

1
Modigliani and Miller (1958) - Assumptions

(1)   Perfect capital markets

No transaction costs - to allow for costless purchases and short sales
No income taxes
No bankruptcy costs

(2) There exists a group of homogeneous firms which have assets that yield a perpetual stream of uncertain
positive cash flows: yearly cash flows are random drawings from the same distribution, i.e., no growth. Since
all firms have the same cash flows (or cash flows times a constant) in every state of nature, then these firms
also have the same risk and therefore the same expected return, ρk.

Example
Firm A (e.g., \$10, \$20, or \$30, each with a 1/3 chance)
Firm B (e.g., \$10, \$20, or \$30, each with a 1/3 chance)
Cash flows are aligned
_
What is X (i.e., the expected value of each firm’s cash flows)?
If ρk = 0.1, then what are the values of these two firms?

(3) These firms can either be all equity or part debt and part equity

(4) Equity of firms is risky. Debt is risk free, paying a constant interest rate, r. Investors can borrow and lend at
interest rate r.

2
Modigliani and Miller (1958) – Other Implicit Assumptions

(5) Managers always work to maximize shareholder wealth (i.e., no conflicts of interest between managers and
stockholders) and a firm’s investment decision is unaffected by its financing decision

How might a firm’s leverage ratio affect manager’s incentives (and therefore management’s decisions on
which projects to select or reject)?

Note - stockholder / bondholder conflicts are another important conflict of interest, but are assumed away
because debt is risk-free

(6) Corporate insiders and outsiders have the same information

What if corporate insiders have more information than outsiders? How might this affect their capital structure
decisions?

(7) 100% dividend payout ratio

When one of the firms in the set of “identical firms” issues debt, the stock of that firm becomes more risky. Thus,
even though the assets of the firm remain unchanged, risk-averse investors will not view the stock in the levered
firm as a perfect substitute for the stock in the unlevered firm.

3
Modigliani and Miller (1958) – Proposition 1

Proposition 1: The market value of the firm, V j , which is the sum of the market value of the bonds, D j , and the
stock, S j , is independent of the particular capital structure chosen by management.
_
Xj
This value, V j , is equal to         for any firm in risk class k
k
_          _
Xj          Xj
Equivalent to this is that the WACC,                             k , is the same for all firms in class k, regardless of the
DJ  S J       Vj
particular capital structure chosen

To prove, M&M show that arbitrage profits will result if proposition 1 does not hold. Since there should be no
arbitrage profits in equilibrium, then capital structure cannot affect firm value.
_
Consider two companies from the same risk class, with the same expected cash flow, X , and same cash flows in
each state of nature, X. Let company 1 be all equity and company 2 have some debt.

According to proposition 1, these two firms must have the same value to prevent arbitrage

What is an arbitrage profit in M&M (1958)?

Zero investment at time 0
Guaranteed positive cash flows in future years

Why shouldn’t arbitrage profits exist in equilibrium?

4
Modigliani and Miller (1958) – Arbitrage Proof (V2 > V1)

A short sale of α of the stock of company 2 will require the investor to pay every year in perpetuity (or until the
short position is closed out):

 Y2   ( X  rD2 )                                                                                        (1)

To see arbitrage profits, sell αS2 short and personally borrow αD2. Use the proceeds to buy a portion of company
 ( D2  S 2 )
1’s stock (remember company 1 is all equity). The portion purchased is                        .
S1

Note that the cost of the purchase of company 1 stock is completely offset by the proceeds of the short sale and
the borrowed funds (net cost at t = 0 is \$0)

Future cash flows from the three positions are:

 ( D2  S 2 )
  ( X  rD2 )  rD2                     X                                                                (2)
S1

The first term =
The second term =
The third term =

5
Modigliani and Miller (1958) – Arbitrage Proof (V2 > V1) – continued

Simplifying:

V2
 X        X 0                                                                                               (3)
V1

Since V2 > V1, by assumption, you receive a perpetual stream of positive future cash flows at no t = 0 cost (i.e., an
arbitrage profit)

Arbitrage profits indicate disequilibrium (i.e., excess demand or supply)

In this case, there is excess demand for stock 1 and excess supply for stock 2

What should happen to the price of company 1’s stock?

Prices will continue to move until V1 = V2

Note that there is no requirement that investors are rational. It is the actions of arbitragers that ensure that V2 is
never greater than V1.

6
Modigliani and Miller (1958) – Arbitrage Proof (V2 < V1)

Now sell αS1 short. This obligates the investor to pay αX per year. Take the proceeds of the short sale and buy
S2    D
stock and bonds of company 2 in the proportions               and 2 (i.e., the proportions of equity and debt in company 2’s
V2    V2
capital structure). Net cost at t = 0 equals zero.

The proportion held in the stock of company 2 is:
S2
S1
V2       S1
                                                                                                       (4)
S2        V2

In the debt of company 2:
D2
S1
V2       S1
                                                                                                       (5)
D2        V2

Thus,
S2             D2
S1            S1
V2             V2       S1
                                                                                                      (6)
S2          D2           V2

7
Modigliani and Miller (1958) – Arbitrage Proof (V2 < V1) - continued

The cash flows from these three positions are:
S1                S
 X        ( X  rD2 )   1 rD2                                                                            (7)
V2                V2

The first term =
The second term =
The third term =

Simplifying:

        S1              V1 
X   1         X   1  V   0                                                                      (8)
        V2               2

Since V1 > V2, again, the cash flow stream is positive. To prevent arbitrage, the market value of S2 has to increase
and/or S1 decrease.

In summary, for two firms with identical assets, the no arbitrage condition requires that:

S1  V1  V2  D2  S 2                                                                                     (9)

In other words, the value of the firm is created by the cash flow generating power of the assets, not by the
particular capital structure chosen.

8
Modigliani and Miller (1958) – Proposition 2

Proposition 2: The expected rate of return for the common stock of levered firm j in risk class k, ij, is equal to:
Dj
i j  k  (k  r)                                                                                            (10)
Sj
To see, note that by definition
_
X j  rD j
ij                                                                                                            (11)
Sj
As stated, the WACC is
_
Xj
 k                                                                                                  (12)
Dj  S j
Rearranging the WACC formula
_
X j  k (D j  S j )                                                                                          (13)
Plugging into equation (11)
 k ( D j  S j )  rD j
ij                                                                                                            (14)
Sj
Dj          Sj         Dj
i j  k           k        r                                                                               (15)
Sj          Sj         Sj
Dj
i j  k  (k  r)                                                                                            (16)
Sj
So, while the WACC remains the same as leverage increases (since the value of the firm remains unchanged), the
expected (or required) return for the stock (which is equal to ρk when unlevered), increases as the firm's debt to
equity ratio increases.

9
Modigliani and Miller (1963) – Capital Structure with Corporate Taxes

Modigliani and Miller, 1963, Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: A correction, American
Economic Review 53, 433-443 examine capital structure decisions with corporate income taxes

They conclude that capital structure does matter. In particular, firms with more debt should have higher values.

The key change in assumption is that corporations pay a tax on their income and the tax law provides for a
deduction for interest expense

Therefore, firms with debt have lower taxable income and pay less income tax than all-equity firms

The reduction in income taxes means more cash flow to the firm’s owners, resulting in a higher firm value

M&M (1963) serves as the foundation for the “tradeoff model.” In the tradeoff model, firms maximize value by

Increased value from additional debt (associated with lower income taxes)

Decreased value from additional debt (associated with increase chances of bankruptcy and/or debt agency
costs

10
Modigliani and Miller (1963) – Assumptions and Cash Flows

Assumptions

Corporate taxable income is taxed at rate τc

Taxable income equals cash flow from assets (X) less interest on debt (rD)

The other assumptions in M&M (1958) still apply (including that there is no individual income tax)
_
Two identical firms (with perpetual expected cash flows equal to X ), one all equity and one levered (with a
perpetual risk-free bond with a face of D and an interest rate of r).

Cash flows

Expected cash flows to all security holders, net of taxes, for the all equity firm and the levered firm are:
_
CFU  X (1   c )                                                                                          (17)

_
CFL  rD  ( X  rD)(1   c )                                                                              (18)

_
CFL  X (1   c )   c rD                                                                                 (19)

11
Modigliani and Miller (1963) – Valuation of Levered and Unlevered Firms

The values of unlevered and levered firms can be determined by discounting the respective cash flow streams.
Following the discussion of the M&M (1958) paper, assume that ρk is the appropriate discount rate for the
unlevered firm in class k. Therefore, its current market value is
_
X (1   c )
VU                                                                                                          (20)
k

What is assumed about the nature of the tax code in order to use ρk as the discount rate?

The cash flow stream for the levered firm is the same as the unlevered firm plus τcrD. To calculate the levered firm’s
value, discount the two cash flow streams at the appropriate discount rates.

The first cash flow stream can be discounted at ρk (same as above)

The discount rate for the second cash flow stream is r. For example, if the debt is risk free, then discount τcrD at
the risk-free rate. What are the implied assumptions with using r?

Therefore the current market value of the levered firm is:
_
X (1   c )  c rD
VL                      VU   c D                                                                        (21)
k           r

This equation implies near 100% debt. Why “near” 100% debt?

This equation assumes that the tax rate τc is applied to positive and negative amounts of taxable income

12

A natural counter weight to the tax advantage of debt is bankruptcy costs. The inclusion of bankruptcy costs leads
to the development of the tradeoff model. With the tradeoff model, firms maximize the following equation:

VL  VU   c D  PV [ E ( BC )]                                                                          (22)

Note – Some versions of the tradeoff model also subtract the PV of the expected agency costs.

What are bankruptcy costs?

Examples of direct bankruptcy costs = fees charged by lawyers, accountants, and trustees
Examples of indirect bankruptcy costs = lost sales, inefficient decisions by management and/or the bankruptcy
trustee

One of the early papers is this area is Warner, Jerold. “Bankruptcy costs: Some evidence.” Journal of Finance
32 (1977), 337-348. He finds in his sample of 11 railroad bankruptcies that direct bankruptcy costs were 1% of
firm market value 84 months before bankruptcy and 5.3% of market value as of the filing date.

Altman (1984), reviewed in the textbook on page 593) estimates indirect bankruptcy costs at 17.5% of market
value.

What adjustment is needed to calculate “expected” bankruptcy costs?
What is the “PV” of expected bankruptcy costs?
What if courts don’t follow absolute priority in bankruptcy proceedings?

Taking into account the “PV” and the “expected” in the calculation of PV[E(BC)], and the fact that the courts don’t
always follow absolute priority, bankruptcy costs would have to be extremely high to offset the tax benefits of
debt.

13
Capital Structure with Corporate and Personal Taxes

Miller, Merton. “Debt and taxes.” Journal of Finance 32 (1977), 261-276, in commenting on the tradeoff
model, notes:

Corporate income tax rates have increased over the years in the U.S. (10% to 11% in the 20’s to 52% in the
50’s), yet debt-equity ratios have stayed pretty much constant

With bankruptcy costs, why have any debt prior to the income tax?

Why do some firms like IBM and Kodak have little debt, while other firms (public utilities) have a lot of debt?
Are managers of public utility firms smarter?

The Miller (1977) model:
~                        ~
1) An all equity firm (firm U) receives a cash flow perpetuity of X from its assets (and, X = taxable income)

2) Corporate income tax rate =  c

Personal tax rate on income from equity ownership (dividends and capital gains) =  PS
Personal tax rate on debt ownership (interest income) =  PB
Note:  PB is also the rate that individuals receive tax benefits from an interest expense deduction

14
The Miller (1977) Model – continued

3) Assuming a 100% payout ratio, equity owners receive after-tax cash flow per year of:
~
Unlevered firm: X (1   c )(1   PS )                                                          (23)
~
Levered firm: ( X  rBL )(1   c )(1   PS )                                                   (24)

4) Consider a long position in αSU and a short position in the amount of

 (1   c )(1   PS ) 
BL                                                                                                   (25)
 (1   PB ) 

5) Cash flow from the long and short positions are:

~                                         (1   c )(1   PS ) 
 X (1   c )(1   PS )  rBL                                    (1   PB )                       (26)
 (1   PB ) 

6) After simplification
~
 ( X  rBL )(1   c )(1   PS )                                                                      (27)

Compare to the cash flow from owning a long position in the levered firm (with the same assets) in the amount
of αSL (see equation 24)

15
The Value Gain from Leverage

7) Two identical cash flow streams must have the same value:

 (1   c )(1   PS ) 
S L  SU  B L                                                                        (28)
 (1   PB ) 

8) Add BL to both sides, and recognize that VL  S L  BL , and VU  SU

 (1   c )(1   PS ) 
V L BL  VU  BL                                                                     (29)
 (1   PB ) 
 (1   c )(1   PS ) 
V L VU  BL 1                                                                       (30)
        (1   PB ) 

9) So, the gain from leverage is:

 (1   c )(1   PS ) 
G L  BL 1                                                                           (31)
     (1   PB ) 

10)       Notice that if  PS   PB (a special case is when both are equal to zero), then:

G L   C BL            … Compare to M&M (1963)                                         (32)

16
The Value Gain from Leverage – continued

11)       The gain from leverage formula again:

 (1   c )(1   PS ) 
G L  BL 1                                                                                                    (33)
     (1   PB ) 

12)       When  PS   PB , then G L   C BL . What about when  PS   PB ?

13)       Compare and note in each case if additional leverage increases or decreases firm value

(1   C )(1   PS )  (1   PB )

(1   C )(1   PS )  (1   PB )

(1   C )(1   PS )  (1   PB )

14)       Assume that  PS = 0. (Note:  PS = 0 is not a necessary assumption, but simplifies the presentation.) In this case:

    (1   c ) 
G L  BL 1                                                                                                    (34)
 (1   PB ) 

Is there any logic behind assuming  PS = 0? How is “equity income” taxed?

17
The Miller (1977) Equilibrium

15)   Assume:

A.  PS = 0


B. Progressive individual income tax rates on interest income,  PB , lowest rate = 0 and highest rate greater than  C

C. The exists an unlimited supply of tax-free securities that individuals can purchase that pay r0

D. Individuals decide whether to invest in taxable debt issued by corporations or tax-free debt based on their tax

rate  PB

a. Assume all debt is risk-free – so investment decisions are based on after-tax returns
b. In the U.S., debt issued by state and local governmental agencies are tax free
c. Although not allowed in the U.S. tax code, we could also assume that corporations have a choice of
issuing tax-deductible debt and receiving a tax deduction at rate  C or tax-exempt debt (with interest rate
r0 ) and receiving no tax deduction

E. All firms (without regard to their taxable income) are faced with a corporate tax rate equal to  C and therefore
receive a tax benefit from interest at rate  C for unlimited amounts of their (“taxable”) debt

18
The Miller (1977) Equilibrium - continued

16)   Initially, consider the case where the economy has no debt and the first firm issues debt to individuals with an
interest rate equal to r0


A. Who would buy this debt security (i.e., what is  PB )?

B. What is GL?

17)   Since GL > 0, other firms have the incentive to issue debt until the supply of funds available from tax-exempt

investors is fully used and any additional debt must be sold to individuals with  PB > 0.

r0
A. The next firm to sell bonds will need to pay            
. Why?
1   PB

B. However, if  C   PB , then GL > 0

C. Firms will continue to issue debt (at ever higher interest rates) as long as  C   PB

18)   The debt market is in equilibrium if GL = 0. In equilibrium:

A.  PB   C
r0
B. The interest rate on corporate debt =
1  C

19
The Miller (1977) Equilibrium - continued

19)   Description of the Miller equilibrium:

A. There is an optimal capital structure, but only on the macro (economy-wide) level

B. Assuming the debt market is in equilibrium, individual firms have no incentive to change their capital
structure since there is no gain from either a higher or lower debt level

Therefore, in this equilibrium, there is no incentive for IBM (with little debt) to increase its debt/equity
ratio. Why? Verify that GL < 0 if any addition debt is issued by IBM

Likewise, there is no incentive for a public utility with a lot of debt to decrease leverage by issuing new
equity to repurchase bonds. Why? (Again verify that GL < 0 if any debt is retired.)

                                  r0
C. Investor surplus is created in that investors with  PB   C receive interest rate          but require interest rate
1  C
r0

.
1   PB

D. The difference between tax rates on tax-exempt bonds and corporate bonds approximately reflect the
corporate tax rate

E. What is the after-tax cost of debt for corporations? Compare to the tax exempt rate (i.e. assume corporations
have the choice of issuing tax deductible debt or tax-exempt debt).

20
The Miller (1977) Equilibrium – some questions

20)
A. What about observed regularities in capital structure across firms in different industries?

B. What if the maximum  PB is less than  c ?

C. How would changes in tax laws (i.e., changes in corporate or personal tax rates) affect the equilibrium?

D. Miller (1977) assumes that corporations receive full tax benefit (equal to  C ) for unlimited amounts of debt.
What if firms receive no tax benefit (or reduced tax benefit) from debt if taxable income is less than zero and
if there is uncertainty in the amount of their income?

See DeAngelo, Harry and Ron Masulis. “Optimal capital structure under corporate taxes.” Journal
of Financial Economics 8 (1980), 5-29

DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) extend the Miller argument by allowing for more realistic assumptions.

1) They find a unique interior optimal capital structure for each firm (so capital structure decisions are
important)

2) They find the existence of an optimal capital structure even without the use of bankruptcy costs
(although the analysis could have been done including these costs)

3) In their model, they allow for firms to have access to varying amounts of non-debt tax shields, such
as depreciation expense and investment tax credits

21
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) assumptions

The following is a simplified discussion, which describes the essence of the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) model,
without all the complicating detail (many thanks to Professor Avner Kalay).

The (simplified) model:

1) Two dates, t = 0 and t = 1. Firms make leverage decisions and individuals make portfolio decisions at t = 0.
At t = 1, liquidating payments are made to the firm's debt and equity holders where the payments are state-
contingent. All participants are risk neutral.

2) Interest is tax deductible, but the firm also has non-debt tax shields. (We will ignore the investment tax
credits.)

3)  is the amount of non-debt tax shields for the corporation (e.g., depreciation expense).

4) R0 is the interest rate on tax-free municipal bonds

5) pb is the personal tax rate on interest income, ps is the personal tax rate on equity income, and c is the
corporate tax rate

6) Zero tax on taxable income at or below \$0. No carrybacks or carryforwards of losses allowed.

22
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) example

1) State contingent t = 1 firm cash flows (i.e., EBIT) = \$1000, \$1500, \$2000, or \$2500 (equally probable)

2)  = \$500 (depreciation)

3) R0 = 6%

4) pb = 25%, ps = 0%, and c = 40%

5) The demand for bonds from these marginal individual investors is:
R d ( B)  R0 /(1   PB )  6% / 0.75  8%                                                          (35)

6) Taxable income and corporate tax across all four states (no interest)

State                        1               2        3          4      Expected
Probability                 0.25            0.25     0.25       0.25
Cash Flow                  \$1000           \$1500    \$2000      \$2500     \$1750
Depreciation               -\$500           -\$500    -\$500      -\$500     -\$500
Interest                      \$0              \$0       \$0         \$0        \$0
Taxable Income              \$500           \$1000    \$1500      \$2000     \$1250
Inc. Tax at 40%             \$200            \$400     \$600       \$800      \$500

23
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) example (continued)

7) Taxable income and corporate tax across all four states (\$500 of interest)

State                  1           2            3           4        Expected
Probability           0.25        0.25         0.25        0.25
Cash Flow            \$1000       \$1500        \$2000       \$2500        \$1750
Depreciation         -\$500       -\$500        -\$500       -\$500        -\$500
Interest             -\$500       -\$500        -\$500       -\$500        -\$500
Taxable Income           \$0       \$500        \$1000       \$1500         \$750
Inc. Tax at 40%          \$0       \$200         \$400        \$600         \$300

What is the marginal reduction in expected income tax? \$200
What is the percentage expected tax benefit from the interest deduction? \$200 / \$500 = 40%

8) Taxable income and corporate tax across all four states (another \$500 of interest)

State                  1            2           3            4       Expected
Probability          0.25         0.25        0.25         0.25
Cash Flow            \$1000        \$1500       \$2000       \$2500       \$1750
Depreciation         -\$500        -\$500       -\$500        -\$500       -\$500
Interest            -\$1000       -\$1000      -\$1000       -\$1000      -\$1000
Taxable Income        -\$500           \$0       \$500        \$1000        \$250
Inc. Tax at 40%          \$0           \$0       \$200         \$400        \$150

What is the marginal reduction in expected income tax? \$150
What is the percentage expected tax benefit from the interest deduction? \$150 / \$500 = 30%

24
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) example (continued)

9) Taxable income and corporate tax across all four states (another \$500 of interest)

State                  1            2           3            4       Expected
Probability          0.25         0.25        0.25         0.25
Cash Flow            \$1000        \$1500       \$2000       \$2500       \$1750
Depreciation         -\$500        -\$500       -\$500        -\$500       -\$500
Interest            -\$1500       -\$1500      -\$1500       -\$1500      -\$1500
Taxable Income      -\$1000        -\$500           \$0        \$500       -\$250
Inc. Tax at 40%          \$0           \$0          \$0        \$200         \$50

What is the marginal reduction in income tax? \$100
What is the percentage tax benefit from the interest deduction? \$100 / \$500 = 20%

10)      Taxable income and corporate tax across all four states (another \$500 of interest)

State                  1             2          3            4       Expected
Probability          0.25          0.25       0.25         0.25
Cash Flow            \$1000        \$1500       \$2000       \$2500       \$1750
Depreciation         -\$500         -\$500      -\$500        -\$500       -\$500
Interest            -\$2000       -\$2000      -\$2000       -\$2000      -\$2000
Taxable Income      -\$1500        -\$1000      -\$500            \$0      -\$750
Inc. Tax at 40%          \$0            \$0         \$0           \$0         \$0

What is the marginal reduction in income tax? \$50
What is the percentage tax benefit from the interest deduction? \$50 / \$500 = 10%
Note - Any additional borrowing will have a zero corporate tax benefit!

25
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) example (continued)

11)            Remember, from Miller (1977), firms were willing to supply debt securities to the market at:
R s ( B)  R0 /(1   c )                                                                               (36)

In this environment, the effective corporate rate depends on the amount of interest:

Interest                        [\$0,\$500]       (\$500,\$1000]     (\$1000,\$1500]   (\$1500,\$2000]       (\$2000,)
Effect. Tax Rate                  40%               30%              20%              10%               0%
Max int. rate offered             10%              8.57%             7.5%            6.67%              6%
Demand int. rate                   8%               8%                8%              8%                8%

What is the optimal capital structure for this firm?

12)            What about a firm with  = \$1000?

13)            What does aggregate supply and demand look like in the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) world?

14)            Some questions / issues:

What are the implications of this “imperfect” tax shield?

Multi-period tax code – how would the allowance of carrybacks and carryforwards affect the supply
curve?

Mergers and leases – the market for tax shields

What are the implications of a “perfect” market for tax shields?

26
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) hypotheses

15)      Testable hypothesis:

H1) Capital structure changes (holding investment constant) have an impact on firm value
                                                                           
H2) In equilibrium 1 -  PD > (1 -  PE)(1 -  c) . Assuming no personal tax on equity income, then  PD <  c

H3) Other things equal, firms with lower non-debt tax shields will use more debt

H4) Other things equal, firms with higher bankruptcy costs will use less debt

H5) Other things equal, as  c increases, firms will use more debt financing

Masulis (1980) finds an increase in firm value around exchange offers supporting H1. Also supporting H3,
firms with more non-debt tax shields have less debt. For example, drug, mining, oil industries have lowest
debt ratios. They also have the highest non-debt tax shields [Scott-Martin (1975)].

High inflation reduces the value of depreciation, so according to H3, there should be an increase in debt
during inflationary periods. H5 says that there should be increases in debt ratios as corporate tax rates
increase. Holland-Myers (1977) find support for this.

Sharpe (1978) backs  P D out of the difference between municipal and corporate interest rates and finds

.30 =  PD <  c = .48 . This is inconsistent with the Miller model which would find these two rates should be the
same (assuming the personal tax rate on equity income is zero), but supportive of H2.

27
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Bankruptcy Costs

16)      Bankruptcy costs can be added to this model.

While it is argued that the corporate tax advantage overwhelms the PV of the expected bankruptcy costs, in
this model, the addition of bankruptcy costs will decrease the unique optimal capital structure for the firm.

Any additional costs associated with additional leverage needs to be subtracted from the declining

28

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