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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT Eastern District of California

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					                        UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
                              Eastern District of California

                              Honorable Michael S. McManus
                                    Bankruptcy Judge
                                 Sacramento, California

                                July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND
OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS
OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE
CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 11. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF
THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES’
ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO
APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER
ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY
APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND
IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE
COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶
3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2), OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2),
RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED.
RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT
OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE
THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING
UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A
FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY
THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON AUGUST 29, 2011 AT 1:30 P.M.
OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY AUGUST 15, 2011, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED
AND SERVED BY AUGUST 22, 2011. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE
DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON THE ITEMS IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR, ITEMS 12
THROUGH 57. INSTEAD, EACH OF THESE ITEMS HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE
FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING
MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE
COURT’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR
HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK
PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN
FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON AUGUST 8, 2011, AT 2:30 P.M.




                                   July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 1 –
                           Matters to be Called for Argument

1.   11-32713-A-13   ALAN/JANNET ALMAZAN                   OBJECTION TO
     JPJ-1                                                 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
                                                           DISMISS CASE
                                                           7-7-11 [19]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:   Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of
     the proposed chapter 13 plan was set pursuant to the procedure authorized by
     General Order 05-03, ¶ 3(c), the debtor was not required to file a written
     response. If the debtor appears at the hearing and offers opposition to the
     objection, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless
     there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at
     the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the
     court’s tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no
     opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this
     tentative ruling.

     The objection will be overruled because the debtor has filed an amended plan
     moving the Wells Fargo claim from Class 4 to Class 2, eliminating the basis for
     the objection and the request for dismissal.

2.   10-39924-A-13   WILMER/BRENDA SCOTT                   MOTION TO
     SAC-1                                                 MODIFY PLAN
                                                           6-7-11 [23]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:    The motion will be denied and the objection will be
     sustained.

     There is a confirmed that provides interest on a secured claim at the rate of
     6%. The proposed modified plan reduces the interest rate to 4.75%. However,
     nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 1329 authorizes a modification reducing the interest
     rate set by a confirmed plan.

3.   11-36358-A-13   GREGORY FRAGOLA                       MOTION TO
     RIN-1                                                 EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY
                                                           7-11-11 [14]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:   Because less than 28 days’ notice of the hearing was given
     by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule
     9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and
     any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or
     opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the
     hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing
     schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record
     further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up
     the merits of the motion. Below is the court’s tentative ruling, rendered on
     the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                            – Page 2 –
     there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

     The motion will be granted.

     This motion is brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3). It is applicable
     whenever an individual was a debtor in a prior case under chapter 7, 11, or 13,
     and the prior petition was dismissed provided the dismissal comes within 1 year
     of the new petition. When these circumstances are present, the automatic stay
     with respect to a debt, property securing such debt, or any lease terminates as
     to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of new case.

     In this instance, the debtor filed a prior case that was dismissed within the
     prior year. Therefore, the automatic stay in this case is set to expire on the
     30th day after filing.

     Section 362(c)(3)(B) permits any party in interest to file a motion for
     continuation of the automatic stay. The court has authority to extend the stay
     as to any or all creditors after notice and a hearing. See In re Taylor, 334
     B.R. 660 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005). The hearing on the motion to extend the stay
     must be completed before the expiration of the initial 30 days of the case.
     See In re Ziolkowski, 338 B.R. 543 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006); In re Wright, 339
     B.R. 474 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006); In re Toro-Arcila, 334 B.R. 224 (Bankr. S.D.
     Tex. 2005). In this instance, the hearing will be held prior to the 30th day.

     In order to extend the automatic stay, the debtor must demonstrate that the
     filing of the new case was in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed.
     There is a developing divergence in the case law as to how this must be
     established. Some courts merely look to the language of section 362(c)(3)(C).
     For example, in In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), the
     court held: “[T]he chief means of rebutting the presumption of bad faith
     requires the movant to establish ‘a substantial change in the financial or
     personal affairs of the debtor . . . or any other reason to conclude’ that the
     instant case will be successful. If the instant case is one under chapter 7, a
     discharge must now be permissible. If it is a case under chapters 11 or 13,
     there must be some substantial change.” On the other hand, some courts employ
     a “totality of the circumstances” factor analysis to determine a debtor’s good
     faith in filing multiple petitions. See In re Montoya, 333 B.R.449, 458; In re
     Galanis, 334 B.R. 685, 691 (Bankr. D. Utah 2005); In re Ball, 336 B.R. 268, 273
     (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006); In re Havner, 336 B.R. 98 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2006).

     Whichever standard is applicable, the debtor has met it. The prior case was
     dismissed when the debtor was slow to file all required documents and confirm a
     plan. The difficulty seems to have arisen from the fact that the debtor was
     not represented counsel. In this case, he is represented by counsel, has filed
     all required documentation and the plan seems on its way to confirmation.

4.   08-33862-A-13   PHILIP/SHAUNELL ROBINSON              MOTION TO
     CC-1                                                  INCUR DEBT
                                                           7-8-11 [38]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:   Because less than 28 days’ notice of the hearing was given
     by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule
     9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and
     any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                            – Page 3 –
     opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the
     hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing
     schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record
     further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up
     the merits of the motion. Below is the court’s tentative ruling, rendered on
     the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if
     there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

     The motion will be granted. The motion seeks leave to borrow $15,000 to
     purchase a vehicle. The debtors existing vehicles have broken down and must be
     replaced. The loan will be secured only by the vehicle being purchased. The
     vehicle, then, is necessary and repaying the loan will not jeopardize the
     performance of the plan.

5.   10-54066-A-13   CHARLES BELL AND DEENE                MOTION TO
     OAG-3           BYNOE                                 VACATE DISMISSAL OF CASE
                                                           7-6-11 [133]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:   Because less than 28 days’ notice of the hearing was given
     by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule
     9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and
     any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or
     opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the
     hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing
     schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record
     further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up
     the merits of the motion. Below is the court’s tentative ruling, rendered on
     the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if
     there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

     The motion will be granted.

     Counsel for the debtor failed to appear at a hearing on a dismissal motion. He
     had miscalendared that hearing date. Had he appeared, given the filing of a
     motion to confirm a modified plan, it is likely the court would not have
     dismissed the case. The motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing and
     has not been opposed. Therefore, if the dismissal is vacated, the case is in a
     position to go forward with payments to creditors.

6.   10-54166-A-13   JACOB/TERESA GARATE                   MOTION TO
     BLG-1                                                 CONFIRM AMENDED PLAN
                                                           6-8-11 [34]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:    The motion will be denied and the objection will be
     sustained.

     The plan is not feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) for two reasons.
     First, the plan payment of $920 to be made by the debtor each month is less
     than the $1,122.66 in plan dividends the trustee is required to pay out each
     month. Second, the debtor has failed to make one monthly plan payment.


                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                            – Page 4 –
7.   10-54166-A-13   JACOB/TERESA GARATE                   COUNTER MOTION TO
     BLG-1                                                 DISMISS CASE
                                                           7-11-11 [40]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:    The counter motion will be granted and the case will be
     dismissed.

     This case has been pending 8 months without a confirmed plan. The most recent
     attempt to confirm a plan ended in failure because the debtor had failed to
     propose a plan capable of funding the monthly dividends and because the debtor
     had failed to make a monthly plan payment. This delay in paying creditors and
     the inability to perform a proposed plan has delay payment of creditors and is
     prejudicial. This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1).

8.   11-32574-A-13   ROCHELLE/OLANDER WESTON               ORDER TO
                                                           SHOW CAUSE
                                                           7-7-11 [27]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:    The case will be dismissed.

     The debtor was given permission to pay the filing fee in installments pursuant
     to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b). The installment in the amount of $94 due on July
     1 was not paid. This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(2).

9.   11-32574-A-13   ROCHELLE/OLANDER WESTON               OBJECTION TO
     JPJ-1                                                 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
                                                           DISMISS CASE
                                                           7-7-11 [28]

                     9   Telephone Appearance
                     9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

     Tentative Ruling:   Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of
     the proposed chapter 13 plan was set pursuant to the procedure authorized by
     General Order 05-03, ¶ 3(c), the debtor was not required to file a written
     response. If the debtor appears at the hearing and offers opposition to the
     objection, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless
     there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at
     the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the
     court’s tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no
     opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this
     tentative ruling.

     The objection will be sustained and the case will be dismissed.

     The debtor failed to appear at the meeting of creditors as required by 11
     U.S.C. § 343. This breach of duty is cause to dismiss the petition. See 11
     U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6).

     Second, in violation of General Order 05-05 and an order entered in this case
     on the date of filing, the debtor has failed to provide the trustee with

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                            – Page 5 –
      employer payment advices for the 60-day period preceding the filing of the
      petition.

      Third, 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(B) & (C) requires the court to dismiss a petition
      if an individual chapter 7 or 13 debtor fails to provide to the case trustee a
      copy of the debtor’s federal income tax return for the most recent tax year
      ending before the filing of the petition. This return must be produced seven
      days prior to the date first set for the meeting of creditors. The failure to
      provide the return to the trustee justifies dismissal and denial of
      confirmation. In addition to the requirement of section 521(e)(2) that the
      petition be dismissed, an uncodified provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse
      Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 found at section 1228(a) of
      BAPCPA provides that in chapter 11 and 13 cases the court shall not confirm a
      plan of an individual debtor unless requested tax documents have been turned
      over. This has not been done.

      There is no need to address the merits of the several other objections.

10.   10-51982-A-13   FARSHAD GHAZIZADEH                    MOTION TO
      PGM-4                                                 CONFIRM PLAN
                                                            6-13-11 [68]

                      9   Telephone Appearance
                      9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

      Tentative Ruling:    The motion will be denied and the objection will be
      sustained.

      The plan fails to provide for two domestic support obligation claims that are
      entitled to priority treatment. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). Priority claims
      must be paid in full by a chapter 13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).

11.   10-51982-A-13   FARSHAD GHAZIZADEH                    COUNTER MOTION TO
      PGM-4                                                 DISMISS CASE
                                                            7-11-11 [74]

                      9   Telephone Appearance
                      9   Trustee Agrees with Ruling

      Tentative Ruling:    The counter motion will be conditionally denied.

      This case has been pending approximately seven months without a confirmed plan.
      This has been prejudicial to creditors whose claims cannot be paid without a
      confirmed plan. This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1).
      Nonetheless, the case may remain pending on condition that a plan is confirmed
      no later than September 26.




                                     July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                             – Page 6 –
                               FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE

12.   11-32200-A-13 JULIUS/KABELLA MAGEE                   MOTION TO
      PGM-1                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC                        6-27-11 [19]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $225,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by Ocwen Loan Servicing. The first deed of trust secures a
      loan with a balance of approximately $464,133.98 as of the petition date.
      Therefore, Ocwen Loan Servicing’s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust
      is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed
      as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                            – Page 7 –
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $225,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

13.   11-33101-A-13   HAROLD/KAROLYNN SMITH                OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-1                                                CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
                                                           DISMISS CASE
                                                           7-7-11 [32]

      Final Ruling: The objection and the counter motion have been voluntarily
      dismissed by the trustee.

14.   10-20006-A-13   RAYMUNDO/ENGRACIA JUNIO              MOTION TO
      SS-3                                                 MODIFY PLAN
                                                           6-14-11 [47]

      Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after
      confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by
      Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1), General Order 05-03, ¶ 8(b), and Fed. R.
      Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors,
      and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days
      prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is
      considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v.
      Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not
      materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is
      unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006).
      Therefore, the respondents’ defaults are entered and the matter will be
      resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§
      1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                            – Page 8 –
15.   11-32609-A-13   MARIA PINGUELO                          OBJECTION TO
      BRI-1                                                   CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
                                                              7-7-11 [26]

      Final Ruling: The objection will be dismissed as moot.             The case was
      previously ordered dismissed.

16.   11-32609-A-13   MARIA PINGUELO                          OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-1                                                   CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
                                                              DISMISS CASE
                                                              7-7-11 [30]

      Final Ruling: The objection will be dismissed as moot.             The case was
      previously ordered dismissed.

17.   11-32212-A-13 KATHRYN MCOMIE                            MOTION TO
      SAC-1                                                   VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. CARRINGTON MORTGAGE                                 6-20-11 [23]

      Final Ruling: The court continues the hearing on this opposed motion to August
      22, 2011 at 1:30 p.m. so that it may be considered with the motion to confirm
      the modified plan.

18.   11-32212-A-13 KATHRYN MCOMIE                            MOTION TO
      SAC-2                                                   VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. SCHOOLS FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION                      6-17-11 [18]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
      is granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor’s declaration. The debtor
      is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor’s opinion, the subject
      property had a value of 12,700 as of the date the petition was filed and the
      effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the
      debtor’s opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual
      Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $12,700 of
      the respondent’s claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is
      paid $12,700 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall
      be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent’s lien.
      Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is
      allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a
      secured claim.

19.   11-32212-A-13   KATHRYN MCOMIE                          MOTION TO
      SAC-3                                                   CONFIRM PLAN
                                                              6-20-11 [26]

      Final Ruling:   This motion to confirm a plan has been superceded by a motion to

                                       July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                               – Page 9 –
      confirm a modified plan set for hearing on August 22.            This motion is deemed
      voluntarily dismissed.

20.   11-32212-A-13   KATHRYN MCOMIE                          COUNTER MOTION TO
      SAC-4                                                   DISMISS CASE
                                                              7-11-11 [43]

      Final Ruling: This was filed as a counter motion to SAC-4 but set for hearing
      as if it was a counter motion to SAC-3. Because SAC-3 has been superceded by
      SAC-4, the court continues the hearing on the counter motion to August 22, 2011
      at 1:30 p.m., the date and time for the hearing on SAC-4.

21.   11-32715-A-13 MARIO/MARISA VIGO                         MOTION TO
      TOG-1                                                   VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP                        6-15-11 [15]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $145,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by BAC Home Loans Servicing. The first deed of trust
      secures a loan with a balance of approximately $365,000 as of the petition
      date. Therefore, BAC Home Loans Servicing’s other claim secured by a junior
      deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim
      will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.

                                       July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                              – Page 10 –
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $145,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

22.   11-32720-A-13   JASINDA MUHAMMAD                     OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-1                                                CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
                                                           DISMISS CASE
                                                           7-7-11 [15]

      Final Ruling: The objection and counter motion will be dismissed because they
      are moot. The debtor filed an amended plan after the trustee filed his
      objection. The court will consider it for confirmation on August 29. If the
      amended plan is objectionable, the trustee should object to the amended plan.

23.   09-24824-A-13   MILDA ILISCUPIDEZ                    MOTION TO
      SAC-1                                                MODIFY PLAN
                                                           6-8-11 [29]

      Final Ruling: The court concludes that a hearing will not be helpful to its
      consideration and resolution of this matter.


                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 11 –
      The motion will be granted and the objection will be overruled on condition
      that the plan’s duration is increased to 60 months in the confirmation order.
      The debtor’s response to the trustee’s objection agrees to do this. As further
      modified, the plan will comply with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) and 1325(a).

24.   11-34425-A-13 JAVIER/LESLIE LOPEZ                    MOTION TO
      EJS-1                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.                           6-23-11 [17]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $189,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Bank. The first deed of trust secures a loan
      with a balance of approximately $280,694 as of the petition date. Therefore,
      Wells Fargo Bank’s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely
      under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured
      claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.


                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 12 –
      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $189,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

25.   08-26026-A-13   JONATHAN/CARMEL CROSBY               MOTION FOR
      WW-3                                                 ENTRY OF DISCHARGE
                                                           6-27-11 [86]

      Final Ruling: This motion to obtain a discharge has been set for hearing on
      the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the
      creditors and the trustee to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion for entry of a chapter 13 discharge will be granted.

      First, the trustee has filed a final report and the time to file objections to
      it has expired. His report demonstrates that the debtor has made the payments
      required by the plan and that the trustee has made the payments to creditors
      required by the plan. The requirement imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) that the
      debtor receive a discharge only after completion of all payments under the plan
      has been satisfied. See In re Avery, 272 B.R. 718 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002); In
      re Estrada, 322 B.R. 149 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2005).

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 13 –
      Second, the debtor has filed a certificate in connection with this motion that
      the debtor is not required by a judicial or administrative order, or by
      statute, to pay a domestic support obligation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). No
      objection has been filed to that certificate and the time to file an objection
      has expired.

      Third, the debtor has filed a certificate evidencing that the debtor has
      completed a post-petition instructional course concerning personal financial
      management as described in 11 U.S.C. § 111. This satisfies 11 U.S.C. §
      1328(g)(1).

      Fourth, by service of this motion, the debtor has given all creditors notice
      that 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1) is not applicable, and that there is no pending
      proceeding in which the debtor may be found guilty of a felony of the kind
      described in section 522(q)(1)(A) or liable for a debt of the kind specified in
      section 522(q)(1)(B). No creditor has objected to this notice. This satisfies
      the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1328(h).

      Finally, the debtor has not received a discharge in a chapter 7, 11, or 12 case
      during the four years preceding the filing of this case nor has the debtor
      received a chapter 13 discharge in the two years preceding the filing of this
      case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f).

      Therefore, no earlier than 10 days after the hearing on this motion, the clerk
      shall enter the debtor’s discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(h).

26.   11-31128-A-13   KARIN BROWN                          MOTION TO
      CAH-2                                                CONFIRM PLAN
                                                           6-10-11 [23]

      Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the
      notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1), General Order 05-03, ¶¶
      3(a)(2) & 8(a), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the
      U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written
      opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local
      Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of
      the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further,
      because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor,
      an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d
      592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents’ defaults are entered and the
      matter will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.   The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b),
      1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

27.   09-34934-A-13   CARL/DONNA KNUTSON                   MOTION TO
      BSJ-4                                                COMPEL ABANDONMENT
                                                           7-8-11 [66]

      Final Ruling:   The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

      First, there is a confirmed plan in this case. It provides that upon
      confirmation of the plan, all property of the estate revests in the debtor.
      Hence, there is nothing for the estate to abandon to the debtor.

      Second, Local Bankruptcy Rule 2002-1(c) provides that notices in adversary
      proceedings and contested matters that are served on the IRS shall be mailed to

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 14 –
      three entities at three different addresses: (1) IRS, P.O. Box 21126,
      Philadelphia, PA 19114; (2) United States Attorney, for the IRS, 501 I Street,
      Suite 10-100, Sacramento, CA 95814; and (3) United States Department of
      Justice, Civil Trial Section, Western Region, Box 683, Franklin Station,
      Washington, D.C. 20044.

      Service in this case is deficient because the U.S. Attorney and the Dept. of
      Justice were not served.

28.   10-41734-A-13 MICHAEL/BRANDI GIRON                  OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-2                                               CLAIM
      VS. COLLECTION SERVICES OF NEVADA                   6-9-11 [89]

      Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Collection Services of
      Nevada has been set for hearing on at least 44 days’ notice to the claimant as
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the
      claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the
      hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf.
      Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court
      will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an
      actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592
      (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant’s default is entered and the
      objection will be resolved without oral argument.

      The objection will be sustained. The last date to file a timely proof of claim
      was December 29, 2010. The proof of claim was filed on January 24, 2011.
      Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is
      disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir.
      1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v.
      United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V.
      Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

29.   10-41734-A-13 MICHAEL/BRANDI GIRON                  OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-3                                               CLAIM
      VS. PAYCHECK ADVANCE                                6-9-11 [93]

      Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Paycheck Advance has
      been set for hearing on at least 44 days’ notice to the claimant as required by
      Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file
      written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered
      as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d
      52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter
      the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary.
      See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      claimant’s default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral
      argument.

      The objection will be sustained. The last date to file a timely proof of claim
      was December 10, 2010. The proof of claim was filed on February 28, 2011.
      Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is
      disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir.
      1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v.
      United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V.
      Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).




                                   July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                          – Page 15 –
30.   10-41734-A-13 MICHAEL/BRANDI GIRON                   OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-4                                                CLAIM
      VS. PAYCHECK ADVANCE                                 6-9-11 [97]

      Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Paycheck Advance has
      been set for hearing on at least 44 days’ notice to the claimant as required by
      Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file
      written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered
      as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d
      52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter
      the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary.
      See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      claimant’s default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral
      argument.

      The objection will be sustained. The last date to file a timely proof of claim
      was December 29, 2010. The proof of claim was filed on February 28, 2011.
      Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is
      disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir.
      1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v.
      United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V.
      Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

31.   11-30934-A-13   LARRY/AUDREY BULTEMA                 MOTION TO
      MOH-1                                                CONFIRM PLAN
                                                           6-10-11 [17]

      Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the
      notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1), General Order 05-03, ¶¶
      3(a)(2) & 8(a), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the
      U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written
      opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local
      Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of
      the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further,
      because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor,
      an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d
      592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents’ defaults are entered and the
      matter will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.   The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b),
      1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

32.   10-42940-A-13   DAVID/LAURIE TYRELL                  MOTION TO
      SJJ-3                                                CONFIRM PLAN
                                                           6-9-11 [54]

      Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the
      notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1), General Order 05-03, ¶¶
      3(a)(2) & 8(a), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the
      U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written
      opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local
      Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of
      the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further,
      because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor,
      an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d
      592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents’ defaults are entered and the
      matter will be resolved without oral argument.

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 16 –
      The motion will be granted.   The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b),
      1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

33.   11-32542-A-13   GREGORY YIM                          MOTION TO
      FEC-1                                                INCUR DEBT
                                                           6-23-11 [23]

      Final Ruling: This motion to incur credit has been set for hearing on the
      notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the
      trustee and the creditors to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the creditors are entered and the matter will be
      resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted. The debtor seeks leave to enter into an office
      lease for space to conduct his business. The transaction is necessary to the
      debtor’s business and will not jeopardize the performance of the plan.

34.   11-32844-A-13 WILIBALDO GARCIA AND                   MOTION TO
      CCP-1          BEATRIZ ORTIZ-SOTO                    VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. BANK OF AMERICA, NA                              6-23-11 [23]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $169,748 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by Bank of America. The first deed of trust secures a loan
      with a balance of approximately $239,003 as of the petition date. Therefore,
      Bank of America’s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely
      under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured
      claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 17 –
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $169,748. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

35.   11-34452-A-13 EUGENE/JANETTE ROWLEY                  MOTION TO
      CFH-1                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING                         6-21-11 [14]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 18 –
the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
(9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
$480,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
deed of trust held by BAC Home Loans Servicing. The first deed of trust
secures a loan with a balance of approximately $600,000 as of the petition
date. Therefore, BAC Home Loans Servicing’s other claim secured by a junior
deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim
will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
(3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan

                              July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                     – Page 19 –
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $480,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

36.   11-34452-A-13 EUGENE/JANETTE ROWLEY                 MOTION TO
      CFH-2                                               VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. LES SCHWAB TIRE CENTERS                         6-21-11 [19]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
      is granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor’s declaration. The debtor
      is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor’s opinion, the subject
      property had a value of $100 as of the date the petition was filed and the
      effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the
      debtor’s opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual
      Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $100 of the
      respondent’s claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid
      $100 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be
      satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent’s lien. Provided a
      timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a
      general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured
      claim.

37.   09-41460-A-13 STEVE/SANDY BESSO                     OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-1                                               CLAIM
      VS. TRADING FINANCIAL CREDIT LLC                    6-9-11 [33]

      Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Trading Financial Credit
      LLC has been set for hearing on at least 44 days’ notice to the claimant as
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the

                                   July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                          – Page 20 –
      claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the
      hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf.
      Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court
      will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an
      actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592
      (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant’s default is entered and the
      objection will be resolved without oral argument.

      The objection will be sustained. The last date to file a timely proof of claim
      was February 3, 2010. The proof of claim was filed on April 28, 2011.
      Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is
      disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir.
      1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v.
      United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V.
      Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

38.   07-29662-A-13   BRIAN/ANNETTE YOAKUM                 MOTION FOR
      SAC-1                                                ENTRY OF DISCHARGE
                                                           6-15-11 [27]

      Final Ruling: This motion to obtain a discharge has been set for hearing on
      the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the
      creditors and the trustee to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion for entry of a chapter 13 discharge will be granted.

      First, the trustee has filed a final report and the time to file objections to
      it has expired. His report demonstrates that the debtor has made the payments
      required by the plan and that the trustee has made the payments to creditors
      required by the plan. The requirement imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) that the
      debtor receive a discharge only after completion of all payments under the plan
      has been satisfied. See In re Avery, 272 B.R. 718 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002); In
      re Estrada, 322 B.R. 149 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2005).

      Second, the debtor has filed a certificate in connection with this motion that
      the debtor is not required by a judicial or administrative order, or by
      statute, to pay a domestic support obligation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). No
      objection has been filed to that certificate and the time to file an objection
      has expired.

      Third, the debtor has filed a certificate evidencing that the debtor has
      completed a post-petition instructional course concerning personal financial
      management as described in 11 U.S.C. § 111. This satisfies 11 U.S.C. §
      1328(g)(1).

      Fourth, by service of this motion, the debtor has given all creditors notice
      that 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1) is not applicable, and that there is no pending
      proceeding in which the debtor may be found guilty of a felony of the kind
      described in section 522(q)(1)(A) or liable for a debt of the kind specified in
      section 522(q)(1)(B). No creditor has objected to this notice. This satisfies

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 21 –
      the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1328(h).

      Finally, the debtor has not received a discharge in a chapter 7, 11, or 12 case
      during the four years preceding the filing of this case nor has the debtor
      received a chapter 13 discharge in the two years preceding the filing of this
      case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f).

      Therefore, no earlier than 10 days after the hearing on this motion, the clerk
      shall enter the debtor’s discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(h).

39.   11-36565-A-13 BARBARA GESHEKTER                      MOTION TO
      DBJ-1                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK                              7-9-11 [8]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $222,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by JPMorgan Chase Bank. The first deed of trust secures a
      loan with a balance of approximately $352,472 as of the petition date.
      Therefore, JPMorgan Chase Bank’s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust
      is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed
      as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 22 –
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $222,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

40.   11-36565-A-13 BARBARA GESHEKTER                      MOTION TO
      DBJ-2                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. WESTERN NUT COMPANY                              7-9-11 [13]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $222,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 23 –
deed of trust held by JPMorgan Chase Bank. The first deed of trust secures a
loan with a balance of approximately $352,472 as of the petition date.
Therefore, Western Nut Company’s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is
completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a
secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
(3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(5).

                              July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                     – Page 24 –
      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $222,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

41.   11-36565-A-13 BARBARA GESHEKTER                      MOTION TO
      DBJ-3                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK                              7-9-11 [18]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $299,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by JPMorgan Chase Bank. The first deed of trust secures a
      loan with a balance of approximately $364,000 as of the petition date.
      Therefore, JPMorgan Chase Bank’s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust
      is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed
      as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 25 –
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $299,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

42.   10-54066-A-13   CHARLES BELL AND DEENE               MOTION TO
      OAG-2           BYNOE                                CONFIRM PLAN
                                                           6-6-11 [115]

      Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the
      notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1), General Order 05-03, ¶¶
      3(a)(2) & 8(a), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the
      U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written
      opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local
      Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of
      the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further,
      because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor,
      an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d
      592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents’ defaults are entered and the
      matter will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted provided the court first vacates the dismissal of
      the case. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a),
      and 1329.




                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 26 –
43.   10-46568-A-13   JAMES/TERRY BALDWIN                  MOTION TO
      LLL-8                                                MODIFY PLAN
                                                           6-13-11 [104]

      Final Ruling:   The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

      First, the notice of the hearing informed respondents that they were required
      to file written opposition 23 days prior to the hearing. This does not comport
      with Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1) which require written opposition 14
      days prior to the hearing. Notice is insufficient.

      Second, other than service on the debtors, the U.S. Trustee, and the chapter 13
      trustee, the certificate of service does not prove service of the plan and the
      motion on other parties in interest. The attached list referenced on the
      certificate is not attached. Hence, there is no proof that creditors were
      served. Service is insufficient.

44.   11-33069-A-13 LAUREANO/LENA MACARAEG                 MOTION TO
      LLL-1                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. BANK OF AMERICA                                  6-21-11 [17]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $291,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by Bank of America. The first deed of trust secures a loan
      with a balance of approximately $605,658.09 as of the petition date.
      Therefore, Bank of America’s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is
      completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a
      secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 27 –
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $291,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

45.   11-33069-A-13 LAUREANO/LENA MACARAEG                 MOTION TO
      LLL-2                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. TOYOTA FINANCIAL SERVICES                        6-21-11 [22]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 28 –
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
      is granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor’s declaration. The debtor
      is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor’s opinion, the subject
      property had a value of $12,605 as of the date the petition was filed and the
      effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the
      debtor’s opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual
      Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $12,605 of
      the respondent’s claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is
      paid $12,605 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall
      be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent’s lien.
      Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is
      allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a
      secured claim.

46.   11-34669-A-13 ALBERT SMITH                           MOTION TO
      DBJ-1                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC.           6-17-11 [8]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $280,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by BAC Home Loans Servicing. The first deed of trust
      secures a loan with a balance of approximately $357,000 as of the petition
      date. Therefore, American Home Mortgage Servicing Inc.’s claim secured by a
      junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this
      claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 29 –
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $280,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

47.   11-30972-A-13   ARTHUR PAREDES                          ORDER TO
                                                              SHOW CAUSE
                                                              7-7-11 [30]

      Final Ruling: The order to show cause will be discharged and the case will
      remain pending.

      The court granted the debtor permission to pay the installment filing fee in
      installments. The debtor failed to pay the $68 installment when due. However,
      after the issuance of the order to show cause, the delinquent installment was
      paid. No prejudice was caused by the late payment.


                                       July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                              – Page 30 –
48.   11-32475-A-13 DUANE/THEA COUNTRYMAN                  MOTION TO
      PGM-1                                                VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP                     6-27-11 [17]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $240,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by BAC Home Loans. The first deed of trust secures a loan
      with a balance of approximately $305,850.86 as of the petition date.
      Therefore, BAC Home Loans’s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is
      completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a
      secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 31 –
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $240,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

49.   11-33979-A-13 BRIAN/KATIE ASKEW                      MOTION TO
      CC-1                                                 VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. CITIBANK, N.A.                                   6-24-11 [14]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $288,500 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by JP Morgan Chase Bank. The first deed of trust secures a
      loan with a balance of approximately $444,444 as of the petition date.
      Therefore, JP Morgan Chase Bank’s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust
      is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed
      as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified        because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is        the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d        1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See        also In re

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 32 –
Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
(3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
market value of $288,500. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).




                              July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                     – Page 33 –
50.   08-34186-A-13 THOMAS DEARAGONAISE AND        OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-2          EMANUELA FROMENT-DEARAGONAISE CLAIM
      VS. BECKET AND LEE LLP                       6-9-11 [44]

      Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Beckett & Lee LP has
      been set for hearing on at least 44 days’ notice to the claimant as required by
      Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file
      written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered
      as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d
      52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter
      the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary.
      See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      claimant’s default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral
      argument.

      The objection will be sustained. The last date to file a timely proof of claim
      was January 28, 2009. The proof of claim was filed on March 7, 2011. Pursuant
      to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed
      because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re
      Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In
      re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal
      Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

51.   11-31988-A-13 LAWRENCE/SHARON WEAVER                 MOTION TO
      CK-1                                                 VALUE COLLATERAL AND AVOID LIEN
      VS. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING                         6-23-11 [19]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The motion will be granted.

      The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
      $157,156 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
      deed of trust held by Bank of America. The first deed of trust secures a loan
      with a balance of approximately $169,081 as of the petition date. Therefore,
      BAC Home Loan Servicing’s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely
      under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured
      claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

      Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
      secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
      principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
      2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
      Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
      2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
      (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
      (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).


                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 34 –
      Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
      claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
      the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
      $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

      Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
      the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
      will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
      claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
      provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
      valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
      creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
      notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
      motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
      property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
      motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

      To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
      contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
      overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
      3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
      proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
      adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
      such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
      validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
      an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
      not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
      interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $157,156. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

52.   11-31988-A-13 LAWRENCE/SHARON WEAVER                 MOTION TO
      CK-2                                                 VALUE COLLATERAL AND AVOID LIEN
      VS. HSBC/BENEFICIAL                                  6-23-11 [25]

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 35 –
the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
(9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor’s residence at a fair market value of
$157,156 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first
deed of trust held by Bank of America. The first deed of trust secures a loan
with a balance of approximately $169,081 as of the petition date. Therefore,
HSBC/Beneficial’s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-
collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim.
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent’s claim cannot be modified because it is
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s
principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.
2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re
Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.
2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13
(3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the
claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If
the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent’s collateral is
$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent’s security and providing
the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991),
will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent’s proof of
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes
provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate
valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all
creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a
notice that the collateral for the respondent’s claim would be valued. That
motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real
property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation
motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a
contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is
overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary
proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an
adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when
such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent,
validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that
an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is
not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security
interest. The respondent’s deed of trust will remain of record until the plan

                              July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                     – Page 36 –
      is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan
      is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court
      will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i).

      In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent’s collateral. Rule
      3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and
      heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such
      motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of
      collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11
      U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to
      assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining
      whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. §
      1325(a)(5).

      To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor’s opinion of value, that
      objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any
      contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair
      market value of $157,156. Evidence in the form of the debtor’s declaration
      supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of
      property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock
      Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

53.   11-31988-A-13 LAWRENCE/SHARON WEAVER                 MOTION TO
      CK-3                                                 VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. WFS FINANCIAL/WACHOVIA DEALER                    6-23-11 [30]
      SERVICES AND WELLS FARGO BANK

      Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
      is granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor’s declaration. The debtor
      is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor’s opinion, the subject
      property had a value of $19,675 as of the date the petition was filed and the
      effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the
      debtor’s opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual
      Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $19,675 of
      the respondent’s claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is
      paid $16,675 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall
      be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent’s lien.
      Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is
      allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a
      secured claim.

54.   11-31988-A-13 LAWRENCE/SHARON WEAVER                 MOTION TO
      CK-4                                                 VALUE COLLATERAL
      VS. YAMAHA/HSBC RETAIL SERVICE                       6-23-11 [35]

      Final Ruling:   This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 37 –
      required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and
      the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
      (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the
      relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter
      will be resolved without oral argument.

      The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
      is granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor’s declaration. The debtor
      is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor’s opinion, the subject
      property had a value of $7,150 as of the date the petition was filed and the
      effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the
      debtor’s opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual
      Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $7,150 of the
      respondent’s claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid
      $7,150 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be
      satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent’s lien. Provided a
      timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a
      general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured
      claim.

55.   11-33288-A-13   CYNTHIA MAHANNAH                     OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-1                                                CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
                                                           DISMISS CASE
                                                           7-6-11 [17]

      Final Ruling: The court continues the hearing to August 19, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
      for two reasons. First, at that day and time the court will consider an
      objection to the debtor’s exemptions. The ruling on that objection might
      conceivably impact a decision to confirm a plan. Second, the debtor has filed
      several amended schedules that may impact on the trustee’s objections. The
      trustee should review the amended schedules.

56.   10-36690-A-13 MICHAEL/LISA MEDINA                    OBJECTION TO
      JPJ-1                                                CLAIM
      VS. CALIFORNIA STUDENT AID COMM                      6-9-11 [31]

      Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of California Student Loan
      Commission has been set for hearing on at least 44 days’ notice to the claimant
      as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the
      claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the
      hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf.
      Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court
      will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an
      actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592
      (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant’s default is entered and the
      objection will be resolved without oral argument.

      The objection will be sustained. The last date to file a timely proof of claim
      was November 3, 2010. The proof of claim was filed on May 9, 2011. Pursuant
      to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed
      because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re
      Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In
      re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal

                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 38 –
      Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

57.   10-50792-A-13   ARTHUR/CAROLYN MAYORAL               MOTION TO
      WPP-6                                                CONFIRM AMENDED PLAN
                                                           6-23-11 [111]

      Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed prior to
      confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local
      Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1), General Order 05-03, ¶ 8(a), and Fed. R. Bankr.
      R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any
      other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to
      the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered
      as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d
      52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter
      the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
      Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the
      respondents’ defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral
      argument.

      The motion will be granted. 11 U.S.C. § 1323 permits the debtor to amend the
      plan any time prior to confirmation. The amended plan complies with 11 U.S.C.
      §§ 1322 and 1325(a) and is therefore confirmed.




                                    July 25, 2011 at 1:30 p.m.
                                           – Page 39 –

				
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