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									                                                                             United Nations
Photo courtesy of the United Nations

                                                                             Ends versus Means
                                                                             By W I L L I A M H. L E W I S and J O H N O. B. S E W A L L

                                       A liaison officer coor-
                                       dinating air support
                                       for U.S. and Canadian
                                       troops in Somalia.


                                         The end of the Cold War has seen the United Nations assume a more active role in resolving regional con-
                                         flicts. In the last four years alone U.N. forces have mounted over a dozen military operations, more than in
                                         the previous four decades. Many of today’s operations are greater in scope and complexity than in the past,
                                         and their nature is changing from peacekeeping to peace-enforcing. As a result the Secretary-General recom-
                                         mends expanding U.N. military capabilities. While Washington officially pledged support for a stronger and
                                         more forceful United Nations, the resources to achieve that objective are not available. The most immediate
                                         requirement is for a command and control structure for properly employing multinational forces. Moreover,
                                         there is a view that divergent U.N. and U.S. military cultures could inhibit American participation in future
                                         peacekeeping missions under U.N. control. Even if our military contributions to future combined operations
                                         are small, such missions will continue to pose a significant challenge to the way the U.S. Armed Forces cur-
                                         rently plan and train for coalition warfare.

                                       48        JFQ / Summer 1993
                                                                                                                             Lewis    and   Sewall

                                                                                                        or buffer force to the Sinai and an observer

                                                                 he United Nations has become a
                                                                 significant factor for the United      group to the Golan Heights. Later, in 1978,
                                                                 States in developing a coherent        another U.N. buffer force was established in
                                                                 strategic focus to guide its foreign   southern Lebanon.
                                                     policy during the balance of the 1990s. The              The general mission of U.N. field opera-
                                                     collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw        tions was clearly defined: to supervise demar-
                                                     Treaty Organization has been succeeded by a        cation lines or cease-fire agreements, separate
                                                     widening array of conflict situations and          military forces upon agreement of the war-
                                                     crises which are beyond the ability of any         ring parties, and (in limited cases) foster an
                                                     single nation to resolve. Thus the United Na-      environment in which the population could
                                                     tions is now the primary vehicle for conflict      return to normal pursuits. Missions were or-
                                                     resolution, with the Security Council—under        ganized only with the consent of the con-
                                                     its senior executive agent, the Secretary-Gen-     tending parties (including agreement on the
                                                     eral—searching for allies to share the burden      national origin of participating military
                                                     of promoting peace. The United States has          units). For their part U.N. units were ex-
                                                     pledged support for “a more robust, more           pected to avoid the appearance of partiality,
                                                     muscular” United Nations.1 The issue as yet        carry light (nonthreatening) weaponry, and
                                                     unresolved is the nature and the extent of         restrict the use of force to the maximum ex-
                                                     the American support that is required and,         tent possible. In brief, these military units-
                                                     perhaps crucially, whether divergent U.S.          were expected to serve as an instrument of
                                                     and U.N. military cultures will be impedi-         U.N. diplomacy, be militarily nonprovocative,
                                                     ments to developing common doctrine and            and withdraw if the host nation so indicated.
                                                     command and control arrangements for                     The end of the Cold War produced an
                                                     mounting joint and combined operations in          even more challenging international security
                                                     the future as part of a multinational force.       environment characterized by the unleash-
                                                                                                        ing of divisive forces once held in check by
                       Background                                                                       superpower rivalry and by the transforma-
                            The inability of the U.N. Security Coun-                                    tion of international politics from bipolar to
                       cil to play an effective role in maintaining                                     multilateral relations. This led to a dramatic
                       peace and security after the start of the Cold                                   increase in pressure for international organi-
                       War led the United Nations to turn to peace-                                     zations to engage in preventive diplomacy to
                       keeping in default. This was a “golden age”                                      resolve conflicts at an incipient stage or to
                       for the organization during which it avoided                                     forcibly intervene when conflict threatens
                       superpower rivalry and influence by relying                                      peace and security. Complicating this ex-
                       mainly on smaller nations for military con-
                  Joint Combat Camera Center photo

                                                                                                        panded mandate is the eruption of intrastate
                       tributions to peacekeeping operations. The                                       conflicts that, in turn, displace populations
                       conduct of such missions evolved over four                                       and create humanitarian concerns. Such con-
                       decades although the word peacekeeping does                                      flicts also may cause breakdowns in govern-
                       not appear in the U.N. Charter. In the initial                                   mental authority or, in extremis, lead to harsh
                       phase international observer missions were                                       repression of restive ethnic minorities, in-
                       established to monitor cease-fires (1948–56).                                    cluding refusal to permit the distribution of
                       This was followed by the introduction of the                                     emergency foodstuffs and medical supplies.
                       first modern peacekeeping force, the U.N.                                              The impact of these developments on
                       Emergency Force in Egypt (1956), to separate                                     U.N. operations is immense. In terms of de-
                       the military forces of Egypt and Israel. Then,                                   mand the organization launched 13 peace-
                       in 1960, a multinational force was sent to                                       keeping operations since 1988–89, roughly
                       the former Belgian Congo to perform an in-                                       equal to all the missions conducted in the
                       ternal pacification role. The unsettled state                                    previous four decades. The scale and scope
                       of East-West relations inhibited instituting                                     of current operations have necessitated de-
                       peacekeeping initiatives between 1967 and                                        ploying over 54,000 military personnel—
                                                     1973. The 1973                                     more than half the strength of the forces
                                                     Arab-Israeli war                                   that make up the U.N. membership’s exist-
Both William H. Lewis and John O.B. Sewall are
                                                     resulted in the                                    ing military establishments—at an estimated
senior fellows in the Institute for National
                                                     deployment of                                      $3 billion for 1992. Second, these operations
Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
                                                     a peacekeeping
where they analyze regional security issues.

                                                                                                                              Summer 1993 / JFQ    49

                          exceed the traditional bounds of peacekeep-         Defining Roles and Missions
                          ing and include:                                        Rising demands for the United Nations
                               w supporting victims of war, including pro-    to play the part of global crisis manager have
                          vision of safe havens;                              generated a plethora of proposals to enhance
                               w supervising transfers of power and estab-    the organization’s military capabilities. This
                          lishing effective institutions of government;       development was foreshadowed in a post-
                               w organizing and monitoring elections;         Desert Storm observation by then Secretary-
                               w creating secure environments to ensure       General Perez de Cuellar that the war, while
                          the safe delivery of relief supplies.               “made legitimate by the Security Council,
                               Peacekeeping and humanitarian assis-           was not a U.N. victory” because victory
                          tance have become inextricably linked—as            could be claimed only if hostilities were
                          seen in Somalia—and now require the inte-           “controlled and directed” from the United
                          gration of military and humanitarian plan-          Nations. Boutros-Ghali pursued this issue by
                          ning to meet contingencies.2                        recommending that:
                               An added burden not yet fully addressed             w the Security Council assume more peace-
                          by the U.N. membership relates to responsi-         keeping burdens rather than authorizing mem-
                          bility for reestablishing security and order in     ber states to take action on its behalf;
                          failed states, particularly when human rights            w agreements be made as foreseen in article
                          violations are blatant and regional stability       43 of the Charter for member states to make mili-
                                                      is threatened. The      tary forces, assistance, and facilities available to
                                                      demise of viable        the Security Council;
                                                                                   w the Security Council guarantee the per-
                                                      governing institu-
                                                                              manent availability of such peacekeeping forces
                                                      tions in Liberia,
                                                                              (and negotiate with member states—assisted by
                                                      Somalia, and Haiti      the hitherto moribund Military Staff Commit-
                                                      provide striking        tee—to create such forces);
                                                      examples. Many               w peace-enforcement forces be on-call and
                                                      Third World gov-        more heavily armed than peacekeeping units, be
                                                      ernments—most           made up of volunteers, and be extensively trained
                                                      notably the mem-        within their national commands;
                                                      bers of the Group            w peacekeeping and peace-enforcement
                                                  DOD photo by Perry Heimer

                                                      of 77 which today       forces be placed under the command of the Secre-
                                                      numbers over 120        tary-General.4
                                                      countries—resent             The distinction between peacekeeping
                                                      what they believe       and peace-enforcement reposes in chapters
                                                      are threats to their    VI and VII of the Charter whose framers saw
Norwegian U.N. peace-                                 national sover-         the United Nations as an organization re-
keeping forces break      eignty. China, one of the five permanent            quired to offer assurances of comprehensive
down pallets of Ameri-    members of the Security Council, has ex-            collective security. To meet that need two
can rations (MREs)        pressed reservations about Western interven-        functions were regarded as imperative: the
being unloaded from a
                          tion under U.N. auspices in situations where        procedures for the “pacific settlement of dis-
U.S. Air Force C–141 in
Zagreb, Croatia.          humanitarian considerations dictate action          putes” found in chapter VI (peacekeeping)
                          without the approval of the host govern-            and the ability to counter “threats to the
                          ments. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali fa-          peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of ag-
                          vors the humanitarian position. In his June         gression” in chapter VII (peace-enforcement).
                          1992 report to the Security Council, An             In the so-called golden age of the United Na-
                          Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General ob-         tions most disputes and conflict situations
                          served that “the time of absolute and exclu-        were dealt with through chapter VI proce-
                          sive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory       dures. Chapter VII was invoked to redress
                          was never matched by reality” and then              the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and
                          urged “a balance between the needs of good          the Korean “police action” is generally con-
                          internal governance and the requirements of         sidered to be an example of a chapter VII en-
                          an ever more interdependent world.” 3               forcement action. The challenge to the U.N.
                                                                              leadership today is bridging the gap militar-
                                                                              ily when addressing threats to international
                                                                              order and stability that fall between the

50        JFQ / Summer 1993
                                                                                                         Lewis     and   Sewall

                                chapters (sometimes called chapter VI and               w train its forces for “the full range of
                                1/2 requirements). The accompanying table         peacekeeping and humanitarian relief” which
                                seeks to avoid semantical confusion over          will be coordinated with the United Nations;
                                these terms by providing generally accept-              w inform the United Nations on the avail-
                                                                                  ability of its unique military resource capabilities
                                               able definitions.
                                                                                  and encourage other nations to provide informa-
                                                    The recommendations
U.N. Terminology                                                                  tion on logistics, equipment, and training which
                                               found in An Agenda for Peace       can be made available to enhance readiness and
peacemaking—generally means using              present the U.S. military with
  mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or
                                               major questions regarding                w “promote multilateral peacekeeping . . .
  diplomatic initiatives to peacefully resolve
  a conflict                                   roles and missions in future       training exercises, simulations, and leadership
peacekeeping—traditionally involves using      multilateral peacekeeping ac-      development,” and make facilities available for
  military personnel as monitors/observers     tions. For example, in what        such purposes.
  under restricted rules of engagement         kind of situations should the
  once a cease-fire has been negotiated
                                                                                       President Clinton associated himself
                                               United States become involved      with the Bush position during his inaugural
peace-enforcing—using military force to
  complete a cessation of hostilities or to    in peacekeeping? In the event      address by stating: “When our vital interests
  terminate acts of aggression by a member     of a decision to participate in    are challenged or the will or conscience of
  state                                        peacekeeping operations, what      the international community are defied, we
peace-building—rebuilding institutions         doctrine exists to instruct and
  and infrastructure within a country to cre-
                                                                                  will act—with peaceful diplomacy wherever
                                               inform forces? Under what cir-     possible, with force when necessary.” 5 Left
  ate conditions conducive to peace, as
  used by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali      cumstances should members          unanswered are questions about the means
  in his An Agenda for Peace                   of the Armed Forces be directly    of establishing a body of knowledge on
protective engagement—using military           commanded by officers out-         joint and combined peacekeeping within
  measures, essentially defensive, to pro-     side our national chain of
  vide safe havens or a secure environment
                                                                                  the U.N. Security Council and its principal
                                               command? Should peacekeep-         executive agent, the Secretary-General and
  for humanitarian operations (such actions
  tend to fall between chapters VI and VII of  ing be integrated as a subset of   his Secretariat.
  the U.N. Charter                             traditional missions and capa-
                                               bilities? Where should the         Basic Points of Divergence
                                               budgetary authority for peace-          The United Nations is the world’s pri-
                                keeping be lodged: in defense appropriations      mary legitimizing agent in matters of peace-
                                or the Foreign Assistance Act? Should the         keeping. Resolutions by the Security Council
                                United States support strengthening U.N.          provide the framework for diplomatic initia-
                                planning and operational capabilities?            tives (or preventive diplomacy), humanitar-
                                Should the United States seek to energize the     ian intervention, and military action within
                                U.N. Military Staff Committee? If so, with        the framework of chapter VII. Clearly U.S.
                                what mandate and whose participation?             and U.N. interests in maintaining interna-
                                        While not fully endorsing Boutros-        tional peace and security appear inextricably
                                Ghali’s proposals, President Bush, in an ad-      linked, but their
                                dress to the U.N. General Assembly on             respective histo-      the United Nations
                                September 21, 1992, recommended that the          ries, bureaucratic
                                                                                  culture, and deci-     is the world’s pri-
                                Security Council consider them on an ur-
                                gent basis. In outlining his position the Pres-   sionmaking pro-        mary legitimizing
                                ident indicated the United States will:           cedures suggest        agent in matters of
                                                                                  otherwise. In-
                           w support efforts to strengthen the ability                                   peacekeeping
                      of the United Nations to prevent, contain, and re-
                                                                                  deed, unless the
                      solve conflict;                                             obstacles are satis-
                           w support the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-            factorily negotiated in the near future, they
                      zation (NATO), the Conference on Security and               seem to be on a collision course due to mis-
                      Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western Euro-             understanding. As Ambassador James Goodby
                      pean Union (WEU), the Commonwealth of Inde-                 has observed: “Collective security military op-
                      pendent States (CIS), and other competent re-               erations require constant exchanges of views
                      gional organizations to develop peacekeeping                among the governments trying to deal with
                      capabilities—enhanced U.N. capabilities being a             complex situations.” 6 Moreover, the effective-
                      “necessary complement to these regional efforts”;           ness of collective security operations will be
                           w member states, however, must retain the
                      final decision on the use of troops they make
                      available for peacekeeping operations;

                                                                                                           Summer 1993 / JFQ       51
 On-Going Peacekeeping Missions

     Established before 1988                                                        ONUSAL 1991–                            MINURSO 1991–                     UNIPROFOR 1992–
     Fielded since 1988                                                               United Nations Observer                 United Nations Mission for        United Nations Protection
                                                                                      Mission in El Salvador—                 the Referendum in                 Force—established in 1992
                                                                                      established in 1991 to                  Western Sahara—                   to foster security in three pro-
                                                                                      supervise a cease-fire                  established in 1991 to            tected areas of Croatia in order
                                                                                      between the Salvadoran                  supervise a cease-fire and a      to facilitate a peace settlement
                                                                                      government and the FMLN                 referendum to determine inde-     (strength: 621 civilian police,
                                                                                      guerrillas, monitor human               pendence or integration into      22,534 troops, and 394

                                              United Nations photo
                                                                                      rights, and establish a police          Morocco (strength: 110 troops     military observers, including
                                                                                      force (strength: 286 civilian           and 224 military observers,       339 American troops ).
                                                                                      police, 7 troops, and                   including 30 American
                                                                                      94 military observers).                 observers ).

    Note: The term troops in the lexicon of
 U.N. peacekeeping refers to infantry,
 logistics, engineering, aviation, medical,
 movement control, naval, and staff
 personnel. A total of 448 Americans—341
 troops and 107 observers—were serving
 in 5 of the 13 on-going United Nations
 peacekeeping operations listed here on
 March 31, 1993.
    Source: Strength figures courtesy of
 the Office of the Military Advisor,
 Department of Peacekeeping Operations,
 U.N. Headquarters.

                                                                                                U.N. personnel in So-
                                                                                                malia have been using

                                                                                                                                                                     Joint Combat Camera Center photo
                                                                                                advanced communica-
                                                                                                tions equipment.

 Unloading a Navy
 cargo ship under the
 watchful eyes of
 U.N. troops.
                                                                                                                                                                                                        United Nations photo

                                                                                 United Nations Secu-
                                                                                                                       Marines in Mogadishu
                                                                                 rity Council meeting.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Joint Combat Camera Center photo
                                                                     DOD photo

                                                                                                                       counter warring fac-
                                                                                                                       tions during Operation
                                                                                                                       Restore Hope.

52     JFQ / Summer 1993
UNFICYP 1964–                        UNTSO 1948–                        UNIFIL 1978–                         UNDOF 1974–                         UNIKOM 1991–
  United Nations Peace-                United Nations Truce               United Nations Interim               United Nations Disen-               United Nations Iraq-
  keeping Force in Cyprus—             Supervision Organ-                 Force in Lebanon—                    gagement Observer                   Kuwait Observation
  established in 1964 to               ization—established in 1948        established in 1978 to confirm       Force —established in 1974          Mission—established in
  supervise a cease-fire and           to help mediate and observe        the withdrawal of Israeli forces     to supervise a cease-fire           1991 after the recapture of
  administer a buffer zone             the truce in Palestine; today      and assist the Lebanon in            between Israel and Syria            Kuwait to deter Iraqi border
  between opposing forces              supports UNDOF and UNIFIL,         restoring security (strength:        (strength: 1,121 troops).           violations and observe
  (strength: 39 civilian police        and supervises observer            5,216 troops).                                                           potentially hostile action
  and 1,492 troops).                   teams which are located in                                                                                  (strength: 71 troops and 247
                                       Beruit, southern Lebanon,                                                                                   military observers, including
                                       Sinai, Jordan, Israel, and Syria                                                                            14 American observers ).
                                       (strength: 239 military
                                       observers, including
                                       17 Americans ).

                                                                                                                                                 UNMOGIP 1949–
                                                                                                                                                   United Nations Military
                                                                                                                                                   Observer Group in India
                                                                                                                                                   and Pakistan—established
                                                                                                                                                   in 1949 to supervise a cease-
                                                                                                                                                   fire in Jammu and Kashmir
                                                                                                                                                   (strength: 38 military

                                                                                                                                                 UNTAC 1992–
                                                                                                                                                   United Nations Transi-
                                                                                                                                                   tional Authority in Cam-
                                                                                                                                                   bodia—established in 1992
                                                                                                                                                   to assist in the areas of human
                                                                                                                                                   rights, elections, public admin-
                                                                                                                                                   istration, law enforcement, ref-
                                                                                                                                                   ugees, health and welfare, and
                                                                                                                                                   demobilization and disarma-
                                                                                                                                                   ment with a U.N. force that
                                                                                                                                                   includes observers from the
                                                                                                                                                   United States and 21 other na-
                                                                                                                                                   tions (strength: 3,578 civilian
                                                                                                                                                   police; 15,023 troops; and
                                                                                                                                                   488 military observers; includ-
                                                                                                                                                   ing 2 troops and 46 observers
                                                                                                                                                   from the United States ).

                                                                                  UNUMOZ 1992–                                   UNOSOM 1992–
                                                                                    United Nations Operation                       United Nations Operation
 UNAVEM II 1991–                                                                    in Mozambique—                                 in Somalia—established in
   United Nations Angola                                                            established in 1992 to monitor                 1992 to monitor a cease-fire
   Verification Mission II—                                                         a cease-fire and protect                       and protect the delivery of food
   established in 1991 to verify a                                                  delivery of relief aid (strength:              and humanitarian aid
   cease-fire between the                                                           1,082 troops and 153 military                  (strength: 893 troops).
   Angolan government and                                                           observers).
   UNITA and monitor the
   Angolan police (strength:
   75 military observers and
   30 civilian police).

                                                                                                                                               Summer 1993 / JFQ                   53
                                                                                                                                  DOD photo by Marv Lynchard
                                                                                                           Pakistani troops in
                                                                                                           “blue helmets”
                                                                                                           deploying to Somalia
                                                                                                           in 1992.

                                                                                                                                  DOD photo by Marv Lynchard

                                                                                                                                                               Joint Combat Camera Center photo
                                                       U.N. forces load an
                                                       Air Force C–130 in
                                                       Djibouti for the flight to

A U.S. Air Force crew
placing the emblem of
the U.N. High Commis-
                         determined by the mandate of the Charter,                       Shape and Functions of the Military Secre-
sioner for Refugees on   political will, available resources, and per-              tariat. The U.N. Headquarters system is still
their cargo plane.       ceived legitimacy. Recent U.S.–U.N. interac-               not up to expanded peacekeeping require-
                         tion reveals that neither a commonality of                 ments of increased complexity and scope.
                         views nor coordinated action exists across the             Hitherto the Secretariat has met emerging
                         full range of peacekeeping operations. In con-             requirements with ad hoc approaches, not
                         sequence we are also far removed from estab-               infrequently failing to meet challenges on a
                         lishing a joint perspective on the essentials              timely, cost-effective basis. The pattern has
                         for a full-bore collective security system                 been jerrybuilt and does not meet the need
                         under the auspices of the United Nations.                  for clearly defined mandates covering field
                              The approach of U.N. Headquarters to                  personnel, concepts of operations, logistical
                         the challenges of the post-Cold War era ap-                plans, and multi-year resource requirement
                         pears to be coherent and reasonably well                   planning. The U.N. leadership must estab-
                         balanced. Indeed, few member states could                  lish a single chain of command linking the
                         object to the general precepts and guidelines              political (crisis-prevention) side of its opera-
                         set forth in An Agenda for Peace, the report of            tions with the management and logistical-
                         the Secretary-General. It is sensible on the               support side. Concomitantly, the Secre-
                         whole, but the devil is in the details. In par-            tariat’s military staff should be enlarged
                         ticular Boutros-Ghali and the Secretariat                  substantially, with special components es-
                         have yet to come fully to terms with several               tablished for crisis early warning, plans and
                         vexing problems which, if not resolved,                    operations, logistics and communications—
                         would inhibit U.S. military support for                    none of which exist at present.
                         peacekeeping (in the broadest sense) opera-                     Fashioning a Doctrinal Foundation. Tradi-
                         tions. Salient among them are issues involv-               tionally peacekeeping worked well, and ca-
                         ing organization, doctrine, command and                    sualties were kept down because peacekeep-
                         control, logistics, and rules of engagement.               ers were accepted as neutrals whose stated
                                                                                    purpose was to assist in muting conflicts
                                                                                    and mediating between the conflicted par-
                                                                                    ties. Chapter VI 1/2 and peace enforcement

54       JFQ / Summer 1993
                                                                           Lewis    and   Sewall

operations require more heavily armed                escalating funding requirements (given lim-
forces and different operational doctrine.           ited U.S. pre-stockage). These problems are
Within the framework of traditional peace-           compounded by civilian requirements that
keeping operations successes came in the             tend to piggyback on those of the military.
form of ceasefires and negotiated settle-            Although standardization is beyond the ca-
ments of disputes, whereas the circum-               pability of the existing U.N. system, the
stances in both Bosnia and Somalia are               major powers might wish to consider creat-
more ambiguous. The danger in the latter             ing set-aside stocks (in areas such as commu-
cases arises from breakdowns in Security             nications, transportation, and engineering)
Council consensus, disagreements among               in excess of their national needs that can be
lead countries providing troops and the              placed at the disposal of the United Nations.
Headquarters Secretariat, and muddled or             The objective would be to ensure interoper-
mismatched aims among the major actors               ability of equipment under conditions where
involved in organizing field operations.             severe security threats confront U.N. forces.
     Divided Responsibilities in the Field. A sep-        Realistic Rules of Engagement. Communal
arate civilian chain of command is the bane          conflict has altered the nature of peacekeep-
of all military field commanders. Under tra-         ing assignments conducted under U.N. aus-
ditional U.N. practice the field unit’s com-         pices. Operations conducted today involve
mander is subordinate to a Special Represen-         police support, civil administration, civic ac-
tative who reports directly to Headquarters          tion, and humanitarian relief, all of which
and has a predilection to emphasize nonmil-          necessitate military support. In intrastate
itary subjects. A separate chain also includes       warfare traditional rules of engagement may
the Chief Administrative Officer of the mis-         not suffice. In certain situations U.N. forces
sion who reports directly to the field Depart-       deployed to protect the distribution of relief
ment of Administration and Management at             supplies could well become hostages or vic-
U.N. Headquarters. He has the potential to           tims resulting in heavy casualties. As wit-
influence military operations adversely since        nessed in Somalia, the initial U.N. contin-
he has decisionmaking authority over bud-            gent inserted at Mogadishu airport in
getary and logistical matters. Tension be-           mid-1992 became hostage to the clan chief-
tween military field commanders and their            tains and local thugs—yet U.N. Headquarters
civilian counterparts will inevitably crystal-       refused to alter the rules of engagement. The
lize since the decisions taken at Headquar-          U.N. forces in Bosnia operate under similar
ters in New York are not predicated exclu-           constraints, occasionally with tragic conse-
sively on political-military considerations.         quences. Flexibility for field commanders
Consensus in New York involves decision by           would be desirable, but the bureaucratic cul-
committee, diplomatic negotiations, and              ture in New York constrains greater delega-
desiderata not necessarily relevant to the ac-       tion or freedom of action to field comman-
tual state of affairs in the field. These factors    ders regardless of how perilous the situation.
frequently override the practical require-                Given these constraints some observers
ments of military field commanders.                  conclude that U.S. forces are ill-suited to con-
     Logistical Mixes and Matches. The stan-         duct general peacekeeping operations—short
dard guidelines for national units assigned          of Korea-like chapter VII threats to the
to peacekeeping emphasize that troops                peace—for several reasons. The nature of
should arrive fully equipped and prepared to         U.N. coalition roles and missions are at vari-
conduct field operations over several                ance with American military character, doc-
months without requiring U.N. resupply.              trine, traditions, and the concepts of both
Several nations—notably the Nordics, Cana-           decisive force and victory. For example, a re-
dians, and Irish—who have a lengthy his-             cent U.S. statement on “Joint Operational
tory of training and preparation for such op-        Concepts” establishes doctrine which is anti-
erations are readily prepared to meet this           thetical to U.N. Headquarters concepts and
imperative. However, some Third World con-           guidelines. 7 Issued under the signature of
tributors, anxious to participate, must look         General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the
to the United Nations for matériel support           Joint Chiefs of Staff, it sets forth clear guide-
prior to unit arrival. The result has been a         lines for joint operations of the U.S. Armed
mix of equipment, poor interoperability, and

                                                                            Summer 1993 / JFQ      55

                 Forces, including the need to “shock, disrupt,            The primary dilemma for members that
                 and defeat opponents.” The emphasis is               want centrality of U.N. control over future
                 placed on integrating and synchronizing op-          undertakings is the lack of a Headquarters
                 erations to ensure total and complete appli-         organization to operate beyond existing ad
                 cation of military force. And, to ensure suc-        hoc arrangements. Indeed, the ad hoc ap-
                 cess, commanders are admonished that                 proach is resulting in system overload since
                 “there are few distinct boundaries between           additional military expertise is not available
                 the levels of war.” They must “set the terms         for peacekeeping management. To date, ef-
                 for battle” so that “the threat is not able to       forts to increase the professionalism and
                 resurrect itself.” 8 To establish control over       strengthen the Headquarters staff have been
                 the adversary’s “center of gravity,” they            to no avail, and U.N. members themselves
                 are enjoined to emphasize lethality, tempo,          disagree on the size and use of military advi-
                 decisiveness, and operational depth in plan-         sory staff.
                                       ning to shock, demoral-             Recently, several member nations have
U.N. forces deployed                   ize, and disrupt oppo-         recommended that the Military Staff Com-
                                       nents and thereby gain         mittee be revived to provide military exper-
to protect relief supplies
                                       decisive advantage early.      tise to the Security Council and Secretary-
could well become hostages             Such thinking is far re-       General. Both the U.S. and several West
or victims                             moved from the doctrine,       European governments have greeted this
                                       rules of engagement, and       proposal with reserve. Moreover, the tradi-
                 operating procedures currently imbued in             tional troop-contributing countries have not
                 the bureaucracy of U.N. Headquarters.                favored the proposal for fear they will be ex-
                                                                      cluded from decisionmaking processes if the
                   The Command and Control Dilemma
                                                                      Military Staff Committee remains domi-
                         For over forty years the United States has
                                                                      nated by the Security Council “permanent
                   taken the lead in applying chapter VII mili-
                                                                      five” as it is at present.
                   tary sanctions under U.N. authorization. Op-
                                                                           Whatever the final decision taken by
                   erations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in
                                                                      the membership, it would be prudent to as-
                   1990–91 constituted only the second such
                                                                      sume that the Security Council will be
                   American initiative, one which provided a
                                                                      loathe in the future to accord full delegation
                   U.N. license for the use of force without re-
                                                                      of command and control to the United
                   stricting the manner in which the U.S.-led
                                                                      States as in Operations Desert Shield/Desert
                   coalition was to “secure Iraq’s immediate and
                                                                      Storm. Full consideration will have to be
                   unconditional withdrawal of its forces from
                                                                      given in due course to the role of the Mili-
                   Kuwait.” While required to provide periodic
                                                                      tary Staff Committee. Article 46 of the Char-
                   reports to U.N. Headquarters, the coalition
                                                                      ter calls for the Security Council to develop
                   was allowed unfettered planning and opera-
                                                                      plans for applying force with the assistance
                   tional freedom to use “all necessary means”
                                                                      of the Military Staff Committee; article 47
                   essential for success. The coalition fully met
                                                                      details the Committee’s terms of reference
                   its mandate although at some cost. As Ambas-
                                                                      including advice to the Council on readi-
                   sador Pickering has observed: “Broadly licens-
                                                                      ness, planning and general matters of com-
                   ing a few countries to use force in the Coun-
                                                                      mand, and strategic direction of forces.
                   cil’s name enables detractors to argue that the
                                                                      There are some significant traps to be ad-
                   action is the project of a few governments
                                                                      dressed in this context as Ambassador Pick-
                   unrepresentative of the world community.” 9
                                                                      ering has noted:
                   Within the precincts of the United Nations, a
                   number of member states want assurances                  No state whose troops are engaged in hostilities
                   that in future peacekeeping and peace-en-          is likely to allow their direction by a group to which it
                                                                      does not belong or whose members have necessarily
                   forcement operations complete command
                                                                      also contributed troops. [There] . . . is also the need to
                   and control will repose with U.N. Headquar-        ensure that committed troops are not subject to life-
                   ters rather than with a designated lead coun-      threatening surprises by change in the political pa-
                   try. Clearly, Boutros-Ghali’s June 1992 report     rameters governing their use, or by a breach in secu-
                   was intended to satisfy this desire.               rity or by other factors arising from activities which
                                                                      might be implied by the words “strategic direction.”
                                                                      Thirdly, unless the reference to strategic command is

56    JFQ / Summer 1993
                                                                                    Lewis     and     Sewall

interpreted in some static sense, the technology of      ners involves interoperability in ad hoc
modern warfare probably makes it obsolete: it requires   coalitions that comprise forces with little or
flexible, decentralized decisionmaking and instanta-     no history of operating together. Such ar-
neous communication—neither is well suited to deci-      rangements are likely to resemble interna-
sion by U.N. committee.10
                                                         tional versions of a sheriff’s posse. But opera-
     In cases of chapter VII peace-enforce-              tional effectiveness can be directly enhanced
ment where the United States is the coalition            and in-theater preconflict training mini-
leader with full operational control, the re-            mized by periodic command-post exercises
gional unified commander will either be the              (CPXs) for potential coalition leaders and
overall commander or establish a Joint Task              using the concept of lead-nation responsibil-
Force. Such operations, however, have been               ity for certain equipment and functional
and will remain exceptions. More frequently,             support areas such as command, control,
individual U.S. observers or small-sized units           communications, and intelligence (C3I). This
will be integrated into U.N. peacekeeping                concept, suggested by President Bush in his
commands (with U.N. logistical support) and              speech to the General Assembly, will un-
the role of the U.S. unified commander may               doubtedly contribute to shaping the debate
be more circumscribed. In the past the                   in the coming months.                        JFQ
United States has assigned military observers
to a number of peacekeeping missions but                  NOTES
not large military units.11 The experience of                1 “In Somalia, Now It’s the U.N.’s Turn,” The New

Operation Desert Storm in terms of chapter               York Times, February 1, 1993, p. 18.
                                                             2 Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, “The U.N.: From
VII operations is that until multinational
                                                         Peacekeeping to Peacemaking?” Adelphi Paper no. 265
forces are deployed to one place and com-
                                                         (London: The International Institute for Strategic Stud-
mand and control is established, they will               ies, 1991), pp. 30–40.
lack cohesion and effectiveness. On the other                3 Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving

hand, when a substantial force is deployed               Failed States,” Foreign Policy, no. 89 (Winter 1992/1993),
with international agreement, U.S. command               pp. 3–20.
                                                             4 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, a report
and control may be neither required nor war-
                                                         to the United Nations Security Council (New York:
ranted depending on the size of the force                United Nations, June 17, 1992).
contributed. Experience in the NATO inte-                    5 David Newson, “Use of Force to Settle Global Dis-

grated military command and the Multina-                 putes Has Its Limits,” The Christian Science Monitor, Jan-
tional Force and Observers (MFO) in the                  uary 27, 1993, p. 19.
                                                             6 James E. Goodby (with Daniel O’Connor), “Collec-
Sinai after the conclusion of the 1979 Egyp-
                                                         tive Security after the Cold War” (Washington: United
tian-Israeli Peace Treaty should have estab-             States Institute for Peace, March 1993).
lished the fact that American troops can op-                 7 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,

erate under a multinational command                      “A Doctrinal Statement of Joint Operational Concepts,”
unencumbered by military or political con-               November 23, 1992.
                                                             8 Ibid., p. 1.
straints. Although the MFO is only one step                  9 Thomas R. Pickering, “The U.N. Contribution to
away from a U.N. command, there is an ap-                Future International Security” in The Security Roles of the
parent reluctance to place U.S. forces under             United Nations, edited by William H. Lewis (Washing-
foreign command.                                         ton: National Defense University Press, 1993).
                                                             10 Ibid., p. 11.
     Today, military planners have a most                    11 U.S. military units participating in peacekeeping
challenging assignment. Not only must they
                                                         operations are under the operational control of the
identify future adversaries but also surmise             peacekeeping commander. However, the U.S. comman-
who will be our friends and coalition part-              der retains operational command over his subordinates
ners. If we confront a capable adversary—                and all attached units.
with or without direct U.N. involvement—
any arrangement will require unity of
command and control. Either a fragmented
or multiple chain of command, predicated
on loose coordination among national units,
would be self-defeating because operational
decisions must not be cobbled together by
committees once conflict breaks out. Hence,
the basic challenge for U.S. strategic plan-

                                                                                     Summer 1993 / JFQ          57

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