eu_soft_power_da by keralaguest


									Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

EU Soft Power Disadvantage Shell .............................................................................................................. 4

EU Soft Power Disadvantage Shell .............................................................................................................. 5

EU Soft Power Disadvantage Shell .............................................................................................................. 6

Independent European Action Critical .......................................................................................................... 7

U -- EU Soft Power High Now .................................................................................................................. 10

U -- EU Soft Power High Now .................................................................................................................. 11

U – EU Has More Soft Power than the U.S. ............................................................................................... 12

U -- EU Utilizes Soft Power Approach Toward Mideast ........................................................................... 13

U -- AT- Failed Constitution Undermines Leadership ............................................................................... 14

U -- EU Has Uniquely Effective Foreign Policy ........................................................................................ 15

Link – Climate Action ................................................................................................................................ 17

Link – Climate Action ................................................................................................................................ 18

Link – Climate Action ................................................................................................................................ 19

Link – Human Rights & Democracy Promotion Key to Soft Power .......................................................... 20

Link – Collective Action Key to Soft Power .............................................................................................. 21

Link – Collective Action Key to Soft Power .............................................................................................. 22

Link – EU Aid Key to Soft Power .............................................................................................................. 23

Link – EU Aid Key to Soft Power .............................................................................................................. 24

Internal Link -- EU and US Soft Power Trade Off ..................................................................................... 25

Internal Link -- EU and US Soft Power Trade Off ..................................................................................... 26

Soft power key to EU Leadership ............................................................................................................... 27

Impact -- Middle East Peace Process Impact .............................................................................................. 29

Impact -- EU Negotiating Position More Credible Overall ........................................................................ 30

Impact -- EU Aid Promotes Mideast Peace ................................................................................................ 31

Impact -- EU Democracy Promotion Effective ........................................................................................... 32

Impact -- EU Engagement with Iran Generally Effective ........................................................................... 33

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Impact -- EU Soft Power with Iran Key to Stemming Prolif ...................................................................... 34

Impact -- EU Soft Power with Iran Key to Stemming Prolif ...................................................................... 35

EU Soft Power with Iran Key to Stemming Prolif...................................................................................... 36

AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness .................................................................. 38

AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness .................................................................. 39

AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness .................................................................. 40

AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness .................................................................. 41

AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness .................................................................. 42

AT: Bureaucracy Hinders Policy Effectiveness.......................................................................................... 43

AT: EMP Process Empirically Fails ........................................................................................................... 44

AT- EU Lacks Effective Military Assets .................................................................................................... 45

AT- EU Lacks Effective Military Assets .................................................................................................... 46

AT- EU Does Not Have Mechanisms for Foreign Policy........................................................................... 47

AT- EU Does Not Have Mechanisms for Trade Policy .............................................................................. 48

AT- EU Lacks Mechanism to Impose Sanctions ........................................................................................ 49

AT: EU Lacks Experience in Asia .............................................................................................................. 50

US Shifting from NATO to EU for Collective Defense ............................................................................. 51

EU Seeking Independent Policy Now ......................................................................................................... 52

Impact -- EU Soft Power to Mideast More Effective ................................................................................. 54

Impact – EU Soft Power Laundry List Impact Cards ................................................................................. 55

Impact – EU Soft Power Laundry List Impact Cards ................................................................................. 56

Impact -- EU Soft Power Increases Intl Security ........................................................................................ 57

Impact -- EU Soft Power Key to Preserve the NPT ................................................................................... 58

Impact -- EU Soft Power Key to Preserve the NPT ................................................................................... 59

Impact -- EU Soft Power Effective at Conflict Prevention ......................................................................... 60

Impact – EU Soft Power Key to Solve Global Problems............................................................................ 61

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Impact -- EU Soft Power Key to Decrease Terrorism ............................................................................... 62

Impact -- EU Soft Power Relies on US Hard Power ................................................................................. 63

Impact -- Regionalism................................................................................................................................. 64

Impact – EU More Environmentally Sustainable ....................................................................................... 65

Impact – EU Less Militaristic ..................................................................................................................... 66

Impact – EU Less Militaristic ..................................................................................................................... 67

Impact – EU Promotes Realism .................................................................................................................. 68

Impact – EU Promotes Good WTO ............................................................................................................ 69

Impact – Good WTO Leadership ................................................................................................................ 70

Impact – Solves AIDS ................................................................................................................................ 71

Impact – Solves AIDS ................................................................................................................................ 72

Impact – Solves Aids .................................................................................................................................. 73

C. IMPACTS: ............................................................................................................................................ 73

Impact -- Ext: Current Interpretation of TRIPS Prevents Export of AIDS Drugs ..................................... 74

Impact -- Ext: US Pushing for Solution that Worsens AIDS Crisis .......................................................... 75

Impact -- Ext: US Pushing for Solution that Worsens AIDS Crisis .......................................................... 76

Impact -- Ext: EU Pushing for Solution that Allows Export of Drugs ....................................................... 77

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                     EU Soft Power Disadvantage Shell

     A. Uniqueness

     1. The U.S. is ceding international leadership to the EU

Irish Times 07 [March 26, OPINION; Opinion; Pg. 14, ―Was the Treaty of Rome meant to found an economic, and
not a political, union?,‖

In order to examine the Rome Treaty in greater depth, it is useful to see how the enterprise has developed in the last 50 years. For example: the
European Economic Union became described as the European Community (or Communities) and now European Union. These changes in
terminology are a conscious removal of the limiting notion of simply an "economic" identity; from six member states at the outset, the union has
now grown to 27 members with more to come, thus unavoidably obtaining greater political influence; these new members include former
communist states and former dictatorships that have chosen democracy as required by the final preamble that calls upon "the other peoples of
                                           there are increasing demands from the people that the EU should do more
Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts";
in environmental policy, aid to developing countries, human rights and other areas beyond the economic, especially
as the United States has developed different priorities, thus ceding international leadership in these areas to the EU;
development has continued through treaty changes, eg the Single Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and continues with the ongoing debate
about a constitutional or institutional treaty that could profoundly change the nature of the European construct. This point is fundamental to an
assessment of its future wellbeing.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                    EU Soft Power Disadvantage Shell

      2.   EU acting on climate change

      B. Boosting U.S. action/soft power trades-off with EU leadership -- EU Soft power is zero sum
Bernt Berger, Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Research Fellow at the Institute for Asian Affairs, 06[last
modified 11-20-06 ―From strategic triangle to tripartite stakeholdership,‖, accesed 7-17-07]

Conflicting interests and strategies as well as colliding policies among China, U.S. and the EU not only hamper cooperation and
possibly create zero sum conditions. They also create new issues on the global goverance agenda and to some extent on local agendas.
From a European perspective a positive sum game is by and large only possible through coordination and cooperation. Especially macro-
dynamics andrivalries for influence and resources will most likely turn into a zero sum game for the EU. In a strategic
       the EU would inevitably become a playball between the U.S. and China. Therefore the EU needs to
continiously assert its position and – so much for Cold War speak– avoid leaning to either side. In doing so the EU has a
weak agenda as an influential power with strong limitations on its foreign policy implementation. In fact, the EU has
developed an effective representation of its economic interests in trade and investment. However, in dealing with suppliers of raw materials and
commodity-producing countries it also has to deal with a clearly defined ethical guidelines and public interest. The CFSP‘s room for manoeuvre
is restricted by paradigmatic requirements, which are in line with its self-conception as a soft (stance) power. This particularly means that the
European Security Strategy focuses on the nexus between security and development. Clearly defined development agendas are also being
regarded as mitigating security risks, especially through sector development and civil capacity building. As for the European energy agenda and
its energy security, there is still way to go, before a cohesive strategy might become implemented. A green paper drafted this year could be basis
for a common approach. However, a full-blown policy can still be regarded as non-existent. The focus so far is on the liberalisation of the single
market, environmental issues including climate change and alternative energy sources. As of yet, a global strategy for energy security did not
officially find any attention. In contrast to China, in some European countries the energy sector is already detached from national control, as it is
the case in the UK. Thus, energy strategies are for the most part a matter of the private sector.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                        EU Soft Power Disadvantage Shell
   C.   European global leadership necessary to arrest climate change, control global pandemics,
        and solve terrorism

Joseph Nye, Harvard JFK School, The St. Petersburg Times, March 4, 2008, p. 17

U.S. military might is not adequate to deal with threats such as global pandemics, climate change,
terrorism and international crime. These issues require cooperation in the provision of global
public good and in the soft-power technique of attracting support. No part of the world shares more
values or has a greater capacity to influence U.S. attitudes and power than Europe. This suggests
that the fourth political determinant of the future will be the evolution of European policies and

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                        Independent European Action Critical


Brian Crowe, Former Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, EU, 2003, International
Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, p. 537

But a CFSP that works only when following a US lead is a fair-weather CFSP, and something more robust, fit for
fouler weather, is going to be necessary. This is not to say that EU should set out to be in opposition to the United
States with which EU countries generally share a now long-standing and solid history of common values and
objectives; yet its common stance should be robust enough to ensure that the United States cannot simply dismiss it
and the European views underlying it. US leadership is inescapable, and indeed necessary and desirable; but the EU
needs to carry enough weight to ensure that the United States sees its own interest in that leadership being shared,
and not just imposed.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                                        U -- EU Soft Power High Now
Peter van Ham,             Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G. Hauser & F.
Kernic, p. 29
Both the EU and the OSCE are in the business of soft power, using economic, diplomatic, and other non-military
instruments to reach political objectives (Cameron 1995). The main goal of the OSCE is to establish structures of
cooperation in Europe (and beyond) to defuse tensions, prevent conflict, and reconcile enemies . Both institutions lack
military capabilities and have a particularly civilian take on dealing with security challenges. The EU's European Security Strategy makes it clear
that "for the EU, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE – and the Council of Europe – has a particular significance". EU member states
closely coordinate their positions within the OSCE (as a part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy's commitment to
speak with one European voice in international fora), and provide the bulk of the OSCE's funding in all three dimensions of
security (the OSCE's three baskets: politico-military security, the economy, and human rights) across the entire OSCE region. The EU also
provides a large share of the OSCE's field operations staff. Especially the so-called human dimension of security as developed by the OSCE, is of
interest to the EU. The EU therefore funds the bulk of the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR), and many of ODIHR's program's in Central Asia.

Soren Dosenrode & Anders Stubkjaer, International Politics Professor and Lecturer, University of Aalborg,
2002, The European Union and the Middle East, p. 33-4
<Intuitively, the EU is easily accepted as a foreign political actor; its mere presence has created expectations among
the other actors of the international community. Expectations that often have not been met in the past have created frustrations .
Most states in the world have missions accredited to the EU in Brussels, and the EU has led other states to act
differently than they otherwise would have done. Thus, the Union 'makes a difference' in foreign policy. Here it would
be worth recalling Sjostedt‘s already mentioned insight, that being an international actor is a quality which can vary in intensity. Today the EU
possesses all the prerequisites Sjostedt‘s mentioned in 1977 to be an international actor. Thus, the question is the degree to
which the EU is an international actor. The EU's new CFSP structure after Maastricht, Amsterdam and Helsinki has given it the
dynanism and instruments which were needed to talk of a genuine European foreign and security policy. It would now be hard to deny
that the European Union has its own foreign and security policy. The EU's foreign and security policy is not as developed and as coherent as that of a
traditional nation state often is. Perhaps the best picture is to describe it as an adolescent, with all that implies. But the '11 September' has had a maturing impact on the EU in general including -
the CFSP: It is the widespread feeling in the European capitals that the EU needs to strengthen itself to be able to act as a credible actors.

Joshua Kurlantzick, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, CURRENT HISTORY,
December 2005,, p. 422.

          The EU also has devoted more resources to public diplomacy and overseas aid, becoming the world‘s largest provider of
development assistance. This diplomacy, combined with foreign nations‘ desire to emulate the European social and
political model—which is perceived as more humane than America‘s—may be why emerging democracies now
favor European parliamentary states, constitutions, and legal systems when they are designing their institutions.
Recent attention to immigration woes, costly welfare budgets, and the rejection of an EU constitution has not erased
Europe‘s attractiveness.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                        U -- EU Soft Power High Now
Financial Times 07 [March 19, London Edition 1, LEADER; Pg. 16, ―L'Europe tragique et magnifique - at 50 A
weird hybrid of an organisation but a great success,‖ l/n]

As the six founders of the European Economic Community evolved into today's European Union of 27 member states,
this extraordinary and infuriating organisation has shown an incomparable ability to spread stability and prosperity.
The EU has proved a formidable soft power machine for inducing (generally) positive reform. Bureaucratic and
buttoned-down? Yes. Slow and remote? Yes. Too often propelled by utopian rhetoric/crackpot schemes towards the
political outer mists? Yes. But we have not seen its like. Even now, wracked by a crisis of self-confidence and a perceived
deficit of democratic legitimacy after French and Dutch voters rejected the new constitutional treaty nearly two years ago, the EU is still
capable of, for example, agreeing a framework to begin tackling climate change at its recent summit.


John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER,
2007, p. 6
            Europe has also offered a new set of values and priorities that has resonated with many of those who
Along the way,
worry about the costs and implications of American leadership. The result has been a resurgence of European global
influence, which has had the effect of replacing the cold war bipolar system with a post-modern bipolar system. The
cold war system was characterized by geopolitical and ideological competition between two superpowers that relied heavily on military options
as their primary bargaining tools, that engaged in an arms race, that pursued intimidation and propaganda and assassination, and that developed
networks of allies to act as both a source of support and a market for influence. In the post-modern system there is no prospect of war between the
two superpowers, which instead compete for economic, political and cultural in influence, and offer two distinctive sets of methods, values, and

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                           U – EU Has More Soft Power than the U.S.
Guardian 07 [March 26, Final Edition, Guadrian leader pages; pg. 34, ―leading article: Europe at 50: it‘s harder to look forward,‖ l/n]

If you were standing under the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin yesterday and looking either down Unter den Linden, in what was once in east Berlin,
                                                        it would have been easy to think of the good things Europe had
or back towards the Tiergarten, in what was once the west,
achieved at the age 50: reunification, the largest single market in the world, the nemesis of dictatorship in Spain, Portugal and Greece,
the end of continental war. The EU has arguably been more skilful at projecting its soft power than the greatest
military force in the world, America. Cue Beethoven's Ninth Symphony and light the fireworks.

John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 2

This book challenges the conventional thinking. It rejects the traditional view that the greatest powers are states with large militaries that
consciously pursue national interests, and argues instead that power can transcend states, can be expressed without resort to force, and can just as
                                                                           and interdependence have undermined
likely be latent and implied as it can be active and explicit. It also argues that globalization
old-style power politics and replaced it with a more complex and nuanced set of international relationships, in which
ownership of the means of production is more important than ownership of the means of destruction, and
cooperation is more effective than coercion. In this new post-modern environment, the qualities cultivated and
projected by the European Union have made it a new breed of superpower.

John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 34

The European Union was the most successful product of the post-war era of generalized peace and economic change
guaranteed and promoted by the United States. Europeans owe a great deal to Americans for underwriting the post-
war international system, within whose structures European governments were able to achieve a new durability, and
European economies were able to build new wealth and competitiveness. It is all the more ironic, then, that US
policy should have paved the way for the development of a postmodern European Union that has so pointedly and
effectively illustrated the declining relevance of the American model of great power politics, and that is itself now
taking the lead in redefining the international system.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                       U -- EU Utilizes Soft Power Approach Toward Mideast
Bessma Momani,                    Professor University of Waterloo, International Politics, 2007, World Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1,
January-March, p. 3

What has explained the EU‘s choice of instrumentation in dealing with the Middle East? Leon Hadar argues that the
                                                                                                      Europeans, in
comparison to the Americans, have focussed on using diplomacy and soft power in dealing with the Middle East.
This comes out of practical necessity, because the EU does not have the same military might to exercise, and needs to be
cautious about exerting a heavy hand in the region and igniting anger in its own immigrant communities: Europe‘s very
own ‗Arab Streets‘ in Paris, or the like. Unlike the United States, which can use its military muscle to prompt change in Middle East state
policies, the Europeans do not have the latitude to keep direct confrontation within the Middle East far away from their mainland. In Hadar‘s
       the Europeans use soft power as their preferred choice of instrumentation because they are more fearful of a
foreign policy blowback. Europe‘s geographic proximity to the Middle East means that it must choose its instrumentation more wisely. In
recent years, the EU has been promoting regional trade agreements in the Middle East as its preferred instrumentation policy.

Ralph Gert Schoellhammer, Austrian Institute for European Security Policy, 2007, Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, p. 520

Compared to the policies of the United States, the European approach towards the Middle East did not change significantly after the attacks of 11 September. For most
European nations and the EU itself, the attacks did not cause a general shift in its policy towards the Middle East, but sharpened its guiding principles. The main tools
of European policy for promoting political change were cultural exchange and economic liberalization. These means, according to Youngs, rarely triggered real
political change nor did they strengthen the democratic movements within the area. The European Union, which tried to counterbalance the policies of the Bush
administration and to promote democracy and stability via a tightening of co-operation in the Middle East, had to face the fact that the United States‘ explicit
rhetorical commitment to democratization was more present in the new political reform debates throughout the Middle East than the EU‘s careful talk of ‗shared
norms and values‘. But still, the European potential for engagement in the region should not be underestimated. The European Union‘s Common Foreign and Security
Policy is under a permanent process of development and improvement, and the Middle East, as the author emphasizes, was a case which particularly illuminates the
strengths and weaknesses of European foreign policy co-ordination and action.

Nivien Saleh, Professor Political Science Northern Arizona University, 2007, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1,
Winter, [Project Muse], p. 87

After establishing that the EU has sought to amass future capabilities, I asked a second question: What present capabilities could it bring to bear on its relations with third countries as it worked toward increasing power in the future?

              the EU has not been able to draw on its military resources. For one thing, these resources are dispersed
As I then explained,

throughout the EU, as foreign and defense policy continues to be the prerogative of member states. Consequently, the
EU supranational institutions cannot use them to bolster the European claim for international leadership. At the same
time, individual member states cannot employ their military capabilities unilaterally, as this would lead to friction
with other EU member states, which would likely feel blindsided. However, the EU has had one strategic resource,
which it could bring into play as it sought to mold its relationship with other countries: the Common Market.
Because the European market is very large, smaller states whose economies depend on exports to the EU have great
difficulties rejecting EU demands to put their relationship on a new footing that privileges the trade interests of the
EU. This is especially true if they are faced with the alternative of losing market access entirely. The EU, on the other hand, will incur little loss
if trade flows between the two partners subside because the smaller country refuses its economic requests. This fact has provided the EU
with considerable leverage in its interaction with the southern Mediterranean.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

               U -- AT- Failed Constitution Undermines Leadership

Martin Reichard, Austrian Mission to NATO, 2006, The EU-NATO Relationship, p. 80-1
The negative ratification referenda in France and the Netherlands on 29 May and 2 June 2005 respectively threw the ratification process for the
European Constitution into crisis. As a result, the European Council on 17 June 2005 called for a period of reflection on the
European Constitution among the member States until 2006. Even before those dates, however, European policy-makers and
analysts began to think about a 'Plan B' which would save some parts of the European Constitution in case ratification
of the whole should fail. Such considerations mostly concentrated on those parts of the Constitution which could be implemented without
the legal requirement of ratification. The ESDP provisions described above were surprisingly mentioned seldom in this
regard. Hence, a brief summary of possibilities for the post-Constitution implementation of these provisions seems useful here.
  On a political basis, the Solidarity Clause of Art. 1-43 was already implemented by the European Council's Declaration on 25
March 2004. The same has already happened as a matter of secondary EU law for the European Defence Agency, the new Headline Goal 2010
and the Battle Groups. It will also likely be the case for the Emergency Response measures the EU will eventually set in place as a follow-up to
the Tsunami earthquake in December 2004. Further, extension of the Petersberg tasks to cover also the new tasks in Art. III-
309 could be done for each individual crisis management operation through a Joint Action by the Council. However,
legal implementation of paras. 6 and 7 of Art. 1-41 (that is, permanent structured cooperation and collective self-defence) is impossible without
formal ratification. This may not be so serious in practice, as the substance of both these provisions is already very far developed on a political
basis. In case of para. 6 (permanent structured cooperation), this consists in the gradual development of the Battle Groups. Permanent structured
cooperation is a fairly recent development in the EU system, with little pre-existing texts or 'path dependency'. Hence, there is much room
for innovation and it is unlikely that the Battle Groups will stall as a result of the negative referenda. In case of para. 7
(collective self-defence), this notion already exists to a high degree among EU member States, albeit on a political, not a
legal, basis."' For NATO, the EU in any case 'regardless of the fate of its draft constitution; will continue to be a major
international actor'


Leslie Lebl, Senior Fellow Atlantic Council of the US, 2006, Orbis, Winter, p. 117
The French and Dutch votes against the European Union‘s draft constitutional treaty last spring unleashed a wave of
uncertainty about the future of the EU, an uncertainty that has been compounded by the inconclusive outcome of the
September 2005 German parliamentary elections. Is the EU dead, as some pundits proclaimed this fall?1 Or is it alive, with the
referenda votes having created the perfect opportunity for the United States to jump in and save the day for the EU, as another expert argues?2
Would doing so be in the United States‘ interest? Technically,
                                                    the impact of the constitutional referenda is fairly clear. The draft
treaty consolidated existing EU treaties as much as it proposed further European integration. Without it, the previous
treaties remain in force and business continues as usual. The EU has sufficient authority, based on previous treaties,
to pursue all existing economic, political, and security policies.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                  U -- EU Has Uniquely Effective Foreign Policy

John O‘Brennan, University of Limerick, 2007, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2, p. 515

Setting out the volume‘s overarching theoretical frame of the EU as a contemporary integrative space and polity, Ian
Manners examines the constitutive nature of the values, images and principles which inform how the EU behaves in
the international arena. The VIPs which manifest themselves in those behavioural patterns are not just rhetorical or
symbolic (and thus hollow); neither are they an expression of purely material attachments or ambitions. The EU
really is different, as constructivist scholars of the integration process assert and really is pre-disposed to act in a
normative way in its international activity. This is largely because it has evolved in a way which has facilitated the
embedding of these core values, images and principles in its own self-representation and consequently in its foreign
policy ‗output‘. And even if, as

Knud Erik Jorgensen points out in his chapter, the VIPs identified in the volume are frequently contested and
contestable (both in real world political activity and in scholarship), such VIPs constitute the primary cognitive
repository which EU actors drawn on in contemplating what the EU is and should do in the world of international
politics. In broadening the focus of EU external action and delivering a coherent and organically linked collection of
chapters, the volume makes a valuable dual contribution to contemporary understandings of the European Union.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                   Link – Climate Action
EU acting to arrest climate change now
RIA Novosti, February 29, 2008

The European Union plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% of 1990's levels by 2020, the EU
said in a program to fight climate change presented in Moscow on Friday.

EU pushing for climate change action, boosting leadership on climate
Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan), March 3, 2008

The European Union's environment ministers pushed Monday for EU-wide laws on fighting
climate change to be approved by the end of the year, ahead of talks on a global deal due in
December 2008 and in 2009. "It's extremely important that there be a political deal" before "crucial"
international talks on finding a successor to the Kyoto Protocol begin in the Polish town of Poznan on
December 1-12, French Environment Minister Jean-Louis Borloo said at a meeting with EU counterparts.
France is to take over the EU's presidency in the second half of this year, and will be responsible for
concluding an EU deal on the legal proposals ahead of the talks in Poznan. Such a deal within the EU
would "send a really important signal to the negotiations in Poznan," Britain's Environment Minister
Hilary Benn stressed, adding: "we've got to do a lot between now and the end of the year." Also attending
the EU meeting in Brussels was Yvo de Boer, head of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). He told ministers that the only way to make a global deal viable was for the EU and the
United States to boost their support for emerging states such as China, India and Brazil. "Europe has to
begin thinking now about the kind of financial architecture it can put in place that will make it possible
for large developing countries like China, India and Brazil to engage" in such a deal, de Boer said. That
support should be organized on a government-to-government level, as well as via international market
tools, he stressed. Over the last three months, the European Commission - the bloc's executive body - has
proposed a series of laws aimed at reducing the EU's emissions of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide and
boosting research into climate-friendly technologies and fuels. EU leaders say that a swift adoption of
such laws would give the bloc a powerful negotiating position in international talks on finding a
successor to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. But they have criticized the commission's
proposals for the way in which they attempt to spread the burden of cutting emissions, making a rapid
deal on the laws by no means assured.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                   Link – Climate Action
EU acting on climate now

Reuters, March 3, 2008

European Union environment ministers expect to approve pivotal plans by December to combat
climate change, despite differences over plans for energy-intensive industries and the sustainability
of biofuels. The 27 ministers broadly backed a blueprint to slash carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by at
least one-fifth compared to 1990 levels by 2020, increase the share of renewables in power production to
20 percent and boost the share of biofuels used in transport to 10 percent. But many, including Germany
and France, said more clarity was needed on a range of measures, notably which industries will get free
carbon emissions permits and whether biofuels are produced sustainably. "There are always differences
on such big issues, but there is a general agreement to sort these issues out and have a political
agreement by the end of the year," said Slovenia's environment minister Janez Podobnik, whose
country holds the EU presidency.

EU will meet Kyoto targets now

Peter Christoff teaches climate policy at the University of Melbourne and is Vice-President of the
Australian Conservation Foundation , The Age, March 15, 2008, p. 15

Rudd's visit to Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands tomorrow provides the perfect opportunity to
raise the prospect of a South Seas climate pact to propel and co-ordinate action against global warming in
our region. To date, only one regional body - the European Union - has formed a "carbon bubble"
under the Kyoto Protocol. As a result, by 2010 the EU will meet its ambitious initial collective
emissions mitigation target of 8% below 1990 levels. It is confidently aiming for a subsequent target of
minus 30% by 2020.

The EU has a regional carbon market and is implementing renewables

Peter Christoff teaches climate policy at the University of Melbourne and is Vice-President of the
Australian Conservation Foundation , The Age, March 15, 2008, p. 15

These targets are made possible through "burden-sharing" among EU members, enabling a more equitable
and efficient approach to reducing emissions among countries of varying economic and institutional
capacity. The EU approach has also involved creating a regional carbon market that is now the
centrepiece of the Kyoto carbon market, assembling a coherent regional energy strategy, and defining
regional energy efficiency standards. Lastly, via the example of its leading members, it has enhanced the
diffusion of institutional innovation and the implementation of renewable energy technologies.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                   Link – Climate Action

Differences won‘t block EU climate change plans

Reuters News, March 3, 2008

European Union environment ministers expect to approve pivotal plans by December to combat climate
change, despite differences over plans for energy-intensive industries and the sustainability of biofuels.
 The 27 ministers broadly backed a blueprint to slash carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by at least one-fifth
compared to 1990 levels by 2020, increase the share of renewables in power production to 20 percent and
boost the share of biofuels used in transport to 10 percent. But many, including Germany and France,
said more clarity was needed on a range of measures, notably which industries will get free carbon
emissions permits and whether biofuels are produced sustainably. "There are always differences on such
big issues, but there is a general agreement to sort these issues out and have a political agreement by the
end of the year," said Slovenia's environment minister Janez Podobnik, whose country holds the EU

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Link – Human Rights & Democracy Promotion Key to Soft Power

Promotion of human rights is key to EU influence because the US is not currently seen as a leader in human
rights. There is only one ‗leadership mantle‘ to be seized. (also means perm doesn‘t solve)

Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, 07 [Jan 12, Financial Times, Asia Edition 1, comment;
Pg. 11, ―Europe must pull its weight on human rights,‖ l/n]

If ever the European Union were needed to promote human rights around the world, now is the time. The Bush
administration's use of torture and detention without trial has decimated its credibility. With China professing at best
indifference to governments' domestic rights practices and Russia coddling tyrants, the leadership mantle is there to
be seized.

Mollett 04(―The Will-o-the-Wisps of EU Aid: Governance and Rights‖ Howard Mollett, BOND EU Campaigns
Officer, Reality of Aid publication- Governance and Rights in International Co-operation Oct. 2004

In 2003, the Commission announced a new 250 million euro programme to fund anti-migration measures in
countries agreeing to sign readmission agreements - over two and half times the total EIDHR budget. EU external
policy projects its 'soft power' role by prioritising regional stability and democracy promotion in countries and
regions of strategic importance - themes which articulate a distinctly 'European identity' at home and abroad. Some
analysts fear that in this context, EU governance intervention will increasingly emphasise foreign policy-led
initiatives focused on security issues and highprofile conflicts, rather than long-term development co-operation.
Others welcome this development as a means of securing increased and more effective political engagement in the
problem of corrupt or oppressive regimes.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                     Link – Collective Action Key to Soft Power
Marc Houben, PhD, Former Officer, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, 2005, International Crisis Management, p. 23
Throughout the Cold War, Western Europe depended on American power to deter a possible Soviet attack. After the Cold War, Western
European states started to develop a collective self-help security system. Today, European states, when facing an international
crisis, are forced to cooperate if they want to deal with that crisis in an effective and meaningful way. No Western
European state has either the 'depth' or the 'breadth' of capabilities required to act unilaterally in a meaningful and
effective way. Exceptions to this rule are the interventions of France in the Ivory Coast and a number of other African countries. These operations had the nature of security assistance
and followed from obligations enshrined in bilateral security agreements. Another recent exception was the intervention by the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone. The scale of this operation was
very small.
 While the reasons for adopting a multinational response may vary, the aim is usually to accomplish an objective
that a nation is either unwilling or unable to achieve unilaterally. Depending on the circumstances, there will be different degrees of national interests
at stake, and this in turn determines the strength and nature of each nation's contribution to the multinational operation and the cohesion of the alliance or coalition itself. In its report on The
Lessons of Kosovo, the Defence Select Committee of the House of Commons gives a number of reasons why multinationality may in some cases be the preferred or the sole option:
The political advantages of multinational co-operation include sharing of political risks, demonstrating collective
intent and ... bringing greater international pressure to bear on an adversary than a single nation would be able to do
on its own. The military advantages are that co-operation adds both depth (strength in numbers) and breadth
(additional capabilities) to a force, as well as providing access to national or regional logistic infrastructures and, in
certain circumstances, access to high value information and intelligence.


Brian Crowe, Former Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, EU, 2003,
International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, p. 537
There are no obvious prescriptions for resolving such conflicts, which give rise to the most atavistic of impulses among Europeans. Indeed, the question arises – not entirely hypothetically for
                                                                                                     there can surely be no denying that a Europe
some people, at least in the UK—whether in such circumstances the EU should even try to have a CFSP. And yet

able to act of one accord will carry more weight, whether with the United States or others, than a Europe composed
of individual states acting independently. It is to a great extent an illusion to think that individual European
countries can influence the big issues representing only themselves. The case of the UK over Iraq is the exception
that proves the rule. The UK could change the course of events in Sierra Leone, but not in the Balkans, or Middle East. It arguably made an important difference in getting the Bush
administration to work through the UN on Iraq, but the limits on that influence have also been painfully clear: the UK has to side wholeheartedly with the United States, with no attempt to deflect
it from its objectives or the means of achieving them (military action if necessary, unilaterally if necessary, to disarm Iraq of WMD even in the absence of specific UN authorization). This is not
necessarily a criticism, not only because somebody—and, sadly, if not the UK, then who?—has to share burdens with a United States sharing the values and objectives of the democratic
community of nations, but also because of the importance of avoiding deep splits and eventual crises in the transatlantic security relationship as well as in the whole multilateral system. But        an
effective EU, sharing the responsibility as well as the burden, would be much more effective in this role than any
single European actor. Shifting coalitions of individual European states are no substitute, since it is the EU which alone can
provide the glue to keep them together, and combine the resources (in population, total GDP, GDP per capita, and industrial,
technological and other strengths) to give muscle to European efforts.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                    Link – Collective Action Key to Soft Power
Marc Houben, PhD, Former Officer, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, 2005, International Crisis Management, p. 24-5
                                                                  are at least five reasons that underpin and
< Western Europe forms an interdependent and reciprocal system of states. There
stimulate multilateral security cooperation between European states. 1 Economies of scale. Since the Cold War, spending on defence
has been significantly reduced. Compared with the level of defence spending in 1989, defence budgets in Western Europe in 2000 were 25 percent lower on average (source: IISS, The Military
Balance, 2001). The net result was a substantial decrease in the scale of military capabilities. A second major change that most European countries went through was the professionalisation of
their armed forces and the abolition (in some cases suspension) of conscription. In 2004, most European countries, with the exception of Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, have
                                                                                                               although the
transformed their armed forces into professional forces. Paradoxically, the aim of the transformation was to increase the operational output of the armed forces. So,
(total) volume of units, soldiers, tanks, etc. has gone down, the number of soldiers that can actually be rapidly
deployed has gone up. 2 Obtaining broad (political and public) support. It is necessary for a government to have broad political
and public support if it contemplates sending soldiers abroad. A multinational approach obviates any allegations that an
intervention only serves the national interest. It ensures that the people on whose behalf the intervention takes place
perceive the intervention as disinterested help on the part of the national states carrying out the intervention. Another
perspective on multinationality is that a multinational approach may facilitate national decision making. An emerging multinational coalition is a political force that has an influence on the
domestic scene of the countries involved. Public support for an action is not and cannot be limited to the national domain. Today, 'virtual' communities come into existence and try to influence
policies regarding a given crisis. Although it is often asserted that people are instinctively humanitarian and politically 'left', public support is not a given. A multinational approach to
                                                                                                 3 Risk sharing leads to the reduction of
international concerns often has a conducive effect on the obtaining and sustaining of public support for an action or policy.
risks. It is probably superfluous to say that international crisis management operations are a risky business. Crises do not always develop
logically and may spiral out of control. Spreading the risks may lead to risk reduction, bringing down the perceived
risks to a politically acceptable level. 4 Multinationality facilitates national decision making. A collective of states
functions as a political agent when the collective, as a collective, can influence the decisions of individual governments. For example, the
collective of states calls upon the responsibility and solidarity of individual states. These demands from outside may
facilitate decision making at home. 5 Multilateral cooperation is a good in itself. There are two contrasting views of multinational security
cooperation: the first view is the 'minimal winning coalition', which states that the coalition must comprise only those countries that are absolutely necessary to win the war; the other view is that
the coalition of states must be as broad as possible to ensure the widest possible public support. At the same time, multinationality implies an inherent weakness in decisiveness and tenacity. An
investigation by the House of Commons Select Committee clearly reveals the dilemma:
To have launched an all-out air attack against Serbia on 24 March [1999] would have destroyed the cohesion of the Alliance. But, the Alliance's graduated approach to the air campaign evidently
failed to convince Mi/osevic that subsequent escalation of the campaign would happen.
• (House of Commons Defence Committee 2000: cxxii)
The European view is decidedly in favour of broad coalitions.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                                  Link – EU Aid Key to Soft Power
EU Aid is critical to its soft power
Carlos Montes, Director of Development Strategies, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, September 24,
2003, p.

Competition between donors is strong and donor specialisation and support to governance is difficult to achieve.
This is because, large donors such as the US, Japan and France may share poverty reduction goals in a recipient
country but they often have competing foreign policy, security or commercial objectives. Aid will be used to support both
development and non-development objectives. In this context donor competition becomes difficult to avoid. Our aid evaluations found strong competition between donors, particularly between
the WB and EU aid, in countries such as Albania but also in less ―strategic‖ countries. Thus, a) Specialisation is difficult as donors are involved in ―strategic‖ sectors regardless of their
effectiveness. b) Support to good governance is difficult as donors may pursue their nondevelopment objectives by providing aid even to countries that are not democratic or have high levels of
corruption.  Where to find the value of EU aid for EU and MS? 1.An Essential soft-power tool to promote EU foreign,
security and commercial objectives This soft power tool is central to the European aim of increasing its relative
strength in the world and of promoting European values and solutions, the ―Brussels consensus‖. Democracy, human rights, abolition of death
penalty, regulation of markets, welfare state. Support to multilateralism: Kyoto, Internat Criminal Court, etc. 2. More specifically, European aid also provides support

for the near abroad neighbours and ―neighbourhood‖ issues central to EU citizens –e.g. control of borders, illegal
immigration, asylum, organised crime, drug and women trafficking, and regional stability. Focus on Russia/ Balkans/neighbour
Muslim countries 1. European Aid increases variety of aid available: Provides recipient countries with a European option on the standard US/WB aid menu 2.
Has the potential to usefully address democracy and Rule oL constraints to dvt. I argue that EU aid has the mandate, capacity and maybe will to work in this area. Also it has some expertise ��
           The EU has relied on multilateral processes and financial programmes to ensure European peace, regional
On the mandate,

stability and democracy, including recent Enlargement. Democratic values are at the centre of EU Treaties and have
been included in agreements with other countries e.g. Cotonou. Unlike many multilat. donors, the EU has a strong mandate in this area. It also has the capacity
as a large donor which is supported by the political legitimacy of the MS. Finally, it may also have the will as EU aid is affected in a less direct way by national interests In terms of expertise:
Firstly, the EU aid‘s most successful interventions have been in this area and support to elections- although with localised impacts. Second, EU has had some success in ensuring that governance
is taken into account by other donors. For example, in Uganda, the Commission and MS worked together to ensure the BWI took into account political developments and the war in Congo.
    it is already an important player in conflict situations, as the last donor out; Somalia and Central Africa

Republic; and first donor in, Congo (last week)

EU‘s gain in soft power is linked to the lack of development assistance from the US – the plan
reverses this
JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, a visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment‘s China Program, 2006. ―The Decline
of American Soft Power‖

                                                                                       the ―American Dream‖ is not the only
Unlike in the 1990s, foreigners now have alternative social and economic models to consider ;
vision in town. As the European Union has expanded, it now has a larger population than America and a gross
domestic product equivalent to that of the United States. In banking, mobile telephony, aerospace, and other cutting-
edge industries, European corporations like Nokia have begun to challenge, if not surpass, American companies.
European expansion has made the EU seem accessible, and attractive, to a wide range of potential member-states in
Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. Brussels has used this desire to join the union to persuade Turkey to
make drastic political changes, to push the Balkans away from its recent bloody past, and to convince former Soviet states to reform their
economies and political systems—just the kind of persuasion and leverage that defines soft power. The EU also has
devoted more resources to public diplomacy and overseas aid, becoming the world‘s largest provider of
development assistance. This diplomacy, combined with foreign nations‘ desire to emulate the European social and
political model—which is perceived as more humane than America‘s—may be why emerging democracies now
favor European parliamentary states, constitutions, and legal systems when they are designing their institutions.
Recent attention to immigration woes, costly welfare budgets, and the rejection of an EU constitution has not erased Europe‘s attractiveness.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                   Link – EU Aid Key to Soft Power
EU aid boosts its soft power
Walter Eberlei, University of Applied Sciences Düsseldorf and Denise Auclair, Caritas Europa, CISDE, March 2007, p.

        Development cooperation has long been a part of the European project, European values and the role the European
Union wants to play on the world scene. European Community (EC) assistance represents the collective commitment of EU
Member States to a more just world. This vision is strongly supported by European citizens.

European assistance increases Europe‘s soft power, which gives it greater influence in other areas
Overseas Development Institute, November 6, 2003 "What is the EU's comparative advantage with respect to aid?" OVERSEAS

The main value for the EU and its Member States is that it is an essential soft-power tool to promote EU foreign,
security and commercial objectives which are central to promoting European values. It would equally support multilateral
solutions, such as the Kyoto protocol or the International Criminal Court. In addition, it provides support to the near abroad and on
neighbourhood issues that are central to EU citizens, like the control of borders, organised crime, drug and women
trafficking, and regional stability. From the perspective of the recipients of aid, the added value would be that the
variety of aid increases. It provides recipient countries with a European option to the standard US / World Bank menu. In addition, it has
the potential to address democracy and rule of law constraints to development. The value of EU aid is also shown by its focus
on Russia, the Balkans and near abroad and on neighbourhood issues. Furthermore, the EU can play an important role in providing
space for aid coordination between its Member States and for harmonisation of procedures at EU level.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                           Internal Link -- EU and US Soft Power Trade Off

Joseph Nye, Harvard, 2004, Soft Power: the means to success in world politics, p. 75-6
Currently, the closest competitor to the United States in soft power resources is Europe. European art, literature, music,
design, fashion, and food have long served as global cultural magnets. Taken individually, many European states have a strong
cultural attractiveness: half of the ten most widely spoken languages in the world are European. Spanish and Portuguese
link Iberia to Latin America, English is the language of the United States and the far-flung Commonwealth, and there are nearly 50 Francophone
countries who meet at a biannual summit at which they discuss policies and celebrate their status as countries have French in common. France
                                                                                                                ―France‘s soft power has
spends close to $1 billion a year to spread French civilization around the world. As seen from distant Singapore,
been clearly maintained or even increased in the past fifty years, although Paris may no longer be the prime intellectual, cultural
and philosophical capital of the world.‖ But the soft power does not rest only on language use. One advocate of ―Asian values, ‖ former
Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, refers to the new concerns about environment and human rights as ―European

Europe and the US are in competition for influence – the plan saps EU‘s soft power
Joseph S. Nye Jr., professor of international relations Harvard, 11/15/04, ―Tapping Soft Power: America Needs a Strong
Europe‖, International Herald Tribune.

It is no secret that many European leaders preferred Senator John Kerry to President George W. Bush. Some observers, like Timothy Garton Ash
of Oxford University, predicted that if Bush were re-elected, those leaders would turn to a "Euro-Gaullist" approach designed to make the
European Union a rival superpower to the United States. . Many Americans blame Bush's European problem on President Jacques Chirac and his
aspirations for a multipolar world, but the problem is deeper than any individual. America's attractiveness — or soft power — in
Europe has diminished in the past few years, and polls show that this can be traced largely to American foreign
policy. . In the run-up to the war in Iraq, polls showed that the United States lost an average of 30 points of support in most European countries,
including countries like Britain that supported America in the war. Strong majorities in Europe see U.S. unilateralism as an
important international threat to Europe in the next 10 years. . Given this situation, it would be tempting for Bush to turn away from America's historical policy of
favoring European integration and to pursue an open policy of divide and rule. . There were already signs of this approach last year in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's jibe about Old and

New Europe. But the temptation to punish Europeans for lack of support on Iraq would be short-sighted. The United States has more to fear from a weak Europe than from a coherent Europe. .

A policy of divide and rule would not be difficult. Europeans are already divided, and the enlargement of the European Union to include Eastern Europe has set sharp limits on how much power

will be centralized in Brussels. Even in Western Europe, the prospect that Europe will unite to balance American military power is slim. . To balance the United States would require a doubling

or tripling of military budgets in most European countries and that is just not in the cards. European societies are focused on the costs of their welfare states. The Euro-Gaullist vision of a rival
                                                                                                                                             Power in the world today
superpower that will make NATO obsolete and balance American military power is an empty specter. . But that does not mean Europe is powerless. .

is distributed like a three dimensional chess game. On the top board are military relations among countries. Here, the
United States is the world's only superpower, and its likely to stay that way. But on the middle board of economic
relations, Europe (and others) already balance American power. . Bush cannot reach a deal in the Doha round of world
trade talks without their agreement. And last month, the U.S. Congress passed a major restructuring of American business taxes because of
the threat of European sanctions. . Finally, on the bottom board are transnational issues that cross borders outside the control of governments — like infectious diseases, international
crime, or transnational terrorism. Here power is chaotically distributed and it makes no sense to speak of American empire. . America cannot manage these transnational threats without the help

of other countries, especially Europe. That is why a strategy of weakening Europe would be mistaken. Indeed, America's efforts to do so would simply reinforce the loss of U.S. soft power

among European populations and further reduce the leeway that leaders have to help the United States.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                     Internal Link -- EU and US Soft Power Trade Off
European Union Soft Power will be cut due to the aff plan
Stanley Sloan, founding director of the Atlantic Community Initiative and a Visiting Scholar at Middlebury College,
Vt. Heiko Borchert heads SCPA, a political and business consulting firm in Switzerland. September 8-15, 2003,
“Europe, U.S. Must Rebalance Soft, Hard Power,‖,%20hard%20power.html

Today, Europe is too quick to shun military might (of which it has little) and too dependent on soft power (with which it is well endowed).
Europe‘s hard power deficit undermines the gravitas of its diplomacy, particularly in dealing with its superpower U.S. ally. The other part of the
problem is that  U.S. soft power policy approaches are all too often the neglected stepchild in American responses to
global challenges. Until recently, post-World War II U.S. foreign policy had been designed to capitalize on America‘s
abundant soft power, including the perception of the United States as a benign force in the international system. This meant the United
States decided to cooperate with its allies rather than dominate them, that Washington made its position of strength less
offensive to friends and allies by taking the lead in creating and operating multilateral organizations. President Bush‘s administration has
called into question this foundation for successful U.S. international leadership. The administration‘s unilateralist
inclinations have shifted the balance between the hard and soft power instruments of American foreign policy. Some
Americans see this as evidence of decisive leadership. However, when the United States fails to bring its considerable soft power
into play to support its actions, would-be followers become reluctant or even resistant, as happened in the trans-
Atlantic crisis over Iraq. Public opinion studies already have shown how seriously this approach undermined global perceptions of the
United States as a benign international actor. The soft power deficit in U.S. foreign policy has put more focus on the EU‘s
soft power capability. Some Europeans are tempted to shape the EU‘s soft power into a new pole for a multipolar international system,
designed to counterbalance the hard-power-heavy pole of the United States.


John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 9

Chapter 6 compares and contrasts European and American values, arguing that the two actors now differ so greatly on so broad a range of social
issues that they offer quite distinctive personalities to the rest of the world. It argues that   brand image is central to notions of power,
and that while the United States is still a cultural hegemon, the EU is catching up. Anti-Americanism has grown, taking
multiple different forms, but there has been no corresponding rise of anti-Europeanism. Europeans and Americans see themselves – and are seen
by others – in quite different ways, and offer distinctive interpretations about what they each represent. The chapter looks in detail at transatlantic
contrasts in the role of religion, at competing social models, and at the manner in which Europe has begun to take the lead on addressing
                    In the competition in the marketplace for ideas, European post-modern attitudes are building
environmental problems.
advantages over the values associated with American power.

John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 174

The European superpower has an important role to play in redefining our understanding of the intemational system,
and in helping its American counterpart adjust its perceptions and values. At no time since it became a superpower
has the United States been faced with so compelling a set of alternatives as it does today from Europe. The Soviets
offered only military and ideological competition; the Europeans offer economic, political, ideological, social,
cultural and moral altematives. Europe not only offers another interpretation of how international affairs might be
managed, and of how threats to the international community might be defined and resolved, but it also poses limits
to the ability of the United States to mould that community according to its priorities and principles. The European
Union is a superpower, and the new pole in a post-modern bipolar international order. It is time to acknowledge this,
and to better understand the implications

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                             Soft power key to EU Leadership
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 6-7

In this new system, the European Union is a superpower that relies upon soft power to express itself and to achieve
its objectives, and that finds itself at a moral advantage in an international environment where violence as a means
of achieving influence is increasingly detested and rejected, and at a strategic advantage because its methods and
priorities fit more closely with the needs and consequences of globalization. The EU has become influential by
promoting values, policies and goals that appeal to other states in a way that aggression and coercion cannot. In so
doing, it has redefined our understanding of the meaning of power, as well as fundamentally and irrevocably
changing the balance of influence in the international system.

John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 31

Jeremy Rifkin contrasts the American emphasis on economic growth, personal wealth, individual self-interest, and
the use of military power with the European emphasis on sustainable development, quality of life, community, and
political cooperation, and concludes that Europe is developing a new social and political model better suited to the
needs of the globalizing world of the new century." The journalist T. R. Reid offers an economic perspective on the
rise of the EU, arguing that the emergence of Europe has meant the end of American global supremacy. Rockwell
Schnabel, former US ambassador to the EU, offers his support to the idea of Europe using its soft power to influence
world events, and warns of the challenge it poses to the United States. Arid from the other side the Atlantic,
Stephen Haseler has looked at developments intrinsic to the EU – including monetary union, an integrated legal
system, trade, and common diplomacy – and has written of 'Europe's hour', arguing that the EU is already 'well
along the road to becoming the world's second superpower'. Mark Leonard argues that Europe will 'run the 21st
century', and writes of the 'invisible hand' of Europe exerting a new kind of influence based less on military power
than on offering a long-term model of economic and political transformation. The end of the American era is nigh,
he concludes.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                        Impact -- Middle East Peace Process Impact

Thomas F. Lynch, US Army – Chief of CENTCOM Commanding General‘s Advisory Group, 2005,
Orbis, Winter, p. 150
The central zone includes Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, and Egypt. Here, the central security challenge remains
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is unlikely to be resolved by direct transatlantic intervention in the near future.
Instead, the challenges within this zone are best grounded upon soft-power components, featuring EU cooperative
programs and diplomatic overtures. Collaborative efforts to revive the Road Map for Middle East Peace should be
the number-one priority. Simultaneously, NATO might gradually expand its presence within peacekeeping activities
across the region, setting the stage for a major NATO role in any eventual Israeli-Palestine settlement. To set the
stage for transition to a meaningful Israeli-Palestinian peace, the EU should continue to play a proactive diplomatic
role with the United States, the UN, and Russia to resuscitate the Road Map. It should be urging the Palestinian
Authority toward moderation and de-escalation of violence, to complement the United States‘ similar efforts with
Israel. The EU‘s thrust would be to broaden the Barcelona Process: by encouraging transatlantic cultural exchanges
for children, expanding women‘s opportunities in government, and helping establish solid secular schools.

Muriel Asseburg, Research Associate Stiftun g Wissenchaft und Politik, 2004, Euro-Mediterranean Relations After
September 11, ed. Annette Junemann, p. 184
 From the beginning of the Oslo Process, the EU was able to offer additional fora for dialogue and contacts between the parties, often away from
the attention of the international community but nevertheless of added value. Most importantly, the EU and its member states have
extensively supported track-two diplomacy, that is, non-official, non-public negotiations, often between academics,
the results of which have already fed into official negotiations and have been (or will be in the future) essential to
the creative search for solutions on issues such as Jerusalem. The EU has also helped to find solutions to day-to-day
problems between the parties to the conflict. Its special envoy, for example, has established an 'EU-Israeli Joint
Dialogue' in which European and Israeli practitioners and experts regularly discussed ways and means to overcome
(Israeli) obstacles to economic development in the Palestinian territories [Peters, 2000: 161].>


Muriel Asseburg, Research Associate Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politik, 2004, Euro-Mediterranean Relations
After September 11, ed. Annette Junemann, p. 185

Since the beginning of 2002, discussions on a way out of the crisis have taken place in EU circles, taking as their point of
                                              building on the European assessment that the Israeli/American 'security-
departure the 'Peres-Abu Ala Understanding' and
first' approach would not work, since there needs to be a political vision in order for any cease-fire to be effective
and lasting. Based on the German foreign minister's 'seven-point plan', a three-phase 'road map' was finally agreed upon at the EU's meeting of
foreign ministers in Helsingor in August 2002 and had a great influence on the Quartet statement the following month in which the international
community (led by the US, EU, UN and Russia) proposed a plan envisioning a Palestinian state and a peace settlement by 2005. Indeed, the
Quartet statement (as well as the more detailed road map produced by the Quartet in October 2002) can be seen as an important success for
European diplomacy: the EU has kept the US working on finding a common approach, even though there have clearly been different priorities in
parts of the US administration with Operation 'Enduring Freedom' continuing and preparations being made for war against Iraq . The EU was
also successful in pushing its comprehensive approach for a way out of the impasse - that is, the need for a realistic
political perspective, a timetable and immediate gains for both parties in order for a cease-fire to be effective - and
making it a joint Quartet initiative. Moreover, the EU has succeeded in convincing the US administration of the importance of protecting Arafat
from physical elimination and preventing the complete destruction of the PA.>

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

          Impact -- EU Negotiating Position More Credible Overall

Muriel Asseburg, Research Associate Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politik, 2004, Euro-Mediterranean Relations After
September 11, ed. Annette Junemann, p. 183

The EU can take pride in a very consistent declaratory policy on the matter of Palestinian self-determination and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
The European position has developed from Venice (1980) via Cardiff (1998) to Berlin (1999) in a lineal- fashion, becoming ever more outspoken
and well-expressed while being firmly based on international law. Lately, the EU has also developed a clear outlook on the
question of what a final settlement should look like and which principles it should be based on. According to the EU
declarations of Seville (June 2002), a final solution should be based on the 1967 borders – rather than just referring to the
controversial Security Council resolution. Particularly when compared to US policies on the conflict, the EU declarations have
been much more concise, progressive and unified, different US government bodies and administrations having
expressed different positions on the status of East Jerusalem, the Palestinian territories and so on.'


Richard Youngs, Politics Lecturer, University of Warwick, 2006, Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September
11, p. 151-2

In June 2002 President Bush explicitly committed the United States to supporting the creation of an independent Palestinian state, making this
conditional on PA reform and the removal of Arafat. The three-stage Roadmap toward a final settlement was presented under the auspices of the
Quartet in October 2002. European governments played a significant role in the elaboration of the Roadmap. Indeed, the latter was based on a
Danish presidency proposal, itself worked up from a German paper. After its pivotal 1999 Berlin declaration, the EU's approach to the
peace process became more sharply political. The EU stipulated with increasing force and clarity that the Palestinian
state must extend to 1967 borders; that Israel must halt and reverse settlement construction and cease its attempt to
irreversibly change the facts on the ground; that Israel's new security barrier was illegal; and that fundamental
human rights standards were being breached through Israeli incursions into the Occupied Territories. In practice, no
punitive EU measures were taken against Israel on these issues. The EU was influential mainly through crisis
management activities, the EU special representative intervening to defuse a number of "microsecurity" crises—
negotiating temporary ceasefires and mediating hostage standoffs, for example. Increased support for peace projects involving
cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian civil society organizations was still seen as the most concrete expression
of the EU's attempt to underpin the formal diplomacy of the peace process. Rather than pursuing new initiatives of
its own, the EU prioritized its involvement in the Quartet and in efforts to ensure a reengagement of the Bush
administration. The EU's elaboration of the Roadmap was presented in this light, as a concrete and balanced plan
that would facilitate the United States' reengagement.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                           Impact -- EU Aid Promotes Mideast Peace

Raffaella A. Del Sarto, European University Institute, 2006, Contested State Identities and Regional Security in
the Euro-Mediterranean Area, p. 119-20
Yet in spite of the general consensus, there are differences regarding the favored type of EU–Israeli relations among Israel's political elites. In
fact, EU–Israeli relations fluctuated in correlation with Israel's alternation of governments. Thus, Labour-led
governments in general had a rather positive attitude toward the EU. In particular, the former Barak government maintained a
somewhat "Europeanist" foreign policy. In this vein, Barak and his ministers Shlomo Ben-Ami and Shimon Peres frequently
consulted European leaders on issues related to the peace process, and their discourse toward the EU was quite
amicable and value-oriented. Thus, upon the entering into force of the 1995 EU–Israel agreement in June 2000, Barak's first foreign
minister David Levy (2000) described EU–Israeli relations as constituting "an extensive framework of long-standing democratic principles,
membership in the free world, economic gains and shared cultural values." And while Levy stressed the "important role" that the EU played in
the Middle East peace process, his successor Ben-Ami declared that the EU foreign-affairs representative Javier Solana "has an important role to
play in this part of the world as key member of the European Union leadership." In the same declaration, Ben-Ami also addressed the former EU
special envoy to the Middle East Moratinos, as "our friend" (Ben-Ami and Solana 2001).

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                       Impact -- EU Democracy Promotion Effective

Eduard Soler I Lecha, Research Fellow Institut Universitari d‘Estudis Europeus, 2004, Euro-Mediterranean
Relations After September 11, ed. Annette Junemann, p. 117-8

The Civil Forum was originally a project of both the Catalan government and the European Commission designed to bring
Mediterranean civil society actors together. One of its aims is to discuss Euro-Mediterranean issues from the
perspective of civil society and to present proposals to the Euro-Mediterranean authorities; another aim is to increase
-contacts between Euro-Mediterranean civil society actors, for example through the constitution of thematic networks. The first
Civil Forum, held in Barcelona in November 1995 and organized and coordinated by the Institut Catala de la Mediterrania, was the main
contribution of the Catalan regional government to the Spanish EU Presidency of 1995. Since that Forum, other European regional and local
governments have engaged in the organization of similar events: in Naples and Malta in 1997, in Stuttgart in 1999, in Marseille in 2000, in
Brussels in 2001 and in Valencia in 2002. Since 1995, the Civil Fora have experienced an interesting evolution. Step by step
they have become more independent of public powers, especially since the Stuttgart Forum in 1999." It was at this Forum that the
agenda gained a more political slant compared to the economic and cultural perspectives that had dominated in Barcelona, Naples and Malta.
Moreover, it was at Stuttgart that some thematic networks, for example in the realm of human rights protection, were strengthened [Junemann,
2002: 98-101].


Richard Youngs, Politics Lecturer, University of Warwick, 2006, Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September
11, p. 21

A prominent assumption was that Europe was less heavy-handed and unidimensional than the United States in the use of its international
influence. The eschewal of a crudely instrumental use of power was routinely conceived as an important and pervasive aspect of EU foreign and
security policy coordination. Many analysts of European foreign policy judged a focus on human rights and mutually
beneficial democratic power sharing to flow from the EU's own experience and identity. It was such a dynamic that was
seen to have invested European actions with both value and effectiveness in post–Cold War Eastern Europe and at the end of the 1990s in
Kosovo. If the EU had gained influence, it was as a point of reference for governance standards, a model to help temper
conflicts through its philosophy of "multiple rather than exclusive identities." The nature of "social learning" in the evolution of European identity
and deliberative European democratic space was seen as having provided the key to taking the EU beyond power-interest dynamics to enjoy
significant standing as a conveyor of democratic norms. The centrality of normative values had, it was suggested, deepened a
European foreign policy system into a foreign policy society. A commitment to promoting democracy and human rights had been
central to the EU's collective identity, which provided the enabling conditions for coordinated European foreign policy action. As The Economist
opined: "The EU is comfortable talking about values, but uncomfortable talking about interests."

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

           Impact -- EU Engagement with Iran Generally Effective

Smeland 04(―Countering Iranian Nukes: A European Strategy‖ Sean P. Smeland associate at The
Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2004 accessed 07/14/07
The European Union‘s diplomatic relationship with Iran is perhaps an even greater source of leverage than the
economic relationship. While the United States has staunchly supported Israel and antagonized Iran, most of Europe has
maintained diplomatic relations and pursued engagement with Iran, all the while presenting itself as rather critical of
Israel in the Middle East conflict. As such, in the absence of an American recognition of legitimacy, Iran has looked
to European nations as its primary source of international status. Tehran also recognizes the technological and
cultural strength of Europe, not to mention its military sophistication, all of which contrasts with the Islamic republic‘s past and present
technical partners, China and Russia. As a result, the European Union today carries a great deal of soft power in dealing with


Richard Youngs, Politics Lecturer, University of Warwick, 2006, Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of
September 11, p. 73-4

While the original proposal was to focus on trade, political dialogue gradually developed into a central element of
European relations with Iran. The partnership sought by the EU after 9/11 included a tighter focus on human rights
than had existed prior to the attacks. This was presented as building on Khatami's advocacy of a dialogue on
convergence between different cultural values. The leverage of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) offer
was seen by diplomats as the-factor that succeeded in enabling the beginning of a formal human rights dialogue.
This dialogue in turn led to Iran opening up to UN human rights inspections, declaring a moratorium on stoning, and
releasing a number of dissidents. Seeking to boost its own reformist credentials, Tehran regularly reminded EU
negotiators that its willingness to engage in political dialogue and accept the EU's democracy clause had taken Iran
beyond the nature of EU political relations with China. Unlike the human rights dialogue with China, the talks with
Iran included the notion of concrete benchmarks, with the EU linking progress on trade to specific measures, such as
Iran agreeing to the visit of the UN rapporteur to inspect prison conditions. A declared priority for the EU was to use
the dialogue as a means of holding Iran to its moratorium on stoning. In addition, the EU's focus on judicial reform
opened the way for engagement between experts from the two sides on the structure of the procurator's office in
Iran. These were areas where Iran reacted specifically to EU pressure through the new human rights dialogue.
Increasingly, the view held that, in the words of one European diplomat, Iran was willing to "play the game,"
making just enough compromise on human rights to maintain a forward momentum in negotiations with the EU.
Indeed, some officials judged that Iran was more willing to do this than most of the EU's other Middle Eastern

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

              Impact -- EU Soft Power with Iran Key to Stemming Prolif


Smeland 04(―Countering Iranian Nukes: A European Strategy‖ Sean P. Smeland associate at The
Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2004 accessed 07/14/07
The task before the West, therefore, is to help Iran understand the intricacies of its own interests, to illustrate to Iran
that foregoing nuclear weapons is the best route for pursuing these interests, and to make the arguments sufficiently
compelling that no relevant faction within Iran would have enough motivation or power to act otherwise. The European Union is
arguably the best-positioned actor to make this happen. The European Union possesses a unique suite of power,
interest, facility, diplomatic connection, and credibility vis-à-vis Iran to bring about sufficient change in Tehran‘s
policy. Its stake in a non-nuclear Iran is as great as or greater than that of the United States—as is its leverage over
Iran, owing to the history of continued contact with Iran and the consequent dependence of Iran on European trade. The European Union
also derives its capability to pursue new and constructive directions with Iran from its longstanding diplomatic
connections and its political credibility with Tehran. The European Union is thus endowed with a substantial
capacity to influence Iran that must be utilized if there is to be any real progress in curtailing the Iranian nuclear
weapons program.


Smeland 04(―Countering Iranian Nukes: A European Strategy‖ Sean P. Smeland associate at The
Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2004 accessed 07/14/07
While most of the literature has focused on the United States-Iran relationship, arguably it is the European Union that is best
suited to address Iran‘s interests and influence its policy. By virtue of its continued relationship with Iran, the European Union
carries a unique set of policy tools that are crucial to managing the nuclear issue successfully. The European Union‘s points of
leverage include economic power, diplomatic prestige, influence over the United States, and technological capital. If the
European Union exercises its leverage in a pure carrot-and-stick mode, it can substantially influence Iranian behavior, but Iran
will likely continue to pursue its nuclear ambitions in still greater secrecy. However, a more hands-on engagement strategy has
the possibility of changing the very nature of Iranian interest calculations to a more internationally acceptable position. Either
way, a measure of coercive diplomacy may be highly effective in modifying Iran‘s near-term behavior— particularly because in
many ways, the European Union ―holds all the cards‖ in the Euro-Iranian relationship.

Smeland 04(―Countering Iranian Nukes: A European Strategy‖ Sean P. Smeland associate at The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2004 accessed 07/14/07

          that Iran agreed to sign the protocol in October and declared it would follow its provisions in the interim period, but
It is worth noting

delayed actually signing it until after the Board of Governors issued its resolution. This wait-and-see strategy was a
successful tactic by the Iranians, who had already declared that they ―would not tolerate any direct mention of Security Council action.‖
It also underscores the limits of sanctions and the importance of carrots in diplomacy with Iran. The relative
weakness of the subsequent resolution, compared to wordings and threats that the United States was urging, kept
Iran at the bargaining table, and was very likely a significant factor in Iran‘s actual signing of the protocol three
weeks later. As such, European diplomacy and influence with both Iran and the United States was instrumental in
getting the Iranians to the table and keeping them there.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

      Impact -- EU Soft Power with Iran Key to Stemming Prolif
EIU Views Wire 06(March 16, ―EU/Iran politics: Soft Power and a Nuclear Iran‖ Proquest, accessed 07/13/07)

In October 2003 the EU took its first major step in resolving a security problem outside Europe, with the foreign
ministers of France, Germany and the UK travelling to Tehran. It was a promising start. Iran agreed to halt its
production of enriched uranium - material which is needed to create a nuclear weapon - and to sign the Non-
Proliferation Treaty additional protocol which allows for more intrusive inspections. Soft power - the ability to
persuade without cohesion - appeared to be working. Building on that, the Paris agreement of November 2004
ensured Iran would "extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities".

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                   EU Soft Power with Iran Key to Stemming Prolif
Smith 06 (Mitchell P Smith, associate Professor of Political Science and International & Area Studies and Co-Director of the European Union
Center at the University of Oklahoma, Jan/Feb 2006, World Literature Today, Vol.80, Iss. 1; pg. 20, Proquest)

Consistent with its predilection for the exercise of soft power, a Europe that rivals the United States economically
wishes to equal the United States as a diplomatic power, even while leaving U.S. military supremacy uncontested. Iran offers a first
test of whether this will be possible. The European Union, with the British, French, and German governments acting in the name of the
entire organization, has led the way in nuclear diplomacy in Iran. Iran has resisted EU inducements, moving forward with its nuclear
program, and the outcome remains undetermined. However, it is clear that, for the Iranian government, the EU is the only
possible interlocutor. The United States hulks in the background, casting a shadow over negotiations with periodic
threats to use force if necessary; with the United States mired in Iraq, such threats bear little credibility.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

     AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness
STRENGTHENS EU FOREIGN POLICY MAKING – (answers divergence of views and
unanimity requirement blocks effective action)
Michael E. Smith, Professor International Relations Georgia State University, 2000, Journal of European Public
Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4,, p. 615-7

The first and most fundamental norm involves regular communication and consultation on foreign policy issues.
From the earliest days of political cooperation, EU member states adopted a general rule to consult with each other
before adopting final positions of their own so that policies of their partners would not catch them by surprise . This
norm was linked to the development of the transgovernmental communications network mentioned above: little progress toward co-operation
could be made if states merely used the system to express rigid foreign policy positions to each other. According to interviews, EU states have in
fact hared an increasing amount of sensitive foreign policy related information. By the mid-1970s, EPC participants were sending an average of
4,800 telegrams a year to each other regarding political issues; this number grew to nearly 13,000 a year immediately after the Treaty on
                                                                                                                   such a priori
European Union entered into effect (Wessels 1982; Institut für Europäische Politik 1995). Through these communications,
consultations help to define political co-operation as an issue-area and foster the development of a communauté de
vue on what constitutes ‗European interests.‘ Second, CFSP discussions are confidential; states cannot use information shared during
them to embarrass or blame other states. Institutionalized communications and the engineering of trust are the foundations
of the system; the norm of secrecy undoubtedly encourages confidence among EU states since they typically do not
have to fear public politicization of issues brought up for discussion, embarrassment at failure, or that information
shared will be used against them. Discussions in the context of political co-operation have been occasionally leaked, of course, yet states
have adhered to this rule to a surprising extent when compared to other forums for multilateral co-operation. While this rule apparently violates
some more fundamental rules of European integration (such as democratic legitimacy and openness), it is difficult to see how political co-
                                                                                                          CFSP discussions are also
operation could have proceeded without it. Third, despite limited provisions for QMV in the Maastricht Treaty,
usually conducted by consensus; any state can block a discussion of a sensitive matter with little or no justification.
In theory, all CFSP delegations are equal, and unanimity is required for most decisions. Although EU states are fully
aware of their different capabilities, in the CFSP they at least attempt to act as if each state has an equal stake in the
system. This norm has been increasingly challenged over the years with enlargement and the growing number of difficult issues on the CFSP
agenda, but in general it makes discussions less threatening since states feel they can terminate them at will. Smaller
states also appreciate the fact that the larger EU states cannot impose their preferences on others. Unanimity is not
necessarily a paralyzing rule, as one might assume of a consensual system. Officials do not always resort to the
lowest common denominator position, as intergovernmental theories suggest (Moravcsik 1991), but tend toward compromise
and medianism in the hopes of reaching agreement. As Simon Nuttall (1992: 12) recalls of EPC, the system did not operate under the ‗perpetual
threat of veto‘ and officials made ‗genuine efforts to reach a positive outcome.‘ Fourth, the secrecy norm is closely related to the
important unspoken rule in the CFSP: the notion of domaines résérves, or subjects considered off-limits owing to the
objections of one or more EU states. These subjects usually include unilateral problems, whether domestic (such as separatism) or
foreign (Greece‘s attitude toward Turkey); bilateral problems between EU member states (such as Northern Ireland); and certain military crises
affecting one or more partners (such as Africa). For a long time, such issues were outside the scope of political co- operation, except at the direct
initiative of the state(s) involved. At first, this norm occasionally prevented the discussion of many issues, particularly those concerning security
or defense. However, as the CFSP developed and its ambitions grew, this norm became increasingly challenged, and
we can observe a gradual expansion of the political co-operation agenda to include previously taboo subjects. Taken
together, these problem-solving norms have built trust among EU states and have created a climate conducive to the
forging of common positions on a number of difficult issues. These positions, and, later, joint actions, are used as points of
reference by EU member states in future situations. It is impossible to imagine that they could have been forced onto EU states by an activist
Commission or European Court (i.e. ‗political spillover‘) as happens in other policy domains, although the European Parliament has certainly
attempted to influence the process of political co-operation (for example, by making it more sensitive to human rights). More importantly,
political co-operation working methods have had feedback effects into European domestic politics which help to
reinforce the system in the absence of sustained central leadership by EC organizations.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

    AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness
Brian Crowe, Former Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, EU, 2003, International
Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, p. 536

The purpose of this somewhat historical introduction is to demonstrate both that it is possible for the EU to arrive at
common policies in fraught situations and to sustain them through difficult challenges, and that there is precedent
for member states to suppress their own strongly held views in order to arrive at a common view: in other words, for
member states to accept that having a common policy is itself the highest priority.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

    AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness
Richard Youngs, Politics Lecturer, University of Warwick, 2006, Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of
September 11, p. 20
 Most analysts of European foreign policy coordination attested to a deepening reflex of foreign policy cooperation
between EU member states. The CFSP, national foreign policies, and Commission-managed economic dimensions
of EU external relations were seen as increasingly melded together in a deeply interconnected "European foreign
policy system." The outcomes of successive efforts at coordination had come to constitute a constant "feedback" into
the policymaking process, driving enhanced determination to achieve effective cooperation. Within a framework of
multilevel governance, national interest formation could no longer be conceived as separate from the CFSP process
itself; national adaptation to EU foreign policy norms was increasingly significant; and a dynamic of shared
"problem solving" now usurped standard interest-bargaining competition. It was suggested that such policymaking
dynamics had ensured a gradual "ironing out of national foreign policy idiosyncrasies."

Soren Dosenrode & Anders Stubkjaer, International Politics Professor and Lecturer, University of Aalborg,
2002, The European Union and the Middle East, p. 135
Besides expressing its support for peace negotiations, the EU had no influence on the negotiations and meditations
between Israel, Syria and Lebanon during 1996. Nevertheless, in February 1996, the EU Troika, led by Italy, did
visit Syria where, among other things, it expressed the EU's intention to appoint a special envoy to the region who
would enhance the EU's role in negotiations. At least in a Middle East context, the concept of a special envoy made
sense, given the limitations of the Troika's involvement. Not only was the length of any visit by the Troika to any
country limited, but also the lack of continuity affected the chances of obtaining results. A special envoy would to
some extent make up the shortcomings of the situation

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

     AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness
Michael E. Smith, Professor International Relations Georgia State University, 2000, Journal of European Public
Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4,, p. 619

A more visible manifestation of the domestic impact of political co-operation involves changes in national foreign
ministries. While these ministries have not fully harmonized their operations to accommodate political co-operation, there is substantial
evidence to show that EU membership in general and CFSP membership in particular influence the way individual
member states organize their pursuit of foreign policy. Political co-operation priorities become national priorities,
and EU member states are expected to live up to these joint commitments. One aspect of this responsibility involves
expressing common positions and acting on behalf of the EU, particularly when holding the EU Presidency. These requirements
in turn tend to encourage more far-reaching changes in national foreign ministries beyond privileging their overall role in the process. To the
extent that these changes last beyond individual changes of government and take place in accordance with CFSP requirements, political co-
operation is enhanced. Three changes in particular will be stressed, although others can be mentioned.

First, political co-operation requires the establishment of new national officials to serve it. These institutional roles
persist beyond the appointment of specific individuals and provide a key source of continuity in national attention to
CFSP affairs. Second, political co-operation encourages the expansion of most national diplomatic services (although there have been some
cutbacks since the end of the Cold War). Third, political co-operation leads to a clear reorientation (and, in a few states, also a
reorganization of internal administrative structures) of national foreign ministries toward ‗Europe‘ in order to improve their
handling of European affairs, particularly as EC and CFSP activities are increasingly expected to function in a coherent manner. While
some EU states have maintained a distinction between their economic (EC) and political (CFSP) departments, in others there has been a much
                                                                                   these three developments have
closer linkage between the two in the hopes of maintaining consistency of external policy. Together ,
helped to reinforce the norms of political co-operation, and they have also spilled over, to some extent, into national
military structures.

Michael E. Smith, Professor International Relations Georgia State University, 2000, Journal of European Public
Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4,, p. 628

                                                      these changes of process encourage changes in the foreign
The next stage of this research will focus on the extent to which
policy preferences, or interests, of EU states. This process of preference change, engrenage or concertation,
whereby the demands of EU membership and the habits of working together create and upgrade the idea of a
common European interest, is well documented in other areas. Given the ways that political co-operation has been penetrating into
the domestic political structures of EU states, it is reasonable to suppose that preference change has been taking place in this domain as well.
Future research should examine how EU states have changed their positions on a range of issues most relevant to the EU, both geographic (such
as the Middle East, South Africa, Central America, East/West relations) and functional (such as arms control, humanitarian aid, and human
rights). We might even begin to determine whether the EU‘s common foreign policies, or acquis politique, have encouraged new conceptions of
interest and identity among its member states, as social constructivists often suggest.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

     AT: Divergence of Interests Undermines Policy Effectiveness
Michael E. Smith, Professor International Relations Georgia State University, 2000, Journal of European Public
Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4,, p. 628

A CFSP [common foreign and security policy] is one of the most ambitious goals of European integration. Despite the obstacles here, EU
states have managed to bridge many of their differences over foreign policy by engaging in a constant process of
institution-building. Although, like other EU policy areas, most of this has taken place at the EU level, I have explored an overlooked part of
this process: the specific ways that engagement with the CFSP resonates back into the foreign policy cultures of EU states.
The CFSP encourages member states to adapt their working procedures and, in some cases, legal and political cultures to cope with the increasing
workload. Moreover, the behaviors and positions encouraged by political co-operation are now a permanent part of
foreign policy-making processes of EU member states. The CFSP imposes obligations on EU states, by virtue of their
membership in general and when they run the Presidency or represent the CFSP abroad. These responsibilities require that they act as
a point of access for outsiders wishing to make demands of the EU, and that they clearly and consistently articulate,
if not help to devise, the ‗European interest‘ in a variety of contexts. Both of these responsibilities strongly
encourage changes of process in EU member states.

Karen E. Smith, Lecturer in International Relations: London School of Economics, 2003, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Winter/Spring, Volume IX, Issue 2, p. 105

Nonetheless, the EU Member States do often agree on common objectives and mobilize collective and national
resources to try to achieve them. There are incentives for common policy-making, not least the imperatives of
interdependence and an awareness of the benefits of the ―politics of scale:‖ the Member States recognize that they will ―carry more
weight in certain areas when they act together as a bloc than when they act separately.‖ 10 Furthermore, most of the Member
States have worked together for at least three decades; processes of socialization are at work, in which Member States are ever more likely to
perceive common interests and work together to achieve them.11 But the EU‘s foreign policy mechanisms and output still clearly reflect the
tension between the desires to act collectively in international relations and to retain national prerogatives in foreign policy.

Soren Dosenrode & Anders Stubkjaer, International Politics Professor and Lecturer, University of Aalborg,
2002, The European Union and the Middle East, p. 33
Coordination problems are very real and always have to be taken into consideration when judging the quality of the
EU's performance as an international actor. When this is done one has to accept that the results achieved are
reasonably good, but it will take some kind of international crisis or major negotiation to show how the new system
really works under pressure.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                     AT: Bureaucracy Hinders Policy Effectiveness
Stephan Stetter, Research Associate Institute for Global Society Studies, University of Bielefeld, 2004, Euro-
Mediterranean Relations After September 11, ed. Annette Junemann, p. 169-70
Yet, although the EU faced many problems in delivering on its commitments                  to support domestic democratization,
the mere existence of a political approach by the EU to the issue of democratization in MPCs in general, and in
Palestine in particular, is remarkable. It should not be forgotten that the EU itself is undergoing a deep political transformation. Thus,
integration at the EU level of an erstwhile entirely national policy area such as foreign affairs is an outstanding
example of the political will in Europe to overcome the traditional national focus on relations with third countries.
Seen from this perspective, the various pitfalls and deadlocks within the political system of the EU with regard to
developmental assistance are hardly surprising and might even be a necessary institutional mechanism in a possibly
transitional period towards a single European foreign policy.


Leslie Lebl, Senior Fellow Atlantic Council of the US, 2006, Orbis, Winter, p. 121-2
This lack of war-fighting capability does not mean that most European militaries will have nothing to offer. They
will still be able to offer valuable troops and assets for stability and reconstruction missions, an essential component
of virtually all out-of-area operations. Those are the types of missions that NATO and the EU are already
performing or have performed in the Balkans, the Congo, and Afghanistan, and they are consistent with the political
framework most European countries are willing to accept.

In addition, the Europeans are developing civilian crisis-management capabilities that will be very attractive for
anyone conducting an out-of-area operation. In particular, the newly-formed European Gendarmerie Force may have
the potential to bridge the gap between the end of combat operations and the start of stabilization and reconstruction
phases, whether in an EU or a NATO operation.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                            AT: EMP Process Empirically Fails
Richard Youngs, Senior Research Fellow, Fundacion Para Las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo
Exterior, 2007, The EU And the Middle East Peace Process: Re-engagement?, FRIDE Comment, March,
[], p. 7

It is in trying to leverage more macro-level political influence that the European Neighbourhood Policy could prove
useful. ENP marks a turn towards bilateral dealings with individual partners. In a sense it reflects the failure of the
Barcelona design. It could be said in this sense that the collapse of the Middle East peace process has influenced EU
policy more than EU policy has influenced the peace process. The ENP could prove beneficial, to the extent that it
allows the EU to modulate its inducements and pressure in a more agile way in relation to both Israel and
Palestinians, on a bilateral basis.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                        AT- EU Lacks Effective Military Assets

Franz Kernic, Lecturer University of Innsbruck, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G. Hauser & F. Kernic, 18

              Europe's security architecture has developed a multi-level structure of close security and defense
In the last decade,
cooperation among all European states and the US and Canada, i.e. a system that aims at integrating a stronger European pillar
into a broader defined transatlantic structure with strengthened cooperation and integration in the security and military domain among all
European states. As a result, security and defense have become an integral part of the EU's daily business, thus, gradually
eroding the rigid distinction between foreign and security, as well as defense cooperation and other Union policies.
Although the Union's military weakness is still a fact, continued efforts over the past ten years have led to the establishment of
permanent political and military structures and to the development of civilian and military capabilities. The Union
has also defined with NATO the framework of relations between the two organizations, allowing the Union to have
access to NATO's assets and capabilities.

Peter van Ham, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G. Hauser & F.
Kernic, p. 24-5
NATO's relationship with the EU is clearly the most important side of this institutional triangle. With the slow decline of the WEU, the EU
took over the task of organizing and implementing a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This
was agreed in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, and the subsequent European Council meeting (in June 1999) decided to give the EU the means
and capabilities to implement ESDP. The EU's Helsinki Headline Goals (of December 1999) indicated that the EU was committed to
having its own troops to conduct military and crisis management operations. The EU also created its own permanent
political and military structures, which closely resembled NATO's: a Political and Security Committee (PSC), a
Military Committee (MC), and its own Military Staff (MS).

Gunther Hauser, Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, 2006 , European Security in Transition, eds. G.
Hauser & F. Kernic, p. 49
NATO formed a strategic partnership with the European Union so that both could bring their combined assets to
bear in enhancing peace and stability. From 26 September 2001 to 31 March 2003, this partnership has successfully demonstrated its
capabilities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The European Union and NATO combined to prevent civil
war, and in Kosovo, their intervention helped to defuse conflict. Both the European Union and NATO created forums for
enhanced comprehensive cooperation with Russia, the Ukraine, and within the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Soren Dosenrode & Anders Stubkjaer, International Politics Professor and Lecturer, University of Aalborg,
2002, The European Union and the Middle East, p. 18
 With Sjostedt in mind, what are the Union's sources of influence? With an area of 3.2 million sq. km and a population of 372 million persons in
1996, the Union is able to compete with the two other large OECD states, the USA (9.3 million sq. km and 261 million inhabitants) and Japan
(0.4 million sq. km and 125 million inhabitants). Looking at the EU's wealth, we see that the gross domestic product (GDP) (at market
prices current series, Eurostat Yearbook 2000) was 7,593,142 million ECU in 1998, compared to the US's 7,813,767 million ECU and Japan's
3,404,713 million ECU. This implies that the EU's GDP was nearly as large as that of the USA, indicating the huge
economic importance of the EU on a world basis. Looking at how the GDP is spent to get an indication of the future, one sees that measured in percentage of
domestic GDP, the EU spent 0.76% in 1998 for research and development compared with 0.85% in the USA and 0.62% in Japan. In a competition perspective such figures are worrying as they
indicate that the wealth of the EU is by no means secured. Looking at the GDP and R&D the figures indicate something about the potential military power structure (Eurostat Yearbook 2000).
With these figures in mind, let us look at the EU's potential military strength.
 The combined armed forces of the EU member states in 2000 was approximately 2 million compared with the 1.5
million of the USA. Concerning defence expenditure as a share of GNP, the EU member states on average spent 2%
whereas the USA spends around 3% (NATO Review, Summer 2000). Thus one could say that the EU has the potential of
counterbalancing the USA, if the EU was able to coordinate its efforts better.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                               AT- EU Lacks Effective Military Assets

John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 71-2

In terms of weaponry and manpower, the EU is better armed and equipped than most people appreciate. Through
Britain and France it has a significant nuclear capability, and the armed forces of its member states bring together
substantial firepower: it has more active service military personnel than the United States, backed up by 12,000
artillery pieces, 3,430 combat aircraft, more than 150 surface naval vessels (including five aircraft carriers), and 82
submarines (including eight tactical nuclear submarines). If there were a single European military, with a unified budget, all
weapons and personnel pooled under a single command system, and governed by a single security policy, the EU would be the second biggest
military power in the world. And this is not a military that stays at home – Britain and France have been engaged in multiple conflicts since 1945,
and almost all EU member states have committed troops to peacekeeping operations. Finally, more progress has also been made on developing a
                                                When Kagan argued in 2003 that efforts to build a European
common European security policy than most people realize.
security policy had been 'an embarrassment', and that the EU was 'no closer to fielding an independent force, even a
small one, than it was three years ago. He was quite wrong.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                     AT- EU Does Not Have Mechanisms for Foreign Policy

Franco Algieri, Centrum fur angewandte Politikforschung, 2002, China Quarterly, p. 66
For Smith the core of EU foreign policy can be found in those areas where the EU has developed through the EC
potential for strategic action. The EC takes over the role of an agent for the EU. This is even more important to remember,
since the EC and not the EU has legal personality (Article 281 of the EC Treaty). The EU is not only a framework in which states‘ and
other interests can be articulated and adapted. Moreover, the EU is also structuring the international political economy and as such can be seen as
an ―institutional expression of major forces within the global system.‖9 Of course this process is not free of conflict and there is a ―a perpetual
boundary problem‖ between the member states and the Commission as well as between technical and political aspects.10 The way the EU shapes
its international profile is continuously influenced by such institutional factors. In Hill‘s view, the EU has specific functions as an international
actor and in controlling the international economy.11 Through the presence of the EC/EU in international politics and in the international
                                                                                             An essential role can
economy activities can be shaped and expectations of other participants in international arenas can be influenced.12
be attributed to the Commission that can initialize and manage the policy towards third countries.13
Apart from these theoretical considerations it is necessary to look at the legal provisions which define the range of activities of EU external economic relations. The Single European Act created a systematic scheme for external
relations, dividing them into external economic relations and external political relations. With the Treaty of Maastricht, followed by the Treaty of Amsterdam, this double track form of external relations was further advanced and the

                                         the Commission became the central actor not only for the functioning of the Single
role of the EU institutions was clarified.14 As already mentioned,

Market but also for the Union‘s external economic relations. The Commission is initiating and controlling European
trade policy and thus shaping a core aspect of the external relations. Articles 131–34 of the EC Treaty define the scope and range
of the common trade policy and transfer wide ranging competencies to the Commission. Through Articles 133 and 300 the Commission is
empowered to act as an international negotiator and it is required through Article 302 to keep relations with
international organizations. Even though the Council is the ultimate decision-making institution, the ground for these decisions is laid by
the Commission. The Union‘s external economic relations and the agreement policy are thus to a major part the result of the Commission‘s work.
           the Commission has the right to make proposals to the Council for suspending or stopping economic
relations with a third country (Article 301).

Karen E. Smith, Lecturer in International Relations: London School of Economics, 2003, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Winter/Spring, Volume IX, Issue 2, p. 104-5

The EU has a considerable ―presence‖ in international affairs; other international actors cannot fail to notice its
resources (it is the world‘s largest trading bloc), and its internal policies (such as agricultural or monetary policies) affect other international actors. Presence is a
consequence of the EU‘s internal development, not necessarily of any explicit, externally directed EU policy.5 The EU is not always able to translate its presence into ―actorness,‖ or the ability to function actively and deliberately in
relation to other actors in the international system.6

Michael E. Smith, Professor International Relations Georgia State University, 2000, Journal of European Public
Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4,, p. 614

A review of this growing literature seems to imply, if only by omission, that these processes, which are essential to the integration project, are largely confined to the EU‘s socio-economic policy areas. This is not surprising,
considering that European integration has made most of its advances in these domains, some of which (such as monetary union) explicitly require a convergence of practices at the domestic level if EU-level goals are to be reached.

      the EU has been increasingly concerned about its role in world politics and has taken deliberate steps to

enhance its procedures toward that end. In fact, European co-operation in foreign and security policy has now
completed its third decade. With the creation of European political co-operation (EPC) in 1970, its transition to the
common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in 1991, and the moves toward defense integration at the Cologne and Helsinki European
Councils in 1999, the EU has moved increasingly closer toward fulfilling its goal of greater coherence as an
international actor. The next enlargement of the EU, the most ambitious in its history, will also impose greater requirements in terms of foreign and security policy on the new members. Thus the time is ripe for an
examination of the extent to which these aspirations will require corresponding changes in the foreign policy machinery of EU member states. Although several excellent studies explore the general relationship between domestic
politics and EU foreign policy (Hill 1983, 1996; de la Serre 1988), my purpose here is to offer a conceptual framework with which to organize the findings of these and related studies in the hopes of stimulating further research. More
specifically, I hope to address two questions: what particular aspects of EPC/CFSP cause sympathetic changes in national foreign policy structures, and what are the specific indicators of these changes?

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

               AT- EU Does Not Have Mechanisms for Trade Policy
William J. Davey, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law, 2001, Columbia Journal of European Law,
Fall, 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 303, p. 303

This Special Issue of the Columbia Journal of European Law on the European Union and International Trade is particularly timely. The field of
international trade is one in which the European Union has an important position in the world. While there are, of course, other aspects of
international relations in which the Union is active -- the common foreign and security policy and development policy come quickly to mind,
those fields are still dominated by the Member States acting individually (even if in a somewhat coordinated manner). In contrast, the Union is
responsible for the common commercial policy and as such it is the key player on the world stage when European
trade interests are in play. That is not to say that the Member States are uninvolved. Indeed, the Commission is required to consult them
regularly, but it is the Commission that is the international negotiator. The five contributions to this Special Issue cover the field of
important issues relating to the Union and international trade. For purposes of this introduction, I divide them into three categories, dealing with
(i) the external relations power of the Community; (ii) key issues facing the Union's attempt to launch a new round of trade negotiations; and (iii)
matters related to EU -U.S. trade relations.

Rafael Lael-Arcuas, Stanford Program in International Legal Studies Fellow , 2001, Columbia Journal of European
Law, Fall, 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 355, p. 357-8

                                                                                                                the EC itself can
Institutional steps have been taken recently towards greater coherence and common action. For example, the fact that
conclude legally binding agreements including trade agreements with other states or international organizations is an
achievement of the 1950s that has become particularly significant in the last two decades. n14 Many of these agreements have been
concluded on the legal grounds of a common commercial policy pursuant to Article 133 of the EC Treaty. n15 International
agreements today may also involve a number of other legal bases, for example, the procedures for conclusion of agreements and the role of the
Commission, Council and Parliament that appear in Article 300 of the EC Treaty. n16

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                 AT- EU Lacks Mechanism to Impose Sanctions
Andrew Moravscik, Harvard University, 1995, European Journal of International Relations, Volume 1(2), p. 161

Sanctions seek to promote human rights and democracy by linking respect for them to preferential economic
relations. The threat to economic relations aims to mobilize key societal groups against human rights violations,
thereby shifting the domestic balance of power in favor of greater protection for human rights. The only effective
European organization for sanctioning, the EC, has a number of policy instruments at its disposal. First, the EC can
impose negative import, export or investment sanctions on third countries, generally organized by the European
Political Cooperation (EPC) mechanism. Second, it can restrict foreign development assistance and trade
preferences under its Lome Convention arrangements with former African and Caribbean colonies. Third, it can
manipulate the promise of bilateral association agreements with, and potential membership for, neighboring
European countries.

Karen E. Smith, Lecturer in International Relations: London School of Economics, 2003, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Winter/Spring, Volume IX, Issue 2, p. 108-9

Why does the EU take such an approach? It is both a function of the organization itself and of the Member States‘
preferences. The need for consensus, the lack of military instruments, and the abundance of civilian instruments
logically result in a different sort of foreign policy than that of the remaining superpower in particular. This can
infuriate some observers, who argue that the EU‘s ability to influence international affairs is thus severely curtailed.
Maurice Keens-Soper maintains, for example, that the EU cannot simply set a virtuous example and expect others to
follow; it must play the game of power politics and credibly back up its diplomacy by the use of force.22

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                              AT: EU Lacks Experience in Asia

Peter van Ham, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G.
Hauser & F. Kernic, p. 29-30

The potential for EU-OSCE cooperation is most obvious in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management.
The EU and the OSCE work closely together on the ground, most notably in the Balkans and the southern Caucasus.
EU and OSCE programs, projects, missions, and other policy ventures largely overlap in their objectives as well in
their methods. The OSCE's activities in Central Asia give it a specific security niche, since this is an area where the
EU's has little experience and expertise. In 2006, the OSCE has seven field missions, and eight centres and offices in
the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, as well as in Central Asia. This OSCE presence offers the organization
eyes and ears and a real expertise. Rather than seeing the OSCE as a direct rival, the EU is actively involved in
developing this OSCE-expertise. For example, at the OSCE's Istanbul Summit (November 1999) the EU supported
the establishment of REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams), which includes a database of
experts who can be used during crisis situations.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

            US Shifting from NATO to EU for Collective Defense

Peter van Ham, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G.
Hauser & F. Kernic, p. 28-9

One other issue is the fight against WMD proliferation, which now tops the security agenda of both the EU and
NATO. A transatlantic consensus on how to best deal with these new security challenges seems .to be gradually
emerging. However, it is indicative that the real dynamic of transatlantic cooperation no longer lies in NATO, but in
the EU-US summits. In a joint EU-US statement on WMD proliferation on 25 June 2003, transatlantic leaders
pledged to "use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow" (The White
House 2003). Following their June 2005 EU-US summit, both partners agreed to "enhance information sharing,
discuss assessments of proliferation risks, and work together to broaden global support for and participation in non-
proliferation endeavors" ("European Union and United States Joint Program of Work on the Nonproliferation of
Weapons of Mass-Destruction", EU-US Summit, Washington DC, 20 June 2005).
 Although it remains to be seen whether these declarations will go beyond rhetorics, it indicates that NATO's role as
the strategic platform for a transatlantic security policy is eroding. Obviously, Washington sees merit in working
directly with the EU (rather than through NATO) to address key security issues, be they HIV/Aids programs, airline
and port security, WMD proliferation, or political reform in the Middle East. Calls for a more political NATO – i.e.,
turning the Alliance in a more effective forum for political debate – may well have come too late (Ruhle 2005).

Peter van Ham, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G.
Hauser & F. Kernic, p. 29
Shared membership and threat assessments between the EU and NATO may therefore ameliorate the animosity
between Europe's key institutions. But it is unlikely that the bickering will end before too long. Both NATO and the
EU are claiming a global role in the broad area of peace support operations. The EU is also gradually taking over
NATO's role as a collective defense organization since the European Constitution (now still in a comatose
condition) included a so-called "solidarity clause" which obliges all member states to "act jointly in a spirit of
solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster" (Article 1-43). This
covers NATO's famous Article 5 collective defense clause which has been severely weakened since its invocation
after 9/11 failed to turn the Alliance into the center of political gravity in the ensuing "war on terror". Moreover,
since the EU is acquiring more military tasks and NATO is increasingly focused on the non-military elements of
security, both institutions will almost inevitably get in each others way. Now that NATO no longer has any qualms
to go way "out of area" (e.g. into the Middle East), it will increasingly meet the EU as an institutional partner and
occasional rival.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                          EU Seeking Independent Policy Now

Brian Crowe, Former Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, EU, 2003, International
Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 3, p. 538

The CFSP started only with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty at the end of 1993, ESDP even more
recently, with the Cologne European Council in June 1999 an important turning point. After the failure of the
EC/EU‘s Balkan policies in the first half of the 1990s, discussed above, the galvanizing factor in its deliberations for
both was the outcome of events in Kosovo: the recognition that it took the United States to frighten Milosevic,
accompanied by the conviction that Europeans should surely have this capability for themselves and be better able to
bring it to bear, both so as not to be so wholly reliant on the United States and to enable Europe to act in cases where
the United States would not want to be involved.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

              Impact -- EU Soft Power to Mideast More Effective

Bessma Momani, Professor University of Waterloo, International Politics, 2007, World Economics, Vol. 8, No.
1, January-March, p. 5

The current Bush administration, for example, has pursued a regional trade agreement in the Middle East to achieve
its broader foreign policy objectives—specifically, linking Israel to Arab economies and enhancing export
dependency on US markets. This article adds, however, that the European Union has also pursued regional
integration in the Middle East for geostrategic objectives, but its choice of instrumentation is not due to its belief in
soft power, diplomacy, or idealist foreign policy values, but to its lack of policy alternatives as a ‗civilian power‘.
For the EU, intraregional trade integration in the Middle East would have a twofold positive geopolitical spillover:
1) stem economic migration into Europe, and 2) improve political stability in the Middle East. Again, as far as the
EU is concerned, these are geostrategic policy objectives. Unlike the United States, however, the EU has been better
able to measure the success and failure of its economic policy toward the Middle East, and has accordingly tried to
adjust its trade agreements with the region.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                Impact – EU Soft Power Laundry List Impact Cards
European soft power leadership is critical to preventing Iranian proliferation, addressing global climate
change, creating peace process in the middle East, and sustaining US/EU realtions

Wolfgang Ischinger (German ambassador to Britain) March 22, 2007 "Can the EU Fill Leadership Void Left by
US?" The Guardian

In 1990, Charles Krauthammer published his famous essay on the "unipolar moment", about the United States' future power to shape the world at
will. He wrote: "The true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold-War world ... is a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at
the apex of the industrial west." In 2007, most will agree that the unipolar moment, if it ever existed, has passed. That is only
underlined by the failure of the unipolar experiment also know as the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the damage it inflicted on Washington's
international legitimacy and credibility. For traditional European Atlanticists, it does not make for pleasant viewing to see US leadership
damaged and questioned. But expectations are low today regarding US ability to lead the international community. In the
face of a US credibility crisis, some look to Europe to take the initiative and fill the vacuum. Can 2007 be a European
moment? Critics will contend that the EU is in no shape to lead, as it continues to grapple with its constitutional crisis, its inability to provide
clear foreign policy guidance and its lack of military power. But on three critical global issues nuclear non-proliferation, Middle
East peace, and climate change it is better placed than anyone else. Opening nuclear negotiations with Teheran was a
European idea in 2004, initially given a lukewarm reception by Washington. More recently, as the EU3-Britain, France and Germany-approach
began to be seen as the only game in town, Washington has offered more active support, but so far continuing to stop short of speaking to
Teheran directly on the nuclear issue. Bringing Russia and China on board was, again, a European initiative. If a solution
emerges, it is likely to be European-brokered. There is much greater cohesion among Europeans on Iran than there was on Iraq five
years ago: On Iran, the EU will not be split. When it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, barely any progress has been made over the past six
years. The adoption of the road map and the creation of the quartet EU, Russia, the UN, the United States were born of European ideas. They
were formally endorsed by Washington, but never seriously pursued and later quasi-abandoned. This year, a major effort by the current EU
presidency has led to the quartet's revival and more diplomatic activity. Many in the region doubt, however, whether Washington
will have the determination necessary for a breakthrough in the peace process without even more active input from
Europe. The European willingness to take more responsibility in the region and to play a role in ending the Lebanon
War in 2006, including the deployment of military forces to the country, was an eye-opener for many in the region and beyond.
On climate change, the critical question is who can and will lead the international debate about a post-Kyoto regime.
If a deal can be hammered out in 2007, and if it has any chance of endorsement in the United States, China and India, it will most likely be the
result of the EU's ongoing efforts to move ahead with ambitious goals on carbon dioxide emissions and energy saving.
But would a European moment in 2007 not be interpreted as a challenge to the global leadership role of the US? Let's not get carried away.
Without active US support, both political and military, none of these major challenges can be resolved. Europeans should beware the hubris of
challenging the United States. But the European moment could actually enhance the transatlantic relationship by offering,
at a crucial juncture, elements that the United States currently lacks: legitimacy and credibility. That is why our American
friends should encourage European initiatives, embrace a European willingness to lead, and welcome the European moment.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                      Impact – EU Soft Power Laundry List Impact Cards
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 32-33

                                                                    EU will never be a global actor along the old cold war-style
If there is one point on which almost everyone can agree, it is that the
military lines of the United States and the Soviet Union. But the age of the military superpower is over. Instead, the
EU has rejected realist interpretations of the international system, and has emerged as a post-modem superpower.
There is a close association between modernism, militarism, and environmental devastation the European post-
modern view, by contrast, is better suited to the rise of the global economy, new levels of personal mobility, the
increasing irrelevance of borders, the shift from manufacturing to service economies, new attitudes towards the role
of science, the anti-war movement, a preference for social spending over military spending, mass communications,
multiculturalism, the emergence of a new global culture, sustainable development, and a concern for the
environment. For 'post-modern', we could as easily insert `post-national' or `post-material' – these are all related concepts. While the European
Union is adapting to the new international system – indeed, even shaping that system – American policymakers are having difficulty leaving
behind their realist, statist cold war thinking. Richard Cooper writes of a world divided into three zones: a pre-modern zone of chaos (mainly
Africa and Asia) where the rule of law has failed and which acts as a source of modern terrorism; a modern zone with an emphasis on national
interests and national security, and a belief in force as a means of protecting them (he includes in this group the United States, China, and India);
and a post-modern zone (including the EU and Japan) that has the luxury of abhorring war and the use of force as a primary instrument of policy.
In a related argument, Mary Kaldor argues that while the United States still holds to realist views of the world, the European Union has moved
away from a desire to impose its will, and has instead embraced what she calls `cosmopolitanism': a mix of idealism and multilateralism, a belief
             through political and legal means, and a commitment to a liberal world economy and global social
in containment
justice. There is a role in this view for military means, but mainly for the protection of civilians, the arrest of war
criminals, and the achievement of humanitarian goals, and always with the authorization of appropriate multilateral
procedures. In the post-modern era, the kind of economic and political influence that the EU enjoys is more pertinent to the resolution of the most urgent international problems than the
military options so often pursued by the United States. This is not to say that the military option will not always be necessary, and that it should not at least be kept in reserve, but it is of little
value – and may even be counterproductive – when governments are faced with problems to which there is no military solution. In short, the changing nature of power has allowed the EU to
become a new kind of superpower, exerting influence based not on its military firepower, but on its economic, political, and diplomatic influence. Out of a combination of its intrinsic advantages,
the disadvantages of the cold war model of American power, and changes in the international system,      the EU has emerged as a post-modern superpower. The
bipolar system of the cold war era – where Americans and Soviets competed on ideological grounds using military tools – has been replaced with the bipolar system of the post-modern era –
where Europeans and Americans offer competing sets of values, competing definitions of global problems, and competing sets of prescriptions for addressing those problems.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                     Impact -- EU Soft Power Increases Intl Security
Karen E. Smith, Lecturer in International Relations: London School of Economics, 2003 , The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Winter/Spring, Volume IX, Issue 2, p. 108

           the EU‘s approach would, of course, be dismissed by realists, and it is often also denigrated by U.S. officials, even though the
The value of
                                                                               can make a significant contribution to
United States proclaims many of the same foreign policy objectives. But its approach
international security. As Christopher Hill has noted:

Precisely the kinds of attributes possessed by the European [Union]—the intellectual impact of a new model of
interstate relations, the disposition of considerable economic influence over the management of the international
economy, the possession of a vast network of contacts and agreements with every region of the international
system—are those most capable of influencing the very environment which determines whether or not military
strength will need to be used.

Brian Crowe, Former Director General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, EU, 2003, International Affairs,
Vol. 79, No. 3, p. 538

In the heightened tension of the time, the idea prevalent at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997, that the post of High Representative
(HR) for the CFSP created in the Amsterdam Treaty should be filled at senior official/ambassadorial or junior ministerial level, lost fervor. The
need for a high-profile politician who could provide leadership was recognized, and with that shift came the choice of Javier Solana. These two
decisions, on the need for an ESDP and the appointment of Solano, and the way they have evolved, have been critical to the subsequent
development and the future of the CFSP. The remainder of this article will therefore focus on these choices, in full recognition that this means
leaving to one side the vast and generally successful reach of the EC/EU‘s external relations policies over the years, much of which long predates
the CFSP. Among other things, the EU‘s enlargement, not least the current one to the east, the development of a new strategic relationship with
Russia,the Euromed/Barcelona process with its accompanying association agreements, the network of other
association and cooperation agreements, and the Lome/Cotonou conventions, not to mention the EU‘s role in multilateral
trade negotiations and many other manifestations of a near-global reach are also crucial to the EU‘s role in the world
as a foreign policy actor. Indeed, they constitute wide-ranging instruments for the exercise of ―soft power‖ a vital
European contribution to international peace, security and stability—and a contribution, indeed, which the United
States needs too in the pursuit of longstanding ―Western‖ objectives. This complementarity of EU and US
instruments and capabilities needs to be better recognized in Washington than it appears to be now. But while in a sense
harnessed to CFSP, these instruments of ―soft‖ power are not CFSP, which has a rather limited definition in the Treaty on European Union, and
so they are assumed rather than discussed further here.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                       Impact -- EU Soft Power Key to Preserve the NPT

Eileen Denza, Law Professor University College London, 2005, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10:289-311, p.

In assessing the value of what has been achieved by European diplomacy in the collective effort to control
proliferation of nuclear weapons it is in the first place essential to recall that the only international legal prohibition on
the development and possession of nuclear weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the network of ancillary obligations
permitting verification of the obligations which it imposes. There is no rule of customary international law prohibiting the possession of nuclear
weapons for defensive purposes, far less any prohibition on the development of the knowledge, skills and materials required for their
development.Suggestions that in the absence of NPT commitments, existing nuclear-weapon states could issue tough
ultimata, impose sanctions or intervene in order to disarm other states seeking to join their number are therefore
unfounded and unrealistic. The twin objectives of control are first to lock potential nuclear-weapon states - that is states who have the scientific and industrial capacities to build
or to use such weapons - into legal structures which preclude this, and secondly to ensure that the obligations set out in the NPT are effectively verified by International Atomic Energy Agency
        In seeking to achieve adherence to the essential legal obligations, those applying pressure must be aware of

the reciprocal obligations to work towards disarmament which the NPT imposes on nuclear-weapon states as well as
the entitlement to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes which the NPT gives. They must also bear in mind
the underlying reasons which have led certain states - by subtlety or stealth - to try to acquire nuclear weapons. The evidence
from recent years indicates that branding such states as 'rogue states', or as part of an 'Axis of Evil', imposing sanctions on
them which result in their being denied goods and services relevant to their development of nuclear energy even for
peaceful purposes and strengthening the defensive capacities of the existing nuclear-weapon states has not led to the
desired result. This is particularly obvious in the case of North Korea. The policies applied by the USA in particular have led North Korea to withdraw altogether from the NPT and to a
downward spiral of mutual mistrust. In consequence there are no treaty constraints on North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and there is no IAEA verification of what is going on within
its closed and secretive society. It is somewhat unreal to suggest, as has been done, that the remedy for this situation is to impose a requirement to pay compensation on any state which withdraws
from the NPT. Any state which feels its security sufficiently at risk to accept the political and economic consequences of withdrawal will not be deterred by the theoretical possibility of being
                   European Union negotiators by contrast, and in particular the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the
required to pay financial damages.

                  been prepared to play a long and steady game in order to persuade Iran to observe international
United Kingdom, have
legal commitments and to accept new ones. This steadiness of purpose has applied not only to the question of potential development of
nuclear weapons but to violations by Iran of other legal commitments - for example to protect embassy premises and diplomatic agents and to
                 There is little sign that they have been naive or unduly trusting or that they have prematurely given
respect human rights.
away any of the various carrots being dangled during the recent negotiations. Iran has continued as a Party to the
NPT and a Party to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and it has applied in advance of ratification the Additional Protocol
which entitles IAEA inspectors to conduct searching inspections within its territory. It has indeed admitted past concealment of illegal activities and its disclosures have
been slow and suspect. The Director-General of the IAEA has stressed the continuing need for a robust system of inspection in Iran. But the situation is more reassuring than any thing that one
can imagine resulting from the tougher line advocated by some of the armchair critics. No doubt the renewed negotiations with the incoming president will be difficult, and one cannot foresee
that the long-offered Trade and Cooperation Agreement will be concluded soon far less that the necessary support from the USA and others will be found for Iran's entry into the WTO There will
                                                           In the negotiations with Iran, the European Union has made
be no sudden confession or opening of past secrets as happened in the case of Libya

effective use of the foreign policy tools at its disposal. It has worked in close cooperation with the IAEA and its
Director-General and has supplemented IAEA surveillance and legal powers rather than seeking to displace them in any way. There has been
continual coordination between European Union missions to the IAEA in Vienna. The detailed diplomacy has been handled by delegation
to France, Germany and the United Kingdom, thus avoiding the necessity for agreeing common positions on matters of great technical
complexity and also providing serious political weight.                   The Ministers themselves have devoted impressive commitment and
energy to the diplomatic task. They have worked closely with High Representative Javier Solana and with continuous support - expressed
at virtually every recent Council meeting - from the European Union as a whole. They seem even to have persuaded the USA to offer more than
sporadic support for their initiative Looking back to the Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the European Union so
far can say that the formulation there of coherent objectives was valuable and that its coordinated diplomatic efforts have strengthened
compliance with and verification of the global regime of the NPT. Given that the 2005 Review Conference revealed no widespread readiness to
improve the Treaty in any dramatic way, the only option is 'to keep a hold of nurse for fear of finding something worse'. This implies not just
rigorous supervision of potential new nuclear-weapon states. It implies also genuine reciprocity under which the nuclear-weapon states observe
their commitments to assist others in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and intensify their own somewhat limited efforts to disarm.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

              Impact -- EU Soft Power Key to Preserve the NPT

Eileen Denza, Law Professor University College London, 2005, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10:289-311, p.

During 2003 the Council agreed to develop a coherent and comprehensive Union policy on weapons of mass
destruction which would draw together the underlying objectives and the specific actions to be taken. In June the
European Council at Thessaloniki adopted a Declaration on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The
Declaration recognized that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery such as ballistic
missiles was a growing threat to international peace and security and stated that

Meeting this challenge must be a central element in the EU external action, including the common foreign and
security policy. Our objective is to deter, halt and, where possible, reverse proliferation programmes of concern

The European Council listed the instruments and techniques available, and identified those on which the European
Union intended to focus – which included bringing into force before the end of the year the European Additional
Protocols with the IAEA.

Following on from the related Action Plan agreed by the Union and its Member States, the Council in November
2003 adopted a Common Position in order to promote the universal ratification, and compliance with the basic
multilateral agreements - in particular the NPT, the Safeguards Agreements and the IAEA Additional Protocols. The
Council identified the NPT as 'the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for
the pursuit of nuclear disarmament'. Specifically, the European Union bound itself to 'promote all the objectives laid
down in the NPT' and to 'promote measures to ensure that any possible misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for
military purposes will be effectively excluded'. It also undertook to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT
which is currently being provisionally applied.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

           Impact -- EU Soft Power Effective at Conflict Prevention
Karen E. Smith, Lecturer in International Relations: London School of Economics, 2003, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Winter/Spring, Volume IX, Issue 2, p. 108

As William Wallace and Jan Zielonka have pointed out, Europeans can be accused of free-riding on the American security guarantee only if
                                                              security more broadly, it can be shown that the EU does
critics limit their considerations to military capabilities. By defining
make a substantial contribution to peace and security. The authors list aid to the West Bank and Gaza to boost the
Middle East peace process, contributions to international organizations, and development aid to poor countries
across the globe. This sort of work is aimed at creating the bases for peace—for preventing conflicts and eradicating
many of the sources of terrorism. To this list we could also add the crucial role that the EU has played in spreading
peace and security to Central and Eastern Europe and now even to Southeastern Europe. Europe is now safer and more
secure than it ever has been, and considerable credit for this must go to the EU and particularly to the prospect of
enlargement that it has held out to other European states.


Franz Kernic, Lecturer University of Innsbruck, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G. Hauser & F.
Kernic, 17

In December 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was adopted, giving the EU a framework security strategy
for CFSP and ESDP. In May 2004, the Union expanded to 25 member states. This round of enlargement was not
only driven by economic interests but also by security concerns. It concluded a series of "Euro-agreements" with
Central and East European states aiming at regional stabilisation, which came into place in the 1990s.
These changes in the European post-Cold war security landscape also forced the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the former CSCE, to adapt to the new environment. CSCE adaptation occurred
rapidly and during the 1990s included membership enlargement, organizational changes, new functions, and the
development of a close linkage to NATO and the EU. Gradually the OSCE not only expanded from 35 states to
more than 50, but also expanded its roles and functions, primarily by turning into a "soft power" aiming at conflict
prevention and crisis management. To carry out its new roles of early warning, minorities' protection, re-building of
war torn societies, humanitarian aid, conflict prevention, and crisis management, the OSCE has developed specific
tools such as confidence-and security-building measures, observer missions, and preventive diplomacy. Today, the
OSCE adds to the European security architecture a very important element of soft power that is needed to address all
aspects of security issues and to meet a number of new security challenges and threats of the post-Cold war era.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

              Impact – EU Soft Power Key to Solve Global Problems
EU soft power is key to deal with worlds major problems
Carl Bildt, prime minister of Sweden 91-94, Financial Times: 1 June 2005 ‖ Europe must keep its soft
Yet, in recent years, Europe has prided itself on the perceived success of its so-called "soft power".Indeed, there is
no way to explain the swift and smooth transformation of societies from Estonia to Bulgaria without referring to
both the magnetism of the EU and the model it was able to provide. Hard power can certainly bring down regimes, as Iraq
demonstrated, but in order to build new regimes, soft power is largely required. But there is now a serious risk that
Europe will curb its soft powers just when they are perhaps most needed. Such a development would have grave
consequences for the stability of the wider region. The debate is mainly about Turkey. In France, Jacques Chirac, the president, has
talked about Turkish membership being two decades or so away, and Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of the ruling UMP party, makes no secret of his
opposition to the entire idea. In Germany, there is pressure on the Christian Democrats to turn the coming election campaign more or less into a
referendum on Turkish membership of the EU - just ahead of the start of accession negotiations in October. But the coming enlargement must
                                       Europe's soft power is so urgently needed, in order not only to secure the
cover all of south-eastern Europe. It is here that
continued European reformation of Turkey but also the reconciliation and reintegration of the war-torn societies of
the Balkans. Let us be clear: without the soft power of EU enlargement, neither of these processes has much
prospect of going forward and the risk of backsliding is very real. In both cases, the prospect of membership has been declared
time and again by the EU. If the Union is seen as pulling away from its commitment to enlargement, it should be no surprise if these societies
start to backtrack on their commitment to European values and stability. The French referendum result was warmly welcomed by the Serb ultra-
nationalist Radical Party, which noted that Serbia no longer had reason to "mindlessly meet every demand from Europe". Ultra-nationalists
throughout the region certainly joined in the jubilation. A decade after the Srebrenica massacre, there are still serious issues in the Balkans.
Kosovo remains an open wound. Reconciliation has a long way to go in most of these societies. With the status of Kosovo on the negotiating
table in the coming year, the challenge of resolving this at the same time as the EU is seen as backtracking on its commitment to enlargement
                          waning prospects of a broader and united Europe will give free rein to the forces of
could well end in disaster. The
nationalism. There will be an acute risk that the hard power of Nato will have to resolve what the failing soft power
of the EU has caused.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

            Impact -- EU Soft Power Key to Decrease Terrorism
EU soft power is key to fighting terrorism
Joseph S. Nye Jr. is professor of international relations at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and author
of "The Power Game: A Washington Novel." , 11/15/04, ―Tapping Soft Power: America Needs a Strong Europe‖,
International Herald Tribune.

European soft power has an important role to play in the struggle against terrorism. Opening Europe's doors to
Turkey helps to strengthen one of the most moderate Muslim countries, and European aid for democracy reinforces
America's objectives. In some cases, there can be a beneficial division of labor in which Europe's soft power and
America's hard power combine in a good cop-bad cop routine. Elements of this can be seen in the current approach
to Iran's nuclear program. But such a dynamic is effective only if both cops know they are playing the same game
and coordinate their strategy.

Michele Brunelli, University Cattolica di Milano, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G. Hauser & F.
Kernic, p. 190
External Policies EU has pledged to deal with the roots of terrorism, i.e. the social economic and political problems
on which Islamic fanaticism is built. The action plan involves using trade agreements to reduce the poverty that can
lead to radicalization. Technical aid will also be given to build up anti-terrorism capacity. Work with third countries,
the US in particular, and with international agencies continues to be of fundamental importance.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                 Impact -- EU Soft Power Relies on US Hard Power
William Pfaff, staff writer International Herald Tribune, 1/5/05, ―Soft Power Victories‖

During 2004, the "soft power" of the Europeans proved much more effective in shaping international events than
American hard power. The irrelevance of America's military power to its real problems still goes unacknowledged.
European soft power, during this same year, made a fundamental change in the troubled Balkans by incorporating states
in the region into the European Union, and it hopes to have taken a decisive step toward restoring Muslim-Western relations by offering
EU membership to Turkey. At the end of the year, Europe's "soft" intervention to consolidate the independence of Ukraine altered the contours of
Russian as well as Ukrainian political and cultural geography. That, of course, is the optimistic judgment on what Europe did this year. The
Yugoslav succession crisis is still not over, and Albanian irredentism is still unresolved. The promise to Turkey could fail - or be betrayed - and
Europe's opening to Islam could close, with unhappy consequences for Western Europe's Islamic minorities. Moreover, successful deployment
of the European Union's soft power has been achieved at the cost of destroying the European Union itself, as it has existed until now. The original
European ambition to form an integrated political union has had to be abandoned. A new "Europe" has been substituted, whose nature and limits
are still undetermined. Power can no longer be defined in conventional ways. Americans have recently argued that European soft
power is fine, but that it depends on American hard power. Why should this be so? What is the threat against which
the United States defends Europe? Not Iraq, surely. Not Iran - the Europeans are dealing with Iran in their own
way and seem to see no threat to themselves. North Korea? China? Vladimir Putin's Russia? Why should any of
these want to attack Europe, a distant trading, industrial and aerospace giant - and if it ever had to become one,
potentially a military giant? Only militant Islam is a threat in 2005, and everyone knows that its foreign targets are the United States and
Israel, while its ultimate aim is the religious radicalization of Islamic civilization itself, which is an impossible goal. So who is defending whom
against what in 2005?

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                                Impact -- Regionalism
Karen E. Smith, Lecturer in International Relations: London School of Economics, 2003, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, Winter/Spring, Volume IX, Issue 2, p. 108

In the long run, the EU can contribute to the transformation of the international system, by reinforcing elements of
international society such as international law and inter-state cooperation, and minimizing those of power politics.
Indeed, the spread of regionalism—in the form of the growth or relaunch of numerous regional groupings across the
world—can be attributed at least partly to the example of the EU and its policies to encourage regional cooperation.


Bechir Chourou, International Relations, Institut Superieur de Langueus de Tunis, University of Carthage,
2004, Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11, ed. Annette Junemann, p. 196-7
<The concept of regional integration incorporates various forms of cross-national co-operation, ranging from eliminating tariffs and other trade
barriers between nations (free trade) to merging national economies into a single market. Whatever its scope or depth, integration is considered a
means of increasing the welfare of those who take part in it. Consequently, the study of integration has been intimately related to that of economic
growth and development.
  At the risk of oversimplification, it may be said that the theory of integration (and of free trade, of which it is an integral
part) is based on two main hypotheses: first, free trade promotes specialization among nations on the basis of
endowments and comparative advantage, hence a more efficient use of resources and greater welfare for all. Second,
many or most economic activities can be efficient only if they can produce on a large scale. Consequently, markets that are
too small should integrate in order to promote efficiency, and hence a better use of resources and greater welfare.
  Since its creation in 1958 what was then called the European Economic Community (EEC) has become an object of intense scrutiny to test the
validity of these hypotheses as well as others related to the conditions required for starting the process of integration, ensuring its success and
maintaining it on course, as well as to study the existence, measurement and allocation of the benefits of integration. Almost immediately
after its creation, the EEC became an object of emulation in other parts of the world. From, the early 1960s onwards, various
free trade areas and common markets sprung up, especially in Latin America and Africa. However, none of them was as 'successful' as the EEC.
This failure is attributed to several factors. Among other things it is widely held that integration can be successful (that is, lead to
greater welfare) only if certain prerequisites are met, if it goes beyond trade to include co-operation in the economic,
social and financial areas, and if strong and efficient supranational institutions are established.

Bechir Chourou, International Relations, Institut Superieur de Langueus de Tunis, University of Carthage,
2004, Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11, ed. Annette Junemann, p. 210
  This outline of the measures that need to be implemented in the southern Mediterranean is necessarily brief.
Suffice it to say that their ultimate objective is the transformation of a fragmented region into a coherent economic
space where growth and sustainable development are possible. One particular implication of the above measures is
that the current structure of the EMP needs to be changed. At present, all Euromed agreements are between the EU
acting as a unit and individual MPCs. This model has shown its limits. New agreements involving larger entities are needed,
such as those that the EU has with the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and with countries of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions.
In the Mediterranean, such entities may be the UMA, or the group of Arab-Mediterranean countries, or even the League of Arab States.
  Until recently, the EU has done little to encourage this form of cooperation, as can be seen from the small portion of MEDA funds allocated to
regional projects and from the EU's stance concerning the application of the rules of origin contained in the trade agreements signed with MPCs.
However, this attitude appears to be changing and the need for South—South co-operation is brought up more frequently and
with greater insistence — if not greater conviction.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                    Impact – EU More Environmentally Sustainable
John McCormick, political scientist, University of Miami, THE EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 156-7

The EU has recently developed a reputation as a leader on the environmental front, but herein lies an irony. Europe was the
birthplace of the industrial revolution and was generally slow to pick up on early pressures to clean up the environment and better manage natural
resources. It was the Americans who introduced the idea of national parks, and many of the philosophical concepts and practical solutions behind
environmentalism were introduced by Americans such as George Perkins Marsh, John Muir, and Gifford Pinchot. The United States was later at
the forefront of legal and institutional responses to environmental problems: it began passing national clean air and clean water legislation in the
1950s and 1960s, created the federal Environmental Protection Agency in 1970, and was years ahead Competing in the Market for Ideas of the
Europeans in introducing lead-free fuel. But the Reagan administration did its best to gut national environmental initiatives, the Bush
administration has been famously unsupportive of attempts to deal with climate change and America's looming energy problems, and whatever
their advances on the regulatory front, and in spite of how much they have championed green lifestyles, Americans as a whole have ultimately
failed to change their habits in such a way as to make much positive difference. It is not that Americans are less sympathetic than Europeans to
the need for effective environmental management. When asked in 2003 if people should be willing to pay higher prices in order to protect the
environment, more Americans (70 per cent) agreed than Europeans (53-60 per cent in the Big Four countries), and the statement 'Protecting the
environment should be given priority even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs' had 69 per cent support in the US, slightly
more than in France (66 per cent), and not much less than in Italy, Britain and Germany (78-82 per cent). But when Europeans talk about paying
more or about managing economic growth in order to protect the environment, they are doing so from the perspective of people living in small,
crowded and expensive countries where public transport is a way of life for many, and resource consumption is already relatively low. For
Americans, whose resource demands are substantial, who are more aggressive consumers, and where public transport is the choice of the
minority, making sacrifices is of an altogether different order. At the heart of transatlantic differences is the concept of sustainable development.
Usually defined as development that 'meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs', sustainable development has been one of the core principles of EU environmental policy since the 1986 Single
European Act. Debates continue about just how much difference it has made in practice – there is much talk in Brussels, but less evidence of real
change in policy. But with or without policy change, Western Europeans in particular have altered their consumption habits to fit with the goals
of sustainable development. They are conscious of the limitations on natural resources, and of the links between cause and effect, and they are
                                                        Europeans produce about half as many emissions of
less demanding consumers. Some of the results are reflected in the data:
greenhouse gases as Americans, they generate about two-thirds as much waste, and they consume less than one-third
as much water and about half as much energy.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                          Impact – EU Less Militaristic

Franz Kernic, Lecturer University of Innsbruck, 2006, European Security in Transition, eds. G. Hauser & F. Kernic, p. 6
Today, consolidation seems to be on its way, although the whole transformation process must still be regarded as "work-in-progress". However, a
general orientation has been regained and important decisions have been taken, thus giving the traditional security and
defense organizations of Europe, particularly NATO, a new "face", i.e. new tasks and a new organizational design.
At the same time new organizational frameworks, such as, for example, the EU's Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), have been established. But not only organizational
structures have been transformed, the way of thinking about security, in general, and European security, in particular, has
radically, changed as well. In comparison with the Cold-War era, security is today defined in a much broader context, mostly
as "comprehensive security" that combines efforts in all fields of political and societal life to guarantee the health
and survival of a given society and state. Security is no longer narrowly defined as ",military security ," with a
predominant, almost exclusive focus on the armed forces and on armed conflict between nation-states. Even the question of "actorness" in
International Relations theory, as related to security, has led to a tremendous shift away from a narrow state-centric view to a more open
"capabilities"-approach, which also gives space for analysing the impact of certain actions of individuals, small groups, or networks on European


Martin Reichard, Austrian Mission to NATO, 2006, The EU-NATO Relationship, p. 33
European States, while they went along with the operation fighting Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, did not share this 'forward defence' concept.
Rather, because of their wider view of international problems, they did not see terrorist organisations as the central
problem in international relations." Their threat perception is also different in recognising an 'enemy within' and thereby blurring
external and internal security challenges, feeding into the European style of neutralising enemies by absorbing them, all very alien to the clearly
defined concept of frontiers in traditional US security thinking." The differences between US and EU thinking on the
international use of force" became more visible in 2003 after the European Security Strategy was introduced ." That
European view of terrorism as essentially a phenomenon of deeper-rooted social and political origins was not even shaken by the terrorist attack
on the Madrid city trains on 11 March 2004 or London on 7 July 2005.
  The ideas presented by R. Kagan, R. Cooper and W. Ettmayer (with different conclusions) of the basic difference between European
and American views being one between a post-modern (Europe) and a modern, Hobbesian world (the United States)
go a long way towards explaining the origins of these differences. They do not, however, offer any clear way forward.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                         Impact – EU Less Militaristic
Richard Youngs, Politics Lecturer, University of Warwick, 2006, Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September
11, p. 6
 In Europe, External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten argued that "fostering human rights should become an integral part of the fight against
terrorism." British prime minister Tony Blair opined in 2003 that "the best security we can have . . . is through our values, the spread of our
values." In his main 2004 foreign policy speech, Blair asserted that "lasting security against fanatics and terrorists cannot be provided by
conventional military force but requires a commitment to democracy, freedom and justice." EU foreign policy high representative Javier Solana
argued that even if political change could not be expected immediately to assuage the most implacable of terrorists, it was significant that the
latter had been "nourished by a pool of disaffection." In March 2005, then French foreign minister Michel Barrier suggested that strategic policies
should be guided by recognition that "a more democratic world is the guarantee of a more secure world." Rarely a week passed without a
European minister delivering what became an almost standard stock speech advocating a broader approach to
security in the Middle East, embracing economic development, political liberalization, and cultural cooperation.

Richard Youngs, Politics Lecturer, University of Warwick, 2006, Europe and the Middle East: In the Shadow of September
11, p. 96
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership seemed to herald a new direction in European strategy. The EMP enshrined
one of the EU's most high-profile commitments to democracy promotion, incorporated within one of its most far-
reaching and deeply institutionalized external policy frameworks. Six years before the attacks of 9/11, the Barcelona
Process was predicated on a declared need to encourage political reform as a means of mitigating "soft security "
challenges: rising migratory flows from North Africa, the region's economic weakness, the security of energy supplies, as well as the buildup of
arms in the Maghreb and Mashreq. The official philosophy was that progress on economic liberalization, political-security
issues, and cultural cooperation—the respective themes of Barcelona's three OSCE-like baskets—would combine to
produce a holistic strategic framework. The focus on democracy and human rights in the southern Mediterranean had lagged behind the
incorporation of political reform commitments into EU agreements with Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan African states, and
Latin America during the early 1990s. After the Gulf War, states supporting the coalition, and in particular Egypt,
had won significant increases in aid from the European Union. The creation of the EMP brought Mediterranean
relations into line with other areas, through a formal commitment to support political liberalization, the inclusion of
standard democracy and human rights clauses within the new association agreements offered to Maghreb and Mashreq countries, and
new democracy and civil society funding for this region.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                       Impact – EU Promotes Realism

Soren Dosenrode & Anders Stubkjaer, International Politics Professor and Lecturer, University of Aalborg,
2002, The European Union and the Middle East, p. 32-3

Coordination within the Commission and between the Commission and the Council of Ministers is only one aspect
of the coordination problem. Equally large is the issues of coordination among the 15 member states. The whole
history of the EPC and the CFSP can be seen as one long process of learning and adaptation; learning that individual
European states no longer are able to shape and influence the international system as they could until the Second
World War, although some states tried it anyway (e.g. Suez 1956). Member states have had to adapt to, or get used
to cooperating on the most sacred of all things, national foreign policy. The member states had to adjust to not only
looking at some kind of narrowly defined 'national interest' but also looking at the interests of the EU per se, and not
only as an instrument to pursue own interests. This process has, of course been hardest for the great powers, and is
not yet finished, if it ever will be. Still, signs of the progressing 'we-feeling' are seen in, inter alia: Article 11.2 TEU stating
that 'The Member states shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual
solidarity... They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive
force in international relations'; Article 19.1 TEU stating that 'In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the
Member states participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions'; and Article 20 TEU on the need for diplomatic and
commission delegations to cooperate and work together.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                           Impact – EU Promotes Good WTO

Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics, 2002, Journal of International Economic
Law, March, Vol. 5, p. 200

The EU‘s major overt push at Doha was for its environmental agenda. Paragraph 6 in the Preamble affirms both
―the objective of sustainable development‖ and the right of each country to take whatever measures are necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health – as long as Members comply with existing WTO obligations!
Paragraphs 31-33 include the EU‘s agenda, including negotiations on product labeling and the ―precautionary
principle‖, however, were sent back to the Committee on Trade and Environment for ―particular attention‖ – which
may put them off until the next ministerial conference.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                      Impact – Good WTO Leadership

Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Professors Tel Aviv University & NYU, 2004, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, Winter, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 21, p. 23

 Other voices were far more critical. They argued that    the United States had shifted unaccountably from being the world's strongest voice
for the use of multinational negotiations, as the principal vehicle for trade liberalization, to being their most strident critic. Its threat to
withdraw from the GATT and negotiate bilaterally with prospective trading partners unless the rest of the world
capitulated to its demands appeared to many to be nothing short of bullying by a great power, and it violated the two
most fundamental principals of GATT, nondiscrimination and MFN, because the typically 100 percent tariff threat that the U.S. used
was employed selectively against some states but not others. n2 However, for critics such as Bhagwati, the best evidence that the actions
of the U.S. were coercive, and nothing more than a self-intended purpose to capitalize on the bargaining power that
it possessed by virtue of its large markets, was that the U.S. demands promised no reciprocal benefit in return for the
concessions it demanded and that it did little to insure that the concessions it exacted were available to other states.


Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Professors Tel Aviv University & NYU, 2004, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, Winter, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 21, p. 29

   One high profile dispute occurred in South Korea, where South Korea wanted to be able to provide the drug for a
lower price than the drug company charged in the U.S. The drug company refused and the U.S. government stepped
in to pressure South Korea to pay a price equal to the average price among the Group of Seven countries, and to agree to reject an
application for a compulsory license to be issued for the drug which would have opened the way for generic production. Interestingly, the U.S.
appears to have taken this step not so much to maximize the profits for Glivec's manufacturer -- a Swiss firm -- but
to prevent a precedent that might eventually damage the profitability of products manufactured by its own firms.

  Cookson and Dyer say that this dispute over Glivec is typical of the "strong-arm" tactics that the U.S. government
uses to defend its drug industry. "The U.S. government does not control the price of drugs in its own country but it is
telling Korea what they should charge," says Jamie Love of the Consumer Project on Technology. n20

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                                                 Impact – Solves AIDS
Frederick M. Abbot, Professor of International Law, Florida State University College of Law 2005, American
Journal of International Law, April, 99 A.J.I.L. 317, p. 332-3

  On the scope-of-diseases issue, developing countries formulated and maintained a common position with a strong
foundation in policy and law. The result was a major success in the negotiations. Why was the United States
unsuccessful in this regard? First, its legal arguments were not adequately grounded in the Doha Declaration. Second, the U.S. position
was hard to justify from a policy standpoint. The U.S. argument that broad scope-of-disease coverage would undermine future research and
                                                                           the United States was unable to convince
development was ultimately not persuasive to the broad spectrum of WTO members. Third ,
the European Union to join it in demanding that the scope of diseases be limited. In the end, the United States was
isolated, which put it in the diplomatically uncomfortable posture of being the sole obstacle to a solution to the
paragraph 6 problem. This isolation raised the stakes to U.S. trade diplomacy of maintaining its hard line.
  The scope-of-diseases issue did not end with the adoption of the Decision. Shortly afterwards, Canada announced that it would adopt legislation to implement the Decision. n106 An unnamed
"senior federal official" promptly said there was a lack of international consensus about the diseases that could be addressed and that Canada would need to act cautiously n107 Following
[*333]extensive dialogue in Canada, n108 the government dropped the argument that the Decision, as such, limited the scope of diseases. It did, however, draw up a list of products that would
be subject to compulsory licensing for export, which may be expanded by the government in consultation with an expert committee. n109

 Norway, which has also implemented the Decision, did not establish a list of diseases that may be addressed, referring to the text of the Decision. n110

  The proposed EU regulation to implement the Decision ( EU Draft Regulation), issued in late October 2004,
covers all pharmaceutical products and provides for the authorization of compulsory licenses for "any" medicine.
Such authorization includes vaccines that have the property of "preventing disease in human beings" or "restoring,
correcting or modifying physiological functions."

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                                  Impact – Solves AIDS
Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 2002, [Thomas A. Haag, PhD], December, 84 J. Pat. &
Trademark Off. Soc'y 945, p. 969-71

  Contrary to the United States, the EU favors amending TRIPS to provide the most certain, "guarantees for a
sustainable, balanced and workable solution to the problem raised under Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration."
n114 Moreover, the EU states that a textual amendment provides, "for a straightforward, clear, legally secure,
effective and permanent solution within an existing legal framework." n115 Furthermore, the EU feels that the moratorium or
waiver advanced by the U.S. may, "may fall short of providing the type of sustainable and legally secure solution," that it is, "aiming for." n116
However, the EU advocates such a moratorium or waiver be adopted while an amendment is negotiated and ratified. n117

  The EU suggests amending Article 31 such that Members would be exempt from the requirements of Article 31(f) when several
                                                          the amendment would be limited to pharmaceutical
requisite conditions are satisfied. Consistent with the Doha Declaration ,
products needed to address, "public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries,
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics." n118 Additionally, only developing
and least developing countries with no or insufficient domestic manufacturing capacity, could qualify for an exemption. n119 Finally, the
amendment should include provisions to avoid abuses and trade diversion.

 According to the EU,measures necessary to avoid abuses and trade diversion must ensure that products made under a
compulsory license 1) should not be put into circulation on the market of the country of production, but should in
their entirety be exported to the Member designated by the authorization, 2) not be re-exported from that Member,
and that 3) the Member granting the license for export and the importing Member have taken regulatory and
administrative measures to ensure that condition these conditions are enforced. n121 Furthermore, the EU stresses that full
transparency is crucial to regulate compliance with theses conditions. n122

  The EU states that for the sake of expediting access to drugs, any amendment should allow the patent holder to first negotiate, "sustainable
voluntary licensing," at, "strongly reduced pricing offers," however, such negotiations should not "unduly" delay the granting of a license. n123
As such, the amendment should also contain requirements that the patent owner be promptly notified by those intending to authorize a
compulsory license and given the opportunity, following notification, to make an offer to supply the relevant products at strongly reduced prices.
n124 The EU proposal also recommends that any amendment recognizes that when a patent owner agrees to meet the needs of the Member
without manufacturing capacity, with respect to price, safety and sustainability, that this should avert the necessity to issue to a compulsory
license. n125

  Finally, the EU states that any amendment to Article 31 should allow a Member issuing a compulsory license for
the production of patented goods to alleviate a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency in a
country without adequate drug manufacturing ability, to disregard the requirement that efforts first be made to obtain
authorization from the right holder under reasonable commercial and temporal circumstances. n126 The EU indicates
that such a provision expands Article 31(b) to situations where a compulsory license is issued in a Member other than the Member facing a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, in view of supplying the latter Member with needed patented drugs. n127

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

                                                  Impact – Solves Aids


James Orbinski, President, International Council of Medecins sans Frontieres, 2001, Role of the World Trade
Organization in Global Governance, ed. Gary P. Sampson, p. 224-5

Each year, 17 million people die of infectious diseases, more than 90 per cent of whom are in poor countries. The
causes are indeed complex, but they must be faced. Access to essential and innovative medicines is affected by a number of factors such as a lack
of public health infrastructure and logistical capacity, a lack of good-quality drug production in the South, and irrational drug choice and use.
The availability of medicines is not the only aspect of access to quality health care. But it is essential. To prioritize
either availability of medicines or infrastructure delivery capacity is to engage in a fools‘ game that never ends, leading to inaction. Yet
infrastructure will never expand if the possibility of affordable medicines is not realized. Most immediately, access
to essential drugs is in effect denied because drugs are too expensive as a result of patent protection (as with anti-
retrovirals for the treatment of HIV/ AIDS) or are no longer produced because their sale does not guarantee a significant return on investment for
the manufacturer (e. g. DFMO for African sleeping sickness) or because there is no new research and development of new and innovative drugs
for old and high-prevalence problems such as tuberculosis. These three factors are linked to a disengagement of national and international
authorities from ensuring access to health care, the abdication of the problem to the pharmaceutical industry, and the weakness of the WHO
mandate. What does this mean concretely?

James Thuo Gathi, Professor, Albany Law School, 2002, Florida Journal of International Law, Spring, 14 Fla. J.
Int'l L. 261, p. 270-1

  As the experience of the United States and Brazil demonstrates, AIDS is a treatable disease, and levels of infection
can drop dramatically with increased availability of drugs, so the same should also be true for sub-Saharan Africa.
While the AIDS problem in Africa is part of a bigger picture of a health sector in crisis, n33 that is no reason not to
take action to facilitate access to affordable AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa. There can be no gainsaying that low income
levels in sub-Saharan Africa make costs of over $10,000 per year prohibitive. Yet, the pharmaceutical industry has quietly argued that selling
AIDS drugs at discounts in sub-Saharan Africa portends doom with respect to the ability to finance further research and development. In effect, it
argues that the AIDS crisis in Africa is intractable because providing AIDS drugs, which still enjoy patent protection in Western markets,
                                           handouts that pharmaceutical companies have announced are laudable, but
conflicts with its commercial objectives. n34 The
the existence of such handouts does not address the question of affordability in the long term. In addition, it is
possible that these ad hoc responses and the infrequency with which AIDS drugs are consumed in Africa may
contribute to the creation of drug-resistant strains of the virus. n35

Hilde F. Johnson, Minister of International Development, Norway, Speech on Seminar on AIDS and Global
Security, January 25, 2002,

Whether measured by the numbers killed or nations wounded, the AIDS epidemic is a greater global threat than any
war. It calls for worldwide, national and individual action. We need political leadership on all levels. We need
presidents who are committed to making HIV/AIDS a public issue. We need forceful messages from those who
shape opinion. We need political leaders who speak out against harmful myths about HIV/AIDS. Military and
peacekeeping personnel are potential allies in HIV/AIDS prevention.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

 Impact -- Ext: Current Interpretation of TRIPS Prevents Export
                          of AIDS Drugs

Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, Professors Georgia State University, 2004, American Business Law
Journal, Winter/Spring, 41 Am. Bus. L.J. 353, p. 392

On September 12, 2001, Doctors Without Borders announced it was working with Brazil to export the country's
aggressive anti-AIDS program and its locally manufactured drugs to other developing countries. Bernard Pecoul,
President of Doctors Without Borders, and Brazil's heath minister, Jose Serra, signed a letter of intent to recreate the
Brazilian program in Africa, Asia, and parts of Latin America. Presumably this will include the production and sale
of generic drugs and the free distribution of them to patients. As mentioned, Brazil already makes eight of the drugs
used in antiretroviral therapy. Doctors without Borders has also said it intends to buy these drugs from the Brazilian
state laboratory, Far-Manguinhos. Brazil is hoping the Doha Declaration and the mandated 2002 negotiations will
enable it to export its low-cost generics to other countries lacking the resources to manufacture their own generics.
However, as noted, Brazil cannot export its drugs yet to other countries because TRIPS currently requires that
production of pharmaceuticals under a compulsory license must be primarily for domestic use, not export.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

 Impact -- Ext: US Pushing for Solution that Worsens AIDS Crisis

James Orbinski, President, International Council of Medecins sans Frontieres, 2001, Role of the World Trade
Organization in Global Governance, ed. Gary P. Sampson, p. 228-9

MSF is not ―anti-globalization‖ or ―anti-free trade.‖ However, MSF will not remain silent in the face of trade practices that mean inequity and
ultimately unnecessary suffering and death for the people we work with on a daily basis. We are taking active measures to ensure access to
essential medicines. Because, for example, East Africans sometimes pay more than twice what Europeans pay for essential medicines, MSF is
investigating the cost of high-quality generic and patented drugs, including anti-retrovirals, and making this information freely available on the
World Wide Web to nation states; in so doing, it is encouraging competition that will bring prices down even further. 9 We are working with
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the UNAIDS programme, the WHO, and UNICEF to pool this information on prices,
                                                                       data. We also firmly oppose any measure that
manufacturers, and the status of patents in each country as well as quality control
gives any more patent protection than is already afforded by the TRIPS agreement. So-called ―TRIPS-plus‖
measures have been promoted by the United States and the European Union. These may be appropriate for
protecting intellectual property rights in industrialized countries, but they will stifle if not kill pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacity and generic drug ability in developing countries. TRIPS itself already has this potential and
unacceptable risk.

American University International Law Review, 2000, [Sara M. Ford, Law Student] 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 941,
p. 953-4

However, the United States strongly opposes the issuance of compulsory licenses for many reasons. n55 The
United States has discouraged the use of compulsory licenses for various altruistic reasons, including the promotion
of scientific research and development industries in developing nations, n56 the protection of the sick population
from inappropriate administration of potent pharmaceuticals, n57 and the allegiance to international treaties
enforcing the policy of intellectual property rights. n58 Yet, the most consistent complaint by the United States is
that compulsory licenses violate international intellectual property law proscribed in the TRIPs agreement. n59

American University International Law Review, 2000, [Sara M. Ford, Law Student] 15 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 941,
p. 954-5

The USTR's response to South Africa's proposed amendment confirmed the United States' opposition to compulsory
licensing. n60 On the one hand, threatened sanctions were not surprising given the immense financial threat that
compulsory licenses present to United States pharmaceutical companies. n61 Nonetheless, the manner in which the
USTR set forth its objections revealed how the pharmaceutical industry has exerted pressure on the United States to
adhere to a different standard other than that agreed in the international TRIPs agreement. n62 As a result rampant
confusion currently exists in United States Government agencies over the legality of compulsory licensing in TRIPs.

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

 Impact -- Ext: US Pushing for Solution that Worsens AIDS Crisis

Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Professors Tel Aviv University & NYU, 2004, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law, Winter, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 21, p. 27-8

  The Doha declaration on TRIPS and public health represented some progress toward the restatement of rights
desired by developing states. It acknowledged the right of each state to grant compulsory licenses in an emergency
and to determine what represented an emergency. What it did not do was grant states the same power of self-
determination in connection with establishing the grounds for parallel importing. This is significant because the
compulsory licensing provision is meaningless for those states in the south that do not contain drug firms capable of
manufacturing generic products. Their only hope for access to sophisticated AIDS drugs lies in working out
purchasing arrangements with generic drug firms in states such as India and Brazil. Instead of providing a simplified
process for doing this, the final version cleared in August 2003 actually constituted a significant retreat from a draft
statement that had been previously negotiated in 2001, but was subsequently held up by the U.S. government on
behalf of the drug lobby for fear that it would allow generic firms in states such as India and Brazil to flood the
market with cheap copies. In the eyes of some observers, the result is an agreement that "is patently imbalanced in favor of large
multinational patent holders [and] so restrictive and so unworkable for exporters and importers of generic drugs." n16

  "The suspicion must be that this agreement, which had been held up for so long by the developed countries
(especially the U.S.) and the multinational drug lobby, has now been hammered down the throats of the unfortunate
developing country negotiators, simply in order to show some results before the Cancun meeting. If this is so, it
augurs badly for the outcome of other trade negotiations in Cancun." n17

Planet Debate
EU Soft Power DA

         Impact -- Ext: EU Pushing for Solution that Allows Export of

Haochen Sun, Assistant to the Secretary of the Centerfor WTO Studies at Zhejiang University, 2003, Boston
University International Law Journal, Spring, 21 B.U. Int'l L.J. 101, p. 124-7
An Article 31-based solution aims at enabling the prospective exporting Members to overcome the restriction under Article 31(f) to export products manufactured under a compulsory license. It
does not, however, necessarily mean that the solution fully dismantles the exporting barrier created by Article 31(f) of the TRIPs Agreement. Instead, many developing county Members remain
                                                               Although the TRIPs Agreement allows Members to grant compulsory licenses
unable to efficiently and effectively use compulsory licensing under this solution.
subject to certain procedures and conditions, developing country Members have made limited use of this system. n85 Studies indicate that
developing country Members have not used the compulsory license as a tool to address public health issues for a number of reasons, including
that the effective implementation of compulsory licensing requires that certain preconditions relating to administrative, financial and technical
capacities be met, and these conditions are often not met in developing countries. The licensee must have the know-how to reverse engineer and
manufacture the drug without the cooperation of the patent owner, and must also foresee a sufficiently large market to justify the costs of
investment and manufacture and adequate remuneration to the patentee. Compulsory licensing must be "predominantly for the domestic market."
Developing country Members have feared that sanctions might be threatened, bilaterally or multilaterally.                                          Developing country enterprises may find it easier to
reach accommodation with foreign patent holders than to challenge them through the compulsory licensing process for various economic and administrative reasons. Finally, as noted earlier, an
Article 31-based solution only overcomes the restriction of predominant supply for the domestic market, it does not equip developing country Members with increased administrative, financial
and technical capacities to effectively implement compulsory licensing, nor does it provide enough incentives to the generic pharmaceuticals to produce and sell low-price drugs to the Members
lacking pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities. Moreover, it is anticipated that the requirement of the issuance of a compulsory license in the country of export would be subject to bureaucratic
                                                                                              Shortly after the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public
delay based on challenges from patent holders and pressures from developed country governments.

Health was adopted, the largest pharmaceutical companies directed an effort to undermine the Declaration,
attempting to divide developing countries, and to fashion new and dangerous precedents that were designed to
undermine the use of compulsory licensing, even in cases where there were enormous social costs for not addressing abuses of patent rights. In comparison with an
Article 31-based solution, an Article-30 based solution has the following advantages. The Article 30-based solution is permanent. The decision to

adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourths majority of the Members. n88 If there were an interpretation
submitted by the TRIPs Council, WTO Members would vote on it in the Ministerial Conference/General Council. It
would not be necessary to return it back to the national parliaments for consideration. Since it does not need to be ratified at the national level, an
Article 30-based approach is an expeditious solution identified by paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. Meanwhile, once the
interpretation is adopted by the Members, it would be in effect for a long time and it would not undergo review which might lead to a waiver or a moratorium. Considering the legitimate
interests of third parties,   the Article 30-based solution is economically feasible. In the event of a national public health emergency in a Member lacking
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacities, some Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent. The exceptions are limited and do not unreasonably
conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner. In addition, it could be limited to only the health problems that
                     The Article 30-based solution would avoid double remuneration to patent owners. If the
the Doha declaration addresses.

importing Member issues a license and the exporting Member provides reasonable remuneration, n89 then the
interests of the patent owner are in fact taken into account. In the cases where there is no patent in the importing country, the economic consequences to the
patent holder are likely to be insignificant, and in any case could be addressed by an Article 30 solution. This approach would avoid problems of double compensation where patents exist in both
the producing and exporting countries, and would only fail to provide compensation when consumption took place in countries where the inventor did not have a patent (typically in smaller
                           This ensures that the inventor benefits when the product is used in countries where the
markets of marginal economic importance).

inventor obtained a patent, and it permits patients to seek the most efficient suppliers of medicines and other medical
technologies. Finally, the Article 30-based solution would ensure that the exporting Member's use of limited
exceptions will not be successfully challenged by the potential application of non-violation complaints. Non-violation
complaints do not require a violation of an obligation of an agreement. Accordingly, a waiver of an obligation does not affect the availability of these types of complaints. n90 Although non-
violation complaints are currently not applicable to TRIPs-related disputes, n91 there is still the possibility that this will be applied to TRIPS-related disputes. Subject to the interpretation adopted
by the Members and the Doha Declaration, the use of limited exceptions is out of the dimension of the potentially applicable non-violation complaints. Compared with the waiver, the Article 30-
                                        the European Parliament adopted Amendment 196 to the European Medicines
based solution is more legally secure On October 23, 2002,

Directive stating: Manufacturing shall be allowed if the medicinal product is intended for export to a third country
that has issued a compulsory license for that product, or where a patent is not in force and if there is a request to that
effect of the competent public health authorities of that third country. n92 The European Parliament Amendment 196 is only 52
words, but it provides the correct policy framework to balance the objectives of Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration,
while protecting the legitimate interests of patent owners. This amendment provided the precise solution that the
TRIPs Council should have adopted.


To top