ir5_04 by ashrafp

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									             Chapter 4   CAN THE U.S. LEAD THE WORLD?

     U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was clear: stop the
Communists. Now it is unclear; there is no consensus. The great
question, posed by Spykman and others, of is whether to use
troops overseas: to intervene or not? For most of the 19th
century, the U.S. intervened little. With World War II and the
Cold War, the U.S. intervened massively. Vietnam partially
changed that, inducing caution. Behavioralist Klingberg saw a
cycle in U.S. foreign policy from "extroversion" to
"introversion." U.S. public opinion is fickle and has an
isolationist streak that was submerged by the Cold War. U.S.
elites are more internationalist than the masses. A box discusses
idealism v. self-interest in foreign policy.

     There is more continuity than change in the foreign policies
of presidents, especially from Truman to Reagan. Entitlements eat
most of the U.S. budget, and few want deficits again. There is no
military draft; the 1.4 million all-volunteer armed forces is
stretched thin and has trouble recruiting in a good economy. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon are cautious about overseas
intervention. Such factors constrain presidents in foreign
policy. Does the term superpower still fit the U.S.?

     Congress's precise role in foreign affairs is unclear. The
Constitution says Congress declares war but also says the
president is commander in chief. Which power overrides? Since
FDR, presidents have held the initiative in going to war. Rage
grew in Congress over Vietnam, so in 1973 it passed the War
Powers Act which tried to set a 90-day limit on U.S.troops in
hostile situations. No president likes this limit. Reagan ignored
it by simply not reporting that U.S. troops were in hostilities.
A de facto "self-isolationism" emerged as Congress rejected
several areas of international cooperation and alienated allies.

     Some have suggested that the very structure of U.S. foreign
policy is defective: big and sprawling, lacking central control.
The National Security Council, set up to wage the Cold War, has
grown to become the focus of foreign-policy making. Its National
Security Adviser and her staff have proximity to the president
and the ability to act secretly to make them preeminent over the
conventional departments and unsupervised by Congress. The Iran-
contra foulup illustrates what can go wrong with such a body. Do
bureaucracies make foreign policy? We rather doubt it. Recent
studies undermine Allison's "bureaucratic politics" model of the
Cuban missile crisis, for they show JFK was little influenced by
bureaucrats; he never considered attacking Cuba. The 1971
Pentagon Papers show sober and realistic bureaucratic assessments
of Vietnam, nothing that deceived decision makers. Ambassador
Glaspie simply obeyed orders in her conciliatory words to Saddam
Hussein in 1990. Bureaucratic politics does take place, but

usually after the orders have been given and the stage set.

     All these factors mean difficulties in getting the U.S. to
make up its mind to lead in world affairs. The presidential
"bully pulpit" must persuade the U.S. to play a positive role.

Essay and Discussion Questions

1. In general, should the U.S. be prepared to intervene with
   troops overseas?

2. Does the United States have a split personality on intervening

3. American public opinion is so inconsistent and fickle on
   foreign policy that it should be disregarded. Agree or

4. Under what circumstances would you willingly consent to be
   drafted? How would your generation react to a renewed draft?

5. Which power overrides, the power of Congress to declare war or
   the power of the president as commander in chief?

Multiple Choice

6. According to Nicholas Spykman, the key question of U.S.
     foreign policy is whether the U.S. should
     a. maintain a large standing army.
     b. be willing to form alliances with foreign powers.
    *c. defend itself on the near or far side of the oceans.
     d. use force or cash to get its way in the world.

7. In 1952, Frank L. Klingberg predicted that the U.S. would
     a. become involved in Vietnam in the 1960s.
     b. soon end the Korean war.
     c. become strongly interventionistic in the 1960s.
    *d. tire of intervention in the late 1960s.

8. U.S. public opinion ______________ the use of force overseas.
    *a. appears inconsistent on     c. generally opposes
     b. generally supports          d. follows the president on

9. The "Reagan Doctrine" was basically a variation on the
    *a. Truman Doctrine         c. Kennedy Doctrine
     b. Eisenhower Doctrine     d. Carter Doctrine

10. The top or most influential people are called the
     a. leaders     b. decision-makers    *c. elite     d. masses

11. From Truman through Reagan, __________ policy dominated.
     a. an isolationist            c. a doctrine
     b. a continuity              *d. the containment

12. U.S. public-opinion support for our wars in Korea and Vietnam
     declined with increased
     a. TV coverage.               c. domestic protest.
    *b. U.S. casualties.           d. Congressional criticism.

13. U.S. armed forces now number about _______ million.
     a. 1        *b. 1.4         c. 1.8         d. 2

14. Congress's rage over presidential war-making led to the
     a. near-impeachment of President Nixon in 1974.
    *b. War Powers Act of 1973.
     c. Paris Accords of 1973.
     d. repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1970.

15. The   1973 War Powers Act tries to limit the president to
     a.   wars that have been declared by Congress.
     b.   purely defensive military actions.
     c.   use troops only in designated regions.
    *d.   use troops for up to 90 days.

16. Presidents can skirt the War Powers Act by simply
    *a. not reporting hostilities to Congress.
     b. obtaining a joint resolution of Congress.
     c. declaring the action as purely defensive.
     d. declaring actions part of treaty commitments.

17. The focus of U.S. foreign-policy making is the
     a. State Department.    c. Defense Department.
     b. CIA.                *d. National Security Council.

18. The Iran-contra fiasco was carried out by officials of the
     a. State Department.    c. Defense Department.
     b. CIA.                *d. National Security Council.

19. Graham Allison used the __________ to show that ___________.
    *a. Cuban missile crisis; bureaucracies make foreign policy.
     b. Tonkin Gulf incident; presidents make foreign policy.
     c. Bay of Pigs; the CIA makes foreign policy.
     d. Grenada invasion; the military makes foreign policy.

20. The   "Pentagon Papers" generally showed that
     a.   officials deceived the president about Vietnam.
    *b.   officials reported accurately about Vietnam.
     c.   the president wouldn't heed reports from Vietnam.
     d.   officials told the president what he wanted to hear.

21. U.S. public opinion before the 1991 Persian Gulf War was
     a. hawkish.   b. dovish.   *c. split.    d. indifferent.

22. In the 1962 Cuban missiles crises, President Kennedy
     a. seriously considered attacking Cuba.
     b. was influenced by bureaucratic politics.
     c. was influenced by what the generals proposed.
    *d. was influenced by a book he had just read.


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