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SEPTEMBER 2008 . VoL 1 . ISSUE 10
portrayal of AQAP fighters as anti-
establishment “social revolutionaries.”
Of the various narratives put forward
by the Saudi government, the most
Assessing the Strength of
convincing is the assertion that Saudi Al-Qa`ida in Yemen
Outlook for AQAP in Saudi Arabia Arabia faces a credible terrorist threat
There is no doubt that the Saudi from outside the kingdom, albeit By Gregory D. Johnsen
government now publicly exaggerates probably from Yemen rather than from
the scale of the known militant problem Iraq or Afghanistan. The latter two on the evening of August 10, 2008,
in Saudi Arabia to stave off a return of theaters of jihad attract a certain type of acting on a tip from a local resident, a
complacency. This is a stark contrast Saudi militant, a volunteer who chose to Yemeni security patrol approached a
to the 2003-2006 period, when the fight outside Saudi Arabia rather than suspected al-Qa`ida safe house in the
government was still actively trying to at home, and there are strong reasons to eastern city of Tarim. 1 The patrol came
downplay the extent of the threat as it believe that such militants will continue under fire, at which point it retreated,
rooted out truly dangerous networks. to patronize iconic theaters of foreign called for back-up and established a
The number of counter-terrorist jihad in the future. The Yemeni-based perimeter around the area in an effort
arrests is frequently massaged; for militants are another matter; they have to prevent any of the suspects from
instance, the 701 arrests announced in chosen to fight in the Arabian Peninsula escaping. This tenuous stalemate lasted
June 2008 included arrests previously in preference to other theaters and they throughout the night. Fighting resumed
announced by the Ministry of Interior frequently have a historic connection to in the morning, slowly escalating
in November 2007 and March 2008. Saudi Arabia. throughout the day. Government forces
The number of arrests in the first half brought in two tanks, while the al-
of 2008 was approximately 450, with Indeed, Saudi and Yemeni terrorist Qa`ida militants responded with rocket-
a proportion released. Likewise, the cells already share a strong co-dynamic propelled grenade attacks. Eventually,
ministry occasionally repackages old relationship; it is notable that the the militants were able to slip out of their
“most wanted” lists from 2005 to give attack on Abqaiq in February 2006 safe house to a neighboring building, but
the impression that they are new lists of was mimicked closely by the September they were unable to escape the security
Iraq returnees active in the kingdom. 19 2006 car bombings on Yemeni oil perimeter. By the end of the fighting, five
Support cells that have undertaken any facilities; the Saudi shooting of four militants, including leading operative
form of target identification, however Frenchmen outside Medina in February Hamza al-Q`uyati, were dead while two
rudimentary, are often portrayed as 2007 was likewise mirrored by remote more were captured. 2
attack cells, despite a lack of weaponry shootings of expatriates in Yemen in
and a lack of resistance when called to January 2008; and indirect fire attacks The raid was widely seen as a much
surrender. The ministry is erring on the attempted in Saudi Arabia in November needed victory for Yemen. 3 Yemen
side of caution, perhaps understandably 2007 have become a staple of Yemeni claimed that with al-Q`uyati’s death it
so. terrorist cells in 2008. The two theaters had killed the mastermind of a string of
are thus loosely coupled but the flow terrorist attacks that had plagued the
In reality, it would appear unlikely that a may be slowly changing direction. country in recent years. According to
strong AQAP network will emerge again Yemen is already beginning to serve the government, al-Q`uyati was behind
to rival the infrastructure laid down by as a launch pad for attacks into Saudi every major terrorist attack since he
Yusuf al-`Uyayri in the 1990s. Saudi- Arabia. Although the gradual whittling and 22 other militants escaped from a
based cells are isolated, and the little down of Yemen’s al-Qa`ida leadership, Political Security Organization prison
communication existing between cells— particularly older Saudi-born militants, in February 2006, beginning with the
chat room discussions or the sharing of will significantly reduce the prospect failed dual suicide attacks in September
documents and videos—represents a of future attacks, the possibility exists 2006 and ending, most recently, with
critical vulnerability and the frequent of attacks on iconic Saudi oil targets or the July 25 suicide attack on a military
cause of cascading patterns of arrests. exposed expatriates.
The overwhelming impression of AQAP 1 This account of the Tarim shootout has been compiled
remains that of a destitute movement, as Dr. Michael Knights is the Gulf security from statements posted on the jihadist web forum al-
conveyed in the April 2007 issue of Sawt research associate at The Washington Ikhlas, in addition to the following article: “Marib Press
al-Jihad, where the editor notes: “None Institute for Near East Policy. He has is Unparalleled in Publishing Details of the Operation
of the jihadi fronts were deserted as written extensively on Gulf Cooperation in Tarim, Hadramawt” (Arabic), Marib Press, August 11,
much as the jihadi front in the Arabian Council (GCC) security issues and 2008.
Peninsula.” 20 Saudi-based cells appear maintains a broad range of security 2 In addition to al-Q`uyati, the dead included Abdullah
to be almost exclusively sympathizers, contacts in the Gulf region. Ali Batis, Hasan Bazar‘a, Mubarak bin Hawil al-Nahdi,
internet propagandists, recruiters and and Mahmud Baramah. The two captured militants were
fundraisers focused on foreign jihad. identified as Ali Muhsin Salih al-‘Akbari and Muham-
mad Said Ba`awaydhan. The Yemeni military lost three
soldiers. For a good overview, see the excellent reporting
19 These figures and views were derived from close of Muhammad al-Ahmadi, “Yemen and al-Qaeda” (Ara-
scrutiny of Saudi government announcements and ac- bic), al-Ghad, August 18, 2008.
cess to translated Interior Ministry warning statements 3 Both the United States and the United Kingdom used
in 2008. the success of the raid as a pretext to relax travel restric-
20 Sawt al-Jihad, April 2007. tions to the country.
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SEPTEMBER 2008 . VoL 1 . ISSUE 10
base in Sayyun. 4 The government also crack in the facade of anonymity that birth. 15 By the beginning of September,
claimed that al-Q`uyati was planning had surrounded the organization. according to most media accounts,
further attacks in both Yemen and While he does appear to have been the Yemen had managed to arrest at least
Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, given mastermind of the July 25 suicide attack 30 al-Qa`ida suspects since the Tarim
what is known about this period of al- in Sayyun, 11 it is unlikely that he was as raid. On the surface, these appear to
Qa`ida’s operations in Yemen and the prolific as government reports suggest. be significant victories for Yemen at
local make-up of al-Q`uyati’s cell, this is Furthermore, the local nature of al- the expense of al-Qa`ida, but closer
unlikely to be true. 5 Instead, al-Qa`ida, Q`uyati’s cell—five of the individuals, examination suggests they are more
while temporarily weakened, remains a including al-Q`uyati, were from al- symbolic than substantive. According
security threat within Yemen. Mukalla, while the other two came from to Nasser Arrabyee of Gulf News, five
the neighboring towns of Shabwa and al- of the al-Qa`ida suspects that Yemen
The September 17 attack on the U.S. arrested in one security sweep “were
Embassy in Sana`a, which left more “Yet a closer examination not hiding, but [rather] they were under
than a dozen people dead, illustrates lenient house arrest.” 16 Likewise, the
this threat. The attack, while shocking, of the evidence suggests eight suspects returned to Saudi Arabia
was not necessarily unexpected. Days that talk of an acrimonious do not appear to have been arrested
after al-Q`uyati’s death, the Soldiers’ recently, but rather held until their
Brigades of Yemen posted a statement split within the current extradition would guarantee maximum
threatening retaliatory attacks. 6 The generation of al-Qa`ida in benefit. 17
proof, the statement said in a common
Islamist phrase, “will be in what you Yemen may be premature The narrative of a quick and forceful
see and not what you hear.” 7 Then, or misleading.” reaction meets both of Yemen’s goals
on September 9, a teaser was posted at once. First, it allows Yemen to
to al-Ikhlas 8 indicating that the fifth appear strong and in control of the
issue of al-Qa`ida’s Sada al-Malahim security situation to its Western allies
journal was due to be released in the Qatin 12 —suggests a more limited reach and foreign businesses, which have
coming days. 9 The combination of these than the government’s claim assumes. 13 been growing increasingly concerned.
two indicators should have triggered Part of this verbal overreach is designed Second, it suggests that the two militants
warnings in Yemen, as during the past to deflect criticism by Western allies, who Yemen captured in the Tarim
year al-Qa`ida has developed a pattern which have grown increasingly strident raid—Ali Muhsin Salih al-‘Akbari and
of linking its attacks to its rhetoric. in publicly questioning Yemen’s Muhammad Said Ba`awaydhan—have
commitment to the war on al-Qa`ida. “talked”; the appearance of which,
Successes Reveal Al-Qa`ida’s Composition Yemen believes, will turn up the
The September 2006 attacks were Yemen has further underscored the pressure on remaining al-Qa`ida cells,
most likely planned and organized rhetorical nature of this claim by the helping to flush them out into the open.
by Fawaz al-Rabay‘i, who was killed moves it made following the August 11 Despite these choreographed moves, the
by Yemeni security forces in October shootout. Almost immediately, Yemen Tarim raid and the events that preceded
2006. Al-Q`uyati, on the other hand, announced that it had arrested a number it help to explain much about al-Qa`ida
first reappeared publicly this summer of al-Qa`ida supporters, and within a in Yemen. Most notably, it sheds light
in a July 23 videotape released by the week it claimed to have discovered and on the relationship between the “al-
“al-Qa`ida Organization of Jihad in dismantled a separate terrorist cell in Qa`ida Organization in the South of the
the Arabian Peninsula: The Soldiers’ Hadramawt. 14 Days later, following a Arabian Peninsula” and the “al-Qa`ida
Brigades of Yemen.” 10 Al-Q`uyati’s visit by Muhammad bin Nayif, Saudi Organization of Jihad in the Arabian
appearance in the video was the first Arabia’s assistant minister of the Peninsula: The Soldiers’ Brigades of
interior for security affairs, Yemen Yemen.” These two alternate group
4 Ibid. announced that it was extraditing eight identifications had confused many
5 The author dates the “second phase of the war against Saudi militants back to their country of analysts.
al-Qaeda in Yemen” to February 2006. For more infor-
mation, see Gregory D. Johnsen “Securing Yemen’s Co- 11 For more information on the attack, see “Yemen’s Two Theory of a Split Loses Credence
operation in the Second Phase of the War on al-Qa`ida,” al-Qaedas,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, August One theory that has gained strength in
CTC Sentinel 1:1 (2008). 21, 2008. recent months is that the two groups
6 Posted on www.al-ekhlaas.net, August 19, 2008. 12 Al-Q`uyati was born in Saudi Arabia, but his fam- had split over tactics. 18 This explanation
7 Ibid. ily was originally from al-Mukalla and he seems to have
8 Al-Ikhlas is a prominent jihadist web forum located at made his way back to his ancestral home after escaping 15 Faysal Mukrim, “Yemen Delivers to Saudi Eight Sus-
www.al-ekhlaas.net. from prison in 2006. pects in Security Issues” (Arabic), al-Hayat, August 22,
9 The al-Ikhlas website was taken offline, most likely 13 In addition to the local make-up of al-Q`uyati’s cell 2008.
by hackers, before the fifth issue could be posted. As a which has not been stressed enough, one should also 16 Nasser Arrabyee, “Five Al Qaida Suspects Detained
result, analysts are unable to determine what al-Qa`ida note that the local tip that led to the Tarim raid is a posi- in Yemen,” Gulf News, August 19, 2008.
in Yemen is saying in regard to the attack. This makes tive development that has been under-reported. 17 This information was confirmed in personal conver-
predicting and analyzing the group’s future activities ex- 14 Husayn al-Jarabani, “Yemen: The Governor of Hadra- sations with Yemeni government officials.
tremely difficult. mawt Discovers a New al-Qaeda Cell” (Arabic), al-Sharq 18 This theory has been most forcefully expressed by Ni-
10 This group also goes by the name Jund al-Yaman. al-Awsat, August 16, 2008. cole Strake of the Gulf Research Centre. See, for example,
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SEPTEMBER 2008 . VoL 1 . ISSUE 10
held that the original group, which calls The first attacks attempted by a His last will and testament, which was
itself the “al-Qa`ida Organization in reconstituted al-Qa`ida in Yemen were posted to al-Ikhlas on March 29, 2008,
the South of the Arabian Peninsula,” the failed September 2006 dual suicide the anniversary of the assassination of
favored a “lie low” strategy that involved bombings on oil and gas facilities in Qasaylah, also provides some clues. In
building up its internal network and Marib and Hadramawt. Months later, the video, Ruhayqa, who is identified
recruiting new members, while the in March 2007, Ali Mahmud Qasaylah, only by his kunya, states unequivocally
splinter group—the Soldiers’ Brigades of the chief criminal investigator in Marib, that he is carrying out the attack for
Yemen—was eager to strike immediately. was assassinated. This would later be the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen. He
Further strengthening this theory were the first attack for which the Soldiers’ states that the attack is revenge for
reports in the Yemeni press of a split Brigades of Yemen would take credit the death of Fawaz al-Rabya‘i and to
between Hamza al-Q`uyati and two of in a statement released in February “expel the infidels from the Arabian
his colleagues, Nasir al-Wahayshi and 2008. 22 For its part, Sada al-Malahim, the Peninsula.” As he continues to deliver
Qasim al-Raymi, respectively the amir bi-monthly journal edited by al-Qa`ida his will, however, he mentions both
and second-in-command of al-Qa`ida in in the South of the Arabian Peninsula’s the al-Qa`ida Organization of Jihad
the South of the Arabian Peninsula. Yet al-Wahayshi, would later eulogize in the Country of Yemen and the al-
a closer examination of the evidence— one of the attackers, `Abd al-`Aziz Qa`ida Organization in the South of
statements, videos and attacks— Jaradan, in its second issue, following the Arabian Peninsula. He appears to
suggests that talk of an acrimonious his death in August 2007. The overlap use the names interchangeably, which
split within the current generation of of individual operatives such as this could mean that they are synonymous
al-Qa`ida in Yemen may be premature between the supposed two groups is for the members of al-Qa`ida in Yemen.
or misleading. The overlap of rhetoric some of the strongest evidence that The video definitively demonstrates the
and individuals is strong enough to the split, if it exists as such, is more a existence of the Soldiers’ Brigades of
indicate that the two groups are more tactical ploy than a divisive rupture Yemen as early as late June 2007, well
like loose cells of the same organization within the organization before the group first appeared online
than separate entities altogether. 19 in February 2008.
In late June 2007, Qasim al-Raymi
To fully appreciate this overlap, it is released two statements, one of which In addition to the rationale of revenge,
necessary to reexamine the history was a warning to the government. Ruhayqa’s desire to “expel the infidels
of al-Qa`ida in Yemen since it was Within days, these statements were from the Arabian Peninsula” is a common
reconstituted following the February followed by a suicide attack on a convoy theme among both al-Wahayshi’s group
2006 prison break. Of the original 23 of Spanish tourists in Marib on July and the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen.
escapees, three—Nasir al-Wahayshi, 2. This attack was also later claimed
Qasim al-Raymi and Muhammad al- by the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen. It
`Umda 20 —are still at large, according stated that the attack was in retribution “Although al-Q`uyati’s
to official government statements. This for the deaths of five individuals at the
information, however, is contradicted hands of Yemeni security forces 23 ; one
death is a significant blow
by a fax sent by Yemen’s Ministry of of whom, Yasir al-Hamayqani, was later to al-Qa`ida, it did not
Interior to real estate agents warning eulogized in the first issue of Sada al-
them not to rent to any of the 33 at-large Malahim, which was released in January
defeat or even cripple the
militants listed in the fax. Included in 2008. organization in Yemen.”
this list are al-Wahayshi, al-Raymi,
and al-`Umda as well as Ibrahim al- The timing of the attack, following so
Huwaydi and Jamal al-Badawi, both of closely after al-Raymi’s two statements,
whom Yemen has repeatedly claimed suggests some level of coordination. For the latter, it has appeared at the
were in jail. 21 Likewise, the identity of the suicide top of all 13 of the group’s statements,
bomber, at least circumstantially, and has consistently been invoked as a
suggests a possible link to al-Raymi. reason for carrying out attacks. It has
Nicole Strake, “Al-Qaeda in Yemen Divided, but Danger- The bomber was identified as Abduh also appeared often in issues of Sada al-
ous,” The Peninsula, June 2008. Muhammad Sayyid Ruhayqa, a 21-year- Malahim. In the first issue it was quoted
19 The author would like to thank Thomas Heggham- old Yemeni originally from the district by Abu Hammam al-Qahtani, who cited
mer for a series of enlightening conversations, which did of al-Rayma, who was living in the it as the most important reason not to
much to help clarify thinking on this matter. Of course, eastern Sana`ani neighborhood of travel to Afghanistan or Iraq to fight but
any mistakes that remain are solely the author’s respon- Musayk. Like al-Raymi, whose kunya rather to stay in Yemen. 24 Abu Hammam
sibility. For more details, see “Yemen’s Two al-Qaeda’s,” Abu Hurayrah al-Sana`ani reflects his is the kunya of Nayif Muhammad al-
Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, August 21, 2008. birthplace, Ruhayqa was known by Qahtani, who has been linked by the
20 Al-`Umda, who is also known by the kunya Abu the kunya Abu al-Maqdad al-Sana`ani. Yemeni government to the July 2007
Ghrayb al-Taizi, appears to be the same individual who suicide attack against tourists in Marib.
writes under that pseudonym for Sada al-Malahim. 22 Jund al-Iman, “Statement 1,” Soldiers’ Brigades of The hadith commanding Muslims to
21 The fax, of which the author obtained a copy, is dated Yemen, February 24, 2008. The statement misattrib- “expel the infidels from the Arabian
May 25, 2008, and in addition to the five names listed uted the date of the attack, placing it in April instead of
above it also includes al-Wahayshi’s brother, Fahd, Nay- March. 24 “Interview with One of the Wanted Ones” (Arabic),
if al-Qahtani, seven Egyptians and a Jordanian. 23 Ibid. Sada al-Malahim, January-February 2008.
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SEPTEMBER 2008 . VoL 1 . ISSUE 10
Peninsula” is also cited in the second A similar occurrence happened in Saudi The 2008 U.S. Elections and
issue of Sada al-Malahim in a statement Arabia in April 2005 when a “bonus
explaining the group’s thinking. The issue” of Sawt al-Jihad appeared months Sunni Insurgent Dynamics
statement, which opens the journal, says after most of the organization had been in Iraq
that any infidel entering the Arabian eliminated. 27
Peninsula is fair game to be attacked or By Michael Gabbay
killed, regardless of whether they call The core of al-Qa`ida’s leadership in
themselves a tourist, a diplomat or a Yemen—al-Wahashyi and al-Raymi— more than five years after the U.S.-
journalist. 25 remain at large, as do a number of other led intervention in Iraq, the current
known militants. While it is difficult to election campaign season in the United
Al-Qahtani was also linked to al- quantify the remaining strength of al- States presents an opportunity for Sunni
Q`uyati’s Tarim cell through passports Qa`ida in Yemen in terms of numbers, Arabs in Iraq to show the American
and plans, which were discovered in the it does appear that the organization public their desires for a continued U.S.
safe house following the August 11 raid. remains capable of carrying out attacks. troop presence. Like American voters,
Subsequent reports in the Saudi media By far the most worrying indicator is the the Sunnis are not of one mind regarding
that al-Qahtani had received funding localized nature of al-Q`uyati’s cell. Of the U.S. presence. Events in Iraq during
from individuals in Libya and Iran the seven individuals killed or captured the U.S. pre-election period, specifically
is a likely distortion by overzealous in the Tarim raid, only al-Q`uyati was with respect to the level and axes of
Yemeni officials. 26 The preponderance known to security forces. This suggests violence, will help reveal the power
of evidence strongly suggests a level a diffusion of strength, which should balance among different Sunni factions
of cooperation and even coordination concern Yemen. Already there has been as well as which of the three conflict
between what some analysts had pegged discussion on al-Ikhlas about a new way logics—anti-U.S. insurgency, sectarian
as two separate groups. forward for al-Qa`ida in the aftermath civil war, or intra-Sunni factional
of al-Q`uyati’s death. In one widely struggle—is presently the dominant
Al-Qa`ida Remains Viable Threat in Yemen circulated letter of advice, a user on the organizing dynamic among Iraq’s Sunni
Although al-Q`uyati’s death is a site wrote that what was happening in population. Regardless of the results of
significant blow to al-Qa`ida, it did not Yemen reminded him of the fall of al- the upcoming U.S. presidential election,
defeat or even cripple the organization Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia. 28 To avoid a this information can help guide U.S.
in Yemen. Indeed, eight days after his similar fate in Yemen, he suggested the policy. In particular, the absence of a
death the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen selective targeting of security officials. 29 large increase in violence may signal that
posted its 13 th statement to al-Ikhlas. The What is clear is that despite al-Q`uyati’s the time is ripe for formal negotiations
statement, which threatened attacks in death, al-Qa`ida remains a significant with Sunni nationalist insurgent groups.
retribution for his death, was posted by security threat in Yemen. Overall, the divergent priorities of the
the same user in the same manner as the nationalist factions combined with the
previous 12 statements. This continuity Gregory D. Johnsen has written for a variety insurgency’s fractious history suggest
demonstrates that the group’s electronic of publications, including The American that continued factional struggles
infrastructure was not destroyed in Interest, The Christian Science Monitor within the Sunni community will be the
the Tarim raid. Instead, there are two and the Boston Globe. Mr. Johnsen has also most likely near-term dynamic.
possible explanations. advised the U.S. and British governments
on issues related to Yemen. He is currently A Nationalist Taxonomy
In the Soldiers’ Brigades of Yemen’s a Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern Studies The signals that will emerge prior to
13 statements, it has referenced three at Princeton University. the elections will result from power
separate brigades, crediting each with struggles and interactions between
different attacks. These divisions were three strains of Sunni nationalists—
originally dismissed by most as jihadist pro.-U.S. accommodationists, anti-
hyperbole designed to give an artificially U.S. expulsionists and anti-Shi`a
inflated sense of the group’s strength. It revanchists—all of whom, unlike the
is possible, however, that there is some global jihadists of al-Qa`ida in Iraq
truth in the claims of three different (AQI), place value on preserving the
brigades, which would mean that the integrity of Iraq but have different
Tarim raid destroyed one, but left the priorities within that context.
other two intact. The second likely 27 The author is grateful to Thomas Hegghammer for the
possibility is that an individual escaped reference. Pro-U.S. Accommodationists
the raid and has continued to post and 28 Posted on www.al-ekhlaas.net, August 19, 2008. The pro-U.S. accommodationist strain
threaten the government on the internet, 29 The suggestion was widely reported in the Arabic consists of Sunnis who have accepted
while lacking the necessary tools to act. media. See, for instance, Faysal Mukrim “Al-Qaeda in the need for a continued U.S. presence
Yemen is Incited to Target Leader in Security and Intel- in Iraq. Many are former insurgents
25 “Opening,” Sada al-Malahim, March-April 2008. ligence” (Arabic), al-Hayat, August 22, 2008. Strangely, in U.S.-backed militias known as
26 Muhammad al-Malfi, “Abu Hammam al-Qahtani Mukrim refers to the letter as an official al-Qa`ida state- Awakening (sahwa) Councils who have
Receives Support from Iranians and Libyans and Invites ment, which it is not. It is not clear whether the sugges- put their hostility toward the United
the Terrorists in the Kingdom to his Refuge on the Ye- tion of targeting security officials will be adopted by al- States aside, at least tentatively, and
meni Border” (Arabic), al-Watan, August 20, 2008. Qa`ida. are sincerely willing to give the political
13
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