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    standardization of operating procedures.                                       The Cormnander,       ~15th          Aviation

    Battalion, is required" to possess an aeronautical rating, maintain

    currency in technical instructions issued by USASGV or higher authority,

    and, ideally, is proficient in the aircraft assigned.                                          Senior US

    AdvisQrs and the ARVN ground forces commanders are not required to

    possess aeronautical ratings and other qualifications essential to
                                                                                                                 .1,:   ,

    cQmmand of military"aviationunits or i f rated, to attain proficiency

    in pertinent technical matters.
              ; ';

              c.              It would appear, therefore, that these control orinanagement

    practices are proper and dePirable and have no effect o~"theov'er-all

    control exercised by the ground commander.                                          As a further           iUustration

    of the advisability of this concept, the same kind of technical

    supervision is exercised by the Commander, VNAF, and Commander,
                                                                                                                             2nd Air


    Division, through direct channels to subordinate commanders.
    1    ~    ";';::          ,e,,: '.. .' ,         "              . ,.'   ,,'    '.
    6.        Reguirerm:. for J o5.nt ai1:lI.9..2l!!liw~£cti-"es:
    "   .
              a.              The complexiti3s of grour.d opel''',tior.:,: involving heliborne

    forces and tactical [,ir suppo:r>t., .Ihich includes                                    troop-~ar¢~g air':" :
    craft when appropriate, :llndicate that dtrect:!.v')sshouid be 'published

by COllUSNACV and the JGS ,; go'rern                                  r:;utualJ.y--ac~e~ted pr~ctices~:'

These directives shou~,d ch'tI'ify pro;~Edures for e,nploying' ~ir resources,

and they should insure th""t the emplo;y,nent of air resourc"es                                                 :Ls         placed

in proper perspective with relation to t;he employment                                           "ot, other" resb~ces
I       '.

in the conduct of the war.

              b.              In counterinsurgency) air operations is a principal means " or

    combating the enemy.                         \ihfJn the opportunity ie: p~e:3errted to employ air

8                                             . af) • (I Irt?· 6d+iFt ibtlrll                                   Annex'l"

              ,                       ,   ,               ii.,..!
                                   •e    g (f r : i .- ;9' T tIl? (      •
             resources to the limit of their capability, the operation should be
             planned accordingly with all other resources available placed in
                      c.   It may net be appropriate, in all cases, for        the~gro~d              commander
             to be responsible for conducting operations. Provisions should be
             made whereby the responsibility is           p~ced   on the individual providing
             the decisive resource. For exanple, on Eagle flight operations'the
             ground forces are not necessarily the decisive' resource.                       It i3 con-
             ceivable, in fact, that, through proper e6ployoent qf air power, tho
             enemw can be forced to capitulate without resistance to the transported
             troops.        This would indicate that the c=der of the transport heli-
             copter should be given the over-all responsibility for the operation
             and would request support from such other appropriate resources as
             needed.        It is apropos that the designation of individuals as the
             persons responsible for the conduct of the operation does not require
             changes in current practice. The only clarification required is that
             necessary to identify the individual as the person with the authority
             to request support as the occasions arise •
             7. nea$eeents for Airborne COFlll'e rui Pos;!a In current practioe there
             are no jOint:.1hplicll.tions in the use of a 00-1 as an airborne coJDlllalld
             post. for a ground forces commander. The location of the command post
             is not material to his responsibility in the employment ot air
             resouroes, nor is it material to the procedures involved.                        Judicious'
             use of radio fllCilities potentially available in the lIH-lshould .
             enhance the success not only of the ground operation but of tqe
                                                .        . . - "(I/4L

                                         ~ I,       /YP?DCJIW- ..... /

                                                                            . ';   .~   .

                                                    .,                                           :.   .

         employment of air power as well.   There appears to be no purpose
         to .atest program except to marry hardware to the aircraft.           Such a
         program would be of unilateral concern to the U.S.   Army 11110      is res ..
         ponsibie for providing communications and other such equipment needed

         by the ground forces commander.



                                                  ,~   ,.



                                              <'   ','

                                                                  '- •

                                                SECQHP>.uR. DIVISION
                                                                       ·flrm··..';., .
                                                                     ....   ,1. i•
                                                                                 .. k'
                                                                                                  ,   ,

                                               THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE
                                              UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
                                        APO 143, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA:

-.r.   !Qc


      '1'0: Chief. J01fJJ-V
              1.   Ref.rence ia mad. to your requ.llt for commenta on lIubject report;.
              2.   Th. r.port prell.nta findingll and concluaionll which could to
              invalid and COlltly decillionll.
              3. No attempt waa made in the report to compare the armed helicopt.r
              with the fight.r bClllb.r in termll of COllt and ettectiv.neaa. It is
              admittedly difficult to arrive at preciae quantitative reault. 1n .uch
              .tad.i... However, a qualitative approach to the problem would have
              been useful for evaluation purpoees. There are several areas of int.-
    , a discunionof which, oriented in termll of cost and ett.cth.n••••
              would have provided a more objective evaluation. Some exampl.s of
              point. of int.reat are initial costs, operating coats, tactica .. vuln.r,:"
              abilit;y, weapons aelection, and flexibility.
              4 •. Dir.ct comparisons of the initial COstll of the UH-l and the AlII or.
              the '1'-28 ar. rath.r IItraightforward. Th. $285,000 cost of the UH-l i.
              .everal timell that of the klH or the T-28. Generally speaking. initial
              coste of aircraft IIYStllllll are highly correlated with operating cost.. .
              Jlxpenaiv. aircraft require expenllive maintenance 1n termll of part ••
              additional ground IIUpport equipment, and the manpower ef'fort required
              to k.ep the operational ready rate at an acceptable level. In this
              regard, a .ignificant level of combat ~e can compound the 'problem
              stUlf'urther. (This will be discuesed later 1n terme of vulnerabilit;y).
              An. analysill .ot comparative operating coets could well 1ndicate a tactor
              approaching that ot the 1nit1al cost difterence, depending of course
              on the amount otattrition and combat suffered.
          S. Th. ef'fectiv.nees ot an aircraft in a combat role is a tunction of
          tactica, vulnerabilit;y and weaponll .effectivenesll. The UH-l, when used
          all an armed e.cort, ill· constrained to fly at a .low IIpeed and at a low
          altitude in th.landing zone area and deliver machine gun and rocket
          fire against whatever defense the enemy may have in that area. i1h. leVel
          or thisdefenss, when it exillts, variestrom a few ill-armed 1naIargent.
          in' eXpo••d positionll to mt.ny' troops w.ll emplac.d in. a tr.e-line and
          equipped at least in part with automatic weapons. In the latt.r ca•• ,
          the .ff.ctiveness of machine guns and rockets f.iredtrom the UH-l ia
          III&I'Siz1alat best. Adde trom the difficulties involved 1n actually
          .ilhtins in the enemy positiona, the anti-personnel etfects of the UH-l
          weapona are far 1'rOlll optimum.
              6. The arra;y   of weapons available to the tighter bomber ia an importan~
              corusideration. In I4dition to rockets and mach1ne guns, the fight.r
              bClllber can carr;y far· more superior anti-personnel weapons to 1nclude
              the 20 pound fragmentation bomb, napalm, white phoSphoroua bClllb. and
              grenad.s, and. a veriet:.;yof general purpose bombs. The white phoephorou
              a.g.neral purpose bombs can be fuzed to eXplode above the gro~ even
              att.l' penetrating a canopy. Thill capability adds considerably to
              their value as anti-personnel weapona. SUch comparisons should be
              included 1n linT study of the relative etfective~esll of two s;ysteme •

                                                                                    ..        '

                    ClNFIDENT'IAL ()

 7. Jinother area of effectiveneM that must be kept in mind ie flex-
 bility. An examinati.on of paet operations shows that many heliborne
 operations do not encounter significant defenee in the landing zones.
 The tactic for eecorted heliborne operations is to employ five UH-l'e
 for each landing zone. If little or no defense is encountered, then
 the armed helicopter muet return to baee without contributing any-
 thing further to the conflict. The ellcort tact:i.c utilized by the
 fighter-bomber is to assign a minimum of two fixed wing aircraft to each
 landing zone. In thoee cases where a pre-landing softening up is not
 required, and if no enemy defense materializes, the epeed and range of
 the fighter bomber is such as to allow their use on other targets before
 returning home. This eort of flexibility i.s difficult to quantify,
 but it is nevertheless of value and should be cone ide red in any cost-
 effectivenes!I compar:i.son. In thi!! regard. the report states that only
 28% of the landing zones were contested. Thus, flexibility is a factor
 of con!liderable importance in terms of both cost and effectiveness.
 8. The UH-l is forced to present itself as a very vulnerable target
 in order to deliver what is called suppressive fire. In instancee
 where the enemy defense is determined, well emplaced and capable of
 generating B:·.gnificant firepower p the value of suppressive fire is
 questionable. The Ap Bac operation on 2 January 1963 is a case in
 point. This operation demonstrated the vulnerability of the heli-
 copter to a well directed and determined defense. The UH-l is as
 vulnerable to hit!! as any other helicopter. A cost and effectiveneslll
 approach to the problem would consider the impact attrition and battle
 damage has on operations. The report indicates that a large part of
 helicopters forced down can be recovered. This is undoubtedly true,
 but only at a large cost in materiel. manpower and combat operations
 in general. In comparison, the fighter bomber delivery tactic is at
 relatively high speed, a factor that tends to minimize the effective-
 nese of defense fire. This item cannot be too strongly emphasized,
 for attrition and heavy battle damage are factors that contribute
 significantly to cost - effectiveness comparisons.
 9. Some statist ice that are useful in making effectiveneee comparisons
 are contained in the report. Others are available from USAF and VNAF
 sources. The report impliee that there is II. eignificant statistical diff-
 erence between 0.011 hits per combat support hour,.the pre-test period      .
 figure, and 0.0074. the test period figure. The operation at Ap Bac
 demonetrated that a difference of only 0.0036 in the "hits per combat
 eupport hour" ie moet likely well within the sampling variance expected
 in normal operatione. The validity of "hits per combat support hour"
 as II. etatistical index i3 d.iscul!sed later.
 10. The 1,779 combat hours flown by the UH-l's were generated by 3.382
 combat support sorties (eee page 2, Tab 1). an average of about 31.6
 minutee per eortie. Such II. low figure suggests that forward baees were
 utilized frequently for combat operations. For if we allow three minutes
 in the landing zone, the remaining round-trip t:!.me of 28.6 minutee puts
 in base only about 21.5 miles away from the landing zone at an average
 ground speed of 90 knots. In addition. the average number of eorties in
 t~e 257 landing zones must be 13.1.   If we assume that, on the average,
 5 UH-l'e were used per lift, then the 13.1 UH-l sorties per landing zone
 indicatee an average of 2.6 lifte per landing zone.

     ANNEX 2

                         (('"f tD·e· ,U I'1I"I'A··t.'· ()
                            ~':I~~ ~ 'I~ J , " , . J:~;- I~    ~   '~,

                                                ,; !Dill! II

      11. The report states that 28% (73 of 257) of the landing zones were·
      contested, and that 246 casualties (presumably killed !l!!! wounded) were
      inflicted on the insurgents in these 73 zonell. If we assume that the
      UH-l'lI were responsible for 100% of the casualties, then we find that
      there were 3.4 casualties per landing zone contested. Since there were.
      on the average, 13.1 UH-l sorties per landing zone, we find that there
      were 0.26 insurgent casualties inflicted per UH-l sortie in landing zone.
      contested. In tel'lllll of total landing zones this figure is reduced to
      0.07 casualties inflicted per UH-l sortie.
      12. B;y any objective measurement, the UH-l is not an effective callualty
      producer. In the time period coincident with the armed helicopter test.
      the VNAF inflicted 0.9 casualties per sortie and the USAF training
      detachment inflicted 1.7 casualtiell .p!!: lIortie. These figures include all
      interdiction and clolle support sorties, not just those that resulted in
      casualties. The combined figure is 1.2 casualties per sortie. a factor
      17.1 times greater than the 0.07 casualties per UH-l sortie.
   13. It is stated that in the 28% of the landing zones that were contested.
   the defense varied from light to relatively intense. The fact that the
   UH-l's were able to inflict only 0.26 casualties per UH-l sortie in landing
   zones defended indicates that in the majority of instances the en~ defense
   was not determined and not well manned. Further. lIince there were IIlUltiple
   lifts into the landing zones (the data indicates an average of 2.6 l1fts
   per landing zone). it is thought that in the majority of cases defense'was
   encountered only on the first lift into the zones. Certainly. in the casell
   where'this occurred, subsequent lifts into these zones served to accumuiate
   combat support hours without the danger of incurring helicopters hit.
   This factor, of course, reduces the value of "h:Lts per combst hour flown"
   as a valid statistical index.
   14. The significant difference demon8trated between the UH-l and tixed
   wing aircraft a8 casualty producers .reflects directly on the comparative
   eftectivenells ot the two sY8teme. It cannot be logically argued that the
   UH-l ill intended only to suppresll defense fire and therefore should not
   be rated in :l.ts capability &8 a casualty producer. 1lhe fighter bomber :l.s
   demonstrably effective a8 a casualty producer. and in the process ot
   producing casualties (destructive fire) it necessar:!.ly :l.s an efflc:l.ent
   detense-fire suppressor.
      15. In sUllllll&tion, the report does not demonstrate from a cost -
      effectiveness viewpoint that the UH-l is an acceptable vehicle in the
      role for which it was tested.
      16. We already have an in-country capability that is demonstrably
      superior to the UH-l as a casualty producer. The utility ot the
      fighter bomber ill such that this is only ons of the many roles it can .

/s/Rollen H. Anthis                                                           I
      Brigadier General. USAF

AJRElt' 2
                         CONFIDENTIAL                                 ()
                           OFFIG~ OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
 ASGV .                                                                lS June 1963
 SUBJECT:     Operational. Evaluation of Armed Helicopters

 TO:          GOIIIIlIanding General
              Joint Operationa Evaluation Group, Vietnam
              APO 143~ Uo B.Forces

      1. This letter is in response to your verbal requeat for . . informal
 reaction to three difterem.. aete of comments on the Final. Test Report on
 the Operational Evaluation Of Armed Helicopters:

            &.;    Draft Annex    itA", JOEG-V cOlllllents,;
            'II.   Draft Annex ItBIt,' JOEG-Vi cOllllllenta.

            Co .   GOllIJl1ents by 2nd   .Ur   Division.

      2 •. It is unfortunate that 1 did not have the opportunity to partielpat.
:in the preparation ot ACTIV'. report nor had I been requested to cOlllll1ent on
ACTIV'a report. Theretore, it is difficult for me to give you a clear t.nal.ya1e
of the CClllllumts of the report without cOIIIIIIenting directly on the basic report.

      :3. There .,re several are.. in the discussion part of the draft Annex ,
with which I di~ree and theae are discussed :in                acme
                                                           detail in the attached
:inclosure 1. . However, tocOllllllent specifically on thOBe parts ot theilEv'alu-
ation" paragraph pertaining to tactica, I agree that paeeive meaeureill and
at.her weapons relources IllUlllt be used .. available. I also agree that sup-
prelsive tires should nat. normally be uaed unlea. there 111 villual indication
ot t.he enllllq'.
     4" I have personally observed a number of the.e minionlll and it :i:..ve17
apperent to me that clollle oblllert~tion ot the landing area, :1mm.ediate~etiolil .
to insurgent activitiea, and accurate and lIIustained machine gun and rocket
tire can be provided much more ettectively by an Umed helicopter than any .
other type a.1.rcraf't now available. No part Of the dilllcullla;\.ori :in Annex A
explains how fighter-bamberlll could provide the . . . desree of cover nor 1.
there any count ot Viet-Gong caeualt1e1ll 1ntlicted by f1ght;er-bamberll by which
a compariaon with the armed helicopter'lII effectivenelllll can be madeo
      5. It should be' recognized that during the period of th.' Armed Heli-
copter Evaluation, the Rules of Engag_nt llev4lrely reatricted th!l evaluat~oD
ot additional concepta ot employment and future potential.. In thtil tina1. .l)!iIO
weekll of the five month period, the rulea "ere mOd:1ti!!d' &nfiI. IlUbselplently n_
tactics and techniques were explored lIIuch all the "'gle Concept- which full.7
eubatantiated the ettectivenes. ot the armed in the eecort role.
This concept employ. tour armed UH-la with tOtll" thl'lliport UH-ls a. armed re-
connai$lllance. Allan exmple, the "Eagle Flight ..· Open.tion. near Sac Lie1l..
Republic of Vietnam, on 22 M&f 1963, rellU1ted :in !SixtY-lIeven... (6,() Viet -_."
                                                                             .     .
captured and thirty-three (33) killed with eighteen (1.S) V1et..,(!~ ~poM
captured. There were no triendly callualtiea in thial operatiOlli.·                .

                    COFIDENTIAL                                       ()
                        ! XlMJL-,., -3   t   I

 ASGV                                                                      18 June 1963
 SUBJECT: Operational Eval.uation        or      Armed Helicopterll

      6. The armed helicopter can perform effectively not only in the eecort
 role but aleo appear. to pos.e.. a nrietr of unexplored capabilities. We
 will coJ1'\:.inue to explore these new tactic. and technique ••
        7. . I have no .pecific CClllll1ellt. concerning Annex lIB" on 'cOllJlD&lld, control,
  and. cOllllllUllicatione. J3 hae prepared a draft directive which a.eigne mo.t of
  the aviation a ••et. to the operational control of the Senior CorplI Advillor.~
. I agree that these joint and cOlllb:l.ned <lirectiVi' are needed to clarity pro-
  cedure. for IIIIIploying air re.ourcee.
       8. There are several point. I would me concerning the 2nd
 .tir divi.ion'. analytill. I question it there ls anyt.hing to be gained by
 direct comparison. between the tDI-l and the '1'-28. The.e aircraft are d,i.-
 111m11.r in both Ute and effect. Draft Annex A even admit., quote, "Th.
 UH-l lIupprellisive fire. and fighter-bOlllber destructive fire eannot be deliver-
 ed sumultaneoullly for of air .arety,· Coat/effeetivene.. in terme or                  .'
 dollar. required to produce a,.1ia.valty 111 not meaningful. for the UH-la lIince
 thill ill not their misslon. Their misllion 18 to protect the helicopter.. The
 UH-la have,saved dollar. in terme or helieopj;us an1 human lives. It would
 be 1mpoe.ible to all lie•• the '1'-28'. e!fectivene•• in th1e role.
       9. I further question the nUdity of the statistice quote<l on casual.
 tie. produced by the '1'-2811. I have not obeerved a .ingle callualty in the
 landing lIone that resulted trClll '1'-28 action, ~Ue I have perllonally obllerved
 between 35 and 50 callualties attributable to the UH-l armed helicopterll on
 ellcort mi•• ione.
        1(;). The 2nd Air l)ivi.ion'. cClllllllentll etated thAt the UH-l isa very "
 vulnerable target in the delivery or .upprellllive fire. Not a sillgle UH"l
 has been lOillt while pertorming tuppre.sive tire mis.ions. It might be
 interesting for JOEG-V to make an objective ~ison on·loslle. between
 '1'-28s and UH-le.                                         '

                                                 /./J .W. stilwell
                                                 /t/J. W. STII..I.1m.L
                                         Brigadier General, US Army

                     CCNFIDENTIAL                          ()
                I                        J£2 ~:s:a;. "~,,,,~

                      APO 143, San Francisco, California

                        DETAILED COMMENTS ON ANNEX ~


     The overall conclusion of the evaluation of the test ot the Armed
escort tor transport helicopters was that the protection ot the transport
helicopters. was seldon needed and that the liuppressive tire mould be con- as the last r8ll0rt tactic being employe\:! primarily from troop
carrying h.licopters •.

     I woUld have to agr.e that the us. of sp.c1&l tor escort
is expensive and should be used only whenn.eded •. »owev.r, it has been the
only method found to date which can etfectively the .nemy's fire.
Although it is needed on only a small psrcentage ot the missione, it is im-
possible to predict the specific occasion of ns.d. It it hadn't b.en avail-
able on many occasions, the 10•••• would have b.en moet eXpensive in liv.s
and h.licopt.r••

     Based upon .tatistics in the ACT IV Report and comments by the
IlUpported unit, a v.ry d.finite conclusion oan b • •d. that armed h.lioop-
t.r. were a most eff.ctiv. means ot protecting tranllport helicopt.r •• i. quit. obviously no mean. wherebytranaport h.lioopter. can
be proteoted oompletely under ~ conditionetl1ro~out the h.libome
operation.. 'llhrough a t.ntative Joint Agreement, wtth the 2nd Air Div181on,
the respon.ibilit.i88 ot escort delineated. The armed h.lioopter. were
respon.ible one minute trom the landing zone which is normally the commence-
melt of the approach, the landing zone it ••lf, and one minute a.tter 4epa~
tur. of the last1!ran.port helicopter trom the landing zon.. Although this
period i. of rath.r short duration. it 11!1 the most. critical portion of the
heliborn. operation.

     Enrout. protection 18 virtually unneceseary if the h.liborn. torc. i.
at an altitude ot or abOve a. tar II.". the enemy's pr.sent capabil-
ities areconc.rne4. Th. number ot hite SUI1!a1nedat altitude .nroute to
the landing zone IUbst.ant1&tes that tact (Section j, Appendix 3, Figure 2h
U the heliborne command.r .l.cts to tly at OOntour, then .nrouteprotec-
tion ;I.e_s.ntial. Thi. _y b. n.cenary to .xploit .urpr:\.ee. This is notor
fea.ibl. sinc. we poe •••• the Decoa navigation system. ~he .tatement in
Annex itA'" that enroute prot.ction ( ..cort role) ,\>y"the armed helioopter "Wae
abandoned" i •.. incorrect. The only vehicle which 9an provide any degree of
prot.ction to the helibome torce at contour i. the armed helioopter.
T-2Ss "S" turning in front otthe formation ha.:r'4ly be con81dered to
be a. effective and responsiv~ as the armed h,Uoopter flying in the same
4irection, altitude, airsp.ed, and adjac.nt to the transport helieopter.

     It is quite true that for the initial portion ot the test period, the
UH-U did lack significant epee4, however, thie point 1e irrelevant, as it .'
va. not considered teasible to attack a target once the tran.port formatiOn
was put the insurgent tire. Realistic protection ooUld have been attorded
if the target wae engaged prior to its placing tire on the transport forma-
tion. Due to the nature and taotic. ot the insurgent. this was virtually

                     CDNFIDENTIAL                       ()

DETAILED Op~WAIDJEr- "A:"       errant rdj
impo.aible to accampli.h by any On numeroua occaaions the pre.ence
of the T-28 "5" turnin8 in tront at the transport did not deter the insur-
gent from firin8 on the transports aa they paBaed. The only recourae _a
to engage the tar8et with ,,_ing fire" from the tran.port and armed heli-

      In only three of the aeventy-a1ght combat a.aault mia.ion. flown by
the UTTH Co during the ACTIV test period were force. encountered of platoon
.ize or larger. Fire waa norma1l1 recieved from one or two individuall
.cattered along the route to the l;anding zone itself. Thill makes it obviou.
that there i. a need for an aircraft on the edge ot village. or adjat!:lmt to
I;leavily populated area.. The u •• ot napalm and tragmentation bomba :''bould
hardly b. conlidered to be di.criminatin8 ordnance. However, larger forcea
e.g., Ap Hac, hav,! been encounterlili and all available tire support w," needed.

      The armed hel»optBr i. partidularly eftective againet em&ll groupe
enroute or in the landing zone. ~en conlidering that in the majority of
millliona, thi. _II! the type ot taxiget engaged, the armed helicopter played
a very .1gnific~ role. Unle •• ~ediate re.ponaivene.e ill attected on
thi. type of inaurgency tire, ~ewill be inflicted on the tran.port.
and the inaurgenh will "lIIelt awai" before the ,target can be marked and
engaged by tixed wing aircraft.


        e author ate that other fi     eu ort gan. are available to the
airmo ile forcee 0    nder in add t on to t e UH-l armed helico er.     Thie
i. correct, and ba    n the ca b lit ot eac all meane of tire eu orr-
.hould be ,incor oated into the 'rmob e ta t.ical lan However, each mean.
haa it. limitatio   reqUiring oth r meana 0 till the gap or provide comple-
mentary tire. A.moat airmobile perationa are conducted beyond the range
ot artillery, this muat be .upplanted by eupport that movea with the airmobile
torce. Tut resulta indicated that under condition. all the;r ex:1.t in the
Republic of Vietnam, thaUH-l heli~pter provided the most re.ponsive .upport
available to protect the tranaport helicopters enroute at contour and in the
;landin8 zone.
     It i. quite true that optimum munitions may not be available in
Vietnam; however, it iJ envi.ioned thet armed helicopter eftectivene ••
will al.o incr...e with better weapon. syatem..


     The author e.tabliahe. the point that airmobile operation. produced
low Viet-Cong casualty rate. in .ome 50 operationa, conaequently, airmobile
a&lault type operationa in general are unproductive and should be replaced
with .ome other tactic. The UH-l'. pnoductivity ehould not be measured in
 term. at Viet-Cong caaualtie., I:>Ut should be mea.ured in term. of the num-
ber ot transport helicopter. and friendly per.onnel nved. There Wat no
alternative tactic lllM.ated. bther tactic. will be tested at they are con-
ceived and developed. The author atate. that it an airmobile asaault 11
successful and contact 11 made with the enemy, al in Ap Sac, a determined
enemy can prevail over the capability ot the llH-l tactica. Although pre-
aented before in '\teat report number.3. Operational Evaluation of Armed
Helicopter., the fact. lurroundingAp Hac need to be pre.ented clearly.



                     CONF iDEf4TliAcL
                    CDNFIDENTIAL                         ()


A review ot thi. document Show. that t.ctic.l .urpri.e had been loat prior
to the .rriv.l ot the trimapert. in the landing lone. Aleo, the UH-l'a were
.quipped primarily with locally t.bricated weapon. aTat_ and lacked the
fleJdble machin. sun. capabilitT which hal proved .0 .ucce ••M in .ub ••-
qu.nt operatione. F1nal.l.y, atter the UH-l'. dilcoftred and reported the in-
surgent pee1tione eno_a quantit1e. ot tiDel wing power and artillery
were dropped on the.e po.ition. with little ettect.
        Generally it _.t be agreed that the lIIIe ot auppre •• ive tire aa it 1a
nol'llllilly conceived 18 not the //IO.t .tt.ctiv. Danner in which to inflict
casualtie. on an .n~; how.v.r, the inlurgent war conduct.d in the
Republic ot Vl8tl1llll 1.a b.ill8 tought ma1nl.7 againat gu.rrilla. in unprepared
po.itiona who•• onlT cover 18 a tr•• line or ric. pad4T     dik..
reliatanc. in the landing lone 18 confined to a _11 .rea which can b•
• aturated with••uppre8liv. tire it the e1tuation warrant ••
     It hal alway. b••n accepted doctrine to plac. artill.ry IUpporting
tire. on prepared po.ition. during the //IOvemant to the po.ition, note
for the prUlary purpo•• ot inflicting c••ualt1e., but to .uppre•• en~ re-
      Th. author 18 correct in hl8 aaaumption th.t heliborne operation.
are //lOR .t low altitude.. Likni•• ,.n infantr,man is //lOR
vuln.r.ble when ....ulting the .n..,'. poaition. It maT b. n.c....ry
to .ccept thes. ri.k. to .chiev. .urpris. and it is impo••ibl. to conduct
h.l1borne operations without operat1ll8 .t low altitude. during the approach,
:lAnding, and d.parture trom the landing Ion.. In.aDe c••e. it 1a even
n.c ....ry to fly enroute at cont.our l.val, IUch .a during period. ot reduced
visibility, ehort turn around mi••ion. when it 11 not pollible to climb to
altitude )letore reaching the objectiv., and the dictate. ot the
which mai tavor contour .pproach.

                            ONFIDENTIAL                              ()

                                                                           25 ~ 1963

 Daar. CIeaC&l. Terk:
      I q,. lUt&1'd bxIIm all . counties in answer to your .letter of Pebrua1'7
 18 to 1118' 'CODeel'D1rlc C'IIIe4I helicopters. I ~ that Cpl.oJI.el LII44 saw
 fit to .-rr.r W.anawer to ;you tirellt1tiUd q,. 'ac~ b¥ to:preach
 ldm a l1ttle . . . . . . . .t "b'ee~tDc". lIImrftr. I eo1Ul~_ his _ -
 _ts eossat anA I conour with tIil8Ia; tl1us._f,jNat ·bum ~. Men doDe.
         I III eDClos:l.Dg as tabs to this letter, the reactioas of the senior
  ..snsors of both c11v1sions in the 4th Oorps, u vel.l as :t!Iose' of the Air
  ~sOD()ff1cers. I will malte no apolos;tes t.or- the ~rs in ""...... _
  qatax. the ll1at'WI between the ~ of Col V4IDD aD4 the arri'Y&1 of
, Col Xeleher in the 7th D1v1sion acCCll1lt.ts tor _    r!llllllZ'll:8 tnm t'IIat. UBit
  be:l.Dg siped by the.1I-3. '. AU pe.rtiescGlWe1"DClt were ~.ea. to qUery
  theirQOl2Dter,.l8l'ts ·in "','8114 ·lmQr·u to their tboupts 011. the 'Val_ fill
  the armed helicopters.                                                            .

         Is I told;yw, I sh,wldwelcClllllt ~8I'W.t1oa to. the.-l!M'Lof .....
 :pollS  with which to figbt the          va,
                                        to include a achille to throIr rocks,
  i t developed. I consider that the C'IIIe4 heliCO)ter 1s invaluable in. this
  c_t17. ,,.dDst an enem;y whollu lleithercJ;r power nor                  a1rtit:--
  JOII.S {except :pr1m1tive ones). The armed hel1copter cGlllplements the :f'1xed
.v:Lns. fishter ID4 should in.DO cue SlllJPl.aut it, in DI1' op1n1on. Both tIIl-
  t1ll cClll)at aeea.s. which, tho1Ish DOt 1IIIltuall,y exclu1ve. can be.t be sat1s-

  fied 'by '!;he hel1clJlter or the fishter. 'Dut.t the 1ft has maIIe 1Jrv&1.uable
  eAd1t1ons to the CGlllbat potellt1&1 in the delta ~t be ~ed. L1ke ~
  other. new wea,poII.S sys:tem, 1t       prov1ua.. .1D4 actual clllllibat 1. the best
          I hope to sea you 8i$1n         SOOB.

 'lab A - 7th J);Lv rt'llllU'lts                  /s/   .JOHIl P. OODOR
 tab I. - 21st' D1v reuaalits '                        JGIIf l? tJOP'O'8
 'lab c: - IV 00r.\iS 4JJJ rt'IIIIU'lts             . C:oloael" Iataatr,y
                                                     . 8eII.1or .A4v1.or


                               CONFIDENTIAL ()
                                                             ,.. ,.. ,24   .....

J'.Ue 10.                    SUbJect
JUlII..Je.O'I                 Amed Jlelicopters
G3 Nlv                     ;~i!IW.'V'
                           01£..        "~.'
                                     .• ,"'."
                                                                  18 ~ch 1963
                                                                                   Oaaaent Ifo 1
IV Co1'p8                   ". 7th ntv

     1.let~ce letter 19 Feb 1963 :f'J:'OIII ~ CJen York to Col aozmor 8114 our
telecon 18 Mech 1963.                                    ,
      2. Copies of the basic document were s8lft to tield UD:I.ts for c 'nt. !rhe
COlUJeJI8USof the.e UD:I.ts is tlIat they have bad little or no cP.PortUD:l.~ to obsene
the. ut1l1zaUon of the &rIlIed b.elicopters since helibol'll8operat~OI1II s:lJlce Oct.o\)er
1!l'21n this mAl:ia've beennegUgible.                          " .

         3. I I:ia've perllcnlp"Y accClllWen:1ed ~ &med h.:U,c~oJlat 3,...t s1& II1s-
s:l.OI1II of 1Ihich on. two OCCUiOl18 W'e,we1'e able to e~th~ Y:tet'aoac in the landilll
lOne. Based 011 this PlCJ8r1ence tactor_ our cotrveri&:I;1011 :tII,1,a ~. I vill
turn1ah the :tnto require,.
       4. Answer, to CJen Torklsquestions __amed helicopter em;pl.oymeDt:
              (1) What Q)ntribution, if 8Jf¥, hCvethe IIZIIIIiId heliC!O)1:ers me.i'Ie to oper-,
                .1,.- !rhe armeet helicopters ·l!avo·sri&tl3' tacUitateet helicopter oper-
ations 1n the 41st _ due to their great 1IIdIbil1ty ancl tlre poilU' at the.tiIIe .
ot sr-test Q8ecl" in the l.aDding zone. A1~'~ perICIIIIIel: tMltqt the _-j,f;
is l:tDd.tecl in t1re :power this taUs to stress that the . . . . 1 . ce,v8'bJ.e of re- .
·'ining in ~ lan"1»g area and fLr1111 Q)tl.tin.1ulWJ· ~..:l.V8 tire fer 25-30 JDin-
utes. .MatI;r aA'vocates of t:I.xe4 viJIC aircratt po:tnt out tbat they 1CO continne to
t1re tor aoIaetb:tng in excess ot cne hour which does not take :tato consideration
that this aircra:f't can onl3' ~ tor sClllleth:LlIIlike one IIIinIlte :ta 8Jf¥ given pass
at the target t The amecl heliaopt~s luWe ilUectesslf'ull3' accompl:tahecl m1s81one and have
been used 1n lost aircra.t'l; search m1ssiOns.
              (2) Do the.e..A1rcra:f't pertorlll a flmction that CCNl.d DOt 'better 'be per-
tormed   by    the fixed 1I1ng a:l.rcraf't1 in cwnt17f
                                                     ,   .
                A .. The extreme versat~liw__ :t:l:repo._ .. UJ'lIed ~_e this
helicopter·:t'f,r more desirable tbazl.·Clzed'1I1ng aircraft as troop. ·~escwt.
aircratt at the tiDle ot I_UDg. In .      ..w.t1011, 'j;.hehelicopl;er has the ~tiocal
~tas;e ot remaining lItf:~ the .trooP.c~ helicQters1Jl the v:tc1D:ttyot. the
QII 1IhicJr greatly tacilltates coordil:laUOn to:!.' JD:!.88ioU' that".,... IIOt pre-pl anned.
              (3) Is. there requ:f.rement tor both IPoimed. helicopter.e .,.cl fiXed 1I1ng air-
            A - 4t the prelieJ:lt tiDIe tlae:re is a req.,.' rD~ tor both &l'III8Cl hel:t-
copters andt1xed 1I'1ng u.i'Q~. .It· su:tticient· amed helicopte:l's '.".re avail&ble



                            ,.ee14P'II5!fffl:A:' !giL
   ·   ,
                                                      ,I.         d.

, MAG'J.'B-Ja-of                                                              l8 March 1963
 SUBJJlC'l: AIwd. JleUoopten
 to double the m _ _ oteaoon u.lI'Ontt it CO\Il.d. COIlOe1'VUlw' be PH.lble to el1Il-
 lD&te q', req\l1J'tMlat toll' tI.xe4 villi aill'Ontt except tor IIOmal air .trike••
               (4) ID ,... opJ.tOll, vllat 1. tbe proper role ot .,..4 helicopter8 aD4
 fixed     villi a1I'cntt ia _te~ operatiOll8f                       '

               4 - !be . . . . helicopter has a detlD1te role iA counteriDauraenc:y
 operatiOll8 iA 111••10118 .. &1"" ia (1)..... ID I&d41tion W8 cn',..uzatioll has
 workecliA CCIIl,1U11OtloD vitia tbt ,1tb Iel. Co to dev1ae addit:l.OD&l 1'&141ne 11118810118.
 A copJ ot W. teoIIII1p IIU be8II "Ilt to 10\11' Q3 .ection IIIl4 0118 to the 51th
 Hel Co. I teel tbat tI.xe4 villi u.1'CI'att tor COIW8IItiOD&l air .trike 1111.&10118
 8houl4 cOllt1mle to M nt1Iin4. !be:reo , 'Ildat1oD .1Ioul.4 det1D1 telJ be Md.e to
 reque.t additiOD&l . . . . be1100ptere toll' use iA Vletliea after the teat pel'104 1.

                                          '8/Elmer F. Fau8t
                                           /t, ....   r.rMJl'l'
                                              lfIJor, Art1llel7
                                              G3 Mv1.or

                                  CDNFIDENTIAL                                                          I

                                          I IF I in _UIII . . IZLJ2 •   liM"

                                      U.S. AWISOIl'!Y ll:ml~
                                       21st llItlil1l1try m visiOll!.
                                            BIs\Cl Lieu,   V:ie~

                Senior M.viso:~
                IV Corps


        1.     Retla:lt'el!l.Cle: .Letter from Gem fork     to Col ammor i!a.ted l8 Feb 63.
        2. .Introd.1:lcton a_nts: The cOlIIDlents of the Seltl10r M.visor, 21st
Dl.v:1s1Q1l IlilllBt ~'"~o1tlllidered ill! the light of' this div:l.s:l.OII1lI experience which
i8 lUlited toti~ lower De.ltlll £r8lll, south an4 west of: the B,Us$C River.
 Generillly, the tell:'nl:!.ll1 ;Ls extreme1;y fll!l.t N1d seldom Jlll:)re thI!I.II1 4 to lO feet
above sea level. The greater part of the 1&1"_ is cul.t1'ftted rice fields
'Which U'1II baked iJ:q frClOl J~ to Jw:ile and :flooded to a depth of' 1 to 2
feet f'r0illl JUIile to JII\D.U8llt'Y'. llivers and c8lll1$ls IIll:'e 1:he _lilt preGC!!!!1ne.nt ter-
rain features with. the m&;Ior1ty of the lI'W."al po~tion l:l:v:!.ng :l.Jl!.extencled
T.I.lJ.ages elongthe banks ot the nte1l'il1llYs. Alililociated wi t.b. the watel'lliqs
and villages 111 the vegetation of the areil" pa.l.m ad 'bIl£lllDoO trees, 1n'oad
leaf' water plants IImd·1!.I!I&U ~ • Generlil.lly, etaChcual or
strM!1ll l:iu t.r1Dge of delllSe vegetation extending some 50·~ on each
side elong i t8 entire le!!i1:h.                                                      .

      At the soutl!ern tip of the ei!, Mau penilllS1.!l1fl, and aLODe; the southel!oSte.rJl
<lOUt there U'1II. ~ S'!I8IIiPS much are inwd&ted th:woughcmt the year aDd
cl!ariI.cterized by ooa"1Y ~ growth from 4 to'20 teet:in he1ght. livers
and strems are the olllly practical routes ot CClillllllWliCi!,t.1.OIIl in the !II8.iIi1'OYe
s"lllUllPs •

        The lower :!Deltill is heavily populated with po_aut tmms Dei fis_men.
~sepeople plenty of: tood but their stuwo. of: living is othei'Wise
quite lOll'.
        B1~ c.O!i1IIIWl.1catiOill south _d
                                        Wlllt ot the liIullac ru.",","i1fJ nJ.llltive1;y
lU!1ted and pm.eri!lly follow the periphery of' the area. _eating the
la,rger tows of e" Mt\u, lhc Lieu, Soc Trang, Clilntho, J.,oog Jtv,yenana, lIach
Gia. There are other 111D11ted road nets but they bee made unaaf'e
for trav~ by VCl act:tcm OJ!' a:r.e cut 1W4 ~ed beyol!ld :1.imraed:tate repa:l.r
and maintenmllAce       c~b:!.lities.

        The s;overmaw.t controls the eight principal tows. The VCl are !DOst
 aet:Lve in the tour westem IIIIlld southem provi1llCeil $lIIld the fU'therone is
removed :f'roDI the principle Www'I the IIiIOre cOll!lJ!!l.ete !II va :ll.X!J:f.l..uence over
 tlJ.e people. .It should 'be kept in lIdnd that much of' th:!.e area .of Vietnam
had Dot been under gove~t eGlIlt:rol 1'01' severilll. deCe.deIll" MeID;r of tile
llllOple are l!IOt only not Il;ympathetic to sovemm.e1l!.t ~ but they are not
eVen     clear~ IIIfi!,.1'e 01'   them.

  ..                     ([)N FlO E NTIAL                                           .   ()
                          --. .-_'.iii·"iiiii'·IIIi".'I I IUIlJiliiiiu.iu."'" "••

JWmf-BL                                                                                      18 March 1963
l3'Oll.JBC'l: Armed Jfelicopters

     The VC aft not us1l&lly encow:ltered in greater than CQII\P8II.Y streDgth
aDd are, for '!;he /BOst part, armed with small arms, a few autoDlatic wea,pQ118
hand grenade. aDd crude mines and "Launch liombs". The VC n01'lllall.y move aDd
aake their attacks during the l10urs of 4arlmess or in the late afternoon.
     In this setting, the forces of the ~d 'fact1cal Zone (21st Div, BaDger
Companies, Civil Guard Units and aoo) operate apfut the VietCong both
offensively and defensively and on occasions they lIavebeen supported b,y
amed l1elicopters in conjw:lction with hel1borne attacks.
     3. The following are the 21st Division Advisor,y J:letachmeDt answers
to the questions posed by the Cl11ef of JOBG? Vietnam:
              a.     ;t contribution i t      have the armed helico rs iaade to
9ll!l'1tionsf          armed l1elicopters have provide es.cort to'         ciliri"Yfrt«,
lutl,ieop1;ers in severalassault ,land1.ngs • Their presence l1as been a lIIOral,e
ra1s:\.llg factor to the soldiers involved in the assau]. t as they provided an
1lI!pressi:ve 1IIImediately aval1able fire power ca,pabil1 ty dur:\.llg the first
few IIIf.mltes of the landing operation. Their crews were tully aware of the
location of friendly troops being landed and it was \UlIl8cessary to ha'1f8 an
L-19 desiSll&te and, mark targets. When VC have beetl present during a l.and-
:\.IIg, 'llilepresence of the armed hel1copters UIldoubtedly forces them to be
partie\U.arly cautious and prevented the full a,pplication of their streagth
and firepower apinst the forces making the l&13(11 0 g. The facts that the
armed helicopter flys at a speed and altitude that permits relatively ac-
curatetaraet identifiCation and that the visibil1ty :from the pilots and
8 nnn·... ..aeattl is almost unobstructed sive this wea,pon an excellent ca,pabll-
i ty to work closely in.' ~tion with ground forces.                    .
               b. Do these aircrafts ;perform a :!'Unction that could not better
be performed b,y ilie fixed     w1n:d:  aircraft in countr;y% . Ss TaC1;1cal'                       zone
has only had the support of             6,B-l!6 and T-28 fixed wing aircraft (The
Mohawk l1as Dever been used). The greatest potential advantage to the
ground forCes provided by the armed helicopter is its ability to hover,
lIOVe slowly With the troops, turn upon its Own axis and rlq)idly change
the. direction of the supporting, fire. J'1xed wing aircraft caDl10t do
these th1ngs but the teChniques .of controll:\.llg the armed helicopters
have not been developed to the stage that their tullca,pability is util-
ized and in most cases they have not been as responsive toilllllediate Deeds
of the grOund. .,...,.der (or advisor with the grOUllCl. COI!!III.nder)as have the
 fixed w1ng~nratt. QeneraUy, the fixed·wing aircraft supporting a heli-
 copter land1ng are qu111e l:l.m1ted in number (2 to 4 plIaIes) and they I11118t be
 guided to the target b,y an L-19 (us1l&lly (IDly one IiMtUable). Besponseis
IIOt allRqs u futu m16ht be desired. The armed hel.icopters usually qper-
 ate in platoon strength (5) with each lift of troops and a:re present in the
 illlraediate landing area during the actual landing. Their fires are not con-
 trolled by the ground cGIIIIIIIaDder and they have often fired dur:\.llg land:\.llgS
 on t&raets that could !lOt be identified either at the time of landing or
 la1ler by the gl'oUlld commander. Vietnamese observers of extremely 1:l.m1ted
 o r . 'expeJ:'ience are provided to desiSll&te .._gets for U'1".rs (whether they
 actuall.y perform this :!'Unction is not known) ',In s1lllllllQ.17 there are :f'IQ1ct10ns
 the &\'IIIIlI,:\ hellcopt.-rs could perform that cllllllOt be performed b,y fixed wing
 airoraft; ~techniques tor the effective perfOl'lllllZlCe of these :!'Unctions
 must be developed, tejlted and a,pplied in operations. Foremost IIIII.OD8 the
 techniques to be developed is a requireJl1eDt ;for radim cQllllllW11cation between
 the ~ cOllllll&Dder (advisor) and the armed hel1~»tei's once the initial
 11ft of troops is on the ground. At present 'ijle armed hel1copters fire and

                         CON FlO ENTIAL                        ()
                           ~p a L.~~                    ,. '.j':~~~.

maneuver independently. Further, when the "rules Qf enga&eIDent W are mo41-
fied to perm!t armed helicopter support of ground (Iombat they should be
abl.e to perf01'lll aMi t10nal functions not wi th:l.n t~ scope of fixed wing
aircraft ca;pabil1ty.One example would be the carpab1l1ty of '.ding to
pick up the ground commander or his representative who could then point
out the targets diff1cult to identify from the air,,,

                                                           _rcraft.'!'he armed
hel1c.,pter provides a 81011 moving, h1gb:l.y maneuverable, heavily armed gun
;pla tf01'lll which oan provide excellent close support to groUnd troops and
hisblY cClllq)ata,ble escori. to troop and cargo helicopters providing there is
not a fixed wing el1elll1 threat to the helicopters. !I.'he slOll speed and
hovering ab1l1 ty malte it fairly vulnerable to ground fires 11' the el1elQ" is
encountered in strength or is prepal'ed to deliver anti-air fire. Itl\1 re-
lativlity llIII1ted range and orbit ca;pabil1ty over the combat area .restricts
its time on stations. At present it is not reB,POnS1ve to the ~com­
mander. The fixed wing aircraft has sufficient speed to malte it relat1vely
safe :f'ran ground fire as experienced in the Delta, it carries ,"variety of
o~ce and has excellent range and orb1 t-over-s,tatiOl1 cQ$b1li ty • .It 11
resPOllsive to the ~ o.ClilllllUders and its fire are quite aco.urate. Beo.ause
of the l1m1ted nllJD.~ ~le, resPOll,.e with fire sVH1Ort1s often stOWltr
than might be des1l:'abl.e.                                     '

             d. In Y!lF. op1nion what .1sthe J!!I!!l'role of tile armed hel:l.$spters
   d. fixed wi . 1'0. . in o.01ll1ter-1I1sur co. .0
 tha:     e 0.
                                                     e·.r      l .1 dO not c",,1der
                  1 0 the armed helio.opters in' CM. er-1asurgency operations
has b_ explOited. Here in Vietnam it has pla;yed tlie 11m1ted role of
 eso.rtto troop and eargo helicopters to include brief engagements with the Viet
Cons ... 1;be t:lme of &ctivi ties. In this IiI1ngle ~e they haft been
 ef~ct1ve, .but they could have beeneTen IIIOre effective had there been closer
liai80lnbetween the armed helicopter unit and the cround Units whose lanOillgs
they slqlPGrted. I developed the 1mpress1on that the pr1iDar;r interest of most,
:perslillUlel cCNIDected with the test was the armed he).1eopter to troop relationship
.... ..t.Ae chopper to troops employed relationship ..... an.a.v1s.or to the troops
vho debark fraa the choppers and rema:l.n in the assault ~a after the _:Pl*"s.
hare departed, I o.ons1dered the H-2l's and II-34's as_rely a means 5o'ptto the
fight and not an end .in th....elves. The G1ver-OIIIPhas1s em provision of max:1JInmI
protec:tiAn for the lII8A'IIIi- 11ttle attention W c.lkt support of the troops
 seemed to laO to be lIJlri:&l:1St1c. However, even in the1r'j>resentrestrtcted role,
they could he."flI' been more effective 11'c10ser liaisons"'re •• talll:(shed the
troops. Having participated in seores I0Il1' hel1born.operat:l.GII18~ I lUll convinced
that their cClDlpleteJ,y independent· at'\OaCks upon ground targets after the first
troop units are lliIInaed are not in accGlrd with sound m1l1 tary principles or in the
best interest of aUcGlllcerned. I believe it would be well worthwtnJ.e i f the
armed }J,'14opter units would' place a liaiSon. officer OIl. duty with the· 7th .and
21st l'M.viu.u tGI live with these units,blfoome f8lllUiar with the ground 81tua-
t10n _d advise both the divisions and his parent Unit on utilization I0Il1' armed
        Oth~ roles the armed helioopters couldporfol'lll ~('cO'l1Dtl."s1f the
"Wra,ps" are 'ever taken G1ff them. Among these other ~s,are.Cl.oses.pport of
ground treops. cOl1'VeY cover, rwte and armed reconna.:l.ssance, re.cue and evacu&-
t:l.o!l, ~tacks 1IJ.lOI1 selected targets, support of outposts under .ttack and sur-
veill_ee of area adJacent to· operat1G1118 to attack fleeing eneJQ'.
         nxed wing aircraft should pla.Y the conventional roles I0Il1' alose   ~r   support,
.cel1lJD.l1 cGver, _rial photogr~, armed l'!!ICPDa1l1sanee, etc.

                •                           3

   ,   ,
                          crlNFIDENTIAL                                               ()
                                                          ,"';'", ..."," ",','",.,. """ .!t.i<~'"

       4. There is cert&:l.nJ.y a role for both &il"IIISd helic opter s
 aircr aft in count er-ins urgen cy opera tions just as there is a and fixed w:IJIg
 tars and artill ery or ... ton truck s and 2l ton truck s. I f1rml.T tor both 1101'-
 allY effor t to prove that eithe r one shoul d or could                     belie ve that
                                                            perfo l'll all of the funct ions
 of the other wuld be a disse rvice to the Unite d State s Gover
 its place . The armed helic opter is in the embryo stqe of its         tllllellt. Iaoh JIu,
 I fors" a time in the :fUture when its succe ssor v1ll be a I808tdevelO:pDellt and
 poR to the U.S. Likewise the fixed wiDg aircr aft 'will                     valua ble wea-
                                                               contin ue its deVelop-
 meat and bas alre~ proven its worth in sever al wars and count
                                                                            less battl es.

                                                  /./__ _ r,. WID
                                                  " . '• • I"~ I . -
                                                     Lt Col, Infan try
                                                     Senio r .A4v1sor

                                      ' ..   ,'
      · ,
                                ONFIDENTIAL                    ()
                                                                      8 March 1963
    From:     IV Corps .ALO

    'l'O:   G-3 IV Corps
            us Arar:r Advisor
    In regards to General York's letter (attached) l11if cmmiients are stated
    below. I am sure that you will notice that lIiy viewS are definitely
    slanted toward the Air Force concept of operation; hWever, I believe
    in them as an individual. and not merely due to the "Party Line". Please
    use all you see fit.

    1. First of all ·I do not believe we have a place in the Arar:r or Air
   .Force inventory for a helicopter designed solely for close support.
    This type of aircraft is far too vulnerable. When faced with ground
    f1re the helicopter pllot must sacrifice stab111 ty, of the gun platform,
    f.r evas1ve maneuvers, or he 1nvar1ably becomes the ,P1'Overbial "sitting
    duck". I am sure that at the present time the VNA.F/or USAF f1ghter and
    bcllliber aircraft can give much better support than the HlJ-lA,espec1ally
    1f they are given a chance. On III8I:IY occass1ons HlJ-lA' s have remained in
    the target area, preventing fighter aircraft frOlll mak1ng the1r str1kes.
    2. This subject of course 1s a tickl1sh one froml11if po1nt of view, but
    I hate to see the US Arar:r put their money 1nto a weapons system tlat is
    designed for one area only. This 1s probably the only theater where
    th1s type of hel1copter can be, or ever will be used •. Tl11s 1s based
    on the assumption that 1n other areas where we mat be reqUired to fight,
    the enel11if will have more weapons, espec1ally automatic weapons, and m1ght
    even have sOllIe aircraft. A helicopter cannot 11ve in such an env1ronment.

I sl Donald K. Reamy
 It I DONALD K. REAMr                            1 Atch
    Lt Col., USAF                                Ltr from Gen York
    IV Corps .ALO

..                                                                   ()

                         t1. 8. MILl'1'ARY ASBISTA.lICB ADvIsOR!' GROOP
                                           III CORPS
                                        BAlOO., VII'l'IAM


     1BIOlWIDUJI1CIl:        Br1pcUer GeDe:ral York
                             Ad_ed Research ProJects. Aleaq, PielA 1JJI1t, aDd
                             Jo1nt Operat1oa EvalUat10a Gl'OIIP
                             SaiCoa, Viet_       '
     SUB.lEC'.r:             ~ III Co,rps O-.uts to A1r Force Draft AIIIIex A to
                             At".rIV-AM OP.UAJI                      .

           1. (0) !lie 1'ollOVlllC coaaeats are su'llld.tted at 70ar re4lUst to
   draft :sapel' . . cOllta1aecl 1n SUbJect. !lie rearks cantalMd Mre11l are
   f!u'a1sJled IlOt :I.. rebuttal 'bu.t 1n of oven:l.llplit:l.ed "'lJ8~s
   OIltl:l.M4 1n Air Forcje draft AImU A, dated 6J\ute 1963, to-AC'J!IV-AMFDal
   ""stRsport an Operat:l.ODal Ev8luat1oa of Amed lIelicopH!'8, dated 10 *7
   1963. lI'IlrtbftlOre ,tbe views expressed are tllo8e 'based oaexper:l.ellCe :l.1l
 . ,..r:l.ety of terr&11l)17 the "supported" fprces the. armed beJ.t,cDptars
   :La view of tile Pr1nc:l.ples of War applicable :La 801lth V:l.et_.

           2.(0)        .u   d,afted, t~ A1r Foroe .AUeX A :1.8 well vr:I.ttell ..,. 8C111D1l,
     :1.1' accepted the 1'ollov:l.Di UlI4entaDdiDIJ;
       ,                                        ,
                                      .t   '"       .   ,
               a. Y1ew are those of th,e '''8upportiDC'' ..ellC7 'be,8ed 1IOt, em
     "baclarord pJapp1DI". Tllat 1s tbe support needS are cou:l.dered 'fraltbe
     "8Upport1Dg" to tbe "suppoJ;'ted" 1J!stee,d of visa vena.

              b •. ' AJlalises are 'broad:q stated IUId ove!'81apllf1ed to po:Lat 01'
               c. Attempt has 'been made to 'cOIIlpare tbe capab11lty or venatillt7
     of ,tbe armed Jlellcoptera to tllat 01' a...1lable t:l.xed-ViDC a1rcraft. irh1s
     ~ not the lllarpOlle, of the ACTIV test aDd 'evalUat1oa.                    .
                   I. , Rsact1011 of t:l.xed-v111& advoCa~8_7 \lave 'bee 11lfl.uellced 'by
     tlIe ,1WIt:l.t:ta'ble, e'bu.lllence ·01' the ACTIV :report.          ,'.

           :3 • (C) ciCJlMEll'l'S :
                 .    DlSCtsSIOIf: a.Ro~ of the Aned lIel1copter(lqe'l) ..
     operat1ou '1n             area nOl'lllSl.:q last f'rom oueto tvo hoIIrs'before 1111111..
     _ secur:l.t7 statu call be aS8ured; therefore, the US a4vi8ors oa t1l8srt1'ni!
     1u18t oa armed. bellcoptera 'be111& re8pou1ve:qava1lable for 8\1.pp01"t. Th1s
     1s true vheID. cOllVe-.t1011a1 a:l.r .... art:l.lle17 support are h:I.IIdered
     or proh:I.'b1ted 'by the terra1n or op.raU_l s1tw.t:l.em, na these :l.UtallCes,
     tbe support- to the ground forcesllll8t -be,pre4:1.cated em close v:f.8ual
     observat:l.oo, ,:baed:l.ate rBspons1veJless, sele~t1,. &Ct:u,raC;Y of, t:tre and pe)'Cho-
     lac1cal as a bOllWi •. ' ,Tbe cOllCept 01' eaplO71n8 armed bellcoptera
     :I.. IUS escort role enroute ris not d1accmt:l.awt4, Pr1a.rl:q because of lack
     of speed. The JII1l.J"sart? 1'ull,y capable 'Of eftective:q escortiDC the troop hellcoptera; hovever, 1n cou1derat:toa ot tbe 'a:l.rcratt; ava1lable


       MA~-IIIC                                                                         26 Jan 63
       SUBJECT:   MAAG III Corps Comments' to Air Force D1'$ft AmIex A to
             ,    ACTIVo/AM Ol'EHAH '           ,
                                     ,                                    '
       with escort capabilit)' (fixed-Wiuc), greater Dee\'l of a1'lll!d lIelicopters over
       a.ud Dear ob,1ective area, aDd ecClllam;y' of res(!Ul'ces dictated follow:IJIg present
       procedure: The wol'd "escort" IIWIt be used utll a aere suitable oae i f au;y,
       is $lSreedupon~ The t~rm "CClaOJl. :tire support" is ambiSUous aDd even
       mislea4:1J1g. Amed helicopter fire is less hi. this' catego17 thaD is tighter
       s1jrike fire, because it is more direct~ aDd ~d1ate~ respolISive ",lid,                '
       ~,101S greater aff1Jl1.t)' to tarpts of opportWllit)' tllaD to prepla:rmed strikes,
       wh.ich. r1chtf'1l1~ belODg to the Air Force IUId Artllle17.1 Tbe fact is ,that .
       th.e a1"lll8d helicopters are right aloue;, 'by' IID4 With. tllJ ca1"$o r troo. heli-

       copters from beg1D1i11ue; to eDd - - the)' ac:\;u.~ accOJl!P8:W- (tha.t is.> escort)
       th.em.                                                               '         '

                   1>. Roles of other Forces (Page 2): Artlller)' fires are beiue;
       used to place suppress1veaDd destructive ::!'1res e.ga1DSt areas suspected
       to contain e1llllll1 :PositiOll8 or forces on~ wh.eD air "wort is DOt inVolved.
       Close hi. support does assist the ground forces hI.' ",ttaimue; their objec-
       tive; h.owever, it is nOt as effective as artllle17 hi. l,lrinciple s1Jl.ce the
       ~ol'lll$r is n,cot observed except from the l4m.itedvtsibilit)' of observatiOZl
       airc1'$ft . : : :                                             ,
                  c. Neet for '011iOll8' (Page It.): 'If ,we COl1l.d al:lrap laDd, pIU' forces
       waereth.e ellell\Y caD!lOt resist, the protactiol1 factor wiU be Gbv1ous~ 1111-
       If we, adhere to' th.e pol~c)' of ~-air striDs just before laIId1Jlg, th.e
       eDeIIQT Will have ample warl1iJ:lg toevacuste or assume protective positiOll8                ,
       to resist or 1I1de, M1D.1m1z1ue; the resistencehl. au;y operatiOZl is rOl1tiDe,              I
       'but %lOt to the point of' jeOj;l!il'd;l.z1iIg tile accomplishment of the miss1OZl.          I

       The grOllDd cQDll!!!,Mer determines the Ilocceptable degree to risks aDd
                                   I     '
       calculates accordiuc~. '                                           ,

                     d. CorrelaiiOJl. of Test Results to Test Concept' (Page 5): The ,
       missiOJl. of a~ 'heliqopters is not, a.ud, has Dever beeD th.e destl'l1ction
        of the eDelQ',' ftt the suppression of UBmeDdl)' fire. The fact that the
       IIlUlIIlMr of' VC casualties reported was leN cbUl.d 08l)' mean that t'bere were
       not ver)' IIIBDY, or a differeDce hi. method of cla:l.m1llc ''kills'' in COZlt1'$st
       to other air arms. The fact that so IIIBDY laDd1l!c' ZOBeS are ~coJrl;ested
       cou.ld iDdicate that the close preseDpe ~ the a'1i1De4 helicopters did               .
       accomplish. tlleir ,stated miSsiQn of suppress:IJIg en«w,yfire. In this light,
       the ~tatifiltics focus more realistical~ in tlla.t there are aboa.t             3, ,
       Down VC ~ualties per cOZltested lIID41Da, zot!.. 'J.'I!.e l.aII' rate of casualties
       iaflicte4 is 110 1IIdicatlOZl of' the Pr1acipl.e of Surprise hav1ue; little
       "beariuc'in the, pr~blem of develQpiDg tactics bellt 'u1ted tor prOtectiue;
       helicopters. In grOud call1'bat :I.JI terrain ot ll1m1teii vts1'bilit)', tlle
       element or desree of surprise aBII1IIIIeS' greater proporl.ion iMcawse the
       t'esults can lie ~raW from 10 feet, as weU as 10,000 feet _)'. TIle
        ~~ eaJlOJl"1UId d.,. grOWlld tO~le ,do ,not' dtfferut1ate fr1e11d or toe.
       '!be, VC exploit tlle a8:varltaces of.~r1se to, c~ate for their
        lilII1tatiOll8 hi. resoUrces 'agaillat the ovel'W'he~ superiority of RVlW!'.
       Disregard or ill-cOll8ideratiO!l. Of tactics' ."rpr1~ ,in' aD)", operatiollllLl
        pla!W.IIg is alt1a to1mpos,iJIC ll1I8.cceptable risks, UPOJI. the groud cCJ'!lD8"'er.
                , 'e. Anlica:t1O! ' of· ~!Irl Pr1aciples. (Pap T): ,Grantsd
       t~t ever)' NIlIIilot YeapOJl.~ or? ' d.• dC!tl$etsdfrolt troop J1I&Tload,
       in: 1:lIeor)', but ,~ prac~~celi W1th Jle\rer., ,1l.D4 '~ pdltem;t, aircraft, this:
       is iu1ga1:ticu;t;. It:l:s c<DPlete~i~~VN1twh_ d18\lUlISll11 a'1i1De4
       helicopters ~ tbat their miSsion i. ,.ot to carr)' tro0p8' VeapODS ' aad

      MAGfI~IIIC                                                                          26 Jan 63
      SUJJIC'f: HAAG In Corps COIIIIIeJ1ts           ~o   Air Fotce Dl'Iltt ADDitX A to
             ,    ACttv-AM Ol'ENAH                         '   ,               '
                                      .                    \

      PIIIII""ft1on 40 ut s1p1f1cantq affect peri'ol1ll8.Jlce. 'fhe addit10nal drllS
      caue ~ exteraalq-_ted weapons 1s paras1t1c drq, wlUeb ilaereases
      aa the sq\1a1'e of the airspe'ed - -. as sucb', 1t 1s not S1gD~:t1caat in air-
      ~ wJI1eh 9J8rate at low air,sP«\ld8.· It 1s o~' s1gD1ficaat &ad 1m.-
      PQrteat for h1gh-speed loag-ralige aircraft.
                 f;   0:P.rI01l' A:       (Page 9)

                     I f 701l'laI!d 1B areas devo1d of s~~ cover, 7011 are
      also l4rId1ltg 1. areas normal~ dev01d of VC.
                 g.   CPIATION OF EXmtUENCE DuaDG 'l'li:STS .TO THE. 0m0ll3:

                      d.)~10n ~ (Pas~ 10):             Armed heJ.1cophefs          ~re
                                                                                be1ltg emplQ1ed
      larp~ 'because we fOlUldtllat the a1rerew           IBDIIed weapoJlS of trs.lasport
      hel1copters were not _equate for sUppr8ss19B. In add1t1on, ~ the t:bDe
      the t1'&ll8port hel1copters learlil.ed'tllat res1stance 1sgreat, tbe7 are
      al.read7 near to the grOlUld ,or on the grolUld, and abort1ltg. tIie lanMn,
      woali ut help tbeato beeome less. val.Jaerable. 'fhe r&1II1ficat10J!,0f
      SU<lb a ~ are we11·n1g'h illCaleula'ble' - tact1calq (failure to per-
      f~ the llisliion») psycholog1C41J:r ,(loss of of'feJl8ive spi~t)J and
     'pol1t:tc.llt (as iJ. result. of the first two). If more troop truaPQrts are
      requited tIie &Dwer is to get more and 1lOtto cancel the mission of the
      armed lIel1copters.                                                                   '
                                                ,                         ,
                        (2) Opt1oi B (Pace 11): ", It is highJ:r des1rea'ble to have
      destru.eti',e firepall'eravailable, if ,1t 1s :tmediate:q'responsi..,. i.n both,
      t:bDe 8.Jld aceura.q of target location and 1f if ,can beplacedwithOl11l                .
      jeopa.rdizilll.the troop trauports. Araedescort hel1copters of the
      fature c0uJ.4 well be eq,u1pped w;ith hea1'1er al'llalll8Dt to satis~ this
      req,.i1'eMllt. SJaOlre placed' dan&ll'1n11.· of the l.!fi1d1ltg zone can and shOlliLd
      be 'V'e17, effecti,"" 't!oth to screen and '(in the case of whi~e 'pioeplaorous
      and variOllS tear ,gases) as an antipersOllDel weapon. Placed u]illf1n11., it cSJ:l
                                                     ,                  ,                     ,
      Pla7 lIavee with the troop traJl8port visibil1ty for lancl1l1g.                   '
                 t   I'"                                        ; '
                                                  ,                     '
                   A1Wi!SJS OF THE CONCEPl' OF StJPIUSSIVE FlRE: 'fhe price of
      suppressive fire ,11ke ~he value Of lIaDaD· life earmot be determ11led wllb
      the a"...,y line ee.zmot be dist:tae;u1shed from the trie~. WlIat def1B1te
      criteria can lila empiQ1ed to' detel':l$le the wastefUJJiessor; use:f'lll.Jaesp
      of' suppressive fires on an UllCoaventional rOle1 JfaaeUvers e'l:eeuted
      d1i:r1Dc the laII4.1ng' plIase 'fIIA'Y resemble cloeeli ma_vers performed rOU'l!1De~
      by fiPter liI.e~. :But' ,iJII te,rms of suppOrt (w'bich is the
      pr:bDe criteria) .Net close resemblallCe is inad. .te or not f'I1lq sat1s-
      factol'1.                    :
         4. (c) 'In an evaluation or aDILqB.:1s ot camb8.ts~ppOrt .,auto
     groud forces, prima17 cOJl8iderations 1III1It be directed toward the follow111g
     ke:r factors:
                 a. 'Bdp9J18iveness of, the support to the 1ImMdiate needs of tlle
     c.)  JII'Ier OIl tile grcWld concerned. This :lllCludes cOJltiJmal availt.biU,ty
     throachaut the groun/i operat1on.
           '.' . b. M!l.!!i11!les of cau.nter1Jl81lrgenq warfare in S.auth Viet"....
     'l'lIese include troOp lIIorale, un1t effeetive1lel!ls am the vc·s determ:l1ls.tion
     to res1st.

,MAGrlf-IIIC                                                                       26 JIm '63
S'tJBJEC'.r:       HMO III Corpa C - . t . 'to A11' Force Draft ·Aml.exA to
                   AC'.rIV-AM OPQAH

         c. vea clOf!!&!!d I'ccuate fire .upport due to a'bl.cI of                       ~
liDel of 4..-rca 10lIl 'betvl. . fr1Udly aJI4 ....,. farcel.

               4.     J':lN   .~pport p, . .1", 'be pzell1c&ted OIl srOllllll SUIlver.
        I. V1.nalll ob.lned 1!jPpV!.'t capable of aocti:rate fiN with m1D1-
. . -.her of 1ateftlld1e1'!J' ...._ rela71111 tile ..Ids of tile SrolUld c ........ Pd.r.

           la. PaJClaolOS1cal att1t1141 of C10l1, C10i1 all' f1re support
pere0iDll81 'to "0 l1JII or hover" 09'11' tlIel1lPllOJ'ted SrOllllll forcl ••

                                                WIIJIUR WIISO.
                                                C010lllll, IDtant17


..                                                                      C)

                                                                                         20 J'Ime 1963
                     COMMENr ON 'l'llE AI;R, FORCE AmWER '1'0 ACTIV'S REPOO'l'
                               ON UTIL1'!'lt TACTICAL TRAR3PORTS

                                                PAR'!' I

               1. I do Dot agree that '~ concept of suppressive f:i,re should be
         coasidered a"last resort tactic, employed primadJ,y fran troop carry1Dg
         helicopters.     The .concept is tba.t UT'l' escort whicles should haw the
         same fire support relatiolllllhip to troop carrying helicopters as figb.ter-
         b~rs do to Air Force assaw.t tra.nsporls. The US ArtilJf in its role as
         passE:lIgers in US Air Foree C-C123's in a.sse.ultla.nd~s does not propose
         that the Air Force install wa1st gwmers in C-123 's to negate the
         requirement for fighter-bomber fire support in the landiDg zone.

              2. It is a.dm1tted that ,the 1m escort l:!elieopter is a ''make-do''
         vehicle to fill an 1mediate req1l!i~t to ,ellhauce the success of heliborlle
         operatiOllS. No doubt a special pilIrpolile armed VTOL air vehicle would be a
         better soh1tion. HCIII'ever, the :l'e.ct remains tllat we do not have this
         "ideal" wh1.,.,le alld we I!iil.St ,~ do" _ With what we have. This, is not
         the first Vlar' wl1ere the developent of tacticl;I outstripped the ability to
         procure "ideal soh1tion hardware", !!lor willI it be the last.

              3 " The ''moment of tl'lllth" iltl our a:l.r:moblle operation is the few
         m1D11tes before a.ud after ''tooch down" on the objective l.a.udilllg ZOI!.e. It
         is then that maximum fire power must be directed on altld arOUDdthe LZ.
         Th1B fire shOl1ld be delivered by eve17 available fire power source to
                              I           ·                                    r     J

         mclnde figb.ter-bombers, all calibers of artlllery, I1l"l' escort heliCOpters
         and waist gIl!U!.ers in troop carryil!lg helieopten.

                4. The vol'Ull1e and intensity of these fires should 'be so p:;t.a.nned aIId
         execute'd to enable the force to lIIIl.uta.1!ll fire ' superiority durililg all
         phases of the assault laDdingo It is unrealistic to aSs_ that these
         1Iaportant last miwte fires a.t la:t!dilllS ean be mainta.i:med in I!.eCeIIS8.17
         volume: by troop carry:I.Dg helicopter wa1st gmmers alone. At the moment
         of "'tOl1ch-down" their fires are :illllned1a.te1y masked 'by ,the debarkiDg troops
         they carried to tbe laIId:l.xlg zone. Wb.ell!. the empty helicopter departs the
         14nd1Dg zone i t 1l!zed1ately 'begiM its climb OIlLt of the grOlllld level
         enviromDent; t1I1s techrdque m:llllli,m1 zes aW suppressive fiz:ell f'rom troop
         carrying helicopters. It ,is at this t:!.me that it is most important for' the
         m     escort vehicle to re_illl on station. !l.'hEt UTT riot OIJllly proVides, '
         protection for withdraWiIi!g cargo helicopters 1 but supplies ov'e!rwatchixlg
         grO\l:Dd fire support for t)lie in:f'a~tri in their efforts to secure the
         JSDili:ng area. In ltact it is t'I!.1! 0IIIly' fire support :ilIIi!iediately available
         to them at this critical ~Illt.

              5. The f1gb.ter-bodler is desiped aIId suecessfU1.l:y employed to
         suppOrt troop carrying aircraft in alt:l.t1ldes abliWl! 500 feet, . ·The m
         is fulflllilllg a requiremelll.t for suppor:t for a:!.r vehicles, tly:l.i!Ig bela.r
         the altitude of 500 feet. To de~ use of ~. UTT in this se~t of air
         space in favor of a pure troop CIl.r~1lC role '!!rill create. a gap in the whole
         tabrtc of air fire cover for air mobile operat101l1!l.'                             .

               6. A:I:r¥ a:l.rpower advocate that fdle to deseem the separate alld
         cOJllple!llentilig uses of both :f:Itghter-bomben MId U'l'T helicopters in the
         counter ill1Surgeney effort :lD VietlllMl ignores the flexibility' SlIld response
         of both weapons systems in their applications to the objectiVes of tactical
         air pa.rer.
 COIIIIIent oa the Air Force Allawer to AC'.rIV's Report on 'otl'll:ty 'l'actical
 Transports (Con 't)

                                    PART II

       i. Althoap Pliy-Warfare "." its 'place iB, coaatel'~ills11l''''C7
 operations its w.lue has been cwerrated ~ the Air Force. It can
 liot replace closiDg with and killiDg VC as til.,. :I.Drlicate.
                             ,                           I ,
      2.   Because a laDdiDg area isopea aDd voice of c~ea:u.rat in no
way e l1•  'Mtes the necessity of ma.:x::lmmIi precautions. !be:!:r statemeut
that ()JI.~    '-1 precautiPM17 ~s are rel!,U1red nen m's are opsn
is not val14· Well disciplined aDd aaaic:ui'1acedtt'OO»8 _ a:taDll".q,ff
1000 - 1500 meters, and still dellver eUective aut~t1c weapaas fire
against lIelicopters.

       3· !be.30 cal MG on the H-21 and in s _ illstaDcell .-14 rifles' is
Dot -C!IiP fire poWer to suppress vc fire. !be'oa~ t _ lael1copters
tllelllselves can provide sufficient s~press1ve fire is . . !ll 'sll1ps are
firill8 at tlae same loeatioa or pOint. In III08t cases lIel1copters (swmers)
fire S1Dgulf.ll.'Y wllen sllot at and, helicopter fOl'lBtions do not pe1'll1t
coaceJltratel,tire oa an area even if 81+ lIelicopters in ,the fl1cht kDCIIr
that a, sll1p is bdDg fired oa.                      '
       4., !'Close air sUpport" caD not rt8act 1DDdl~te17 Y1IeI1 lIelicopters
 receive fire :1'rCIII an area or locatioa. To adequate17 Protect '1Ie11copters
 SUPP9rt1rll fires _ t be available 1lIII8d1stell. To set tJIe air cover to '
,strille first the 1I'611copter IIIWIIt' ,tell FAe fire is be1Dg received, ,then FAe
 _ t ~itJler ,'1IU1l or direct the "tipt,rs" to ~ spot. "!Iea:iMIile baclt at
 the ranch" we"ve lost, some helicopters. It doesn't talIe ~ lI1ts to
 briDg an H-2J. down.

     5· It appsars to,me that the maili purpose of tl.le lI.UlB 18 to prov14e
~1ate sllppress1ve fire against theVC. A_l kills are:1'r1l1ge •
benefits. At the critical period of helicopter laII/11nP and ltalle ofh the
idea is to lIeeptheVC p1Jlued'dbn. The actual dest:mctioa of tlle tOrce
is the miss1cm ot the air landed troops.                            ,.,'
     6. !be Air Forc,e evidently, does not \1IlderstaDd the use ot SIIIOlIe by
grOWlll torces amd that its' empl~ut is toorisq dur1Dg air lamd1Dg
operatieu. As well all proteet1DgheJ.j.copters :1'rCIII view it cp'.lao
_sit the lIIOVGeat ot enell.r oa the grOIUId SiviDg tllelll oPROrtua1t,' to' 8111ft
P48i1;ioas etc ••

      7. Pliyehological17 spealtiDg I doubt it there is mcll difference
betwe. ,ettiIIC shot, at wl>th a 30 cal J«l or 20 MIl as the Air Force cla:l.llll.
IIi eit~r oase an individual will seek ccwer and tla1s i8 the de8ired
effort.                         ,

                       c  U:N1 TED ST.A'fB$ AIMY
                        II VN COllPS Dl!:T.A.CHMENT
                              Pleiku. Vietll&m

     MAGTN-UC'                                                                15 June 1963
     MEMOJllANDUM FO:Jil: Brigadier Oene,1"a,l llobert H. York, USA
                          Direlctor, Joint Operation li:vablationGl'Qup, Yietll&m
                          APO 143, San Francisco, California

     SUBJECT:                   Comments to (Draft) Annex A,dal:elll (, .June 1963 nJ')

           1. (0) In pa.J!agraph a of the discussion, the statement is made that
     the conclusion of the OTT Tellt is misleading . and that armlnfhelicopters
     cannot uncleI' -...-. ¢onditions protectti'.ans}?(!ifl# hel:ltl!ll\lt:~r "throughout tho
                    all                      ,   "    ,   ,

     heUborne operation", It is a.n oltvio.. f~ tllat no matter what type pro-
     tection is plamted and ell:ecuteq, that protection unilillu: aUc:onditioiltll is
     impolISible. The writer obviously misinterpreted the eonclusion which
     stated that the UTT H Co, could provide acilesuate protection!or transport
     helicopter engaied .in air .mobile operations:

            Z.   ee) The reviewer refers· to the t.rm "escort" and st&.tes that it is
     confUSing and should be discontinued. Thi. would lead one to believe that
     different terminology used by Army Ai/.' is automatic;p,Uy considered wrong
     if it is not a term used by VNAF. The escort role of the HO-IB ianot that
     of fidng upon tariets while in route to and. from Landing Zone. They auist
     in security should a troop carrying helicQptet deve~op trouble and have to
     make a precautionary landing for some reason or other This move' is at an
     altitude so as not to be exposed to nO'l"mal small arms ground fire.
           3. (C) The roles of the other forces in the assault landing (1. e.,
     Artillery and VNAF) is always wlcomed and appreciated by the partlcip;p,Ung
     helicopter units.

            4. (C) On page 3 the writer refers to the method of employment of
     the UTT's always being the same. This is. understandable as the mission of
     the aircraft is the same There is no role for relatively high performance
     VNAF aircraft in the immediate landing :z;one during the pedod of touchdown;
     The UTT' 8 Cal'l and do remain in the LZ during the critical landin* and depar-
     ture pha$e. This millsion cannot be performed by high pedormance aircraft.
     I t takes for instance. about 1 minute turri around for a 1'- 28 after a st.rafim,
     run to get back in pOSition for a second run. The stay time for th. troop
     carrying helicopter in the landing :z;one is approximately 60 to 90 8ecol1d•.
     Thi. would allow for one or at most two strafing runs by VNAF which is

            5. (C) The writer the number of YC killed in the heliborne
     operation on. page sill: (6). Considering the numbero! rounds e:lC:pended by
     the UTT'II, the primary role of the UTT's, that of protecting the troop
     carriers, and not primarily to kill Yct s , the total kill on the :z;o:ne is com-
     para.tively high. The ratio of kills and ordnance ell:pended is very economical
     aa an answer to the reviewer's. constant reierence to the economy of suppres-
     Sive fire.

     ANNEX 6
      6. (e) On pag! six (6), after stating that many fleliborne operations
are uncontested, the reviewer points out the reversal encountered at Ap Bac.
This is a twisted fact for the reviewer's point that UTT's are ineffective
when engaged by a determined enemy. A comparable one would be that of
the Ploisti raid of WW II, in which the U. S. Air Force suffered tremendous

      7. (e)  The writer refers. to Option A, Band C. It is surprising that
he is so wen versed in heliborne operations and considers himself such an
expert on the subject as to suggest to the Army heliborne doctrine. The
U. S. Army has experimented, tried and tested many different concepts of
air mobile operation over the past 10 years. and has arrived with a logical,
workable system.

       8. (C). The use of UH-IB as troop carriers is merely a substitute for
the HU-lD which are 4esigned for this mission. The UH-IB is, if the writer
would analyl/:e the designation, a utility helicopter. It is admitted that the
removal of the XM-6 ki~. from the UH-l would allow for more troop trans-
portation. The removal of the two guns from the CH-21's would allow for
2 additional troops. It is hardly conceivable to remove these guns from the
CH-2I's. However, the additional fire power that the UH-I'll has is a def-
inite advantage in the LZ. \

      9. (e) In option B, he refers to weapons that may be used. These are
not now in country and no date is firm, the "near future" is a very loose
time. On page 15 and 16, the writer admits .that machine gun fire and 20mm
guns against troops in prepared positions has very low kills. But it goes on
to say it has a psychological aspect. Then at the bottom of the page his
statement on suppressive fire states that when suppressive fire is lifte.d the
resistance can appear again with little or no reduction in intenSity. This at
times Is true, but if it is, then the prestrike with rocket and machine gun
would have about the same effect. Consequently the troop carrier would
receive fire from th!t suspected VC position. If the guns were removed from
the UH-I' s, 'the retatitlDry fire would be inadequate.

     10. (e) The writer constantly refers to the expense of suppressive
fires when the location of the enemy is unknown. In II Corps the enemy is
seldom seen except when landing. Yet h,£,£Qntradicts himself on page 18 as
to the few rounds. expended per month. 'This tends to demonstrate that the
spray or saturation type fire is not used by the UTT aircraft. Als.o on page
18 the statement is made that there was an indication that the UH-IB' s were
relatively ineffective because they and the eH-21's were hit by ground fire.
This is a ridiculous statement as we have no way of knowing how many would
ha ve been destroyed had not the UH-IB' snot been employed. This is tanta-
mount to saying I don't need life insurance because I'm healthy.

     II. (e) On page 18, after con$tant reference to the wa$te of ordnance
in the suppressive fire technique, the writer states that low expenditure
rate (ordnance) indicates low participation overall.

     12. (C) On page 21, the statement is made that suppressive fire should
be considered as a last resort. And "Air Cover" VNAF should deliver destruc-
tive fire. It would appear that any fire that supp:t:esses, wounds, or kills VC
would be classified as effe'ctive fire. The term "destructive fire" is impressive
and could be substituted (in army terminology) for"suppressive fire." Due to
the "rules of engagement" it is doubted that this term would be accepted by the
Command in Vietnam .

    13. «(;). Filially, the .tatement on .pa,e I that the concept of employin,
armed helicopteraiDan eacort role enroute waaabandoned, .inca they
lacked .i,ftlftcaJlt .peed advanta,e over the OK.aIl. and therefore could not
be effectively employed durm, the enrouie phi... , i. of cIoubtful veracity.
InI I Oorp. U'oop carryin, helicopter. are alway. e.cortedby UTT pU.e
from take off fielcltolancUna zon... The UK.IS can .low to the .peed of
theH·al andean .cceleraie to pall. the R.·21.

                                    /..1 Hal D. McOown
                                     It! HAL D. McOOWN
                                         Oolonel, Infantry
                                         Senior Advi.or

                      ,   ..... '

                   OFFt CE OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR
                  I VN CORPS A~DTACTICAL ZONE I
                           Dana:ng, Vietnam

MAGTN-IC                                                     :aO June 1963

. SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal

TO:         Brigadier General Robert H.York
            Director, Joint Ope.rations Evaluation Group, Vietnam
            APO 143, U. S. Forces

      1. Transmitted herewith are comments upon Draft Annex A, 6 June
1963, issuing office unknown, no title, which was given to me by you at the
last Semor Advisor's Conference. (Draft Annex A contains comments on
Final Test lteport, OPENAH, published by ACTIV on 10 May 63).

      2. ll~port was delayed in that copy of OPENAH was not availablE' at
this headquarters until IS June 1963.

                                   lsi Leslie H. Cross
                                   Itl L&SL:Ql:: H. CROSS
                                        COIOllOl, Armor
                                       . Setlior Advisor

, ,
      Cmt #   .Page   Line(s)                          Comment

      1        1      11~13          "There should.. ; • heliborne
                                 operations": . Comment: Para 'test
                                 report, defines the ea:cQrt concept.
                                 It is clearly stated that, during the
                                 en-route phase, "armed helicopters
                                 simplyaccQmpanied the transports."
                                 The role of the 'O'TT is further defin.ed
                                during the approach and landing~:

      2        3      3- 6            "No attempt was., .were not tested".
                                  Comment: The purpose of the test was
                                '.to determine tactics and techniques em-
                                  ployed in providing armed eSCQ1't for
                                  transport helicQpters. It was not a
                                  purpose of the test to determine optimum
                                  apportionment of responsibilities, either
                                  stated or implied. While such a tel;lt may
                                 be appropriate, the lack of it does not
                                 invalidate the results of the tests to date.

      3        3      8 - 1Q         "As further ... URI's were used."
                                In operations conducted within I Corps,
                                fighter-bombers were permitted to par-
                                ticipate during theianding and withdrawal
                                phases. By prior arrangement, close-in
                                areas were delineated and were the respon-
                                 sibilityof UTT's. More remote areas
                                were the responsibility of figq.ter bombers..
                                Oq' one such. operation, a fighter-bomber
                                 strike waslrnade concurrently with U'TT
                                 supp1'essive fires.

  4            4      15-16,       ."There is ... of resources .• " See
                                 Comment No. 1.

      5        4      17-25     Jt.egardless of the writers' views of what
                                the test mayor may not have proven, it
                                 i$ .an accepted doctrinal a;x;iom. repeat -
                                 elily substained in airborne operations,
                                 that maximum effect is achieved by lartd-
                                 ing as c1~se to the objective as accept-
                                 ed dsu ~U1permito In any event, if
                                 the A'lfforce is serious in this comment,
                                  they in IJffeet are eliminating the need
                                 not only of UTT's but a.1so of Hshter-
                                 bombers during airmob:Lleope.#tions.

  6                                   " ... the end result ... lancUn& zo~"
                                 In one operation condueted by this. eorps,
                                  one enemy, armed with an automatic wea-
                                 pon, caused the loss of one*H-1I4 in the
                                 leading flight. This enemy was elimin-
                                 ated literally within the UTT's
                                ,aJl.d no further fires. were received. A
                                 fighter-bomber prestrike was empluyed
                                 in this area.
                c                                         ()
Cmt'                 ,Jilne(s)                                 Comments
7                   19·25        Additional characteristics of the heli-
                                 copter which are unique and should be
                                 exploited are its ability to fly at very
                                 slow speeds and to operate in a very
                                 small area, two important elements
                                 in.the UTT concept which fighter.
                                 bombers cannot match. It is these
                                 cN/.racteristics that lead to the UTT

8                   16-18               "RfH!istanc~il.
                                                     .. helicopteu. n In
                                 ai:rmobile operations, transport heU·
                                 copters cannot maneuver in order to
                                 neutralize resistance. Conceivably,
                                 th, inherent armament manned by the
                                 crew may be effective in suppres!lion,
                                 but '\Ie need is for neutralization for
                                 the bel,\efit of following flights as
                                 wd1..This neutralization the trans··
                                 port Jl,elicopter might accomplish
                                 coinqidental1y, but infrequently.
                                 Furt\!.er, during the actual landing,
                                 the period of greatest vulnerabilHy,
                                 mOlit of the crew are fully occupied
                                 with the land and discharge' of troops;
                                 the' machine gun on the H-34, for.
                                 example, cannot be Hredfor a pe:ri~fd
                                 of critical time.

9      11           13·14            "Release ... to this. end. It While tp.e
                                  statement is. correct, it does .not fol~
                                 low that the contribution of the UH·lB
                                 .s a transport would. outweigh. its value
                                 in the suppressive-fire role.

10         13       2- 3                "One method ... landing forces." The
                                 Ulle of smoke, where appropriate, should
                                 be tested but obviously is no panacea.
                                 Wind effects, the impact on g.ound opel'.
                                 ations, the effect on air IUrht routes, etc. ,
                                 all are mitigating iaetor& in itilluse. It
                                 is extre'mely doubtful tN/.t tt can be safely
                                 employed in close-in areas, immediately
                                 .djacent to the LZ, These £acts notwith-
                                 standing, smoke, as well as thee UTI"s
                                 and all other' availa~le means, should be
                                 .mployed when appropriate.

11         13       12-15           "The're is ... a threat." This 1$
                                 unsubstantiated theorizing.

lZ         16       19..l1           "Ot.ineraUy, suppressive ..• queUe4 "
                                 F'l'om time immemorial, suppressive
                                 firell to enable the infantry toclQse with
                                 the enemy ha.s bee'n a fundamental concept.

Cmt   *         Line(s)                       Comments

                          Essentially, suppressive fires from the
                          UTr in an airmobile operation is for
                          the same purpose. Until an as yet un-
                          develClped "ultimate" weapon is created,
                          suppre ssive fire s will continue to be a
                          mainstay of ground tactics.

13         16                  "If misdirected ... military unit. "
                           It is equally true that attack by fighter-
                          bomber is ineffective if the pilots hit
                           the wrong area, as happened on a
                           recent I Corps operation ...

14         16   Z5                          .
                              " ... suppreSSlve f' ... un·known ...
                                                 lre                    II

                           The cost of suppressive fires must be
                          weighed against the loss of lives and
                          of very expensive aircraft. Further in
                          lI. situation where the enemy is .known to
                          be present but his precise location is
                          unknown, the only alternative to suppres-
                          sive fire is acceptance of an unjustifiable

15         19   1- 3          "Since the presence ... high." The
                          author is g\lilty of the very unsubl;ltan-
                          tial conjecture that he attributes. to
                          the writer ·of the test report.

16         19   8 -10         "Categorically, 100 times ... be neutral-
                          ized." There are many days in which an
                          UtITiery unit does not expend its basic
                          load---or a rifleman the rounds he carries
                          on his person---or an escorting fighter-
                          bomber his armament load (except in a
                          Jettison area in order to avoid landing with
                          it). An ounce of prevention is worth a
                          pound of C\lre.

17         19   1S-17        "A OR-!. .. troops. " See comment 9.
                          A fighter-bomber also, carries no troops--
                          with or without armament.

18        zo    1Z-1S         "Optimum utilization ... other air-
                          craft." . The inference in this state-
                          ment that use of OR-lB' s in an. escort
                          role does not fully utilbe the character-
                          isticsof the aircraft is unwarranted.

19         ZO   ZI-Z3         "Better ... load carried. II Integration
                          of the UH- IB as a troop transport would
                          prohibit its employment as a maneuver
                          element to strike targets of opportunity.

zo        ZI    16-18        ".In developing ..• transport. "
                          See comments Nr. 8,9, and 17 •


< ,

      Cmt II          Line(s)                          Comments

                      19-26              "The concept ... destructive fire. "
                                     To relegate suppressive fire to a .
                                     "last resort" tactical role is to refute
                                     the universally recogni:l,ed and accept-
                                     ed principle of fire and maneuver.
                                     (See comment No. 12.) Regardless of
                                     whether it is termed "suppressive" or
                                     "destructive" fire, its. purpose, its
                                     advantages, and its disadvantages
                                     remain the same.

                                     OVERALL COMMENTS:

                                         It appears that the author of
                                     this study was biased at the outset
                                     and sought to prove a predetermined
                                     opinion. The absence of objectivity
                                     in the analySis is noticeable.

           FOil THE SEmOA ADVISOR:

                                     lsi Ronald A. Johnllon
                                     It! RONALD A. JOHNSON
                                         1st Lt, AGC
                                         Act' g Admin Officer

                                                       I CTZ.
                                                       12th DTA - HQS/62
                                                       #28l8/KI20 T /P2

                      INFORMA TI ON REPOR T

Type of Info: VC Military
Origin:       12th DTA
Date Information Received: 20 April 63
Evaluation:   A/I
Source:       VC document confiscated during BACH PHUONG 10
              Operation at AV•. SOO. 250
Subject:      VC Directive on defense against heliborne operations.

      1. The document - confiscated at AT. 800.250 on 20 April 63 -
contains the following instructions concerning the VC defense
against heliborne operations which have been issued by QUANG NAM
Province Hqs and the 1st VC Regiment to their subordinate units.

           a. Units should study the terrain of their locations and
prepare in advance plans for defense against GVN heliborne oper-
at~ons - attention must be paid to the field of fire and the withdrawal
route of each unit.

           b. Standby anti-helicopter elements of platoon or company
sized units armed with rifles and automatic rifles must be designated
for each day - Such elements should be well organized, properly
employed and given alarm of different types of aircraft.

         c. All heavy equipment must be stored at secret. depots,
well camouflaged in deep jungle.

           d. Time should strictly be respected; units must be pre-
pared for combat prior to 0500 hours (each day). All movements
in the early morning are very important.

          e. Highgrounds must be seized at all costs and under
every circumstance to destroy the landing troops as well as the
enemy helicopters.

           f. While the enemy carries out preparatory air strikes,
friendly troops must lay quiet artdavoid disclosure. The whole unit
will withhold their fire until the helicopters start to land. After
opening fire, our troops must advance toward the enemy (GVN) to
avoid air strikes. Shortly after that they should move away. Any
type of force from a guerrilla to a main force unit, which haS cap-
abilities of shooting low flying aircraft or troop helicopters must
automatically attempt to destroy them so as to aggressively defend

            g. The enemy may lay many mines prior to his withdrawal
therefore the area must be marked and have friendly engineer elements
to clear it. It is the (VC) experience that in many cases (VCl personnel
were not wounded or killed during engagements. but by walking over
mines that were laid by GV N troops before their withdrawal.

           h. Plans for defense against GVN Operations should be
widely distributed to "VC liberated areas" to initiate defensive measures
 such as to equipment in secret depots, prepare reserve rice
for evacuation.


Good information and valuable experience for our operations directed
against the enemy bases. It is noted that the above plan has been and
is being implemented by VC Troops.

      Special attention should be paid to this information so as. to
study and improve future operations.

                                      APO. 4277, 22 Apr 63
                                      For Col J,.AM VAN PHAT
                                      CO. 2nd Inf Divand 12th DTA
                                      Capt. NGUYEN VAN BINH
                                      Deputy Chief of Staff for Operation.

                                           Signed and Sealed;
TltUE COpy to
....... ,.. .......... .
22nd Div AdVisory Team                      nCTZ
"For                        22nd Inf. Div
deemed necessary."                          Hqs/H2

                                            # 0746/KCT 22/2/K

                            APO • 4061, 21 May 63
                            For Col NGUYEN BAO TR.I
                            CO. 22nd Div + 22nd DTA
                            For Maj. NGUYEN DUONG HUY
                            Chief of Staff
                            Capt. NHAN VAN QUANG.


    ,   .

                                RAe Southeast Asia Field Ottice
                                    OSD/BPA R6D Fie14 Unit
                              4PO l43, San Prancieco, CAl1to:tD1&
 R&£SlI...s-237                                                            10 June 1963

 IIIIIItAIIDUJI Jai:     General York
.'t: stat1etioal Anal¥lJ1e .ot the OPl!lAl fiD&l .bper1;

     The.e co_ts are directed prilllarilT to Tab m ot the Final Te.t
Report. ·OperatiODal Evaluation ot Araed. Helicopter•• (In", Jrrq Concept
T... in VietlUUll, 10 HaT 1963. C(JJFmUfTUL.

      lYaluation ot the ettectiven... ot . , . . helicopter. 1e cruciall7 d...
pea_t upon the cheic. ot measure. ot eft.Unn•••• which in tum depends
1IpaD the .tated mi.sion ot the helicopt.r.. Accord1q to the r.port. liThe
..cort lIi.sioD 1apli.. that armed h.licopter. will:
            "1.   SUppre.s insurgent tire direct.d at tran.port helicopters.
             2.   Attract insurgent tire, th.reby diverting tir. from the transporta.
             ,. Create an opportunitT tor transport pilote to live their tull at-
                tention to the probl.. ot landinl SDd. unloading their heavilT-
                loaded and ditficult-to-contl'Ol aircr&tt ••
            Such a lIIie.ion 1apl1es that the degree to which the armed h.licopt.rllJ
are eft.otiv.can be measured in large part by their GIl ilUJurgent
tire. ObJ.otive 2 is therefore the major objective ot the test. It is
to anBWer the qa.stion ~does the presence ot armed .Icort reduce the amoUnt
an4 accuracT ot tire placed on transpart helicopters by insur,ent torc••• ~

      In attempting to ver1t;r indirect casual relatiGlllehipe, it 1e neceslS17
to carefull;r isolate all ot the variablel inwlved. 10 as to avoid creating
ara .ttect to the tfrGllg cause. The _sure cholen tor evaluation ot the armed
h.lioopters. 1UUllel;r tr¥1sJ)!)rt helicopterl hit p!r trap.port combat .upport
hour tlo•• i. too llkel;rto b. aftected bT variable. other thaD ~the . .unt
and aoouraoT ot tire" b7 Viet CGIlg to .erve a. an adequate ....ure.
   In te:nu .upplied by the OPniAH ana1;rsie, the elcort role has en-route.
~h,' and landing sone phases. Characteristic I ot tlight. degree ot
  erab1l1ty of transport h.licopters, and actiGlls ot elcort helicopters.
ditt.r III&1'kedly in these three phas.s. Purthel'llOl"e the relative length ot
t_· speat in each phase ditterstor each IlliesiGll an4 with each transport.
wait •. According to the OPniAH report, the active escort tunction "was eDl'-'
o1eed pr1lllarilT and almost exclusivel;r :bl tile land1q sone.· (Page 3. Tab 1).
Therefore, the etteot ot the program can be pr1lllarU7 and allllost exclusivel;r
..aaure4 with r.spect to the t1llle spent in the landing sone.. An appropr:l.ate
. .sura ot ettectiven••s (but not colllplstel;r ..tWactory) lIOuld then b. hits
"ceived in landing zone p.e per hour sFt in landing sones tor transport
    Th......ur. u.ed. 1:11' the OPENAH program can be aJ.gebrac:l.all7 r.pre.ented
askwhere H represent. tran.port hit,      an4 C represents CGlllbat
npport hour.. But

 ANIIl 9

LZ protectM                                   ~~.                   152' : '
LZ CIOJlt...t.e".       .                                8    ..         U
"1'I04II/;t CIOJlt.estM                              J3~     44%     i   ~
~   ...sure of    effect1~ess    designed t.o       el~ate    the   ~fect        of yariation iR
~e percent.asa of       lIadifts Bones contest...        would be ~ ~elicopt.ers h1~
1p   coate.ted.l!adJ.nJ Bms ps ho'll!' in· contested I1Nid1pi ••••
     Plu-therrefineaent.1t are possible. The .1IIe and natllJ'e qt                 tlle conte.t1pg
toroe should. be talcen 1at.o aoc011I\t; w:f.rI. opposed lud1n18 D 1;pe            level of iR-
sultIDt act1T1t.7 w.r:lt4 from l1&ht to relat1v'13 int8lUle' ( _                   II, FtaaJ. Test

-~-~--~.~-w------                        ..
a.pori). The ob3ect of cler1v1ni a 1IMIa,lP'e of .ttect.1vqll!s in
.. UrUeee the v~.t Coal ayoU cont••1;1q lancl1nl zone, ~~W4. et fear of the
                                                                                   th1ls cr1t1q;o

                        t.,.·                                                .
&JIIMCl h.llco~. . , a tencl&nc7 1Ih~h ill not apPal'ent ~ the trend 111 the per-
o..t of at o~t••                                ,-,' .;',
                                                j   ')


                 is to shOll' that more a,ppropriate enLluative teelm1ques ewld ll! been lliP-
                 plied without imposing UI1l'ealistia uta requirements. Indee4, uta lIItI\Y' 'be
                 currently available f'rom wh:1Clh .. better <lalcuJ.atiom of the change is 1i'Ccu-
                 rU7"1IID4 IIIIOU1lt of eneJl1Y fire as the result of s'll.P,Pl'easive fire can be ma4e.
                 COl'l'.m0L IlA.TA
                      The central :problem is, using u;y measure of effectiveness to evaJ.ul!..te
              equip!lent or tactics in IU1 active combat situatiOll-:l:1I that of obtaining
              cCll\PlL1'able c.'Iata for :per:l.04s of time when the equipment or tacties being
              tested are !!t in use. In the Ol'ENAH teat report, two kinds of "control. ~
              c.'Iata are use4: :l.nto~tion on l\I:I.asions f'lom prior to the intreduction
              of the armed helicopters and information on "non-c.'Iangereus" missions
              f'lom without arme4 helicopter eseort. ** The secend of these is patently
              ina;ppropr:l.ate, since mission :profiles for a4m:1.lII:I.strative and trlo1 n1ng
              minions ditf'er:f'rcan cClli.'I; sup:port miSSion pNIlHles in :precillely t h e ) , : ; 4 \ -
              crucial attribute: there is nothing CGlll;P&rable to a contested lpdin~r            zone.
              The increase in helicopters hit :per non-fllltlllbat III:I.saion hour lIItI\Y' be due to
              entirely ilTelevu.t factors: The increase in scheduled aWm1 nistrative runs
              over hostile terr:l.to1'7, fpr ex:ample, or a new enmqr concentration near a
              frequently used airstrip, Nor is it valld to asS\1llle that the VCs best pIQ'-
              ott is against cClllbat missions - in terms of their ettort it lIItI\Y' have been
              more effic1ent, because ea.t.:1er; to increase pressure on routine missions.
                  1tWG, pr:I.SOD of "bet;;;':;"'and after" Ja:l.trecorils is ~ :I.t
              tke extraneous factors discussed 'earlier are taken ':into account, and even
              then changes in the overall mil:!. te.ry situation lIItI\Y'have a greater effect th&u
              the ~~t of armed helicopters on the number of helicopters hit.
              Adequate c.'Iata on "before" situations lIItI\Y' not be available to perm:!. t de-
              tailed ccmpar:l.sons.

                   The final test report notes that there are difficul:Ues in establishing
              adequate control situations:
                            "Tel'llS of reference for the conduct of the test p.'O'f:I.c.'Iall. that
                            the test activity must not have a uu.c::ceptable inpact on
                            military operations. To insure cCllllpl.iance with this in,11U1ction,
                            testing was unclertaken only in connection with actnal operations 7
                            and the test unit was in no case required to eDSlSe in activities
                            deSigned solely or pr1lDar:l.l;y' 'lor teat purposes. As a result,
                            t controls t normally assoc:l.a.ted with testing could not be
                            imposed." (Page 1, ~b I).
, I   ,,':
                     Suck controls are rumetheless basic to the conduct of u;y test of ettect-
              iveness, and could have been em,plOJ"ed to a l:l.m:l.ted ex:tent despite the quoted
             _inj1U1Ction. For ex:lIIIIPle armed helicopter escort ccNla have been ~OJ".cll l.n
              two ll1ff'erent areas during alternating IIlODthS. The control :I.nt_t1OD eO\1ld
              have then been compiled the same ~neral :p<er:l.od of t1lae,unclerll:!Jri:l.lar
              cODibat conditions, and by the SIUllll testing ageJ1q. The ~d ~eli¢opters
              woul/i have been ~0J"8d to the :f'allest ex:tent ODo:perat1. the Whole
              tes'\;ing :period, and ~~n situat1oi1s could have been studied. Under
              nch a test :Plan it wwld have been necessary to el:l.m:l.J:I&te irrelevant
              variation - torexsm,ple ttMer lading zones m:!.Sht have 'beft,eontacted during
              "control" IIlODths had the cmnmanilers avoided operations ·ot high r:l.slt to h.U-
              ~!!!!:!_!!~!I_~!_!!!~:!_!!_!!2!~_~!R!!!!!:!!!!              ___________________ ~ __ ..___ _
             '*This :l.ntol'lllll.tion is not ex:plicitJ;y used in the sense of a "control" ~ JNttlle
             '~;use of unescorted IIlission c.'Iata to III p:ro~ected number ot hits \F:l.g 1,
               'l'abIII) _ t s to the SIUllll thing. Whatever else ~ be. said about the '
              statistics presented in this report, this proJection ia           completel7~ted
              and fincll1nga the number of transport helicopters that "wulil. have
              been hit" mean 'ft1'7 little.                           .

              ANNEX 9

                          CDNFI,eEr~TIAb:                 ,•••/)

          !he question o~ usiJIg helicopters hit.... oppeaeel te mun'ber of 1\1ts 1.s
not well resolved. It is prob~ true* that· "ohc. a hit i8 ree.1,"d the
probabl1ity of ad¢1t101'1&l hits is increlllSed" ad that is adaDger of
 "undue w.1sht to cues of multiple hits reoeived lIT'a.siDgle h.l1cGpt......,.
 (PIp 6, Tab I). On the other haD4, _1U'1ng the 11ke11hoocl of multiple
hits~t lle a U)!ect of the .-valuation of sUppressive tire, which is
in""'" to be e.:rtective shert:l¥ at'ttr the ODBet of eIleIII,Y fire 1UI4er the
"ruleil .'1 ensaauent". .Since elatawere 1n1tiall;y collected both on tJa· )
lIlIJIII'ber of helicGpters hit ad on total DUlllber of hits received ad were
published. in the prel1m111&17 test reports, s _ elata on the latter should
be presented ill the fiDal test report •
      ..ta given in Fipes 2 &I1d 3 of Tab III on slieed ad altitude of CR-21's
when hit are ve%'y' use:f'ul. mWever, they do not represent the p.babUiV
that a hel1copter wUl be hit while traveliq at a given altitude.or speed.
In or'4er to arrive at IJUCh a probabUitT f'lmcUon, the data must be adJusted
to acCO\Ult for the Mttertq _ t s of time spent at the various altitudes
ad speeds. All a h;ypothet1cal exam;ple, sUppOSe that speeds between 10 ad
    knots were ~ encOlUilterecll u trasitiou.l speeds, tllat is, that hel1-
co.pters speDd cml;v: a SlII&ll traction of t;i1eir t:lme in this speecll ~. It
Fisure 3 were asS1llaed to represent hit prebabil1tT as II i'lmction of speeel,
theclaqers of f'l;v1Dsat 10 to 50 knots would 'be greatly' underest1mated,
since II DUlllber of hits were receiveel in a relative~ small :t'raction of f'J.;v;1.q
time UDder the ~thes1s. !Ihus the tintiq that "Although 1ncreues in .
e1ther speecll or alt1tude lessen hel1cGpter wJ.nerabil1tT, altitude appears
1;0 be the .mre critical; Siven a Choice.{ the pUot should tavor il1ereued
altitude over increased speed" {Tab III} 1s merel¥ suaested but not neces-
sar1l:y the cue that "stat1stics presented in Section III indicate that
wJ.nerabil1tT outside the laMq zone was virtuall;y nesligible" (paa. 3,
Tab I), since more thaJl.al1' of the hits occurred at speeds 1naa.88 fit 50
knots - ~ ma.Y have occurred dur:lq contour:fllrbs. A joint Mstributiem.
of hits received as a f'lmctiem. of both speed &I1d altitude, u well IllS a more
explicit statement 01' the speeds ad alt1tudes involved,in a typical escort
mission, would 'be help:ful to· -clear up these points.        .
      '!'he Clata on locations em. the helico,pter whiQh lIave been hit is statis-
tiClJ.4r s1p1ticat, but whether it actua.ll.7 implies" a tirect ,confirmation
of the value of hel1co.pter..-unted tirepever" (1'I8'S 5, Tab III) requ1res
fUrther ,investiption of the tactics 01' the: JIa:tine hel1co,pters ad the s1 t-
uations UI1der which the hits were received.

  . _ 01' ~ computatiODB are al~M:ft1cult, 'because the concept it-
self as~s a st~ date" .......n 1 t1on requirement which rare4r exists in
~tlve CClllbat.~S M:ft1lNltT is accentuated, as the report reaefPl1zes ...
when. avaUable data represent oaly a short. per10d of time. Over and above
such M:ft1oul.t1es, the method ~ which day of su.ppl;r tisures are obttl.1ned in
Tab II 11 erroneous. This _tlIod is represented lIT the follonq fo~:
     _     of ~ (peri.;tube) .. fotal1'WlilAs mended ~ the period
                         .           '.    30 Gun or TUbe     s
where gun or tube days are cCIII.lmted by mUltill1Y1q by the munber of i&ve on
(,J.t"\,"• .s,:td)tll.:' • •5~~"ex:pende(l by the IlUIIber 01' .tubes (or suns)
vb1'cA can Wle that type.                          . .. .                      .
----------.. ---------------r-----..
      .       '

                                       ------~--,~-------   . .-------.------------------

*'l'h1s is a' ccmjecture which caabe Veritiea. lIT ~ staJK'lerd statil;f;1cal
teehll1ques ,to data on tlW llUDiber 01' cues of IIl1Iltiple hits. .

 .oom:   9

      To see the fallac y in this tOl'lllUla p suppo se that only one
                                                                       tube of a
given calib er is on hand. and ths.t :if; fires at least one
                                                                round on every
daT of the perio d. Then the day of suppl y is computed by the
to be one.,. thirti eth of the avera ge daily expen diture of this formu la
                                                                     tube. while
the tube shoul d in tact be suppl ied with its daily expen diture
facto r of 30 U parti cular ly II{1Sterious when appli ed to expen rate. The
the full five month perio d. However if the appar ently more diture s for
figur e of 150 were used. the day of suppl y would be absw         appro priate
                                                                dl7 low. On the
other hand. if the facto r were elimi nated altog ether (set
                                                                 to 1), the day
of suppl y would be that shawn as "expe nditu re rate per gun
is in reali ty the expen diture rate per tube on -activ e" days. tube" which

      In fact, the exper iment al da1' of suppl y shoul d be simpl
round s expen ded divid ed by the avera ge number of tubes avail y the total
                                                                   able and
by the total number of days in the test perio d. Despi te
                                                                the quant ity
of n1llll.bers in Tab II. insuf ficlan t data is provi ded to anabl
                                                                    e indep enden t
calcu n of daT of suppl y.

     In addit ion to these conce ption al diffi culti es, the table
is full of comp utatio nal incon sisten cies - at least 'five       in Tab Xl
                                                               of the numbers
are signi fican tly in error . Furth ermor e, round ing resul ts to the
highe r whole mumber can resul t in gl"oss error s: i f ammu            next
                                                             nition is
requi red at the !'Ate of 12 round s per tube per day, and is
                                                               suppl ied at
the rate of 1 round per tube per day. almos t ~en ti1l!es the
                                                               requir emen t
will be on hand.

        That there are inade quaci es in the stati stica l measu re of
ness and the contr ols used in the OPllNAH progra m does: not          effec tive-
                                                                  refle ct an the
actua l effec tiven ess of armed helic opter s in the escor t role.
findin gs and concl usion s of the study 1IlA1' be .ud - suppr         The
                                                                  essive fire
-1' be as effec tive as claim ed - but it seems clear that
have not yet been estab lished on the basis of sound statiman;r of them            '
                                                                stica l reaso ning,
nor that the T&lid it1' of: the f:indi ngs must rest on other
                                                                bases ., It_1 '
well be that seaso ned milit ary judgement and the opini ons
                                                                  of "user s" are
lIIDl'e appro priate to an evalu ation of this natur e. But, i
                                                                f stati stica l
argum ents are used. the1' Mnst be used prope rly, despi te l1mit
                                                                     ation s imposed
b1' testin g in an activ e theat er.

cc: Hr Warner                               Mark J. Eisne r
    IWID (Mr young )                        Resea rch Analy sis Corpo ration
    RACSJWIO (Bangkok)
    Dr. Clark
                    ,,~ ""'~~""",

                                                  ",CT.-   .. ,_,
Extract From "After A.ction Report," 21st Division, 14 April 63, R4i1,garding
                              "Eagle Flight"

      The "Eagle" concept makee maximum uee of the surprise and shock action
which can be gained by employing highly-trained and well-armed troops in
a quasi - sky cavalry role. From 40-60 troop., are used as an "Eagle" Force.
The force must be kept relatively small for it to retain a high degree
control and a capabiUty to be employed quickly in almost any landing area.
In this instance, 40 troops were employed as the '~gle" Force. Thie force
waa divided into four squads. The squads are delBignated Red, Green, blue,
and yellow and all member., wear colored scarvell! correspcnding to their
llsaignment.,. The Slime soldiers are habitually given the same position.
and each man carries a shoulder weapon and ammunition. Each squad has a
PRC-6 radio; the Company Commander h... a PRC-10; the advisor carries a
PRC-10, also. Three basic formations are used for landing depending upon
the estimate made at the time. Weighed carefully are euch considerations
a. (1) number of enemy actually seen (2) weapons (detected) carried by the
enemy (3) ob.erved fortifications (4) size of the area/canal line/Village
to be a.saulted (5) nearness of friendly troops (6) information concerning
the enemy reported by friendly forces on the ground (7) weather (8) avail·-
ability of landing zone. (9) aggressivnes., of the enemy, i.e., is he run-
ning or firing back (10) fire support available. These factors are consid-
ered in li~ht of the minion to be performed by the "Eagle" force. Missions
include (1) Blocking fleeing Viet Cong (2) reinforcing a unit on the ground
 (3) reconai.sance (4) search (5) information gathering - particularly sei~­
ing prisoners and (6) attacking enemy troops "flu.hed" by air strikes,
other heliborne landings or foot movementa. In this operation, Eagle
was landed four tim.. on D-day and twice on D+1. The first landing
on D~Day wile to block for advancing friendly forces. The .econd landing
involved I"arching a small village immediately follOWing an airstrike.
8 pril!onerl! were taken. The last two landings were directed again.t
fleeing Viet Congo Six more were captured am one KIA. The operation
.nd.d at noon of D+l. Th.refore, only two landings were made. In the
first instance an "abort" wall called by the advisor, wi'b~ the prior
approval of the company commander, just before touch down on one side
of .. tree/canal line in an to deceive enemy .. en rushing into
the tree line II. to which side "Eagle" would land. In this ca.e Eagle
was not split because of the uncert ..inty as to the true number of .nemy
in the t .. rget ar.... The ruse fail.d when the last helicopter touch.d
down instead of aborting and the troops d.parted from the helicopter in
their usual r .. pid manner. Therefore, the remainder of the flight (1st
three ships) swung b.. ck over and landed with the one squad alre ..dy on
the ground__ Thr.e w.r. taken and 1 KIA. On the second land-
ing, the force was landed at .. junction of two can..l., one squad in
each quadrant, ... a blocking force in front of ..dvancing friendly force ••
1 prisoner W&IB t ..ken, however, the advancing unit captured 7 which might
hllve escaped otherwi.e. The armed UHlB's provided support ..nd killed
one (confirmed). More suspects were captured by the advancing units.

                      CDr-t;IBiJliiblI;I'L ()
                          Marine Aircraft Group 16
           1st Marine. Aircraft Wing. Aircraft. FMF, Pacific
                 C/O FPO. San Francisco. California

                                                              ·24 Ju11963

From: Commanding Officer
To:   Commander. Ta8k Element

Subj:   Evaluation of the Armed Escort Helicopter; comment8

R.ef:   Ca) Evaluation of the Armed Escort Helicopter; draft   ot
1.  In accordance with a verbal request from Commander, Ta.k Element the following comments concerning reference Ca) are herewith
submitted. These comments will be confined to Armed Helicopter E.cort
Operations in lItVN. Theysllauld not be con8trued to reflect a satisfaction
or dis-satisfaction with the Armed Escort Helicopter or the relative effec-
tiveness of this vehicle versus fixed wing support aircraft inthi8 .area ot

2. lIteference Ca) i8 well documented and presentl lupportina and
opposing views concerning a highly controversial subject in. what i8
considered to be. a fair. and effective manner. However. there are
several areas set forth in reference Ca) which are based purely on
professional opinion and will be commented upon as such by the under-
signed. Others reflect incomplete 8tatistical analysis and inconclus-
ive test data which. although relatedly interes.ting, are not con8idered
to come within the purview of these comments.

3. The point taken in paragraph c. concerning the ability ot the
armed helicopter to fly in clole proximity to and in the same 8peed
range of the transport helicopter thus giving a quick reaction capa-
bility is considered to be of the utmost importance. This is particu-
larly true in this area of operations where dense jungle vegetation lind
trees abound. The mountainous terrain also dictates the need.for a
protective vehicle which has similar flight characteristics. One
which is able to accompany, side by side i{ necessary the tran.port
helicopter over the above type type terrain be it steep inner valley, 01'
high mountain .landing zones.

~.  Against a less 80phisticated type of weapon ••uch as invariably
found in this area of operations the armed helicopter is ideally .uited
for escort of the transport helicopter particularly under marginal
weather conditions where fixed wing .escort aircraft require greater
ceiling flexibility. This is particularly true where much flying i.
done in mountainous terrain.




5. Vulnerability is probably the chief disadvantage accrueing to the
armed helicopter. Slow speed, relative light armor protection of the
crew and main components are of chief CQ"c~rn in tht. area. However,
one important factor which can:cot be ovedooked is ~ armed helicopters
capability to descend vertically thus ensuring a better opportunity to
effect a safe landing or one that the crew can walk away from should a
main component, other than main rotor blades, be severely damaged.
The opposite must hold for a fixed wing aircraft damaged to the extent
that an immediate landing cannot be precluded.

6.   The undersigned d,oeB not concur with the analysis found on paJe 6
relative to supposedly safe landing zones. All landing zones must be
considered unsafe from the standpoint of the VC's capability in this
area of operat;ions. Surprise is. not always the case in the jungle
and mountainous terrain around Da Nang. The VC also know what
areas helicopters can operate into and out of. As a result many
such zones are staked and presumed to be covered by fire or a ,~ap­
ability of the VC to react to landings in these zones. Therefore. it
is the opinion of the undersigned that all landing zones in this area
must be considered uns.afe.

7. Both fixed wing support aircraft and armed helicopter support
have been excellent in this area. The need for both is considered
necessary for counterinsurgency operations. The relative advantages
of both must be weighed and considered for various type missions over
varying types of terrain and under weather conditions suited for each
type of support aircraft.

                                     /s/ F. A. Shook. Jr.
                                     /t/ F. A. SHOOK, JR.
l'rom: CTE                                   7/24/63
To:    Senior Military Advisor, I Corps

      I concur completely with above.

                                    /sl A. H. Gomez
                                        Col. USMC

," <. ,. ,~,.. ,   ~,   P'
       1- ~6~834Z


       ****************                              * * * * * * '" * * * * * * * * *
       * * * '" *'" '"
                               * * '" '" '" '" * * '" '" '" '" * * * * ~, ** * * * * '" * *










       '" '" '" '" * * '" '" * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *



       * * * * * '" * * * * * * * * * * '" '" '" * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

       FLY ABOVE.             35~~   FEET IS STILL GENERALLY VALID.            ONLY THREE







       ALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM.                  GP-4

       ANNEX 12
                            DI$-RlBUTION LIST
 ADDl'tESSEE                                           Nr. of Copies

 Joint Chies of Staff                                 5
  Department of Defense

 Ch.ief of Staff, US Army                             5

 Chief of Naval Operatl.ons                            5

 Chief of Staff, US Air Force                         5

 Commandant, US Marine Corps                          5

 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific                          5    !

Commander, Mititary ASsistance Command,               5
 Vietnam, APQ 143, San Francisco, Calif.·

Commander-in Chief, U$Army:Pacific                    5 (le:ss incl 3)

Commander-in Chief, US Air Force                     25

Advanced llesearch Projects, Agency, OSD              5

Commanding General, US Continental Army ,Command     15

Commanding Qeneral, US Army Combat Developments      25 (less inc! 3)

Commanding General, US Army Materiel Command         5 (less inc! 3)

Deputy Chlef of Staff for Perrsonnel                  5 (less inc! 3)
 Department of the Army

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations,        5 (less inc! 3)
 Department of the Army

Deputy Chlef of Staff for Logistics,                  5 (less incl 3)
 Department of the Army

,Chief of llesearchand Development,                  , 5 (less inc! 3)
  Department of th.e Army

,Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,      5 (less inc! 3)
  Department of the Army

'Commanding General, 11th Air Assault Division        5 (Ie •• , inc13)

Commanding General, US Army Support Group"            7 (less inc1 3)
 Vietnam       '

Commanding General, 2nd Air Division                  5 (less inc13)

Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam   10 (less inc1 3)

                    DI.$TllIB UTION LIST ( Contd)

ADDRESSEE                                               Nr. of Copi=.s

Commandant, US Army War College,
 Carlisle Barracks, Pa

Commandant, Command and General Staff College
 Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

Commandant, Inf.ntry School, US Army I nfantr.y
 Center, Fort Benirlng, Ga.

Commandlult, ArtUlety School, US Army. Artillery
 and Guided Mis~ile Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Commandant, Armor School, tIS Allmor Center              2
 Fort Knox, Ky.                  '

Commandant, US Aviation School, uS Army Aviation Center 2
 Fort l't.ucker. Ala.

Commanding General. US Army Special Warfare
 . School, Fort Bragg. North Carolina

Chief. Army'Concept Team in Vietnam,                      5 (less incl 3)
 APO 143. San Francisco. Calif.

Page 2

          .&lIlY COlr:BPr '1'IAH IN VIJmW(
       &1'0 1113, san Franolllco, Oalitom1a
                                                    10 May 1963

    Open~   Bvaluat10n of ~ Hel1copten        (0)
               Sbort '1'1tJ..: 0PENAk

                lDIL DIit lem

       1,6 October 1962 -   1S Karch 1;963

                                                                  .   !
                                               U. S.. daY    O~OEPT TEAM Jtl VlETNAK
                                               ml4l.       SanFr~oisc. ,Qal~o:i'n±a
C T I V . . . t M 1 0 M e i T :6:;
BUlJlCT1Final Test loport- O}IeratienaI Evaluationrd Armed (;0)

' IX>1                  Soe Anne.:x:D
                            ,       .

    1. «U)The attach" report covers an opera.tionalevaluat!l.en ·of .&r.IIIIIQ
Mllco""em~yedas.8Cortll tor       trans.po:rthelioopter.senpp4 :in BU~port
oIto~..a.utlenoToptrati.n. :in     thellepUlioaf Vietnam 4.ur~, :\\heper104
JbOctaw 1962thr.o1.P 15 Maroh 1'963.·
          2..         (C) ~.
        :&. ;,\ pl'OiVUicmfJ. ecnpany ot 15 us Arrrr8'UH...l hel.iLoepterewall                                id~,.l
tethe :aepubliq ot Vietnam:l.n Se.ptember. 1902 ter the purPOII•• ot:
                                        (1;) '~V±tinc ar.medpr.oteotientor US AnrIT ,OH-.21heUoe,
UMfI. :&11 traneport •."'t troops of the ~ of the Reputllio .~                                          w..tnul.
               {Z)Servin, as a "test lUlit" tor an operational                                     ,ev.1uat~ cOG-
duct;el\17 1tiheUS A.t."my Ooncept; Team in Vietnu.
           19.T••t:\n& walloonclucted in accerdancs with ali1reott.,. iHllee!..b.7
theUS~CV'           Ani.tanoeCeDlllllZld" Vietnam"uncierdateet 29' S¥hembIll'196.a.
TbUiu..ctive.. entitlecl"'l!est Plan. ,Operati«l&l. .Enluation ·'fllt ~ ;ReJl;:Lcep-
t ... \(Ol, 1t s8tabl1ehed thete.tparameter.e.~
          :;.         (u)                he t ! . t .
        Therepert cen~ist. et an intreduct1on"'·- .,
__oral test09le:c,tl• • , .anclanne.:x:esgivin,.u1!,POrtir!gmate:tW-. '2he., '1n1tllllllUo..
tIlon:l.nclecles &1Iu.aJ:7ot tOllt :results.                                 a 'isdedgned,to:.tanti 40ne         as a
....lItofthe co~te report.

          4.          (0) WtrMC!!'.
                      :&.~ttH'                  oJLtecl   in~.a}Xl2b         ...i¥8. "                  •.

        b. "j)e~t ot the 'A:/:tlq l.etter.,AGiAH..,JI(M);381 (n.oct 62) JJQSGPS,
••jectl " _ '.r1'M1' Te.tPr~F'IIn in Vietnam~U), 1/ 6 NCilvemltel'l~"UImded.

         c. T,.set "portll"" Ar'ssq, _.nce'Pt Team in Vietnam.su1J4ect:
                                 .                                                                           lt~iUlal
flvaluation~,""' (0)1t:

                                                    . , . . . . ' ..'
                                        "MMltlllJr TNtie,.rttlwUf:lr .1. :;t 'N_ember. 194.2.
                                                               lumber2,f 31iecemberl9c~;~
                      ,1,       '                                  "er,.~;, :;,1 .Januaiy. 1~03.
                                                               ¥wPer 4,.,' ~cb1963.                 '
                      (U}"" .......t i ! B . . : . .'
         .,.• '(~>t
                      ACT.. • •• • • • US ,..,Oencept'lleaminVietnam
                      .",.. • • • . .                      ~   .t the Republic of Vietnam

                                                                                                                                                                                                                           ,',         '

           ~, "

                      AcfIV-. ') ."                                                                                        .:.. ,,'.
                      SUB.JEC!: ,.P1naili;'Mltep:>rt ~ Operat.ional Evaluat1enGf ~1I.l1oopt;.r8 (c)
                                                 COiIIJII(ACv • • • COIIIIlIander,US Hilit&r74Ae.~tanCe C-.u1, Vietnam.

                                           'GW .• • •                                  •      • • GovernmeJ)t.of the aep11bJ.1o .01' Vietnam.
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     SUBJECT: Final Test Report -             Operational Evaluation of Armed HeliCClpters (C)

                                         TABI..1t OF    CO~S

           (Tab I).           Section I • • • Introduction,
           (Tab II) • , Section II' ' •• Objective 1 (Tactics and techniques)
           (Tab III), ,Section III • ,',' Objective 2 (Effect on insurgents)
           (Tab IV)      • 'Section IV .".; .,ObJjective 3 (Conunand control)
                          ,      "          ''''',       i   I        .

           (Tab V)      • • Section V ••• Objective: 4 (Formations)
           (Tab VI) •• Section VI              •• Objective 5 (Communications procedures)

           (Tab VII).    • Secticn VII • • Objective 6 (Suppressive fire)
           (Tab VIII) • Section VIII                 • Objective 7 (Insurgent identification)
           (Tab IX) •• Section IX              •• Objective 8 (Optimum organization)

           (Tab X)      •• Section X •• '. Objective 9 (Logistical problems)
           (Tab XI) •• Section XI ., • Objective 10 (Ammunition day of supply)

           (Tab A). • • Ann«x A • • • • Aircraft and armament
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           (Tab ,B). • .Ann«x B • • • • Mission sta.tistics
           (Tab C) •• • Ann«xC • • • • Analysis of, weather, and enemy                 C::::."" "
           (Tab D) ••• Annex D • • • • Distribution of report

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