BCPRStrategyreview-COLOMBIA by ashrafp

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									              BCPR Strategic Review
              Coordinated and edited by Ryan Nichols
              Small Arms Survey, February 2006

                    COLOMBIA
Authored by




Contents
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Justification and Antecedents
4. Project Design
5. Project Implementation
6. Project Effects and Mainstreaming
7. Conclusions and Lessons Learned
8. Acknowledgements
9. References
10. Annexes




                                                       1
1.        Introduction

Early in 2003, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Office in Colombia
and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) designed a strategy to reduce
armed conflict violence in Colombia. An integrated BCPR mission was organised in
March of 2003 to establish the programme and to draft a Cooperation Framework
between UNDP Colombia and BCPR. Based on the recommendations of the mission,
UNDP Colombia developed and implemented the Reconciliation and Development
Programme (REDES), a comprehensive and integrated strategy to reduce conflict
violence, mitigate its effects, and gradually diminish the mechanisms that perpetuate
violence. The preparatory assistance and initial phase of the programme were financed by
a contribution from BCPR of USD 930,000 for 2003-2004, while the Swedish
Government later contributed SEK 35 million for 2004-2006.
         REDES originally envisioned the possibility of participating in combatant
demobilization processes of irregular armed groups, both under collective and individual
terms, and participated in various exploratory activities related to disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) until December, 2003. However, non-
compliance with international and UN standards specified for these processes,
particularly those regarding human rights protection and international humanitarian law,
especially by non-state armed groups, led the United Nations to abstain from
participating.
         In consultation with the Small Arms and Demobilization Unit (SADU) office in
Geneva, a variant to UNDP’s support in this field was defined under the existing
Cooperation Framework with the design of the Urban Security Project (USP) and the
Prevention of Youth Recruitment into the Armed Conflict Project (PFR). These two
projects are being implemented within the overall REDES strategy in line with the
recommendations of the Preparatory Assistance approval meeting on June 9, 20031.
         This report reflects on the conceptualization, design, financing, implementation,
impacts, and sustainability of these two REDES components. It is intended to support a
larger system-wide review of BCPR/SADU programming on armed violence reduction
and arms control. The report is based on interviews with UNDP staff in Bogotá and
Medellín, in addition to focus groups, and observations conducted during visits to
Medellín and Montes de María region. Although the current REDES program has
operations in other areas of Colombia (the Alto Ariari in the Meta department and in
Villavicencio) it was first established in the two regions that constitute the focus of this
review The structure of the report follows that suggested by the Small Arms Survey, and
therefore highlights a number of key themes of interest to BCPR. Following a brief
discussion of the background to the project, this report will assess the extent to which
these projects have been (1) properly designed with respect to the Colombian context; (2)
successfully implemented in a cost effective manner; (3) instrumental in producing lasting
effects; and (4) mainstreamed into multilateral and national programming. In conclusion,
the report will highlight a number of lessons learned which may serve to inform future
BCPR/SADU programming in Colombia and elsewhere.



1
    See Armed Conflict Reduction in Colombia (COL/03/M19).


                                                                                          2
2.       Background

Historical Context

The common notion that Colombia has suffered from persistent violent conflict since the
1940s is somewhat misleading; in fact, two specific periods of armed violence of varying
intensities can be clearly distinguished. The first, known as La Violencia, was essentially
a civilian confrontation between supporters of Partido Liberal and Partido Conservador,
the country’s two primary political parties. After a political settlement based on
alternation in power known as the Frente Nacional, some small armed rural movements
survived and became increasingly contentious. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, these
self-defence farmer groups (as they were known) evolved into offensive guerrilla
movements. Group violence was present although it remained localised and of rather
low-intensity by all accounts. The period during the Frente Nacional was rather peaceful
and exhibited relatively high human security. During La Violencia (1948-1965), in
contrast, as many as 180,000 persons lost their lives2.
         The second period of violence has been characterised by a guerrilla war between
insurgent armed groups and State forces, a conflict that grew more complicated with the
appearance of illegal paramilitary groups. By the end of the 1960s, these guerrilla groups
were well established, although the State had periodic success in quashing them. In the
1980s, organized armed violence grew steadily and became a serious threat to human
security. This same decade, Colombia also saw the emergence of non-state illegal
paramilitary self-defence groups as well as other powerful criminal organizations.
Despite several successful peace deals leading to DDR processes, the State is still
confronted by non-state armed groups. In the wake of a broad national peace movement
whereby some 10 million Colombian citizens voted for a peace mandate in 1997, the
Pastrana administration (1998-2002) entered into negotiations with the largest guerrilla
group, the FARC-EP. These efforts were eventually abandoned, however, while the
conflict escalated to crisis proportions3
         Currently, the administration of President Uribe (2002-2006) enjoys considerable
popularity due to its departure from these previous failed negotiation efforts and its more
offensive approach to resolving the conflict4. His Politica de Seguridad y Democracia
(Democratic Security Policy) has aimed to 1) strengthen State institutional presence in
areas where it has been traditionally weak, 2) pursue the guerrilla groups through an
aggressive military campaign, and 3) demobilize illegal paramilitary groups, most
notably, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). While Uribe’s security policy has
had a meaningful positive impact on a variety of indicators of human security, there is
evidence in recent months that the FARC–EP have been increasing the scale of their
operations, implementing continuous and more direct confrontations by means of well-

2
  Estimate from the Colombian 2003 Human Development Report “Callejón con Salida”, Chapter 1:
Orígenes; guerra en la periferia. pp 18–45, although this figure is in dispute.
3
  Estimates of the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) range from 1.5 to 3 million, depending on
source and definition, and Colombia ranked 4 th internationally in terms of landmine accidents. Our own
estimate of deaths directly related to the conflict during the period 1988-2004 surpasses the 38,000 figure.
4
  Recently, President Uribe has warned the international community that armed violence in Colombia is not
the expression of an internal conflict but of a terrorist threat, and new guidelines were issued prohibiting
local and international agencies from having contact with guerrilla groups.


                                                                                                           3
orchestrated attacks on state forces throughout the country. At the same time, compliance
by the illegal paramilitary groups of the cease fire agreement has been patchy.
        Efforts to fight against organised crime, mostly linked to the production and
distribution of narcotics, have been a major item on the national political agenda since the
mid-eighties. Crime related armed violence relates in a complex manner with conflict
violence, presenting a formidable challenge to both the national government of Colombia
and the international community.

UNDP and the Institutional Framework

The mandate of UNDP in Colombia dates back to 1974, when it was established that
UNDP would support the Government on projects to advance the standard of living of
Colombian society. In 1997, UNDP established a four-year cooperation agreement in
order to support national development strategies in accordance with the Presidential
Development Plan of 1994–19985. In 2001, another cooperation agreement was
established for the period between 2002 and 2006, according to the Development Plan of
President Alvaro Uribe. This cooperation agreement commits UNDP Colombia to
contribute to government efforts to reduce poverty, strengthen democratic governance,
and encourage peace through dialogue and reconciliation. More specifically, the current
cooperation agreement establishes seven primary functions of the UNDP Colombia
office, which are to:

    1. promote access to international sources of technical and financial
       cooperation for development;
    2. promote the programs approach to the local investment strategies;
    3. facilitate the execution of innovative actions that may become replicable
       sector models;
    4. promote horizontal technical cooperation;
    5. enforce technical, financial and administrative supervising systems,
       including specific criteria to measure cooperation impact and institutional
       capacity strengthening;
    6. enhance community participation in the identification and resolution of
       problems; and,
    7. encourage the participation of women in development activities and
       incorporate a gender perspective in all of UNDP’s efforts.

Civil Society Initiatives

It is important to note that many peace-building and conflict prevention efforts in
Colombia focus on the strengthening of local and regional civilian initiatives, such as the
Peace and Development Programmes (PDPs). PDPs go back as far as 10 years in
existence6 and were originally established by small groups of peasants and communities
with the guidance of Catholic Church communities. Though initially concerned with

5
  Each President in Colombia has to enact their own Plan de Desarrollo (Development Plan), which
includes their goals and planned activities for the four year presidential period.
6
  See, for example, the PDP of Magdalena Medio under the direction of Father Francsico de Roux s.j..


                                                                                                       4
poverty, lack of development prospects, and the direct effects of violence on local
communities, they soon broadened in scope to address the wider socioeconomic and
political context of weak State institutions and the unconstitutional power structures of
illegal armed groups. Today, there are 16 operational PDPs recognised by the National
Government, the international community, and a prolific array of civil actors that support
them. In supporting and accompanying such civil society processes, the UNDP has
explicitly chosen to strengthen the basis for a national-level peace movement, increase
local and regional 7 capacities for violence reduction and peacebuilding, and promote
sustained dialogue between civil society and the State. PDPs today are a proven
mechanism for local and regional civil society groups to reach foreign donors and for the
international community to engage in an effort to sustain development initiatives in the
middle of conflict.

3.      Justification and Antecedents

The UNDP Reconciliation and Development Programme (REDES) builds on a number of
international, regional, and national precedents which deserve mention. These include a
growing recognition of the importance of small arms control and disarmament in UNDP
and the UN more generally, a series of regional arms control initiatives, a decentralized
national legislative framework resulting from the recent implementation of a new
Political Constitution (in 1991), careful consideration by UNDP-REDES of experiences
from previous peace and demobilization initiatives, and a thorough understanding of the
characteristics and trends of conflict at the regional level. Each of these factors is
reviewed in further detail below.
         First, the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in
all its Aspects8 in July of 2001 spurred a number of UN agencies to launch activities to
halt the proliferation of small arms, including UNDP, the World Health Organization
(WHO), and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN-LiREC). With the aid of a special
fund to support the prevention and reduction of small arms proliferation, UNDP launched
a series of projects beginning with a pilot weapons collection project in Albania in 1998
and, subsequently, its first Latin American programme in El Salvador. The UNDP has
supported a variety of activities in this context, including weapons collection and
destruction, the introduction of proposals to modernise national legislation, and the
management of government stockpiles.
         Second, the Western Hemisphere was the first region to develop a treaty against
the illegal trafficking of firearms in the framework of the Organization of American
States (OAS), with the adoption of the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit
Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related
Materials (CIFTA) in 19979. It was also the first region to develop a system of

7
  REDES currently supports 3 PDPs: Cordepaz in Meta, Prodepaz in Antioquia, and the Fundación Red
Desarollo y Paz in Montes de María.
8
  The fact that a Colombian diplomat, Camilo Reyes, was named president of the Conference ensured that
the Latin American agenda would be considered in any comprehensive programme of action. Mr Reyes is
currently the Colombian Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.
9
  While Colombia has signed this agreement, it has not yet ratified it.


                                                                                                         5
procedures to implement a treaty of this nature, with the adoption of the Model
Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and
Components and Ammunition in 1998.
        Third, the preparation of a conflict reduction and development strategy in
Colombia required a thorough understanding of the national political and legislative
structure. Colombia stands out among Latin American countries for the relative stability
of its democratic political system. In 1991, a new Constitution was enacted which
replaced the former Constitution which had been in effect since 1886. Article 1 of the
new Constitution establishes the decentralized nature of the Colombian political
structure, allowing mayors and governors10 to make their own decisions as they see fit,
and has important ramifications for locally-based initiatives such as the aforementioned
PDPs. The current Constitution further designates the mayor to be the police authority in
his or her jurisdiction, while the armed forces are responsible for national protection as
well as the production and regulation of firearms11.
        Fourth, the project has carefully considered a number of national demobilization
and reintegration attempts. In 1990, for example, thousands of combatants were
demobilized in the context of the framework of negotiated agreements between the
government and certain armed groups12. At the same time, the Presidential Programme
for Reintegration, a programme of the executive branch, has promoted programmes of
individual demobilization aimed at combatants belonging to those groups that have not
reached specific agreements with the government13. In 1999, the National Directorate for
Reintegration was established within the Ministry of the Interior and given the
responsibility of coordinating government execution of a national Reintegration
Programme, under the specific mandate to promote reintegration initiatives targeted at
previously demobilized adults1415.
        Finally, any consideration of the DDR process in Colombia must take into
account recent developments with respect to the Ley de Justicia y Paz16, a demobilisation
law championed by the Uribe administration. Drafted and put forth earlier this year with
the aim of providing a legal framework for the demobilisation of the AUC by year end,
the law has been strongly criticized by the international community for its deficiencies in
the area of victims’ reparations and its leniency toward those most responsible for human
rights violations. The law was approved by the Colombian Congress in June of this year
and quickly ratified in July in order to facilitate the ongoing demobilization of illegal



10
   Alcaldes (mayors) are the elected heads of cities and municipalities, while gobernadores (governors) are
the elected heads of departamentos (departments).
11
   This division of responsibility often leads to differing viewpoints with respect to the merits of firearms
control and disarmament on the part of these two institutions.
12
   Including, for example, the M19 and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL).
13
   This was initiated in 1994 and has been validated by a recent government decree in the current
Administration.
14
   The reintegration of under-age combatants is implemented by the Colombian Institute for Family
Welfare (ICBF).
15
   The first two-month stage of the demobilization process of combatants is under the responsibility of the
Ministry of Defence and involves the participation of the armed forces, which debrief, secure and provide
emergency attention to the demobilized and their families.
16
   Law 975 of 2005.


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paramilitary groups17. Currently, only the Swedish and Dutch governments have made
financial contributions to the external monitoring of the demobilisation process by the
OAS. The head of the mission has expressed its concern about the lack of means and
resources in order to tackle the large responsibilities that the monitoring mission has.
Recently, the independent Comisión de Conciliación y Reparación, was appointed under
the directorship of the respected academic Eduardo Pizarro León-Gómez.

4.      Project Design

Although the original need to support a deliberative and participatory formulation of
public policy regarding DDR could not be addressed, UNDP Colombia, with the support
of BCPR/SADU, designed and launched two initiatives, the Urban Security Project
(USP) and the Prevention of Youth Recruitment into the Armed Conflict Project (PFR),
within the overall context of the REDES programme. It was perceived that these
initiatives would not only serve to complement the overall REDES strategy and
objectives, but would also lay the groundwork to address a number of shortcomings in
the current DDR process in Colombia, should UNDP decide to support the process at a
later stage. In this sense, the true impact of BCPR/SADU support to UNDP programmes
in Colombia follows the logic of reducing violence and preventing violence through
development and recruitment prevention in the midst of a complex conflict and very
difficult political and security conditions.
         A number of specific risks in the current individual DDR process were
recognized. First, the most seriously affected conflict zones, where the presence of
irregular armed groups is strongest, are often those which most lack information about
the process. Second, the procedure for receiving and protecting those who, as deserters,
face a clear danger of reprisals is deficient, especially after the initial two months of
Ministry of Defence protection. Third, the procedure of registration, acceptance and
summoning to the main cities is slow and overly centralized, and often entails a lack of
adequate follow-up in the reintegration process: Fourth, there have been some incidents
of programme beneficiaries joining rival groups after receiving reintegration assistance or
becoming involved in crime. Finally, the lack of institutional presence in the conflict-
affected zones reduces the operational possibility of effectively reaching potential
beneficiaries with the services offered by the programme.
         Thus, while not actively supporting the DDR process, REDES is acutely aware of
its pitfalls. REDES has opted for intervening in violence prevention and conflict
reduction actions to based on encouraging the participation of civil society, forging
alliances between public actors and civil society, enabling the collection and sharing of
knowledge and experiences, and incorporating community objectives and strategies into
public policies. The programme's hypothesis is that as local and regional actors become
more capable of assuming their institutional mandate, broad-based alliances and
partnerships can be established and social organisation can be extended, leading to an
improvement in the quality of participatory processes and directly affecting the
conditions that facilitate violence. In short: major organisation means less vulnerability to
violence. Risk protection thus arises from increasing social organisations in an alliance

17
 Although emphasis has been on illegal paramilitary demobilization, the law is designed for application to
members of guerrilla groups wishing to demobilize.


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with international community. In turn, the international community becomes a catalyser
for social organisation and for the visibility of local and national organisations. The
REDES programme was conceived as programme of local alliances that is turning
regional and national with time, creating a complex network for risk reduction in the
middle of conflict. Common understanding of regional conflict dynamics, and of the
socioeconomic and political context, enables participatory analyses to lay the foundation
for consensus-based public policies and peacebuilding. The remainder of this report will
address the specific characteristics of the two BCPR/SADU projects that are being
implemented within this context.

The Prevention of Youth Recruitment into the Armed Conflict Project (PFR)

In designing the PFR, REDES selected a group of municipalities in the Montes de
María18 region, where the well-respected Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco has been
operating for some time. Participating municipalities were chosen on the basis of conflict
dynamics19 and political support. The project’s original aim was to formulate and develop
participatory and integrated local programmes to prevent forced recruitment of youths20
by illegal armed groups through the design and implementation of interventions for risk
prevention. At the same time, the project aimed to promote the development of
employment activities due to the strong link identified between youth unemployment and
recruitment by armed groups. The strategy of the project was then twofold: to build local
organisations in order to reduce violence against a vulnerable population, and to use those
local organisations to prevent recruitment, directly tackling risk vulnerabilities and
recruitment of youngsters. Due to the extreme sensitivity of this theme in an area such as
Montes de María, the project's coordinators deemed it necessary to refer to the project as
Promoción de los derechos de la niñez y la juventud (Promotion of Children's and
Youths' Rights).
        It was envisioned at the outset that the PFR would be implemented in a series of
three phases. First, representatives from REDES, the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), and Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco would hold dialogues with
community members in the selected municipalities in order to identify the specific causes
of recruitment with respect to local conflict dynamics. Next, the creation of a multi-
purpose fund would serve to support projects that reinforce the recruitment issues which
arose from the initial community vulnerability mapping (Phase I). Finally, the results and
experiences of Phases I and II would serve as input for the formulation of local public
policies on Derechos de la niñez y la juventud (Children and Youths' Rights).
While there are no previous experiences in forced recruitment prevention in Colombia, .
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco , REDES, and the IOM have incorporated national
experiences in promoting Derechos de la niñez y la juventud, which has been a political
issue since the Constitution of 1991. Although progress made by Colombia Jóven (a
18
   The region of Montes de María is split by the boundary of two administrative departments (Sucre and
Bolívar), and REDES is working in 7 of the 15 municipalities that constitute the region: San Onofre, Tolu
Viejo and Ovejas in Sucre, and Carmen de Bolívar, Zambrano, San Juan Nepomuceno and San Jacinto in
Bolívar.
19
   This region has been one of the regions most affected by the conflict (see Maps in the Annex).
20
   The Colombian Constitution recognizes special rights of children (from 1 to 5 years old) and youths
(from 15 to 29 years old); it is precisely these rights that REDES promotes in Montes de María.


                                                                                                            8
national institution) towards the creation of a National Youth Policy has been perhaps
helpful in establishing an overall framework, there are no concrete municipal policies that
serve as precedents. REDES, in short, had to be designed from scratch with very few
international or national experiences, and in the midst of conflict in a highly contested
region.
        From the very beginning, it has been the intention of the PFR to incorporate
members of the community in the project's design and implementation in order to
maximize the likelihood of sustainability over the long term. To this end, the PFR has
created local institutions in 6 of the 7 municipalities in which they operate21, in order to
oversee the mapping process, support the preparation of project proposals to the multi-
purpose fund, and eventually lead the way in the development and proposal of more
formal local policies. Establishing such a legal framework requires legislative support
from the Municipal Council, the Departmental Assembly, or the National Congress,
depending on the administrative level22. While the establishment of such municipal
policies in Montes de María requires the support of the Mayors, the Governors, the City
Council and other political actors in the region, REDES recognized that they would not
be effective without civilian support.

The Urban Security Project (USP)

As in the case of the PFR, REDES held a number of planning sessions with local
authorities and other stakeholders in order to define a strategy for the USP. The USP was
conceived in the context of striking reductions in the level of homicides and other
indicators of violent crime in the cities of Bogotá and Medellín, the two main cities of the
country. In particular, the progress in Bogotá has spotlighted the city as a model of Urban
Security not only in Colombia but in the entire Latin American region23. In the last
twelve years, Bogotá has managed to reduce its homicide rate by nearly 70%24, and
estimates have attributed some 14% of the criminality rate reduction to the voluntary
submission of over 2,500 firearms. In order to share the experiences of Bogotá and other
successful urban security practices with other Colombian cities, REDES established a
partnership with the UNDP LAC SURF/Regional Project on Local Governance for Latin
America to provide technical assistance, develop knowledge management tools, and
support the formulation of public policy on urban security at the local level.
        The REDES LAC-SURF partnership originally planned pilot projects in three
cities: Medellín, Villavicencio, and Pereira, which were selected due to their levels of
crime in addition to the willingness of their administrations to match resource
contributions. Medellín in particular had executed a demobilization campaign just one
month before the current mayor25 took charge. As a result of this campaign, the new
administration decided to include the issue of disarmament in its Municipal Development
Plan.
21
   In the remaining municipality they are working to strengthen the City Council.
22
   The legislative authority at the Municipal level is the Municipal Council; at the Departmental level, it is
the Departmental Assembly; and in the National realm, it is the bicameral Congress.
23
   For more details, see the Master Plan of Security and Cohabitation of the City of Bogotá.
24
   Estimate based on data from the National Insitute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences.
25
   Mr. Sergio Fajardo, the current mayor of Medellín, envisions the city moving through a linear
progression of four stages: terror - miedo - susto - tranquilidad; the city is currently in miedo.'


                                                                                                                 9
        Project planners conceived the USP with the primary objective of strengthening
local governance capacities to reduce high levels of violent urban crime. The strategy of
the USP was developed around four key domains. First, the project would work to
integrally expand technical assistance with respect to security and cohabitation in
Medellín, Pereira and Villavicencio, emphasizing the prevention of armed violence
through SALW reduction and control initiatives. Second, the project would assist
vulnerable youth populations in order to reduce urban security threats and mitigate risks
associated with armed conflict in Medellín. Third, the project would organize an
international forum on urban cohabitation and security in order to collect and share a
diverse array of experiences. Finally, the project would work to develop toolkits and
other systems of managing knowledge and identifying best practices.
        It was envisioned that the implementation of the USP would proceed in three
phases. Phase I would consist of a thorough diagnosis of the problem in each city
concluding in the development of a Plan Maestro. This Master Plan would in turn guide
Phase II, in which social communication and mobilization programs would sensitize the
community and initiate the cultural change necessary to bring about a significant
reduction in firearm demand (in Medellín, this campaign slogan is Un Arma de Menos
son Muchas Vidas Más26). Finally, in Phase III, voluntary disarmament campaigns would
commence.

5.         Project Implementation

Since its inception, REDES has been implemented by the UNDP Country Office. This
has required close coordination with the Colombian Government in order to ensure
effective implementation of interventions on the ground, which has uniquely positioned
the programme to build strategic alliances between government agencies and civil actors.
The UNDP operates in Colombia through projects of direct execution and projects of
national execution which are implemented through government institutions at the
National level. When REDES commenced it was considered the possibility of executing
it as a National project, but this idea was abandoned later and it has been since a project
of direct execution. This supposed certain coordination difficulties with national
government agencies when the programme started. The Colombian Government
requested all interventions to be monitored and approved centrally by State institutions,
which posed a serious obstacle. Such an approach could have delayed the implementation
of the programme if bundled with other, larger interventions. Fortunately, a process of
trust building and negotiation between UNDP and the national government allowed for
the launch of REDES with the understanding that its activities would lay the foundation
for larger interventions in the future. We attest that the UNDP currently maintains good
relationships with a number of State institutions. Such state of affairs can also be
measured by the fact that several national and local government institutions are net
resource contributors to REDES initiatives. This is one of the main positive elements that
can be extracted from the Colombian experience: that it is possible, even in the middle of
difficult conflict conditions, to build constructive relationships with government
institutions steering policies and resources for violence reduction.


26
     Loosely translates to "One less arm means many more lives."


                                                                                        10
Prevention of Youth Recruitment into the Armed Conflict Project (PFR)

Phase I of the PFR consisted of a series of workshops in which youths and other
community members discussed the primary challenges posed by recruitment by illegal
groups in their respective communities. REDES wisely partnered with two organizations
with extensive experience and contacts in the region, the IOM and Fundación Antonio
Restrepo Barco. The tangible result of each workshop was a map of community
vulnerability with respect to forced recruitment, but the events also served to introduce
the REDES project and provide a space where community concerns could begin to be
voiced. These community maps serve as the starting point for all future work in the
municipalities, in that they specifically outline community priorities, identify the primary
threats, and make suggestions on how to avoid them.
         The implementation of Phase I in seven municipalities was overseen by REDES,
coordinated by Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco, and implemented by a base group in
the municipality, typically an organization of youths, teachers, parents, or the Municipal
Council. Overall, three primary issues were identified as being fundamental to the
prevention of forced recruitment: culture (by bringing the community together),
education (by providing children and youths with the foundation to become active
participants in society), and income generation (by providing the tools to secure a degree
of economic stability).
         Phase II, which is currently in progress, consists of the establishment, launch, and
promotion of a fund designed to support small community project proposals consistent
with the priorities identified in the vulnerability mapping workshops. Resources for this
fund (USD 150,000) have been provided directly by REDES, while promotion, selection,
and disbursement are managed by the Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco. At the time of
this review, the fund had been successfully established and the first round of proposals
solicited. More than 300 project proposals were submitted (totalling an amount of some
USD 500,000), of which over half successfully passed the initial screening process. The
awards will be relatively small (USD 2,500); nonetheless, the process has already
generated considerable excitement in a region where such programmes have been non-
existent and promises by State institutions rarely fulfilled.
         A monitoring system will be in place to evaluate progress once a proposal is
approved and receives initial funding, and disbursement of the remainder of the award
will be contingent upon a successful review27. While there has been no formal evaluation
of the two phases implemented thus far, project coordinators have gauged the reception
of the initiative based on community participation in the mapping workshops, the quality
the resulting vulnerability maps, and the number and calibre of fund proposals submitted.
Additionally, coordinators are pleased with the number of projects that have satisfied the
initial screening criteria, with over half of proposals qualifying in all but two
municipalities (Zambrano and Carmen de Bolívar). This indicates that projects were
formulated and presented even without any support from the base group. We consider
that the fund's objectives could have been made clearer in order to improve the success
ratio. In any event, one would expect that as funds for the higher-quality proposals begin

27
 Projects will receive 50% of the resources awarded at the outset and the remainder upon passing a
midterm evaluation.


                                                                                                     11
to be disbursed, the community will develop a sense for developing and presenting
relevant and feasible projects. REDES with the Fundación Restrepo Barco have
implemented a close follow up system for successful and failing projects. This
monitoring system is perceived by the communities as a transparency mechanism greatly
appreciated in an environment in which this is not a common feature of resource-based
development initiatives. Communities’ trust in the scheme rests in part on this perception.

The Urban Security Project (USP)

Since its inception just last year, the USP has demonstrated efficiency and flexibility in
the implementation of its strategy. It has secured political and financial commitments
from the authorities of Medellín and Villavicencio28 to include citizen security
programmes in their local political agenda and municipal development plans.
Furthermore, it has conducted preliminary diagnoses (Phase I) of the security situations
in these two cities, and Phase II is well underway in Medellín and the surrounding
metropolitan area. Finally, SURF has developed a toolkit that designed to help
municipalities to strengthen democratic governance conditions oriented towards urban
security. These points will be discussed in further detail below.
        In order to support the design of public policies on urban security at the local
level, BCPR/REDES originally selected three municipalities for a technical cooperation
aimed at reducing rates of urban violent crime29, and progress in Medellín has been
especially brisk. At the outset, planners in Medellín recognized that efforts in that city
would run an especially high risk of failure without simultaneous and complementary
interventions in the surrounding metropolitan area. Through a strategic partnership with
the Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá, the program has extended its influence to
include ten municipalities in the surrounding region. Last year, Medellín and the Área
Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá have formulated a strategic plan on urban security30
which was enacted at the end of 2004 and will continue until late 2005. The program has
achieved a local funding reorientation of nearly USD 20 million according to the
recommendations resulting from this work. In October of last year, the Alcaldía de
Medellín (Mayor's Office) held an international disarmament seminar, and a legal
agreement between UNDP REDES-LAC SURF, the Alcaldía de Medellín and the Área
Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá was signed on December 15.
        Meanwhile, the USP has begun implementing the first components of the Plan
Desarme, primarily the well-crafted communication campaign "Un arma de menos son
muchas vidas más‖. The campaign has produced and aired television and radio spots and
has positioned posters and signs in key locations throughout the city. The project is
additionally working with a group of public schools, where the campaign currently
focuses on encouraging children to turn in toy guns. In keeping with the REDES spirit of
construyendo sobre lo construído, or "building on what is already built," the school
28
   The cooperation with the municipality of Pereira has stalled primarily due to political reasons, and
several other cities, including Armenia, Santa Marta, and Buenaventura, have requested to become
partners.
29
   The technical assistance itself is provided by former practitioners familiar with the citizen security
experience of Bogotá.
30
   This plan is referred to as the Plan Maestro, and the end result will be a public security policy for
Medellín and the surrounding metropolitan area.


                                                                                                            12
program is implemented largely by personeros estudiantiles—students in the highest
grades selected by their peers to safeguard human rights. Similarly, the programme is
evaluating potential mechanisms for a firearm disarmament campaign later this year in
which the Catholic Church serves as the receptor of weapons.
         In addition to the above partnerships, it must be stressed that the Police
Department of Medellín has been and will continue to be a key partner in this process.
They have been especially cooperative with respect to the componente policivo, that
component of the project concerned with the control of arms in the city through measures
such as checkpoints and confiscation. Although the Mayor is formally the nominal Police
authority, the structure of the National Police31 means that effective cooperation still
depends on a constructive relationship between the Chief of Police and the Mayor. If the
Chief of Police is unwilling to cooperate, the Mayor’s initiatives can be substantially
hindered. The fact that the Mayor's Office and the Police Department in Medellín enjoy a
good relationship has been fundamental to the project's successful implementation thus
far.
Finally, one of the more tangible intermediate results of the REDES LAC-SURF
partnership thus far has been the development of a conceptual and methodological toolkit
designed to strengthen local governance capacity with respect to urban security. The
toolkit emphasizes a concept of governance spanning six key domains. First, the toolkit
suggests mechanisms that empower local authorities to manage, coordinate, and plan
better in order to strengthen institutional frameworks. Second, the resource emphasizes
citizen's cultural enhancement by promoting acknowledgement of the links between such
factors as alcohol and gun possession with violence. Third, emphasis is placed on social
inclusion of populations at risk through a variety of programmes (e.g., tour guides) to try
to keep vulnerable youth culturally engaged and gainfully employed. Fourth, specific
measures for outdoor advertising regulation, cleanliness, and management of public
spaces have been assembled to help improve urban quality of life. Fifth, strategies to
facilitate peaceful conflict resolution and to solve community disputes aim to improve
justice delivery. Finally, the toolkit suggests concrete ways to strengthen metropolitan
police and improve their relationship with the community.

Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms

In 2005, REDES began implementing a monitoring and evaluating system for measuring
the results and the impact of the programme. The evaluations will be carried-out by an
external party and will involve the participation of the main beneficiaries and
counterparts of the programme. It was decided that the development and coordination
(but not execution) of monitoring and evaluation processes will be the responsibility of
the recently-established Working Group for Peace, Conflict and Development which
includes external experts. Measurements will focus both on concrete results as well as on
the impacts achieved. Results will be measured in terms of the immediate effects yielded

31
  The National Police is a unified body with authority over the whole Nation and all other administrative
units (departments, municipalities and police inspections) with a centralized structure of command and
control. The National Police is a civilian force, but organically depends of the Ministry of Defence and
given the prevalence of organized crime and conflict some of its units have become increasingly
militarized.


                                                                                                        13
by the implementation of the activities in accordance with the specific objectives initially
formulated. Impact will be measured in terms the direction and magnitude of change that
the programme has induced in the living conditions of the inhabitants in the targeted
regions. Measurement instruments will include a range of qualitative and quantitative
indicators derived through methods such as interviews, polling, focus groups, and
baseline surveys.

Budgets and Financing

BCPR contributions to the REDES programme in 2003-4 amounted to USD 960,000, of
which USD 240,000 came from SADU32. The PFR is being financed by BCPR/SADU
and SIDA, for an amount of USD 240,000. The most significant cost of the PFR is the
fund, which currently totals USD 150,000. The fund is financed by UNDP and managed
by Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco, and administrative expenses have been shared by
both institutions. The USP was launched in 2004, with USD 40,000 from BCPR, USD
100,000 from the Alcaldía de Medellín, and USD 60,000 from Área Metropolitana del
Valle de Aburrá, and an additional USD 50,000 in the city of Villavicencio. Perhaps
more importantly, the REDES LAC-SURF partnership has achieved a local funding
reorientation of nearly USD 20 million through a collection of municipal policy
recommendations.
        The efficiency REDES has shown in executing resources and achieving
intermediate objectives has allowed the programme to build alliances within the UN as
well as with other international community members, civil and State actors. For example,
REDES has jointly developed exploratory missions with the EU for the 3rd Peace
Laboratory to Meta and Montes de María. In this sense, REDES has improved
coordination and has consolidated its role as a conditions-setter for larger interventions
by increasing local governance conditions. In addition, REDES has raised funds from the
Netherlands, Spain, Catalunya, and the UNDP-BCPR Small Grants Programme, and has
been recently granted a second consecutive allotment from BCPR33. In addition, a grant
from the Social Solidarity Network of the Colombian Government has recently been
approved. The attached funding chart shows the commitment of each institution to the
overall budget of REDES in US$ dollars.

REDES OVERALL FUNDING
            BCPR      UNDP        SGP       SIDA       AECI     Catalunya   Netherlands     SSN     TOTAL
2003         48000         0          0          0          0           0             0         0     48000
2004         48000     16750          0     105401          0           0             0         0   1701518
2005         39000     16750     100000     210970      29150      15600         10000     250000   3564705
2006         39000     18000          0     281294      29150      15600         10000     250000   4180440
TOTAL      1740000    515000     100000    5976662     583000     312000         20000     500000   9926662
%             18%        5%         1%        60%         6%          3%            2%        5%      100%



6.       Project Effects and Mainstreaming
32
   Elisabeth Scheper notes in her internal review that BCPR country notes (2005) indicate the first two year
contribution was considerably higher: USD 1.4 million, of which USD 400,000 came from SADU.
33
   Scheper notes that Colombia is the first country in the world to receive a second consecutive grant from
BCPR.


                                                                                                         14
While the REDES programme, including its two BCPR/SADU funded projects, have
made noteworthy progress to date in terms of the programme's process indicators, the real
effects on the communities it intends to benefit would be difficult to measure at this
stage. Nevertheless, in our visits and interviews with stakeholders and communities, it
was widely held that the influence of REDES projects was positive. Previous assessments
and reviews by different donors have also tried to measure the impact of the programme,
with, in general, positive results which are difficult to quantify. REDES is currently
implementing a more systematic method of measuring the impact of its development
efforts on reducing conflict risk and vulnerability, and to be sure, certain components of
the programme have been only recently launched. As in many programs such as this one,
one would expect to have seen a greater investment in the establishment of certain
baseline indicators before the projects got underway, rather than during their
implementation.

The Prevention of Youth Recruitment into the Armed Conflict Project (PFR)

Process indicators confirm that the PFR is being implemented according to strategy. For
example, REDES and Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco have developed new base
groups or strengthened existing groups in each of the programme municipalities, and a
round of workshops has generated a collection of community vulnerability maps with
respect to the prevention of forced recruitment of youth. With respect to Phase II (the
project fund), the number of project proposals presented as well as the number which
passed the initial screening process indicate a healthy degree of community awareness
and understanding of the fund and its objectives. At this stage, it is impossible to assess
the impact of the project in terms of its longer term objective of developing public
policies to situate the program in municipal and regional legislative frameworks, although
the progression from local to regional to national network and alliance formation is
growing at a very fast pace.
        Despite a lack of systematic feedback thus far, there is substantial evidence that
the programme has induced a number of positive effects. First and foremost, REDES has
begun the arduous process of establishing a trusted and reliable presence in the Montes de
María region, in conjunction with Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco. The two
organizations have set the correct tone in the initial mapping exercises by valuing
community input and encouraging dialogue and social participation. Furthermore, they
have demonstrated by means of the launch of the project fund that behind the rhetoric lies
a concrete programme designed to improve the lives of community members in tangible
ways through a fair and transparent process.
        At the same time, REDES has shown through a series of political planning
workshops for mayors and other planners that it is committed to supporting the
formulation of municipal development plans and regional networks, such as the
Asociación de Entes Territoriales. Mayors themselves have been a particularly
vulnerable group34 and conversations with local mayors of the Montes de María region
clearly indicate that the support provided by REDES is very much welcome.

34
  In an attempt to destabilize the country prior to Uribe's inauguration, the FARC-EP threatened local
elected officials throughout the country, resulting in the submission of resignations by 399 mayors


                                                                                                         15
The Urban Security Project (USP)

The REDES LAC SURF partnership has demonstrated that it has the technical
knowledge and resources necessary to help willing municipalities confront urban security
issues, as demonstrated by a high degree of demand to participate in the programme and
recognition from appropriate State institutions such as the Ministry of the Interior.
Specific impacts in terms of improvements in actual security, perceived safety, or
firearms demand have not been assessed, although such measurement would pose few
challenges if designed properly. The program has had success in the development of
information systems for monitoring urban security, although it is not yet clear to what
extent these are useful and utilized. Evidence of impact also exists in terms of the
quantity of armas blancas and aggressive toys handed over in a series of recent
campaigns, as such events represent meaningful indicators of demand reduction and
constitute positive steps toward more comprehensive voluntary disarmament campaigns
planned for later this year.

Mainstreaming

The REDES Programme understands mainstreaming as the process of instilling its
conflict perspective, particularly the concept of ―working on the conflict,‖ into the
agendas of actors such as the UNDP, other UN organizations, and State35 and civilian
counterparts. One of the stated goals of this mainstreaming process is to "consolidate
regional social mobilization for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in order to increase
its capacity to impact national level policy." More specifically, REDES has thus far been
working to mainstream conflict and peacebuilding in four ways. First, the programme has
sought to improve knowledge and understanding of regional conflict determinants and
dynamics through joint analysis with partners in situ. Second, REDES has served as a
bridge between regional and national institutions, for example, by linking certain civil
society organizations with national agencies such as the Defensoría del Pueblo and the
Procuraduría. Third, the programme has made explicit efforts to incorporate key conflict
and peacebuilding issues into departmental and municipal development plans. At the
same time, REDES has worked to increase departmental and local government capacities
to develop public policies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This is a novel
model of how to build up institutions for conflict prevention and resolution. Group
visibility, which directly prevents violence against vulnerable groups of the population, is
a product through a complex network of alliances between government institutions,
international community and civil society groups.
         The success of such efforts ultimately depends on a programme's effectiveness
and ability to establish fruitful partnerships with a variety of different organizations, and


nationwide. Hundreds more were obligated to carry out their responsibilities remotely from relatively
secure department capitals. Even nowadays, after an important reduction in the violence against elected
officials, it is not uncommon to frequently read in the news about assassinations of mayors and council
members throughout the country.
35
   The challenge of mainstreaming UNDP policies into State institutions under the current Administration,
which has tended to view the conflict through a security/terrorism lens, should not be underestimated.


                                                                                                       16
in this sense REDES shows much promise. The Ministerio del Interior, for example, has
already shown interest in partnering with REDES to provide seed funding to produce
tools to upscale the Urban Security Project to the national level. Other national
counterparts include: the National Planning Department (DNP), the National Landmine
Observatory, the National Disaster Prevention Directorate, the Colombian Institute for
Family Welfare (ICBF), the Procuraduría General de la Nación, and the Defensoría del
Pueblo. The specific work plans that REDES is executing with these government
agencies are thus introducing REDES principles while strengthening national institutional
capacities36.
         While mainstreaming of urban security policies is a relatively straightforward
process, that of the PFR faces unique and considerable challenges posed by the politically
sensitive nature of the project. As mentioned before, the project must ostensibly focus on
the rights of youth despite the fact that its primary objective is to reduce youth
vulnerabilities to recruitment by illegal armed groups. This fact in itself poses substantial
obstacles to the development of more formal local, regional, or national policies. At the
policy level, explicit pursuit of programme objectives may encounter resistance based on
the acknowledgment of the existence of particular armed groups, or even of the armed
conflict itself. At the community level, programmes explicitly designed to prevent forced
recruitment will be poorly received by illegal armed groups present in the area. Despite
these challenges, REDES has demonstrated considerable tact in finding an appropriate
balance, and has positioned itself well to promote the idea of development in the midst of
conflict.

7.      Conclusions and Lessons Learned

The design and implementation of a programme of violence reduction and prevention in
Colombia entails considerable additional challenges that are often absent in post-conflict
or non-conflict settings. In the midst of conflict, every choice of partnership, with
civilians, communities, local or national authorities, implies a ―taking of sides‖ which can
be very problematic. The REDES programme has neither shrunk from its responsibilities
nor avoided making necessary choices in this sense. From the outset, REDES has
committed itself to supporting existing institutions and communities, whether they be
State institutions or otherwise, on the condition that they support the project's strategy
and objectives. While some have objected to this approach of building relationships with
groups that may be perceived to be part of the conflict, the ability of REDES to
accomplish its objectives thus far owes largely to its recognition that action based on
conflict loyalties only obstructs meaningful and efficient intervention. The following
sections include discussion of specific lessons learned with respect to the design,
implementation, effects, and mainstreaming of the REDES programme and the two
projects of interest.

Project Design



36
 At the regional level, REDES similarly cooperates with the governments of Meta, Antioquia, Sucre, and
Bolívar, as well as regional authorities associated with these governments.


                                                                                                    17
The projects' objectives and strategies were clearly aligned with core UNDP objectives
and capacities. The preparatory assistance received by BCPR served to ensure adequate
communication between BCPR and UNDP Colombia during the design phase of the
project. The decision to target the PFR at youth was appropriate as it was consistent with
current understanding of the demography of conflict. By focusing on small arms, the USP
has acknowledged the primary vector of urban violence, and the project constitutes the
first large-scale government intervention with respect to firearms.

The project has advanced a demand-focused approach based on careful assessment of a
range of national, regional, and international precedents. UNDP-Colombia carried out a
comprehensive review of DDR practices which has informed the current REDES project
even though support to the DDR process has been thus far withheld. The USP operates on
the premise of providing evidence-based technical capacity to municipal planners in
order to facilitate development of policies that will positively impact urban security and
quality of life. The project keeps abreast of lessons learned nationally (e.g., demand
reduction policies in Bogotá) as well as regional37 and international best practices.

The project has shown dexterity and efficiency in mobilising and executing resources
with respect to a diverse array of donors and partners. REDES has raised funds from the
Netherlands, Spain, Catalunya, and the UNDP-BCPR Small Grants Programme, and has
been recently granted a second consecutive allotment from BCPR. A grant from the
Social Solidarity Network of the Colombian Government has recently been approved,
and joint exploratory missions with the EU and the World Bank are underway. This high
degree of partnership diversification has very positive long-term implications for the
programmatic and financial stability of REDES.

Project Implementation

Implementation of the REDES strategy has thus far been flexible, participatory, and cost-
effective. The REDES programme has demonstrated a healthy degree of flexibility in
focusing on what works while scaling back that which does not (e.g., the stalled
partnership with the Alcaldía de Pereira). In addition, REDES has utilized a variety of
simple yet effective mechanisms to control costs and ensure programme quality. For
example, the USP required matching financial contributions from participating cities in
order to receive technical assistance. Meanwhile, the PFR has implemented an innovated
award scheme designed to allocate resources to those funding proposals which are most
viable, coherent, and in line with community objectives. This flexibility in
implementation owes largely to the high degree of competence of the REDES staff and
its partners.

The projects have appropriately combined bottom-up and top-down approaches to
achieve programme objectives. REDES has utilized a variety of different strategies to
achieve programme objectives at each of the levels at which it operates. In Montes de
María, for example, REDES and Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco have worked to

37
  Earlier this month, Medellín hosted the Foro Interamericano de Seguridad (Interamerican Security
Forum). For more details, see http://www.fcm.org.co/es/noticia.php?uid=0&todo=0&det=3485&leng=es.


                                                                                                 18
engage the community in the design and implementation of projects while at the same
time supporting municipal and regional authorities at the policy level. In emphasizing
city-wide campaigns and changes in urban policies, the USP has relied more heavily on a
top-down approach, although one which is solidly grounded in a thorough review of best
practice. Nonetheless, the USP has involved personeros estudiantiles and other
community groups to ensure the success of the campaign.

Project Effects

REDES has established the profile of UNDP Colombia as an organisation firmly
engaged in the reduction of armed conflict risks at both grassroots and national level.
The publication of the National Human Development Report on the conflict 2003, the
launch of the REDES programme and the promising mobilisation results in the three
conflict prone regions are perceived as key interventions that have strategically
positioned UNDP’s peace and development agenda in Colombian society and the donor
community. REDES has been instrumental in allowing communities to organise
themselves and to make part of a complex network of alliances, including strong financial
links with the international community. REDES facilitated the channelling of funds
towards violence prevention and conflict reduction community initiatives. Transparency
and merit-based allocations have allowed a trust-based relationship between the
international community and grassroots groups.

A mechanism of systematic internal monitoring and evaluation should have been
conceived with the original design of the project in order to establish appropriate
baseline indicators for assessing programme impacts. While the project has satisfactorily
fulfilled its own process indicators, evidence of real programme impacts is not quantified,
although in many cases its impacts are not quantifiable. REDES clearly understands the
importance of systematic programme monitoring and is currently taking steps to
implement such a mechanism. However, efforts made in this area before programme
implementation would have enhanced the programme's ability to demonstrate impact and
attract more support.

Project Mainstreaming

The project's success in partnering with key actors among the UN system has helped to
convey a unified UN and purpose and strategy with respect to conflict prevention and
peacebuilding in Colombia. Certain agencies are already involved in a number of REDES
components, and it is expected that joint programming will be expanded during the
upcoming months of the programme. Specifically, cooperation with other UN agencies is
occurring in the areas of human rights (UNHCHR), mine action (OCHA, UNICEF, and
IOM), youth (IOM and UNFPA), PDPs (UNFPA, IOM, OCHA, and UNHCR),
alternative development (UNODC) and gender mainstreaming (UNFPA).

The REDES approach of "construyendo sobre lo construído"(building on what is already
built) has been key in legitimizing the project's principles and objectives among State
institutions. The government can be a difficult partner in situations of conflict, especially



                                                                                           19
when it attempts to exercise control over projects. This manifests itself in different forms,
including the selection of local partners, requests for compulsory inclusion in
committees, and interference in the procedure of interventions, such as project bundling.
Yet, this offers a clear opportunity for institution and alliance building for violence
reduction. One of the most valuable components of the REDES program has been an
insistence upon the meaningful strengthening of existing institutions and engaging and
steering their policies towards conflict prevention and violence reduction. The failure of
state and civilian institutions, amply understood, is often overlooked as a root cause of
conflict. REDES has made special effort to develop the programmes described herein
within existing institutional frameworks.

UNDP Colombia should make a commitment to more actively support DDR in the
country. The programme has made commendable efforts to encourage development in the
midst of conflict and strengthen institutions which will prevent conflict over the long-
term. Nonetheless, due to a political decision by the UN Secretariat, the
UNDP/BCPR/SADU has played little or no role in the current demobilization and
disarmament of the AUC, Colombia’s largest illegal paramilitary group, despite BCPR's
substantial technical expertise and experience in this area. In our view, abstaining from
participating in the DDR process currently under way might be an opportunity lost in
terms of improving the procedures for disarmament, the need to reintegrate former
combatants to society and the gathering of information about victims, victimization and
perpetrators.




                                                                                          20
8.     Acknowledgements

Juan Chaves
UNDP-REDES
Bogotá, Colombia
+57 (1) 488 9000 ext. 250
juan.chaves@undp.org

Andrés Franco Legro
UNDP-LAC SURF and UNDP-REDES
Bogotá, Colombia
+57 (1) 488 9000 ext. 240
andres.franco@undo.org

Jaime Jaramillo Arbeláez
Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá
Calle 41 Nro. 53 07
Medellín, Colombia
+57 (4) 385 6000 ext. 705
jaime.jaramillo@metropol.gov.co

Raul Rosende
UNDP-REDES
Bogotá, Colombia
+57 (1) 488 9000
raul.rosende@undp.org

Gabriel Turriago Piñeros
UNDP-REDES
Bogotá, Colombia
+57 (1) 488 9000 ext. 176
gabriel.turriago@undp.org

Jesús Sánchez
UNDP-REDES
Medellín, Colombia

Diego Corrales
Alcaldía de Medellín
Medellín, Colombia
+57 (300) 655 7021

Jaidi Madero
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco (FRB)
Sincelejo, Colombia

Juanita Méndez
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco (FRB)
Sincelejo, Colombia




                                         21
9.     References

Alcaldía de Medellín, Área Metropolitana del Valle de Aburra y PNUD. Documento
 Base del Programa para la Prevención de la Violencia a través del desestímulo al uso,
 porte y tenencia de armas.
Brittain, James J. 2003. The FARC-EP in Colombia: A Revolutionary Exception in an
        Age of Imperialist Expansion. Monthly Review.
        www.monthlyreview.org/0905brittain.htm
Godnick, William and Helena Vázquez. 2003. Small Arms Control in Latin America.
        International Alert. Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Controls
        (MISAC). Security and Peacebuilding Programme. Latin America Series No. 1.
Scheper, Elisabeth. 2005. UNDP-BCPR Internal Review: Colombia. New York, July 13,
        2005.
UNDP Reconciliation and Development Programme (REDES). 2005a. Progress Report
        for SIDA..
—. 2005b. Briefing File for Dr Elisabeth Scheper: BCPR International Review. Bogotá.
—. 2005c. Prevention of Forced Recruitment into Illegal Armed Forces: Youth and
        Children Vulnerable Populations.
—. 2005d. Synthesis Report.
—. 2005e. BCPR/SADU Support to the Colombia UNDP Country Office Programs.
        Activity Report 2003-2004 and Proposal for 2005.
—. 2005f. Proposal for Phase 2005.
—. 2005g. Programme News. <www.pnud.org.co/noticias/ProgramaRedes.pdf>.
UNDP Colombia. 2003. Armed Conflict Reduction in Colombia. Preparatory Assistance
        Document. Bogotá, Colombia.
—. 2004. Reduction of Armed Conflict in Colombia Project: Work Report and
        Projections. COL/03/M19. Bogotá.
—. 2005a. Technical Support for the Reduction and Prevention of Urban Crime and
        Violence.
—. 2005b. Marco de cooperación del PNUD en Colombia <www.pnud.org.co/ccf/>.
—. 2005c. Primer marco de cooperación con Colombia
        <www.pnud.org.co/ccf/CCF%20Colombia%2097-2001.pdf>.
—. 2005d. Segundo marco de cooperación del país para Colombia 2002-2006 <
        <www.pnud.org.co/ccf/CCF2002-2006ESPAÑOL.doc>.
—. 2005e. Convenio entre el Gobierno de Colombia y el Programa de Naciones Unidas
        para el Desarrollo <www.pnud.org.co/ccf/ACUERDO%20BASICO.pdf>.




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