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					Semantik für Realisten




                         1
1. Die Welt ist alles was der Fall ist.


 Das, was nicht der Fall ist, gehört
 nicht zur Welt.


                                          2
 5.6 Die Grenzen meiner Sprache
 bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.


Falschheiten (das, was nicht der Fall
 ist) kann ich in meiner Sprache nicht
 zum Ausdruck bringen.


                                         3
Wittgensteins Lösung




                       4
2. Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist
das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.

Sachverhalte können also bestehen
oder nicht bestehen.

Es gibt also nicht nur die Welt, sondern
auch zusätzliche Bereiche (von
möglichen Welten, nicht-bestehenden
Sachverhalten udgl.)
                                           5
2.01 Der Sachverhalt ist eine
Verbindung von Gegenständen
(Sachen, Dingen).

Dies gilt eigentlich nur von
bestehenden Sachverhalten.

Wie vermeiden wir nicht-
bestehende Sachverhalte?
                                6
Wittgensteins Bildtheorie der
Sprache


2.1 Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.




                                      7
Das propositionale Bild als ein
Komplex von Namen

3.14 Das Satzzeichen besteht darin, dass
  sich seine Elemente, die Wörter, in ihm
  auf bestimmte Art und Weise voneinander
  verhalten.


                                      8
Satz




             a          r          b


   4.22 Der Elementarsatz besteht aus Namen.
   Er ist ein Zusammenhang, eine Verkettung, von Namen.




                                                     9
 Satz und Sachverhalt



language


                        a   r   b
                                    names


                                    simple objects

world
                                             10
Der Satz als Bild eines Sachverhalts

3.21 Der Konfiguration der einfachen
  Zeichen im Satzzeichen entspricht die
  Konfiguration der Gegenstände in der
                Sachlage.

3.22 Der Name vertritt im Satz der
  Gegenstand.

                                      11
 Satz und Sachverhalt



language


                        a   r   b

                                    projection



world
                                             12
Die Projektion

3.12 ... der Satz ist das Satzzeichen in
  seiner projektiven Beziehung zur Welt.

3.13 Zum Satz gehört alles, was zur
  Projektion gehört; aber nicht das
  Projizierte.


                                           13
            Ein Projection
         Semantic Satz


„ Blanche is shaking hands with Claire “




                                           14
A Map




        15
Semantic Projection
 Satz und Sachverhalt




                        „ John   kisses      Mary “
                           a        r         b




                         John    this kiss    Mary


                                                      16
 Falsehood



2.21 Das Bild stimmt mit der Wirklichkeit
  überein oder nicht; es ist richtig oder
  unrichtig, wahr oder falsch.



                                            17
Falsehood
 Satz und Sachverhalt




                        „John kisses Mary“
                         a       r      b




                               projection
                        John              Mary
                                  fails

                                                 18
Falsehood: A Realist Theory
Falsehood is not: successful conformity
with some non-existing state of affairs

... it is the failure of an attempted
conformity, resting on either

   1. failure of projection, or
   2. failure of coordination

                                          19
4.25 Ist der Elementarsatz wahr, so
  besteht der Sachverhalt; ist der
  Elementarsatz falsch, so besteht der
  Sachverhalt nicht.




                                         20
Satz und Sachverhalt



 Projection Failure

                       „John kisses Mary“
                        a       r      b




                       John              Mary
                              nothing here
                                                21
Nothing




          really nothing



                           22
Satz und Sachverhalt



 Projection Failure

                       „John kisses Mary“
                        a       r      b




                       John          Mary


                                            23
 Coordination Failure



Coordination Failure

                        „John kisses Mary“
                         a       r      b




                        Mary   this kiss   John


                                                  24
Realist Semantics

We begin with a theory of propositions as
articulated pictures of reality

The theory of truth comes along as a free
lunch

We then show how to deal with the two
kinds of failure which constitute falsehood
                                        25
           Semantic Projection
           Semantic Projection
„ Blanche is shaking hands with Claire “




                                           26
Optical Projection




                     27
Cartographic Projection



 Cartographic Hooks




                          28
The Problem of Vagueness
      Semantic Projection




                            29
  The Problem of Vagueness
        Semantic Projection

„ Blanche is shaking hands with Claire “




                             what is this
                             entity called a
                             shaking of hands?

                                           30
The Problem of Vagueness
Wittgenstein solved this problem by
presupposing that the world is made up
of absolute simples and that only in
relation to configurations of absolute
simples can language picture reality.

Can the semantic realist find a better
solution?
                                         31
The basic machinery of realist
         semantics




                                 32
A Simple Partition



                     33
            A partition can be more or less refined




A partition can be more or less
refined




                                                      34
35
36
A partition is transparent
It leaves the world exactly as it is




                                       37
38
Artist’s Grid




                39
           Label/Address System




A partition typically comes
with labels and/or an
address or coordinate
system


                                  40
41
Mouse Chromosome
Five
              42
Partitions are artefacts of our
cognition
= of our referring, perceiving, classifying,
mapping activity




                                           43
Partitions always have a certain
granularity:

when I see an apple my partition does
not recognize the molecules in the
apple




                                        44
 A partition is transparent

= it corresponds to a true
  propositional picture in the sense of
  the Tractatus



                                      45
Intentionality




                 46
Intentionality




                 47
CartographicHooks




                    48
an object x is recognized by a partition:


= there is some cell in which x is located




                                            49
The theory of partitions
is a theory of foregrounding,
of setting into relief
Cf. L. Talmy, The Windowing of
Attention in Language



                                 50
      Setting into Relief

You use the name ‘Mont Blanc’ to refer
to a certain mountain

You see Mont Blanc from a distance

In either case your attentions serve to
foreground a certain portion of reality

                                          51
      Setting into Relief

You use the name ‘Mont Blanc’ to refer
to a certain mountain

You see Mont Blanc from a distance

In either case your attentions serve to
foreground a certain portion of reality

                                          52
      Setting into Relief

You use the name ‘Mont Blanc’ to refer
to a certain mountain

You see Mont Blanc from a distance

In either case your attentions serve to
foreground a certain portion of reality

                                          53
      Setting into Relief

You use the name ‘Mont Blanc’ to refer
to a certain mountain

You see Mont Blanc from a distance

In either case your attentions serve to
foreground a certain portion of reality

                                          54
                  Hertz


4.04 Am Satz muss gerade soviel zu
  unterscheiden sein, als an der Sachlage
  die er darstellt. Die beiden müssen die
  gleiche logische (mathematische)
  Mannigfaltigkeit besitzen.




                                        55
Wittgenstein: a sentence can
picture a complex in reality only if
the two have the same logical-
mathematical multiplicity.

Have we solved this problem of
logical-mathematical multiplicity?

                                       56
Cartographic Projection



 Cartographic Hooks




                          57
         Foreground/Background




our partition does not allow us to
recognize objects beneath a certain size
                                   58
Have we solved the problem of
logical-mathematical multiplicity?




                                     59
The Problem of the Many
There is no single answer to the question as
to what it is to which the term ‘Mont Blanc’
refers. Many parcels of reality are equally
deserving of the name ‘Mont Blanc’

– Think of its foothills and glaciers, and the
fragments of moistened rock gradually
peeling away from its exterior; think of all the
rabbits crawling over its surface

                                                   60
Mont Blanc from Chatel




                         61
Mont Blanc (Tricot)
                      62
The world itself is not vague

Rather, there are for any given referring
term different equally good ways to
demarcate its referent from out of the
surrounding messy reality




                                        63
The world itself is not vague

Rather, many of the terms we use to
refer to objects in reality are such that,
when we use these terms, we stand to
the corresponding parcels of reality in a
relation that is one-to-many rather than
one-to-one.


                                         64
David Lewis:    Many but almost one




 There are always outlying particles,
 questionable parts of things, not
 definitely included and not definitely
 not included.




                                      65
                  Tracing Over




Granularity:
if x is recognized by a partition A, and y
is part of x, it does not follow that y is
recognized by the partition A.




                                             66
John




       67
When you think of John on the baseball
field, then the cells in John’s arm and
the fly next to his ear belong to the
portion of the world that does not fall
under the beam of your referential
searchlight.

                  They are traced over.

                                      68
John




       69
                 Granularity




Cognitive acts of Setting into Relief:
the Source of Partitions

Partititions: the Source of Granularity

Granularity: the Source of
Vagueness



                                         70
John




       71
                Granularity the source of vagueness




... your partition does not recognize
parts beneath a certain size.

This is why your partition is compatible
with a range of possible views as to the
ultimate constituents of the objects
included in its foreground domain


                                                      72
It is the coarse-grainedness of our
                Granularity the source of vagueness




partitions which allows us to ignore
questions as to the lower-level
constituents of the objects foregrounded
by our uses of singular terms.

This in its turn is what allows such
objects to be specified vaguely

Our attentions are focused on those
matters which lie above whatever is the
pertinent granularity threshold.
                                                      73
Reference can be successful
even though our referring terms
are vague
       a      r
              Satz und Sachverhalt
                                     b

                                         projection



                                                  74
Reference can be successful
even though our referring terms
are vague
       a      rSatz und Sachverhalt
                                      b

                                          projection is a
                                          one-to-many function




            alternative crisp aggregates of matter
                                              75
Consider:

  Mont Blanc is one mountain
  Bill Clinton is one person




                               76
these are both true
no matter which of the many
aggregates of matter we
assign as precisified referent
of the corresponding terms


                             77
Mont Blanc is one mountain

Bill Clinton is one person

– both are true on the appropriate
level of granularity
(our normal, common-sense ontology
is in perfect order as it stands)
                                 78
and the same applies to:

    John is kissing Mary

    Blanche is shaking hands with Claire



                                     79
The world is messy
How to solve the problem of
vagueness?

Supervaluationism:
we need to distinguish between truth
and supertruth

                                       80
Definition of precisification

 a precisification is an acceptable way of
 projecting from a term to a crisp
 aggregate of matter

 (to Bill Clinton with these hairs in his
 ear, to Bill Clinton without those hairs in
 his ear, and so on)

                                           81
For each term

 there is a range of admissible
 precisified references

 (some with bits of hair, some
 without; some with bits of food,
 some without)
                                    82
Standard Supervaluationism
A sentence is supertrue if and only if it is true
under all precisifications.

A sentence is superfalse if and only if it is
false under all precisifications.

A sentence which is true under some ways of
precisifying and false under others is said to
fall down a supervaluational truth-value gap.
Its truth-value is indeterminate.
                                                    83
but ...

          84
 semantic realism has no
 room for truth-value gaps


4.25 Ist der Elementarsatz wahr, so
  besteht der Sachverhalt; ist der
  Elementarsatz falsch, so besteht der
  Sachverhalt nicht.

                                         85
Mont Blanc (Tricot)
      look for the rabbits
                             86
Are those rabbits part of
Mont Blanc?




                            87
Mont Blanc (Tricot)
                      88
Example of Gaps




     On Standard Supervaluationism

                  Rabbits are part of Mont Blanc


     falls down a supertruth-value
     gap

                                                   89
Rabbits




          Some precisifications contain rabbits as
          parts

          Some precisifications do not contain
          rabbits as parts



                                                 90
Can we do better?

Well consider that there are
different contexts involved




                               91
In a perceptual context it is supertrue that
these rabbits are part of Mont Blanc

In a normal context of explicit assertion
it is superfalse that these rabbits are
part of Mont Blanc

In a real estate context in a hunting
community it is supertrue that these
rabbits are part of that mountain
                                            92
The hunter says: These rabbits are
part of my mountain




                                 93
But now, if we stick to some one
given context, then even with

  Rabbits are part of Mont Blanc,

there are no gaps.




                                    94
Hypothesis:

 projection always within some
 given context

 there are no naturally
 occurring contexts with gaps


                                 95
     Supervaluationism
      Contextualized

We pay attention in different ways and
to different things in different contexts
So: the range of available precisified
referents is dependent on context.



                                            96
      Supervaluationism
       Contextualized

Thus the evaluations of supervaluationism
should be applied not to sentences taken
in the abstract but to judgments taken in
their concrete real-world contexts



                                       97
            No gaps
The everyday judgments made in
everyday contexts do not fall down
supervaluational truth-value gaps
This is so, because the sentences
which might serve as vehicles for
such judgments are in normal
contexts not judgeable

                                     98
            Unjudgeability
Consider:

   Rabbits are part of Mont Blanc

is in the normal contexts occupied by you and
me unjudgeable




                                                99
        Normal contexts

(including normal institutional contexts)
have immune systems which protect
them against problematic utterances

such utterances are not taken seriously
as expressing judgments


                                            100
Judgments and Evolution

Most naturally occurring contexts
possess immune systems because
those which did not would have been
eliminated in the struggle for survival.




                                           101
Contextualized Supervaluationism
 A judgment p is supertrue if and only if:

• (T1) the judgment successfully projects,
  in its context C, upon corresponding
  families of precisifications, and
• (T2) the corresponding families of
  precisifications are such that p is true
  whichever precisification we select.


                                             102
Supertruth and superfalsehood are
not symmetrical:
  A judgment p is superfalse if and only if
  either:
• (F0) it fails to project, in its context C,
  upon anything in the world
  corresponding to its constituent singular
  referring terms,


                                            103
or both:
Falsehood




• (F1) the judgment successfully projects,
  in its context C, upon corresponding
  families of precisifications, and
• (F2) the corresponding families of
  precisifications are such that p is false
  whichever precisification we select.




                                          104
Pragmatic presupposition failure:


In case (F0), p fails to reach the starting
gate for purposes of supervaluation

Consider: „Karol Wojtyła is more
intelligent than the present Pope“




                                              105
          Lake Constance
  No international treaty establishes where the
  borders of Switzerland, Germany, and Austria
  in or around Lake Constance lie.

• Switzerland takes the view that the border
  runs through the middle of the Lake.
• Austria and Germany take the view that all
  three countries have shared sovereignty over
  the whole Lake.

                                             106
       Lake Constance

If you buy a ticket to cross the lake by
ferry in a Swiss railway station your
ticket will take you only as far as the
Swiss border (= only as far as the
middle of the lake)




                                           107
but for all normal contexts
concerning
   fishing rights,
   taxation,
   shipping,
   death at sea, etc., there are treaties
regulating how decisions are to be
made
(with built in immune-systems guarding against
problematic utterances)
                                                 108
          Lake Constance




an ontological black hole in the middle of Europe
                                               109
       Lake Constance (D, CH, A)




                Germany



Switzerland
                                   Austria




                                             110
                That Water is in Switzerland




You point to a certain kilometer-wide
volume of water in the center of the
Lake, and you assert:

   [Q] That water is in Switzerland.

Does [Q] assert a truth on some
precisifications and a falsehood on
others?

                                               111
No
By criterion (F0) above, [Q] is simply
(super)false.

Whoever uses [Q] to make a judgment
in the context of currently operative
international law is making the same
sort of radical mistake as is someone
who judges that Karol Wojtyła is more
intelligent than the present Pope.
                                         112
                Reaching the Starting Gate


In both cases reality is not such as
to sustain a partition of the needed
sort.
The relevant judgment does not
even reach the starting gate as
concerns our ability to evaluate its
truth and falsehood via
assignments of specific portions of
reality to its constituent singular
terms.
                                             113
              Partitions do not care




Our ordinary judgments, including
our ordinary scientific judgments,
have determinate truth-values

because the partitions they impose
upon reality do not care about the
small (molecule-sized) differences
between different precisified
referents.
                                       114
                  No Gaps




‘Bald’, ‘cat’, ‘dead’, ‘mountain’ are all
vague

But corresponding (normal) judgments
nonetheless have determinate truth-
values.

There are (on one way of precisifying
‘normal’ in the above) no truth-value
gaps
                                            115
The philosophical contexts
invented by philosophers
interested in the logic of
vagueness are not normal



                             116
   DOWN

   WITH

PHILOSOPHY !

               117
   THE END




THE END

             118

				
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