VIEWS: 14 PAGES: 47 POSTED ON: 7/15/2011
Terrorism Definitions • No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions: • The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. • The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. • The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. What is terrorism? • Definition: Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents for the purpose of influencing an audience. – Non-combatant = civilians and individuals connected with an army or navy, but for purposes other than fighting (e.g., surgeon). Terrorist or Freedom Fighter? • Hard to generate consensus over who is a terrorist. – Osama bin Laden – Timothy McVeigh Terrorism is a value-laden term The Aims of Terrorism • The short term goals of terrorism 1.Advertise a cause 2.Win specific concessions through coercive bargaining 3.Create or enforce obedience either within the population at large or within the ruling party 4.To provoke indiscriminate reactions or repression to expose the “true nature” of the regime or insurgent The Aims of Terrorism spread fear (and terror) through a population so that the population will pressure the government to change its policies. • The long term goal of terrorism is to either maintain a regime or create the conditions for a new one. • Myth: Political terrorism is exclusively the activity of non-governmental actors. • What these definitions are missing is why terrorists resort to these actions, but this is central to understanding terrorist activity. April 2001 report on Global Patterns of Terrorism 2000 • 19 US citizens killed in 2000 • Afghanistan named as a primary sponsor of terrorism • Cooperation with our international partners based on four basic policy tenets: 1. First, make no concession to terrorists and strike no deals. 2. Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes. 3. Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior. 4. Fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the United States and require assistance. Total Terror Attacks by Region Causalities by Region Attacks on US, 2000 Attacks on US, 2000 Attacks on US, 2000 International Terrorist Incidents, 2001 Cost of Terrorism • insurance industry is expected to face a bill of between $20bn to $30bn for the 9/11attacks • Spain's Basque Region: Estimates of the 30 year conflict about 10% GDP. Basque was once richest area of Spain, now one of the poorer regions. Cost of 9/11 (institute of science technology and public policy) • $105 billionEstimated cost of recovery for New York City over the next 2 years • $1,380 billion Stock market losses Sept. 11–21 triggered by terrorist attacks • $150 billionFederal Reserve System expenditures to stabilize U.S. and European stock markets ($100 billion for U.S. and $50 billion for Europe) • $40 billion Rescue efforts and clean-up of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon • $24 billionAirline losses related to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks • $15 billionTourism, restaurant, and hotel industry losses in New York, Washington, and the Washington-Boston urban corridor • $1,500 billionEstimated cost of defense of the homeland over the next 5 years • $111 billionPrivate (corporate and individual) spending on increased security and losses that result from diversion of funds from productive activities • $40 billion Emergency Supplemental Appropriations: Increased short-term spending by the Federal government on the war on terrorism, including increased funding for defense, intelligence, law enforcement, sky marshals, etc. • $367 billionTotal U.S. annual defense budget • $100 billionTotal cost of proposed U.S. missile defense shield when fully implemented A model of terror and negotiations • Terrorists operate in diffuse cells. • Cells differ: Moderate and Extreme. 1 2 • Order of play: – Government offer concessions, k≥0 – Cells 1 and 2 decide whether to accept. – Cells that do not take government offer then choose a level of terror. Key Intuition • Extremists required to ensure government credibility – If all cells accept gov. offer then the government knows who all the terrorists are and can arrest them and then renege on concession. – Hence extremists required to make government deal credible. Key Intuitions … • Why should government make a deal with the moderates when extremists remain active? – Moderates help detect and discipline the extremists. – Given the available resources, extremist perpetrate a higher level of terror than moderates • Extremists try to produce more terror, but deal increases the likelihood of finding extremists. Results • With concessions: high level of terror by extremists, but high probability of capture • Without concessions: lower level of terror by combined moderates and extremists, but low level of capture • If overall a lower expected level of terror with concessions then the government is prepared to offer concessions. • If agreement then often end of terror, but if terror continues then escalation in level of terror. • Spoilers: At negotiations spoilers increase violence to undermine any deal. – After deal implemented then spoilers no longer have incentive to maintain elevated level of violence. Case Studies • Basque Nationalism: ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna – Basque Homeland and Freedom) – ETA – many changes in ideology – Start terror in mid 1960’s • Franco’s government responded harshly • December 1973 assassinated Prime Minister Carrero Blanco • Death of Franco in 1975 • Negotiations 1978-81 with moderate Basque groups about Basque autonomy • ETA divided – ETA-m (militar – extremists) – ETA-pm (politico militar –moderates) • Partial autonomy starting in 1978 • By 1981, sufficient autonomy that moderate ETA-m abandoned terror • Big spoiler effect, but higher level of violence continues Palestinians • PLO – umbrella organization • PLO led first Intifada in 1980’s • Rise in more extreme groups: Hamas – terror, but also social/education network; Islamic Jihad • Terror to end occupation of West Bank and Gaza strip (and destroy state of Israel) Negotiations • First negotiations in 1991 in Madrid • Concludes in Oslo agreement in September 1993 Northern Ireland Ireland as a whole is predominantly Catholic But, Northern Ireland is majority Protestant In 1920’s Britain gave Home rule to Ireland, But NI popular protest: majority wanted to be British. NI oppressive to Catholics, in 1970’s Britain imposed direct rule from Westminster. Negotiations • Provisional Irish Republican Army– allow Sinn Fein to run in parliamentary elections • Breakaway CIRA (continuity IRA) -- first terror act in 1996 in response to disagreement over 1994 ceasefire. • 1998 – Real IRA • Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), CIRA and RIRA not prepared to join powersharing organizations Terror Attacks • 1998 onwards terror campaign – Attack on MI6 base, car bombs, attack rail stations and BBC • Omagh (shopping area) bombing Aug. 15 th 1998 killed 29 and injured 200+ • Omagh bombing strongly criticized by PIRA • Many other attacks prevented by information • Estimate that 80% of RIRA plots foiled • Generally a decline in violence following agreements, helped by cooperation of IRA etc. • Large reduction in foreign donations (NORAID) FLQ in Quebec • Early 1960’s offshoot of mainstream Quebec nationalist parties (riots, strike etc. in Quebec – demanding independence) • 1960 Jean Lesage elected premier of Quebec. Left Liberal cabinet position– adopted position of “maitres chez nous” (masters of our own house) • 1963 Lester Pearson Canadian PM. Receptive to quiet revolution. Bilingual, bicultural etc… • Main stream nationalist cooperated with gov. • Others opposed: Parti Quebcois • Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) began1963 with 22 incidents (no fatalities) • After nationalist compromise with Federal gov, FLQ primary perpetrators • Oct. 1970: Kidnap James Cross (British trade commissioner) and Pierre Laporte (Quebec minister on immigration and Labour). Laporte died in captivity. • Denounced by nationalist. Government used war measures act against suspect terrorists. • By 1971, all terror cells destroyed. • 7 total deaths over a decade Zionists in Palestine • Military/terror against British occupation of Palestine in 1930’s, 1940’s – Haganah , Irgun and LEHI (Stern gang) • Haganah was largest official Zionist organization • During WW2, Zionist official policy was restraint while Britain fought Nazis. – David Ben Gurion leader of Haganah called for policy of restraint (havlaga). – But Irgun (led by Menachem Begin) and Stern (led by Yitzhak Shamir) wanted to maintain struggle • Thru early 1940 all followed leadership of Gurion, but… • 1944 Irgun renew struggle against Britain. • Steal munitions, Feb 1944 attack immigration offices, attack tax offices, kill 15 police by October • Huganah began counter-Irgun campaign, “the season” and collaborated with UK – Begin had policy of non-retaliation for “the season”. Created growing pressure within Zionists. In 1945, Zionists ended collaboration with British. • Summer 1945, defeat of Hitler • October 1945: British refusal to allow more Jews to enter Palestine • Unified Zionist resistance – Joint command Nov. 45- June 1946 • Gurion negotiated with British and considered partition of Palestine. • Extremists increased attack: King David Hotel bombing (July 22, 1946) • Partition resolution in UN in Nov. 1947 – Irgun attacks increased • 1948 statehood – Struggle between moderates and Irgun continued. – Altalena (june 20, 1948) • Irgun arms and volunteers on ship • Begin informs gov, but insists that 20% arms remain with Irgun. • Government send IDF, fire on Irgun. • Ship leaves port, heads to Tel Aviv. Begin onboard • Tries to negotiate. • IDF hit ship with Mortar. Fire, so Irgun abandon ship and IDF shoot Irgun on the beach. (16 Irgun and 3 soldiers die) • Effective end of Irgun, although Begin not jailed Quality of Terrorists • Contradictory findings – Declining economic opportunities increases terrorist mobilization – Terrorists typically have higher socio- economic standards than societal average • Government crackdowns can have mixed effects. Model of terrorist selection • Government chooses a level of counterterrorism – This makes successful terrorism harder, but – Negative externality for economy • Sympathizers decided whether or not to join • Terror group decide who to recruit and how many resources to invest in terrorism. • Increase counterterrorism – Harm economy – More talented individuals now willing to volunteer – Terror group takes the most talented – Recession improves the quality average terrorist – Incentives to invest more resources in terror as better quality terrorists (although more counter-terror too) • Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent. It is difficult to select only a few. Those whom we turn away return again and again, pestering is, pleading to be accepted – senior member of Hamas (Hassan 2001) • The selection process is complicated by the fact that so many wish to embark on this journey of honor. When one is selected, countless others are disappointed. (Hassan 2001) • A high degree of sophisitaction has been added… so that the terrorist is now more likely to conform to the image of a middle ranking clerk than a gun-toting hoodlum. (Adams 1987) • Al Qaeda training manual captured by British police – Importance of only accepting the highest quality candidates (www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm) Economic Decline • Northern Ireland: Unemployment among Protestants and Catholics predicts the level of Loyalist and Republican terror violence, respectively. • Improving economic conditions reduces terror. • Optimal level of crackdown- – Too much causes recession and extra recruits and more investment – Too little causes terror that could have been deterred.
Pages to are hidden for
"terror"Please download to view full document