Innovation Destruction and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era
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Innovation Destruction and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble Era document sample
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Presented by
Michael J. Aguirre
Aguirre, Morris and Severson
One year ago US had 5 major investment
banks. Today one (Lehman Brothers) is
insolvent; two (Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns)
were on the brink of insolvency. The
remaining two (Goldman and Morgan Stanley)
have converted into bank holding companies.
10 March 2009 US Senate Banking Committee Testimony of
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law
Columbia University Law School
2
Rapid financial innovation outpaced private
sector risk management and supervision,
disclosure, and regulation
Resulted in excessive risk-taking, weak
underwriting, maturity mismatches, and asset
price inflation.
3
19 November 1987 - Greenspan Calls for Repeal
Of Glass-Steagall Bank Law
January 22, 1993 - The CFTC exempted "certain
swap agreements and hybrid instruments from
regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act."
February 24, 1994 - Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) began trading.
May 25, 1994 - Greenspan tells Congress there
was "negligible" risk financial derivatives might
someday require a taxpayer bailout. Netrootsmass Financial
Regulation Timeline
4
NYT, May 19, 1994 - G.A.O. Seeks Sweeping
Rules for Derivatives A two-year Congressional
study of the explosive growth in financial
derivatives that was released yesterday calls for
sweeping new regulation of the companies that
create these often complex financial products
and the companies that use them.
December 6, 1994 - Orange County, California
was forced to declare bankruptcy due to the loss
of over $1.5 billion in derivatives by treasurer
Robert Citron. Netrootsmass Financial Regulation Timeline
5
May 25, 1994 - Greenspan told House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance he strongly disagreed with the GAO
report. He said there was "negligible" risk that
the rapidly growing market for financial
derivatives might someday require a taxpayer
bailout. (NYT, May 26, 1994 - Derivatives Get a Key Supporter)
March 1995 - Less than 2 months after
becoming Secretary of the Treasury, Robet
Rubin asked Congress to repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act and to change the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956. Netrootsmass Financial Regulation Timeline
6
March 1997 – Arthur Levitt‘s SEC exempted
some of Enron‘s partnerships from
accounting controls of the depression era
Investment Company Act of 1940.
April 1998 CFTC Chair Brooksley Born
proposed to regulate derivatives
7 May 1998 Rubin, Greenspan and Levitt
issued a joint statement expressing "grave
concerns about this action and its possible
consequences.― Netrootsmass Financial Regulation Timeline
7
September 1998 - After losing $4.6 billion in
less than four months, Long-Term Capital
Management, was bailed out in a deal organized
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
October 1998 – Pres Clinton signs into law
H.R.4328, Emergency 1999 appropriations bill.
The law has an obscure reference to the CFTC
(section 760): "During the restraint period, the
Commission may not propose or issue any rule
or regulation, or issue any interpretation or
policy statement, that restricts or regulates
activity in a qualifying hybrid instrument or swap
agreement.‖ Netrootsmass Financial Regulation Timeline
8
13 November 1999 Pres Clinton signed law
repealing Glass Steagal NYT
21 December 21, 2000 – Pres Clinton signed
H.R. 4577, the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 that exempted
credit swaps from regulation
Jan 2001 President Bush assumes office
3 August 2005 - Christopher Cox was sworn
in as Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission Netrootsmass Financial Regulation Timeline
9
Structured Finance Operating Companies
Credit risk transfer (credit default swaps)
Credit tranching
Securitization
Originate to distribute
Dynamic leverage
Subprime, Alt-A loans
Off balance sheet
Lancaster, Brian P., Schultz Glenn M., Fabozzi Frank, J., Structured Products and Related
Credit Derivatives
10
A SFOC can be seen as an operating finance
company with structured finance
characteristics. Promoters manage its assets,
liabilities, and liquidity.
Global Legal Group, The International Comparative Legal Guide to:
Securitization 2007
11
Financial entities engage in credit risk
transfer by selling loans, syndicating loans,
issuing collateralized loan obligations
(CLOs), credit default swaps (CDSs), and
credit derivative product companies.
The global credit explosion and subsequent
crunch were the products of the new era of
credit risk transfer ("CRT").
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CREDIT
MARKET REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,57
12
Entities were structured to transfer the risk of
default on assets like subprime loans to investors
through securitization
These securitizations were supported credit
enhancements all of which were rated by
nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations like Moody‘s Investor Services.
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CREDIT
MARKET REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53
13
1. The rating agencies, the main arbiter of
asset and bond credit quality, get it wrong;
2. The originators of the original asset turn
into ‗toll takers,‘ not caring about credit
quality buy -- only fees;
3. The investors don‘t understand the risk
and opportunities embedded in the securities
they are acquiring; and
4. Risk transfer and dispersion is not as clear
cut as originally expected.
Lancaster, Brian, P., Schultz, Glenn M., Fabozzi, Frank J., Structured Products and Related
Credit Derivatives, p. 4.
14
Over the last two decades, bank credit has
evolved from the traditional relationship
banking model to an originate-to-distribute
model where banks originate loans, earn their
fee, and then sell them off to investors
through securitization.
15
Investors were sold on the idea that they
could avoid risk by credit tranching, meaning
any credit losses would be absorbed by the
most junior class of bondholders until the
principal value of their investment reaches
zero. Wikipedia
16
Cash
Originator Mortgage
Mortgages
Borrowers
CDS Counterparty
Negative
Basis Trade Credit
30 bps
Protection
Mortgage
Backed Investment Bank
Securities
Senior (L+50)
Investment Manager Sr Mezz
Senior Management Jr Mezz
Sr Mezz Agreement
Jr Mezz Mortgage CDO Securities
Sub Sub
17
By the early 1990s, technological advances
made it possible to estimate and price the
risk of subprime home loan pools, paving the
way for subprime securitizations.
In 2005, total securitizations of subprime and
home equity loans ballooned to an estimated
$ 525.7 billion. Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, TURNING A
BLIND EYE: WALL STREET FINANCE OF PREDATORY LENDING ,75 Fordham L. Rev. 2039
18
Those securitizing mortgage-backed
securities avoided heightened default risk of
subprime loans and predatory loans by using
credit risk transfer devices to shift the risk to
others. The "lemons" were simply passed on.
Engel, Kathleen C., McCoy Patricia A., Turing a blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory
Lending, 75 Fordham L. Rev 2039, 2040-2041 (March 2007)
19
Off-Balance Sheet Derivative Contracts:
Derivative contracts that generally do not
involve booking assets or liabilities (i.e.,
swaps, futures, forwards, and options).
Off balance sheet (Glossary Office Comptroller of the
Currency)
20
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) were relied
upon to evaluate the risk of default. However,
these ratings have turned out to be self-
serving, allowing market participants (and the
CRAs) to earn profit and fees, while offering
very little informational value about risks.
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED
FINANCE AND CREDIT MARKET REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA, 5
Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,65-66.
21
Moody‘s Investor Services issued its rating
methodology for SFOCs in 2005
Moody‘s Ratings Methodology A Framework for Understanding Structured Finance
Operating Companies (April 2005) p. 1; Lancaster, Brian P., Schultz Glenn M.,
Fabozzi Frank, J., Structured Products and Related Credit Derivatives, p. 12
22
Structured Finance Issuer Ratings are
opinions of an entity's general financial
capacity to ultimately honor its contracts and
financial obligations.
Moodys Structured Finance Issuer Ratings Definition
23
As of December 2008 Moody‘s Investor
Services has rated and currently monitors
ratings on approximately 109,000 structured
finance obligations.
Moody‘s 2008 10K p. 1
24
As of 2006, structured finance accounted for 54
percent of Moody‘s rating revenues, with the
largest contributions coming from mortgage-
backed securities and CDOs
―Global structured finance revenue was $890.6
million for 2007, an increase of 1.1%, or $10.0
million, from $880.6 million in 2006.‖
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CREDIT MARKET
REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,65-66; Moody‘s 2007 10-K p. 23
25
―Within the ratings business, global structured finance
revenue totaled $92.2 million for the fourth quarter of 2008,
a decrease of 42% from a year earlier. U.S. structured finance
revenue decreased 57%, driven by declines in issuance across
all asset classes. Non-U.S. structured finance revenue
decreased 26%, led by declines in European commercial real-
estate finance and credit derivatives.‖
Moody‘s Press Release 5 Feb 2009: ―Moody‘s Corporation Reports Results for Fourth
Quarter and Full-Year 2008‖
26
―Financial derivatives for market and credit risk,
asset-backed securities with customized cash flow
features, specialized financial conduits that manage
pools of assets, and other types of structured finance
transactions serve important purposes, such as
diversifying risk, allocating cash flows and reducing
cost of capital.
As a result, structured finance transactions, including
the more complex variations of these transactions,
now are an essential part of U.S. and international
capital markets.‖
The Fed Reserve Board and other banking agencies have issued an Interagency Statement regarding
sound practices in dealing with the elevated risks associated with complex structured finance activities.
72 Fed. Reg. 1377 (2007)
27
We have entered a new economic era where
financial innovation is replacing production
as the engine of growth. In 2005, global
financial assets (including banking assets,
stock market capitalization, and bond market
value) were calculated at US $165 trillion – a
sum nearly four times the global GDP.
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND
CREDIT MARKET REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA ,5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,56-58.
28
The notional value of derivatives, which
equals US $454.4 trillion -- more than ten
times the global GDP and three times the size
of all financial assets.
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND
CREDIT MARKET REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,56-58.
29
There was a collective failure to appreciate
the extent of leverage taken on by a wide
range of institutions—banks, monoline
insurers, government-sponsored entities,
hedge funds—and the associated risks of a
disorderly unwinding.
30
The ten largest market makers account for
close to 90% of the $45 trillion outstanding
notational value of CDS as of 2007.
IMF Report Global Financial Stability Report 2008, p. 17 fn 32
31
Hedge funds generate more than 55% of US trading
volume in liquid or "flow" derivatives with investment-
grade ratings, and more than 80% in high-yield
derivatives, more than 85% of US trading volume in
distressed debt, nearly 55% of US trading volume in
emerging-market bonds, and more than 40% of US
leveraged loan trading volume.
In structured credit, hedge funds generated nearly half the
trading volume reported in the US over the past 12
months," says Greenwich Associates consultant Frank
Feenstra.
Hedge funds Become the US Fixed-Income Market,
Helen Avery ,Sept 2007
32
Combination of unregulated financial
innovation and human greed
Tremendous economic expansion due to
historic asset bubble
Financial institutions earned immense profits
33
Dynamic leverage depends on the difference
between the fund's net asset value and its critical
liquidation level. The critical liquidation level is
the level of net asset value loss from which the
fund manager could not recover and the fund
would need to be liquidated to meet margin calls
and redemptions. At some intermediate critical
level (above the liquidation level), efforts to
reduce risk have little influence on the chance the
fund will hit the critical liquidation level.
Clifford De Souza; Mikhail Smirnov , Dynamic Leverage (Fall 2004) THE
JOURNAL OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
34
Perhaps the greatest system threat facing the
global economy is the risk that counterparties
to credit risk transfer agreements will default
Credit risk transfer agreements exceed $50
trillion
35
In April of 2008, the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") reported prospective losses at
the $1 trillion mark.
International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Containing
Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness, (April 2008), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/ index.htm ("IMF").
More recent predictions have reached the $2 trillion mark. See, e.g., RGE
Monitor, Roubini Pegs Credit Related Losses at $ 2 trillion!, RGEMONITOR,
Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.rgemonitor.com; Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE
DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CREDIT MARKET REFORM IN THE
BUBBLE ERA, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,57
36
―Simply stated, the bright new financial
system - for all its talented participants, for
all its rich rewards - has failed the test of the
market place.― Paul Volcker, April 8, 2008
Wolf, Martin, Seven Habits That Finance Regulators Must
Acquire
37
Throughout this reshaping of the
international financial system, authorities
remained on the sidelines, trusting market
forces and sophisticated institutions to
maintain growth and stability.
When financial crisis struck, the same
government that sat idly while firms profited
from financial manipulation came to rescue of
irresponsible corporations
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CREDIT
MARKET REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,81.
38
The OCC‘s primary supervisory objective is to
assess each bank‘s ability to identify,
measure, monitor, and control risks through
its risk management systems.
OCC Guide to National Banking System p. 18
39
1. Determine whether the bank's derivative
activities are conducted in a safe and sound
manner.
2. Determine the adequacy of board and senior
management supervision of the bank's derivative
activities.
3. Determine compliance with laws, regulations,
regulatory guidelines, and established policies
and procedures.
Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, Comptroller‘s Handbook
January 1997
40
There is a tremendous moral hazard
associated with bailing out institutions who
have profited from excessive risk taking
without meaningful legal reforms
Without meaningful legal reforms, the current
cycle of financial crisis will continue and
become more devastating.
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CREDIT MARKET
REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,72.
41
―Coordinated central bank actions have
continued to aim at reducing risks to
systemically important financial institutions.
However, funding and liquidity strains remain
high, as reflected in persistently wide
interbank spreads and liquidity premia and
have recently risen even further.‖ (2008 IMF Global Financial
Stability Report p. 5; GAO Report TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM Additional Actions Needed to
Be tter Ensure Integrity, Accountability, and Transparency, Dec 2008 )
42
As of July 2008 there were at least 128
subprime and structured finance-related
class action lawsuits filed in US Courts
Most of the major securities issuers are
named as defendants
Unterman, Aaron, INNOVATIVE DESTRUCTION--STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CREDIT
MARKET REFORM IN THE BUBBLE ERA, 5 Hastings Bus. L.J. 53,79
43
◦ Require bank board that engaged in reckless
financial behavior regarding derivatives to sign a
formal written agreement setting out in an article-
by-article form necessary corrective action. The
agreement is backed up by a cease and desist order
(12 USC 1818)
◦ OCC- An Examiner's Guide to Problem Bank Identification, Rehabilitation, and Resolution
pp. 28-29
44
John Maynard Keynes argued that "when the
capital development of a country becomes a
byproduct of the activities of a casino, the job
is likely to be ill done".
Wolf, Martin, Seven Habits That Finance Regulators Must Acquire
45
Structured Finance Operating Companies
Credit risk transfer (credit default swaps)
Credit tranching
Securitization
Originate to distribute
Dynamic leverage
Subprime, Alt-A loans
Off balance sheet
46
Repeal the repeal of Glass-Stegal
Arm and empower the SEC, and State Securities
enforcement agencies
Repeal the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995; reinstate protection of securities
laws
Repeal the CFTC exemption for credit default
swaps and related financial products
Fully empower investors with federal protection
laws and permit states to add protections
47
Repeal the CFTC exemption for credit default
swaps and related financial products
Fully empower investors with federal
protection laws and permit states to add
protections
Extend due diligence laws for assignees of
predatory or otherwise unlawful, fraudulent,
or unfair loans or assets
48
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